GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD

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(5)

28 GILBERT
GALILEO
HARVEY

29 CERVANTES

30 FRANCIS BACON

31 DESCARTES
SPINOZA

32 MILTON

33 PASCAL

34 NEWTON
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BERKELEY
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GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD

Introductory Volumes

1 The Great Conversation

2 The Great Ideas I

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4 HOMER

5 AESCHYLUS
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GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD

ROBERT MAYNARD HUTCHINS *EDITOR IN CHIEF*

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THE GREAT IDEAS I

THE GREAT IDEAS

A Syntopicon of Great Books of the Western World

MORTIMER J ADLER *Editor in Chief*
WILLIAM GORMAN *General Editor*

VOLUME I



WILLIAM BENTON *Publisher*
ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA INC
CHICAGO LONDON TORONTO GENEVA SYDNEY TOKYO

GENERAL CONTENTS

VOLUME I

VOLUME II



THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

The Great Books
is published with the editorial advice of the faculties
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By calling this work "a Syntopicon of *Great Books of the Western World*" the editors hope to characterize its nature, to indicate the function it performs in relation to the set as a whole, and to assert its originality as an intellectual instrument. The relation of these two volumes of *The Great Ideas* to the rest of the set is the key to the nature of the Syntopicon and its originality as an instrument. Apart from this relation *The Great Ideas*, though to some extent readable in itself, does not perform the function for which it was created—to show that the 443 works which comprise Volumes 4 to 54 can be seen and used as something more than a collection of books.

The great books are pre-eminently those which have given the western tradition its life and light. The unity of this set of books does not consist merely in the fact that each member of it is a great book worth reading. A deeper unity exists in the relation of all the books to one tradition, a unity shown by the continuity of the discussion of common themes and problems. It is claimed for this set of great books that all the works in it are significantly related to one another and that, taken together, they adequately present the ideas and issues, the terms and topics, that have made the western tradition what it is. More than a collection of books, then, this set is a certain kind of whole that can and should be read as such.

The Great Ideas results from and records such a reading of the great books. The aim of this syntopical reading was to discover the unity and continuity of western thought in the discussion of common themes and problems from one end of the tradition to the other. The Syntopicon does not reproduce or present the results of this reading in a digest to save others the trouble of reading the great books for themselves. On the contrary, it only lays down the lines along which a syntopical reading of the great books can be done, and shows why and how it should be done. The

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Because of the traditional and proved importance of the thought and opinion contained in the great books, the Syntopicon in the editors' opinion creates an intellectual instrument which is comparable to, though quite distinct from, the dictionary and the encyclopaedia. The dictionary is a basic reference work in the sphere of language. The general encyclopaedia is a basic reference work in the sphere of fact, concerned with all matters ascertainable in the present state of historical and scientific knowledge. The Syntopicon—these two volumes taken together with the rest of the set—is a basic reference work in the sphere of ideas, comprehending the wisdom and understanding accumulated thus far in all major fields of inquiry. As its utility is realized, it will, the editors hope, take its place beside the dictionary and the encyclopaedia in a triad of fundamental reference works.

II THE STRUCTURE OF THE SYNTOPICON

The Great Ideas consists of 102 chapters, each of which provides a syntopical treatment of one of the basic terms or concepts in the great books. As the Table of Contents indicates, the chapters are arranged in the alphabetical order of these 102 terms or concepts, from ANGEL to LOVE in Volume I and from MAN to WORLD in Volume II.

Following the chapter on WORLD there are two appendices. Appendix I is a Bibliography of Additional Readings. Appendix II is an essay on the Principles and Methods of Syntopical Construction. These two appendices are in turn followed by an Inventory of Terms.

THE 102 CHAPTERS

Each of the 102 chapters is constructed according to the same pattern. Each consists of five parts—an Introduction, an Outline of Topics, References, Cross-References, and Additional Readings. The inner structure of the Syntopicon is constituted by the order and relation of these five parts and by the integral relation of the Inventory of Terms to the 102 chapters as a whole.

various uses of the Syntopicon, described in Section III of this Preface, all derive from its primary purpose—to serve as a guide to the reading of *Great Books of the Western World* as a unified whole

The lines along which a syntopical reading of the great books can and should be done are the main lines of the continuous discussion that runs through the thirty centuries of western civilization This great conversation across the ages is a living organism whose structure the Syntopicon tries to articulate It tries to show the many strands of this conversation between the greatest minds of western civilization on the themes which have concerned men in every epoch, and which cover the whole range of man's speculative inquiries and practical interests To the extent that it succeeds, it reveals the unity and continuity of the western tradition

It was with these considerations in mind that the editors called *The Great Ideas* a syntopicon of the great books—literally, a collection of the topics which are the main themes of the conversation to be found in the books A topic is a subject of discussion It is a place at which minds meet—to agree or disagree, but at least to communicate with one another about some common concern Just as a number of minds, or what they have to say, can be related by their relevance to a common theme, so a number of topics can be related by their relevance to a common term—a single concept or category which generates a number of problems or themes for discussion Hence the Syntopicon is organized first, by a listing of the ideas that are the important common terms of discussion, and, then by an enumeration of the topics that are the various particular points about which the discussion of each of these ideas revolves

The full title of this work—*The Great Ideas a Syntopicon of Great Books of the Western World*—thus indicates not only that its structure consists of terms and topics, but also that it functions as a guide to the great books from which its terms and topics are drawn But the title may fail to indicate another equally important function which the Syntopicon performs when it is taken together with the great books By serving as a guide to the syntopical reading of the great books it does more than transform them from a mere collection of books into a unified whole it transforms them into a new kind of encyclopaedic whole—a new kind of reference library Without in any way interfering with all the values the great books have as books to be read individually, the Syntopicon gives

them the further utility of a unified reference library in the realm of thought and opinion.

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(1) *INTRODUCTION* Each chapter begins with an essay which comments on the various meanings of the idea under consideration, and takes note of the problems it has raised and the controversies it has occasioned in the tradition of western thought

The Introduction to a great idea is designed to serve as a guide to its topics and, through them, to the content of the references For certain of the most important topics, it frequently provides, in the words of the authors themselves, a foretaste of the great conversation contained in the passages referred to The Introduction usually expands on the necessarily brief statement of the themes or issues in the Outline of Topics, and furnishes some comment on the structure of the Outline as a whole, and on the relation of particular topics to one another

The Introduction serves one other purpose It indicates some of the connections between the idea it discusses and other great ideas, thus functioning as a commentary on the Cross References In some cases, the Introduction also calls attention to the way in which certain works recommended in the Additional Readings supplement the references to the great books in the discussion of certain aspects of the idea under consideration

(2) *OUTLINE OF TOPICS* In each chapter, the Outline of Topics *follows the Introduction It states the major themes of the conversation* to be found in the great books on the idea of that chapter It exhibits the internal structure of the idea by presenting its topics in relation to one another There are about 3000 topics in the Syntopicon as a whole, an average of 30 to a chapter though the actual number varies from as few as six topics in a chapter to as many as 76

The 3000 topics provide a statement of the scope and variety of subjects with which the great books deal in a substantial and significant fashion Since the topics are divided among 102 chapters according to the great *ideas under which they fall the user of the Syntopicon can find a particu*lar topic by turning to the chapter on the idea which is a central term expressed in the statement of that topic or if not actually present in the phrasing of the topic is implied by it

Almost all the topics involve one or more terms other than the name of the great idea under which they fall Hence, by consulting the Inventory of Terms the user of the Syntopicon can ascertain whether the particular subject in which he is interested is represented by one or more of the 3000

topics. As will be seen below the prime function of the Inventory is to enable the user of the Syntopicon to find topics in which he is interested and which he could not otherwise find except by examining the Outlines of Topics, chapter by chapter

Since the references to the great books are organized by topics, the individual topic, rather than a great idea is the elementary unit of the Syntopicon. From the standpoint of the references, the great ideas are collections of topics. The same is true of all the other terms listed in the Inventory of Terms. For each of these one or more topics are the headings under which the discussion of the subject can be found in the great books. The user of the Syntopicon must therefore, always use a topic rather than a term to discover what the great books have to say on a particular subject. However with the help of the Inventory of Terms, he can always use a term to find the topics which either state or approximately *represent* the subject of his interest.

For the convenience of the reader the Outline of Topics in each chapter is keyed to the pages of the Reference section which immediately follows. In the Outline, the number to the right of a particular topic indicates on which page of the Reference section it begins.

(3) *REFERENCES* The References are the heart of each chapter As the Introduction and the Outline of Topics are designed to help the reader use the References, so the References, organized topically are designed to enable him to turn to the great books for the discussion of a particular subject For each topic they locate, by volume and page the relevant works and passages in *Great Books of the Western World* There are about 163 000 references in the Syntopicon as a whole, an average of 1500 to a chapter though the actual number varies from as few as 284 references in a chapter to as many as 7065.

Under each topic, the references are arranged in the order in which the authors and their works appear in *Great Books of the Western World* References to the Bible when present are always placed first. The order of references enables the user of the Syntopicon either to follow the discussion of some theme through the great books in the historical sequence, or to select particular authors or the authors of a particular period according to his interest.

Ideally, a syntopical reading of the great books in relation to any single topic should cover all the works or passages cited under that topic Ideally, such a reading should proceed, in the first instance at least, in the order in which the references are presented Reading the materials in chronological order enables the reader to follow the actual development of thought on a topic In many passages, later authors explicitly refer to earlier ones, and even more frequently, the expression of later views presupposes an understanding of earlier ones, on which they are based or with which they take issue

But the individual reader may deviate from this ideal procedure in a number of ways, according to his particular interests He may wish only to *sample the materials referred to under a given topic, or he may wish to* examine what a certain group of authors have to say on a particular topic The reader may know sufficiently well the position of certain authors on the topic in question, and so may turn his attention to other authors whose works are cited there, or he may wish to examine thoroughly the thought of certain authors while merely forming a general impression of what others have to say The Reference section is so constructed that it permits the reader, almost at a glance, to follow any one of a wide variety of procedures

A brief explanatory note, repeated at the beginning of every Reference section, gives the minimum necessary directions for going from the references to the passages to which they refer For the sake of brevity it offers only such information as is uniform for all of the works cited If the reader wishes complete information concerning the way in which each particular work is cited he will find this set forth by authors and titles, in the Explanation of Reference Style, which immediately follows this Preface (see pg xxxiii) and is also printed for the reader s convenience at the opening of Volume II The Explanation of Reference Style contains a complete account of all the symbols and abbreviations used in the Reference section and gives examples of the usual typographical form of the references

Only one further point requires comment here In some chapters a few topics contain *no references These topics serve in the Outline as headings* for other topics grouped analytically under them The user of the Syntopicon who wants to know what the great books have to say on a particular subject, and finds that subject represented by a topic without reference

content will find in its subordinate topics references to the great books on various aspects of the general subject he has in mind

(4) *CROSS REFERENCES* The Cross References follow the References in each chapter They direct the reader to other chapters in which similar or related matters are considered By relating the topics of one chapter to those of other chapters the Cross References show the interconnection of the great ideas

In general the order of the Cross-References follows that of the Outline of Topics Each entry in the Cross-References indicates by its phrasing the subject of the topic in a given chapter to which topics in other chapters are related or similar

The phrasing of the Cross-References enables the reader to determine whether the topics in the other chapters mentioned are *similar* or *related* to the topic in this chapter The *related* topics will usually offer a quite different set of references

The user of the Syntopicon will find that topics in different chapters often resemble one another both in their phrasing and in the references set forth under them In a few cases they are identical or almost identical. But *similar* topics will usually differ in their reference content because the meaning of a topic is partly determined by the idea under which it falls, and by the surrounding topics which form its context Hence, in most cases the reader who turns to similar topics in other chapters will find some proportion of different references.

(5) *ADDITIONAL READINGS* *Great Books of the Western World* comprises 443 works by 74 authors if we add the 77 books of the Bible which are syntopically treated along with these published works the number is 5 0 But this large number does not represent all the books which make signal contributions to the great conversation in the sphere of each of the great ideas

The list of Additional Readings which is the last part of each chapter is a list of books recommended as companions to the works and passages cited in the Reference section For the ideas and topics of each chapter they supplement or amplify the discussion to be found in the great books They represent some of the works in the wider field of literature, in which the great books occupy a central position.

In each list of Additional Readings, the recommended titles are divided into two groups first, works written by authors represented in *Great Books of the Western World*, and second, works by other authors Each group is listed chronologically Whenever they are available, translations of foreign works are suggested The existence of English translations is always indicated by the use of English titles, these are usually accompanied by the title in the original language

The 102 lists of Additional Readings, each constructed for the idea and topics of a particular chapter, contain in all 2603 titles by 1181 authors For the convenience of the reader, the authors and titles in the 102 separate lists of Additional Readings are compiled into a single list in the Bibliography of Additional Readings, which is Appendix I (see Volume II, pg 1143)

In the Bibliography of Additional Readings the authors names are in alphabetical order and the works of each author are listed alphabetically under his name In addition, the Bibliography provides useful information concerning authors and works, such as birth and death dates of authors, date and place of writing or publication, names of editors or translators, names of publishers, and names of standard collections in which individual works appear A note, preceding the Bibliography, explains the principles of its construction

THE INVENTORY OF TERMS

The Inventory of Terms is an integral part of the Syntopicon placed for convenience at the end of Volume II

The Syntopicon is both a book to be read and a reference book The Table of Contents sets forth its contents as a book to be read But since this is limited to listing the 102 great ideas chapter by chapter, it cannot indicate the scope and range of the Syntopicon as a reference book The Inventory of Terms performs that function, it serves as a table of contents for the Syntopicon as a reference book

The person who wishes to use the Syntopicon as a reference book, in order to learn what the great books have to say on a particular subject, must be able to find that subject among the 3000 topics The primary function of the Inventory of Terms is to enable him to find the topic or topics which either clearly express or approximately represent the subject of his inquiry It does so by citing for each term listed the topics in which that

term is a principal element It cites these by giving the name of the chapter in which the topic appears, and the number of the topic in that chapter The reader can find the topic in which he is interested by looking in the Inventory for the term or terms that would appear in a statement of the subject.

The user of the Syntopicon may have a broader interest than can be expressed in a particular topic. He may wish to examine the whole range of discussion of a basic concept whether that be one of the great ideas or some other term This may involve, not one or two topics, but a large number as is certainly the case for the great ideas, and for many other important concepts as well. Since the Inventory of Terms cites all the topics in which each term is significantly involved it enables the reader to investigate the whole range of the discussion in the great books relevant to that term.

Among the terms listed in the Inventory are the names of the 102 great ideas. This does not duplicate the information furnished by the Table of Contents. For each of the great ideas, the Table of Contents locates only the whole chapter which deals with that great idea whereas the Inventory of Terms usually cites topics in many other chapters, in addition to the chapter on that idea itself. For the reader who wishes to explore the discussion of a great idea as thoroughly as possible, the Inventory of Terms supplements the topics to be found in the chapter on that idea and even those mentioned in the Cross-References of that chapter

The 1800 terms in the Inventory are listed alphabetically and for each term the relevant topics are cited in the alphabetical order of the chapters in which the topics occur Sometimes the topics are divided into two groups, of primary and secondary importance. Within each group the chapters are alphabetically arranged

The Inventory is likely to present only one difficulty to the person who consults it in order to find a particular topic. The first step in the location of a topic is accomplished when the reader turns in the Inventory to the term that he thinks is involved in a statement of the subject of his interest. But finding a number of topics cited there, he must choose among them.

There are two ways for him to proceed (1) he can examine the topics one after another until he finds the one which satisfies him as a statement of the subject or (2) he can use the names of the chapters in which the topics occur as a clue to finding the topic which states the subject of

his inquiry Since the content of particular topics is largely determined by the idea under which they fall, the chapter names will quite frequently prove a reliable guide

A brief note, at the beginning of the Inventory of Terms, explains its construction and furnishes directions for its use Nothing more need be said here of its structure, or of its utility in making the Syntopicon a reference book But a word should be added about the significance of the Inventory in relation to the great ideas

The division of the Syntopicon into 102 chapters may give rise to the notion that its editors think there are only 102 ideas worth discussing The number of really great, that is, primary or pivotal ideas may be smaller or larger than 102 That number represents an editorial judgment which was made in the course of constructing the Syntopicon How it was reached is explained elsewhere (see Appendix II, Section I), but here it should be said that it does not represent a judgment by the editors that the 102 terms selected by them are the only concepts or ideas which have notable significance in the tradition of western thought The Inventory of Terms manifests exactly the opposite judgment Its 1800 words or phrases express important concepts Though many of these will immediately be seen to have much less comprehensive or critical meaning than the 102 major terms of the Syntopicon, they all have general currency or importance in some special field of inquiry They also represent notions or topics which fall under one or more of the 102 great ideas

THE PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF SYNTOPICAL CONSTRUCTION

The essay on the Principles and Methods of Syntopical Construction is Appendix II (see Volume II, pg 1219) It is intended as a supplement to this Preface The foregoing brief descriptions of the parts of the Syntopicon indicate its structure, but they do not explain how it was constructed

The work of creating each part of the Syntopicon raised many difficult intellectual and editorial problems These problems and especially the principles and methods by which they were solved may be of interest to the reader after he has had some experience in using the Syntopicon but probably not before The editors decided to make the essay on the Syntopicon s construction an appendix to the work rather than burden the Preface with an account of the methods employed and an exposition of

the principles adopted. While freeing the Preface from the burden of fuller explanations they nevertheless hoped to provide systematic answers to questions which might arise in the reader's mind as a result of using the Syntopicon

III THE USES OF THE SYNTOPICON

The foregoing discussion of the nature and structure of the Syntopicon has expressed the purpose for which it was designed but it does not fully state all its possible uses There are four basic types of usefulness which the editors hope the Syntopicon will have. Two of these have already been mentioned It has been pointed out that the Syntopicon is both a reference book and a book to be read But the Syntopicon is also intended to serve as an instrument of liberal education through the aid it can give to a certain kind of study and teaching of the great books It is not inconsistent with its primary function as a reference book that it should in addition, prove to be an instrument of research and discovery

(1) *The Syntopicon as a reference book.*

The description (in Section II of this Preface) of the parts of the Syntopicon and their function in the structure of the whole includes some indication of how it may be used as a reference book Here we are concerned with its general character as a reference work as evidenced by the types of questions it has been constructed to answer

In contradistinction to books of other sorts reference books are designed to help the reader who comes to them with inquiries on particular subjects If in addition to answering the question he brings, they raise further questions in his mind and excite him to further inquiries which in turn they are able to satisfy, they are more than answer books They are pedagogues leading the mind from question to question in the pursuit of learning Reference books at their best perform an educational function not simply by answering questions but by arousing and sustaining inquiry

Nevertheless the field of any reference book is defined in the first instance by the types of questions it is able to answer The specific type of inquiry which the Syntopicon is able to satisfy and which gives it its special character as a reference book, can be formulated by the question *What*

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Nevertheless, the field of any reference book is defined in the first instance by the types of questions it is able to answer The specific type of inquiry which the Syntopicon is able to satisfy and which gives it its special character as a reference book can be formulated by the question *What*

do the great books have to say on this subject? This is not the only question the Syntopicon is designed to answer, but it is the primary one

The topics are the units through which the Syntopicon functions as a reference book, since it is under the topics that the references to the great books are assembled, and it is through reading the works or passages recommended by these references that the person who consults the Syntopicon finds the answer to his question, What do the great books have to say on this subject?

The range and variety of the particular subjects of inquiry on which the Syntopicon can be consulted, is indicated *quantitatively* by the number of topics and terms 2987 topics are covered in the 102 chapters, 1798 terms are listed in the Inventory of Terms *Qualitatively*, the range and variety of the inquiries the Syntopicon is able to satisfy, can be seen only through an examination of the topics, chapter by chapter, or by an examination of the chapter titles in the Table of Contents and the words or phrases listed in the Inventory of Terms

To every question expressed in this way—What do the great books have to say on this subject?—the Syntopicon helps the reader to discover the answer *for himself* by a syntopical reading of the great books in the light of the topics and guided by the references assembled under them This fact distinguishes the Syntopicon from all other familiar reference books, which contain *within themselves* the answers to the questions on which they are consulted The Syntopicon does not contain the answers, but only a guide to where the answers can be found in the pages of the great books The references which constitute this guide do not tell the reader *what* the great books have to say on a particular subject They only tell him *where* to read in the great books in order to discover for himself the thought and opinion the imagination and emotion, in which the authors of these books have expressed their minds on this or that particular subject For this reason it was said earlier in this Preface that only when it is taken together with the great books themselves does the Syntopicon create a reference library in the sphere of thought and opinion

While this is true for the primary type of question which the Syntopicon is designed to answer through its system of references to the great books, it is not true, at least not to the same extent, for the subordinate types of questions now to be considered

The question *What themes have been discussed in the tradition of western thought under this idea?* is answered in the first instance by the Outline of Topics in the chapter on each of the great ideas. If the reader becomes interested in the actual content of the discussion under one or more of these topics, he will then be asking the primary sort of question to which the references, assembled under these topics, provide the beginning of an answer and the great books the fullness of it.

The question *To which of the other great ideas is this idea related and how is it related?* is answered by the Cross-References in the chapter on each of the great ideas. The Cross-References enumerate the topics in other chapters which are related to the topics covered by the idea in question. The introductory essay on the idea also usually contains references to other Introductions in which related ideas are considered. By reading the Introduction and examining the Cross-References, a person can use the Syntopicon to discover at least initially the connections between one great idea and others.

The question *What books other than those published in this set contain important discussions of this idea?* is answered to some extent by the Additional Readings listed in the chapter on each of the great ideas.

The question *What is the history of the idea, its various meanings and the problems or controversies it has raised?* is answered at least initially by the Introduction to the chapter on each of the great ideas. Here as before if the reader's interest is aroused to further inquiry the topics, the references under them the passages in the great books referred to, and the books listed in the Additional Readings provide the means for a fuller exploration of the idea, in varying degrees of thoroughness and ramification

(2) *The Syntopicon as a book to be read*

With respect to its 102 essays on the great ideas, the Syntopicon is first of all a book to be read. These essays are arranged in the alphabetical order of the ideas, but they need not be read in that order Each is intended to be intelligible in itself independently of the others.

The reader can therefore begin according to his interests with any one of the Introductions to the great ideas. No matter where he begins, he will find that the reading of no other Introduction is presupposed. But he will also find that each Introduction traces some of the connections between the particular idea which it treats and other great ideas.

With whatever idea he begins the introductory essay will at least suggest other ideas as subjects of related interest These in turn will turn his attention to, and may arouse his interest in, still others Since each of the great ideas is directly or remotely related to many others—perhaps to all—through a network of connections radiating from each idea as a point of origin, the reader, starting at any point in the realm of thought, can explore the whole of it by going from any one idea to all the rest by circuits or pathways of his own choosing

The reading of one or more Introductions should also turn attention to the Outlines of Topics in these same chapters, and, through them and the references organized under them, to the great books themselves As integral parts of the Syntopicon, the Introductions to the great ideas are not intended to satisfy the reader s interest, but rather to arouse it, and then direct it to the great books The name Introduction specifies the function these essays were designed to perform When they function effectively as introductions to the Outlines of Topics and the References, they implement the use of the Syntopicon, not simply as a reference book, but as an instrument of liberal education

(3) *The Syntopicon as an instrument of liberal education*

The Syntopicon serves the end of liberal education to the extent that it facilitates the *reading of the great books and, beyond that, the study and* teaching of them To make the nature of this educational contribution clear, it is necessary to distinguish between the *integral* and the *syntopical* reading of great books

Integral reading consists simply in reading a whole book through But *syntopical reading does not consist simply in reading parts of a book* rather than the whole It involves the reading of one book in relation to others, all of them relevant to the consideration of the same topic

In some cases, as the References show, whole works are cited along with passages from other works, which may be as short as a paragraph or as long as a chapter or a series of chapters *For the most part, a syntopical* reading consists in reading passages of varying length rather than whole works, but the point remains that the essence of syntopical reading lies in the juxtaposition of many authors under the same topic and in consequence, the *reading together* of their works, in whole or part

Neither of these two types of reading can ever be a substitute for the other nor can either be taken as sufficient in itself On the contrary each is incomplete without the other Those who begin by reading *in* the great books and reading them syntopically must eventually read at least some of them integrally Those who have already read some of the great books *through* must read them syntopically to discover what an integral reading of the great books seldom reveals, except perhaps, to the most mature student or conscientious scholar For each of these two sorts of persons—the beginning reader and the more advanced student or scholar—the Syntopicon functions differently and the syntopical reading of the great books serves a different purpose

For the beginning reader—in the extreme case, a person who has read none of the great books—a syntopical reading done in accordance with the references under even a few topics, works in three ways initiatively suggestively, and instructively

It works *initiatively* by overcoming the initial difficulty that anyone faces when confronted by a collection of books as vast and, in a sense, as overpowering as *Great Books of the Western World* The problem is where to begin and in what order to proceed There are many solutions to this problem usually in the form of courses of reading based on different principles of selection but these usually require the reading of whole books or at least the integral reading of large parts of them.

It is a matter of general experience that this kind of solution seldom achieves the intended result. A syntopical reading of the great books provides a radically different sort of solution which promises to be more effective. It initiates the reading of the great books by enabling persons to read in them on the subjects in which they are interested and on those subjects, to read relatively short passages from a large number of authors. It assumes only that every educable mind has some interest in one or more of the themes, problems, or ideas on which the great books touch.

A syntopical reading may also work *suggestively* Starting from a reader's existing interest in a particular topic it may arouse or create an interest in other topics related to those which initiated his reading in the great books. The syntopical reading of a collection of authors under a particular topic may also impel the reader to look beyond the passages cited. Except

when they cite whole works, the references cite passages which necessarily exist in a context ultimately the context of the whole book Few of these passages are absolutely self-contained For few of them can it be said that it will be finally satisfactory to read them without looking further into the author s thought Hence, proceeding along the natural lines of his own interests, the reader may be led from reading small parts of certain books to reading larger parts and, eventually, to reading whole books If this process is repeated, each syntopical reading may occasion and stimulate a more and more extensive integral reading of the great books

Working initiatively and suggestively, syntopical reading opens the great books at the pages of maximum interest to the individual and, by *the force of the passages read and their dependence on context, carries him* from reading parts to reading whole works Syntopical reading works *instructively* when it guides the mind in interpreting and understanding the passages or works being read It does this in three ways

First, the topic in connection with which the passage is being read serves to give direction to the reader in interpreting the passage But it does not tell him what the passage means since the passage cited may be relevant to the topic in any one of a number of ways Hence the reader is called upon to discover precisely what relevance the passage has to the topic To learn to do this is to acquire a major skill in the art of reading

Second, the collection of a number of passages on the same topic, but from different works and different authors serves to sharpen the reader s interpretation of each passage read Sometimes when passages from the same book or author are read in sequence and in the context of one another, each becomes clearer Sometimes the meaning of each of a series of contrasting or conflicting passages from different books or authors is accentuated when they are read against one another And sometimes the passages from one author by amplifying or commenting on the passages cited from another, materially help the reader s understanding of the second author

Third, if the individual does a syntopical reading of the great books under a number of distinct topics, the fact that the same passage will often be found cited under two or more topics will have its instructive effect As relevant to distinct topics the passage must have an amplitude of meaning which the reader will come to perceive when he interprets it somewhat differently in relation to different topics Such multiple inter

pretation not only is a basic exercise in the art of reading but also tends to make the mind habitually alert to the many strains of meaning which any rich or complex passage can contain

In this description of the ways in which a syntopical reading instructs in the art of reading the great books we have emphasized only the influence of the topic under which the reading is done and the effect of reading one passage in relation to another or in relation to several distinct topics. But to assure or reinforce its instructive effect, two other factors may operate in the background of a syntopical reading One is the whole Outline of Topics, which places a particular topic in the context of other topics under the same idea. The other is the Introduction to that idea which may help the reader to interpret the particular topic thereby increasing the effectiveness of that topic as a guide to the interpretation of the works or passages referred to under it.

If we turn now from the beginning reader to the more mature student or scholar—in the extreme case, a person who has read through many if not all, of the great books—we shall see that a syntopical reading works in a different way It no longer need function initiatively or suggestively nor for the competent reader need it serve instructively to develop skill in the art of reading But it does provide the occasion and the materials for a more intensive and critical reading of passages already read and it supplements the reading of whole works independently of one another by requiring an examination of these works, or passages from them in mutual relation as relevant to the same topic.

It is the general experience of highly competent readers that a great book can be read through many times without the attainment of such complete mastery that the reader knows the relevance of every passage in it to every theme it touches. On the contrary the integral reading of a great book even when done more than once seldom reveals even a large part of its meaning Only the most intensive scholarly study of a particular book or author ever arrives at such mastery

Short of that reading a great book through one or more times will inevitably leave unnoticed or only partly recognized many passages of critical significance to a particular theme or problem. Only when the book is read with that particular subject in mind will these passages, hitherto unobserved be found

The truth of this can be verified by accomplished readers of the great books if they will examine, under particular topics, passages from books they have already read or even studied to some extent Unless their previous reading of the books was done in the light of the particular intellectual interest represented by this topic, they are likely to find some passages that they never saw before, or at least never fully recognized as having the significance they take on when read syntopically—in the light of this topic and in relation to other works and passages relevant to the same theme

The Syntopicon can thus serve those who have already done, to a greater or less extent, an integral reading of the great books The method of syntopical reading not only provides a different and rewarding way of reading them, but also carries the study of them to deeper and deeper levels of understanding It overcomes the defects of the ordinary integral reading in several ways It involves reading the great books in relation to one another rather than in isolation It supplements the knowledge of whole works by concentration on the significance of parts Taking each of 3000 topics as the occasion for a purposeful reading in all the great books, it makes possible the close study of each work in relation to all the problems or issues on which it bears

There is still another way in which the method of syntopical reading can advance the study of the great books, or rather a studious use of them Here the aim is not to study the books themselves, but to consider a problem or an issue to the solution or clarification of which they contribute

The particular problem may involve many topics in one or more chapters It may involve a number of great ideas and many subordinate terms The organization of the Syntopicon enables the student of such a problem to discover the range of the terms and topics traditionally involved in its consideration The References enable him to examine systematically, in their chronological order or in any order he wishes, the record of western thought concerning this problem, so far as it is contained in the great books The Additional Readings supplement these materials by citing other books which bear upon the problem more or less directly

It does not seem an exaggeration to say that a person who has done all the syntopical reading suggested by the References and the Additional Readings on a particular problem will have a fairly adequate knowledge of that problem and its proposed solutions in the development of western

thought. The Syntopicon should be able to save the person who is beginning his inquiry into a certain problem much of the preliminary labor of research and advance him rapidly to the point where he can begin to think independently about it, because he knows what thinking has been done. For the scholar already advanced in his research on a given problem, it may still be possible for the Syntopicon to serve some good purpose as a reminder or a check it may even uncover a neglected passage or throw new light upon one by placing it in the context of other passages

WHAT HAS JUST BEEN SAID about the studious or scholarly use of the Syntopicon suggests how it may serve as an instrument in teaching the great books or in using them as teaching materials For the most part, the great books enter the curricula of schools and colleges engaged in liberal education only by way of courses in which some of these books, or most of them are read integrally Even when they are read in selections rather than as wholes they are, for the most part, used as materials in a general course of study rather than as applicable to the study of particular subject matters.

Without detracting from or competing with the unquestionable value of such procedures, the Syntopicon offers another pedagogical use of the great books. The method of syntopical reading makes them available in the teaching of courses concerned with particular subject matters or in the conduct of seminars devoted to the study of particular problems In certain cases, it may encourage the reading of the great texts *in place of* textbooks.

For a particular problem or subject matter whose name is either one of the great ideas or a major term in the Inventory of Terms, the Syntopicon suggests some, if not all, of the topics which deserve to be studied and some if not all, of the works which deserve to be read in whole or part. It thus provides a set of materials organized *so as* to be adaptable to the method and interest of the individual teacher For example, at one extreme the teacher can use the Syntopicon merely as a guide to supplementary reading at the other extreme, he can use it to construct his own set of textual materials, selected from the References and the Additional Readings and organized in the framework of a sequence of topics

(4) *The Syntopicon as an instrument of discovery and research*

What has already been said about the use of the Syntopicon by the serious student, or even the advanced scholar, in the sphere of a particular problem or subject matter, obviously covers part of the Syntopicon s utility as an instrument of research or discovery But there are three special types of inquiry for the pursuit of which the Syntopicon seems to be especially adapted

The first of these is the study of the history of ideas The chapter on each of the 102 great ideas presents the record of thought in the form of references to the great books, organized under each topic Since the references are arranged in the order in which the authors and works appear in the set of great books, and since with few exceptions, this is a strictly chronological order, the record of thought is presented in an order suited to the historian s interest The Additional Readings, which supplement the great books in the record are also arranged chronologically Hence the Syntopicon provides an organization of materials eminently useful to the scholar engaged in the historical study of ideas

The second type of special inquiry concerns the thought of a single author, in its historical relation to the thought of predecessors who influenced him and followers influenced by him If that author happens to be one of the authors of the great books, the Syntopicon can facilitate such research, since for hundreds of distinct topics it places references to the work of the particular author in the context of references to other authors —earlier, later or contemporary—whom he may have influenced or by whom he may have been influenced

The third type of special inquiry is limited to the thought of a particular period rather than a particular author Within this limitation the historical interest may extend to all the great and near great minds who formed the thought of this period as well as to all the ideas with which they dealt. So far as the formative minds of the particular period are represented by authors of the great books and by other authors cited in the Additional Readings, the Syntopicon can assist such research Instead of using its references vertically from one end of the tradition to the other, as would the student of the history of an idea the student of an epoch of thought would cut through the references horizontally He would take all the authors and books which fell within the period under considera

tion he would examine the materials referred to under every idea or topic which appeared to have been considered by the minds of that period

In these three types of historical inquiry the Syntopicon is at best an auxiliary instrument in the service of scholarship If it proves to be more than that for the ordinary student it will probably be less than that for the accomplished scholar whose documentary resources in a particular field are more extensive than those from which the Syntopicon is constructed This is especially true of those problems in the history of ideas which have been investigated by prolonged research But some problems have not been so investigated and the Syntopicon may have something to contribute to the study of these. It is even possible that the Syntopicon may uncover or call attention to new problems, or may cause the re fo mulation of old p oblems in a new way

THE GRAND RESEARCH suggested by the existence of the Syntopicon is not historical, however but philosophical. Stated simply it is the project of creating in and for the twentieth century a synthesis or summation of western *thought* past and present which will serve the intellectual needs of our time as analogous syntheses or summations have served antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the period of the enlightenment

The 10_ great ideas, the 1800 other terms, and the ,000 topics of the Syntopicon are a fair representation of the *objects* as the materials to be *found* in the 443 works here published and the 2600 other works listed in the Additional Readings are a fair representation of the *conter* of western inquiry and discussion The *Syntopicon* is, *therefore* an instrument adapted to the sort of research which might produce a summation of western *thought* from the beginning to the present.

Because the existence of the Syntopicon makes it possible and suggests that it be undertaken the project envisaged might be called a Program of Syntopical Research. Because the method of this research like the method which produced the Syntopicon would be thoroughly dialectical in character the intellectual summation which would be its product could be called a Summa Dialectica.

MORTIMER J ADLER, *Editor*

Chicago 195_

EXPLANATION OF REFERENCE STYLE

THE references have a uniform typographical style but the manner of referring to particular works varies in certain respects The Explanation of Reference Style describes the typographical construction of the references, with some comment on the variations It is divided into four parts

I General Typographical Style
II Style of Bible References
III Punctuation Symbols Abbreviations
IV Table of Authors, Titles, and Author s Divisions Cited

I GENERAL TYPOGRAPHICAL STYLE

The two examples below illustrate the general typographical pattern of the references to *Great Books of the Western World* and the headings above the examples call attention to the five elements commonly present in the construction of the references

Volume Number	Author s Name	Title of Work	Author Divisions	Page Sections
35	LOCKE	*Human Understanding*	BK II CH XXI	178a 200d
41	GIBBON	*Decline and Fall*		365b 378d

(1) Volume Number

The volume number indicates in which volume of *Great Books of the Western World* the work or passage referred to can be found Most volumes contain the work of one author When a single volume contains the works of two or more authors the volume number is given for each author When the work of a single author is contained in two volumes, the volume number is assigned according to the contents of the volume.

(2) Author s Name

The author s name immediately follows the volume number except in the case of the American State Papers and the Federalist which are included in Volume 43. Authors names are usually given in shortened form.

(3) Title of Work

The title follows the author s name, with the two exceptions above noted Titles are also frequently abbreviated or shortened When two or more works are cited for a single author, the titles are listed in the order in which the works appear in the volume.

(4) Author s Divisions

By author s divisions is meant all such subdivisions of a work as book, part, section, chapter, paragraph, line number The phrase author s divisions does not necessarily mean divisions made by the author, they may have been made by an editor of his work

Author s divisions are given only for some works, according as, in the judgment of the editors, their inclusion would prove meaningful or helpful to the reader References to Locke, for instance as in the example, always cite author s divisions, whereas references to Gibbon, as in the example, do not

For some works, author s divisions are completely given, as for Locke For other works, only the most important or largest divisions are given Thus for Rabelais only the book but not the chapter is given

Line numbers in brackets, are given for all works of poetry including those published in prose translations For Goethe s *Faust* the line numbers cited refer to the lines of the English translation as well as to the lines of the original German For other poetical works in translation—the works of Homer, the Greek dramatists Lucretius Virgil, and Dante—the line numbers cited refer to the lines of the works in their original languages, for these works, the line numbers printed on the pages of this edition *furnish only an approximate indication of the location of the* equivalent lines in the English translation For all poetical works written in English, the line numbers are the numbers of the English lines In the case of Chaucer s *Canterbury Tales* the numbering of the lines is consecutive for all the tales written in verse

In references to the works of Aristotle (in Volumes 8 and 9), the figures and letters enclosed in the brackets signify the page column, and approximate line in the Berlin edition of the Greek text edited by Immanuel Bekker In references to the American State Papers (in Volume 43),

the bracketed line numbers refer to the lines on the pages of this edition only

In references to the *Summa Theologica* of Thomas Aquinas (in Volumes 19 and 20) the author's division "Part I-II" stands for Part I of the Second Part, and "Part II-II" stands for Part II of the Second Part. In the case of the *Summa Theologica* the author's divisions cited may include not only questions and articles, but the subdivisions of articles. In such cases the page sections correspond in extent to that of a whole article, to enable the reader to see the subdivision of an article, when it is cited in the context of other parts to which it is related.

Author's divisions precede page sections except in the case of footnote and note numbers, which follow page sections. When more than one passage is cited within the same author's division the author's division is not repeated, as, for example

38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK II 403a-404a 405d-406a

(5) Page Sections

The pages of *Great Books of the Western World* are printed in either one or two columns. The upper and lower halves of a one-column page are indicated by the letters a and b. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand column, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand column. These half and quarter page sections are based on divisions of a full text page.

Page sections give the page numbers and locate the sections of the page in which the passage referred to begins and ends. For example, in the reference

53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b

the passage cited begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. In the reference

7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b-164c

the passage cited begins in the lower half of the left hand column of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand column of page 164.

In references to works printed in two columns, the format of the page

(3) Title of Work

The title follows the author's name, with the two exceptions above noted. Titles are also frequently abbreviated or shortened. When two or more works are cited for a single author, the titles are listed in the order in which the works appear in the volume.

(4) Author's Divisions

By "author's divisions" is meant all such subdivisions of a work as book, part, section, chapter, paragraph, line number. The phrase "author's divisions" does not necessarily mean divisions made by the author; they may have been made by an editor of his work.

Author's divisions are given only for some works, according as, in the judgment of the editors, their inclusion would prove meaningful or helpful to the reader. References to Locke, for instance, as in the example, always cite author's divisions, whereas references to Gibbon, as in the example, do not.

For some works author's divisions are completely given, as for Locke. For other works, only the most important or largest divisions are given. Thus for Rabelais only the book but not the chapter is given.

Line numbers, in brackets, are given for all works of poetry, including those published in prose translations. For Goethe's *Faust* the line numbers cited refer to the lines of the English translation as well as to the lines of the original German. For other poetical works in translation—the works of Homer, the Greek dramatists, Lucretius, Virgil, and Dante—the line numbers cited refer to the lines of the works in their original languages; for these works, the line numbers printed on the pages of this edition furnish only an approximate indication of the location of the equivalent lines in the English translation. For all poetical works written in English, the line numbers are the numbers of the English lines. In the case of Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*, the numbering of the lines is consecutive for all the tales written in verse.

In references to the works of Aristotle (in Volumes 8 and 9), the figures and letters enclosed in the brackets signify the page, column, and approximate line in the Berlin edition of the Greek text edited by Immanuel Bekker. In references to the American State Papers (in Volume 43),

III PUNCTUATION SYMBOLS ABBREVIATIONS

(1) Punctuation

Diagonal line When a series of references to one author includes two or more of his works published in the same volume a diagonal line is used to separate references to one work from references to another The diagonal line is used in the same way to separate references to different books of the Bible. For example

OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 33 1 -23 / *Job* 11 7-9

43 MILL *Liberty* 302d 303a / *Representative Government* 327b d 332d

Semi Colon When a series of references includes the citation of two or more passages in the same work a semi-colon is used to separate the references to these passages. For example

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 1 1 -14 9 1-11

38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK II 403a-404a 405d-406a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART II 265c 266a PART IV 346c 348a

Comma When a comma separates the title of a work or an author s division of a work from the page sections which follow passages cited are only a part of the whole work or of the author s division indicated For example, in the references

14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 36a b 44d 45

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART II 73a 4b

the passages from Plutarch are only a part of *Lycurgus* and the passage from Swift is only a few pages from Part II of *Gulliver s Travels*

When the title of a work or an author s division of a work, is *no* separated by a comma from the page sections which follow the reference is to the whole work or to the whole of the indicated author s division For example, in the references

14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 32a-48d

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART II 45a 87b

the whole of *Lycurgus* and the whole of Part II of *Gulliver s Travels* are cited

sometimes places continuous reading matter in the a and c sections of the upper half of the page, or in the b and d sections of the lower half of the page This occurs when a work or an author s division begins in the lower, or ends in the upper, half of the two column page Where continuous reading matter thus appears in discontinuous page sections, it is indicated by a,c or b,d For example

14 PLUTARCH *Solon* 64b d 77a c

means that the work cited begins in the lower half of page 64 and ends in the upper half of page 77

Footnotes or notes are sometimes specifically cited by themselves in the references, in which case the page sections given correspond to their location on the pages referred to When a footnote or a note is not specifically cited, the page sections given mark the beginning and the end of the text referred to The reader is expected to consult the footnotes or notes indicated in the body of that text

Chaucer s works (in Volume 22) are printed in two columns, the inside column of each page contains the Middle English text, the outside column a Modern English version Since both columns contain equivalent passages, the references to this volume employ page sections (a and b) which divide each page only into an upper and a lower half

II STYLE OF BIBLE REFERENCES

All Bible references are to book, chapter, and verse in both the King James and Douay versions of the Bible When the King James and Douay versions differ in the title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (*D*), follows For example

OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—(*D*) *II Esdras* 7 46

In references to the Bible a colon is used to separate chapter and verse numbers, and a comma separates the numbers of verses in the same chapter For example

OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 6 1–4 16–18

IV TABLE OF AUTHORS, TITLES, AND AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS CITED

The following pages present a tabulation of the contents of *Great Books of the Western World*, Volumes 4-54. The authors are enumerated in the order in which they appear in the successive volumes of the set, and under each author's name the titles of his works are listed in the order of their appearance.

In the references, the name of the author is frequently given in shortened form. In this table, their full names are given, followed by their life dates when these are ascertainable. Because some volumes contain the works of two or more authors who may be separated by centuries, the order in which the authors are cited in the references sometimes departs from the strict chronological order. The life dates help the reader to place the authors and their works in the right chronological order.

In the references, the title of a work is frequently given in an abbreviated or shortened form. In this table, the titles are first given exactly as they appear in the references. Whenever this is an abbreviated or shortened title, the full title follows.

The table also includes a notation of the author's divisions that are used in references to particular works.

A dash in the column headed "Author's Divisions Cited" means that references to the work or works in question cite page sections only. Where the author's divisions cited are the same for several titles, they are named only once, either opposite the set of titles as a whole or opposite the last title in the group.

Titles in brackets are inclusive titles which appear on the title page of the work, but do not appear in the references. The names of the authors of *The Federalist* (in Volume 43) are bracketed because they do not appear in the references.

Volume Number, Author and Title		*Author's Divisions Cited*
4 Homer		
The Iliad	*The Odyssey*	BOOK, LINE
5 Aeschylus (c. 525-456 B.C.)		
The Suppliant Maidens	*Agamemnon*	
The Persians	*Choephoroe*	
The Seven Against Thebes	*Eumenides*	
Prometheus Bound		LINE

(2) Symbols

esp The abbreviation esp precedes one or more especially relevant passages which are contained within the page boundaries of a larger passage or a whole work that has just been cited

Whenever passages contained within a single reference are especially referred to, a comma after the page sections separates these passages For example

42 KANT *Science of Right* 435a 441d esp 435c 436b 437c d 438d 441d

Whenever passages contained within a single reference to the Bible are especially referred to, a comma is also used to separate these passages For example

NEW TESTAMENT *Romans* 1–8 esp 2 11–16 2 27–29 7 21–25 8 27

passim The word passim following a reference signifies that the work or passage referred to discusses the topic under which it is cited, intermittently rather than continuously For example

9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK II CH 7 461d 463c passim / *Athenian Constitution* CH 1–41 553a 572d passim

(3) Abbreviations

The following is a list of the abbreviations used in the references Unless an abbreviation for the plural is listed below, the singular abbreviation is used for both singular and plural words

A	ARTICLE	[n]	note
AA	ARTICLES	OT	OLD TESTAMENT
ANS	ANSWER	par	paragraph
APH	APHORISM	PREF	PREFACE
BK	BOOK	PROP	PROPOSITION
CH	CHAPTER	Q	QUESTION
COROL	COROLLARY	QQ	QUESTIONS
(D)	DOUAY	REP	REPLY
DEF	DEFINITION	SC	SCENE
DEMONST	DEMONSTRATION	SCHOL	SCHOLIUM
DIV	DIVISION	SECT	SECTION
EXPL	EXPLANATION	SUPPL	SUPPLEMENT
[fn]	footnote	TR	TRACTATE
INTRO	INTRODUCTION		

REFERENCE STYLE

Volume Number Author and Title	Author's Division Cited
8 ARISTOTLE (384 3-2 c.)	
Categories	CHAPTER Lin
Interpretation——On Interpretation	BOOK CHAPTER Lin
Prior Analytics	
Posterior Analytics	
Topics	CHAPTER Line
Sophistical Refutations——On So histical Refutations	BOOK CHAPTER, Line
Physics	
Heavens——On the Heavens	
Generatio and Corr tion——On Generation and Corruption	
Meteorology	
Meta hysics	
So l——On t Soul	CHAPTER, Line
Sense and the Sensib e——O Sense and the Sensib	
Memory and Reminiscence——On Memory and Reminiscence	
Sleep——On Sleep and Sleep ness	
Dreams——On Dreams	
Pro hesying——On Pro hesying by Dream	
Longevity——On Longevity and Shortness f Life	
Y th, Li and Breathing——On Youth a d Old Age On Life and Death On Breathing	
9 ARI TOTLE	
History of A imals	BOOK, CHAPTER, Lin
Parts f Animals——On the Parts of A imals	CHAPTER Line
Motio of Animals——On the Motion of A imals	
Gait f Animals——On the Gait of Animals	
Generation f Animals——On the Generatio of Animals	OOK, CHAPTER, Line
Ethics——N omachean Ethics	
Po ics	CH PTER para raph
The Athenian Constitution	BOOK CHAPTER, Line
R etoric	CH PTER, Line
Poetics——On Poetics	
10 H PPOCR TE (*fl* 400 B.C.)	
Th Oath	——
Ancient Medicine——On Ancient Medicine	paragraph
Airs Waters Places——On Airs Waters and Places	
Progn stics——Th Book f Prognostics	
Regimen in Acute Disease——O Regimen in Acute Diseases	paragraph PPENDIX
Epidemics——Of e Epidemics	BOOK SECTIO paragraph CASE
Injuries f the H d——On Injuries f the H ad	paragraph
Surgery——On the Surgery	
F acture ——On F actures	
Articulations——On the Articulations	
Instruments f Reduc	

Volume Number Author and Title — *Author's Divisions Cited*

SOPHOCLES (*c* 495–406 B C)

Oedipus the King
Oedipus at Colonus
Antigone
Ajax
Electra
Trachiniae
Philoctetes — Line

EURIPIDES (*c* 480–406 B C)

Rhesus
Medea
Hippolytus
Alcestis
Heracleidae
The Suppliants
The Trojan Women
Ion
Helen
Andromache
Electra
The Bacchantes
Hecuba
Heracles Mad
The Phoenician Maidens
Orestes
Iphigenia Among the Tauri
Iphigenia at Aulis
The Cyclops — Line

5 ARISTOPHANES (*c* 445–*c* 380 B C)

The Acharnians
The Knights
The Clouds
The Wasps
The Peace
The Birds
The Frogs
The Lysistrata
The Thesmophoriazusae
The Ecclesiazusae
The Plutus — Line

6 HERODOTUS (*c* 484–*c* 425 B C)

The History — BOOK

6 THUCYDIDES (*c* 460–*c* 400 B C)

Peloponnesian War——*The History of the Peloponnesian War* — BOOK

7 PLATO (*c* 428–*c* 348 B C)

Charmides
Lysis
Laches
Protagoras
Euthydemus
Cratylus
Phaedrus
Ion
Symposium
Meno
Euthyphro
Apology
Crito
Phaedo
Gorgias
The Republic
Timaeus
Critias
Parmenides
Theaetetus
Sophist
Statesman
Philebus
Laws
The Seventh Letter —— except *Republic* and *Laws* BOOK

Volume Number Author and Title		Author's Divisions Cited

14 PLUTARCH (c 46-c 120 A D)

[The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans]

Theseus
Romulus
Romulus Theseus—Romulus and Theseus Compared
Lycurgus
Numa Pompilius
Lycurgus Numa—Lycurgus and Numa Compared
Solon
Poplicola
Poplicola Solon—Poplicola and Solon Compared
Themistocles
Camillus
Pericles
Fabius
Fabius Pericles—Fabius and Pericles Compared
Alcibiades
Coriolanus
Alcibiades Coriolanus—Alcibiades and Coriolanus Compared
Timoleon
Aemilius Paulus
Aemilius Paulus Timoleon—Aemilius Paulus and Timoleon Compared
Pelopidas
Marcellus
Marcellus Pelopidas—Marcellus and Pelopidas Compared
Aristides
Marcus Cato
Aristides Marcus Cato—Aristides and Marcus Cato Compared
Philopoemen
Flamininus
Flamininus Philopoemen—Flamininus and Philopoemen Compared
Pyrrhus
Caius Marius
Lysander
Sulla
Lysander Sulla—Lysander and Sulla Compared
Cimon
Lucullus
Cimon Lucullus—Cimon and Lucullus Compared
Nicias
Crassus
Crassus Nicias—Crassus and Nicias Compared
Sertorius
Eumenes
Eumenes Sertorius—Eumenes and Sertorius Compared
Agesilaus
Pompey
Agesilaus Pompey—Agesilaus and Pompey Compared
Alexander
Caesar
Phocion
Cato the Younger
Agis
Cleomenes
Tiberius Gracchus
Caius Gracchus
Caius and Tiberius Gracchus Agis and Cleomenes—Caius and Tiberius Gracchus and Agis and Cleomenes Compared
Demosthenes
Cicero
Demosthenes Cicero—Demosthenes and Cicero Compared
Demetrius
Antony
Antony Demetrius—Antony and Demetrius Compared
Dion
Marcus Brutus
Brutus Dion—Brutus and Dion Compared
Aratus
Artaxerxes
Galba
Otho

Volume Number	*Author and Title*	*Author's Divisions Cited*
10	HIPPOCRATES (continued)	
	Aphorisms	SECTION paragraph
	The Law	paragraph
	Ulcers—On Ulcers	paragraph
	Fistulae—On Fistulae	paragraph
	Hemorrhoids—On Hemorrhoids	paragraph
	Sacred Disease—On the Sacred Disease	—
10	GALEN (*c* 130–*c* 200 A D)	
	Natural Faculties—On the Natural Faculties	BOOK, CHAPTER
11	EUCLID (*fl c* 300 B C)	
	Elements—The Thirteen Books of Euclid's Elements	BOOK DEFINITION POSTULATE COMMON NOTION PROPOSITION LEMMA
11	ARCHIMEDES (*c* 287–212 B C)	
	Sphere and Cylinder—On the Sphere and Cylinder Books I II	BOOK DEFINITION ASSUMPTION PROPOSITION COROLLARY LEMMA
	Measurement of a Circle	PROPOSITION
	Conoids and Spheroid—On Conoids and Spheroids	DEFINITION LEMMA PROPOSITION
	Spirals—On Spirals	PROPOSITION DEFINITION
	Equilibrium of Planes—On the Equilibrium of Planes Books I II	BOOK POSTULATE PROPOSITION
	The Sand Reckoner	—
	Quadrature of the Parabola	PROPOSITION DEFINITION
	Floating Bodies—On Floating Bodies Books I II	BOOK POSTULATE PROPOSITION
	Book of Lemmas	PROPOSITION
	Method—The Method Treating of Mechanical Problems	PROPOSITION
11	APOLLONIUS OF PERGA (*c* 262–*c* 200 B C)	
	Conics—On Conic Sections	BOOK DEFINITION PROPOSITION
11	NICOMACHUS OF GERASA (*fl c* 100 A D)	
	Arithmetic—Introduction to Arithmetic	BOOK
12	LUCRETIUS (*c* 98–*c* 55 B C)	
	Nature of Things—On the Nature of Things	BOOK Line
12	EPICTETUS (*c* 60–*c* 138 A D)	
	The Discourses	BOOK CHAPTER
12	AURELIUS (MARCUS AURELIUS) (121–180 A D)	
	The Meditations	BOOK SECTION
13	VIRGIL (70–19 B C)	
	The Eclogues	Number of Eclogue Line
	The Georgics	Number of Georgic Line
	The Aeneid	BOOK Line

Volume Number Author and Title		Author's Divisions Cited
22 CHAUCER GEOFFREY (continued)		
[The Canterbury Tales]		
The Squire's Tale	The Tale of Melibeus	paragraph
The Words of the Franklin	The Monk's Prologue	
The Franklin's Prologue	The Monk's Tale	
The Franklin's Tale	The Prologue of the Nun's Priest's Tale	
The Physician's Tale	The Nun's Priest's Tale	
The Words of the Host	Epilogue to the Nun's Priest's Tale	
The Prologue of the Pardoner's Tale	The Second Nun's Prologue	
The Pardoner's Tale	The Second Nun's Tale	
The Shipman's Prologue	The Canon's Yeoman's Prologue	
The Shipman's Tale	The Canon's Yeoman's Tale	
The Prioress's Prologue	The Manciple's Prologue	
The Prioress's Tale	The Manciple's Tale	
Prologue to Sir Thopas	The Parson's Prologue	
Sir Thopas	The Parson's Tale	paragraph
Prologue to Melibeus	L'Envoi	——
23 MACHIAVELLI NICCOLO (1469-1527)		
The Prince		CHAPTER
23 HOBBES THOMAS (1588-1679)		
Leviathan—Leviathan, or Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil		INTRODUCTION, PART, CONCLUSION
24 RABELAIS FRANÇOIS (1495-1553)		
Gargantua and Pantagruel		BOOK
25 MONTAIGNE MICHEL EYQUEM DE (1533-1592)		
The Essays		——
26 SHAKESPEARE WILLIAM (1564-1616)		
1st Henry VI—The First Part of King Henry the Sixth	Richard II—The Tragedy of King Richard the Second	
2nd Henry VI—The Second Part of King Henry the Sixth	A Midsummer-Night's Dream	
3rd Henry VI—The Third Part of King Henry the Sixth	King John—The Life and Death of King John	
Richard III—The Tragedy of King Richard the Third	The Merchant of Venice	
The Comedy of Errors	1st Henry IV—The First Part of King Henry the Fourth	
Titus Andronicus	2nd Henry IV—The Second Part of King Henry the Fourth	
The Taming of the Shrew	Much Ado About Nothing	
The Two Gentlemen of Verona	Henry V—The Life of King Henry the Fifth	
Love's Labour's Lost	Julius Caesar	
Romeo and Juliet	As You Like It	PROLOGUE, ACT, SCENE, EPILOGUE, Line

Volume Number	Author and Title	Author's Divisions Cited
15	TACITUS, P. CORNELIUS (c. 55–c. 117 A.D.)	
	The Annals *The Histories*	BOOK
16	PTOLEMY (c. 100–c. 178 A.D.)	
	The Almagest	BOOK
16	COPERNICUS, NICOLAUS (1473–1543)	
	Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres——*On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres*	BOOK
16	KEPLER, JOHANNES (1571–1630)	
	Epitome——*Epitome of Copernican Astronomy*, IV and V	BOOK
	The Harmonies of the World, V	—
17	PLOTINUS (205–270)	
	First Sixth Ennead——*The Six Enneads*	TRACTATE, CHAPTER
18	AUGUSTINE, SAINT (354–430)	
	The Confessions	BOOK, paragraph
	The City of God	BOOK, PREFACE, CHAPTER
	Christian Doctrine——*On Christian Doctrine*	PREFACE, BOOK, CHAPTER
19	AQUINAS, SAINT THOMAS (c. 1225–1274)	
	The Summa Theologica, First Part; Part I of the Second Part, Questions 1–48	PROLOGUE, PART, QUESTION, ARTICLE, ANSWER, CONTRARY, REPLY
20	AQUINAS, SAINT THOMAS	
	The Summa Theologica, Part I of the Second Part (continued), Questions 49–114; Part II of the Second Part, Questions 1–46, 179–189; Third Part, Questions 1–26, 60–65; Supplement to the Third Part, Questions 69–99	PROLOGUE, PART, QUESTION, ARTICLE, ANSWER, CONTRARY, REPLY
21	DANTE ALIGHIERI (1265–1321)	
	The Divine Comedy, HELL, PURGATORY, PARADISE	Number of Canto, Line
22	CHAUCER, GEOFFREY (c. 1340–1400)	
	Troilus and Cressida	BOOK, STANZA
	[*The Canterbury Tales*]	Line, except prose parts (see below)
	The Prologue	
	The Knight's Tale	
	The Miller's Prologue	
	The Miller's Tale	
	The Reeve's Prologue	
	The Reeve's Tale	
	The Cook's Prologue	
	The Cook's Tale	
	Introduction to the Man of Law's Prologue	
	The Prologue of the Man of Law's Tale	
	The Tale of the Man of Law	
	The Wife of Bath's Prologue	
	The Tale of the Wife of Bath	
	The Friar's Prologue	
	The Friar's Tale	
	The Summoner's Prologue	
	The Summoner's Tale	
	The Clerk's Prologue	
	The Clerk's Tale	
	The Merchant's Prologue	
	The Merchant's Tale	
	Epilogue to the Merchant's Tale	

Vol me Number Author and Title — Author s D ισιο s Cited

22 CHAUCER GEOFFRE (cont nued)

[The Ca terb ry Tale]

The Sq e s Tale
The W rd of the Frankl n
The Fra kl s Pr logue
The F a kl n s Tale
Th Physician s Tale
The W rds f the H st
The P l gue f the Pard ner s Tale
The Pa d n s T le
The Sh pman s P l g e
The Sh pman T le
The Prio es s P lo ue
The Pri ress s Tale
P ol gue to S r Th pas
Sı Th pas
Pr logue to Melibeus
The Tale of Melibeus
The Monk s Prologue
The Monk s Ta e
The Prologue of the Nun s Priest s Tale
The Nun s Priest s Tale
Epil gue to the N n s Priest s Tale
The Seco d Nun s Prologue
The Se nd N n s Tale
Th Canon s Y oman s Prologue
The Canon s Yeoman s Tale
The Mancipl s Prolog e
The Manc ple s Tale
The Pa son s Prologue
The P rson s Tale
L Envoi

paragraph (to The Tale of Melibeus) … para raph (to The P rson s Tale) —

23 M CHIAV LLI N o ò (469-1527)
The Pr ce — CHAPTER

23 Ho B THOM s (588 1679)
Levi than—Levi tha o M tter Form and Power f a Comm u lth Ecclesiastic l and C vil — INTRODUCTION PART CONCLUSION

24 R BE I FR I (c 49 553)
Garg ntı a d P nt uel — BOOK

25 M NTA N M HEL E QUE DE (533 1592)
Th Ess ys — —

26 SHAK S E RE WILLI (564 616)

1st H ry VI—Th F rst Pa t f I g H ry tl S xth
2 d He nry VI—Th Seco d Part f Ki Hen y th Sixth
3 d H nry VI—Th Third P t f K g He ry the S xth
Rich d III—Th T edy f K g R l a d the Th d
The C m dy of Error
Tıt A d ıcus
Th T m g f the Sh w
Th Two G tl m of Vero
Lo Labo l st
R o a d Jul t
R hard II—The Tragedy of King Rich d the Second
A M dsum er N ght s Dream
Ki g John—The Life and De th of K g John
Th Mer h t of V
1 t H nry IV—Th F rst P t of K g H ry the Fo th
2 d Hen y IV—The Second Part of K g H ry the F u th
M l Ado About Notl ng
He ry V—The L f f K g Henry the F fth
J l s C sar
As Y Lik It — PR LOGU T SC N EP L OGUE Line

Volume Number	*Author and Title*	*Author's Divisions Cited*
15	TACITUS, P. CORNELIUS (*c.* 55–*c.* 117 A.D.)	
	The Annals *The Histories*	BOOK
16	PTOLEMY (*c.* 100–*c.* 178 A.D.)	
	The Almagest	BOOK
16	COPERNICUS, NICOLAUS (1473–1543)	
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16	KEPLER, JOHANNES (1571–1630)	
	Epitome——*Epitome of Copernican Astronomy*, IV and V	BOOK
	The Harmonies of the World, V	—
17	PLOTINUS (205–270)	
	First Sixth Ennead——*The Six Enneads*	TRACTATE, CHAPTER
18	AUGUSTINE, SAINT (354–430)	
	The Confessions	BOOK, paragraph
	The City of God	BOOK, PREFACE, CHAPTER
	Christian Doctrine——*On Christian Doctrine*	PREFACE, BOOK, CHAPTER
19	AQUINAS, SAINT THOMAS (*c.* 1225–1274)	
	The Summa Theologica, First Part, Part I of the Second Part, Questions 1–48	PROLOGUE, PART, QUESTION, ARTICLE, ANSWER, CONTRARY, REPLY
20	AQUINAS, SAINT THOMAS	
	The Summa Theologica, Part I of the Second Part (continued), Questions 49–114, Part II of the Second Part, Questions 1–46, 179–189, Third Part, Questions 1–26, 60–65, Supplement to the Third Part, Questions 69–99	PROLOGUE, PART, QUESTION, ARTICLE, ANSWER, CONTRARY, REPLY
21	DANTE ALIGHIERI (1265–1321)	
	The Divine Comedy, HELL, PURGATORY, PARADISE	Number of Canto, Line
22	CHAUCER, GEOFFREY (*c.* 1340–1400)	
	Troilus and Cressida	BOOK, STANZA
	[*The Canterbury Tales*]	Line, except prose parts (see below)

The Prologue
The Knight's Tale
The Miller's Prologue
The Miller's Tale
The Reeve's Prologue
The Reeve's Tale
The Cook's Prologue
The Cook's Tale
Introduction to the Man of Law's Prologue
The Prologue of the Man of Law's Tale
The Tale of the Man of Law
The Wife of Bath's Prologue
The Tale of the Wife of Bath
The Friar's Prologue
The Friar's Tale
The Summoner's Prologue
The Summoner's Tale
The Clerk's Prologue
The Clerk's Tale
The Merchant's Prologue
The Merchant's Tale
Epilogue to the Merchant's Tale

Line Number Author and Title		Author's Divisions Cited
22 CHAUCER GEOFFREY (continued)		
[*The Canterbury Tales*]		
The Squire's Tale	*The Tale of Melibeus*	paragraph
The Words of the Franklin	*The Monk's Prologue*	
The Franklin's Prologue	*The Monk's Tale*	
The Franklin's Tale	*The Prologue of the Nun's Priest's Tale*	
The Physician's Tale	*The Nun's Priest's Tale*	
The Words of the Host	*Epilogue to the Nun's Priest's Tale*	
The Prologue of the Pardoner's Tale	*The Second Nun's Prologue*	
The Pardoner's Tale	*The Second Nun's Tale*	
The Shipman's Prologue	*The Canon's Yeoman's Prologue*	
The Shipman's Tale	*The Canon's Yeoman's Tale*	
The Prioress's Prologue	*The Manciple's Prologue*	
The Prioress's Tale	*The Manciple's Tale*	
Prologue to Sir Thopas	*The Parson's Prologue*	
Sir Thopas	*The Parson's Tale*	paragraph
Prologue to Melibeus	*L'Envoi*	—
23 MACHIAVELLI NICCOLO (1469-1527)		
The Prince		CHAPTER
23 HOBBES THOMAS (1588-1679)		
Leviathan—*Leviathan or Matter Form and Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and Civil*		INTRODUCTION PART CONCLUSION
24 RABELAIS FRANÇOIS (c 1495-1553)		
Gargantua and Pantagruel		BOOK
25 MONTAIGNE MICHEL EYQUEM DE (1533-1592)		
The Essays		—
26 SHAKESPEARE WILLIAM (1564-1616)		
1st Henry VI—*The First Part of King Henry the Sixth*	*Richard II*—*The Tragedy of King Richard the Second*	
2nd Henry VI—*The Second Part of King Henry the Sixth*	*A Midsummer Night's Dream*	
3rd Henry VI—*The Third Part of King Henry the Sixth*	*King John*—*The Life and Death of King John*	
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The Comedy of Errors	*1st Henry IV*—*The First Part of King Henry the Fourth*	
Titus Andronicus	*2nd Henry IV*—*The Second Part of King Henry the Fourth*	
The Taming of the Shrew	*Much Ado About Nothing*	
The Two Gentlemen of Verona	*Henry V*—*The Life of King Henry the Fifth*	
Love's Labour's Lost	*Julius Caesar*	
Romeo and Juliet	*As You Like It*	PROLOGUE ACT SCENE EPILOGUE Line

Volume Number	*Author and Title*	*Author's Divisions Cited*
27	SHAKESPEARE, WILLIAM	
	Twelfth Night—*Twelfth Night, or, What You Will*	
	Hamlet—*Hamlet, Prince of Denmark*	
	The Merry Wives of Windsor	
	Troilus and Cressida	
	All's Well That Ends Well	
	Measure for Measure	
	Othello—*Othello, the Moor of Venice*	
	King Lear	
	Macbeth	
	Antony and Cleopatra	
	Coriolanus	
	Timon of Athens	
	Pericles—*Pericles, Prince of Tyre*	
	Cymbeline	
	The Winter's Tale	
	The Tempest	
	Henry VIII—*The Famous History of the Life of King Henry the Eighth*	PROLOGUE, ACT, SCENE, EPILOGUE, Line
	Sonnets	Number of Sonnet
28	GILBERT, WILLIAM (1540–1603)	
	Loadstone—*On the Loadstone and Magnetic Bodies*	PREFACE, BOOK
28	GALILEO GALILEI (1564–1642)	
	Two New Sciences—*Concerning the Two New Sciences*	DAY
28	HARVEY, WILLIAM (1578–1657)	
	Motion of the Heart—*On the Motion of the Heart and Blood in Animals*	
	Circulation of the Blood—*On the Circulation of the Blood*	
	On Animal Generation—*On the Generation of Animals*	—
29	CERVANTES, MIGUEL DE (1547–1616)	
	Don Quixote—*The History of Don Quixote de la Mancha*	PART
30	BACON, SIR FRANCIS (1561–1626)	
	Advancement of Learning	—
	Novum Organum	PREFACE, BOOK, APHORISM
	New Atlantis	—
31	DESCARTES, RENÉ (1596–1650)	
	Rules—*Rules for the Direction of the Mind*	Number of Rule
	Discourse—*Discourse on the Method*	PART
	Meditations—*Meditations on First Philosophy*	Number of Meditation
	Objections and Replies—*Objections Against the Meditations and Replies*	DEFINITION, POSTULATE, AXIOM, PROPOSITION
	The Geometry	BOOK
31	SPINOZA, BENEDICT DE (1632–1677)	
	Ethics	PART, PREFACE, DEFINITION, AXIOM, PROPOSITION, DEMONSTRATION, SCHOLIUM, COROLLARY, LEMMA, POSTULATE, EXPLANATION, APPENDIX

Volume Number Author and Title — *Author's Divisions Cited*

32 Milton, John (1608–1674)

[*English Minor Poems*] — Lines except Sonnets and Psalms

Christs Nativity——*On the Morning of Christs Nativity* and *The Hymn*
A Paraphrase on Psalm 114
Psalm 136
The Passion
On Time
Upon the Circumcision
At a Solemn Musick
An Epitaph on the Marchioness of Winchester
Song on May Morning
On Shakespear 1630
On the University Carrier
Another on the Same
L'Allegro
Il Penseroso
Arcades
Lycidas
Comus
Death of a Fair Infant——*On the Death of a Fair Infant*
Vacation Exercise——*At a Vacation Exercise*
The Fifth Ode of Horace——*The Fifth Ode of Horace Lib I*
Sonnets I, VII–XIX
New Forcers of Conscience——*On the New Forcers of Conscience under the Long Parliament*
Lord Gen Fairfax——*On the Lord Gen Fairfax at the siege of Colchester*
Lord Gen Cromwell——*To the Lord Generall Cromwell May 1652*
Sr Henry Vane——*To Sr Henry Vane the Younger*
Mr Cyriack Skinner——*To Mr Cyriack Skinner upon his Blindness*
Psalms I–VIII, LXXX–LXXXVIII
Paradise Lost — BOOK, Line
Samson Agonistes — Line
Areopagitica — —

33 Pascal, Blaise (1623–1662)

The Provincial Letters — —
Pensées — Number of Pensée
Vacuum——*Preface to the Treatise on the Vacuum* and *New Experiments Concerning the Vacuum*
Great Experiment——*Account of the Great Experiment Concerning the Equilibrium of Fluids*
Equilibrium of Liquids and
Weight of Air——*Treatises on the Equilibrium of Liquids and the Weight of the Mass of the Air*
Geometrical Demonstration——*On Geometrical Demonstration*
Arithmetical Triangle——*Treatise on the Arithmetical Triangle*
Correspondence with Fermat——*Correspondence with Fermat on the Theory of Probabilities* — —

34 Newton, Sir Isaac (1642–1727)

Principles——*Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy* — DEFINITION, COROLLARY, SCHOLIUM, LAW, COROLLARY, BOOK, RULE, LEMMA, PROPOSITION, PHENOMENON, HYPOTHESIS
Optics — BOOK

Volume Number	*Author and Title*	*Author's Divisions Cited*
34	Huygens, Christiaan (1629-1695)	
	Light—*Treatise on Light*	PREFACE, CHAPTER
35	Locke, John (1632-1704)	
	Toleration—*A Letter Concerning Toleration*	—
	Civil Government—*Concerning Civil Government, Second Essay*	CHAPTER, SECTION
	Human Understanding—*An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*	INTRODUCTION, BOOK, CHAPTER, SECTION
35	Berkeley, George (1685-1753)	
	Human Knowledge—*The Principles of Human Knowledge*	PREFACE, INTRODUCTION, SECTION
35	Hume, David (1711-1776)	
	Human Understanding—*An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*	INTRODUCTION, SECTION, DIVISION
36	Swift, Jonathan (1667-1745)	
	Gulliver—*Gulliver's Travels*	PART
36	Sterne, Laurence (1713-1768)	
	Tristram Shandy	—
37	Fielding, Henry (1707-1754)	
	Tom Jones—*The History of Tom Jones, A Foundling*	—
38	Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat, Baron de (1689-1755)	
	The Spirit of Laws	BOOK
38	Rousseau, Jean Jacques (1712-1778)	
	Inequality—*On the Origin of Inequality*	—
	Political Economy—*On Political Economy*	—
	The Social Contract	BOOK
39	Smith, Adam (1723-1790)	
	Wealth of Nations—*An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*	INTRODUCTION, BOOK
40	Gibbon, Edward (1737-1794)	
	Decline and Fall—*The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Chapters 1-40	—
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42 KANT, IMMANUEL (1724-1804)	
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Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals—*Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals*	
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Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics—*Preface and Introduction to the Metaphysical Elements of Ethics With a Note on Conscience*	
Intro. Metaphysic of Morals—*General Introduction to the Metaphysic of Morals*	
The Science of Right	
Judgement—*The Critique of Judgement*	—
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43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION	Number of Article, Line
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.	ARTICLE, SECTION, AMENDMENT, Line
43 [HAMILTON, ALEXANDER (1757-1804), MADISON, JAMES (1751-1836), JAY, JOHN (1745-1829)] THE FEDERALIST	PAPERS, BY NUMBER
43 MILL, JOHN STUART (1806-1873)	
Liberty—*On Liberty*	
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44 BOSWELL, JAMES (1740-1795)	
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45 LAVOISIER, ANTOINE LAURENT (1743-1794)	
Elements of Chemistry	PREFACE, PART
45 FOURIER, JEAN BAPTISTE JOSEPH (1768-1830)	
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45 FARADAY, MICHAEL (1791-1867)	
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46 HEGEL, GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH (1770-1831)	
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The Philosophy of History	INTRODUCTION, PART
47 GOETHE, JOHANN WOLFGANG VON (1749-1832)	
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48 MELVILLE, HERMAN (1819-1891)	
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49	DARWIN, CHARLES (1809–1882) *Origin of Species*——*The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection* *Descent of Man*——*The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex*	—
50	MARX, KARL (1818–1883) *Capital*	—
50	MARX, KARL and ENGELS, FRIEDRICH (1820–1895) *Communist Manifesto*——*Manifesto of the Communist Party*	—
51	TOLSTOY, LEO (1828–1910) *War and Peace*	BOOK EPILOGUE
52	DOSTOEVSKY, FYODOR MIKHAILOVICH (1821–1881) *The Brothers Karamazov*	BOOK EPILOGUE
53	JAMES, WILLIAM (1842–1910) *Psychology*——*The Principles of Psychology*	—
54	FREUD, SIGMUND (1856–1939) *The Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis* *Hysteria*——*Selected Papers on Hysteria*, Chapters 1–10 *The Sexual Enlightenment of Children* *Psycho-Analytic Therapy*——*The Future Prospects of Psycho-Analytic Therapy* *"Wild" Psycho-Analysis*——*Observations on "Wild" Psycho-Analysis* *The Interpretation of Dreams* *Narcissism*——*On Narcissism* *Instincts*——*Instincts and Their Vicissitudes* *Repression* *The Unconscious* *General Introduction*——*A General Introduction to Psycho-Analysis* *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* *Group Psychology*——*Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* *The Ego and the Id* *Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety* *War and Death*——*Thoughts for the Times on War and Death* *Civilization and Its Discontents* *New Introductory Lectures*——*New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*	—

THE GREAT IDEAS I

Chapters 1–50 ANGEL *to* LOVE

Chapter 1 ANGEL

INTRODUCTION

INFLUENCED by a long tradition of religious symbolism in painting and poetry, our imagination responds to the word "angel" by picturing a winged figure robed in dazzling white and having the bodily aspect of a human being.

This image, common to believers and unbelievers, contains features which represent some of the elements of meaning in the abstract conception of angels as this is found in the writings of Jewish and Christian theologians and in related discussions by the philosophers. The human appearance suggests that angels, like men, are persons; that they are most essentially characterized by their intelligence. The wings suggest the function of angels—their service as messengers from God to man. The aura of light which surrounds them signifies, according to established conventions of symbolism, the spirituality of angels. It suggests that to imagine angels with bodies is to use a pictorial metaphor.

Another interpretation might be put upon this aura of light if one considers the role which the notion of angel has played in the history of thought. Whatever that notion has entered into discussions of God and man, of matter, mind and soul, of knowledge and love, and even of time, space, and motion, it has cast light upon these other topics. The illumination which has been and can be derived from the idea of angels as a special kind of being or nature is in no way affected by doubts or denials of their existence.

Whether such beings exist or not, the fact that they are conceivable has significance for theory and analysis. Those who do not believe in the existence—or even the possible existence—of utopias nevertheless regard them as fictions useful analytically in appraising accepted realities. What an ideal society would be like can be considered apart from the question of its existence, and so considered it functions as an hypothesis in political and economic thought. What sort of being an angel would be if one existed can likewise serve as an hypothesis in the examination of a wide variety of theoretical problems.

The idea of angels does *in fact* serve *in precisely this way* as an analytical tool. It sharpens our understanding of what man is, how his mind operates, what the soul is, what manner of existence and action anything would have apart from matter. Hence it suggests how *matter* and its motions in time and space determine the characteristics of corporeal existence. Pascal's remark—that "*man is* neither angel nor brute, and the unfortunate thing is that he who would act the angel acts the brute"—*points to the different conceptions* of man which result from supposing him to be either angel or brute *rather than neither*. Such views of human nature considered *in* the chapters on ANIMAL and MAN cannot be fully explored without reference to theories of the human mind or soul in its relation to matter and to body. As the chapters on MIND and SOUL *indicate*, theories carrying the names of Plato and Descartes, which attribute to the human mind or soul the being and powers of a *purely* spiritual substance or entity seem to place man in the company of the angels. *In this* tradition Locke applies the word "*spirits*" equally to human minds and to supra*human intelligences*.

IT WOULD BE misleading to suppose that the idea of angels is primarily a construction of the philosophers—a fiction invented for their analytical purposes, or that it is simply their conception of a supramundane reality concerning the existence and nature of which they dispute. In the literature of western civilization angels first appear by name or reference in the Old

and the New Testaments Readers of the Bible will remember many scenes in which an angel of the Lord performs the mission of acquainting man with God s will Among the most memorable of such occasions are the visits of the angels to Abraham and Lot and the angelic ministry of Gabriel in the Annunciation to Mary

In one book of the Bible Tobias (Tobit as it is called in the King James Apocrypha) one of the leading characters is the angel Raphael Through most of the story he appears as a man but at the end after he has accomplished his mission he reveals his identity I am the angel Raphael he declares

one of the seven who stand before the Lord

And when they had heard these things they were troubled and being seized with fear they fell upon the ground on their face

And the angel said to them Peace be to you Fear not

For when I was with you I was there by the will of God bless ye him and sing praises to him

I seemed to eat and to drink with you but I use an invisible meat and drink which cannot be seen by men

It is time therefore that I return to him that sent me

And when he had said these things he was taken from their sight and they could see him no more

As A RESULT of scriptural exegesis and commentary the angels become a fundamental topic for Jewish theologians from Philo to Maimonides and for such Christian theologians as Augustine Scotus Erigena Gregory the Great Aquinas Luther Calvin Pascal and Schleiermacher They figure in the great poetry of the Judaeo Christian tradition—in the *Divine Comedy* of Dante in *Paradise Lost* of Milton and in Chaucer s *Canterbury Tales* and Goethe s *Faust*

The philosophers especially in the 17th and 18th centuries are motivated by Scripture or provoked by theology to consider the existence the nature and the activity of angels Hobbes for example attacks the supposition that angels are immaterial on the ground that the notion of incorporeal substance is self contradictory and undertakes to re interpret all the scriptural passages in which angels are described as spirits After examining a great many he says that to mention all the places of the Old Testament where the name of Angel is found would be too long Therefore to comprehend them all at once I say there is no text in that part of the Old Testament which the Church of England holdeth for Canonical from which we can conclude there is or hath been created any permanent thing (understood by the name of *Spirit* or *Angel*) that hath not quantity and in sum which is not (taking Body for that which is somewhat or somewhere) Corporeal

All the passages can be interpreted Hobbes thinks simply in the sense in which angel means messenger and most often a messenger of God which signifies anything that makes known his extra ordinary presence" If instead of existing only when they carry God s word to men the angels are supposed to have permanent being then they must be corporeal As *in the resurrection men shall be permanent* and not incorporeal Hobbes writes so therefore also are the angels To men that understand the signification of these words *substance* and *incorporeal*—and mean by incorporeal having no body at all not just a *subtile* body—the words taken together imply a contradiction Hence Hobbes argues that to say an angel or spirit is (in that sense) an incorporeal substance is to say in effect that there is no angel or spirit at all Considering therefore the signification of the word *angel* in the Old Testament and the nature of dreams and visions that happen to men by the ordinary way of nature Hobbes concludes that the angels are nothing but supernatural apparitions of the fancy raised by the special and extraordinary operation of God thereby to make his presence and commandments known to mankind and chiefly to his own people

Locke seems to take the exactly opposite position Asserting that we have no clear or distinct idea of substance in general he does not think spirits any less intelligible than bodies The idea of *corporeal substance* he writes is as remote from our conceptions and apprehensions as that of *spiritual substance* or spirit and therefore from our not having any notion of the substance of spirit we can no more conclude its non existence than we can for the same reason deny the existence of body Just as we form the complex idea of bodies by supposing their qualities such as figure and motion or color and weight to co exist in some substratum so by supposing the activities we find in ourselves—such as thinking understanding

willing knowing and the power of beginning motion etc —to co-exist in some substance we are able to frame the *complex idea of an immaterial spirit*

Not only does Locke think that we have as clear a perception and notion of immaterial substances as we have of material but he also finds the traditional doctrine of a hierarchy of angels quite acceptable to reason It is not impossible to conceive nor repugnant to reason that there may be many species of spirits as much separated and diversified one from another by distinct properties whereof we have no ideas as the species of sensible things are distinguished one from another by qualities which we know and observe in them

Locke goes even further—beyond the mere possibility of angels to the likelihood of their real existence His reasoning resembles the traditional argument of the theologians on this difficult point When we consider the infinite power and wisdom of the Maker he writes we have *reason to think* that it is suitable to the magnificent harmony of the Universe and the great design and infinite goodness of the Architect that the species of creatures should also by gentle degrees ascend upward from us toward his infinite perfection as we see they gradually descend from us downwards

Such speculations concerning the existence and the order of angels are usually thought to be the province of the theologian rather than the philosopher But Bacon like Locke does not think it unfitting for the philosopher to inquire into such matters In natural theology—for him a part of philosophy—Bacon thinks it is improper from the contemplation of *nature* and the principles of *human* reason to dispute or urge anything with vehemence as to the mysteries of faith But it is otherwise he declares as to the nature of spirits and angels this being neither unsearchable nor forbid but in a great part level to the human mind on account of their affinity

He does not further instruct us concerning angels in the *Advancement of Learning* but in the *Novum Organum* he throws light *on* their nature as well as ours by touching on one characteristic difference between the human and the angelic mind Discussing there the theory of induction he holds that it is only for God (the bestower and creator of forms) and perhaps for angels or intelligences at once to recognize forms affirmatively at the first glance of contemplation.

UNLIKE MOST of the great ideas with which we are concerned the idea of angel seems to be limited in its historical scope It is not merely that since the 18th century the discussion has dwindled but also that the idea makes no appearance in the great books of pagan antiquity —certainly not in the strict sense of the term whereby angel signifies a creature of God spiritual in substance and nature and playing a role in the divine government of the universe

There are nevertheless analogous conceptions in the religion and philosophy of the ancients and in philosophy at least the points of resemblance between the analogous concepts are sufficiently strong to establish a continuity of discussion Furthermore elements in the thought of Plato Aristotle and Plotinus exercise a critical influence on Judaeo-Christian angelology

Gibbon relates how the early Christians made the connection between the gods of polytheism and their doctrine about angels It was the universal sentiment both of the church and of *heretics*, he writes that the daemons were the authors the patrons and the objects of idolatry Those rebellious spirits who had been *degraded from the rank of angels* and cast *down into the infernal pit* were still permitted to roam upon the earth to torment the bodies and to seduce the minds of sinful men The daemons soon discovered and abused the natural propensity of the human heart *towards* devotion and artfully withdrawing the adoration of mankind from their Creator they usurped the place and honors of the Supreme Deity

In the polytheistic religions of antiquity the demi gods or inferior deities are beings superior in nature and power to man The polytheist and the philosopher the Greek and the barbarian writes Gibbon were alike accustomed to conceive a long succession an infinite chain of angels or daemons or deities, or aeons or emanations, issuing from the throne of light *In* Plato s *Symposium* for example Diotima tells Socrates that Love is intermediate be-

tween the divine and the mortal and interprets between gods and men conveying and taking across to the gods the prayers and sacrifices of men and to men the commands and replies of the gods he is the mediator who spans the chasm which divides them Love Diotima explains is only one of these spirits and intermediate powers which are many and diverse

Such demi gods are intermediate by their very nature Although superhuman in knowledge and action they still are not completely divine Occupying a place between men and gods they are according to Plato by nature neither mortal nor immortal Their existence is necessary to fill out the hierarchy of natures They are links in what has come to be called the great chain of being

The analogy with the angels arises primarily from this fact of hierarchy Both pagan and Christian religions believe in an order of supernatural or at least superhuman beings graded in perfection and power In both these beings serve as messengers from the gods to men they act sometimes as guardians or protectors sometimes as traducers deceivers and enemies of man But the analogy cannot be carried much further than this The angels according to Christian teaching are not inferior gods or even demi gods As compared with the intermediate spirits of pagan religion they are less human in character as well as less divine Nevertheless the reader of the great poems of antiquity will find a striking parallelism between the heavenly insurrection which underlies the action of *Prometheus Bound* and the angelic warfare in *Paradise Lost*

In the writings of Plato Aristotle and Plotinus philosophical inquiry turns from the sensible world of material things to consider the existence and nature of an order of purely intelligible beings As there is an inherent connection between being perceptible to the senses and being material so that which is purely intelligible must be completely immaterial If ideas exist independently—in their own right and apart from knowing or thinking minds—then they *constitute* such an order of purely intelligible entities

At this point a number of difficult questions arise Are the intelligibles also intelligences i e are they an order of knowers as well as a realm of knowables? Can they be regarded as substances? And if so do they have a mode of action appropriate to their mode of being—action which is other than knowing action which in some way impinges on the course of events or the motions of the physical world?

Plotinus answers affirmatively that the purely intelligible beings are also pure intelligences but he does not conceive them as having any power or action except that of knowledge Another answer to these questions given in antiquity and the Middle Ages is that the intelligences are the celestial motors the movers of the heavenly bodies Since we see Aristotle write that besides the simple spatial movement of the universe which we say that the first and unmovable substance produces there are other spatial movements—those of the planets—which are eternal (for a body which moves in a circle moves eternally) each of *these* movements also must be caused by a substance both unmovable in itself and eternal These secondary movers Aristotle thinks are of the same number as the movements of the stars and not only must they be eternal and unmovable as is the prime mover but also without magnitude or immaterial

Plato offers an alternative hypothesis—that the celestial bodies are alive and have souls This hypothesis like Aristotle s tends in the Middle Ages to be restated in terms of the theory of angels Aquinas reports Augustine as thinking that if the heavenly bodies are really living beings their souls must be akin to the angelic nature He himself holds that spiritual substances are united to them as movers to things moved the proof of which he says lies in the fact that whereas nature moves to one fixed end in which having attained it it rests this does not appear in the movement of the heavenly bodies Hence it follows that they are moved by some intellectual substances

The question whether intelligences govern the planets also occupies the attention of an astronomer like Kepler Although he denies any need for such intelligences—among other reasons because planetary motion is not circular but elliptical—he argues that the celestial movements are the work either of the natural power of the bodies or else a work of the soul

acting uniformly in accordance with those bodily powers." But whether or not they are to be regarded as *movers* as well as *knowers* and *knowables*, the intelligences represent for ancient and mediaeval thought a mode of being exempt from the vicissitudes of physical change even as it is separate from matter.

WHEN MODERN philosophers consider spirits or spiritual beings they seldom deal with the ancient speculations about pure intelligibles or separate intelligences without being influenced by the theological doctrine of angels which developed in mediaeval thought.

The extent of this doctrine may be judged from the fact that the *Summa Theologica* of Aquinas contains a whole treatise on the angels, as well as additional questions on the speech of angels, their hierarchies and orders, the division between the good and the bad angels, and their action on men—the guardianship of the good angels and the assaults of the demons. That these additional questions are contained in the treatise on divine government throws some light on their theological significance.

The primary fact about the angelic nature is immateriality. An angel is immaterial both in its substantial being and in its characteristic activity which, says Aquinas, is "an altogether immaterial mode of operation." Being immaterial, they are also incorruptible. "Nothing is corrupted except by its form being separated from the matter.... Consequently," Aquinas writes, "a subject composed of matter and form ceases to be actually when the form is separated from the matter. But if the form subsists in its own being, as happens in the angels, it cannot lose its being." To signify that they are intelligences existing apart from matter, the angels are sometimes called "subsisting forms" and sometimes "separate substances."

Although they are imperishable in being and have immortal life, the angels are not like God eternal. "That *heaven of heavens* which Thou *createdst in the beginning* is some intellectual creature," Augustine writes, but it is in no ways coeternal unto Thee." As created the angels have a beginning. Yet while not eternal, neither are they temporal creatures in continual flux, but according to Augustine they "partake of Thy eternity ... through the sweetness of that most happy contemplation of Thyself ... cleaving close unto Thee, placed beyond all the rolling vicissitudes of times." It is for this reason that the angels are spoken of as aeviternal.

The familiar question concerning the number of angels able to stand on a needle's point—if it was ever asked by mediaeval theologians—merely poses the problem of how an incorporeal substance occupies space. The way in which Aquinas discusses angels in relation to place discloses how the question serves to raise generally significant issues concerning the nature of space and quantity and their relation to causality. He points out that a body occupies place in a circumscribed fashion, *i.e.*, its dimensive quantity is contained within the space, whereas "an angel is said to be in a corporeal place by application of the angelic power in any manner whatever to the place.... An incorporeal substance virtually contains the thing with which it comes into contact, and is not contained by it."

To an objector who thinks that since, unlike bodies, angels do not fill a place, several can be in the same place at the same time, Aquinas replies that two angels cannot be in the same place because "it is impossible for two complete *causes to be immediately the cause of one and the same thing*." Since an angel is where he acts, and since by the power of his action he contains the place at which he acts, "*there can* not be but one angel at one place."

Angels are also said to go from one place to another without traversing the intervening space and without the lapse of time. Considering their immateriality, such *action* is less remarkable for angels to perform than is the action of electrons, which, according to modern quantum mechanics, jump from outer to inner orbits of the atom without taking time or passing through *inter-orbital space*.

The immateriality of angels has other consequences which throw comparative light on the conditions of corporeal existence. In the world *of physical* things we ordinarily think of a species as including a number of individuals. While all men have the same specific nature they differ numerically or individually. But because angels are immaterial substances, it is held that each angel *is* a distinct species. "Things which agree in species but differ in

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number Aquinas explains agree in form but are distinguished materially If therefore the angels are not composed of matter and form it follows that it is impossible for two angels to be of one species

Furthermore as Aquinas states in another place among incorporeal substances there can not be diversity of number without diversity of species and inequality of nature Each species is necessarily higher or lower than an other so that the society of angels is a perfect hierarchy in which each member occupies a dis tinct rank No two angels are equal as on the supposition that they share in the same specific humanity all men are Yet such names as sera phim and cherubim and the distinction be tween archangels and angels indicate an organi zation of spiritual substances into various groups—according to the tradition into nine orders or subordinate hierarchies

The nine orders or ranks of angelic being are described by Dante in the *Paradiso* as dis tinct circles of love and light Using these meta phors he thus reports his vision of the heavenly hierarchy I saw a Point which was raying out light so keen that the sight on which it blazes must needs close because of its intense bright ness Perhaps as near as a halo seems to girdle the light which paints it when the vapor that bears it is most dense at such distance around the Point a circle of fire was whirling so rapidly that it would have surpassed that mo tion which most swiftly girds the world and this was girt around by another and that by the third and the third then by the fourth by the fifth the fourth and then by the sixth the fifth Thereon the seventh followed so wide spread now in compass that the messenger of Juno entire would be narrow to contain it So the eighth and ninth

Beatrice explains to him how the relation of the circles to one another and to the Point which is God depends upon their measure of love and truth whereby there is in each heaven a marvellous agreement with its Intelli gence of greater to more and of smaller to less She then amplifies her meaning The first cir cles have shown to thee the Seraphim and the Cherubim Thus swiftly they follow their own bonds in order to liken themselves to the Point as most they can and they can in proportion as they are exalted to see Those other loves which go around them are called Thrones of the divine aspect because they terminated the first triad The next triad that in like man ner bourgeons in this sempiternal spring which the nightly Aries despoils not perpetually sin Hosannah with three melodies which sound in the three orders of joy first Dominations and then Virtues the third order is of Powers Then in the two penultimate dances the Prin cipalities and Archangels circle the last is wholly of Angelic sports These orders all gaze upward and downward so prevail that towards God all are drawn and all draw

The theory of angels raises many questions regarding the similarity and difference between them and disembodied souls But for compari son with men perhaps the most striking con e quences of the theory of angels as bodiless in telligences concern the manner of their knowl edge and government The comparison can be made on quite different views of the nature of man and the soul In fact diverse conceptions of man or the soul can themselves be compared by reference to the angelic properties which one conception attributes to human nature and another denies

Lacking bodies the angels are without sense perception and imagination Not being im mersed in time and motion they do not reason or think discursively as men do by reasoning from premises to conclusion Whereas human intellects according to Aquinas obtain their perfection in the knowledge of truth by a kind of movement and discursive intellectual opera tion as they advance from one known thing to another the angels from the knowledge of a known principle straightway perceive as known all its consequent conclusions with no discursive process at all Their knowledge is intuitive and immediate not by means of concepts abstracted from experience or other wise formed but through the archetypal ideas infused in them at their creation by God That is why Aquinas goes on to say angels are called *intellectual* beings as contrasted with such *rational* natures as human souls which ac quire knowledge of truth discursively If men possessed the fulness of intellectual light like the angels then in the first grasping of princi

ples they would at once comprehend their whole range by perceiving whatever could be reasoned out from them.

It would appear from this that conceptions of the human intellect which minimize its dependence on sense and imagination, and which emphasize the intuitive rather than the discursive character of human thought, attribute angelic power to man. The same may be said of theories of human knowledge which account for its origin in terms of innate ideas or implanted principles. Still another example of the attribution of angelic properties to man is to be found in the supposition that human beings can communicate with one another by telepathy. The angels are telepathic; one angel, it is said, can make its ideas known to another simply by an act of will and without any exterior means of communication.

Lacking bodies, the angels are without bodily emotions, free from the human conflict between reason and passion, and completely directed in their love—or the motion of their will—by what they know. In the *Divine Comedy* Beatrice speaks of the angelic society as one in which "the Eternal Love disclosed himself in new loves." Adverting to the division between the good and the bad angels, she tells Dante: "those whom thou seest here were modest in grateful recognition of the Goodness which had made them apt for intelligence so great, wherefore their vision was exalted with illuminant grace and by their merit, so that they have full and steadfast will.... Yet their vision and love of God is not equal. In heaven the *Primal Light* that irradiates it all is received *in it* by as many modes as are the splendors with which the Light pairs Itself. Wherefore, since the affection follows upon the act that conceives, *in this nature* the sweetness of love *diversely* glows and warm."

Such a society, governed by knowledge and love, has no need for the application of *coercive force*, for angels are ordered to one another in such a way that no misunderstandings or disagreements can occur among them. The philosophical anarchist who proposes the ideal of a human society without restraint or coercion seems, therefore, to be angelizing men, or at least to be wishing for heaven on earth. Conceiving government on earth in other *terms* the writers of *The Federalist* remark that "if men were angels, no government would be necessary." If they had considered that the angelic society is governed by love alone and without force, they might have said, "if men were angels, no coercion would be necessary in their government."

ONE OF THE GREAT theological dogmas asserts that from the beginning the angels are divided into two hosts—the good and evil spirits. The sin of Lucifer or Satan and his followers is that of disobedience or rebellion against God, motivated by a pride which refuses to be satisfied with being less than God. As Satan himself says in *Paradise Lost*:

> pride and worse Ambition threw me down
> Warring in Heav'n against Heav'ns matchless King ...
> All his good prov'd ill in me,
> And wrought but malice; lifted up so high
> I sdeind subjection, and thought one step higher
> Would set me highest, and in a moment quit
> The debt immense of endless gratitude ...
> And that word
> Disdain forbids me, and my dread of shame
> Among the spirits beneath, whom I seduc'd
> Then to submit, boasting I could subdue
> Th' Omnipotent.

The theologians try to define precisely the *nature* of Satan's pride in wishing to be God. "*To be as God*," Aquinas *explains*, "can be understood in two ways: first, by equality; secondly, by likeness. An angel could not seek to be as God in the first way, because by natural knowledge he knew that this was impossible.... *And* even supposing it were possible, it would be *against natural* desire, because there exists in everything the natural desire to preserve *its* own nature, which would not be preserved were *it* to be changed into another nature. Consequently no *creature* of a lower nature can ever covet the grade of a higher *nature*, just as an ass does not desire to be a horse."

"It must be in the other way," then, Aquinas thinks, that Satan sinned by wishing to be like God. But this requires further explanation. "To *desire to be as God* according to likeness can happen in two ways. In one way, as to that likeness whereby everything is likened unto God. And so, if anyone desire in this way to be Godlike, he commits no sin, provided *that he* desires such likeness in proper order, that is to

say that he may obtain it from God But he would sin were he to desire to be like God even in the right way but of his own power and not of God s In another way he may desire to be like God in some respect which is not natural to one *e g* if one were to desire to create heaven and earth which is proper to God in which desire there would be sin

In this last way Aquinas asserts the devil desired to be as God Not that he desired to resemble God by being subject to no one else absolutely for thus he would be d siring his own non being since no creature can exist except by participating under God But he desired as the last end of his beatitude something which he could attain by virtue of his own nature turning his appetite away from the supernatural beatitude which is attained by God s grace

In the original sin of Lucifer and the other fallen angels as well as in all subsequent intervention by Satan or his demons in the affairs of men lie the theological mysteries of the origin of evil in a world created by God s love and goodness and of the liberty of those creatures who while free can only do God s will As indicated in the chapter on SIN the fall of Adam from grace and innocence involves the same mysteries Man s destiny is connected with the career of Lucifer in traditional Christian teaching not only on the side of sin but also with regard to man s redemption—salvation replacing the fallen angels by the souls of the elect in the heavenly choir

Among the most extraordinary moments in our literature are those in which Lucifer talks with God about mankind as in *Paradise Lost* or about a particular man as in the Book of Job or in the Prologue in Heaven in *Faust* Their pagan parallel is the speech of Prometheus to a silent Zeus but Prometheus unlike Satan is man s benefactor and he can defy Zeus because the Fates whose secret he knows rule over the gods Lucifer on the contrary seems always to be in the service of God When he appears to Ivan in the *Brothers Karamazov* he protests I love men genuinely and against the grain I serve to produce events and do what is irrational because I am commanded to If it were otherwise the warfare between the powers of light and darkness would have to be construed as a battle between equals which according to Christian orthodoxy is the Manichean heresy that regards the world as the battle ground of the forces of good and evil

The word angelic usually has the connotation of perfect moral goodness but that must not lead us to forget that the demons are angelic in their nature although of a diabolical or evil will Nor should the fact of Satan s subservience to God cause us to forget that Christian theology tries not to underestimate the power of the devil in his goings and comings on earth Satan tried to tempt even Christ and throughout the New Testament the destruction of the diabolical influence over men occupies a prominent place The intervention of the devil in man s life provides if not the theme the background of Goethe s *Faust*

As the theory of demonic influences and diabolical possession is an integral part of the traditional doctrine of angels so in modern times demonology has been a major focus of attack upon theological teaching concerning spirits Moralists have thought it possible to explain human depravity without recourse to the seductions of the devil and psychiatrists have thought it possible for men to go mad or to behave as if bewitched without the help of evil spirits The idea of the devil according to Freud is a religious fiction— the best way out in acquittal of God for those who try to reconcile the undeniable existence of evil with His omnipotence and supreme goodness

The characteristic skepticism of our age has been directed against the b lief in angels generally It casts doubt by satire or denies by argument the existence of spirits both good and evil Yet all arguments considered it may be wondered whether the existence of angels—or in philosophical terms the existence of pure intelligences—is or is not still a genuine issue Or a there two issues here one philosophical and the other theological one to be resolved or left unresolved on the level of argument the other to be answered dogmatically by the declarations of a religious faith?

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to For example in **4** Homer *Iliad* BK II [265–283] **12d** the number **4** is the number of the volume in the set the number **12d** indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12

Page Sections When the text is printed in one column the letters **a** and **b** refer to the upper and lower halves of the page For example in **53** James *Psychology* **116a 119b** the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119 When the text is printed in two columns the letters **a** and **b** refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters **c** and **d** to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page For example in **7** Plato *Symposium* **163b 164c** the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164

Author's Divisions One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases e g *Iliad* BK II [265–283] **12d**

Bible References The references are to book chapter and verse When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (*D*) follows e g Old Testament *Nehemiah* 7 45—(*D*) *II Esdras* 7 46

Symbols The abbreviation esp calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface

1 Inferior deities or demi gods in polytheistic religion

4 Homer *Iliad* BK VIII **51a 56d** esp [1 40] **51a b** BK XIV [135–360] **99c 101d** BK XV [1 235] **104a 106c** BK XVIII [368 467] **133d 134d** BK XX **142a 147d** BK XXI [383–513] **152a 153c** / *Odyssey* BK V [1–147] **208a 209c** BK IX [231–280] **231c 232a** BK XIII [125 164] **256b d**

5 Aeschylus *Prometheus Bound* **40a 51d** / *Eumenides* **81a 91d**

5 Sophocles *Trachiniae* **170a 181a c** / *Philoctetes* [1409–1471] **194d 195a c**

5 Euripides *Rhesus* [890–982] **210d 211d** / *Hippolytus* **225a 236d** esp [1 55] **225a c** [1268–1440] **235b 236d** / *Alcestis* **237a 247a c** / *Trojan Women* [1–97] **270a 271a** / *Ion* **282a 297d** / *Helen* **298a 314a c** / *Andromache* [1 26–1 88] **325c 326a c** / *Electra* [1233–1359] **338b 339a c** / *Bacchantes* **340a 352a c** / *Heracles Mad* **365a 377d** esp [1–59] **365a c** / *Orestes* [1625 1693] **410b d**

5 Aristophanes *Clouds* [595 626] **496a b** / *Peace* **526a 541d** / *Birds* **542a 563d** esp [571–638] **549d 550d** [1109–1261] **557c 558b** [1494 1693] **560c 562d** / *Frogs* **564a 582a c** / *Plutus* **629a 642d**

6 Herodotus *History* BK I **21d 22a 31a b 48c** BK II **58a 60d 79d 80c 82d 83b** BK IV **155c 156a** BK VIII **266c d**

7 Plato *Protagoras* **44a 45a** / *Euthydemus* **81d 82b** / *Cratylus* **92b 97d** / *Phaedrus* **116b d 122c 125b** passim esp **124d 125a 130d 131a 141c** / *Symposium* **152b 153b d 159d 161a 163a 164c** / *Euthyphro* **193a-c** / *Apology* **204c 205c** / *Republic* BK II III **320d 328a** / *Timaeus* **452b** / *Critias* **481c-482a** / *Statesman* **588a 589c** / *Laws* BK II **653a c 662c d** BK IV **680c 684a** passim BK VII **730a d** BK X **757d 771b**

8 Aristotle *Metaphysics* BK III CH 4 [1000 8 18] **518d 519a** BK XII CH 8 [1074^b 1 14] **604d 605a**

9 Aristotle *Rhetoric* BK III CH 18 [1419 8 13] **673d 674a**

12 Lucretius *Nature of Things* BK I [1–41] **1a c** BK II [581 660] **22b 23b** BK V [396–404] **66b**

12 Epictetus *Discourses* BK I CH 3 **108b-c** CH 12 **118d 120b** CH 14 **120d 121c** BK II CH 16 **158b d** BK IV CH 4 **226d 228a** CH 11 **240d 241a**

12 Aurelius *Meditations* BK II SECT 11 **258a b**

13 Virgil *Aeneid* **103a 379a** esp BK I [223 233] **109a** [297–304] **111a** [657–694] **121a 122a** BK IV [218–258] **173a 174a** BK X [1–117] **302a 305a**

2. The philosophical consideration of pure intelligences spiritual substances supra-human persons

2a The celestial motors or secondary prime movers: the intelligences attached to the celestial bodies

(2 *The philosophical consideration of pure intelligences spiritual substances suprahuman persons 2a The celestial motors or secondary prime movers the intelligences attached to the celestial bodies*)

174b c CH 35 177c CH 42 180d 181b TR VIII CH 2 202a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 47 A 1 ANS 256a 257b Q 50 A 3 ANS and REP 3 272a 273b Q 51 A 3 REP 3 277a 278c Q 52 A 2 279b 280a Q 66 A 2 ANS 345d 347b Q 70 A 3 365b 367a Q 76 A 6 REP 3 396a d Q 110 A 1 REP 2-3 564c 565d A 3 ANS 566d 567b Q 115 A 4 REP 1 589d 590c Q 117 A 4 REP 1 599b d PART I-II Q 6 A 5 REP 2 648b 649a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL Q 91 A 2 REP 10 1017c 1020c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL VII [67-96] 10b c PARADISE I [103 126] 107b c II [112-138] 109a VIII [16-39] 116d 117a [97-114] 118a XIII [52-72] 126a XXVIII 148d 150b XXIX [37-45] 150c

28 GILBERT *Loadstone* BK V 104b 105d

2b Our knowledge of immaterial beings

17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR VIII CH 8-10 132d 136a

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XII par 2-9 99c 101c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 50 A 2 ANS 270a 272a Q 84 A 7 REP 3 449b 450b Q 88 AA 1-2 469a 472c Q 94 A 2 503a 504a Q 111 A 1 REP 3 568c 569b PART I-II Q 3 A 6 ANS 627b 628a A 7 628a d

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL Q 92 A 1 ANS and REP 9 1025c 1032b

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 41d 42a

31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 122c

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XV SECT 11 165a b CH XXIII SECT 5 205a b SECT 13 207d 208b SECT 15 37 208c 214b BK III CH VI SECT 11-12 271b 272b CH XI SECT 23 305a b BK IV CH III SECT 17 317c SECT 27 321d 322a CH VI SECT 14 336a b CH XI SECT 12 357c d CH XVI SECT 12 370b 371a

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 27 418a b SECT 81 428c d SECT 89 430b c SECT 135-145 440a 442a

3 The conception of angels in Judaeo Christian doctrine

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK VIII XII 264b d 360a c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I QQ 50-64 269a 338d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE XXVIII XXIX 148d 151d

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART III 174b 176d

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I 93a 110b esp [84-191] 95b 97b [423-431] 102b BK V [769-904] 192a 195a BK VI [320 353] 203a 204a

3a The first creatures of God their place in the order of creation

OLD TESTAMENT *I Kings* 8 27—(D) *III Kings* 8 27 / *II Chronicles* 2 6 6 18—(D) *II Paralipomenon* 2 6 6 18 / *Psalms* 8 4-5 115 16 148 4—(D) *Psalms* 8 5-6 113 16 148 4 / *Isaiah* 6 1-3—(D) *Isaias* 6 1 3 / *Ezekiel* 1—(D) *Ezechiel* 1 / *Daniel* 7 10

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 18 10 / *John* 1 51 / *Acts* 23 8 / *Hebrews* 1 2 esp 1 1-8 2 1-9 / *I Peter* 3 22 / *Revelation* 5 11-14—(D) *Apocalypse* 5 11 14

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XII 99b 110d BK XIII par 4 111c / *City of God* BK XI 322b d 342a c BK XXII CH 1 586b d 587b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 45 A 5 ANS and REP 1 245c 247a Q 47 A 1 ANS 256a 257b A 2 ANS 257b 258c Q 50 AA 1 3 269b 273b Q 61 314d 317c Q 62 A 1 317d 318c A 3 319c 320b Q 65 AA 3 4 341c 343c Q 66 A 3 ANS and REP 3 347b 348d A 4 ANS and REP 1 348d 349d Q 67 A 4 ANS and REP 4 352a 354a Q 85 A 1 ANS 451c 453c Q 90 A 3 482c-483a

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XII [25 27] 70 PARADISE VII [121-148] 116b c XIX [40-51] 135c XXIX [1-48] 150b d

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART III 174d

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK III 132b c

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 17c d

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [86-102] 137a b BK V [800-868] 192b 194a / *Samson Agonistes* [667-673] 354a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 140 199a b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH VI SECT 11 12 271b 272b BK IV CH XVI SECT 12 370b 371a

3b The angelic nature

OLD TESTAMENT *Psalms* 103 20-22 104 4—(D) *Psalms* 102 20-22 103 4 / *Isaiah* 6 1 3—(D) *Isaias* 6 1-3 / *Ezekiel* 1 10—(D) *Ezechiel* 1 10

NEW TESTAMENT *Hebrews* 1 2 esp 1 1-8 / *II Peter* 2 10-11 / *Revelation* 18 1—(D) *Apocalypse* 18 1

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XII par 7 100d 101a par 9 101b c par 12 101d 102a par 18-22 103b 104a / *City of God* BK XXI CH 1 560a d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I QQ 50-53 269a 284d Q 79 A 1 REP 3 414a d Q 87 A 1 ANS and REP 2 3 465a-466c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE XXIX [1 48] 150b d [127 145] 151c d

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART III 174b 176d

31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 218d 225d 226a

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I [84-191] 95b 97b [423-431] 102b BK V [800-868] 192b 194a BK VI [320-353] 203a 204a

33 Pascal *Provincial Letters* 87a-88a
35 Locke *Human Understanding* bk ii ch x sect 9, 143a b bk iii ch vi sect 11 12 271b-272b

3e The eternity and incorruptibility of angels

18 Augustine *Confessions* bk xii par 9 101b-c par 12 101d 102a par 15 16 102b-103a par 18-22, 103b-104a par 28 105c / *City of God*, bk xii ch 15 351b-352d bk xiii ch 1 360a b
19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 1 3, a 5 and rep 42c-43b aa 5-6 44b-46d q 50, a 5 274b-275a q 61 a 2 315c 316a q 97 a 1 ans 513c 514c q 104 a 1 a 5 and rep 1 3 534c 536c
21 Dante *Divine Comedy* p r di vii [64-69] 115d [1 148] 116b-c
23 Hobbes *Leviathan* p rt iii 175d 176d
24 Rabelais *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, bk iii 173a-c
32 Milton *Paradise Lost* bk i [6-159] 96a 9 a bk ii [31 95] 113 b bk [846-860] 193b-194a [859-892] 194b bk vi [96-35] 202b-204 esp [370-353] 203a 204a [430-436] 205b

3f The angelic intellect and angelic knowledge

Old Testament *Genesis*, 16—1 18 9-15 22 5 18 / *Jd* 5 6 1 16 13—14 / *II Samuel*, 14:20—(D) *II Kings*, 14:20 / *Daniel*, 10-1
New Testament *Matthew* 24 35 36 / *Mark* 13:28-3 *I Timothy* 3 16 / *I Peter* 12 / *Revelation* 18:21 24 2 9-22—(D) *Apocalypse* 5:2 24 9-22
18 Augustine *Confessions* bk xii par 2 101d 102a par 6 102d 103a par 2 103c-d / *City of God*, bk x ch 20-22 296a 297 bk x ch 2 299d 300a bk x ch 1 328d-329b ch 3 15 329c 331 ch 9 339a b bk x ch 6 426c 42 bk xxii, ch 586b d 58 b ch 9, 614b-d
19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* p rt i q 2, a and r 2 31d 32 q 2 a 4 rep 2 53b-54c qq 54-58 284d 305b q 64 1 334 335c q 5 a 3 384d 385c q 9 1 r 3 414 -d 2 s 414d-416a 8 ans and 3 421 -422b 1 a s 423d-424d q 8 442b-443c a 3 r 1 443d 444d a 449b-450b q 85, a 1 a s 451 453c 5 a s 45 d-458d q 8 a and 465a-466c a 3 a s 46 b-468a q 89, 3 a 4 5d-4 6c a 4 ans 4 6c-4 q 11 a 597 598c p r 1-11 q 6 2 628d 629c
20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* pa t -i q 50 6 11 12 q 5 1 a nd p 2 12b-13c -1 q 5, aa 1 2 410a-412
21 Dante *Divine Comedy* p rad e, xix [40-5] 135c x [3 2] 139a b x vii [95-1] 149d 150a xxix [6 -84] 151 [12 145] 151 -d

30 Bacon *Novum Organum*, bk ii aph 15 149
32 Milton *Paradise Lost* bk i [24 255] 98b-99a bk ii [142 151] 114b bk iii [654 735] 149b-151b esp [681-693] 150a-b bk v [355-505] 183b-185a esp [388-413] 183b-184a, [469-505] 185b-185a bk vi [66-79] 233b-234a
33 Pascal *Pensées* 5 2 4
35 Locke *Human Understanding* bk ii ch x sect 9 143a-c ch xxiii sect 13 207d 208b sect 36 213c-d bk iii ch vi sect 3 268d ch xi s ct 23 305a b bk iv ch iii sect 6 315a b sect 23 320a-c ch xvii, sect 14 378c-d
35 Berkeley *Human Knowledge* sect 81 428c-d
36 Sterne *Tristram Shandy* 318b

3g The angelic will and angelic love

18 Augustine *Confessions* bk xii par 9 101b-c par 12 13 101d 102b par 15 102b-c par 18 103b-c par 21 22, 103d 104a par 28 105c / *City of God* bk ix, ch 0- 2 296a 29 a bk x ch 7 302d 303a bk x 1 ch 3 343d-344b ch 6-9 345b-348b bk xxii ch 1 586b d 587b
19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* p rt i qq 59-60 306b-314c q 62 a 318d 319c q 64 aa 2 3 335d-33 c
20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* p rt i-ii q 50 a 6 11 12a p rt ii-ii q 5 a 2 411b-412a
21 Dante *Divine Comedy* p rad se iii [31-39] 117a xxiii [70-139] 142a-c xx iii 148d 150b esp [106-114] 150a xxix [55-66] 150d 151 [12 145] 151c-d
32 Milton *Paradise Lost* bk v [535-543] 187 bk iii [61 -643] 245b-246a
35 Locke *Human Understanding* bk i ch xxi sect 50-51 191b-c
47 Goethe *Faust* p rt ii [1 6-6-824] 294a 287b [1 854 12 11] 288b-294b

3f Angelic action: its characteristics in general

19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* p rt i q 45 a 5 ans and rep 1 245c 247a qq 51-53 275a 284d q 91 a 2 r p 1 485b-486b 4 rep 2 48 d-488c qq 106-107 545c 552b qq 10-111 564c 571d
23 Hobbes *Leviathan* p rt i 174c 175c d
32 Milton *Paradise Lost* bk iii [10 114] 234b
35 Locke *Human Understanding* bk ii ch xxi s ct 13 207d 208b

3g The angelic hierarchy: the inequality, order and number of the angels and their relation to one another

Old Testament *Psalms* 80 1—(D) *Psalms* 79:2 / *Isaiah* 6 1 3 16—(D) *Isaias*, 6 1-3 3 16 / *Ezekiel*, 10 11:22—(D) *Ezechiel*, 10 11:2 / *Daniel*,
Apocrypha *T* 1 15 1—(D) OT *Tobias* 1 15

(3 *The conception of angels in Judaeo-Christian doctrine 3g The angelic hierarchy the inequality order and number of the angels and their relation to one another*)

NEW TESTAMENT *Colossians* 1 16 / *I Thessalonians* 4 16—(D) *I Thessalonians* 4 15 / *Hebrews* 12 22-23 / *Jude* 9 / *Revelation* 5 11—(D) *Apocalypse* 5 11

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XII par 12 102a par 31 106c d / *City of God* BK VIII CH 24 283b BK XXII CH 30 617c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 47 A 2 ANS 257b 258c Q 50 AA 3-4 272a 274b Q 63 A 7 331c 332b A 9 REP 3 333b d QQ 106-109 545c 564b PART I II Q 4 A 5 REP 6 632c 634b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q 8 A 4 759b d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE II [112-138] 109a XXVIII 148d 150b XXIX [127 145] 151c d

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 17d

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK V [600 904] 188b 195a esp [769-799] 192a b [809 845] 193a b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK IV CH III SECT 27 321d 322a CH XVI SECT 12 370c 371a

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 81 428c d

47 GOETHE *Faust* PROLOGUE [243-270] 7a b PART II [11 844-12 111] 288a 294b

4 Comparison of angels with men and with disembodied souls their relation to the blessed in the heavenly choir

OLD TESTAMENT *Job* 4 18 19 / *Psalms* 8 4 5—(D) *Psalms* 8 5-6

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 22 23 33 / *Mark* 12 18-27 / *Luke* 20 27 38 / *I Corinthians* 6 2-3 / *Hebrews* 1 13-14 2 7 12 22 23 / *Revelation* 22 8-9—(D) *Apocalypse* 22 8 9

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XII par 23 104b c / *City of God* BK VII CH 30 261d BK VIII CH 14 18 273d 277a CH 25 283b c BK IX CH 5 13 288b 292d CH 22 296d 297a BK XI CH 29 339a b BK XIII CH 1 360a b BK XVI CH 6 426c 427a BK XXI CH 10 569d 570b BK XXII CH 9 614b d / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 23 630a c CH 30 632c 633b CH 33 633d 634b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 7 A 2 REP 2 31d 32c Q 23 A 1 REP 3 132c 133b Q 47 A 2 ANS 257b 258c Q 51 A 1 ANS and REP 2 3 275b 276b QQ 54-60 284d 314c passim Q 62 317c 3 5b passim Q 66 A 3 ANS and REP 3 347b 348d Q 75 A 7 384d 385c Q 76 A 2 REP 1 388c 391a A 5 ANS 394c 396a Q 79 A 1 REP 3 414a d A 2 ANS 414d 416a A 8 ANS and REP 3 421c 422b Q 84 A 3 REP 1 443d 444d A 7 ANS 449b 450b Q 85 A 1 ANS 451c 453c A 5 ANS 457d-458d Q 87 A 1 ANS and REP 3 465a 466c A 3 ANS 467b-468a Q 89 A 3 ANS 475d 476c A 4 ANS 476c 477a A 7 REP 2 478d 479c Q 93 A 3 493d 494c Q 97 A 1 ANS 513c 514 Q 108 A 1 ANS 552c 553c A 8 561a 562a Q 117 A 2 597c 598c PART I II Q 2 A 3, REP 1 617b 618a Q 4 A 5 REP 6 632c 634b Q 5 A 1 REP 1 636d 637c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 50 A 6 11a 12a Q 51 A 1 ANS and REP 2 12b 13c PART II II Q 5 A 2 411b-412a PART III Q 6 A 3 REP 2 742a 743a Q 8 A 4 759b d PART III SUPPL, Q 69 A 3 REP 5 887d 889c Q 70 A 3 CONTRARY 897d 900d Q 89 A 3 1007d 1008b A 8 1011b-1012a Q 95 A 4 1046d 1047d Q 96 A 9 1062d 1063b Q 99 A 3 1081d 1083a

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE IV [28 48] 111a VII [121 148] 116b c VIII [22 39] 116d 117a XIX [40-66] 135c d XXI [73 102] 139a b XXIX [13-36] 150b c XXXI 153b 154c XXXII [85-114] 155c d

27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT II SC II [314 322] 43d

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 80d 81a / *Novum Organum* BK II APH 15 149a

32 MILTON *At a Solemn Musick* 13a b / *Paradise Lost* BK II [345 353] 118b 119a BK III [654 735] 149b 151b esp [681 693] 150a b BK IV [358 365] 160a b BK V [388 450] 183b 185a [469-505] 185b 186a BK VI [316 353] 203a 204a BK VIII [66-178] 233b 236a BK X [888 908] 293b 294a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 140 199a b 418 243a 603 326b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH X SECT 9 143a c CH XXIII SECT 13 207d 208b BK IV CH III SECT 17 317c CH XVII SECT 14 378c d

36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 318b 319a 394a

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 51 163b c

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 363a b

47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [11 894 12 111] 289b 294b

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK VII 295b c

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK II 22c 23a

5 The distinction and comparison of the good and the bad angels

OLD TESTAMENT *Job* 4 18

NEW TESTAMENT *II Peter* 2 4 / *Jude* 6

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X par 67 88b c / *City of God* BK IX 285b d 298a c passim BK XI 322b d 342a c passim esp CH 11 13 328d 330b CH 19 20 332b 333a BK XII CH 1-9 342b d 348b BK XXII CH 1 586b d 587b / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 33 633d 634a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 47 A 2 ANS 257b 258c QQ 63-64 325b 338d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE XXIX [49-81] 150d 151a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART III 174d 175a PART IV 258d 259b

o 6a

2 M LTON Parad e Lost BK I 93a 110b esp [1, 52] 94 99b [587-615] 106a b BK II [2 9 53] 116 117a [477 485] 121b BK III [(13 742] 148b 151b BK IV [1 130] 152b-155a [88 1015] 169b 174b BK V [5,7] BK VI [912] 187b-216a pa im

47 G ET IE Faust PROLOGUE [243 292] 7a 8a

48 MEL ILLE Moby D ck 219b

The or gi of the division between angels a d demons the sin of Luc fer or Satan

OLD TE TAMENT Isa ah 14 4 27—(D) Isaias 14 4

APO RYP I W sdom f S lomon 2 24—(D) OT Book of W sdom 2 24 25

NEW TEST MENT II Peter 2 4 / Jude 6 / Revela i n 2 7 1 —(D) Apoc lypse 12 7 10

18 A GUSTINE Confessio s K X par 67 88b c / C ty f God BK XI c 1 9-20 326d 333a BK XI C 1 3 343d 344b II (-9 345b 348b BK XX I CH 1 586b d 587b

19 AQU N S S ma Th ol g ca P RT I Q 47 2 257b 258c Q 63 325b 333d

21 DA T D e Comedy IE L III [22-51] 4b c XXXI [28 3(] 51c U G T R XII [25 27] 70c P R D SE X X [40-5] 135c XXIX [49 6(] 150d 151a

22 C UCER Mo k s Tale [4 005-012] 434a

30 B Ad cement of Learn ng 81a

3 M LTON Pa ase Lost BK I 93a 110b esp [27 83] 94 95a BK IV [32 104] 153a 154b B V [600-904] 188b 195a

47 GOETHE Fa t P RT [10 75 21] 246 247

5 DO OE K B thers Ka ama BK XI 344c d

56 The soc ety f the demons the rule of Sat n o er the powers of da kness

APOC YP Eccle astic s 39 28—(D) OT Eccl s i ci 39 33 34

NEW TE T Matth 9 34 1 25 12 22 30 / Ma k 3 2 / Luk 1 14 23 / Joh 8 31 59 / Eph 1 2 1 3 6 2 / Hebre s 2 13 15 / I J h 3 8 2 / Revel t on 2 9 3 9 1 1 18 2—(D) Ap caly e 2 9 13 9 1 11 18 2

18 A X 1 C ty f G d BK XX C 1 11 541a-c / Christ an Doctr ne BK 1 I CH 37 673d-674

19 AQ S m a Theol gi a PART I Q 63 A 8-9 332 333d Q 109 562 564b

21 D T Divine Comedy I ELL 1a 52d esp V II [5] X [103] 11c 13b X III [19 39] 25c d XX X 1 130a 34c XX 1 [1 43] 41b-c XXXIV [6-31] 51c

22 C E T a s T le [6957-7220] 279a 283b / S mm ner Prol g e 284b 285a

23 H B E Le than P RT III 195 PART IV 247 248a

3 M TO Par d Lost K I [24 263] 98b-99a BK I [1-5] 111a 122b esp [11 42] 111b-112 BK I [89-92] 154b BK V [(00-904] 188b 195

33 PASC L Provincial Letters 116a

4 GOET E Fa st P T I [2338 2604] 56b 63b e P [2465 531] 60a 61b [3835 4222] 93b 103a P RT II [11 636-675] 283a 284a

6 The role of the angels in the government of the universe

OLD TESTA ENT Genesis 3 24 28 12 / Ps l s 103 20- 2—(D) Psalms 102 20 22 / Dan el 7 10 / Zechariah 1 7 21 4 1-6 8—(D) Zach a rias 1 7 21 4 1-6 8

NE TESTA ENT Matthew 24 31 / Mark 13 27 / John 1 51 / Revelation 5 2 11 14 8 2 pa m—(D) Apocalypse 5 2 11 14 8 20 pas s m

18 AUGUSTINE City of God BK II CH 30 261d BK VIII CH 24 283a b BK X CH 15 308a b C 1 21 311c 312a BK XII CH 27 359c 360a c BK XVI CH 5-6 426a c BK XXII CH 1 586b d

19 AQUIN S S mma The logica PART I Q 45 A 5 ANS and REP 1 245c 247a Q 63 A 7 ANS 331c 332b Q (4 A 4 ANS 337d 338d Q 66 A 3 RE 2 337b 348d Q 89 A 8 REP 2 479c 480c Q 91 A 2 REP 1 3 485b 486b A 4 REP 2 487d 488c QQ 106 114 545c 585c

21 D NTE D i e Comedy HELL VII [(7-96] 10b c PURGATORY II [10-51] 54c 55a III [22 36] 64c X [1 3(] 75b-d XVII [40 63] 78d 79a XXIV [133 154] 91a b PAR DI E II [112 138] 109a VIII [91 148] 117d 118c XIII [52 72] 126a XXVIII [1 0-129] 150a XXIX [3 45] 150b c

24 RA L IS Garga tua and Pantag uel B II 117d

32 MILTON Parad se Lost BK II [119 134] 113b 114a [237 249] 116b [402 416] 120a BK VII [550 601] 229a 230a / A eopag tica 410a

6 The ministry of the good angels in the affa rs of men g ard ansh p

OLD TEST MENT Genesis 16 7 12 18 1 19 22 21 9 21 22 1 19 24 40 32 1 2 24-, 48 15 16 / Exod s 14 19 20 23 20-23 3 34 33 2 / N mbers 0 16 22 22 35 / Joshua 5 13 15—(D) Jos e 5 13 16 / J dges 2 1 4 6 11 24 13 / II Sam el 24 15 17—(D) II K gs 24 15 17 / I K g 1 5-8—(D) III Kings 19 5 8 / II K gs 19 32 35—(D) IV K gs 19 32 35 / I Cl nicl s 21 11 30—(D) I Pa al po n n 21 11 30 / II Ch on cles 32 21—(D) II Para l p menon 32 21 / Psalms 34 7 35 5-6 91 1 1 —(D) Psa ms 33 8 34 5-6 9 10 13 Isa ah 6 6-7 37 36—(D) Isaias 6 6-7 37 36 / Da l 3 28 6 22 8 12—(D) Dan el 3 95 62 8 12 / Hosea 12 2 4—(D) Osee 1 2 4 / Zech riah 1 7 21 3—(D) Zacha ias 1 7 21 3

APO RYPHA Tob t 3 17 5 12—(D) OT Tobias 3 25 5 12 / Ba u ch 6 7—(D) OT Ba ch 6 6 / S g f Th e Ch l re 25 26—(D) OT Da l 3 49-50 / Bel and Dr g n 31 42—(D) OT D l 14 30-41

(3 The conception of angels in Judaeo-Christian doctrine 3g The angelic hierarchy: the inequality, order, and number of the angels and their relation to one another.)

NEW TESTAMENT: *Colossians*, 1:16 / *I Thessalonians*, 4:16—(D) *I Thessalonians*, 4:15 / *Hebrews*, 12:22-23 / *Jude*, 9 / *Revelation*, 5:11—(D) *Apocalypse*, 5:11

18 AUGUSTINE: *Confessions*, BK XII, par 12 102a; par 31 106c-d / *City of God*, BK VIII, CH 24 283b; BK XXII, CH 30 617c

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART I, Q 47, A 2, ANS 257b-258c; Q 50, AA 3-4 272a-274b; Q 63, A 7 331c-332b; A 9, REP 3 333b-d; QQ 106-109 545c-564b; PART I-II, Q 4, A 5, REP 6 632c-634b

20 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART III, Q 8, A 4 759b-d

21 DANTE: *Divine Comedy*, PARADISE, II [112-138] 109a; XXVIII 148d-150b; XXIX [127-145] 151c-d

30 BACON: *Advancement of Learning*, 17d

32 MILTON: *Paradise Lost*, BK V [600-904] 188b-195a esp [769-799] 192a-b, [809-845] 193a-b

35 LOCKE: *Human Understanding*, BK IV, CH III, SECT 27 321d-322a; CH XVI, SECT 12 370c-371a

35 BERKELEY: *Human Knowledge*, SECT 81 428c-d

47 GOETHE: *Faust*, PROLOGUE [243-270] 7a-b; PART II [11,844-12,111] 288a-294b

4 Comparison of angels with men and with disembodied souls: their relation to the blessed in the heavenly choir

OLD TESTAMENT: *Job*, 4:18-19 / *Psalms*, 8:4-5—(D) *Psalms*, 8:5-6

NEW TESTAMENT: *Matthew*, 22:23-33 / *Mark*, 12:18-27 / *Luke*, 20:27-38 / *I Corinthians*, 6:2-3 / *Hebrews*, 1:13-14; 2:7, 12; 2:3 / *Revelation*, 22:8-9—(D) *Apocalypse*, 22:8-9

18 AUGUSTINE: *Confessions*, BK XII, par 23 104b-c / *City of God*, BK VII, CH 30 261d; BK VIII, CH 14-18 273d-277a; CH 25 283b-c; BK IX, CH 5-13 288b-292d; CH 22 296d-297a; BK XI, CH 29 339a-b; BK XIII, CH 1 360a-b; BK XVI, CH 6 426c-427a; BK XXI, CH 10 569d-570b; BK XXII, CH 29 614b-d / *Christian Doctrine*, BK I, CH 23 630a-c; CH 30 632c-633b; CH 33 633d-634b

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART I, Q 7, A 2, REP 2 31d-32c; Q 23, A 1, REP 3 132c-133b; Q 47, A 2, ANS 257b-258c; Q 51, A 1, ANS and REP 2-3 275b-276b; QQ 54-60 284d-314c passim; Q 62 317c-325b passim; Q 66, A 3, ANS and REP 3 347b-348d; Q 75, A 7 384d-385c; Q 76, A 5, REP 1 388c-391a; A 5, ANS 394c-396a; Q 79, A 1, REP 3 414a-d; A 2, ANS 414d-416a; A 8, ANS and REP 3 421c-422b; Q 84, A 3, REP 1 443d-444d; A 7, ANS 449b-450b; Q 85, A 1, ANS 451c-453c; A 5, ANS 457d-458d; Q 87, A 1, ANS and REP 3 465a-466c; A 3, ANS 467b-468a; Q 89, A 3, ANS 475d-476c; A 4, ANS 476c-477a; A 7, REP 2 478d-479c; Q 93, A 3 493d-494c; Q 97, A 1, ANS 513c-514c; Q 108, A 1, ANS 552c-553c; A 8 561a-562a; Q 117, A 2 597c-598c; PART I-II, Q 3, A 3, REP 1 617b-618a; Q 4, A 5, REP 6 632c-634b; Q 5, A 1, REP 1 636d-637c

20 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART I-II, Q 50, A 6 11a-12a; Q 51, A 1, ANS and REP 2 12b-13c; PART II-II, Q 5, A 2 411b-412a; PART III, Q 6, A 3, REP 2 742a-743a; Q 8, A 4 759b-d; PART III SUPPL, Q 69, A 3, REP 5 887d-889c; Q 70, A 3, CONTRARY 897d-900d; Q 89, A 3 1007d-1008b; A 8 1011b-1012a; Q 95, A 4 1046d-1047d; Q 96, A 9 1062d-1063b; Q 99, A 3 1081d-1083a

21 DANTE: *Divine Comedy*, PARADISE, IV [28-48] 111a; VII [121-148] 116b-c; VIII [22-39] 116d-117a; XIX [40-66] 135c-d; XXI [73-102] 139a-b; XXIX [13-36] 150b-c; XXXI 153b-154c; XXXII [85-114] 155c-d

27 SHAKESPEARE: *Hamlet*, ACT II, SC II [314-322] 43d

30 BACON: *Advancement of Learning*, 80d-81a / *Novum Organum*, BK II, APH 15 149a

32 MILTON: *At a Solemn Musick* 13a-b / *Paradise Lost*, BK II [345-353] 118b-119a; BK III [654-735] 149b-151b esp [681-693] 150a-b; BK IV [358-365] 160a-b; BK V [388-450] 183b-185a; [469-505] 185b-186a; BK VI [316-353] 203a-204a; BK VIII [66-178] 233b-236a; BK X [888-908] 293b-294a

33 PASCAL: *Pensées*, 140 199a-b; 418 243a; 793 326b

35 LOCKE: *Human Understanding*, BK II, CH X, SECT 9 143a-c; CH XXIII, SECT 13 207d-208b; BK IV, CH III, SECT 17 317c; CH XVII, SECT 14 378c-d

36 STERNE: *Tristram Shandy*, 318b-319a; 394a

43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 51, 163b-c

44 BOSWELL: *Johnson*, 363a-b

47 GOETHE: *Faust*, PART II [11,894-12,111] 289b-294b

51 TOLSTOY: *War and Peace*, BK VII, 295b-c

52 DOSTOEVSKY: *Brothers Karamazov*, BK II, 22c-23a

5 The distinction and comparison of the good and the bad angels

OLD TESTAMENT: *Job*, 4:18

NEW TESTAMENT: *II Peter*, 2:4 / *Jude*, 6

18 AUGUSTINE: *Confessions*, BK X, par 67 88b-c / *City of God*, BK IX 285b-d; 298a-c passim; BK XI 322b-d; 342a-c passim, esp CH 11-13 328d-330b; CH 19-20 332b-333a; BK XII, CH 1-9 342b-d-348b; BK XXII, CH 1 586b-d-587b / *Christian Doctrine*, BK I, CH 33 633d-634a

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART I, Q 47, A 2, ANS 257b-258c; QQ 63-64 325b-338d

21 DANTE: *Divine Comedy*, PARADISE, XXIX [49-81] 150d-151a

23 HOBBES: *Leviathan*, PART III, 174d-175a; PART IV, 258d-259b

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I 93a 110b esp [2 282] 94a 99b [587-6 5] 106a b BK II [2 9- 83] 116a 117a [477 485] 121b BK III [613 4] 148b 151b BK IV [139] 152b-155a [88-1 15] 169b-174b BK [57]- K VI [912] 187b-216a passim

47 GOETHE *Faust* PROLOGUE [243 92] 7a 8

48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 219b

5a The origin of the division between angels and demons the sin of Lucifer or Satan

OLD TESTAMENT *Isaiah* 14:4 27—(D) *Isaias* 14:4 27

APOCRYPHA *Wisdom of Solomon* 2:24—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 2:24 5

NEW TESTAMENT *II Peter* 4 / *Jude* 6 / *Revelation* 12:7 10—(D) *Apocalypse* 12:7 0

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X par 67 88b-c / *City of God* BK XI c 9-20 326d 333a BK XI c 3 343d 344b CH 6-9 345b-348b BK XXI CH 586b d 587b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 4 5 257b-258c Q 63 325b-333d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL, II [22-51] 4b-c X XI [36] 51c URG Y X [2 2] 70c PARADISE, X X [40-] 135c XXIX [49-66] 150d 151a

22 CHAUCER *Monk's Tale* [400 -0 2] 434a

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 81a

3 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I 93a 110b esp [7-83] 94 95 BK IV [32 04] 153a 154b K V [600-904] 188b-195a

47 GOETHE *Faust* PART [ ] 246a 47a

5 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* K XI 344c d

5b The society of the demons the rule of Satan over the powers of darkness

APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 39:28—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 39 33 34

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 9 34 10:25 2 2 3 / *Mark* 3 2 / *Luke* 11 14 3 / *John* 8 3 -59 / *Ephesians* 3 6 2 / *II Thessalonians* 13 15 / *I John* 3 8 / *Revelation* 2:9 3 9 12 11 18— 15 2—(D) *Apocalypse* 2 9 3 9 11 18

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XX CH 11 541a-c *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 37 673d-674

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 63 6-9 332 333d Q 109 562a 564b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL I a 52d esp I ( ) [1 3] 11 13b XVI [9-39] 25c-d, X XX 30a 34c XX [2 4] 41b-c XXX V [6-31] 51

22 CHAUCER *Friar's Tale* [69 7-7 0] 279a 283b / *Summoner's Prologue* 284b-285a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART III 195a PART IV 247 248

3 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK [42 63] 98b-99a BK [-5] 111a 122b esp [11 42] 111b-11 a K V [89-9] 154b a [600-904] 188b-195

33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 116a

47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [2338-2604] 56b-63b esp [465 2531] 60 61b [3835 42 2] 93b-103a PART II [11 636-675] 283a 284a

6 The role of the angels in the government of the universe

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 3 24 28 12 / *Psalms* 103 0- 2—(D) *Psalms* 102 0- 2 / *Daniel* , 10 / *Zechariah* 1:7-21 4 1-6 8—(D) *Zacharias* 1 7 1 4 1-6 8

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 24 31 / *Mark* 13:27 / *John* 1 51 / *Revelation* 5:2 11 14 8 20 passim—(D) *Apocalypse* 5:2 11 14 8-20 passim

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK VII CH 30 261d BK III CH 24 283a b BK X CH 15 308a b CH 21 311c 312a BK XII CH 7 359 360a c BK X I CH 5-6 426a c BK XXII C 1 586b d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 45 A 5 AN and REP 1 245c 247a Q 63 A ANS 331c 332b Q 64 A 4 ANS 337d 338d Q 66 A 3 REP 2 347b-348d Q 89 A 8 REP 2 479c 480c Q 9 A 2 REP 1 3 485b-486b A 4 REP 2 487d-488c QQ 106-114 545c 85c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL, II [67-96] 10b c PURGATORY II [10-51] 54c 55a II [22 6] 64c X [1 36] 75b-d X II [40 63] 78d 79 XX V [33 154] 91a b PARADISE II [112 138] 109 VII [91 148] 117d 118c XIII [5] 126a XXVIII [1 0-129] 150a XXIX [13 45] 150b-c

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK II 117d

3 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK II [119-134] 113b-114 [3 249] 116b [402 416] 120a V VII [550-60] 229a 230a / *Areopagitica* 410a

6a The ministry of the good angels in the affairs of men, guardianship

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 16:7 12 18 1 19 2 2 9- 1 22 19 24—40 32 1 ,24 3 48 ; 16 / *Exodus* 14 19- 0 23:20-23 32 34 33:2 / *Numbers* 2 16 22:2 35 / *Joshua* 5 3 15—(D) *Josue* 5 13 16 / *Judges* 2 1 4 6 1 24 3 / *II Samuel* 4 5 1 —(D) *II Kings* 24 15 17 / *I Kings* 19 5-8—(D) *III Kings* 19 5-8 / *II Kings* 19 32 35—(D) *IV Kings* 19 3 35 / *I Chronicles* 21 1 30—(D) *I Paralipomenon* 21 1 5 / *II Chronicles* 32:21—(D) *II Paralipomenon* 32:21 / *Psalms* 34:7 35 5-6 91 10-13—(D) *Psalms* 33 8 34 5-6 90 10- 3 *Isaiah* 6 6-7 37 36—(D) *Isaias* 6,6-7 3 36 / *Daniel* 3:28 6.22 8-12—(D) *Daniel* 3 95 6 8-12 / *Hosea* 12:2 4—(D) *Osee* 2 2-4 / *Zechariah* 1:7 21 3—(D) *Zacharias* 1:7 21 3

APOCRYPHA *Tobit* 3 1 5 12—(D) OT *Tobias* 3 25 5 12 / *Baruch*, 6:7—(D) OT *Baruch* 6:6 / *Song of Three Children* 25 26—(D) OT *Daniel* 3 49-50 / *Bel and Dragon*, 31 4 —(D) OT *Daniel* 14 30-41

(6 *The role of the angels in the government of the universe* 6a *The ministry of the good angels in the affairs of men guardianship*)

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 1 18 25 2 13 19 20 13-4 30 36 43 47 51 18 10 24 31 28 1 7 / *Mark* 1 13 13 27 / *Luke* 1 1 38 2 8 15 16 22 / *John* 5 4 12 28 29 / *Acts* 5 17-20 7 52-53 8 26 10 1-7 22 30 32 12 5 11 23 9 27 21-24 / *Galatians* 3 19 / *Hebrews* 1 13-14 / *Revelation* 1 1 7 11 14 6 20 15-18 19 17 18 22 16 —(D) *Apocalypse* 1 1 7-11 14 6 0 15-18 19 17-18 22 16

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XII par 37 108d / *City of God* BK VIII CH 25 283b c BK X CH 8 303a d CH 12-13 306d 307c BK XIX CH 9 516a c / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 30 632c 633b CH 33 633d 634b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 64 A 4 ANS 337d 338d Q 66 A 3 REP 2 347b 348d Q 86 A 4 REP 2 463d 464d Q 89 A 8 REP 2 479c 480c Q 91 A 2 REP 1 3 485b 486b QQ 111-113 568b 581d PART I II Q 3 A 7 REP 2 628a d Q 5 A 6 641a 642a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 98 A 3 241c 242b PART III SUPPL Q 76 A 3 912b d Q 89 A 3 1007d 1008b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL VIII [65] IX [103] 11c 13b PURGATORY V [85-129] 59d 60c VIII [1-108] 64a 65b IX [70 145] 66c 67b XII [73 136] 71a d XVII [40-63] 78d 79a PARADISE XXXII [85 114] 155c d

22 CHAUCER *Second Nun's Tale* [15 588 825] 463b 467b

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART III 174d 175a 175c d

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK III 132b c 158c 159b 168c

27 SHAKESPEARE *King Lear* ACT IV SC II [38-50] 270d 71a

32 MILTON *Comus* 33a 56b esp [170 -29] 37a 38b / *Paradise Lost* BK II [1024 1033] 133b BK IV [549-588] 164b 165a [776 843] 169b 170b BK V [224-247] 180a b BK VI [893-912] 215b 216a BK VIII [630 643] 246a / *Areopagitica* 410a b

33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 124a / *Pensées* 722 309b 312a 846 339a b

47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [11 676-12 111] 284a 294b

48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 409b 410a

5 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VII 185a c

6b The intervention of the demons in the affairs of men temptation possession

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 3 / *I Samuel* 16 14 23 —(D) *I Kings* 16 14-23 / *I Kings* 22 20-23—(D) *III Kings* 22 20-23 / *I Chronicles* 21 1—(D) *I Paralipomenon* 21 1 / *II Chronicles* 18 20 - —(D) *II Paralipomenon* 18 20-22 / *Job* 1 2

APOCRYPHA *Tobit* 3 8—(D) OT *Tobias* 3 8 / *Wisdom of Solomon* 2 4—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 2 24 25

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 4 1 11 8 28 34 9 32 34 12 2 30 43 45 13 19 24 30 36-43 17 14 18 / *Mark* 1 13 4 15 5 1 20 / *Luke* 4 1-13 8 2 3 12 26-36 11 14 26 22 3-6 / *John* 8 31 59 10 19 21 13 2 21 27 / *Acts* 5 1 11 8 5-8 10 37 38 16 16 18 / *Romans* 8 38 39 / *II Corinthians* - 10 11 11 13 15 / *Galatians* 1 8 / *Ephesians* 2 2 / *I Thessalonians* - 18 / *I Peter* 5 8-9 / *Revelation* 2 10 9 12 13—(D) *Apocalypse* 2 10 9 12 13

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X par 67 88b c / *City of God* BK II CH 4 26 164c 166d BK VIII CH 15 24 274d 283b BK IX CH 18 295c d BK X CH 9 11 303d 306d CH 21 22 311c 312b BK XVIII CH 18 480d 482a BK XIX CH 9 516a c / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 23 24 648a 649a BK III CH 37 673d 674a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 63 A 9 REP 3 333b d Q 64 A 4 ANS 337d 338d Q 86 A 4 REP 2 463d-464d Q 89 A 8 REP 2 479c 480c Q 114 581d 58 c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 80 159d 162d PART III Q 8 AA , 8 761d 763b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL VIII [65] IX [103] 11c 13b XXVII [55 136] 40a 41b XXXIII [91 157] 50c 51b PURGATORY V [85 129] 59d 60c VIII [1-108] 64a 65b

22 CHAUCER *Tale of Man of Law* [4778 4805] 240b 241a / *Friar's Tale* 278a 284a / *Physician's Tale* [12 055-072] 368a b / *Pardoner's Tale* [12 778 829] 380b 381b / *Parson's Tale* par 20 508b 509a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 69c 71a PART III 174d 175a 195a PART IV 258c 261a

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK II 93d 94a BK III 169d 173d BK IV 261a 265a 285c 288d 300b d

27 SHAKESPEARE *Othello* ACT II SC III [356-379] 220c d

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I [27 36] 94a [331 621] 100b 107a BK II [310 389] 118a 119b [496 505] 122a [1024 1033] 133b BK IV [3- 113] 153a 155a [358 392] 160a 161a [502 535] 163b 164a [776 1015] 169b 174b BK VI [893-912] 215b 216a BK IX [404 794] 256a 264b

33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 140a / *Pensées* ,84 325b 843 3 7b 338a 850 340a

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 184c d

47 GOETHE *Faust* PROLOGUE 7a 9b PART I [48 517] 14a b [1178 336] 29b 56a esp [13-2 1384] 32b 34a [1530 1867] 37a 44b [3,76-3834] 92a 93b [4176 4 05] 102a 103a PART II [4941-4970] 122b 123a [5357 5392] 132b 133a

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK II 21d 22b BK IV 86b c BK V 130b 132c BK VI 169c 170b BK VII 175b 176b BK X 295a c

7 God and S tan

18 A   ustine *City of God* x xx 530a 560a c passim
19 Aquinas *S mma Theologica* PART I Q 63 325b-333d esp A 3 327b-328b
20 Aq in s *S mma Theologica* PART I I Q 80 A 1 E 2 3 159d 160c
21 Dante *D i Comedy* I LL, XXXIV 51b-52d
22 C ii cer *Fr a s Tale* 278a 284a
23 Hobbes *Leviatha* PART III 195a
32 Milto *Pa ad se Lost* 93a 333a esp BK I II 93a 134a K I I [56-134] 136b 138a BK IV [006-10 5] 174b BK V [224 245] 180 b BK V [563]-BK VI [892] 187b-215b BK X [1-62] 274b-275b [460-584] 284b-287a
33 Pas L *Pensées* 84 325b 820 331b 826 332b-333 846 339a b
52 Dosto sk *Brothers Ka amazo* BK XI 337a 346a

7 Warfare between the powers of l ght and dark ess the r struggle for domi on over man

Old Testament *I Samuel* 16 14 23—(D) *I Ki g* 6 14 23 / *Job* 1 2 / *Zechariah* 3 1 7—(D) *Zacharias* 3 1 7
Apocrypha *Tobit* 8 3—(D) OT *Tobias* 8 3
New T stame t *Matthew* 4 11 1 22 30 13 19 24 30 36-43 25 4 / Ma k 1 13 5 20 / *Luke* 4 13 8-26-36 10 17 20 1 14 23 22 31 34 / J h 12 3 3 / *Acts* 8 5-8 19 11 20 26 9-29 / *Romans* 6 , 20 / *I Corin th* 10 20- / *II C r nth ans* 2 10-11 4 3 4 10 2-5 11 13 15 / *Ephe a* 4 7 6 10-18 / *II The salo ia* 2 8-9 / *I Timothy* 4 1-7 / *II T m th)* 2 24 26 / *H br ws* 2 3 15 / *J me* 4 7 / *I P ter* 5 8-9 / *I John* 3 8-12 / *Jud* 9 / *Rev lat on* 2 9- 3 3 9-13 12 14 16 13 4 2 I I —(D) *Apocalypse* 2 9-13 3 9-13 12 14 16 13 4 1
18 Au TI E *Co f ssi ns* BK I\ p r 24 27 25b 26a x v par 2 32d 33a BK X pa 67 88b- / *City f God* K CH , 165c 166b BK C I 6 345b-346c BK XX H 11 13 541 542d / *Christ an Doct ne* BK I C 3 643a K I H 37 673d 674
19 Aqui *S mma Theol g a* PART I Q 8 A 1 R 4 34d 35c 3 N 36b 37 Q 49 3 266d 268a Q 63 2 AN 326c 327b
20 Aqui *Summ Theol g ca* P II SUPPL, Q 74 A RE 1 925c 926c
21 D E *Dwine Comedy* H LL, I [63]-IX [1 3[11 13b XX 11 [55 136] 40a-41b PURG T E [85 1 9] 59d 60c III [1 1 5] 64 65b XI [1] 68d 69a X V [39- 5] 75a b
22 Ch R *F ia Tale* [722 -7246] 284
23 H *Lev han* 1 247a 248a
32 Mi ton *Par dise Lost* BK II [890-1009] 130b 133 R I [1 415] 135b-144b K IX [6 9- -9] 262a 264

33 Pascal *Provincial Let ers* 116a b
40 Gibbon *Decl ne a d F ll* 81b-c
41 Gibbon *Decl e and Fall* 330b
47 Go the *Fa st* ROLOGUE 7a-9b PART I [1335 1378] 33a 34a PART II [11 612-843] 282b 288a
48 Mel ille *Moby D ck* esp 4b-5a 117a 122b 131a 138a 144a b 370b 372a, 418a-419b
52 Dostoevsky *B others Karama ov* BK III 50c 54b esp 54a b BK IV 86b-c BK V 130b 136b BK VI 151b-d 169c 170b BK VII 175b 176c 185a-c BK XI 342d 343b

7b Lucifer in the service of God

Old Test ment *Job* 1 2 / *Psalms* 8.49—(D) *Psalms* 77 49
Apocrypha *Ecclesiasticus* 39 28—(D) OT *Ec clesiast cus* 39 33 34
18 Augustine *City of God* K VIII CH 24 283a b BK X CH 21 311c 312a BK XII CH 27 359c 360a,c BK XXII CH 1 586b d 587b
19 Aqui s *Summa Theol g ca* PART I Q 64 A 4 ANS 337d 338d Q 114 A 1 581d 582c
20 Aqui s *S mma Theologica* PART III UPPL Q 89 A 4 1008b-1009b
21 Dant *D vine Comedy* HELL, XVIII [19-39] 25c d XXI XXIII 30a 34c XXVII [55]-X VIII [42] 40a-41 X XIV 1b-52d
22 Ch uc R *Fri s Tale* [05 , 085] 281 b
32 Milton *Pa ad se Lost* K 1 [157 168] 97a [209-22] 98a BK X [6 6-640] 288a b
47 G THE *F ust* P OLOGUE [271 353] 7b-9b PA T II [7 13,] 174b-175a
52 Dostoevsk *B thers Ka am ov* BK XI 151b-d BK XI 341a 344d
54 Freud *Civil ation a d Its Di contents* 790d

8 Criticism and satire with respect to the bel ef in angels nd demons

23 Ho bes *Levi than* P RT I 51d 52b 69c 71a P RT III 174b-176d 195a PART IV 258b 261a 2 6c
24 Rabelai *G rgantua and Pa t gruel* B III 171a 173d BK IV 285c 288d 300b d
25 Mont igne *Essays* 500 501a
30 B con *A va cement f Learn g* 41d-42a / *N um Org m* K I A H 62 113d
38 Montesquieu *Spirit f La* BK XII 86d 87b
40 Gibbon *Decl ne d Fall* 184c d 189c 347a
41 Gi on *Decline a d Fall* 229d 231b 244c 334c
42 Kant *Judgement* 592a c 599d-600a
46 Hegel *Phil sophy of History* P RT IV 354c 355b
50 M rx *Cap t l* 31d
52 Dostoev ky *Brother Ka a ia* BK II 21d 22b K X 337 346a
53 Ja es *Psychol gy* 148b
54 F ud *Ne Introd ctory Le tur* 8 6d 877a 877c

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For Other discussions relevant to the theory of angels, *see* ETERNITY 4a; IDEA 1e; KNOWLEDGE 7b; MIND 10c; SOUL 4d(2); and for the metaphysical consideration of immaterial substances, *see* BEING 7b(2).

The theological doctrine of the fallen angels, *see* SIN 3, 3b; and for the related doctrines of Heaven and Hell, *see* ETERNITY 4d; GOOD AND EVIL 1d, 2b; IMMORTALITY 5e–5f; PUNISHMENT 5e(1).

The theory of the celestial motors, *see* ASTRONOMY 8b; CHANGE 14.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World*, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:

I. *Works by authors represented in this collection.*
II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*.

I.

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—— *Summa Contra Gentiles*, BK II, CH 46–55, 91–101; BK III, CH 104–110
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—— *De Substantiis Separatis*
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PROCLUS. *The Elements of Theology*, (M)
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Chapter 2 ANIMAL

INTRODUCTION

ALPHABETICAL ordering places ANIMAL after ANGEL in this list of ideas. There is a third term which belongs with these two and but for the alphabet m ht have com between them. That term is MAN.

These three terms—and a fourth GOD which rounds out the comparison—are conjoined in Shakespeare's statement of what is perhaps the most universal reflection of man upon himself. "What a piece of work is man!" says Hamlet. "How noble in reason! how infinite in faculty! in form and moving, how express and admirable! in action how like an angel! in apprehension how like a god! the beauty of the world! the paragon of animals!" Animal, angel, god—in each of these man has seen his image. And at different moments in the history of thought he has tended to identify himself with one to the exclusion of the others.

Yet predominantly man has regarded himself as an animal, even when he has understood himself to be created in God's image and to share with the angels through the possession of intellect the dignity of being a person. As his understanding of himself has varied, so has he altered his conception of what it is to be an animal.

In terms of a conception of personality which involves the attributes of *reason* and *free will*, man has legally as well as morally and metaphysically drawn a sharp line between persons and things, and placed brute *animals* in the class of things. According to the principle of this distinction, being alive or even being sensitive does not give animals any more than plants and stones, the dignity or status of persons.

When man's animality—either in terms of his kinship or affinities or his evolutionary origin—has seemed an adequate definition of his nature, man has attributed to animals many of his own traits, his intelligence and freedom, even his moral qualities and political propensities. Nevertheless, he has seldom ceased to regard himself as the paragon of animals, possessing in a higher degree than other animals the characteristic properties of all.

There are exceptions to this, however. Animals have been glorified by *man for skeptical* or satiric purposes.

Montaigne, for example, doubts that *man* can lay claim to any special attributes or excellences and further suggests that in some particulars at least men are less able and less noble than the beasts. Relying on legends found in Pliny and Plutarch which describe the marvelous *exploits of animals*, he argues that "it is not upon any true ground of reason, but by a foolish pride and vain opinion, that we *prefer* our selves *before other* animals, and separate our selves from their conditions and society."

"Why," Montaigne asks, "should we attribute to I know not what natural and servile inclination the works that *surpass* all we can do by nature and art?" We have no grounds for believing that "beasts, by natural and compulsory tendency, do the same things that we *do* by our choice and industry." Rather "we ought," he *continues*, "from like effects to conclude like faculties, and consequently confess that the *same* reason, the same method by which we operate, are common with them, or that they have others that are better."

Nor can we excuse our presumption of superiority by the fact that we are compelled to look at animals from our human point of view. "When I play with my cat," Montaigne writes, "who knows whether I do not make her more sport than she makes me? We mutually divert one another with our monkey tricks. If I have my hour to begin or to refuse, she also has hers." Suppose animals were to tell us what they

thought of us The defect that hinders communication betwixt them and us why may it not be on our part as well as theirs? Tis yet to determine Montaigne thinks where the fault lies that we understand not one another for we understand them no more than they do us by the same reason they may think us to be beasts as we think them

If Montaigne s view were to prevail no special significance could be given to brute as opposed to rational animal For that matter the same holds true whenever man is conceived as *just an animal* paragon or not Animals are brute only when man is not—only when to be human *is to be somehow more than an animal* different in kind not merely in degree

Satirists like Swift idealize an animal nature to berate the folly and depravity of man In his last voyage Gulliver finds in the land of the *Houyhnhnms a race of human looking creatures* the Yahoos who by contrast with their noble masters the horses are a miserable and sorry lot Here it is the Yahoos who are brutes bereft as they are of the intelligence and virtue which grace *the splendid Houyhnhnms*

THE COMPARISON of men and animals takes still another direction in the allegories of fable and poetry From Aesop to the mediaeval *Bestiaries there is the tradition of stories in which animals* are personified in order to teach a moral lesson In the *Divine Comedy* Dante uses specific animals to symbolize the epitome of certain passions vices and virtues The intent of his allegory *is however never derogatory to man as* man But when Machiavelli allegorizes the qualities required for political power he advises the prince knowingly to adopt the beast and to choose the fox and the lion This tends to re*duce human society to the jungle where strength* and guile compete for supremacy

The comparison of men and animals fails to touch the distinction or lack of distinction between animals and plants This is basic to the definition or conception of animal nature As in the case of men and animals this problem can be approached in two ways *either* from the side of plant life and with respect to those functions which seem to be common to all living things *or* from the side of animal life and with respect to those functions which seem to belong only to animals never to plants On either approach the issue remains whether plants and animals are different in kind not merely in degree

On the one hand it may be argued that sensitivity desire and locomotion (even *perhaps* sleeping and waking) are in some form or degree to be found in all living things On the other hand it may be argued that such functions as nutrition growth and reproduction though obviously *common to plants and animals* are performed by animals *in a distinctive* manner If plants manifest all the vital powers or activities present in animals or if in functions common to both animals differ only in *degree then the scale of life would seem to* be a continuous gradation rather than a hierarchy

The opposite position which affirms a difference in kind and consequently a hierarchy is taken by Aristotle In his biological writings as well as *in his treatise On the Soul* he draws a sharp line between plant and animal life by reference to faculties or functions absent in the one and found in the other Aristotle first points out that living may mean thinking or perception *or local movement and rest or movement in the* sense of nutrition decay and growth Hence he goes on we think of plants also as living for they are observed to possess in themselves an originative power through which they in*crease or decrease in all spatial directions* they grow up and down and everything that grows increases its bulk alike in both directions or indeed in all and continues to live so long as it can absorb nutriment

This lead him to assign to plants what he calls a nutritive or vegetative soul whereby they have the three basic faculties common to all living things—nutrition growth and reproduction But Aristotle does not find in plants any *evidence of the functions performed* by animals such as sensation appetite and local motion These are the characteristic powers of the animal soul called by him the sensitive soul because sensation is the source both of animal desire and animal movement

Galen follows Aristotle in this distinction In his *Natural Faculties* he limits his investigations to the functions common to all living things He uses the word natural for those effects such as growth and nutrition common to plants as well as animal which in his view

are opposed to such activities as feeling and voluntary motion peculiar to animals that he calls effects of the soul or psychic It may seem surprising at first that Galen s study of nutrition growth and reproduction—not only of the functions themselves but of the bodily organs and processes involved in these functions—should be restricted to their manifestation in animals and not in plants as well The reason may be that for the naturalists of antiquity the biological functions of vegetable matter did not yield their secrets readily enough to observation A treatise on plants not written by Aristotle but attributed to his school begins with the remark that life is found in animals and plants but whereas in animals it is clearly manifest in plants it is hidden and less evident.

This view of the world of living things as divided into the two great kingdoms of plant and animal life prevailed through centuries of speculation and research But from the time that Aristotle began the work of classification it has been realized that there exist numerous examples of what Bacon called bordering instances such as exhibit those species of bodies which appear to be composed of two species or to be the rudiments between the one and the other

Within the last hundred years the difficulty of classifying such specimens particularly those which seem to fall between plant and animal has raised the question whether the traditional distinction can be maintained If we look even to the two main divisions namely to the animal and vegetable kingdoms writes Darwin "certain low forms are so far intermediate in character that naturalists have disputed to which kingdom they should belong Yet Darwin does not find the evidence available to him sufficient to determine whether all living things have descended from one primordial form or whether the evolution of life is to be represented in two distinct lines of development

Since Darwin s day the researches of scientists like Loeb and Jennings on the behavior of micro-organisms and the phenomena of tropisms (e g the sunflower s turning toward the sun) and the study of what appears to be local motion in plants have contributed additional evidence relevant to the issue It is, however still considered open and arguable.

The fact that organisms exist which do not readily fall into either classification may signify continuity rather than separation between plants and animals but it may also be taken to mean that more acute observations are required to classify these so-called intermediate forms Plant tropisms may or may not require us to deny that sensitivity belongs to animals alone The apparent local motion of plants may be a mode of growth or a random movement rather than a directed change from place to place and the attachment to place of apparently stationary animals, such as barnacles and mussels may be different from the immobility of rooted plants

AGAINST THE BACKGROUND of these major issues concerning plants animals and men as continuous or radically distinct forms of life the study of animal organisms—their anatomy and physiology—acquires much of its critical significance

Anatomy is an ancient science Several surgical treatises of Hippocrates display an extensive knowledge of the human skeletal structure and the disposition of some of the organs of the human body The dissection of animals as well as gross observation provides Aristotle with a basis for the comparative anatomy of different species of animal For Galen as well as Aristotle much of this anatomical study was motivated by an interest in the structure and relation of the organs involved in the local motion of the body as a whole and in local motions within the body such as the motions of the alimentary or reproductive systems.

It remains for a later investigator schooled in the tradition of ancient biology to make the startling discovery of the circulation of the blood through the motions of the heart Harvey not only does this but he also suggests the functional interdependence of respiration and circulation based on his observation of the intimate structural connections between heart arteries veins, and lungs His contribution is at once a departure from and a product of the scientific tradition in which he worked for though his conclusions are radically new he reaches them by a method of research and reasoning which follows the general principles of Aristotle and Galen His insistence moreover

thought of us The defect that hinders communication betwixt them and us why may it not be on our part as well as theirs? Tis yet to determine Montaigne thinks where the fault lies that we understand not one another for we understand them no more than they do us by the same reason they may think us to be beasts as we think them

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The comparison of men and animals fails to touch the distinction or lack of distinction between animals and plants This is basic to the definition or conception of animal nature As in the case of men and animals this problem can be approached in two ways *either* from the side of plant life and with respect to those functions which seem to be common to all living things or from the side of animal life and with respect to those functions which seem to belong only to animals never to plants On either approach the issue remains whether plants and animals are different in kind not merely in degree

On the one hand it may be argued that sensitivity desire and locomotion (even perhaps sleeping and waking) are in some form or degree to be found in all living things On the other hand it may be argued that such functions as nutrition growth and reproduction though obviously common to plants and animals are performed by animals in a distinctive manner If plants manifest all the vital powers or activities present in animals or if in functions common to both animals differ only in degree then the scale of life would seem to be a continuous gradation rather than a hierarchy

The opposite position which affirms a difference in kind and consequently a hierarchy is taken by Aristotle In his biological writings as well as in his treatise *On the Soul* he draws a sharp line between plant and animal life by reference to faculties or functions absent in the one and found in the other Aristotle first points out that living may mean thinking or perception or local movement and rest or movement in the sense of nutrition decay and growth Hence " he goes on we think of plants also as living for they are observed to possess in themselves an originative power through which they increase or decrease in all spatial directions they grow up and down and everything that grows increases its bulk alike in both directions or indeed in all and continue to live so long as it can absorb nutriment

This lead him to assign to plants what he calls a nutritive or vegetative soul whereby they have the three basic faculties common to all living things—nutrition growth and reproduction But Aristotle does not find in plants any evidence of the functions performed by animals such as sensation appetite and local motion These are the characteristic powers of the animal soul called by him the sensitive soul because sensation is the source both of animal desire and animal movement

Galen follows Aristotle in this distinction In his *Natural Faculties* he limits his investigations to the functions common to all living things He uses the word natural for those effects such as growth and nutrition common to plants as well as animal which in his view

der lacks, the lizard an organ of locomotion which the oyster lacks The sponge lives in one manner so far as locale is concerned and the per in another reptiles have one manner of locomotion birds another So ample were Aristotle s data and so expert were his classifications that the major divisions and sub-divisions of his scheme remain intact in the taxonomy constru ted by Linnaeus

The rad cal character of Darwin s departure from the Linnaean classification stems from a diff rence in princ ple rather than a correction of observational errors or inadequacies Where Aristotle and all taxonomists before Darwin classify animals by reference to their similarities and differences Darwin makes inferred geneal ogy or descent the primary criterion in terms of wh ch he groups animals into varieties species genera and larger phyla

Naturalists according to Darwin try to arra ge the spec es genera and fam lies in each class, on what is called *the Natural System*. But what is meant by this system? Some authors look at it merely as a scheme for arranging together those living objects which are most alike and for separating those which are most unlike

The ingenuity and ut lity of this system are ind putable but Darwin thinks that its rules cannot be explained or it difficulties overcome except on the vi w that the N tural System is founded on descent w th m dification—that the characters which naturalists *consider* as show ng true affinity between any two or more species, are those wh ch ha e been inherited from a common *parent* all true classification bein genealogical—that community of descent is the hid len bond wh ch naturalists ha e been unconsc ously seek ng and not some unknown plan of creation or the enunciat on of general propos tion and the mere putting together and separatin objects more or less alike

In Darwin s op n on classification must be strictly geneal g cal in order to be natural Only by the prin iple of descent— the one c rt inly known ca se of s milarity n organic be ng —c n we arran e all organic beings throu hout all t me in g oups under groups see th nature f the relation hips by whi h all li and xt n t o gan m are united by com plex ra iat g and ci cu tous lines of affin ties i to a few grand classes and understand th wide opposition in value between analo ical or adaptive characters and characters of true af finity Furthermore the importance of em bryolo ical characters and of rudimentary or gans in classification becomes intelligible on the view that a natural arrangement mu t be genealogical" By reference to this element of descent not only shall we be able to under stand what is meant by the Natural System but also Darwin adds *our classifications will come to be as far as they can be so mad genealogies* and will then truly give what may be called the plan of creation

Whereas the Aristotelian classification is tatic *in principle* having no reference to temporal *connections or th succession of gener tions* the Darwinian is dynamic—*almost a moving picture of the ever shifting arrangement of ani* mals according to their affinities throu h com mon ancestry or their diversities throu h genetic variation Connected with this opposition between static and dynamic principles of clas sification is a *deeper conflict* between two ways of understandin the *nature* of scientific classi fication itself

The point at issue is whether the classes which *the taxonomist* constructs represent d tinct *natural forms*. Do they exist independently as *objects demanding sc entific* definition or are the scientist s groupin s somewhat arb trary and artificial? Do they di ide and separate what in nature is more like a continuous distri *bution with accid ntal* gaps and unevennesses? This issue in turn tends to raise the metaph ysi cal question conc rning the reality and fixity of pecies, wh ch relates to the problem of th e d f ference between real and nom nal d finitions and the d fference between n tural and arbi trary systems of classif cation

On these matters Aquinas and Locke have much to say as vell as Aristotle and Darwin Fu ler discussion of such questions is to be found in the chapters on DEFINITION and EVOLU TION Insofar as problems of classification and the nature of species have a bearing on e olu t on they are treated in that chapter as are the related issues of *con inuity* or *h erarchy* in the world of li ing things and of difference in *de gre* or *kind* as between plants and animals ani mals and men Th e last t vo problems also occur in the chapters on LIFE and MAN

on the necessity of finding a functional purpose for an organic structure stands as the classic rejoinder to Francis Bacon s recommendation that formal and final causes be separated from material and efficient causes in the study of nature Bacon assigns the first two types of cause to metaphysics and limits physics to the last two

Harvey s work on the generation of animals is another example of the continuity between ancient and modern biology In some respects Aristotle s researches on the reproductive organs and their functions are more general than Harvey s They represent for him only part of the large field of comparative anatomy and have significance for the study of mating habits in different classes of animals Yet on the problem of the act of generation itself its causes and consequences especially the phenomena of embryonic development Harvey s treatise reads partly as a conversation with Aristotle and partly as the record of original observations undertaken experimentally

Respect for our predecessors and for antiquity at large he writes inclines us to defend their conclusions to the extent that love of truth will allow Nor do I think it becoming in us to neglect and make little of their labors and conclusions who bore the torch that has lighted us to the shrine of philosophy The ancients in his opinion by their unwearied labor and variety of experiments searching into the nature of things have left us no doubtful light to guide us in our studies Yet Harvey adds no one of a surety will allow that all truth was engrossed by the ancients unless he be utterly ignorant of the many remarkable discoveries that have lately been made in anatomy Referring to his own method of investigation he proposes as a safer way to the attainment of knowledge that in studying nature we question things themselves rather than by turning over books

It is particularly with respect to animal generation that the great books exhibit continuity in the statement of basic problems in biology as well as indicate the logical conditions of their solution The issue of spontaneous generation as opposed to procreation runs through Aristotle Lucretius Aquinas Harvey and Darwin The problem of sexual and asexual reproduction with all the relevant considerations of sexual differentiation and sexual characteristics, is to be found in Aristotle Darwin and Freud. Questions of heredity though they are raised with new significance by Darwin and William James have a lineage as ancient as Plato

Scientific learning has of course advanced in recent times with regard to the nature and behavior of animals On such topics as heredity the work of Mendel Bateson and Morgan is crucial or to take another example our knowledge of the functioning of the respiratory and the nervous system has been greatly enlarged by the researches of Haldane Sherrington and Pavlov Yet even in these areas the background of recent scientific contributions is to be found in the great books—in the writings for example of Harvey Darwin and William James

Another interest which runs through the whole tradition of man s study of animals lies in the problem of their classification—both with respect to the principles of taxonomy itself and also in the systematic effort to construct schemes whereby the extraordinary variety of animal types can be reduced to order In this field Aristotle and Darwin are the two great masters If the names of Buffon and Linnaeus also deserve to be mentioned it must be with the double qualification that they are followers of Aristotle on the one hand and precursors of Darwin on the other

The Aristotelian classification is most fully set forth in the *History of Animals* There one kind of animal is distinguished from another by many properties by locale or habitat by shape and color and size by manner of locomotion nutrition association sensation by organic parts and members by temperament instinct or characteristic habits of action With respect to some of these properties Aristotle treats one kind of animal as differing from another by a degree—by more or less—of the same trait With respect to other properties he finds the difference to consist in the possession by one species of a trait totally lacking in another He speaks of the lion as being more ferocious than the wolf the crow as more cunning than the raven but he also observes that the cow has an organ of digestion which the spi

exact opposite of action based upon free will. It is completely determined by the inborn pattern of the instinct. It may vary in operation with the circumstances of the occasion, but it does not leave the animal the freedom to act or not to act, or to act this way rather than that. Such freedom of choice, Aquinas holds, depends on reason's ability to contemplate alternatives, to none of which is the human will bound by natural necessity.

Aquinas does not limit human reason and will to a role analogous to the one he ascribes to instinct and emotion in animal life. Their power enables man to engage in speculative thought and to seek remote ends. Nevertheless, on the level of his biological need, man must resort to the use of his reason and will where *other animals are guided by instinct.* "Man has by nature," Aquinas writes, "his reason and his hands, which are *the organ of organs,* since by their means man can make for himself instruments of an infinite variety and for any number of purposes." Just as the products of reason take the place of "hair, hoofs, claws, teeth, and horns—fixed means of defense or of clothing, as is the case with other animals"—so reason serves man's needs, in the view of Aquinas, as instinct serves other animals.

Others, like Darwin, James, and Freud, seem to take a different view. They attribute instinct to men as well as to animals. In their opinion instinctively determined behavior is influenced by intelligence and affected by memory and imagination, in animals as well as in men. They recognize, however, that instinct predominates in some of the lower forms of animal life, and acknowledge that the contribution of intelligence is great only among the more highly developed organisms.

"Man has a far greater variety of *impulse* than any lower animal," writes James; "and any one of these impulses taken in itself, is as blind as the lowest instinct can be; but owing to man's memory, power of reflection, and power of inference, they come each one to be felt by him, after he has once yielded to them and experienced their results, in connection with a *foresight* of those results." On the same grounds, James argues that "*every instinctive act, in an animal with memory, must cease to be 'blind' after being once repeated*" and must be accompanied with foresight of its end just so far as that end may have fallen under the animal's cognizance."

If instinct, in animals or men, were sufficient for solving the problems of survival, there would be no need for what James calls "sagacity" on the part of animals, or of learning from experience. Like Montaigne, James assembles anecdotes to show that animals exercise their wits and learn from experience. "No matter how well endowed an animal may originally be in the way of instincts," James declares, "his resultant actions will be much modified if the instincts combine with experience, if in addition to impulses he have memories, associations, inferences, and expectations, on any considerable scale."

In his consideration of "the intellectual contrast between brute and man," James places "the most elementary single difference between the human mind and that of brutes" in the deficiency on the brute's part "to associate ideas by similarity," so that characters "the abstraction of which depends on this sort of association, must in the brute always remain drowned." Darwin similarly makes the difference in degree between human and animal intelligence a matter of greater or less power to associate ideas. In consequence human instincts are much more modified by learning and experience than the instincts of other animals, as in turn the higher animals show much greater variability in their instinctive behavior than do lower organisms.

It is not necessary to deny that men alone have reason in order to affirm that, in addition to instinct, animals have intelligence in some proportion to the development of their sensitive powers, especially their memory and imagination. The position of Aristotle and Aquinas seems to involve both points. But if we attribute the extraordinary performances of animals to their intelligence *alone,* rather than primarily to instinct, then we are led to conclude with Montaigne that they possess no merely a sensitive intelligence but a reasoning intellect.

"Why does the spider make her web tighter in one place and slacker in another?" Montaigne asks. "Why now one sort of knot and then another, if she has not deliberation, thought, and conclusion?" And in another

On the theme of comparisons between animals and men two further points should be noted

The first concerns the soul of animals When soul is conceived as the principle or source of life in whatever is alive plants and animals can be said to have souls Like Aristotle Augustine distinguishes three grades of soul in universal nature one which has only the power of life the second grade in which there is sensation the third grade where intelligence has its throne

Though he also follows Aristotle in defining three kinds of soul Aquinas distinguishes four grades of life and in so doing differentiates between *perfect* and *imperfect* animals There are some living things he writes in which there exists only vegetative power as the plants There are others in which with the vegetative there exists also the sensitive but not the locomotive power such are immovable animals as shellfish There are others which besides this have locomotive power as perfect animals which require many things for their life and consequently movement to seek the necessaries of life from a distance And there are some living things which with these have intellectual power—namely men

On this theory man viewed in terms of his animal nature is a perfect animal Viewed in terms of his reason or intellect he stands above the highest animals Yet having a soul is not peculiar to man just as being alive or sensitive or mobile is not But when as with Descartes soul is identified with intellect—as a thing which thinks that is to say a mind or an understanding or a reason —and in addition soul is conceived as a spiritual and immortal substance then the conclusion seems to follow that animals do not have souls

For Descartes the theory of the animal as a machine or automaton follows as a further corollary If there had been such machines possessing the organs and outward form of a monkey or some other animal without reason Descartes claims that we should not have had any means of ascertaining that they were not of the same nature as those animals Hobbes likewise would account for all the actions of animal life on mechanical principles For what is the heart but a spring he asks and the nerves but so many strings and the joints but so many wheels giving motion to the whole body? The animal is thus pictured as an elaborate system of moving parts inflexibly determined to behave in certain ways under the impact of stimulation by external forces

The doctrine of the animal automaton is sometimes generalized as by La Mettrie a follower of Descartes to include the conception of man as a machine The same conclusions which are reached from the denial of soul in animals seem to follow also from the theory that the soul even in the case of man is material or a function of matter According to those who like Lucretius hold this view the phenomena of life sensation and thought can be explained by the movement of atomic particles and their interaction

The second point concerns the relation between instinct and intelligence in animals The nature of animal instincts (or innate habits) is considered in the chapters on Emotion and Habit as is the nature of animal intelligence in the chapters on Man and Reasoning But here we face the issue whether instinct functions in animals as reason does in man to meet the exigencies of life or whether in both though varying in degree intelligence cooperates with instinct to solve the problems of adjustment to environment

Those who like Aquinas regard instinct and reason as the alternative and exclusive means which God provides for the ends of animal and human life necessarily tend to interpret animal behavior in all its detail as pre determined by elaborate instinctive endowments Accordingly animal behavior even when voluntary rather than purely the action of physiological reflexes is said not to be free or an expression of free choice on the part of the animal for as is pointed out in the chapter on Will Aquinas calls behavior voluntary if it involves some knowledge or consciousness of the objects to which it is directed

Instinctive behavior such as an animal's flight from danger or its pursuit of food or a mate involves sense perception of the objects of these actions as well as feelings or emotions about them But though it is voluntary in the sense in which Aquinas uses that word instinctive behavior is according to him the

exact opposite of action based upon free will It is completely determined by the inborn pattern of the instinct It may vary in operation with the circumstances of the occasion but it does not leave the animal the freedom to act or not to act or to act this way rather than that Such freedom of choice Aquinas holds depends on reason s ability to contemplate alternatives to none of which is the human will bound by natural necessity

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place he asks What is there in our intelligence that we do not see in the operations of animals? Is there a polity better ordered the offices better distributed and more inviolably observed and maintained than that of bees? Can we imagine that such and so regular a distribution of employments can be carried on without reason and prudence?

GREGARIOUSNESS in animals and the nature of animal communities are considered in the chapter on STATE in connection with the formation of human society But so far as human society itself is concerned the domestication of animals signifies an advance from primitive to civilized life and an increase in the wealth and power of the tribe or city

Aeschylus includes the taming of animals among the gifts of Prometheus who first brought under the yoke beasts of burden who by draft and carrying relieved men of their hardest labors yoked the proud horse to the chariot teaching him obedience to the reins to be the adornment of wealth and luxury The *Iliad* pays eloquent testimony to the change in the quality of human life which accompanied the training of animals to respond to human command Homer s reference to Castor as breaker of horses indicates the sense of conquest or mastery which men felt when they subdued wild beasts and the oft repeated Homeric epithet horse taming which is intended as a term of praise for both the Argives and the Trojans implies the rise of a people from barbarous or primitive conditions—their emancipation from the discomforts and limitations of animal life

Aristotle points out that one mark of wealthy men is the number of horses which they keep for they cannot afford to keep them unless they are rich For the same reason he explains in old times the cities whose strength lay in their cavalry were oligarchies

Legend and history are full of stories of the loyalty and devotion of animals to their human masters and of the reciprocal care and affection which men have given them But motivated as it is by their utility for economic or military purposes the breaking of animals to human will also frequently involves a violent or wanton misuse

The use or even the exploitation of animals by man seems to be justified by the inferiority of the brute to the rational nature As plants exist for the sake of animals so animals according to Aristotle exist for the sake of man the tame for use and food the wild if not all at least the greater part of them for food and for the provision of clothing and various instruments Aristotle s conception of the natural slave discussed in the chapter on SLAVERY uses the domesticated animal as a kind of model for the treatment of human beings as tools or instruments

Though he does not share Aristotle s view that some men are by nature slaves Spinoza takes a comparable position with regard to man s domination and use of animals The law against killing animals he writes is based upon an empty superstition and womanish tenderness rather than upon sound reason A proper regard indeed to one s own profit teaches us to unite in friendship with men and not with brutes nor with things whose nature is different from human nature I by no means deny he continues that brutes feel but I do deny that on this account it is unlawful for us to consult our own profit by using them for our pleasure and treating them as is most convenient to us inasmuch as they do not agree in nature with us

But other moralists declare that men can befriend animals and insist that charity if not justice should control man s treatment of beasts Nor is such contrary teaching confined to Christianity or to the maxims of St Francis, who would persuade men to love not only their neighbors as themselves but all of God s creatures Plutarch for instance argues that although law and justice we cannot in the nature of things employ on others than men nevertheless we may extend our goodness and charity even to irrational creatures In kindness to dumb animals he finds the mark of the gentle nature —the sign of a man s humaneness Towards human beings as they have reason behave in a social spirit says Marcus Aurelius but he also writes As to animals which have no reason and generally all things and objects do thou since thou hast reason and they have none make use of them with a generous and liberal spirit

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

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REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passa es referred to. For example in 4 HOMER Iliad BK II [65 283] 12d the number 4 is the number of th volume in the set the number 12d indic tes that the passage is in section d of page I

P GE SECTI NS When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b ref r to the pper and lower hal es of the page. For example in 53 J M S Psychology 116a 119b th passage begins in th upper half of p e 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand sid of the pa e the letters c and d to the upper and lower hal es of the right hand side of the page. For example, in 7 PLATO Sympos m 163b-164c the passa e begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the ri ht hand side of page 164

AUTHOR S DI IS O S One o more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK, CH, S CT) are som times incl ded in the refe ence line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer tai cases e g Iliad BK II [65 283] 12d.

B L RE ERE ES Th r ferences are t book chapter and verse When th King James and Doua ersions d ffer in titl of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the K ng James rsion is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e g OLD TESTAMENT Nehemiah 45—(D) II Esd. 21 7-46

SYMBOLS Th abbreviation esp calls the reader s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermi tently ather than continuously in the work or passa cited

For dditional inf rmation concernin the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas cons lt the Pr face

1 General theori s abo t the animal nature

1a. Characteristics of animal life the animal soul

7 PLATO Cratylu 93c-d / Phaedo 233b-c / Re bac K 440b-c / Timaeu 476d-477a,c
8 ARI TOTL Met hysic BK CH 8 [0 b10-] 538b / So l 631a-668d esp BK II CH 2 [4 3b20-b4] 643b-c
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P GE SECTIONS When the text is printed n one column the letters a and b refer to tl e upper and lowe hal es of the page For example in 53 J MES Psychology 116a 119b tl e passa e beg ns in the upper half of p e 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119 When the text is printed n two column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower hal es of the left hand sid of the pa e the letters c and d t the upper an l lower halves of the rigl t hand side of the pag For example n 7 PLATO Symposium 163b-164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side f pa e 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand s de of page 164

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SYM B LS The abbreviat on esp calls the reader s atte tion to one or more especially rel v nt parts f a whole eference passim sig ifies that the topic is d scussed interm t tently rather than c ntinuously in the wo k or passa e cited

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4 HOMER *Odyssey* BK XVII [290-327] 280a-c
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4 HOMER *Iliad* BK XVII [426-455] 126c d / *Odyssey* BK XVII [290-327] 280a c
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49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 279a 280c 371d 3 2c

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12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK II [700–7] 23d 4a

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35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH IX SECT 11 15 140b 141a BK III CH VI SECT 12 271d 272b
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53 JAMES *Psychology* 8a
54 FREUD *Unconscious* 429c d

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(1 *General theories about the animal nature* 1b *The distinction between plants and animals in faculty and function cases difficult to classify*)

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK VII CH 23 256b c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 18 A I REP 2 104c 105c A 2 REP I 105c 106b A 3 ANS 106b 107c Q 69 A 2 REP I 361c 362c Q 72 A I REP I 368b 369d Q 78 A I ANS 407b-409a
28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 278b / *Circulation of the Blood* 327d 328a / *On Animal Generation* 368a b 369d 370b 372b 397c 398c 457c d 461b d
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 30 159c d
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH IX SECT 11 15 140b 141a BK III CH VI SECT 12 271d 272b
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 37 119c
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 241b c / *Descent of Man* 372b c
53 JAMES *Psychology* 8a
54 FREUD *Unconscious* 429c d

1c The distinction between animal and human nature

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 1 20-30 / *Psalms* 8 esp 8 4-8—(D) *Psalms* 8 esp 8 5-9 / *Ecclesiastes* 3 18-22
5 AESCHYLUS *Prometheus Bound* [436-505] 44c 45a
5 EURIPIDES *Trojan Women* [669-672] 275d
7 PLATO *Laches* 35b d / *Protagoras* 44a 45a / *Cratylus* 93a b / *Timaeus* 452d 453a / *Laws* BK II 653b c BK VII 723c d
8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK V CH 3 [132 17 22] 183a / *Heavens* BK II CH 12 [292^{b}1-11] 384a / *Metaphysics* BK I CH I [980 28-^{b}27] 499a b / *Soul* BK II CH 3 [414^{b}17-20] 644d [415^{a}7-12] 645b BK III CH 3 [427^{b}7-14] 659d 660a [428 20-24] 660c CH 10 [433^{a}8-13] 665d / *Memory and Reminiscence* CH 2 [453 5-14] 695b
9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK I CH I [488^{b}20-27] 9d BK IV CH 9 [536 34-^{b}8] 63a b BK VIII CH I [588 18-^{b}4] 114b d / *Parts of Animals* BK I CH I [641^{b}5-10] 164b-c BK II CH 10 [656 4-14] 182a b BK III CH 10 [673 4-10] 201d 202a BK IV CH 10 [686 25-687^{b}5] 217d 219a / *Generation of Animals* BK V CH 7 [786^{b}15-22] 328c d / *Ethics* BK I CH 7 [1097^{b}33-1098 4] 343b BK III CH 2 [1111^{b}6-9] 357b BK VI CH 2 [1139 17-20] 387d CH 13 [1144^{b}1 10] 394b BK VII CH I [1145 15 26] 395a CH 5 399a d CH 6 [1149^{b}24 1150 8] 400b c BK X CH 8 [1178^{b}23-3] 433c / *Politics* BK I CH 2 [1253^{a}7 18] 446b c BK III CH 9 [1280^{a}31-34] 477d-478a BK VII CH 13 [133- 39-^{b}5] 537a b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH I [1355^{b}1-3] 594d / *Poetics* CH 4 [1448^{b}4-8] 682c
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 3 108b-c CH 6 111a c CH 9 114c 115a CH 16 121d 122d CH 28 134a b BK II CH 8 146a c BK III CH 7 183d BK IV CH 5 228c d CH , 233a b CH 11 240d 241a
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK III SECT 16 262d 263a c BK V SECT 16 271c d BK VI SECT 23 276b BK IX SECT 9 292b d
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X par 11 74a b BK XIII par 35-37 120b 121a esp par 37 121a / *City of God* BK VII CH 23 256b-c BK XI CH 27-28 337b 338d BK XXIX CH 24 610c d / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 8 626c 627a CH 22 629b c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A I REP 14b 15b A 4 REP I 16d 17c Q 18 A 2 REP I 105c 106b A 3 A S 106b 107c Q 19 A 10 ANS 117d 118b Q 30 A 2 REP 3 168a 169b Q 59 A 3 ANS 308b 309a Q 72 A I REP I 3 368b 369d Q 75 AA 2 3 379c 381b A 6 REP I 383c 384c Q 76 A 5 REP 4 394c 396a Q 78 A I ANS 407b-409a A 4 ANS 411d 413d Q 79 A 8 REP 3 421c 422b Q 81 A 3 ANS and REP 2 430c 431d Q 83 A I ANS 436d-438a Q 91 A 3 REP I 3 486b-487d Q 92 A I ANS 488d-489d Q 96 A I 510b 511b Q 115 A 4 ANS 589d 590c Q 118 AA I 2 600a 603b PART I II Q I A I ANS 609b 610b A 2 ANS and REP I 3 610b 611b Q A 5 CONTRARY 618d 619c Q 6 A 2 646a c Q 10 A 3 ANS 664d 665c Q 11 A 2 667b d Q I A 5 672a c Q 13 A 2 673c 674c Q 15 A 682a c Q 16 A 2 684d 685b Q 17 A 687d 688b
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 50 A 3 REP 2 8b 9a Q 110 A 4 REP 3 350d 351d PART III Q 2 A REP 2 711d 712d Q 7 A 9 ANS 751d 752c PART III SUPPL Q 79 A I AN 951b 953b
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL XXVI [112 120] 39b PURGATORY XXV [34 78] 91d 92a PARADISE V [19 24] 112b VII [1 148] 116b-c
22 CHAUCER *Knight's Tale* [1303 1333] 181b 182a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 52b 53a b 54a 59b c 63a 79b c PART II 100a c
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 207a c 215a 232c
27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT IV SC IV [32 37] 59a
31 DESCARTES *Rules* 11 19d 20a / *Discourse* PART I 41d PART V 56a b 59a 60b / *Objections and Replies* 156a d 226a d 276c
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 57 SCHOL 415b PART IV PROP 37 SCHOL I 435a b
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VII [449 549] 227a 229a BK VIII [369-451] 240a 242a BK IX [549-566] 259b
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 140 199a b 339 344 233a b 418 243a / *Vacuum* 357a 358a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* INTRO SECT 5 93a b BK II CH XI SECT 4 11 144d 146a passim esp SECT 10-11 145d 146a CH XXVII SECT

(1c *The distinction between animal and human nature*)

1c(2) Comparison of animal with human intelligence

7 PLATO *Republic* BK II 319c 320c
8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK II CH 8 [199^{a}20–23] 276c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH I [980^{a}28–981^{a}12] 499a c
9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK I CH I [488^{b}20–27] 9d BK VIII CH I [588^{a}18–^{b}4] 114b d BK IX CH I [608^{a}10–^{b}19] 133b d 134a CH 7 [612^{b}18–32] 138b c / *Parts of Animals* BK I CH I [641^{b}5–10] 164b c BK IV CH 10 [686^{b}22–687^{a}23] 218b d / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH 23 [731^{a}24–^{b}8] 271c d BK II CH 6 [744^{a}27–31] 285c / *Ethics* BK VI CH 7 [1141^{a}20–35] 390a b BK VII CH 3 [1147^{b}3–5] 397d / *Politics* BK I CH 5 [1254^{b}20–25] 448b
10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK I CH 12 172d 173c
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK IX SECT 9 292b d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 59 A 3 ANS 308b 309a Q 76 A 5 REP 4 394c 396a Q 79 A 8 REP 3 421c-422b Q 83 A I ANS 436d 438a Q 96 A I ANS and REP 4 510b 511b PART I-II Q I A 5 672a c Q 17 A 2 687d 688b
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL Q 79 A I ANS 951b 953b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 52b 53a b 53d 54a 59b c 63a 64b c 79b c PART II 100a c PART IV 267b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 215a 224a 231d 232c
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 428a b 454a
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK I APH 73 117d 118a BK II APH 35 163d 164a
31 DESCARTES *Rules* XII 19d 20a / *Discourse* PART V 59d 60b / *Objections and Replies* 156a d 226a d
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VIII [369–451] 240a 242a BK IX [549–566] 259b
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 339–344 233a b / *Vacuum* 357a 358a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH IX SECT 12–15 140c 141a CH X SECT 10 143c d CH XI SECT 4–11 144d 146a passim CH XXVII SECT 8 221a 222a SECT 12 223a b BK III CH VI SECT 12 271d 272b BK IV CH XVI SECT 12 370c 371a CH XVII SECT I 371c d
35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO SECT 11 407b 408a
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT IX 487b 488c SECT XII DIV 118 504c
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART IV 135a 184a esp 151b 152a 159b 160a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 337d 338a 341d 342a / *Social Contract* BK I 393b-c
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 6d 8b
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 199c 200c 235c d / *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 372a b / *Judgement* 479a c 584d 585c 602b d [fn 1]
43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 469c d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* ADDITIONS 25 121a 121 136c d
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 134b 135a
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 287a 303d esp 291c 297b 319b d 591d 592a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE II 689 690a
53 JAMES *Psychology* 5a 6b 13a 15a passim 49a 50a 85a b 665a 666b 677a 678b 686b 704a 706b 873a
54 FREUD *Interpretation of Dreams* 385b-c

1d The habits or instincts of animals types of animal habit or instinct the habits or instincts of different classes of animals

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK II 62c 64c passim 67b c BK III 111d 112c BK VII 236c
7 PLATO *Republic* BK II 320b
8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK II CH 8 [199^{a}20–30] 276c
9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK I CH I [487^{a}10–488^{b}29] 7d 9d BK IV CH 9 62a 63c BK V–VI 65a 106d esp BK V CH 8 [542^{a}18–^{b}2] 68d 69a BK VIII IX 114b d 158d esp BK VIII CH I [588^{b}23–589^{a}9] 115b CH 12 [596^{b}20–28] 122d / *Parts of Animals* BK II CH 4 [650^{b}19–651^{a}5] 175c d BK IV CH 5 [679^{a}5–32] 209a c / *Generation of Animals* BK III CH 2 [753^{a}8–17] 294a b / *Politics* BK I CH 5 [1254^{b}23–24] 448b CH 8 [1256^{a}18–30] 450a BK VII CH 13 [1332^{b}3–4] 537b
10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK I CH 12 173a c
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK II [333–370] 19b d [661–668] 23b c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 19 A 10 ANS 117d 118b Q 59 A 3 ANS 308b 309a Q 78 A 4 ANS 411d 413d Q 81 A 3 ANS and REP 2 430c 431d Q 83 A I ANS 436d-438a Q 96 A I ANS and REP 2 4 510b 511b Q 115 A 4 ANS 589d 590c PART I II Q 12 A 5 ANS and REP 3 672a c Q 13 A 2 esp REP 3 673c 674c Q 15 A 2 ANS 682a c Q 16 A 2 REP 2 684d 685b Q 17 A 2 REP 3 687d 688b Q 40 A 3 794c 795a Q 41 A I REP 3 798b d Q 46 A 4 REP 2 815b d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 50 A 3 REP 2 8b 9a
22 CHAUCER *Nun's Priest's Tale* [15,282–87] 457b / *Manciple's Tale* [17,104–144] 490a b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 100a c
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK IV 247d 248b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 184a b 216b 219a
26 SHAKESPEARE *Henry V* ACT I SC II [187–204] 535d 536a
27 SHAKESPEARE *Timon of Athens* ACT IV SC III [320–348] 414b c
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 339a b 346a 347d 349a 350a 361c 362a 402a d 405c-406a 428a c 476b-477b

1 The co ception of the nimal as a machine o tomaton

2 The classification of animals

2a General schemes of class fication their pr ciples and major d isions

2b Analog of structure and f nct on among diffe ent classes of a imals

(4 *Animal movement* 4b *The cause of animal movement voluntary and involuntary movements*)

12 Lucretius *Nature of Things* bk ii [51 293] 18b d bk iii [161 167] 32b bk iv [877–906] 55d 56a
19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 18 a 3 ans 106b 107c q 78 a 1 ans and rep 4 407b 409a q 80 a 2 rep 3 428a d q 115 a 4 ans 589d 590c part i–ii q 6 a 2 646a c q 1 a 5 672a c q 13 a 2 673c 674c q 15 a 2 68 a c q 16 a 2 684d 685b q 17 a 2 687d 688b
23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part i 61a b
24 Rabelais *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk iii 192d 193a
28 Harvey *Motion of the Heart* 267a b 285d 286a 302d 303a / *Circulation of the Blood* 316d 325d 3?6d / *On Animal Generation* 369d 370b 415b 429c esp 417a 419b 423b 424a 427c 428c 456b 458a 488d-496d
31 Descartes *Rules* xii 19d 20a / *Discourse* part v 58d 59a 60b / *Objections and Replies* 156a d
35 Locke *Human Understanding* bk ii ch xxi sect 5 179 d sect 7–11 180a d ch xxxiii sect 6 249a b bk iv ch x sect 19 354a c
35 Hume *Human Understanding* sect vii div 51–5 472b 473c
42 Kant *Pure Reason* 164b c / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 386b d
49 Darwin *Origin of Species* 115b
53 James *Psychology* 3b 5a 8a 15a esp 12a b 15a 71b [fn 1] 694a 702a 705a 706b 761a 765b 767b 768a 827a 835a
54 Freud *Interpretation of Dreams* 351d 352a 363b d / *Instincts* 412b 414b passim

4c The organs mechanisms and characteristics of locomotion

7 Plato *Timaeus* 454b
8 Aristotle *Soul* bk iii ch 10 [433b13 27] 666b-c
9 Aristotle *History of Animals* bk i ch 1 [487b14–34] 8c d ch 4 [489 -7 9] 10c ch 5 [489b-0 490b6] 11a 12a ch 15 [493b26–494 18] 16a b bk ii ch 1 [497b18–498b10] 20a d ch 12 26b 27a passim bk iii ch 5 39c 40a bk iv ch 1 [523b21–524 32] 48d 50a ch 2 [525b15 526b18] 51d 53b ch 4 [528 9 b11] 55b ch 7 [532 19 9] 59a b / *Parts of Animals* bk ii ch 9 [654 31–b35] 180a d bk iv ch 6–9 213b 217b passim ch 10 [690 4–b11] 221d 222c ch 12 [693a24]—ch 13 [696 34] 225b 228a / *Motion of Animals* ch 1 2 233a 234a ch 7 [701b1–13] 236d 237a ch 8 [702 22] ch 10 [703b1] 237c 239a / *Gait of Animals* 243a 252a c
10 Hippocrates *Articulations* par 60 113b d
12 Lucretius *Nature of Things* bk iv [877 897] 55d 56a
16 Kepler *Epitome* bk iv 855b
19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 71 a 1 rep 2 367a 368b q 99 a 1 ans 519b-520a
20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part iii suppl q 84 a 1 rep 4 983c 984c
28 Harvey *Motion of the Heart* 301d 302a / *Circulation of the Blood* 319b / *On Animal Generation* 450a b
31 Descartes *Rules* xii 19d 20a / *Discourse* part v 58d 59a / *Objections and Replies* 156a d
34 Newton *Principles* corol ii 15a 16b esp 16b
48 Melville *Moby Dick* 276b-278a
49 Darwin *Origin of Species* 23a b 66a 67a 83b 84b 93b c 94d 95a 105c 106a / *Descent of Man* 278c 280c 365b c
53 James *Psychology* 9a 12b 19b 26b 714a 715b passim

5 Local motion within the animal body

5a The ducts channels and conduits involved in interior bodily motions

7 Plato *Timaeus* 470a 471b
8 Aristotle *Youth Life and Breathing* ch 14 [474b-9] 720d ch 17 [476 26 b8] 722b c ch 22 724b d passim
9 Aristotle *History of Animals* bk i ch 2 [488b29] ch 3 [489 14] 9d 10b ch 4 [489 20-23] 10b c ch 12 15a ch 16 [495 18]-ch 17 [497 29] 17b-19d bk ii ch 15–bk iii ch 4 28b 39c bk iii ch 20 [521b4–8] 46c bk v ch 5 [540b20–541 12] 67b c bk vi ch 11 [566 2 14] 92a b bk vii ch 8 [586b12 24] 112d 113a / *Parts of Animals* bk ii ch 9 [654 31 b12] 180a b bk iii ch 3 191d 193a ch 4 [665b10]-ch 5 [668b31] 193b 197b ch 7 [670 7–18] 198c d ch 8 [670b34]-ch 9 [671b 5] 199c 200c ch 14 203b 205c bk iv ch 2 [676b16–677 24] 206b 207a ch 4 [677b36–678 0] 207d 208a / *Generation of Animals* bk i ch 2 [716 33]-ch 16 [721a6] 256b 261a passim bk ii ch 4 [738b9–739b2] 278d 279d [740 21–35] 281a b ch 6 [743 1 11] 284b ch 7 [745b 746 19] 287a c bk iv ch 4 [773 13 29] 315a b
10 Hippocrates *Ancient Medicine* par 2 8a d / *Sacred Disease* 156a b
10 Galen *Natural Faculties* bk i ch 10 171b 172b ch 13 173d 177a bk i ch 15–bk ii ch 3 179d 185b bk ii ch 5–6 188b 191a ch 9 195c 199a c bk iii 199a 215d passim
28 Harvey *Motion of the Heart* 268d 304a c esp 295d 296a / *Circulation of the Blood* 305a 328a c / *On Animal Generation* 339c 340c 342d 345a 347d 350a 353b 368b-371c 373b 374d 378b d 379b c 388d 389a 401c 402c 430b d 438c-441a 449c d 473d-476b 485a-487b
31 Descartes *Discourse* part v 56b 59a
49 Darwin *Descent of Man* 257c

5 The circul tory system the mot ons of the heart blood and lymph

7 PLATO Tim eus 466e d 471c d
8 ARISTOTL Yo th Lif a d Brea hing c 1 6 725d 726b
9 ARISTO L Hist ry f Animals BK I I CH 19 [52 ᵃ6-31]4 d-46b BK VI CI 3[56 9-15]87 / Parts of Animals BK III CH 4-5 193a 197b / Gener t o f A mals BK I CH I [735ᵃ10- 6] 275d 276 c 1 5 [741ᵇ15 24] 282d c 1 6 [742ᵇ33 743 1] 284 BK IV CI 1 [66ᵃ30-ᵇ2] 30 c d
10 H PPO RAT S Sacred D sease 160a
10 G EN Natur l Facult s BK I CH 15 BK II H 2 1ᵃ9d 183a BK I CH 4-6 188a d BK II CH 13 15 213a 215d
17 PLOTI L Fo rth E nead T II CH 23 154b
19 AQ I S mma Theolog ca P RT I II Q 17 9 R 692d 693d
24 R EL I G rg ntua and Pantagruel BK III 138a d
28 H RV Y M t on of the H art 268d 304 c esp 285b-296 / Ci culat n f th B'o d 305a 328a esp 309b-d, 321a 326d / O A mal Generat o 368a 371b 374a d 429 -441a 449c d 456b d 488d-496d
30 B C N tum Orga m K II APH 48 186d
31 D A E D sco se P RT 56b-59a / Object and Repl s 156c d
53 JAM P y ho gy 64 65 695 -696a

5 The gl ndular system the glands of n te nal a d external secretion

7 PLA O T mae 472a-474b
9 AR TOTL H tory f A im ls K CH 2 [493 6] 15 K C I 13 [5 4 22] 27a b K I C 2 [5 I 0] 35 II [2 ᵇ]- C I 2 [523 3] 46d 48c K C 2 [574ᵇ, 13] 100b c [₅ᵇ9- 2] 101b CH 6 103d I 33 [580ᵃ2 4] 103c d BK C 3 [583 6-34] 108d 109 5 [8 ᵃ29-3] 111b CH 114a, / I rt f Anim ls BK C 7 [653ᵇ8-9] 179 K II 5 [668ᵇ 0] 196d I 15 20 d K I 10 [685 9-ᵇ34] 219d 220d / Genera i f A im is BK I CH 20 [34 8ᵃ9] 268a b BK II C I 2 [₃2ᵇ23 4] 293d BK I 8 318b 319c
10 H OCR TE Ancient Med cine pa 19 6d 7b / Air W ater Places par 8 12a b / Prog t pa 6 20
10 C N t al F cult s BK I H 3 175d 177a K 2 184b-185 H 4-5 188a-c C 8-9 191b-199 K III CH 5 202 d H 209 b
28 H E M t f th H rt 288d / Ci c l t f th Blood 320 b / On A mal Gener t n 396c d 435a 451b 461b 464c d 487 -488a
31 S OZA Eth s A EF 451 -452c
34 N WTO Opt s BK 538a
49 D RV IN Origin of Species 110c 111a / Descent of Man 339d 340c 547c 548c
53 JA ES P ychology 66b 67a 696b-697b

5d The resp ratory system bre thing lungs g lls

7 PLATO Timaeus 470b-471b
8 A ISTOTL Youth Life and Breath ng CH 7 27 717a 726d
9 ARISTOTLE His ory of A mals BK I CH I [48-ᵃ14 ᵇ3] 8a b CH 5 [489ᵃ34 ᵇ6] 10d CH II [49 ᵇ₃ 12] 14b-c CH 16 [495 0-ᵇ19] 17b-d CH 17 [496 27 34] 18c BK II CH 13 [504ᵇ - 505ᵃ19] 27b-c CH 15 [505ᵇ3 -506 4] 28c BK I CH 2 [5 6 18 22] 53b BK VI C I 12 [566ᵇ2-14] 92c d BK VI I CH 2 [589ᵃ10-ᵇ29] 115c 116b / Parts of Animals BK II CH 16 [658ᵇ26-659ᵇ 9] 185d 186c BK III CH I [662 16-28] 189b-c CH 3 191d 193a CH 6 197b-198a BK I CH 13 [696 37 ᵇ24] 228a-c [69-ᵃ16-ᵇ1] 229a b / Motion of An mals CH II [703ᵇ3 15] 239 b
10 HIPPOCRATES Prognostics par 5 20b c / Articulat ns par 41 103c 104b
10 G L N Nat l Facult s BK III CH 13 211b-d
28 HAR Y Mot of the Heart 268d 273a pas s m 282b-285b 303d 304a, / Ci cula o of the Blo d 309c 317c d 324a 325d / On A imal G nerat o 339 340c 458a
30 B CON No um Org num BK II APH 12 141d 142
31 DES RT Di co rse ART 58b c
33 PAS L W eight of Air 415 b
48 MEL ILL Moby D k 272b 276b
49 D RWIN Orig of Species 87d 88c 90c 91a 238d / D scent of Man 339a
53 JAM S Psych logy 696 b 740b [fn 1]

5e The l mentary system the motions of the d gest ve organs in the nutr ti e process

7 P TO Timaet s 467d-468a
9 ARI TOTLE Pa t of A m ls BK II CI 3 [65 I 3] 174c 175 BK III C I [661 34 ᵇ1] 188b CH 3 191d 193 H 14 203b-205 BK I H II [690ᵇ18-691] 222d 223a [69 28 ᵇ27] 223 d
10 HI POCR T A ent M d cine par II 4b
10 G Nat l Facult K I CH 9 10 171b-172b C I 16 180 181b K III CH 4-5 201b 202d CH 7-8 203b-20 b I 13 211d 212d
28 HAR Y Mot on of the He rt 279 b / On A m l Generat o 350 c 451b 452d-453a 456d 460 -461a
31 DES A ES D c I se P RT 58c d

5f The excretory ystem the motions of elim in t on

9 AR OTL Hist ry f A mals BK III C I 15 44b-c BK I CH [524ᵃ9-14] 49d BK I CH 20 [574 19-23] 100b- K VI CI I [587ᵃ 27 33] 113c K VI I CH 5 [594ᵇ2 6] 120d

(5 *Local motion within the animal body* 5f *The excretory system the motions of elimination*)

BK IX CH 45 [630b7 17] 155d 156a / *Parts of Animals* BK III CH 7 [670b23]-CH 9 [672 26] 199b 201a CH 14 [675 31-b38] 204d 205c BK IV CH 1 [676 29-35] 206a CH 2 206b 207b CH 5 [679 5 32] 209a c CH 10 [689 3 34] 220d 221b / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH 13 [719b29-720 11] 259d 260a

10 HIPPOCRATES *Airs Waters Places* par 9 12d 13b / *Prognostics* par 11 12 21c 22b

10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK I CH 13 173d 175d CH 15 17 179d 183d BK II CH 2 184b-185a BK III CH 5 202c d CH 13 13 208b 213b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 119 A 1 REP 1 604c 607b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL, Q 80 A 2 REP 1 957c 958b A 3 ANS and REP 2 958b-959c

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 16c 18b BK III 138b c BK IV 293a b 310d 311d

28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 273b c 283a b / *On Animal Generation* 344b 345a 351a b 356c d 380c

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 26a b

45 LAVOISIER *Elements of Chemistry* PART I 45c d

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 111b c 120b c

5g The brain and nervous system the excitation and conduction of nervous impulses

9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK II CH 7 177c 179a CH 10 [656 14-b28] 182b 183a

10 HIPPOCRATES *Sacred Disease* 156a 160b

10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK II CH 6 188c 191a

16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 855a b

17 PLOTINUS *Fourth Ennead* TR III CH 23 153d 154a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 99 A 1 ANS 519b 520a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 49b d

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK III 190a c

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 456b 458a

31 DESCARTES *Rules* XII 19d 20a / *Discourse* PART V 58d 59a / *Meditations* VI 102a d / *Objections and Replies* 156a d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART V PREF 451a 452c

34 NEWTON *Optics* BK III 518b 519b 522a b

45 FARADAY *Researches in Electricity* 540a 541a c

53 JAMES *Psychology* 2b 3a 8a 67b esp 9b 17a 42a b 46b 47a 70a 77b esp 70a 71a 152a 153a 497a 501b esp 500b 501b 694a 695a 698b 699a 705a b 758b 759a 827b 835a

54 FREUD *Hysteria* 87a / *Interpretation of Dreams* 351c 352d 363c 364b 378a b / *Instincts* 413a d / *Unconscious* 431d / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 646b-649d / *Ego and Id* 700a b

6 Animal nutrition

6a The nature of the nutriment

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 1 29-30

5 ARISTOPHANES *Peace* [1 172] 526a 527d

7 PLATO *Timaeus* 469d 470a 471d-472a

8 ARISTOTLE *Generation and Corruption* BK I CH 5 [322 4 28] 419d 420b / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 3 [983b19 25] 501d 502a / *Soul* BK II CH 4 [416 18 b31] 646c 647b / *Sense and the Sensible* CH 4 [441b24-442 12] 679b d

9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK I CH 1 [488 15-20] 9a BK III CH 20 [521b21]-CH 21 [523 13] 46d-48c BK VIII CH 2 [590 18]-CH 11 [596b19] 116d 122d CH 21 [603b25 33] 129d BK IX CH 1 [608b19]-CH 2 [610b19] 134a 136b CH 9 140a b / *Parts of Animals* BK II CH 4 [651 12 19] 176a / *Generation of Animals* BK IV CH 8 [777a4 19] 319a b / *Politics* BK I CH 8 [1256 18-30] 450a [1256b11- 0] 450b c

10 HIPPOCRATES *Ancient Medicine* par 3-8 1d 3b par 13 15 4c 5d / *Regimen in Acute Diseases* par 4 27c 28a par 14 17 32c 34c APPENDIX par 18 41a d

10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK I CH 2 168a b CH 10 11 171b 172d BK II CH 8 191b 193d esp 192d 193b

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [633-672] 52c 53a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 97 A 3 REP 2 515a d A 4 515d 516d Q 119 A 1 604c 607b

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK III 138b

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 378b d 398d 399c 408c d 409c d 414a b 435a 438b 439a 440a 448a-c 461a d 463b-466b 486c d 487c 488a 494a 496d esp 494b 495c 496a

30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 50 193b c

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 337d

6b The process of nutrition ingestion digestion assimilation

7 PLATO *Timaeus* 467d 468a 471c-472a

8 ARISTOTLE *Meteorology* BK IV CH 2 [379b10-34] 483d 484a / *Soul* BK II CH 4 [416 18 b29] 646c 647b / *Sleep* CH 3 699b 701d passim

9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK VIII CH 4 [594 11 21] 120a b CH 6 [595 6-13] 121a CH 17 [600b 1] 126c / *Parts of Animals* BK II CH 3 [650 1 b13] 174c 175b BK III CH 1 [661 36 b12] 188b CH 3 191d 193a CH 14 203b 205c BK IV CH 3 [677b30]-CH 4 [678 20] 207d 208a CH 11 [690b20-691 1] 222d 223a [691 28 b27] 223c d

10 HIPPOCRATES *Ancient Medicine* par 11 4b / *Regimen in Acute Diseases* APPENDIX par 18 41a d

10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK I CH 2 167b 168c CH 7 12 170c 173c esp CH 10 11 171b-

8b

172d CH 16 180c 181b BK II CH 4 187 b CH 6-7 188c 191b BK I I CH I 199 -c CH 4 201b-202c CH 6-9 202d 207b CH 13 209b-213b esp 211d 213a

12 L CR TIUS *Nat e of Things* BK II [8,1-882] 26a [1 8 1147] 29b-c BK IV [858-8,6] 5b-c

19 AQ INAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 97 A 3 RE 515a d 4 515d 516d Q 118 A I AN and REP 3 4 600 601 Q 119 A I 604c 607b

20 AQU S *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL, Q 80 A 3 ANS 958b-959c A 4 959c 963a

24 R B LA S *Gargantua and P ntagruel* BK III 134d 135a 138a 139b

27 SH K PE RE *Cori lanus* ACT I SC I [92 159] 352b 353

28 H Y *Mot n of the Heart* 279a b 296a 297 esp 296d 297a 297d 298b / *Circ lat on of th Bl od* 307c 308c 319b 320 b / *On A mal Gener tion* 350a-c 408c d 413a-415a 435 -438b 441b-443b 446c-447a 455c d 460b-461d 465b

30 B C N *Novum Org um* BK II APH 48 184 c

31 D C R *Discourse* P T 58c d

7 Animal growth o augmentatio its natur caus s a d lim t

6 HE ODOTU *History* BK I 63b

7 PLATO *Timaeus* 471d-472a

8 A TOTL *Physics* BK I CH I [93 13 19] 269d 270 K C I I [241a2, b2] 325b-c K II C 7 [60a] 346b-c / *Generat on and Corrupt on* K I H 5 417b-420b / *M a physic* K H 4 [014b20-26] 535a

9 A I TOTL *H story f A im ls* BK C 19 [5, 26-3] 77d H 33 [5,5 8- 4] 84d 85a / *M o f A im ls* H 5 235c d / *Generat n f Anim l* BK I CH 18 [23a9-23] 263a b BK H [35a13 23] 275d 276 CH 3 [73-a3, b7] 278b H 4 [739 34 741a2] 280d 281d H 6 [44 3 45 9] 286a-d BK C 4 [7- b33 --2 1] 313d / *Pol ic* K I CH 4 [326 35 4] 530c

10 H POC E *Ancient Med cin* par 3 1d 2b

10 GAL *Nat ir l F cult* K C I I 2 167 d H 5 169b-c H 7 170c 171a K I H 3 186c-d

12 L ETI S *N ture f Things* BK I [184 4] 3b-d K [I 5 47] 29 -c K [83-8] 71b-d [8 8-900] 72 d

19 AQ *S mma Theolog* P RT Q 97 4 515d 516d Q 99 A 519b-520a Q I 9 I A and RE 4 604c-607b

20 AQ I *Summ Theologic* T III S L, Q 80 4 959c 963 5 REP I 963 964b

28 G LI EO *T o New Science* S COND Y 187b-188c

28 H Y *O A m l Generat* 353b-354b 374b-d 388c d 403c-409b 412b-415b esp 415 441 -443b 450b-d 494a-496d esp 495c-496a

48 MELVILLE *Moby D ck* 338a 339a

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 71a d 227c 228b / *Descent of Man* 402a b 405a d 540a 541c

54 FREUD *Civiliz at o and Its D scontents* 770b

8 The generat on of an m ls

8a The origin of an mals cre tion or evolu tion

OLD T ST MENT *Genesis* I II 12,20-28 2-4 9 19-23

7 PLATO *Timaeus* 452c-454a 476b-477a c

9 ARISTOTLE *Generation of Animals* BK III CH 11 [62b28- 63 8] 303d 304a

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature f Th gs* BK V [,83-836] 71b-72a

18 AU USTINE *City of God* BK XII CH 21 357a b CH 27 359 360a c BK XVI CH 7 427a b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theolog ca* PART I QQ ,1 72 367a 369d

32 M LTO *Pa adise Lost* BK II [387-550] 225b-229a

34 NE TON *O t cs* BK III 542b

42 K NT *Judgement* 5 8d 580a esp 579b-c 581b-58_c

47 GOETHE *Fa st* P T II [8245-8 64] 201a

49 D RWIN *Origin f Species* 1a 251a c esp 1a 7d, 63b-64d 85b-c 217d 219a, 230a 243d / *D scent f Man* 26 d

8b Di e se theor es of nimal generat on pro creation and spo taneous generat on

7 PLATO *T maeus* 476b-477a c

8 AR STOTLE *Meteorol gy* K IV CH I [3,9b6-8] 483c CI 3 [381b9-13] 485d CH II [389a-8-b7] 49 c / *Met hysics* K II CH 9 [1034 32-b5] 5 7c d BK XII CH 6 [I 71b29 31] 601c CH 7 [I --b30-1 73a2] 603a

9 ARISTOTLE *H story of A mals* BK V CH I [39a 5 b13] 65b-66a CH II [543b18-19] 70b C I5 [46b 7-54-a1] 73c CH I5 [4-b12]-c 16 [548 7] 74b-75b CH 19 [550b31-551 13] 77d 78a [551b19-55 7] 78c 79c CH 21 [553 16-b2] 80a b CH 31 [556b 5]-CH 32 [557b14] 83c-84b BK VI CH 15 16 95a 96 / *Generat on f A mals* K I C I I [7 5 18-7 6a2] 255b-256 CH 16 [21 3 1] 260d 261 BK I CH I [732b8-14] 272d 273a CH 3 [737a1 5] 277d BK I I C I 9 299b-300a CH II [61 24 63b1,] 302d 304d

12 L CR TIUS *Nature f Th gs* BK II [865-943] 26a 27 BK [783-82] 71b-d

18 AUGUSTINE *City f God* BK XII CI II 349a b K X I CH 7 427a b

19 AQUIN S *Summa The log ca* P RT I Q 23 A 2 REP 144c 145b Q 45 A 8 REP 3 249b-2 0a Q 71 A I R 1 367 368b Q 72 A I R 5 368b-369d Q 92 A I AN and RE 488d-489d Q 118 AA I 2 600a-603b Q 119 A 2 607b-608d

20 AQ N S *Summ Th ologica* P RT I II Q 60 A I A 49d 50c

(8 *The generation of animals* 8b *Diverse the ories of animal generation procreation and spontaneous generation*)

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK II 114b-c
28 GILBERT *Loadstone* BK V 105a b
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 338b d 390b c 400d 401a 406c d 412c 413a 428c d 449a b 454d 455a 468b 472c
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 50 192a b
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 1c 61a

8c Modes of animal reproduction sexual and asexual

7 PLATO *Symposium* 157d 158b / *Timaeus* 476b d / *Statesman* 587a 588a
9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK IV CH II [537b- -538 21] 64b d BK V-VII 65a 114a c esp BK V CH I 65a 66a BK VI CH 18 97b 99c / *Generation of Animals* 255a 331a c esp BK I CH 1-2 255a 256c BK I CH 21-BK II CH I 269c 276a BK II CH 5 282a d
10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK II CH 3 185a 186d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 119 A 2 ANS 607b 608d
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 331a 338a 496d esp 390b 429
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 47c-49c 220a b / *Descent of Man* 390c 391b 395a 399c passim
54 FREUD *Instincts* 415b / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 655b 657d 659d 660c

8c(1) Sexual differentiation its origins and determinations primary and secondary characteristics

7 PLATO *Symposium* 157b 159b / *Timaeus* 476b d
9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK II CH 3 [501b20-25] 24a BK III CH 7 [516 15 0] 40c CH II [518 30-b4] 42d 43a CH 19 [5 1 21 31] 46b CH 20 [522 II 21] 47a b BK IV CH I [524b31 525 13] 50d 51a CH 2 [5 5b34 526 6] 52b CH 3 [5 7b30 34] 54c d CH II 64b 65a c BK V CH 5 [540b14 28] 67b CH 7 [541b30]-CH 8 [542 1] 68c CH 14 [544b32 545 22] 71c 72a CH 18 [550b17 21] 77c d CH 28 [555b18 23] 82c CH 30 [556b11 13] 83b BK VI CH 2 [559 2, 29] 86a CH 10 [565b13 15] 91d CH 19 [573b32-574 1] 99d BK VII CH I [582 27 32] 107d 108a CH 3 [583b14 29] 109b c CH 6 [585b21 -7] 111d BK VIII CH 2 [589b29-590 4] 116b c BK IX CH I [608 21 b19] 133b d 134a / *Parts of Animals* BK III CH I [661b33 662 5] 189a b BK IV CH 10 [688 20-26] 219d 220a [688b30 34] 220c d / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH 2 256a c CH 18 [723 23 b3] 263b c CH 19-20 266c 269c BK II CH I [731b18 732 12] 272a b BK III CH 10 [759b1 7] 300c BK IV CH I 2 304b d 308d esp CH I [766 30-b8] 307c d CH 3 [767b5 14] 309a BK V CH 7 [786b16 788 13] 328c 330a
10 HIPPOCRATES *Airs Waters Places* par 9 12d 13b
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [122, 1232] 60b
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 9 A I ANS and REP I 488d-489d Q 98 A 2 ANS 517d 519a Q 99 A 2 520a d Q 115 A 3 REP 4 588c 589c Q 118 A I REP 4 600a 601c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL, Q 81 A 3 966a c A 4 REP 2 966d 967d
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 346b 400c 401b 402c d 454a b 462b 481c
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 27 158a
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XVI 116d 117a
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 339b 340c 364a 561d esp 364a 366b 373b 374c 384c d 586b 587d 594a 595b
54 FREUD *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 659d 661c / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 785a [fn 1] / *New Introductory Lectures* 853d 855b

8c(2) The reproductive organs their differences in different classes of animals

7 PLATO *Timaeus* 476b d
9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK I CH 3 [489 8 14] 10b CH 13 [493 24] CH 14 [493b6] 15b c CH 17 [497 4-34] 19c d BK II CH I [500 3 b 5] 22c 23a CH 10 [503 4 7] 25b c CH 13 [504b18 19] 27a BK III CH I 32a 35a BK IV CH I [524 2 9] 49a c [5 4b31-525 8] 50d CH 2 [527 II 30] 53c d BK V CH 2 [540 3] CH 3 [540 33] 66c 67a CH 5 [540b29-541 12] 67b c CH 6 [541b, 12] 68a b BK VI CH 9 [564b10] CH 10 [564b24] 90d 91a CH 10 [565 12 22] 91b c CH II [566 14] 92a b CH 12 [56, II] CH 13 [567 24] 93b CH 32 105b c BK IX CH 50 [631b2 25] 157a [632 2 2,] 157c / *Parts of Animals* BK IV CH 5 [680 12 681 5] 210b 211c CH 10 [689 3 34] 220d 221b CH 12 [69 26-27] 227a CH 13 [697a10-14] 228d 229a / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH I 16 255a 261b BK III CH 5 [755b5 756 5] 296c 297a CH 6 [756b30-757 13] 297d 298a CH 8 [758 7 15] 299a BK IV CH I [765b35 766b26] 307a 308a CH 4 [772b27 773 25] 314d 315b
10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK III CH 3 199d 201a
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 10c 11a 15a c BK II 70b c 95a 97b BK III 131b d 143a 144c 178b 185d 192b 193b
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 338d 352d 401b 405c 452c 473b 476b 477b 479c 485a
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 27 158a
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 310a b
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 136b / *Descent of Man* 264d 265a 272a d 339b c 364a b
54 FREUD *General Introduction* 592a

(8 *The generation of animals* 8b *Diverse theories of animal generation procreation and spontaneous generation*)

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK II 114b c
28 GILBERT *Loadstone* BK V 105a b
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 338b d 390b c 400d 401a 406c d 412c 413a 428c d 449a b 454d 455a 468b 472c
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 50 192a b
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 1c 61a

8c Modes of animal reproduction sexual and asexual

7 PLATO *Symposium* 157d 158b / *Timaeus* 476b d / *Statesman* 587a 588a
9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK IV CH II [53-ᵇ 2 538 21] 64b d BK V-VII 65a 114a c esp BK V CH I 65a 66a BK VI CH 18 97b 99c / *Generation of Animals* 255a 331a c esp BK I CH I 2 255a 256c BK I CH 21-BK II CH I 269c 276a BK II CH 5 282a d
10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK II CH 3 185a 186d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 119 A 2 ANS 607b 608d
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 331a 338a 496d esp 390b 429c
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 4 c 49c 220a b / *Descent of Man* 390c 391b 395a 399c passim
54 FREUD *Instincts* 415b / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 655b 657d 659d 660c

8c(1) Sexual differentiation its origins and determinations primary and secondary characteristics

7 PLATO *Symposium* 157b 159b / *Timaeus* 476b d
9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK II CH 3 [501ᵇ20-25] 24a BK III CH 7 [516 15 0] 40c CH II [518 30 ᵇ4] 42d 43a CH 19 [521 21 31] 46b CH 0 [522 II 21] 47a b BK IV CH I [5-4ᵇ31-525 13] 50d 51a CH 2 [525ᵇ34 5 6 6] 52b CH 3 [527ᵇ30-34] 54c d CH II 64b 65a c BK V CH 5 [540ᵇ14 28] 67b CH 7 [541ᵇ30]-CH 8 [542 I] 68c CH 14 [544ᵇ32-545 2] 71c 72a CH 18 [550ᵇ17--I] 77c d CH 28 [555ᵇ18 3] 82c CH 30 [556ᵇII 13] 83b BK VI CH 2 [559 27 29] 86a CH 10 [565ᵇ13 15] 91d CH 19 [573ᵇ32-574 I] 99d BK VII CH I [582 27 3] 107d 108a CH 3 [583ᵇ14 29] 109b c CH 6 [585ᵇ21-27] 111d BK VIII CH 2 [589ᵇ29-590 4] 116b c BK IX CH I [608 -I ᵇ19] 133b d 134a / *Parts of Animals* BK III CH I [661ᵇ33-662 5] 189a b BK IV CH 10 [688 20--6] 219d 220a [688ᵇ30 34] 220c d / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH 2 256a c CH 18 [723 23 ᵇ3] 263b c CH 19-0 266c 269c BK II CH I [731ᵇ18 73 12] 272a b BK III CH 10 [759ᵇI 7] 300c BK IV CH I-2 304b d 308d esp CH I [766ᵃ30-ᵇ8] 307c d CH 3 [76ᵇ5-14] 309a BK V CH 7 [786ᵇ16 788 13] 328c 330a
10 HIPPOCRATES *Airs Waters Places* par 9 12d 13b
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [12 3 1232] 60b
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 92 A I ANS and REP I 488d 489d Q 98 A 2 ANS 517d 519a Q 99 A 2 520a d Q 115 A 3 REP 4 588c 589c Q 118 A I REP 4 600a 601c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL Q 81 A 3 966a c A 4 REP 2 966d 967d
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 346b 400c 401b 402c d 454a b 462b 481c
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 27 158a
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XVI 116d 117a
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 339b 340c 364a 561d esp 364a 366b 373b 374c 384c d 586b 587d 594a 595b
54 FREUD *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 659d 661c / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 785a [fn 1] / *New Introductory Lectures* 853d 855b

8c(2) The reproductive organs their differences in different classes of animals

7 PLATO *Timaeus* 476b d
9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK I CH 3 [489 8 14] 10b CH 13 [493 4] CH 14 [493ᵇ6] 15b c CH 17 [497 24 34] 19c d BK II CH I [500 3 ᵇ 5] 2c 23a CH 10 [503 4 7] 25b c CH 13 [504ᵇ18 19] 27a BK III CH I 32a 35a BK IV CH I [524 2 9] 49a c [5 4ᵇ31-525 8] 50d CH - [5 7 II 30] 53c d BK V CH 2 [540 3] CH 3 [540 33] 66c 67a CH 5 [540ᵇ29-541 12] 67b c CH 6 [541ᵇ, 12] 68a b BK VI CH 9 [564ᵇ10] CH 10 [564ᵇ24] 90d 91a CH 10 [565 12 2] 91b c CH II [566 2 14] 92a b CH 12 [567 II]-CH 13 [567 24] 93b CH 32 105b c BK IX CH 50 [631ᵇ 25] 157a [632 2 2] 157c / *Parts of Animals* BK IV CH 5 [681 12 681 5] 210b 211c CH 10 [689 3 34] 220d 221b CH 12 [695 26 27] 227a CH 13 [697ᵃ10 14] 228d 229a / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH I 16 255a 261b BK III CH 5 [755ᵇ5 756 5] 296c 297a CH 6 [756ᵇ30-757ᵃ13] 297d 298a CH 8 [758ᵃ7 15] 299a BK IV CH I [765ᵇ3 766ᵇ26] 307a 308a CH 4 [772ᵇ27 773 25] 314d 315b
10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK III CH 2 3 199d 201a
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 10c 11a 15a c BK II 70b c 95a 97b BK III 131b d 143a 144c 178b 185d 192b 193b
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 338d 352d 401b 405c 452c 473b 476b 477b 479c 485a
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 27 158a
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 310a b
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 136b / *Descent of Man* 264d 265a 272a d 339b c 364a b
54 FREUD *General Introduction* 592a

10 HIPPOCRATES *Aphorisms* SECT V par 38 139a
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 363a 382d 384a 481 482b 482d-483a 484b 488a 488c

9 The period of gestation. parturition delivery birth

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 5:24 -6 38:27 3 / *Job* 39:1 4
APOCRYPHA *Wisdom of Solomon* 7:2—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 7:2
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 112d 113b BK VI, 197b-c 198b-d
9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK V CH 11 [543b14 17] 70b CH 12 [44 1 3] 70c CH 14 [545b6-9] 72b [546b1 14] 73a b CH 17 [549a 14-2] 76a [49b 3] 76b-c CH 18 [550a 6-27] 77b [550b6- 4] 77c CH 20 [553a2 11] 79d BK 1, CH 2 [559b1 16] 86b [560b17 -4] 87 b CH 4 [562 15 31] 89a CH 10 [565a22 3] 91 [565b24 3] 92 CH 11 [566 15 16] 92b CH 2 [566b 9-20] 92d CH 3 [567a28 b27] 93c-d CH 17 96b-97b CH 8 [572b31 573 32] 98d 99a CH 19 [573b2] 99c CH 20 [574a-0-b] 100a b CH 1 [575a23 29] 101 CH 2 [575b 26-] 101 [5 6a2 5] 101d 102 CH 23 [577a24 b1] 102d 103a CH 26 [5 8 0]-CH 29 [578 18] 103d 104b CH 30 [579a19]-CH 3 [579b5] 104d 105 CH 33 [5 9b31]-CH 35 [580a19] 105c 106a BK VII, CH 1 [58 16-] 107d CH 3 [583b11]-CH 4 [584b25] 109b-110c CH 9 [586b-6]-CH 0 [58-b5] 113a d BK 11 CH 21 [603b34-604 3] 129d CH 24 [604b29-605a] 130c / *Generation of Animals* BK I C 11 [719a2 30] 259a b BK II CH 8 [748a2 31] 289c BK III CH 2 [752 0-b 7] 293a-d BK IV CH 4 [772] 314b-c CH 6 [775a-8 b2] 317b-c CH 8 [777a22]-CH 0 [778 2] 319b-320a,c / *Politics* BK VII CH 6 [1335a 1 2] 540a [1335 12 19] 540c
10 HIPPOCRATES *Airs Waters Places* par 4 10a d par 7 11 c / *Aphorisms* SECT par 29-6 138d 139d
10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK I H 3 200a 201 CH 208c d
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 5c-6b 8c 9c
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 343d 353a b 381b-382d 406a b 458-459d 476c
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 268a b 270 274
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 254a 255a 287a b
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 94a / *Descent of Man* 341b d [fn 3] 384b-c
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK IV 180d 183b
54 FREUD *Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety* 737 738a passim

9f The care and feeding of infant offspring: lactation

7 PLATO *Republic* BK 362b-c
9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK I [500a 3 33] 22b-c CH 3 [503b-2 2] 27 b
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12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK V [806-815] 71c
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33 PASCAL *Weight of Air* 415a
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VII SECT 78-80 42b-43a
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 316b
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 336a b 337b 340c
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 510b-c
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 286b-287b
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 110c 111b / *Descent of Man* 289d 290a 339d 340c 441c d 443b-444a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE I 661d 662c-d
53 JAMES *Psychology* 709 710a
54 FREUD *New Introductory Lectures* 854c

9g Characteristics of the offspring at birth

9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK VI CH 20 [574a20-29] 100 CH 3 [579a21]-CH 31 [579b9] 104d 105b CH 33 [580a4]-CH 35 [580a29] 105d 106a / *Generation of Animals* BK IV CH 6 [774b5 775a6] 316c 317 BK V 320a 331a,c passim
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 222b-223b
53 JAMES *Psychology* 49b-50a 691 b 710a

10 Heredity and environment: the genetic determination of individual differences and similarities

7 PLATO *Republic* BK III 340b-341
9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK CH 19 [573 3- 4a9] 99d CH 9 [5 8b26-30] 104c BK VII CH 6 [585b 9-586a14] 111d 112b / *Parts of Animals* BK I CH 1 [640a14 28] 162 d [64 27 39] 164d 165a CH 1, [, 1 14]-CH 18

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8d Comparison of human with animal reproduction

9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK I CH 5 [489 36–b18] 10d 11a BK V–VII 65a 114a c esp BK V CH I 65a 66a CH 8 [542 17–b1] 68d 69a BK VI CH 18 97b 99c BK VII 106b d 114a c / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH 9 II 258d 259b BK II CH I [732 24–733b23] 272c 274a CH 4–7 278b 288b esp CH 4 [737b25–739b33] 278c 280d / *Politics* BK I CH 2 [1252 26–31] 445c BK VII CH 16 [1335 11–18] 540a

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21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XXV [34–78] 91d 92a

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36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 555a 556a

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47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [6838 6847] 167b

49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 256c 257a 354b 355a

54 FREUD *Sexual Enlightenment of Children* 121d

9 The development of the embryo birth and infancy

9a Oviparous and viviparous development

9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK I CH 5 [489 34–b19] 10d 11a BK V CH 18 [549b30–550 31] 76d 77b BK VI CH 3 87c 88d CH 10 [564b26–565 12] 91a b CH 13 [567b27 568 4] 93d 94a BK VII CH 7 112b c / *Parts of Animals* BK IV CH 12 [693b21–24] 225c / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH 8–13 258b 260b BK II CH I [732 24 733b23] 272c 274a CH 4 [737b7–25] 278b c [739b21–33] 280c d BK III CH I [749 12 33] 290b d CH I [751 5] CH 4 [755 34] 292a 296 / *Politics* BK I CH 8 [1256b11 15] 450b c

28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 277c d 298b c / *On Animal Generation* 338a 496d esp 449a 454a 463d 464a 470c–472c

9b The nourishment of the embryo or foetus

9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK V CH 18 [550 16–24] 77a BK VI CH 3 87c 88d CH 10 [564b 6–565 12] 91a b [565b2 10] 91c d CH 13 [568 1 4] 94a BK VII CH 8 112c 113a / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH 20 [730 33 b9] 270d BK II CH 4 [740a17–741 2] 281a d CH 7 [745b22–746 28] 287a c BK III CH I [751 6–7] 292a CH 2 [752 24 b28] 293b 294a [753 36–754 15] 294c 295b CH 3 [754b1–755 6] 295c 296a BK IV CH 6 [775b2 24] 317c d CH 8 318b 319c

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20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL Q 80 A 4 REP 5 959c 963a

28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 298b-c / *On Animal Generation* 366d 367b 373b-c 378b-d 379b 381a 396b 398d 399c 408b 415b 438c 443b 446c 447a 458a-461d esp 461a d 463b 466b 471d 472a 481d 482b 484c 485c 488c

9c The process of embryogeny the stages of foetal growth

8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK V CH 4 [1014b 0–22] 535a

9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK VI CH 3 87c 88d CH 10 [564b26 565 12] 91a b CH 13 [567b27–568 4] 93d 94a BK VII CH 3 [583b2 8] 109a CH 7–8 112b 113a BK VIII CH 2 [589b29–590 11] 116b c / *Parts of Animals* BK III CH 4 [665 31 b1] 193a / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH 20 [729 12] CH 23 [731 21] 269b-271c BK II CH I [733b22 –35 28] 274a 276a CH 3 [737 18–34] 278a b CH 4 [739b21 741 5] 280c 282a CH 5 [741b5]–CH 6 [745b22] 282c 287a BK III CH 2 [752b1]–CH 4 [755 34] 293d 296c CH 11 [762 10–b19] 303a d BK IV CH I 304b d 308a CH 4 [771b19 772 39] 313c 314b

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19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 118 A I REP 4 600a 601c A 2 REP 2 601c 603b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XXV [34 78] 91d 92a

28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 277c d 298b-c 302b c / *On Animal Generation* 359a c 363d 398c esp 394b d 402d 405c 407c 431b esp 415a b 438c 456a esp 451c 453b 478a 488d

36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 352b 353b

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 143d 144a 219d 225b esp 219d 222a / *Descent of Man* 257c 258b

54 FREUD *General Introduction* 509d 510a

9d Multiple pregnancy superfoetation

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6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 112d 113a

9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK V CH 9 [542b30 33] 69c BK I CH 3 [562b4 b2] 88c d CH 11 [566 15 16] 92b CH 12 [566b6–8] 92 d CH 19 [573b19 32] 99c d CH 20 [574b25 26] 100c CH 22 [575b34–576 3] 101c CH 30 [5 9 20 21] 104d CH 31 [579 34 b12] 105a b CH 33 35 105c 106a CH 37 [580b10–20] 106b c BK VII CH 4 [584b26–585 27] 110c 111b / *Parts of Animals* BK IV CH 10 [688a28–b25] 220a c / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH 18 [723b9–16] 263c d CH 20 [728b33–729 20] 269a b BK IV CH 4–5 311c 316c

9 ARISTOTLE *History of A m als* BK I CH I [488a26-31] 9b BK II CH 21 [5 3b1 3] 101a BK IX CH I [608a-4 27] 133b d [608 o-609 3] 134b [6 0a24 34] 135d CH 6 143b c 1 46 [630b18-21] 156a / *Politics* BK I CH 5 [1254b4 13] 448a
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41 GIBB *Decline a d Fall* 86d 107a b 221d
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49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 13c d 121b-122c passim 233c d
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53 JAME *Psychology* 708a 709

12*b* The use a d abus of animals

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38 ROUSSEAU *I eq ality* 330d 331b
40 GIBBON *Decline a d F ll* 38b-39a 139c 140a 411d-412c 619d-620
41 GI BO *Decl ne a d Fall* 107a b 221c 222a
44 BOSWELL *Johnso* 312b
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50 M RX *Ca al* 86b 183b-c
51 TOLSTOY *Wa a d Peace* K I 19c-d BK VII 278a 287a 296d 297d BK VIII 330d 332a K XII 538a d K XI 592a-c
53 J S *Psychol gy* 705 720a
54 FR UD *War and Death* 758b-c / *Ci l zation a d I s D scontents* 771d 772a

12*c* F endship or lo e between an mals and men

4 HOMER *Iliad* BK XV I [426-455] 126c d BK XIX [399-4 4] 141 c K XXIII [2 56] 164a / *Od sey* BK X 1 [90-327] 280 -c
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25 M N AIG E *Essays* 206b-208a 224c 225b 227b 28b
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31 S I OZ *Ethics* P RT I P O 37 CHOL I 435 b
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52 DO TOEV K *Brothers Kar mazo* BK VI, 167 K X 282a 288d
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12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [741-753] 39c d BK IV [1209 1232] 60a b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 119 A 2 REP 2 607b 608d

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 363a c 386d 387b 391c 393b 395a 396a 425b d 446b c 455d 456a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH VI SECT 23 274b c

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39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 7d 8a

42 KANT *Judgement* 580a 581d 582a

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 9b 12a esp 9b 10d 53b 55b 62a 63a 65a 71a 98c 132a 134c esp 134a c 144a 149b 150c 182d 183a 220b 228a esp 222a 224b / *Descent of Man* 268b 269a 375a 382d esp 381c 382a 413d [fn 61] 429d 430c 500a 525a passim esp 500a 502a 511a b 524d 525a 529d 531a c

53 JAMES *Psychology* 853a 858a esp 857b 890b 897b esp 896a 897a

54 FREUD *General Introduction* 594d 595a

11 The habitat of animals

11*a* The geographical distribution of animals their natural habitats

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6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 113a b BK V 161b c BK VII 236d

9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK I CH 1 [48, 14-^{b}5] 8a b BK IV CH 1 [525 1 25] 51a c BK V CH 15 [547^{a}4 12] 73d CH 15 [547^{b}11]-CH 16 [548 -8] 74b 75a CH 16 [548^{b}18-30] 75c d CH 17 [549^{b}14-2-] 76c CH 22 [554^{b}8-18] 81b c CH 28 [556 4-6] 82d CH 30 [556 21-24] 83a CH 31 [557 4-32] 83d 84a BK VI CH 5 [563 5 12] 89b BK VIII CH 2 20 115c 129b esp CH 2 [589 10-590 19] 115c 116c CH 12-17 122d 127b CH 28- 9 131c 132d BK IX CH 11 27 140c 143c passim CH 3- [618^{b}18-619 8] 144b c / *Generation of Animals* BK III CH 11 [761^{b}9-*4] 302c d

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK II [532-540] 21d

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41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 630b c [n 43]

48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 146b 148a

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 181a 206a c esp 181a 184d 196a 199d 204d 206a c 231b-c 237c 238b

11*b* The relation between animals and their environments

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK IV 129a b

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK II CH 8 [198^{b}16-33] 275d 276a / *Longevity* 710a 713a c passim

9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK I CH 1 [487 14-^{b}33] 8a d BK III CH 12 [519 3 19] 43d 44a CH -1 [522^{b}1--523 1] 47d-48a BK IV CH 5 [530^{b}19-24] 57c BK V CH 11 [543^{b}19-31] 70b c CH 22 [553^{b}20- 4] 80c BK VIII CH 2--9 115c 132d BK IX CH 1 [608^{b}18-610 34] 134a 136a CH 37 [62- 8-15] 147c / *Parts of Animals* BK II CH 16 [658^{b}30-659^{a}36] 185d 186b BK IV CH 5 [680 28-^{b}3] 210d CH 8 [684 1 14] 215b CH 12 [693 10-24] 225a / *Gait of Animals* CH 15 [713 4]-CH 18 [714^{b}8] 250d 252a / *Generation of Animals* BK II CH 4 [738 9-27] 278d 279a BK IV CH - 308b d BK V CH 3 [782^{b}23 783^{b}22] 324d 325d

10 HIPPOCRATES *Airs Waters Places* par 12 14b d par 19 16c 17a

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK V [843-854] 72a b

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK IV 242a b

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28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences* FIRST DAY 160 d SECOND DAY 187b 188c

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33 PASCAL *Equilibrium of Liquids* 401a-403a

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36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 224b 295b 296b

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53 JAMES *Psychology* 857b

54 FREUD *Civilization and Its Discontents* 791d 792a

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5 AESCHYLUS *Prometheus Bound* [459-468] 44d

5 SOPHOCLES *Antigone* [332-352] 134a

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ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:

I. Works by authors represented in this collection.
II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*.

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13 The attribution of human qualities or virtues to animals personification in allegory and satire

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27 SHAKESPEARE *Timon of Athens* ACT IV SC III [3 0-348] 414b c

29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 39b d 40d 41a

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CROSS REFERENCES

For The general discussion of the grades of life and the kinds of soul *see* LIFE AND DEATH 3 3b SOUL 2c-2c(3)

Other considerations of the issue concerning continuity or discontinuity in the relation of plants animals and men as well as between living and non living things *see* EVOLUTION 3e 7a-7b LIFE AND DEATH 2 3a MAN 1a-1c NATURE 3b SENSE 2a

The comparison of men and animals or of different species of animals with respect to sensitivity memory imagination and intelligence *see* MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 1 MIND 3a-3b REASONING 1a SENSE 2b-2c

The general theory of instinct *see* HABIT 3-3e and for the emotional aspect of instincts, *see* EMOTION 1c

Diverse theories of classification *see* DEFINITION 2a-2e EVOLUTION 1a-1b

Alternative theories of the origin and development of living organisms *see* EVOLUTION 4a 4c

Other discussions of heredity *see* EVOLUTION 3-3e FAMILY 6b

Other discussions of sexual attraction mating and reproduction *see* CHANGE 10b FAMILY 7a LOVE 2a(1) 2d

The causes of animal movement *see* CAUSE 2 DESIRE 2c WILL 3a(1) 6c

Another consideration of sleeping and waking *see* LIFE AND DEATH 5b

The comparison of human and animal societies *see* STATE 1a

the one or the many exercise political power and dominate the state. By this criterion of number aristocracy is always differentiated from monarchy and democracy.

Though he uses the word oligarchy to name what others call aristocracy, Locke defines the three *forms* of government by reference to numbers. When the majority themselves exercise the whole power of the community, Locke says, "then the form of the government is a perfect democracy." When they put "the power of making laws into the hands of a few select men ... then it is an oligarchy: or else into the hands of one man, and then it is a monarchy." Kant proceeds similarly, though again in somewhat different language. "The relation of the supreme power to the people," he says, "is conceivable in three different forms: either *one* in the state rules over all; or *some*, united in relation of equality with each other, rule over all the others; or *all* together rule over each individually, including themselves. The form of the state is therefore either *autocratic*, or *aristocratic*, or *democratic*."

Hegel claims, however, that "purely quantitative distinctions like these are only superficial and do not afford the concept of the thing." The criterion of number does not seem to suffice when other forms of government are considered. It fails to distinguish monarchy from tyranny or despotism, which may consist of rule by one man, as has usually been the case historically. Number alone likewise fails to distinguish aristocracy from oligarchy. In the deliberations of the Median conspirators, which Herodotus reports or invents, the rule of a certain number of the worthiest is set against both democracy and monarchy and identified as oligarchy. How, then, shall aristocracy be distinguished from oligarchy?

There seem to be two answers to this question. In the *Statesman* Plato adds to the characterization of number the criterion of law and the absence of law. The holders of political power, whatever their number, may govern either according to the established laws, or by arbitrary caprice in violation of them. "To go against the laws which are based upon long experience and the wisdom of counsellors who have graciously recommended them and persuaded the multitude to pass them, would be," the Eleatic Stranger declares in the *Statesman*, "a far greater and more ruinous error than any adherence to written law."

Taking the division of governments according to number, "the principle of law and the absence of law will bisect them all." Monarchy divides into "royalty and tyranny," depending on whether "an individual rules according to law" or governs neither by law *nor by custom, but* ... pretends that he can only act for the best by violating the laws, while in reality appetite and ignorance are the motives." By the same criterion, the rule of the few divides into aristocracy, "which has an auspicious name," and oligarchy. While democracy is subject to the same division, Plato makes the same name apply to both its good and bad forms.

The second way in which aristocracy differs from oligarchy is also brought out in the *Statesman*. Since "the science of government" according to Plato is "among the greatest of all sciences and most difficult to acquire ... any true form of government can only be supposed to be the government of one, two, or, at any rate, of a few ... really found to possess science." Because of this demand for "science," which presupposes virtue and competence in ruling, monarchy and aristocracy came to be defined as government by the single best man or by the few best men in the community.

A high degree of competence or virtue is, however, not the only mark by which the few may be distinguished from the many. The possession of wealth or property in any sizeable amount also seems to divide a small class in the community from the rest, and Plato at times refers to aristocracy simply as the government of the rich. Yet if wealth is the criterion by which the few are chosen to govern, then *oligarchy results*, at least in contrast to that sense of aristocracy in which the criterion is excellence of mind and character. Aristocracy is called aristocracy, writes Aristotle, "either because the rulers are the best men, or because they have at heart the best interests of the state and of the citizens."

By these additional criteria—never by numbers alone—the ancients conceive aristocracy. When it is so defined, it always appears to be a good form of government, but never the only good form, or even the best. The same

Chapter 3 ARISTOCRACY

INTRODUCTION

THE forms of government have been variously enumerated differently classified and given quite contrary evaluations in the great books of political theory In the actual history of political institutions as well as in the tradition of political thought the major practical issues with respect to the forms of government—the choices open the ideals to be sought or the evils to be remedied—have shifted with the times

In an earlier day—not merely in ancient times but as late as the 18th century—the form of government called aristocracy presented a genuine alternative to monarchy and set a standard by which the defects and infirmities of democracy were usually measured If aristocracy was not always regarded as *the* ideal form of government the principle of aristocracy always entered into the definition of the political ideal

Today both in theory and practice aristocracy is at the other end of the scale For a large part of mankind and for the political philosopher as well as in prevailing popular sentiment aristocracy (together with monarchy) has become a subject of historical interest It is a form of government with a past rather than a future It no longer measures but is measured by democracy If the aristocratic principle still signifies a factor of excellence in government or the state it does so with a meaning now brought into harmony with democratic standards

This change accounts for one ambiguity which the word aristocracy may have for contemporary readers Formerly its primary if not only significance was to designate a form of government It is currently used to name a special social class separated from the masses by distinctions of birth talent property power or leisure We speak of the aristocracy as we speak of the elite and the four hundred or we follow Marx and Engels in thinking of the feudal aristocracy as the class that was ruined by the bourgeoisie The *Communist Manifesto* wastes little sympathy on the aristocrats who while seeking an ally in the proletariat forgot that they [too] exploited under circumstances and conditions that were quite different For Marx and Engels the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie alike represent the propertied classes but they differ in the manner in which they came by their property and power The landed gentry and the feudal nobility got theirs largely by inheritance the bourgeoisie by industry and trade

Today for the most part we call a man an aristocrat if justly or unjustly he claims a right to certain social distinctions or privileges We seldom use that word today to indicate a man who deserves special political status or preeminence though we do sometimes use it to name the proponent of any form of government which rests upon the political inequality of men

Since the discussion of aristocracy in the great books is largely political we shall here be primarily concerned with aristocracy as a form of government The general consideration of the forms of government will be found in the chapter on GOVERNMENT Here and in the other chapters which are devoted to particular forms of government we shall consider each of the several forms both in itself and in relation to the others

THERE is one element in the conception of aristocracy which does not change with changing evaluations of aristocratic government All of the writers of the great political books agree with Plato that aristocracy is a government of the few according as the few rather than

the one or the many exercise polit cal power and dom_ate th_ stat By this criterion of number aristocracy is always differentiated from monarchy and democracy

Though he uses the word oligarch to name what others call aristocracy Locke defines the three forms of go ernment by refer ence to numbers. When the majority them sel es exercise the whole power of the commu nity Locke says, then the form of the go ern ment is a perfect democracy When they put "the power of making laws into the hands of a few select men then t is an oligarchy or else into the hands of one man, and then it is a monarchy" Kant proceeds similarly thou h in somewhat different language "The re lation of the supreme power to the peopl he says, is concei abl in three diff rent forms either one in the state rules o er all or some unit ed in relation of equality with each other rul over all the others o all together rule over each indi idually including themselves. The form of the state is therefore either auto cratic or aristocratic or democratic

Hegel claims, however that purely quanti tati e distinction like these are only super ficial and do not afford th concept of the thing The cr erion of number does not seem to suffice when other forms of go ernment are considered It fail to distinguish monarchy from tyranny or despotism which may consist of rule by one man, as has usually been the case historically Number alone likewise fails to dis tinguish ari tocracy from oligarchy In the de liberations of the Median conspirators, which Herodotus report o in ents, the rule of a certain number of the worthies is set against both democracy and monarch and identified as "oligarchy How then, shall aristocracy be distinguished from oligarch ?

There seem to be two answers to this ques tion. In the Statesman Plato adds to the char act ristic of number the "criterion of law and the absence of law The hold rs of political power wherever their number may govern either accord to the established laws, or by arbitrary caprice in iolation of them. "To go against the laws, which re based upon long ex perience and th wisdom of counsellors who ha e graciously recommended them and per suaded the mult ude to pass them, would be " the Eleatic Stranger declares in the Sta sman "a far greater and more ruinous error than any adherence to written law

Taking the division of governments accord in to number "the principl of law and the absence of law will bisect them all." Monarchy di ides into royalty and tyranny depending on whether an individual rules according to law or governs neith r by law nor by cus tom, bu pretends that he can only act for the best by violating the laws, while in real ty appetite and ignorance are the moti es." By the same criterion the rule of the few divides into aristocracy which has an au picious name and oligarchy " While democracy is sub ject to the same di ision Plato makes th same name apply to both its good and bad forms.

The second wa in which aristocracy differs from oligarchy is also brou ht out in the S es man Since "th sci nce of government " ac cording to Plato is "among the greatest of all sciences and most difficult to acquire any true form of government can only be supposed to be the government of one two or at any rate of a few reall found to possess sci ence." Because of this demand for "science " which presupposes virtue and competence in ruling monarch and aristocracy came to be defined as go ernment by the sin le best man or by the few best men in the communit

A high d gree of competence or virtue is, however not the only mark by whi h the few may be distinguished from the many The possession of wealth or property in any size able amount also seems to d ide a small class in the community from the rest and Plato at times refers to aristocracy simpl as the go ern ment of the rich. Yet if wealth is th criterion by which the few are chosen to go ern, then oligarchy results, at least in contra t to that sense of aristocracy in which the criterion is excellence of mind and character Aristocracy is called aristocracy writes Aristotle "either because the rulers are the best men, or because they have at heart the best interests of the state and of the citizens."

B these addit onal criteria—ne er b num bers alone—the ancients concei e ari tocracy When it is so defined it always appears to be a good form of government but never the only good form or even the best. The same

criteria also place monarchy among the good forms and—at least in Plato s *Statesman*—democracy is a third good form when it is lawful government by the many the many being competent or virtuous to some degree In this triad of good forms aristocracy ranks second best because government by one man is supposed to be more efficient or because in the hierarchy of excellence the few may be superior but only the one can be supreme Aristotle however seems to rank aristocracy above monarchy

If we call the rule of many men who are all of them good aristocracy and the rule of one man *royalty* he writes then aristocracy *will* be better for states than royalty

THE INTRODUCTION of democracy into the comparison tends to complicate the discussion Not only are the many usually the poor but they are also seldom considered pre eminent in virtue or competence According to the way in which either wealth or human excellence is distributed both oligarchy and aristocracy organize the political community in terms of inequalities in status power and privilege This fact leads Rousseau for example to use the different kinds of inequality among men as a basis for distinguishing three sorts of aristocracy—natural elective and hereditary

Natural aristocracy according to Rousseau is based on that inequality among men which is due primarily to age and is found among simple peoples where the young bowed without question to the authority of experience Elective aristocracy arose in proportion as artificial inequality produced by institutions became predominant over natural inequality and riches or power were put before age This form in Rousseau s opinion is the best and is aristocracy properly so called The third which is characterized as the worst of all governments came about when the transmission of the father s power along with his goods to his children by creating patrician families made government hereditary

This emphasis upon inequality radically separates aristocracy from democracy From Aristotle down to Montesquieu Rousseau and our own day equality has been recognized as the distinctive element of democracy Disregarding slaves who for the ancients were political pariahs Aristotle makes liberty the other mark of democracy—all freemen having apart from wealth or virtue an equal claim to political status As the principle of an aristocracy is virtue Aristotle writes so wealth is the principle of an oligarchy and freedom of a democracy

To the defenders of democracy ancient or modern aristocracy and oligarchy stand together at least negatively in their denial of the principle of equality To the defenders of aristocracy oligarchy is as far removed as democracy since both oligarchy and democracy neglect or underestimate the importance of virtue in organizing the state Yet oligarchy more than democracy is the characteristic perversion of aristocracy It also puts government in the hands of the few but it substitutes wealth for virtue as the criterion The democratic critic of aristocracy usually calls attention to the way in which oligarchy tries to wear the mask of aristocracy However far apart aristocracy and oligarchy may be in definition he insists that in actual practice they tend to become identical in proportion as wealth or noble birth or social class is taken as the sign of intrinsic qualities which are thought to deserve special political recognition

The defenders of aristocracy have admitted the tendency of aristocratic government to degenerate into oligarchy Its critics are not satisfied with this admission They deny that aristocracy has ever existed in purity of principle—they deny that the governing few have ever been chosen solely for their virtue Machiavelli assumes it to be a generally accepted fact that

the nobles wish to rule and oppress the people and give vent to their ambitions

Montesquieu although more optimistic about the possibility of a truly virtuous aristocracy recognizes its tendency to profit at the expense of the people To overcome this he would have the laws make it an essential point that

the nobles themselves should not levy the taxes and should likewise forbid the nobles all kinds of commerce and abolish the right of primogeniture among the nobles to the end that by a continual division of the inheritances their fortunes may be always upon a level

But perhaps the strongest attack upon aristocracy in all of the great political books is

made by Mill in his *Representative Government*. He admits that "the governments which have been remarkable in history for sustained mental ability and vigour in the conduct of affairs have generally been aristocracies." But he claims that "whatever their abilities such governments were essentially bureaucracies" and "the dignity and estimation of their ruling members were quite different things from the prosperity or happiness of the general body of the citizens and were often wholly incompatible with it." When their actions are dictated by "sinister interests," as frequently happens, the "aristocratic class assumes to themselves an endless variety of unjust privileges, sometimes benefiting their pockets at the expense of the people, sometimes merely tending to exalt them above others, or, what is the same thing in different words, to degrade others below themselves."

Yet except by those political thinkers who deny the distinction between good and bad government, and hence the relevance of virtue to institutions which are solely expressions of power, the aristocratic principle is seldom entirely rejected. Even when the notion of a pure aristocracy is dismissed as an ideal which can never be fully realized, the aristocratic principle reappears as a counsel of perfection in the improvement of other forms of government.

Even so, one difficulty remains which tends to prevent aristocracy from being realized in practice, quite apart from any question of its soundness in principle. It lies in the reluctance of the best men to assume the burdens of public office. The parable told in the Book of Judges applies to aristocracy as much as to monarchy.

> The trees went forth on a time to anoint a king over them; and they said unto the olive tree, Reign thou over us.
>
> But the olive tree said unto them, Should I leave my fatness, wherewith by me they honour God and man, and go to be promoted over the trees?
>
> And the trees said to the fig tree, Come thou, and reign over us.
>
> But the fig tree said unto them, Should I forsake my sweetness, and my good fruit, and go to be promoted over the trees?
>
> Then said the trees unto the vine, Come thou, and reign over us.
>
> And the vine said unto them, Should I leave my wine, which cheereth God and man, and go to be promoted over the trees?
>
> Then said all the trees unto the bramble, Come thou, and reign over us.
>
> And the bramble said unto the trees, If in truth ye anoint me king over you, then come and put your trust in my shadow: and if not, let fire come out of the bramble, and devour the cedars of Lebanon.

Socrates thinks he has a solution for this problem. In the *Republic*, he proposes a new way to induce good men to rule. Since "money and honor have no attraction for them," necessity, Socrates says, "must be laid upon them, and they must be induced to serve from fear of punishment. . . . Now the worst part of the punishment is that he who refuses to rule is liable to be ruled by one who is worse than himself. And the fear of this, as I conceive, induces the good to take office, . . . not under the idea that they are going to have any benefit or enjoyment themselves, but as a necessity, and because they are not able to commit the task of ruling to anyone who is better than themselves, or indeed as good."

THE POLITICAL ISSUES in which monarchy, aristocracy, oligarchy, and democracy represent the major alternatives cannot be clarified without recourse to the distinction between government by laws and government by men.

It has already been noted that in the *Statesman* Plato makes respect for the laws and violation of the laws the marks of good and bad government respectively. But he also proposes that "the best thing of all is not that the law should rule, but that a man should rule, supposing him to have wisdom and royal power." The imperfection of law could then be avoided because one or a few men of almost superhuman wisdom would govern their inferiors even as the gods could direct the affairs of men without the aid of established laws. But if no man is a god in relation to other men, then, in Plato's opinion, it is better for laws or customs to be supreme, and for men to rule in accordance with them.

The larger issue concerning rule by law and rule by men is discussed in the chapters on CONSTITUTION and MONARCHY. But here we must observe how the difference between these two types of rule affects the understanding of all other forms of government. This can be seen in terms of Aristotle's distinction between royal

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sion of aristocracy as a distinct form of government is largely superseded by the consideration of the role which the aristocratic principle plays in the development of republican institutions.

The writers of *The Federalist*, for example, respond in several places to the charge that the constitution which they are defending shows tendencies toward aristocracy or oligarchy. Yet in their consideration and defense of the new instrument of government as essentially republican, they frequently appeal to principles that are aristocratic in nature.

In order their own meanings to the terms "republic" and "pure democracy"—that is, government by elected representatives on the one hand, and by the direct participation of the whole people on the other—the Federalists also give an aristocratic bent to the very notion of representation. They seem to share the opinion of Montesquieu that "as most citizens have sufficient ability to choose, though unqualified to be chosen, so the people, though capable of calling others to account for their administration, are incapable of conducting administration themselves."

Thus Madison praises "the delegation of the government ... to a small number of citizens elected by the rest" as tending "to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country." He further points out that "it may well happen that the public voice pronounced by the representatives of the people will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose."

On such a view, the people's representatives in the legislature, or other branches of government, are supposed to be not their mimics, but their betters. For the American constitutionalists, as for Edmund Burke, the representative serves his constituents by making independent decisions for the common good, not by doing their bidding. This theory of representation, to which Mill and other democratic thinkers agree in part, supposes that the representative knows better than his constituents what is for their good.

The effort to ensure leadership by superior men may involve the aristocratic principle, yet it is also claimed by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay to be a necessary safeguard for popular government. The senate, for instance, is not only to provide elder statesmen, but is also to serve as "a salutary check on the government ... [which] doubles the security to the people, by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of one would otherwise be sufficient." The electoral college aims directly at placing the immediate election of the president in the hands of "men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station ... under circumstances favorable to deliberation." In addition it may serve as an "obstacle ... opposed to cabal, intrigue, and corruption," which are the "most deadly adversaries of republican government."

In all these respects, as well as in the restrictions on suffrage which it permitted the states to impose, the unamended American constitution appears to have adopted an aristocratic principle in government. Whether the motivation of its proponents was in fact simply aristocratic, or whether it was partly or even largely oligarchical—leadership being the right of men of "good" family and substantial property—will always be a question to be decided in the light of the documents and the relevant historic evidence.

MORE DEMOCRATIC than the American constitutionalists of the 18th century, certainly so with regard to the extension of suffrage, John Stuart Mill appears to be no less concerned than they are to introduce aristocratic elements into the structure of representative government.

According to Mill, two grave dangers confront a democracy: "Danger of a low grade of intelligence in the representative body, and in the popular opinion which controls it; and danger of class legislation on the part of the numerical majority." Claiming that much of the blame for both dangers lies in the rule of the majority, Mill looks for means to overcome the situation in which "the numerical majority ... alone possess practically any voice in the State."

His major remedy was a system of proportional representation. This would supposedly

and political government which closely resembles the modern conception of the difference between absolute or despotic government on the one hand and limited constitutional, or republican government on the other

There are passages in which Aristotle regards absolute rule by one or a few superior men as the divine or godlike form of government When one man or a few excel all the others together in virtue and both rulers and subjects are fitted the one to rule the others to be ruled it is right in Aristotle s opinion for the government to be royal or absolute rather than political or constitutional—whether one man rules or a few Royal rule is of the nature of an *aristocracy* he says *It is based upon merit* whether of the individual or of his family

But in other passages Aristotle seems to regard absolute government as a despotic regime appropriate to the family and the primitive tribe but not to the state in which it is better for equals to rule and be ruled in turn In either case it makes a difference to the meaning of aristocracy as also to monarchy whether it be conceived as absolute or constitutional government

When it is conceived as absolute government aristocracy differs from monarchy only on the point of numbers—the few as opposed to the one Otherwise aristocracy and monarchy are defended in the same way The defense usually takes one of two directions One line of argument which stems from Plato and Aristotle claims that inequality in wisdom or virtue between ruler and ruled justifies absolute rule by the superior The other line is followed by those who like Hobbes maintain that since sovereignty is absolute unlimited and indivisible the difference between kinds of government consisteth not in the difference of Power but in the difference of Convenience or Aptitude to produce the Peace and Security of the people When they are conceived as forms of absolute government aristocracy and monarchy are attacked for the same reason to those who regard absolutism or despotism in government as unjust because it violates the basic equality of men an absolute monarchy and a despotic aristocracy are both unjust

Aristocracy however can also be conceived as a form or aspect of constitutional government Montesquieu for example divides governments into republican monarchical and despotic and under republican places those in which the body or only a part of the people is possessed of the supreme power thus including both democracy and aristocracy In both laws not men are supreme but the spirit of the laws is different In democracy the spring or principle by which it is made to act is virtue resting on equality in aristocracy 'moderation is the very soul a moderation founded on virtue not that which proceeds from indolence and pusillanimity Hegel s comment on this theory deserves mention The fact that moderation is cited as the *principle of aristocracy* he writes implies the beginning at this point of a divorce between public authority and private interest

For Aristotle, in contrast to Montesquieu the two major types of constitution are the democratic and the oligarchical according as free birth or wealth is made the chief qualification for citizenship and public office Aristocracy enters the discussion of constitutional governments mainly in connection with the construction of the polity or mixed constitution Although in most states the fusion goes no further than the attempt to unite the freedom of the poor and the wealth of the rich he points out that there are three grounds on which men claim an equal share in the government freedom wealth and virtue

When the fusion goes no further than the attempt to unite the freedom of the poor and the wealth of the rich the admixture of the two elements Aristotle says is to be called a polity But sometimes the mixture of democracy with oligarchy may include an ingredient of aristocracy as in the distribution of offices according to merit The union of these three elements is to be called aristocracy or the government of the best and more than any other form of government except the true and the ideal it has in Aristotle s judgment a right to this name Polity and aristocracy s mixed constitutions are fusions of some of the same elements hence he says it is obvious that they are not very unlike

BEGINNING IN the 18th century and with the rise of representative government the discus

yet prefers government by the one or few who are eminent in wisdom or virtue. Each side, perhaps, contributes only part of the truth. Certainly those who acknowledge a political wisdom in the preponderant voice of the many but who also recognize another wisdom in the skilled judgment of the few cannot wish to exclude either from exerting its due influence upon the course of government.

Still another issue has to do with education. Shall educational opportunity be as universal as the franchise? Shall those whose native endowments fit them for political leadership be trained differently or more extensively than their fellow citizens? Shall vocational education be given to the many and liberal education be reserved for the few?

These questions provide some measure of the extent to which anyone's thinking is aristocratic or democratic—or involves some admixture of both strains. In the great discussion of these questions and issues, there is one ever present ambiguity. We have already noted it in considering the reality of the line between aristocracy and oligarchy. The agreement or disagreement of Mill and Aristotle, of Burke and Plato, of Hamilton and Paine, of Veblen and Pareto, or John Dewey and Matthew Arnold cannot be judged without determining whether the distinction between the many and the few derives from nature or convention.

It is this distinction which Jefferson had in mind when, writing to Adams in 1813, he said "There is a natural aristocracy among men. The grounds of this are virtue and talents... There is also an artificial aristocracy founded on wealth and birth, without either virtue or talents; for with these it would belong to the first class. The natural aristocracy I consider as the most precious gift of nature for the instruction, the trusts, the government of society... The artificial aristocracy is a mischievous ingredient in government, and provision should be made to prevent its ascendancy."

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

constitute a democratic improvement by securing *representation for every minority in the whole nation* on principles of equal justice But it may also serve to increase an aristocratic element since it affords the best security for the intellectual qualifications desirable in the representatives This would be brought about by making possible the election of hundreds of able men of independent thought who would have no chance whatever of being chosen by the majority with the result that Parliament would contain the 'very *élite* of the country

To make still more certain that men of superior political intelligence exert an effect upon government Mill also proposes a plurality of votes for the educated and the establishment of an upper legislative chamber based on a specially qualified membership Such proposals seem to indicate Mill s leanings toward aristocracy not only because they aim at procuring a government of the best but also because *they are designed to prevent a government* based on a majority of manual labourers with the consequent danger of too low a standard of political intelligence

THE ISSUES RAISED by the theory of aristocracy or by the aristocratic principle in government seem to be basically the same in all centuries however different the terms or the context in which they are expressed Even when as today a purely aristocratic form of government does not present a genuine political alternative to *peoples who have espoused democracy* there remains the sense that pure or unqualified democracy is an equally undesirable extreme The qualifications proposed usually add an aristocratic leaven

One issue concerns the equality and inequality of men The affirmation that all men are created equal does not exclude a recognition of their individual in qualities—the wide diversity of human talents and the uneven distribution of intelligence and other abilities Nor does it mean that all men use their native endowments to good purpose or in the same degree to acquire skill or knowledge or virtue

To grasp the double truth—that no man is essentially more human than another though one may have more of certain human abilities than another—is to see some necessity for the admixture of democratic and aristocratic principles in constructing a political constitution But the issue is whether distributive justice requires as a matter of right that the best men should rule or hold public office

Some political philosophers like *Plato* and Aristotle tend to take the aristocratic view that men of superior ability have a right to govern—that for them to be ruled by their inferiors would be unjust This theory places greater emphasis on the inequality than on the equality of men Their democratic opponents insist that the equality of men *as men* is the fundamental fact and the only fact having a bearing on the just distribution of suffrage That certain individuals have superior aptitude for the exercise of political authority does not automatically confer that authority upon them The inequality of men in merit or talent does not establish a political right as does their equality in human nature The selection of the *best men for public office is on this theory not* a matter of justice but of expediency or prudence

Another issue concerns the weight to be given the opinion of the majority as against the opinion of the wise or the expert when as frequently happens these opinions diverge or conflict As the chapter on OPINION indicates, the experts themselves disagree about the soundness of the popular judgment

Where Thucydides believes that ordinary men usually manage public affairs better than their more gifted fellows because the latter are always wanting to appear wiser than the laws Herodotus observes that it seems easier to deceive the multitude than one man Where Hegel holds it to be a dangerous and a false prejudice that the People alone have reason and insight and know what justice is John Jay declares that the people of any country (if like the Americans intelligent and well informed) seldom adopt and steadily persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting their interests and Hamilton adds that the people commonly *intend* the public good

Sometimes the same author seems to take both sides of the issue as Aristotle does when *though he says* that *a multitude is* a better judge of many things than any individual he

(2 *The relation of aristocracy to other forms of government* 2b *Aristocracy and constitutional government the polity or mixed constitution*)

43 Mill *Representative Government* 353d 354b 406a 409c 419b-c

46 Hegel *Philosophy of Right* part iii par 279 94b / *Philosophy of History* part ii, 275b-276a 277c d part iv 356d 357a

51 Tolstoy *War and Peace* bk vi 238c 243d passim esp 241c 242b bk ix 384c 388a,c passim

2c Aristocracy and democracy

6 Herodotus *History* bk iii 107c 108c

6 Thucydides *Peloponnesian War* bk vi 520a c 533a c bk viii 579c 581 582b-c 590a b

7 Plato *Republic* bk viii 401d-402d 408b-409d / *Statesman* 598b-604b

9 Aristotle *Politics* bk iii ch 11 [1281 39-^{b}25] 479b-c ch 13 [1284 3 ^{b}-3] 482a d bk iv ch 7 [1293^{b}12 18] 493b bk v ch 7 [1307^{a}5-27] 509a b ch 8 [1307^{b}39-1308^{a}24] 510a b [1308^{b}31-1309 10] 511a b / *Rhetoric* bk i ch 8 [1365^b-- 1366 -] 608a b

14 Plutarch *Lycurgus* 34d / *Lycurgus Numa* 62b-c / *Dion* 792d 802a,c esp 800c

15 Tacitus *Annals* bk vi 94b

20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i ii q 95 a 4 ans 229b-230c q 105 a 1 ans 307d 309d

23 Machiavelli *Prince* ch ix 1 c 16a passim

23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part ii, 104d 105a

27 Shakespeare *Coriolanus* act i sc i [1 47] 3[illegible] act ii sc i [1 100] [illegible] 362a act iii sc i [140-161] 3[illegible]0d [illegible]1a

33 P[illegible] *P[illegible]* [illegible] 2[illegible]5b-225b

38 Montesquieu *Spirit of Laws* bk ii 4a 7c bk iii 9b-11a bk v [illegible]b 23d bk vii 44d 45[illegible] bk viii [illegible]1d 5[illegible]d 54a bk ix 58b bk x 6[illegible] bk x [illegible]c bk xi 70[illegible]b

38 Rousseau [illegible] *Social Contract* bk iv [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

43 Federalist number [illegible] number 57 [illegible] 151b-c num[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] 36[illegible]d 368a-369b

[illegible]

[illegible] 11b-[illegible]

[illegible] part iii par[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] part iii 55b d

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] [1160^{b}32 1161 2] 413a b / *Politics* bk ii ch 10 [1272 27 ^{b}10] 468c 469a ch 11 469a-470b bk iii ch 5 [1278 15-24] 475b c ch 7 476c 477a esp [1279^{b}4-10] 476d 477a ch 13 [1283 25 ^{b}26] 481b d ch 15 [1286^{b}12 16] 485a bk iv ch 2 [1289 26-^{b}4] 488b c ch 4 [1290^{b}17-20] 489d ch 5 [1292 39-^{b}6] 491d 492a ch 7 [1293^{b}2-12] 493a b ch 8 [1293^{b}30-1294 28] 493c-494a ch 12 [1297^{b}6-9] 497b bk v ch 7 508c 509d ch 12 [1316 39-^{b}10] 519c / *Rhetoric* bk i ch 8 [1365^{b}22 1366^{a}6] 608a b

14 Plutarch *Lycurgus* 36a 37b 47a 48a

15 Tacitus *Annals* bk ii 35d

20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i ii q 95 a 4 ans 229b 230c

21 Dante *Divine Comedy* hell xvi [64 ,] 23a b

23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part ii 104d 105a part iv 273a b

38 Montesquieu *Spirit of Laws* bk ii 7b c bk v 23a 25a bk xx 151c 152a

38 Rousseau *Social Contract* bk iii 419b

39 Smith *Wealth of Nations* bk iii 165c 166a bk v 309c 310d

42 Kant *Science of Right* 450a c

43 Federalist number 63 194d

43 Mill *Representative Government* 363d 364d

46 Hegel *Philosophy of History* part ii 277c d part iii 292d 293b

2e Aristocracy and tyranny

6 Thucydides *Peloponnesian War* bk vi 533a c

7 Plato *Republic* bk viii 401d-402d bk viii ix 411d 421a / *Statesman* 598b 604b passim esp 603b 604b / *Laws* bk iv 679c 680b

9 Aristotle *Politics* bk v ch 10 [1310 30-1311^{a}7] 512d 513b / *Rhetoric* bk i ch 8 [1365^{b}32 1366 6] 608a b

15 Tacitus *Histories* bk i 193c 194a

20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i ii q 95 a 4 ans 229b 230c

23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part iv 273a b

33 Pascal *Pensees* 380 238a

35 Locke *Civil Government* ch xviii sect 201 71c

38 Montesquieu *Spirit of Laws* bk ii 4a bk vi 34d 35a bk viii 52c d bk xi 70c 78d 9b bk xv 109a b

43 Federalist number 47 153d number 48 157b-c number 70 213d 214a

46 Hegel *Philosophy of Right* part iii par 273 91c / *Philosophy of History* part ii 271c d

51 Tolstoy *War and Peace* bk i 9b c epilogue i 668a 669d

3 The causes of degeneration or instability in aristocracies aristocracy and revolution

Old Testament *I Samuel* 7 15-8 5-(D) *I Kings* 7 15 8 5 [illegible]

6 Herodotus *History* bk iii 108b-c

(2 *The relation of aristocracy to other forms of government 2b Aristocracy and constitutional government the polity or mixed constitution*)

43 MILL *Representative Government* 353d 354b 406a-409c 419b c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 279 94b / *Philosophy of History* PART II 275b 276a 277c d PART IV 356d 357a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK VI 238c 243d passim esp 241c 242b BK IX 384c 388a c passim

2c Aristocracy and democracy

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 107c 108c
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK VI 520a c 533a c BK VIII 579c 581c 582b c 590a b
7 PLATO *Republic* BK VIII 401d 402d 408b 409d / *Statesman* 598b 604b
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK III CH II [1281 39-b25] 479b c CH 13 [1284 3 b25] 482a d BK IV CH 7 [1293b12 18] 493b BK V CH 7 [1307 5-27] 509a b CH 8 [1307b39-1308a24] 510a b [1308b31 1309 10] 511a b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 8 [1365b22 1366a4] 608a b
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 34d / *Lycurgus Numa* 62b c / *Dion* 792d 802a c esp 800c
15 TACITUS *Annals* BK VI 97b
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 95 A 4 ANS 229b 230c Q 105 A I ANS 307d 309d
23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* CH IX 14c 16a passim
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 104d 105a
27 SHAKESPEARE *Coriolanus* ACT I SC I [1-47] 351a d ACT II SC I [1 106] 361a 362a ACT III SC I [140-161] 370d 371a
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 294 225b 226b
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 4a 7c BK III 9b 11a BK V 23a b 23d BK VII 44d 45c BK VIII 51d 53d 54a BK IX 58b BK X 64a d BK XII 90b c BK XV 109b
38 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 369c d / *Social Contract* BK IV 427a d
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 81c d
42 KANT *Science of Right* 450a d
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 39 125b d NUMBER 57 176d 179b passim NUMBER 58 181b c NUMBER 60 185b 187a
43 MILL *Liberty* 298b 299a / *Representative Government* 353b 354b 364b d 366a 369b passim 376b c
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 125c d 141a 211b c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 273 91b c par 279 94b / *Philosophy of History* PART II 275b 276a 277c d PART III 285b d 310a c

2d Aristocracy and oligarchy

7 PLATO *Republic* BK VIII 401d-402d 405c 407a / *Statesman* 598b 604b
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK V CH 3 [1131 24 29] 378d BK VIII CH 10 [1160b12 16] 412d [1160b35 1161a2] 413a b / *Politics* BK II CH 10 [1272 27 b10] 468c-469a CH II 469a-470b BK III CH 5 [1278 15 24] 475b c CH 7 476c 477a esp [1279b4 10] 476d-477a CH 13 [1283 25 b26] 481b d CH 15 [1286b1 10] 485a BK IV CH 2 [1289a26-b4] 488b c CH 4 [1290b17-20] 489d CH 5 [1292 39-b6] 491d 492a CH 7 [1293b2 12] 493a b CH 8 [1293b30-1294 28] 493c-494a CH 12 [1297a6-9] 497b BK V CH 7 508c 509d CH 12 [1316 39-b10] 519c / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 8 [1365b22 1366a6] 608a b
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 36a 37b 47a 48a
15 TACITUS *Annals* BK II 35d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 95 A 4 ANS 229b 230c
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL, XVI [64 ,9] 23a b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 104d 105a PART IV 273a b
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 7b-c BK V 23a 25a BK XX 151c 152a
38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK III 419b
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK III 165c 166a BK V 309c 310d
42 KANT *Science of Right* 450a c
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 63 194d
43 MILL *Representative Government* 363d 364d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART II 277c d PART III 92d 293b

2e Aristocracy and tyranny

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK VI 533a-c
7 PLATO *Republic* BK VIII 401d-402d BK VIII IX 411d-421a / *Statesman* 598b 604b passim esp 603b 604b / *Laws* BK IV 679c-680b
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK V CH 10 [1310 40-1311 7] 512d 513b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 8 [1365b32-1366 6] 608a b
15 TACITUS *Histories* BK I 193c 194a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 95 A 4 ANS 229b 230c
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART IV 273a b
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 380 238a
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH XVIII SECT 201 71c
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 4a BK VI 34d 35a BK VIII 52c d BK XI 70 78d 79b BK XV 109a b
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 47 153d NUMBER 48 157b c NUMBER 70 213d 214a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 273 91c / *Philosophy of History* PART II 277c d
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 9b c EPILOGUE I 668a 669d

3 The causes of degeneration or instability in aristocracies aristocracy and revolution

OLD TESTAMENT *I Samuel* 7 15-8 5—(D) *I Kings* 7 15 8 5
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 108b c

2 *The relation of aristocracy to other forms of government 2b Aristocracy and constitutional government, the polity or mixed constitution*)

43 Mill *Representative Government* 353d 354b 406a 409c 419b-c

46 Hegel *Philosophy of Right* part iii par 279 94b / *Philosophy of History* part ii 275b 276a 277c d part iv 356d 357a

51 Tolstoy *War and Peace* bk vi 238c 243d passim esp 241c 242b bk ix 384c 388a c passim

2c Aristocracy and democracy

6 Herodotus *History* bk iii 107c 108c

6 Thucydides *Peloponnesian War* bk vi 520a c 533a c bk viii 579c 581 582b c 590a b

7 Plato *Republic* bk viii 401d 402d 408b 409d / *Statesman* 598b 604b

9 Aristotle *Politics* bk iii ch 11 [1281 39-b25] 479b c ch 13 [1284 3 b23] 482a d bk iv ch 7 [1293b12 18] 493b bk v ch 7 [1307a5-27] 509a b ch 8 [1307b39 1308a24] 510a b [1308b31-1309 10] 511a b / *Rhetoric* bk i ch 8 [1365b-2 1366] 608a b

14 Plutarch *Lycurgus* 34d / *Lycurgus Numa* 62b c / *Dion* 792d 802a c esp 800c

15 Tacitus *Annals* bk vi 97b

20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i ii q 95 a 4 ans 229b 230c q 105 a 1 ans 307d 309d

23 Machiavelli *Prince* ch ix 14c 16a passim

23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part ii 104d 105a

27 Shakespeare *Coriolanus* act i sc i [1-47] 351a d act ii sc i [1 106] 361a 362a act iii sc i [140-161] 370d 371a

33 Pascal *Pensées* 294 225b 226b

38 Montesquieu *Spirit of Laws* bk ii 4a 7c bk iii 9b-11a bk v 23a b 23d bk vii 44d 45c bk viii 51d 53d 54a bk ix 58b bk x 64a d bk xii 90b c bk xv 109b

38 Rousseau *Political Economy* 369c d / *Social Contract* bk iv 427a d

41 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 81c d

42 Kant *Science of Right* 450a d

43 Federalist number 39 125b d number 57 176d 179b passim number 58 181b c number 60 185b 187a

43 Mill *Liberty* 298b 299a / *Representative Government* 353b 354b 364b d 366a 369b passim 376b c

44 Boswell *Johnson* 125c d 141a 211b c

46 Hegel *Philosophy of Right* part iii par 273 91b-c par 279 94b / *Philosophy of History* part ii 275b 276a 277c d part iii 285b d 310a c

2d Aristocracy and oligarchy

7 Plato *Republic* bk viii 401d-402d 405c 407a / *Statesman* 598b-604b

9 Aristotle *Ethics* bk v ch 3 [1131 24 29] 378d bk viii ch 10 [1160b11 16] 412d [1160b3 -1161a2] 413a b / *Politics* bk ii ch 10 [1272a27 b10] 468c-469a ch 11 469a-d 0b bk iii ch 5 [1278 15 24] 475b c ch 7 4 6c 477a esp [1279b4 10] 476d 477a ch 13 [1283 25 b26] 481b-d ch 15 [1286b1 16] 485a bk iv ch 2 [1289 26-b4] 488b-c ch 4 [1290b17-20] 489d ch 5 [1292 39 b0] 491d 492a ch 7 [1293b2 12] 493a b ch 8 [1293b30-1294 28] 493c-494a ch 12 [1297a6-9] 497b bk v ch 7 508c 509d ch 12 [1316 39-b10] 519c / *Rhetoric* bk i ch 8 [1365b22 1366a6] 608a b

14 Plutarch *Lycurgus* 36a 37b 47a 48a

15 Tacitus *Annals* bk ii 35d

20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i ii q 95, a 4 ans 229b 230c

21 Dante *Divine Comedy* hell, xvi [64 78] 23a b

23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part ii 104d 105a part iv 273a b

38 Montesquieu *Spirit of Laws* bk ii 7b-c bk v 23a 25a bk xx 151c 152a

38 Rousseau *Social Contract* bk iii 419b

39 Smith *Wealth of Nations* bk iii 165c 166a bk v 309c 310d

42 Kant *Science of Right* 450a c

43 Federalist number 63 194d

43 Mill *Representative Government* 363d 364d

46 Hegel *Philosophy of History* part ii 27/c d part iii 92d 293b

2e Aristocracy and tyranny

6 Thucydides *Peloponnesian War* bk vi 533a c

7 Plato *Republic* bk viii 401d-402d bk viii ix 411d 421a / *Statesman* 598b 604b passim esp 603b 604b / *Laws* bk iv 679c 680b

9 Aristotle *Politics* bk v ch 10 [1310 40-1311a7] 512d 513b / *Rhetoric* bk i ch 8 [1365b32 1366a6] 608a b

15 Tacitus *Histories* bk i 193c 194a

20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i ii q 95 a 4 ans 229b 230c

23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part iv 273a b

33 Pascal *Pensées* 380 238a

35 Locke *Civil Government* ch xviii sect 1 71c

38 Montesquieu *Spirit of Laws* bk ii 4a bk vi 34d 35a bk viii 52c d bk xi 70c 78d 9b bk xv 109a b

43 Federalist number 47 153d number 48 157b c number 70 213d 214a

46 Hegel *Philosophy of Right* part iii par 273 91c / *Philosophy of History* part ii 277c d

51 Tolstoy *War and Peace* bk i 9b c epilogue i 668a 669d

3 The causes of degeneration or instability in aristocracies aristocracy and revolution

Old Testament *I Samuel* 7 15-8 5—(D) *I Kings* 7 15 8 5

6 Herodotus *History* bk iii 108b-c

4. Aristocracy and the issue of rule by men as opposed to rule by law

5. The training of those fitted for rule: aristocratic theory of education

6. The selection of the best men for public office: the aristocratic theory of representation in modern constitutional government

(6 *The selection of the best men for public office the aristocratic theory of representation in modern constitutional government*)

390b 391b / *Statesman* 598b 604b 608c d / *Laws* BK VI 697a 705c passim BK XII 786b 787b 794b 799a c esp 796d 798b / *Seventh Letter* 807a b

9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK II CH 9 [1270b7-1271 17] 466d 467b CH 11 [1272b33 1273 2] 469b-c [1273 22-b7] 469d 470a BK III CH 4 [1277 13-23] 474a b CH 5 [1278 40-b5] 475d CH 7 [1279 24-b4] 476c d CH 10 13 478d 483a CH 15 [1286 22-b14] 484c 485a CH 16 [1287b12 14] 486a CH 18 487a c BK IV CH 7 [1293b2 21] 493a b CH 8 [1294 9-24] 493d 494a CH 14 [1298b5-10] 499a CH 15 [1300 9-b4] 500d 501b BK V CH 8 [1308b31-1309 10] 511a b CH 9 [1309 33-b13] 511c d BK VI CH 4 [1318b21-1319 4] 522b c BK VII CH 9 [1328b 33 1329 17] 533b c / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 8 [1365b32-39] 608a b

14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 45c d / *Lysander* 365a 366a / *Lysander Sulla* 387d 388a

15 TACITUS *Annals* BK XI 105d 107b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 92 A 1 REP 3 213c 214c Q 105 A 1 ANS and REP 1-2 307d 309d

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 136b

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 364b 365a 411a d 452a d

27 SHAKESPEARE *Coriolanus* ACT I SC I [30 166] 352b 353a ACT II 361a 369a

35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VII SECT 94 46b CH VIII SECT 105-112 48c 51b passim

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 28b 29a PART II 73a b

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 4d 5a BK III 10c 11a BK V 21d 22c BK XI 71a 72b

38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK III 412b-c BK IV 427a d

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK IV 269d 271d BK V 309c 311c

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 61d 62a

43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U S ARTICLE I SECT 2 [11 16] 11b SECT 3 [67 72] 12a ARTICLE II SECT 1 14b 15a SECT 2 [424 439] 15b AMENDMENTS XII 18a c

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 3 33d 34a NUMBER 10 51d 53a NUMBER 28 98a NUMBER 35 113a 114b NUMBER 52-63 165a 195b passim esp NUMBER 57 176d 177a NUMBER 68 205b 207a NUMBER 76-77 225a 229b

43 MILL *Liberty* 290d 291a 320c 322a / *Representative Government* 336b 337a 338a b 341d 424c passim esp 363b 366a 384a 387d 439d-442a

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 125c d 141a 178b-c 191c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 279 94b c par 291 295 97d 99a par 308 102c 103a ADDITIONS 169 145d 182 148c d / *Philosophy of History* PART II 277c d PART IV 368b d

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK VI 241c 242b

7 Historic and poetic exemplifications of aristocracy

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 107c 108d BK V 160d 161a

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK I 355a 356a BK II 409a BK III 434c 438b passim BK IV 458d 459c 463a b 465c 478d 479b BK V 482d 483a BK VI 533a c BK VIII 568d 569a 579c 590c

9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK II CH 9 [1270b7 34] 466d 467a BK V CH 7 [1307a27-b24] 509b d / *Athenian Constitution* CH 1 41 553a 572a passim esp CH 23 26 563c 565a

14 PLUTARCH *Theseus* 9a d / *Romulus* 20c 21a / *Lycurgus* 32a 48d / *Pericles* 121a 141a c esp 126d 127a / *Coriolanus* 174b d 184a / *Aristides* 263c 266a

15 TACITUS *Annals* BK I 1b 2a 3a b BK II 32b d 34a c BK IV 65a c 72a b BK VI 97b BK XI 105d 107b / *Histories* BK I 193c 194a 212a b

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK V CH 12 218d 219b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY VIII [112 139] 65c d

22 CHAUCER *Tale of Wife of Bath* [6,01 6,58] 274b 275b

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 181d 183c

27 SHAKESPEARE *Troilus and Cressida* ACT I SC III [33-54] 108c / *All's Well That Ends Well* ACT II SC III [115 151] 152c 153a / *Coriolanus* 351a 392a c esp ACT I SC I [1-47] 351a d ACT II SC I [1 106] 361a 362a

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART II 73a 76b PART IV 157a 158b

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 6b 7c BK V 23a 25a BK VII 45b c BK XI 76c 84c

38 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 369c d / *Social Contract* BK III 418c d [fn 2]

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK III 165b-181a c passim

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 61d 62a

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 71d 73c passim 217d 219a 387d 390b passim 427d-428a 452d-456a c esp 452d 453a c 453a b 570d 574b 582c 588a 589a

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 17 70a d

43 MILL *Representative Government* 363d 364d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART II 277c d PART III 285b-d 310a c PART IV 368b d

50 MARX *Capital* 355d 364a esp 356a 357a 359a c

50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 419b d 420b c 423d 424b 429c 430b

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK IX 384c 388a c

CHAPTER 3 ARISTOCRACY

CROSS REFERENCES

For The general theory of the forms of government *see* GOVERNMENT 2–2e
Other chapters on particular forms of government *see* CONSTITUTION DEMOCRACY MONARCHY OLIGARCHY TYRANNY and for the conception of the ideal state *see* STATE 6–6b
The comparison of aristocratic with democratic theories of education *see* EDUCATION 8d
Discussions of the role of virtue in political theory in relation to citizenship and public office *see* CITIZEN 5 VIRTUE AND VICE 7–7d
Another discussion of the theory of representation *see* CONSTITUTION 9–9b
The role of honor in the organization of the state and the theory of timocracy *see* HONOR 4a.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below a e works n t included n *G eat Books of the W e tern W o ld* but rele ant to the idea and t p cs with hich this chapter deals Tl ese o ks a e di ided into t o groups

I W ks by uthors represented in thi collection
II W rks by auth rs n t rep esented in th s collect on

F r the date pl ce a d other facts co cern ng the publication of the works cited consult th B bli g phy of Additi n l Re d gs wh ch follo s th last chapter f *The G eat Ideas*

I

D T *Conv o(Tl Banquet)* FOURTH TREA ISE
 0– 4
S I L *T actat s P lit cu (Polit cal T eat se)* CH
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II

I *g S ga*
S E *The Fact O e*
C M LLA *A D sco T hi the Spanish M hy*
F LM R *Patria ha*
H RRI TO *Oc a*
S I *E Letter*
A S Y *D sc s Co cern g G ernn nt*
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Chapter 4 ART

INTRODUCTION

THE word art has a range of meanings which may be obscured by the current disposition to use the word in an extremely restricted sense In contemporary thought art is most readily associated with beauty yet its historic connections with utility and knowledge are probably more intimate and pervasive

The prevalent popular association reflects a tendency in the 19th century to annex the theory of art to aesthetics This naturally led to the identification of art with one kind of art —the so called fine arts beaux arts or Schone Kunste (arts of the beautiful) The contraction of meaning has gone so far that the word art sometimes signifies one group of the fine arts—painting and sculpture—as in the common phrase literature music and the fine arts This restricted usage has become so customary that we ordinarily refer to a museum of art or to an art exhibit in a manner which seems to assume that the word art is exclusively the name for something which can be hung on a wall or placed on a pedestal

A moment s thought will of course correct the assumption We are not unfamiliar with the conception of medicine and teaching as arts We are acquainted with such phrases as the industrial arts and arts and crafts in which the reference is to the production of useful things Our discussions of liberal education should require us to consider the liberal arts which however defined or enumerated are supposed to constitute skills of mind We recognize that art is the root of artisan as well as artist We thus discern the presence of skill in even the lowest forms of productive labor Seeing it also as the root of artifice and artificial we realize that art is distinguished from and sometimes even opposed to nature

The ancient and traditional meanings are all present in our daily vocabulary In our thought the first connotation of art is fine art in the thought of all previous eras the useful arts came first As late as the end of the 18th century Adam Smith follows the traditional usage which begins with Plato when in referring to the production of a woolen coat he says The shepherd the sorter of the wool the wool comber or carder the dyer the scribbler the spinner the weaver the fuller the dresser with many others must all join their different arts in order to complete even this homely production

In the first great conversation on art—that presented in the Platonic dialogues—we find useful techniques and everyday skills typifying art by reference to which all other skills are analyzed Even when Socrates analyzes the art of the rhetorician as in the *Gorgias* he constantly turns to the productions of the cobbler and the weaver and to the procedures of the husbandman and the physician If the liberal arts are praised as highest because the logician or rhetorician works in the medium of the soul rather than in matter they are called arts only in a manner of speaking and by comparison with the fundamental arts which handle physical material

The Promethean gift of fire to men which raised them from a brutish existence carried with it various techniques for mastering matter —the basic useful arts Lucretius writing in a line that goes from Homer through Thucydides and Plato to Bacon Adam Smith and Rousseau attributes the progress of civilization and the difference between civilized and primitive society to the development of the arts and sciences Ships and tillage walls laws arms roads dress and all such like things all the prizes all the elegancies too of life without

exception, poems, pictures, and the chiselling of fine-wrought statues, all these things practised together with the acquired knowledge of the untiring mind taught men by slow degrees as they advanced on the way step by step."

At the beginning of this progress Lucretius places man's discovery of the arts of metal working, domesticating animals, and cultivating the soil. "Metallurgy and agriculture," says Rousseau, "were the two arts which produced this great revolution"—the advance from primitive to civilized life. The fine arts and the speculative sciences come last, not first, in the progress of civilization.

The fine arts and the speculative sciences complete human life. They are not necessary—except perhaps for the good life. They are the dedication of human leisure and its best fruit. The leisure without which they neither could come into being nor prosper is found for man and fostered by the work of the useful arts. Aristotle tells us that is "why the mathematical arts were founded in Egypt; for there the priestly caste was allowed to be at leisure."

There is another ambiguity in the reference of the word "art." Sometimes we use it to name the effects produced by human workmanship. We elliptically refer to *works of art* as art. Sometimes we use it to signify the cause of the things produced by human work—that skill of mind which directs the hand in its manipulation of matter. Art is both in the artist and in the work of art—in the one as *cause*, in the other as the *effect*. That is effected is a certain ennoblement of matter, a transformation produced not merely by the hand of man, but by his thought or knowledge.

The more generic meaning of art seems to be that of art as cause rather than as effect. There are many spheres of art in which no tangible product results, as in navigation or military strategy. We might, of course, call a landfall or a victory a work of art, but we tend rather to speak of the art of the navigator or the general. So, too, in medicine and teaching, we look upon the health or knowledge which results from healing or teaching as natural. We do not find art in them, but rather in the skill of the healer or teacher who has helped to produce that result. Hence even in the case of the shoe or the statue, art seems to be primarily in the mind and work of the cobbler or sculptor and only derivatively in the objects produced.

Aristotle, in defining art as a "capacity to make, involving a true *course of reasoning*," identifies it with making as distinct from doing and knowing. Though art, like science and moral action, belongs to the mind and involves experience and learning, imagination and thought, it is distinct from both in aiming at production, in being knowledge of *how* to make something or to obtain a desired effect. Science, on the other hand, is knowledge *that* something is the case, or that a thing has a certain nature. Knowledge is sometimes identified with science, to the exclusion of art or skill; but we depart from this narrow notion whenever we recognize that skill consists in *knowing how* to make something.

"Even in speculative matters," writes Aquinas, "there is something by way of work, *e.g.* the making of a syllogism, or a fitting speech, or the work of counting or measuring. Hence whatever habits are ordained to suchlike works of the speculative reason are, by a kind of comparison, called arts indeed, but *liberal* arts, in order to distinguish them from those arts which are ordained to works done by the body, which arts are in a fashion servile, inasmuch as the body is in servile subjection to the soul, and man as regards his soul is free. On the other hand, those sciences which are not ordained to any suchlike work, are called sciences simply, and not arts."

The discussion of medicine in the great books throws light on the relation of art and science in their origin as well as their development. Hippocrates writes of medicine as both an art and a science. In his treatise on *Ancient Medicine* he says, "It appears to me *necessary to every* physician to be skilled in nature, and strive *to know*—if he would wish to perform his duties—what man is in relation to the articles of food and drink, and to his other occupations, and what are the effects of each of them on every one. And it is not enough to know simply that cheese is a bad article of food, as disagreeing with whoever eats of it to satiety, but what sort of disturbance it creates, and wherefore

and with what principle in man it disagrees Whoever does not know what effect these things produce upon a man cannot know the consequences which result from them nor how to apply them As a science medicine involves knowledge of the causes of disease the different kinds of diseases and their characteristic cour es Without such knowledge diagnosis prognosis and therapy would be a matter of guesswork—of *chance* as Hippocrates says—or at best the application of rule-of thumb in the light of past experience

But the scientific knowledge does not by itself make a man a healer a practitioner of medicine The practice of medicine requires art in addition to science—art based on science but going beyond science in formulating *general* rules for the guidance of practice in *particular* cases The habit of proceeding according to rules derived from science distinguishes for Galen the artist in medicine from the mere empiric The antithesis of artist and empiric —suggesting the contrast between operation by tested rule and operation by trial and error—parallels the antithesis between scientist and man of opinion

It has seldom if ever been suggested that an art can be originally discovered or developed apart from some science of the subject matter with which the art deals This does not mean that an individual cannot acquire the habit of an art without being taught the relevant scientific knowledge An art can be learned by practice skill can be formed by repeated acts But the teacher of an art cannot direct the learning without setting rules for his pupils to follow and if the truth or intelligibility of the rules is questioned the answers will come from the science underlying the art

According to Kant every art presupposes rules which are laid down as the foundation which first enables a product if it is to be called one of art to be represented as possible In the case of fine art which he distinguishes from other kinds of art as being the product of genius Kant claims that it arises only from a talent for producing that for which no definite rule can be given Yet he maintains that a rule is still at its basis and may be gathered from the performance *i e* from the product which others may use to put their own talent to the test

Granting that there is no art without science is the reverse true and is science possible without art? The question has two meanings First are there arts peculiarly indispensable to the development of science? Second does every science generate a correlative art and through it work productively?

Traditionally the liberal arts have been considered indispensable to science This has been held to be particularly true of logic Because they were intended to serve as the instrument or *the art* for all the sciences Aristotle s logical treatises which constitute the first systematic treatment of the subject deserve the title *Organon* which they traditionally carry Bacon s *Novum Organum* was in one sense an effort to supply a new logic or art for science and to institute a renovation of the sciences by the experimental method

As an art logic consists of rules for the conduct of the mind in the processes of inquiry inference definition and demonstration by which sciences are constructed Scientific method is in short the art of getting scientific knowledge In the experimental sciences there are auxiliary arts—arts controlling the instruments or apparatus employed in experimentation The experiment itself is a work of art combining many techniques and using many products of art the water clock the inclined plane and the pendulum of Galileo the prisms mirrors and lenses of Newton

The second question—whether all sciences have related arts and through them productive power—raises one of the great issues about the nature of scientific knowledge discussed in the chapters on Philosophy and Science.

For Francis Bacon and to some extent Descartes art is the necessary consequence of science At the beginning of the *Novum Organum* Bacon declares that knowledge and human power are synonymous since the ignorance of the cause frustrates the effect for nature is only subdued by submission and that which in contemplative philosophy corresponds with the cause in practical science becomes the rule The distinction Bacon makes here between the speculative and practical parts of knowledge corresponds to the distinction between science

and art or as we sometimes say pure and applied science. He opposes their divorce from one another If science is the indispensable foundation of art and consists in a knowledge of causes art in Bacon s view is the whole fruit of science, for it applies that knowledge to the production of effects

His theory of science and his new method for its development are directed to the establishment of man s empire over creation which is founded on the arts and sciences alone Just as the present state of the arts accounts for the immense difference between men s lives in the most polished countries of Europe and in any wild and barbarous region of the new Indies so further advances in science promise the untold power of new inventions and techniques.

On Bacon s view not only the value but even the validity of scientific knowledge is to be measured by its productivity A useless natural science—a science of nature which cannot be used to control nature—is unthinkable With the exception of mathematics every science has its appropriate magic or special productive power Even metaphysics in Bacon s conception of it has its true natural magic, which is that great liberty and latitude of operation which dependeth upon the knowledge of forms.

The opposite answer to the question about science and art is given by Plato Aristotle, and others who distinguish between speculative and productive sciences. They differ from Bacon on the verbal level by using the word practical for those sciences which concern moral and political action rather than the production of effects. The sciences Bacon calls practical they call productive but under either name these are the sciences of making rather than doing—sciences which belong in the sphere of art rather than prudence But the significant difference lies in the evaluation of the purely speculative sciences which consist in knowledge for its own sake divorced from art and morals or from the utilities of production and the necessities of action.

In tracing the history of the sciences, Aristotle notes that those men who first found the useful arts were thought wise and superior But as more arts were invented and some were directed to the necessities of life others to recreation the inventors of the latter were naturally always regarded as wiser than the inventors of the former because their branches did not aim at utility Hence when all such inventions were already established the sciences which do not aim at giving pleasure or at the necessities of life were discovered and first in the places where men first began to have leisure So that the man of experience is thought to be wiser than the possessors of any sense-perception whatever the artist wiser than the man of experience the master worker than the mechanic and the theoretical kinds of knowledge to be more of the nature of Wisdom than the productive That the theoretic sciences are useless in the sense of not providing men with the necessities or pleasures of life is a mark of their superiority They give what is better than such utility—the insight and understanding which constitute wisdom.

The Baconian reply condemns the conception that there can be knowledge which is merely contemplation of the truth It announces the revolution which for John Dewey ushered in the modern world The pragmatic theory of knowledge had its origin in a conception of science at every point fused with art

The ancients trying to understand the natural phenomena of change and generation found that the processes of artistic production provided them with an analytic model Through understanding how he himself worked in making things man might come to know how nature worked

When a man makes a house or a statue he transforms matter Changes in shape and position occur The plan or idea in the artist s mind comes through his manipulation of matter to be embodied and realized objectively To the ancients a number of different causes or factors seemed to be involved in every artistic production—material to be worked on the activity of the artist at work the form in his mind which he sought to impose on the matter thus transforming it and the purpose which motivated his effort

In the medical tradition from Aristotle through Galen to Harvey there is constant emphasis upon the artistic activity of nature.

Galen continually argues against those who do not conceive Nature as an artist Harvey con sciously compares the activity of nature in biological generation to that of an artist Like a potter she first divides her material and then indicates the head and trunk and extremities like a painter she first sketches the parts in outline and then fills them in with colours or like the ship builder who first lays down his keel by way of foundation and upon this raises the ribs and roof or deck even as he builds his vessel does nature fashion the trunk of the body and add the extremities

Of all natural changes the one most closely resembling artistic production appears to be generation especially the production of living things by living things In both cases a new individual seems to come into being But upon further examination artistic production and natural generation reveal significant differences —differences which divide nature from art

Aquinas considers both and distinguishes them in his analysis of divine causation In things not generated by chance he points out that there are two different ways in which the form that is in the agent is passed on to another being In some agents the form of the thing to be made pre exists according to its natural being as in those that act by their nature as a man generates a man or fire generates fire Whereas in other agents the form of the thing to be made pre exists according to intelligible being as in those that act by the intellect and thus the likeness of a house pre exists in the mind of the builder And this may be called the idea of the house since the builder intends to build his hou e lil e to the form conceived in his mind

Thus in biological procreation the progeny have the form of their parents—a rabbit pro ducing a rabbit a horse a horse Put in artistic production the product has not the form of the artist but the form he has conceived in his mind and which he seeks to objectify Further more in generation and in other natural changes as well the matter which undergoes change seems to have in itself a tendency to become what it changes into as for example the acorn naturally tends to become an oak whereas the oaken wood does not have in itself any tendency to become a chair or a bed The material the artist works on is entirely passive with respect to the change he wishes to produce The artist's result is in this sense entirely of his making

The realm of art or of the artificial is thus opposed to the natural and differentiated from it Kant for whom art is distinguished from nature as making is from acting or operating in general claims that by right it is only production through freedom *i e* through an act of will that places reason at the basis of its action that should be termed art Conse quently art is that which would not have come into being without human intervention The man made object is produced by man not in *any* way but specifically by his intelligence by the reason which makes him free

Animals other than man are apparently pro ductive but the question is whether they can be called artists A spider conducts opera tions that resemble those of a weaver and a bee puts to shame many an architect in the construction of her cells But according to Marx what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality At the end of every labour process we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its com mencement He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he works but he also realizes a purpose of his own that gives the law to his *modus operandi* and to which he must subordinate his will

As indicated in the chapter on ANIMAL some writers like Montaigne attribute the produc tivity of animals to reason rather than to instinct Art then ceases to be one of man s dis tinctions from the brutes But if man alone has reason and if the productions of art are works of reason then those who refer to animals as artists speak metaphorically on the basis of what Kant calls an analogy with art As soon as we call to mind he continues that no rational deliberation forms the basis of their labor we see at once that it is a product of their nature (of instinct) and it is only to their Creator that we ascribe it as art

This in turn leads to the question whether nature itself is a work of art Let me suppose the Eleatic Stranger says in the *Sophist* that things which are said to be made by nature

: the work of divine art and that things uch are made by man out of these are the ork of human art And so there are two kinds making and production, the one human and e other divine

If we suppose that the things of nature are riginally made by a divine mind how does their production differ from the work of hu an artists or from biological generation? One answer given in Plato's *Timaeus* con eives the original production of things as a ashioning of primordial matter in the patterns et by the eternal archetypes or ideas. In conse quence the divine work would be more like human artistry than either would be like nat ural reproduction The emanation of the world from the One according to Plotinus and the production of things out of the substance of God in Spinoza's theory appear on the other hand to be more closely analogous to natural eneration than to art

Both analogies—of creation with art and with generation—are dismissed as false by Christian theologians God's making is *absolutely* creative It presupposes no matter to be formed nor do things issue forth from God's own substance but out of nothing

Thus Augustine asks How didst Thou *make the heaven and the earth?* And he answers It was not as a human artificer forming on body from another according to the discretion of his mind which can in some way invest with such a form as it seeth in itself by its inward eye Verily neither in the heaven nor in the earth didst Thou *make heaven and earth* nor in the air or waters, seeing these also be long to the heaven and the earth nor in the whole world didst Thou make the whole world because there was no place where to make it before it was made that it might be For that is, but because Thou art? Therefore *Thou spakest and they were made and in Thy Word Thou madest them.* According to this view human art cannot be called creative, and God cannot be called an artist except metaphor ically

The issue concerning various theories of creation, or of the origin of the universe is dis cussed in the chapter on WORLD But here we must observe that according to the view we take of the similitude between human and divine workmanship the line we are able to draw between the realms of art and nature becomes shadowy or sharp

THE DISCUSSIONS OF ART in the great books af ford materials from which a systematic classi fication of the arts might be constructed but only fragments of such a classification are ever explicitly presented.

For example the seven liberal arts are enu merated by various authors but their distinc tion from other arts, and their ordered relation to one another do not receive full explication There is no treatment of grammar rhetoric and logic (or dialectic) to parallel Plato's con sideration of arithmetic, geometry music and astronomy in the *Republic* nor is there any analysis of the relation of the first three arts to the other four—traditionally organized as the *trivium* and the *quadrivium*

However in Augustine's work *On Christian Doctrine* we have a discussion of these arts as they are ordered to the study of theology That orientation of the liberal arts is also the theme of Bonaventura's *Reduction of the Arts to Theology* Quite apart from the problem of how they are ordered to one another particular liberal arts receive so rich and varied a dis cussion in the tradition of the great books that the consideration of them must be distributed among a number of chapters, such as LOGIC RHETORIC LANGUAGE (for the discussion of grammar) and MATHEMATICS

The principles of classification of the fine arts are laid down by Kant from the analogy which art bears to the mode of expression of which men avail themselves in speech with a view to communicating themselves to one another as completely as possible Since such expression consists in word gesture and tone he finds three corresponding fine arts the art of speech formative art and the art of the play of sensations. In these terms he analyzes rhetoric and poetry sculpture archi tecture painting and landscape gardening and music.

A different principle of division is indicated in the opening chapters of Aristotle's *Poetics* The principle that all art imitates nature sug gests the possibility of distinguishing and re lating the various arts according to their char-

acteristic differences *as imitations*—by reference to the *object* imitated and to the *medium* and *manner* in which it is imitated by the poet sculptor or painter and musician Color and form Aristotle writes are used as means by some who imitate and portray many things by their aid and the voice is used by others Rhythm alone without harmony is the means in the dancer s imitations There is further an art which imitates by language alone without harmony in prose or in verse Aristotle s treatise deals mainly with this art—poetry it does not develop for the other fine arts the analysis it suggests

Aristotle s principle also suggests questions about the useful arts Are such arts as shoe making and house building imitations of nature in the same sense as poetry and music? Does the way in which the farmer the physician and the teacher imitate nature distinguish these three arts from the way in which a statue is an imitation or poem or a house?

The Aristotelian dictum about art imitating nature has of course been as frequently challenged as approved Apart from the issue of its truth the theory of art as imitation poses many questions which Aristotle left unanswered If there are answers in the great books they are there by implication rather than by statement

THE MOST FAMILIAR distinction between arts—that between the useful and the fine—is also the one most frequently made in modern discussion The criterion of the distinction needs little explanation Some of man s productions are intended to be used others to be contemplated or enjoyed To describe them in terms of imitation the products of the useful arts must be said to imitate a natural function (the shoe for example the protective function of calloused skin) The imitation merely indicates the use and it is the use which counts But in the products of the fine arts the imitation of the form quality or other aspect of a natural object is considered to be the source of pleasure

The least familiar distinction among the arts is implied in any thorough discussion yet its divisions are seldom if ever named Within the sphere of useful art some arts work toward a result which can hardly be regarded as an artificial product Fruits and grains would grow without the intervention of the farmer yet the farmer helps them to grow more abundantly and regularly Health and knowledge are natural effects even thou h the arts of medicine and teaching may aid in their production.

These arts more fully discussed in the chapters on MEDICINE and EDUCATION stand in sharp contrast to those skills whereby man produces the useful things which but for man s work would be totally lacking In the one case it is the artist s activity itself which imitates or cooperates with nature s manner of workin in the other the things which the artist makes by operating on passive materials supplied by nature imitate natural forms or functions

For the most part the industrial arts are of the second sort They transform dead matter into commodities or tools The arts which cooperate with nature usually work with living matter as in agriculture medicine and teaching The distinction seems warranted and clear Yet it is cut across by Adam Smith s division of labor into productive and non productive The work of agriculture is associated with industry in the production of wealth but whatever other use they may have physicians and teachers according to Smith do not directly augment the wealth of nations

If to the foregoing we add the division of the arts into liberal and servile the major traditional distinctions are covered This last division had its origin in the recognition that some arts like sculpture and carpentry could not effect their products except by shaping matter whereas some arts like poetry or logic were free from matter at least in the sense that they worked productively in symbolic mediums But by other principles of classification poetry and sculpture are separated from logic and carpentry as fine from useful art Logic along with grammar rhetoric and the mathematical arts is separated from poetry and sculpture as liberal from fine art When the word liberal is used to state this last distinction its meaning narrows It signifies only the speculative arts or arts concerned with processes of thinking and knowing

The adequacy of any classification and the intelligibility of its principles must stand the test of questions about particular arts The

...eat books frequently discuss the arts of animal husbandry and navigation, the arts of cooking and hunting, the arts of war and government. Each raises a question about the nature of art in general, and challenges any analysis of the arts to classify them and explain their peculiarities.

THERE ARE TWO OTHER major issues which have been debated mainly with respect to the fine arts.

One already mentioned concerns the imitative character of art. The opponents of imitation do not deny that there may be some perceptible resemblance between a work of art and a natural object. A drama may remind us of human actions we have experienced; music may simulate the tonal qualities and rhythms of the human voice registering the course of the emotions. Nevertheless, the motivation of artistic creation lies deeper, it is said, than a desire to imitate nature, or to find some pleasure in such resemblances.

According to Tolstoy, the arts serve primarily as a medium of spiritual communication, helping to create the ties of human brotherhood. According to Freud, it is emotional or subconscious expression, rather than imitation or communication, which is the deepest spring of art; the poet or artist forces us to become aware of our inner selves in which the same impulses are still extant even though they are suppressed. Freud's theory of sublimation of emotion or desire through art seems to connect with Aristotle's theory of emotional catharsis or purgation. But Freud is attempting to account for the origin of art, and Aristotle is trying to describe an effect proper to its enjoyment.

The theories of communication, expression, or imitation, attempt to explain art, or at least its motivation. But there is also a conception of art which, foregoing explanation, leaves it a mystery—the spontaneous product of inspiration, of divine madness, the work of unaccountable genius. We encounter this notion ... in Plato's Ion.

THE OTHER MAJOR controversy concerns the regulation of the arts by the state for human welfare and the public good.

Here as before the fine arts (chiefly poetry and music) have been the focus of the debate. It is worth noting, however, that a parallel problem of political regulation occurs in the sphere of the industrial arts. On the question of state control over the production and distribution of wealth, Smith and Marx represent extreme opposites, as Milton and Plato are poles apart on the question of the state's right to censor the artist's work. In this debate, Aristotle stands on Plato's side in many particulars, and Mill with Milton.

The problem of censorship or political regulation of the fine arts presupposes some prior questions. Plato argues in the *Republic* that all poetry but "hymns to the gods and praises of famous men" must be banned from the State "for if you go beyond this and allow the honeyed muse to enter, either in epic or lyric verse, not law and the reason of mankind which by common consent have ever been deemed the best, but pleasure and pain will be the rulers in our State." Such a view presupposes a certain theory of the fine arts and of their influence on the citizens and the whole character of the community. Yet because both Plato and Aristotle judge that influence to be far from negligible, they do not see any reason in individual liberty for the state to refrain from interfering with the rights of the artist for the greater good of the community.

To Milton and Mill, the measure of the artist's influence does not affect the question of the freedom of the arts from political or ecclesiastical interference. While admitting the need for protecting the interests of peace and public safety, Milton demands: "Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties." The issue for them is entirely one of liberty. They espouse the cause of freedom—for the artist to express or communicate his work and for the community to receive from him whatever he has to offer.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in hea y type, which are the olume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER *Iliad*, BK II [265 283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that th passage is in section d of pa e 12.

PAGE SECTIO S When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the pper and lower hal es of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the te t is printed in two columns, the letters a and b efer to the upper and lower hal es of the left hand side of the page, the letters and d to the upper and lower hal es of the right hand side of the page. For example, in 7 PLATO *Sympos m*, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164

A TH R S DI I IO One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers, in brackets, are gi en in cer tain cases e g *Iliad*, BK I [65 283] 12d.

BIBL REFERE E The eferences are to book, chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay ersions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James rsion is cited first and th Douay indicated by a (*D*) follows e g., OLD TESTA MEN *Nehemiah*, 7 45—(*D*) *II Esdras*, 46

SYMBOLS The abb eviation esp" calls the reader s attention to one or mo e especially relevant parts of a whole eference passim signifies that th topic is discussed intermit tendy rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference St le for g neral guidance in the use of *The G eat Ideas* consult the P eface.

1. The generic notion of art: skill of mind in making

7 PLATO *Protagoras*, 44 45b / *Phaedrus*, 136b 138c 139a / *Ion*, 145d 146c / *Symposium*, 160c d 164d / *Gorgias* 260a 262a 280d 283c / *Republic* K I, 302c 306a 307a 308a BK III, 333b-d BK X, 42 434c / *Statesman*, 593d 595a / *Philebus*, 633a-c / *Law* K IV 679a-c

8 ARI TOTLE *Physics* K II, CH I [192b 3 32] 268d 269a [93b12 16] 269d 2 0a CH 8 [199b 6-31] 277 / *Metaphysics*, K I, CH I [80b 5-981b34] 499b-500b BK II CH 7 [3-25 29] 555b-d BK IX, CH 571 572a CH 5 573a-c CH 7 [048b3 049a12] 574c-d

9 ARI TOT *Parts of Animals* BK I, CH I [640a25 33] 162d / *Ethics* BK I, CH 7 [097b 3 1098 8] 343a-c BK CH 4 388d 389a K IX, CH 7 [1 6b34 68 18] 421b-c / *Pol ics* CH [55 35 59] 453b BK II CH 13 [33 30-38] 53 c / *Rhetoric* K I, CH I [354a1] 593a [355b9-14] 594d 595a CH 2 [355b26-36] 595b [1356b-6-1357a7] 596b-c

12 A ELI *M ditations*, K VI ECT 16, 275c

17 PLOTINUS *F f h Ennead*, TR VIII, CH I 239b-240a

18 A TI *City f God*, K XXI CH 24, 610a-c / *Christian Doctrine* K I, CH 30 651 -d

19 AQUI AS *Summa Theologica* P RT I Q 14 A 8 82 83b Q 15, A I ANS 91b-92a A 2, ANS and REP 2 92a-93b Q 36 A 3 ANS 194c 195d Q I A I A S and REP 2 595d 597c ART I-II Q 14 A 4 A S 679b-d Q 21 A 2, REP 2 718a-d Q 34 A I REP 3 768c 769d

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 57 AA 3 4 37b-39a Q 58 A 2, R P I 42a-43a 5 REP 2 44d-45c Q 65 A I REP 4 0b-72a

25 MO TAIGNE *Essays* 437b

28 HA EY *On Animal Generation*, 333a

30 B CON *Novum Organum*, BK I APH 85 121d 122b

31 DESCAR ES *Discourse* PART I 61b-c

42 KANT *Judgement*, 523c 524b 525c 527b

46 HEGEL *Philoso hy f Right* PART I par 68 29d 30a / *Philosophy f History* I TRO 176a-c PART II, 266a-2 4 PA T IV 346c-d

47 GOETHE *F ust* PRELUDE [134 15] 4a b

49 DARW N *Descent f Man*, 2 8b-c

50 MARX *Capital*, 85b-d

53 JAMES *Psychology* 186b 774a

2. Art and nature

2a. Causation in art and nature: artistic production compared with natural generation

7 PLATO *I n*, 144b / *Symposium* 155d 157a / *Timaeus* 447 449c / *Laws* K X 60a-761d

(2 *Art and nature* 2a *Causation in art and nature: artistic production compared with natural generation*)

8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK II CH II [95ª3-9] 129d / *Physics* BK I CH 8 [191ª33-ᵇ9] 267b BK II CH I [192ᵇ8-32] 268b d 269a CH 2 [194ª33-ᵇ8] 270d 271a CH 8-9 275d 278a c esp CH 8 [199ª8-ᵇ7] 276b d / *Generation and Corruption* BK II CH 9 [335ᵇ18-336ª13] 437b d / *Meteorology* BK IV CH 12 [390ᵇ2-14] 494c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 6 [988ª1-7] 506a CH 9 [992ª29-34] 510c BK VI CH I [1025ᵇ18-27] 547d BK VII CH 7-9 555a 558a BK IX CH 2 571c 572a CH 5 573a c BK XI CH 7 [1064ª10-16] 592b c BK XII CH 3 [1070ª4-8] 599b

9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH I [639ᵇ12-640ª35] 161d 162d [641ᵇ13-29] 164c d / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH 21-22 269c 271a BK II CH I [734ª17-735ª5] 274c 275c CH 4 [738ᵇ18-28] 279c [740ª13-18] 281a [740ᵇ25-741ª2] 281d CH 6 [743ᵇ20-25] 285a BK III CH II [762ª15-20] 303b BK IV CH 2 [767ª16-25] 308c CH 6 [775ª20-23] 317b / *Ethics* BK I CH 9 [1099ᵇ18-24] 345a b BK VI CH 4 [1140ª11-16] 388d

10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK I CH 7 170c 171a CH 12 172d 173c BK II CH 3 185a 186d CH 6 189a 190a

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [823-857] 55a b

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK III SECT 2 259d 260a BK VI SECT 40 277d

17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR VIII CH 3-4 130a 131a / *Fourth Ennead* TR III CH 10 147c 148b TR IV CH 31 174d 175a / *Fifth Ennead* TR VIII CH 1-2 239b 240c CH 5 242a TR IX CH 2 247a / *Sixth Ennead* TR II CH II 275c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 18 A 3, ANS 106b 107c Q 36 A 3, ANS 194c 195d Q 41 A 3, ANS 219d 221c Q 45 A 2, ANS 242d 244a Q 104 A I, ANS 534c 536c Q 105, A 5, ANS 542a 543b Q 117 A I, ANS and REP I 2 595d 597c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL Q 80 AA I-2 956c 958b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL XI [91-111] 16a b PARADISE I [94-142] 107b d II [112-138] 109a VIII [91-111] 117d 118a XIII [52-84] 126a b

22 CHAUCER *Physician's Tale* [11,941-972] 366b-367a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* INTRO 47a b

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 93b d

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 385a c 400d 401a 407c 412b 415b 427d 428c 442d 443b 443d 444c 447d 448a 450c 492a b

29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 251d 252a

30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK I APH 4 107b

33 PASCAL *Geometrical Demonstration* 437a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXVI SECT 2 217b d

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 188c 189a / *Judgement* 523c d 557c 558b 564d 565b

43 MILL *Representative Government* 327b d 328d passim

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART II 266a 267b

50 MARX *Capital* 85b d

53 JAMES *Psychology* 186b

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8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK I CH 7 [191ª7-11] 266d BK II CH I [193ª9-ᵇ19] 269b 270a CH 2 [194ª21-ᵇ13] 270c 271a CH 3 271a 272c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 6 [988ª1-7] 506a BK VII CH 7-9 555a 558a esp CH 8 556b 557b BK VIII CH 3 [1043ᵇ5-24] 567d 568b / *Soul* BK II CH I [412ᵇ10-18] 642c d

9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH I [640ª10-641ᵇ42] 162b 165a / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH 20 [729ª9]-CH 22 [730ᵇ32] 269b 271a BK II CH I [734ᵇ8-735ª10] 275a d

10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* 167a 215d esp BK II CH 3 185a 186d

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK VII SECT 3 281b

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR VI CH 2-3 21d 23a / *Fifth Ennead* TR VIII CH I-2 239b 240c TR IX CH 2 247a

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XI par 7 90d 91a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 41 A 3, ANS 219d 221c Q 45 A 2, ANS 242d 244a Q 47 A I, REP I 256a 257b Q 91 A 3, ANS 486b 487d Q 104 A I, ANS 534c 536c Q 105 A 5, ANS 542a 543b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q A I, ANS 710a 711c PART III SUPPL Q 79 A 2, REP 4 953b 955c Q 80 AA I-2 956c 958b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE I [127-142] 107c d XIII [52-84] 126a b

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 412b 415b

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 17b-d 43c 45a

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK V [468-505] 185b 186a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 56-57 26b 27a ADDITIONS 32 121d 122a / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 165a 166b 185c d PART II 266a 267b

50 MARX *Capital* 17a 85b c 86d 87c

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7 PLATO *Republic* BK X 427c 428d / *Timaeus* 447a 449c / *Sophist* 577d 578d / *Laws* BK X 760a 761d

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK VI SECT 40 277d

16 KEPLER *Harmonies of the World* 1048a

PLOTINUS *Fourth Ennead* TR IV C 1 31 174d 175a / *Fifth Ennead* TR VIII CH 5 242a
AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XI par 7 90d 91a / *City of God* BK XXII CH 24 610 d / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 30 651c-d
AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2 A 3 A s and REP 2 12c 14a Q 4 A 8 82c 83b A II ANS 84c 85c Q 15 91b-94a Q 16 A 1 94b-95 Q 17 1 100d 101d Q 22 A 2 NS and R P 3 128d 130d Q 41 A 3 ANS 219d 221c QQ 44 46 238a 255d passim QQ 65-66 339a 349d passim Q 74 A 3 REP 1 375a 377 c Q 9 3 ANS 486b 487d Q 93 A 2 REP 4 493a d Q 103 A 1 REP 1 3 528b-529 Q 104 A 1 534c 536c PART I II Q 1 A 2 610b-611b Q 13 A 2 R P 3 673c-674c
0 AQUI AS *S mma Theologica* PART III Q 3 A 8 ANS 729b 730b P RT III SUPPL Q 75 A 3 REP 4 938a 939d
21 D NTE *D ine Comedy* HELL XI [91 111] 16a b PARAD SE VIII [91 111] 117d 118a IX [103 08] 119d X [7 21] 120b XIII [52-84] 126 b X I I [70-117] 134b-d esp [1 9-111] 134d
22 CHAUCER *Physic an s T le* [II 941-972] 366b-367a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* INTRO 47a b
28 H R Y *On A mal Generat on* 427d-428c 442d-443b 492 b
32 MILTON *Par dise Lost* BK III [694 735] 150b-151b
40 GIBB *Decline and F ll* 663d-664
42 KA *Pu e Reaso* 188c 189a / *Judgement* 521b-523d
49 DA W O g *f Species* 87a b

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4 HOMER *Il d* K X I [4,8-608] 135a 136c
7 PLATO *Cratyl s* 104c 106c 108c 110d / *Rep blic* BK I I 320c 334b BK VI 382 c BK 427 434c / *T maeus* 443b d 455b c / *Crit a* 478c d / *Sophist* 552 d 560b-561d 577 579d / *Statesm* 596c d / *L ws* K II 654a c 660a 662 K X 760a b
8 ARISTOTL *Physics* BK I CH 2 [94ᵃ22-26] 270c
9 ARI TOTLE *P litics* BK III CH [8 ᵇ o- 5] 4 9b K H 5 [1340ᵃ14 ᵇ 9] 545 546a / *Rhetori* BK I CH II [1371ᵇ4 10] 615a / *Poetic* 681 699 esp H -5 681a 684a
12 L R TI S *Nat e f Thi gs* BK V [1379-1383] 79a
12 AUR LI S *Meditat* BK III SECT 2 259d 60 BK ECT 10 303b-c
16 K PL *Harmonie f the Wo ld* 1048a
17 PLOTI S *First Enne d* TR VI 2 3 21d 23a / *F urth Enne d* TR I I C 10 147 148b / *Fifth En e d* TR VII CH I 2 239b-240 TR IX C 1 2 247a C 11 250c 251a / *S th Enne d* II 11 275c
18 AU I *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 5 649b-d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q I A 9 REP I 8d 9c Q 93 A 2 REP 4 493a d Q 117 A I ANS 595d 597c
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL XI [91 111] 16a b PURGATORY X [22-99] 67c 68b XII [10-72] 70b-71a
22 C AUCER *Troilus and Cresnda* BK II STANZA 149 41a / *Physician s Tale* [II 941-972] 366b-367a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* INTRO 47a b PART IV 262c
27 SHAKESPE RE *Hamlet* ACT II SC II [576-592] 46b ACT III SC II [I 39] 49a b / *T mon of Athens* ACT I SC I [28-38] 393d 394a [156-160] 395b-c / *Winter s Tale* ACT IV SC IV [77 1 8] 508c 509a / *Sonnets* LXVII-LXVIII 596c d
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 332c 333c 438c 444b-c 492b
29 CERVANT S *Don Quixote* PART I 82c d 184a 185b PART II 237b c 251d 252a
30 BACON *Advancement of Learn g* 33c d / *N m Organum* BK II APH 29 159b-c
31 DES ART S *Medit t ons* I 76 b
32 MIL ON *Sam on Agonistes* 337a 338a
33 PASCAL *Pensees* 29 176 32 33 176a b 120 195a 134 196a
35 HUME *Human Understandi g* SECT I DIV 5 452d 453a
37 F ELDING *Tom Jones* 121b d 123a 243a d
40 GIB ON *D cline and Fall* 158d
42 KANT *Judgement* 521b-524b 525a 528c esp 527b-528c 557a 558b
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 196d 197a
46 HEGEL *Ph losophy f R ght* PART I par 68 29d 30a / *Philosophy of History* PART I 219b c
52 DO TOEVSKY *Brothers Ka ama ov* BK X 284b-d
53 J ES *Psychology* 186b 686b 688a
54 F UD *Interpret t on of Dreams* 265c / *Civil at on and Its Di contents* 779 d

4 Di e e cl ss fications of the arts useful and fi e liberal and servile

7 PLATO *Euthydem s* 74b-76b / *I n* 145d 148a c / *Gorg as* 253 255 260a 262a 280d 282b / *Republ c* K I 305b 306a / *S ph st* 552c 553a 560b-561d 577c 579d / *Statesman* 592d 593a 593d 595a / *Philebus* 633a 635b / *Laws* K II 662c 663b BK X 760a b
8 ARIS OTL *Physics* BK II CH 2 [194 33 ᵇ9] 270d 271a / *M t physics* BK I C I I [981ᵇ13-24] 500a
9 A ISTOTLE *Eth cs* BK I CH I 339a b CH 7 [97ᵃ15 23] 342c / *Pol tics* BK I CH II [1258ᵇ9-39] 452d-453b BK VIII CH 2 [1337ᵇ3-3] 542 d / *Rhetoric* K CH 2 [1355ᵇ 6-36] 595b / *Poetics* CH I 3 681a 682c
17 PLOTINU *Fourth E ne d* R IV CH 31 175a / *Fifth Enn d* TR IX CH 11 250c 251a
18 AU USTINE *Christia Doctr ne* BK II CH 30 651 d

(2 *Art and nature* 2a *Causation in art and nature: artistic production compared with natural generation*)

8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK II CH II [95 3-9] 129d / *Physics* BK I CH 8 [191 33-^{b}9] 267b BK II CH I [192^{b}8-32] 268b d 269a CH 2 [194 33-^{b}8] 270d 271a CH 8-9 275d 278a c esp CH 8 [199 8-^{b}7] 276b d / *Generation and Corruption* BK II CH 9 [335^{b}18-336 13] 437b d / *Meteorology* BK IV CH 12 [390^{b}2-14] 494c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 6 [988 1-7] 506a CH 9 [992 29-34] 510c BK VI CH I [1025^{b}18 27] 547d BK VII CH 7-9 555a 558a BK IX CH 2 571c 572a CH 5 573a c BK XI CH 7 [1064 10-16] 592b c BK XII CH 3 [1070 4-8] 599b

9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH I [639^{b}12-640 35] 161d 162d [641^{b}13 29] 164c d / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH 21-22 269c 271a BK II CH I [734 17-735 5] 274c 275c CH 4 [738^{b}18 28] 279c [740 13-18] 281a [740^{b}25-741 2] 281d CH 6 [743^{b}20-25] 285a BK III CH II [762 15-20] 303b BK IV CH 2 [767 16-25] 308c CH 6 [775 20-23] 317b / *Ethics* BK I CH 9 [1099^{b}18 24] 345a b BK VI CH 4 [1140 11-16] 388d

10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK I CH 7 170c 171a CH 12 172d 173c BK II CH 3 185a 186d CH 6 189a 190a

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [823 857] 55a b

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK III SECT 2 259d 260a BK VI SECT 40 277d

17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR VIII CH 3-4 130a 131a / *Fourth Ennead* TR III CH 10 147c 148b TR IV CH 31 174d 175a / *Fifth Ennead* TR VIII CH 1-2 239b-240c CH 5 242a TR IX CH 2 247a / *Sixth Ennead* TR II CH 11 275c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 18 A 3 ANS 106b-107c Q 36 A 3 ANS 194c 195d Q 41 A 3 ANS 219d 221c Q 45 A 2 ANS 242d 244a Q 104 A 1 ANS 534c 536c Q 105 A 5 ANS 542a 543b Q 117 A 1 ANS and REP 1-2 595d 597c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL Q 80 AA 1-2 956c 958b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL XI [91 111] 16a b PARADISE I [94 142] 107b d II [112-138] 109a VIII [91-111] 117d 118a XIII [52-84] 126a b

22 CHAUCER *Physician's Tale* [11 941-972] 366b-367a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* INTRO 47a b

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 93b d

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 385a c 400d 401a 407c 412b 415b 427d 428c 442d 443b 443d 444c 447d-448a 450c 492a b

29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 251d 252a

30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK I APH 4 107b

33 PASCAL *Geometrical Demonstration* 437a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXVI SECT 2 217b d

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 188c 189a / *Judgement* 523c d 557c 558b 564d 565b

43 MILL *Representative Government* 327b d 328d passim

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART II 266a 267b

50 MARX *Capital* 85b-d

53 JAMES *Psychology* 186b

2b The role of matter and form in artistic and natural production

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK I CH 7 [191^{a}7 1] 266d BK II CH I [193 9-^{b}19] 269b-270a CH [194 21-^{b}13] 270c 271a CH 3 271a 272c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 6 [988 1 7] 506a BK VII CH 7-9 555a 558a esp CH 8 556b 557b BK VIII CH 3 [1043^{b}5 24] 567d 568b / *Soul* BK II CH I [412^{b}10-18] 642c d

9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH I [640 10-641^{b}42] 162b 165a / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH 20 [729 9]-CH 22 [730^{b}32] 269b 271a BK II CH I [734^{b}8 735 10] 275a d

10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* 167a 215d esp BK II CH 3 185a 186d

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK VII SECT 3 281b

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR VI CH 2 3 21d 23a / *Fifth Ennead* TR VIII CH I 2 239b 240c TR IX CH 2 247a

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XI par 7 90d 91a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 41 A 3 ANS 219d 221c Q 45 A 2 ANS 242d 244a Q 47 A 1 REP 1 256a 257b Q 91 A 3 ANS 486b 487d Q 104 A 1 ANS 534c 536c Q 105 A 5 ANS 542a 543b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q 2 A 1 ANS 710a 711c PART III SUPPL Q 79 A REP 4 953b 955c Q 80 AA 1-2 956c 958b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE I [12, 14] 107c d XIII [52-84] 126a b

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 412b-415b

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 17b-d 43c 45a

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK V [468-505] 185b 186a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 56 26b 27a ADDITIONS 32 121d 122a / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 165a 166b 185c d PART II 266a 267b

50 MARX *Capital* 17a 85b c 86d 87c

2c The natural and the artificial as respectively the work of God and man

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 1 2 / *Leviticus* 6 1 / *Numbers* 33 52 / *Deuteronomy* 5 7 10 16 21 22 / *Job* 37 1-40 5—(D) *Job* 37 39 / *Isaiah* 40 18-26—(D) *Isaias* 40 18 6

7 PLATO *Republic* BK X 427c-4 8d / *Timaeus* 447a 449c / *Sophist* 577d 578d / *Laws* BK X 760a 761d

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK VI SECT 40 277d

16 KEPLER *Harmonies of the World* 1048a

(2 *Art and nature* 2a *Causation in art and nature: artistic production compared with natural generation*)

8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK II CH 11 [95 3-9] 129d / *Physics* BK I CH 8 [191 33-^{b}9] 267b BK II CH 1 [192^{b}8-32] 268b-d 269a CH 2 [194 33-^{b}8] 270d 271a CH 8-9 275d 278a c esp CH 8 [199 8-^{b}7] 276b d / *Generation and Corruption* BK II CH 9 [335^{b}18-336 13] 437b d / *Meteorology* BK IV CH 12 [390^{b}2-14] 494c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 6 [988 1-7] 506a CH 9 [99- 29-34] 510c BK VI CH 1 [1025^{b}18 27] 547d BK VII CH 7-9 555a 558a BK IX CH 2 571c 572a CH 5 573a c BK XI CH 7 [1064 10-16] 592b c BK XII CH 3 [1070 4-8] 599b

9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH 1 [639^{b}12 640 35] 161d 162d [641^{b}13 29] 164c d / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH 21 22 269c 271a BK II CH 1 [734 17-735 ɔ] 274c 275c CH 4 [738^{b}18 8] 279c [740 13-18] 281a [740^{b}25-741 2] 281d CH 6 [743^{b}20 25] 285a BK III CH 11 [762 15-20] 303b BK IV CH 2 [767 16-25] 308c CH 6 [775 20-23] 317b / *Ethics* BK I CH 9 [1099^{b}18 24] 345a b BK VI CH 4 [1140 11-16] 388d

10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK I CH 7 170c 171a CH 12 172d 173c BK II CH 3 185a 186d CH 6 189a 190a

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [823 857] 55a b

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK III SECT 2 259d 260a BK VI SECT 40 277d

17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR VIII CH 3-4 130a 131a / *Fourth Ennead* TR III CH 10 147c 148b TR IV CH 31 174d 175a / *Fifth Ennead* TR VIII CH 1-2 239b 240c CH 5 242a TR IX CH 2 247a / *Sixth Ennead* TR II CH 11 275c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 18 A 3 ANS 106b-107c Q 36 A 3 ANS 194c 195d Q 41 A 3 ANS 219d 221c Q 45 A 2 ANS 242d 244a Q 104 A 1 ANS 534c 536c Q 105 A 5 ANS 542a 543b Q 117 A 1 ANS and REP 1-2 595d 597c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL Q 80 AA 1-2 956c 958b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL, XI [91 111] 16a b PARADISE I [94 142] 107b d II [112-138] 109a VIII [91-111] 117d 118a XIII [52 84] 126a b

22 CHAUCER *Physician's Tale* [11 941-972] 366b-367a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* INTRO 47a b

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 93b d

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 385a c 400d 401a 407c 412b-415b 427d 428c 442d 443b 443d 444c 447d 448a 450c 492a b

29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 251d 52a

30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK I APH 4 107b

33 PASCAL *Geometrical Demonstration* 437a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXVI SECT 2 217b-d

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 188c 189a / *Judgement* 523c d 557c 558b 564d 565b

43 MILL *Representative Government* 327b d 328d passim

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART II 266a 267b

50 MARX *Capital* 85b d

53 JAMES *Psychology* 186b

2b The role of matter and form in artistic and natural production

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK I CH 7 [191 7 12] 266d BK II CH 1 [193 9-^{b}19] 269b 270a CH [194 21 ^{b}13] 270c 271a CH 3 271a 272c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 6 [988 1 7] 506a BK VII CH 7-9 555a 558a esp CH 8 556b 55/b BK VIII CH 3 [1043^{b}5 24] 567d 568b / *Soul* BK II CH 1 [412^{b}10-18] 642c d

9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH 1 [640 10-641^{b}42] 162b 165a / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH 20 [729 9]-CH 22 [730^{b}32] 269b 271a BK II CH 1 [734^{b}8-735 10] 275a d

10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* 167a 215d esp BK II CH 3 185a 186d

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK VII SECT 23 281b

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR VI CH 2 3 21d 23a / *Fifth Ennead* TR VIII CH 1 2 239b-240c TR IX CH 2 247a

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XI par 7 90d 91a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 41 A 3 ANS 219d 221c Q 45 A 2 ANS 242d 244a Q 47 A 1 REP 1 256a 257b Q 91 A 3 ANS 486b 487d Q 104 A 1 ANS 534c 536c Q 105 A 5 ANS 542a 543b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q 2 A 1 ANS 710a 711c PART III SUPPL Q 79 A 2 REP 4 953b 955c Q 80 AA 1 2 956c 958b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE I [127 14 107c d XIII [52 84] 126a b

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 412b-415b

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 17b-d 43c 45a

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK V [468-50 185b 186a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 56-57 26b 27a ADDITIONS 32 121d 122a / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 165a 166b 185c d PART II 266a 267b

50 MARX *Capital* 17a 85b c 86d 87c

2c The natural and the artificial as respectively the work of God and man

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 1-2 / *Leviticus* 26 1 / *Numbers* 33 52 / *Deuteronomy* 5 7 10 16 21 22 / *Job* 37 1-40 5—(D) *Job* 37-39 / *Isaiah* 40 18-26—(D) *Isaias* 40 18 26

7 PLATO *Republic* BK X 427c 428d / *Timaeus* 447a 449c / *Sophist* 577d 578d / *Laws* BK X 760a 761d

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK VI SECT 40 277d

16 KEPLER *Harmonies of the World* 1048a

o 6c

1 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 5b-6a 48d-49b 50c 51d 53a b

1 DESCARTES *Rules* I 1a-b / *Discourse* PART 61b-d

1 NEWTON *Principles* 1a-b

2 KANT *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 388d / *Judgement* 463a-464c 515b-c 523d 524a 526a 52 b esp 52 a b

3 MILL *Utilitarianism* 445c d

6 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART IV 346c 348a

3 JAMES *Psychology* 687a-688a 863a-866a

4 FREUD *New Introductory Lectures* 874c-875a

The liberal arts as products e of science means and methods of achie ing knowl edge

7 PLATO *Protagoras* 50d 52d 57 -c / *Phaedrus*, 134a-d 139d 140b / *Meno* 179d 183c / *Gorgias* 2 2a 262a / *Republic* BK 1 386d 388a BK II, 391b-398c / *Parmenides* 491a-d / *Theaetetus* 525d 526b / *Sophist*, 571 -c / *Statesman*, 594d 595d / *Philebus* 610d-613a 633a-635a / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810d

8 ARISTOTLE *Pno Analytics* BK I CH 30 63d 64b / *P sterior Analytics* 9 a-13 a,c esp BK I, CH 3 97a 100a BK II, CH I 10 122b d 128d / *Topics*, BK I, CH I 3 143a 144b CH 10-11 147b-148c BK III CH I [155^b 16] 211a b CH 14 [63^b8- 6] 222a / *Sophistical Refutations* CH 9-11 234b-237c CH 16 [1 5 1 1] 241 CH 34 252 253d / *Physics* BK I CH I 2 9a b CH 2 [184^b 185^a19] 259c 260a / *Heavens* BK CH 0 [9^b4 1] 3 0d BK III CH [306^a 8] 397b-c / *Generation and Corruption*, K I, CH 2 [316^a5 14] 411c d / *Metaphysics* BK II CH 3 513c-d BK III, CH I [995^a23-^b4] 513b,d BK V C I 3 [005^b1-4] 524c, CH 4 [005^b3 006^a28] 525a-c BK XI CH 3 589a-d CH 5 [061^b34 062^a19] 590a-c BK XIII, CH 2 [10—^b1]-CH 3 [078^a32] 608d 609d CH 4 [1 8 18-3-] 610b-c / *So l* K I CH 631 -632d K II CH 4 [415^a14 22] 645b-c

9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK CH I 161a-165d / *Ethics* BK CH 3 339d 340b CH 7 [1098^a20- 8] 343c 344a, BK 7 CH 3 385b-c / *P litics* BK I, CH [252^a18-24] 445b / *Rhetoric* BK I, CH 2 [358^a3 33] 597d 598b

11 A HIM ES *Method*, 569b-5 0a

12 EP TETU *Discourses* K I, CH 7 112b-113d CH 7 122d 124 K II, CH 2, 1 4b-c

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead*, TR III 10a 12b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 20-24 6a 7 / *City of God* BK VIII, CH 3 4 266a-267c esp CH 4 267b / *Christian Doctrine* BK II, CH 3 37 651d-654b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I Q 117 A I 595d 97c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II, Q 57 3, REP 3 3 b-38a A 6 REP 3 40a-41a, ART III Q 9, A 3 REP 2 765b-766b

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 56b 58a 61a 65c-d

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 69d 77a passim 240c 242a 446d-450a

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 331a 337a,c

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 56b-69c esp 56b-58c / *Novum Organum* PREF 105a 106d BK I 10 a 136a,c esp APH II 26 107d 108d APH 39-69 109c 116b, APH 103 106 12 d 1 8c / *New Atlantis* 210d 214d

31 DESCARTES *Rules* 1a-40a,c esp X 15d 17a / *Discourse* 41a-6 a,c esp PA T I 41d-42b P T II 46c-48b, PART III 50b-51a, PART IV 52a, PART VI, 61d 62c / *Meditations*, I 5a 7 c / *Objections and Replies* 128a 129a / *Geometry* BK I 295a 298b BK II 304a 305a BK III, 353a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* I 4 171a 1 2d / *Vacuum* 355a 358b passim 365b-366a / *Great Experiment* 382a 389b / *Geometrical Demonstration*, 430a-434a 442a-446b

34 NEWTON *Principles* K III RULES 270a 2 1b LEMMA 5 338b-339a G NERAL SCHOL. 371b-3 2a / *Optics* BK III 542a 543a 544a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* INTRO SECT 4 7 94a 95c BK IV CH III SECT 18-20 317d 319c C I II SECT 11 340a 342d CH XII I CT 1-8 358c 360c passim SECT 14 15 362d 363b CH X II, SECT 11 3 8b

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT I DIV 7 10 453c-4 5b passim SECT VII DIV 48 4 0d-4 1c

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 339d 342b

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations*, BK V 335d-336a

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 299b

42 KANT *Pure Reason*, 1a 13d 15c 16c 17d 19a 36d 37d 60a-c 109d 112d 119a b 146a 149d 193d 194b 211 218d 223a-d / *Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals* 253a 254d 261c d 264b-d / *Practical Reason*, 291a 296d 310a-b 319c 321b 329a 330c

43 FEDERALIST NUM R 31 103c 104a

43 MILL *Liberty* 283d 284d 287c 288c

45 LAVOISIER *Elements of Chemistry* PREF 1c 2d

45 FOURIER *Theory of Heat* 1 2a 173b

45 FARADAY *Researches in Electricity* 659a 774d 775a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO, par 31 19c 20a

50 MARX *Capital*, 10a-11d

53 JAMES *Psychology* 175a 1 6a 385a b 674a 675b 67 b 687 862a-865a 869a-8 8a

54 FREUD *New Introductory Lectures* 8 9c 881b-c

6c Art as the application of science: the productive powers of knowledge

7 PLATO *Lysis* 16c 18b / *Protagoras* 43b-d / *Euthydemus* 70a-c / *Ion* 142a 148a c / *Gorgias* 261a 262a / *Republic* BK II 391b-397a esp 392b, 394b 394d / *Statesman*, 580d 582a / *Laws* BK IV 684c-685a

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK II, CH 2 [194^b21 ^b13] 270c 271a / *Metaphysics*, BK I CH I [980^b25-

(4. *Diverse classifications of the arts: useful and fine, liberal and servile.*)

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I, Q 18, A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 103, A 1, REP 2 529a-530a; PART I-II, Q 8, A 2, REP 3 656a-d; Q 9, A 1, ANS 657d-658d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I-II, Q 57, A 3, REP 3 37b-38a
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, BK II, 82c-d; BK III, 190d-191a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays*, 69d-70d
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote*, PART II, 251b-c
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning*, 38c-39d; 56a-b / *Novum Organum*, BK I, APH 85 121d-122b
42 KANT *Judgement*, 524a-b; 526a-527b; 532a-536d

5. The sources of art in experience, imagination, and inspiration

OLD TESTAMENT: *Exodus*, 31:1-11; 35:30-36:8
4 HOMER *Iliad*, BK I [1-7] 3a; BK II [484-493] 14d-15a / *Odyssey*, BK I [1-10] 183a
7 PLATO *Phaedrus*, 124a / *Ion*, 142a-148a,c / *Symposium*, 160c-d / *Apology*, 202b-d / *Gorgias*, 253a; 260a-262a / *Sophist*, 561b-d; 577d-579d / *Laws*, BK IV, 684b-c
8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics*, BK II, CH 19 [100a3-9] 136c / *Metaphysics*, BK I, CH I [980b25-982a1] 499b-500b
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics*, BK II, CH I [1103a26-b13] 348d-349a; BK X, CH 9 [1180b29-1181b23] 435d-436a,c / *Rhetoric*, BK I, CH I [1354a1-12] 593a; BK III, CH I [1404a13-19] 654b; CH 2 [1405a3-9] 655b; CH 10 [1410b5-8] 662c / *Poetics*, CH 17 [1455a22-36] 690c
10 HIPPOCRATES *Ancient Medicine*, 1a-9a,c esp par 1-8 1a-3b / *Articulations*, par 10 94d
13 VIRGIL *Eclogues*, IV [1-3] 14a; VI [1-12] 19a / *Aeneid*, BK I [1-11] 103a; BK VII [37-44] 237a
14 PLUTARCH *Demosthenes*, 692d-695d
17 PLOTINUS *Fifth Ennead*, TR VIII, CH I 239b-240a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I-II, Q 68, A 4, REP I 91b-92c
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy*, HELL, II [7-9] 2c; XXXII [1-12] 47c; PURGATORY, I [1-12] 53a; XXIV [49-63] 90a-b; XXIX [37-42] 98a; PARADISE, I [1-36] 106a-b; II [1-18] 107d; [91-105] 108d; XVIII [70-117] 134b-d esp [109-111] 134d; XXII [112-123] 140d; XXIII [55-69] 141d-142a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan*, PART IV, 262c
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, BK I, 2d-3a,c; BK III, 129c-d
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays*, 52d-53a; 309c-310c; 450d-451a; 523c-524a; 532a-b
26 SHAKESPEARE *Midsummer-Night's Dream*, ACT V, SC I [1-27] 370d-371a / *Henry V*, PROLOGUE 532b-d; ACT III, PROLOGUE 543c-d
27 SHAKESPEARE *Sonnets*, XXXII 591a-b; LXXVIII-LXXXV 598b-599b; C-CVI 601c-602c
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation*, 332c-333c
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote*, PART II, 251d-252a; 340b
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning*, 32d; 38c-39b
31 DESCARTES *Discourse*, PART I, 43b / *Meditations*, I, 76a-b
32 MILTON *On Shakespear*, 1630 16a / *Paradise Lost*, BK I [1-26] 93b-94a; BK III [1-55] 135b-136b; BK VII [1-39] 217a-218a; BK IX [1-47] 247a-248a
36 SWIFT *Gulliver*, PART III, 97a-98a
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy*, 198a-b; 302a-b
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones*, 152a-155b; 190b-191c; 273a-274c; 280a; 296b-d; 298a
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 185b; 627b-d
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 528c
42 KANT *Judgement*, 463a-464c; 473a-c; 482b-483d; 523d-524b; 525c-532a esp 526a-d, 528c-530c; 542b-543c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History*, INTRO, 153a-c, 176a-c; PART II, 263d-268b
47 GOETHE *Faust*, DEDICATION 1a-b; PART II [9945-9960] 242a
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man*, 288d-289a; 292a-b
50 MARX *Capital*, 85b-c
53 JAMES *Psychology*, 165b [fn 1]; 686b-688a
54 FREUD *Interpretation of Dreams*, 181a-b; 239c-240a; 246c-248c; 383d / *General Introduction*, 483c; 600d-601b / *Group Psychology*, 670a-b; 692c-693a

6. Art and science

6a. The comparison and distinction of art and science

7 PLATO *Republic*, BK VI, 386d-388a; BK VII, 391b-398c; BK X, 427c-434c / *Laws*, BK IV, 684b-685a
8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics*, BK II, CH 19 [100a0-9] 136c / *Physics*, BK II, CH 2 [194a1-b13] 270c-271a / *Metaphysics*, BK I, CH I [980b25-982a1] 499b-500b; BK VI, CH I [1025b18-28] 547d; BK XI, CH 7 [1064a10-18] 592b-c
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics*, BK I, CH 1-2 339a-d; BK III, CH 3 [1112a30-b10] 358b-c; BK VI, CH 3 [1139b14-18] 388b; CH 4 [1140a10-16] 388d; CH 5 [1140a33-b2] 389b; CH 7 390a-d
10 HIPPOCRATES *Regimen in Acute Diseases*, par 3 27a-c
17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead*, TR VIII, CH 3-4 130a-131a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I, Q 16, A I, ANS 94b-95c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I-II, Q 57, A 3, ANS and REP 1, 3 37b-38a; A 4, ANS and REP 2 38a-39a; Q 95, A 2, ANS 2 7c-228c
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation*, 333a-b

(6 *Art and science* 6c *Art as the application of science the productive powers of knowledge*)

982 1] 499b-500b BK VII CH 7 [1032 25-1033 4] 555b-556a CH 9 [1034^{a}21-32] 557c BK IX CH 2 571c 572a CH 5 573a c CH 7 [1049^{a}5-12] 574c d BK XI CH 7 [1064 10-14] 592b c

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH I 339a b CH 7 [1098^{a}28-32] 343d BK II CH 4 [1105 17-^{b}4] 350d 351a BK VI CH 4 388d 389a

10 HIPPOCRATES *Ancient Medicine* 1a 9a c esp par 1-4 1a 2c par 14 5a c par 20-22 7b 8d / *Epidemics* BK III SECT III par 16 59b c / *Surgery* par 1 70b / *Articulations* par 58 112d / *The Law* 144a d

10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK II CH 9 195c 197b

11 NICOMACHUS *Arithmetic* BK I 812d 813a

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK II CH 17 158d 159b

13 VIRGIL *Georgics* 37a 99a passim esp II [475-515] 65a 66a

14 PLUTARCH *Marcellus* 252a 255a

16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* BK I 510b

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XXII CH 24 610a c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 14 A 8 82c 83b Q 17 A 1 ANS 100d 101d Q 19 A 4 REP 4 111c 112c PART I-II Q 14 A 4 ANS 679b d

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 57 A 3 REP 3 37b-38a A 4 38a 39a Q 95 A 2 ANS 227c 228c

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 60a b 73b PART II 158c d PART IV 267a b

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 450d-451a 523c 524b

28 GILBERT *Loadstone* BK V 100c 101c

28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 289d 292a esp 289d, 291d 292a / *Circulation of the Blood* 305a d

29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 145c d PART II 251b 252a

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 42a c 48d 49b 50c 51d 53a b 56b-58c / *Novum Organum* 105a 195d esp BK I APH 1-3 107a b APH 11 107d APH 19-21 108b-c APH 81-82 120b-121b APH 85 121d 122d APH 92 125b-d APH 103-105 127d 128c APH 124 133c d APH 129-130 134d 136a c BK II APH 1-9 137a 140c APH 44-52 175d 195d / *New Atlantis* 210d 214d

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART VI 61b-c 66d 67a c

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK IV CH XII SECT 11-12 361c 362c

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT I DIV 5 452d 453b

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III 103b-115b

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 5b 6a

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 633c 661c 663c

42 KANT *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 388d / *Judgement* 523d 524a

43 MILL *Representative Government* 369a

45 FOURIER *Theory of Heat* 170a 184a 213a b

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 218d 219a 251a b PART IV 347b-348a

50 MARX *Capital* 170b c 177a 183b-189a 239c 241a 299b d

54 FREUD *Psycho Analytic Therapy* 123a 125a / *General Introduction* 484a / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 777a c 778b-779a esp 778d

7 The enjoyment of the fine arts

7a Art as a source of pleasure or delight

7 PLATO *Gorgias* 260a 262a / *Republic* BK X, 433a 434c / *Timaeus* 455b-c / *Statesman*, 596c d / *Philebus* 628d 630c / *Laws* BK II 654b-d 658d 660d

8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK I CH I [981^{b}13-19] 500a

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VII CH 11 [1152^{b}18-19] 403d CH 12 [1153^{a}24-27] 404c BK IX CH 7 [1167^{b}34-1168 18] 421b-c / *Politics* BK VIII CH 3 [1337^{b}27-1338^{a}29] 543a c CH 5 544c 546a / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 11 [1371^{b}4 11] 615a BK III CH 1 [1403^{b}15]-CH 12 [1414 13] 653b d 667a esp CH 1 653b d 654c / *Poetics* CH 4 [1448^{b}4 23] 682c d CH 14 688b-689a

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK V [1379-1411] 79a b

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK I [440-493] 115a 116b BK VIII [608-731] 275a 278b

16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* BK I 510a b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 20-27 6a 7d BK III par 2-4 13c 14b BK X par 49-53 83c 85a / *City of God*, BK I CH 31 33 147d 149a BK XXII CH 24 610a c / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 6 638a d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q I A 9 REP 1 8d 9c PART I-II Q 32 A 8 ANS 764c 765b Q 34 A 1 REP 3 768c 769d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY II [106-133] 55c d

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 1b d 3a c BK III 129d 130c 190d 191a BK IV 232a b

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 104d 105c 191c 192d 399d 401a

26 SHAKESPEARE *Taming of the Shrew* ACT III SC I [10-12] 212d / *Merchant of Venice* ACT V SC I [60-88] 431b c

29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 184a 185b PART II 251b-c

32 MILTON *Samson Agonistes* 337a 338a

37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 1a 2a 35a d 49a 50c

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 502c 503a

42 KANT *Judgement* 471d 473a 476a-483d 516d 518d 527b-528c 532a d 534c 539d

43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 446d 447a 451c

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 254c d

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46 HEGEL Philosophy of History PART II 2 5d 2 6a AR 1 60b-c 361d 362a

51 TOLSTOY War and Peace BK VI, 238 243d 260a 262a BK IX 3 0d 3 4

53 JAMES Psychology 201a

10 Th m ral and political significance of the art

10a The influence of the arts on character and citizenship. the role of the arts in the training of youth

5 ARISTOPHANES Acharnians [6 6-6 8] 462b-d / Frogs [009- 0] 519d 520c / Frogs [1005-1098] 6b-57 c [48 1 33] 581d 582a,c

7 PLATO Protagoras 46b-c / Phaedrus 1 0a-d / Symposium 156b-c / Gorgias 260d 282b / Republic BK I -III 320c 339a BK I 344b-d BK II 388a-401d esp 389d 8 BK X, 42 434c / Timaeus, 4 a-c / Laws BK 1 653a 663d X 67 c-6 6b BK V 696b-d BK 1 b- 2 b

9 ARISTOTLE Politics K II CH 17 [1336b30-4] 541b-d BK III 542a 5 8a

12 A ELIUS Meditations BK SECT 2 3c

13 VIRGIL Aeneid, K I [441 493] 11 a 116b K [8 -8 3] 233b-234 BK VIII [008- 31] 275a 2 8b

14 PLUTARCH Lycurgus 33d 34a 43b-d / Solon Pericles 121a-122b / Timoleon 19 a b / Demetrius 26a-d

15 TACITUS Annals K XI 146b-d

16 COPERNICUS Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres K 1 510a b

17 PLOTINUS First Ennead, TR III, CH 10a-d

18 AUGUSTINE Confessions BK par 20-2 6a-c par 5 7a d I III, par 2 4 13c 14b X X par 49-3 83c 8 a / City of God K I CH 33 147d 149a K I H 8-14 153d 15 K I H 6- 7 202a-203c / Christian Doctrine K H 6 638a-d H 649b-d

21 DANTE Divine Comedy PURGATORY XXII [25-93] 8 -c ARAD E, I [36] 106a b I [1 8] 107d X II [100-142] 133a-c

22 CHAUCER Intro t Man f Law Prologue [4465 45] 234b-235b / Prologue t Melibeus 400b-401a / L Envoi 550a b

24 RABELAIS Gargantua and Pantagruel, K I 26d 30c

25 MONTAIGNE Essays 60a 80b passim

26 SHAKESPEARE Two Gentlemen of Verona, CT III SC II [66-9] 245a b / Richard II ACT SC [41-63] 3 0a b / Merchant f Venice ACT SC I [60-88] 431b-c

27 SHAKESPEARE Measure f r Measure ACT I SC I [1 15] 192c

29 CERVANTES Don Quixote PART I 1a 3b 12b-16c 184a 18 c 189d 193c PART II 42 c 429d

30 BACON Advancement of Learning 4c-6c 39c 39a 8a d 9c 80a

31 DESCARTES Discourse PART I 43a b

32 MILTON Paradise Lost BK IX [1 4] 24 a 248a / Areopagitica, 385a-386b

33 PASCAL Pensées 11 1 3b-1 4a

35 HUME Human Understanding SECT I DIV 1 4 1a b

36 SWIFT Gulliver XVIIb-XVIIIa

36 STERNE Tristram Shandy 250b-251a

37 FIELDING Tom Jones 2 3d 254d

38 MONTESQUIEU Spirit of Laws, K IV 1 b-18d

38 ROUSSEAU Inequality 365c 366b

39 SMITH Wealth of Nations BK V 33 d 343d 34 c d

40 GIBBON Decline and Fall 3a b 9a b 9 a b 619a b

41 GIBBON Decline and Fall, 40d-41a 225a 226a esp 225c 300a b 5 3a 574b

42 KANT Judgement 521b-5 3c 586d 58 a

44 BOSWELL Johnson, 158a b 299b-c 308b d

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24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK III 131b d 133b

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Other d scuss ons of art and nature *see* NATURE 2a and for the comparison of artistic pro duction natural generation and divine creation *see* FORM 1d(1) 1d(2) WORLD 4e(1)

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More extended treatments of the liberal arts *see* LANGUAGE 4-8 LOGIC MATHEMATICS RHETORIC and for an analysis of one of the fine arts *see* POETRY

Discuss ons of the useful and industrial arts *see* EDUCATION 5a-5b LABOR 2b MEDICINE PROGRESS 3c 4a 6a STATE 8d 8d(3) WAR AND PEACE 10-10f WEALTH 3c-3d

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Li ted b l w re w ks not included in *G eat Books of the W estern W orld* but rele ant to the idea a d top cs with wh h this ch pter d als These vorks are d v ded into t o g oups

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II Works by authors not represented in this collect on

F r the dat pl ce nd other facts c ncern the p blicat on of the o ks cited con ult the B bliog phy of Add t onal Read ngs which f llows the last chapter of *The G eat Id as*

I

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ROU U D *rse the A ts a d Scienc s*
A. SMI Of the Aff nity Betwe n M sic Dan ng d Poet y in *Es ys Phil phic l d*

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Chapter 5 ASTRONOMY

INTRODUCTION

ASTRONOMY could take its place in this catalog of ideas on the ground that several of the great books are monuments of astronomical science exemplifying the imaginative and analytical powers which have made it one of the most remarkable triumphs of the human mind. Its claim might further be supported by the fact that other great books—of mathematics, physics, theology, and poetry—have a context of astronomical imagery and theory. But the inclusion of astronomy can be justified by what is perhaps an even more significant fact, namely, that astronomical speculation raises problems and suggests conclusions which have critical relevance for the whole range of the great ideas.

Man has used astronomy to measure not only the passage of time or the course of a voyage, but also his position in the world, his power of knowing, his relation to God. When man first turns from himself and his immediate earthly surroundings to the larger universe of which he is a part, the object which presses on his vision is the overhanging firmament with its luminous bodies moving with great basic regularity and, upon closer observation, with certain perplexing irregularities. Always abiding and always changing, the firmament which provides man with the visible boundary of his universe also becomes for him a basic, in fact an inescapable, object of contemplation.

Careful and precise astronomical observations antedate the birth of astronomy as a science. The early interest in the heavenly bodies and their motions is often attributed to the usefulness of the predictions which can be made from a knowledge of celestial phenomena.

Whether their motive was entirely utilitarian or partly religious and speculative, the Egyptians and Babylonians, we learn from Herodotus, undertook patient study of the heavens. They observed and recorded with immense persistence. They calculated and predicted. They turned their predictions to use through the priestly office of prophecy to foretell eclipses, tides, and floods; and they employed their calculations in the mundane arts of navigation and surveying to guide travel and fix boundaries. But they did not, like the Greeks, develop elaborate theories which sought to organize all the observed facts systematically.

With the Greeks, the down-to-earth everyday utility of astronomy seems to count for less than its speculative grandeur. The dignity which they confer upon astronomy among the disciplines reflects the scope and majesty of its subject matter. The Greek astronomer, concerned as he is with figuring motions that range through the whole of space and are as old as time or as interminable, takes for his object the structure of the cosmos.

Aristotle and Plato pay eloquent tribute to the special worth of astronomy. In the opening chapters of his *Metaphysics* Aristotle associates astronomical inquiry with the birth of philosophy. Apart from usefulness, he says, men delight ... in the sense of sight; and he adds:

"it is owing to their wonder that men both now begin and at first began to philosophise. They wondered first about ... the obvious difficulties, but little by little they advanced to ... greater matters and stated difficulties ... about the phenomena of the moon and sun and stars, and about the genesis of the universe." In his own philosophical thought, Aristotle's treatise *On the Heavens* is not only one of the basic natural sciences, but certain of its principles have general significance for all the other parts of his physical science.

A wider view of the importance of astronomy is taken by Plato. In the *Timaeus* he dwells on the higher use and purpose for which God has given eyes to us. "... Had we never seen the

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NIETZSCHE *The Will to Power* BK III (4)
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Still another point of view on the importance of astronomy is represented in the skeptical and humanist attitude of Montaigne "I am very well pleased with the Milesian girl," he remarks, "who ... advised the philosopher Thales rather to look to himself than to gaze at heaven." In saying this, or in quoting with approval the question asked of *Pythagoras* by Anaximenes—"To what purpose should I trouble myself in searching out the secrets of the stars, having death or slavery continually before my eyes?" —Montaigne intends more than a preference for the moral over the natural sciences. He regards astronomical inquiry as a prime example of man's "natural and original disease—presumption." It is presumptuous to suppose that our minds can grasp and plot the course of the heavens when we fail to comprehend things much nearer at hand. Hence Montaigne advises everyone to say, in the spirit of Anaximenes: "Being assaulted as I am by ambition, avarice, temerity, superstition, and having so many other enemies of life, shall I go cudgel my brains about the world's revolutions?"

Kant can be as critical as Montaigne of the frailty of human knowledge. "The investigations and calculations of the astronomers," he writes, have shown us "the abyss of our ignorance in relation to the universe." But Kant—an astronomer himself as well as a moralist—does not therefore advise us to forsake the study of the heavens. On the contrary, he recommends it not only for its scientific value, but for its moral significance.

"Two things," Kant declares in a passage which has become famous, "fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and more steadily we reflect on them: the starry heavens above and the moral law within." The two fit together to produce a single effect. Astronomy with its view "of a countless multitude of worlds annihilates, as it were, my importance as an *animal* creature." Morality "elevates my worth as an *intelligence* by my personality, in which the moral law reveals to me a life independent of animality and even of the whole sensible world."

Kant's association of the starry heavens with the moral life is not so much an echo of, as a variant upon, Plato's precept that we apply the courses of intelligence in heaven ... to the courses of our own intelligence. But in one passage of Freud we find an almost complete return to the Platonic insight. "Order has been imitated from nature," he writes; "man's observations of the great astronomical periodicities not only furnished him with a model, but formed the ground plan of his first attempts to introduce order into his own life."

ASTRONOMY HAS connections with biology and psychology, as well as with mathematics and physics. The obvious fact that the sun supports terrestrial life—operating here as a unique and indispensable cause—occasions the inference by Aquinas that it may also operate as a cause in the production of new species by spontaneous generation from putrefying matter. This notion bears some resemblance to the theory in contemporary genetics of the effect of cosmic radiations upon gene mutations.

Unlike these notions in biology, speculations concerning celestial influences upon psychological phenomena seem to cross the line between astronomy and astrology. Sometimes the influence upon man and his actions is found in the constellations attending a nativity; sometimes it is a particular influence of the sort still signified by the meaning of the word "lunacy"; and sometimes omens and auguries are read in the aspect of the heavens.

The chapters on PROPHECY and SIGN AND SYMBOL deal with the issues raised by astrology. Problems more closely associated with astronomical science and speculation are treated in other chapters. The cosmological problem of the origin of the material universe is discussed in the chapters on ETERNITY, TIME, and WORLD; the question of its size in the chapter on SPACE; the question of whether the celestial spheres are themselves alive or are moved by intelligences or spirits in the chapters on ANGEL and SOUL; and the question of the nature of the heavenly bodies in the chapter on MATTER.

This last problem is of crucial significance in the history of astronomy itself. Opposed theories of the motions of the heavenly bodies become correlated with opposed theories concerning their matter—whether that is different in kind from terrestrial matter or the same. It is with reference to these related issues that what

stars and the sun and the heaven Timaeus says none of the words which we have spoken about the universe would ever have been uttered God invented and gave us sight he continues to the end that we might behold the courses of intelligence in the heaven and apply them to the courses of our own intelligence which are akin to them the unperturbed to the perturbed and that we learning them and partaking of the natural truth of reason might imitate the absolutely unerring courses of God and regulate our own vagaries

For Plato then man s intellectual relation to the heavens does more than initiate philosophy Man s elf rule his purity and peace of soul is at stake in that relation That is one reason why in both the *Republic* and the *Laws* Plato makes astronomy a required part of the curriculum for the education of ruler He who has not contemplated the mind of nature which is said to exist in the stars and seen the connection of music with these things and harmonized them all with laws and institutions is not able the Athenian Stranger says in the *Laws* to give a reason for such things as have a reason

Plato considers the opposition to astronomy on religious grounds by those who think that men who approach celestial phenomena by the methods of astronomy may become godless because they see things happening by necessity and not by an intelligent will accomplishing good His answer points out that one of the two things which lead men to believe in the gods is the argument from the order of the motion of the stars and of all things under the dominion of the mind which ordered the universe It was a false understanding of these matters which gave rise to much atheism and perplexity

The issues raised by Plato concerning the importance of astronomy for purification and piety for education and politics run through the tradition of western thought Though they are somewhat transformed in the context of Jewish and Christian beliefs and altered by later developments in the science of astronomy itself they remain as matters on which an author s strong assent or diss nt forcefully reflects his whole intellectual position

On the one hand astronomers like Ptolemy Copernicus and Kepler for all their differences on points of scientific theory seem to concur in reaffirming Plato s conception of the bearing of their science on religion and morals Lucretius and Augustine on the other hand while not agreeing with each other seem to disagree with Plato In the tradition of western thought they represent different types of opposition to the Platonic view

Where Plato and his followers including religious Christians like Copernicus and Kepler hold that true piety profits from astronomical study Lucretius hopes that astronomy may help to free men from religious superstitions. If when they gaze on the heavenly quarters of the great upper world and direct their thou hts to the courses of the sun and moon they do so with a mind at peace because they see only the workings of natural law and no evidences of a controlling power in the will of the gods then men achieve the natural piety of the scientist —different in the opinion of Lucretius from the false worship which is based on fear

From his own experiences in dealing with the astronomy of the Manichean sect in relation to their religious doctrine Augustine insists that the teachings of religion in no way depend upon astronomy He denies that such knowledge is in any way essential to true piety Though a man does not know even the circles of the Great Bear yet is it folly to doubt he writes that he is in a better state than one who can measure the heavens and number the stars and poise the elements yet neglecteth Thee Who hast made all things in number weight and measure

When Faustus the leader of the Manicheans was found out to have taught falsely of the heaven and stars and of the motions of the sun and moon (although these things pertain not to the doctrine of religion) his religious teachings according to Augustine inevitably suffered ridicule because of his pretension that they derived support from a science of the heavenly bodies Augustine would disengage theology from astronomy His position anticipates that later taken by Cardinal Barberini who during the controversy over the Copernican hypothesis is reported to have told Galileo that astronomy and religion have quite separate tasks the one teaching how the heavens go, the other how to go to heaven

world since it *is only* a part of a part *i.e.* the planetary region he deliberately adds the qualification But I am speaking *now of the Earth in so far as it is a part of the edifice of the world* and not of the dignity of the governing creatures which inhabit it

Whether or not it was the *traumatic* blow to the *human* ego which Freud conjectures, there can be little doubt that the shift from Ptolemy to Copernicus involved a real shock to the imagination The Ptolemaic system *conforms* to the look of the world which is indeed the reason why it is still the one used in practical courses in navigation Here again Kepler defends Copernicus by explaining why our uncultivated eye sight cannot be other than deceived and why it should learn from reason to understand that things are really different from the way they appear

A certain disillusionment may result from this affirmation—repeated by every schoolboy who is taught the Copernican system—that despite what we see the *sun does not move around* the earth and the earth both rotates and revolves It undermines the trust men placed in their senses and the belief that science would *describe the world as they saw it In order to* save the appearances that is to account for the phenomena, science might henceforward be expected to destroy any naive acceptance of them as the reality

Furthermore though the Ptolemaic world was very la e the Copernican universe was much larger Whereas in the former the radius of the earth was deemed negligible in relation to the radius of the sphere of the fixed stars in the new universe the radius of the earth s orbit *around the sun* was negligible in relation to the same radius of the sphere of the fixed stars It can hardly be doubted that this intensified some men s sense of almost being lost in an abyss of infinity I see those *frightful* spaces of the universe which surround me Pascal writes and I find myself tied to one o ner of this vast ex*panse, without knowin* why I am put in this place rather than in another When he regards the world s immensity as the greatest sensible mark of the almighty power of God Pascal experiences an e which for him is qualified by re e e ce Other men may experience the same feeling but less with reverence than with a gnawing loneliness *born of the doubt* that so vast a cosmos—if cosmos it is rather than chaos—can have been beneficently designed as man s habitation

WHATEVER THE TRUTH about the effect of the Copernican theory in the order of opinion imagination and feeling it did produce a direct result on the intellectual plane It more than any other single factor led to the overthrow of certain crucial doctrines which had been linked together in the physics and astronomy of Aristotle it thus radically changed the fundamental principles in terms of which man had *understood* the order and unity of nature That scientific event deserves not only the name but the fame of the Copernican revolution

The revolution in the realm of theory goes *much deeper* than the substitution of one mathematical construction for another to describe the motions of the world s great bodies As Freud points out the heliocentric hypothesis *associated with the name of Copernicus* was known to the Alexandrian astronomers of antiquity It is for example attributed to Aristarchus by Archimedes in the *Sand Reckoner*

As far as the earth s *rotation is concerned* Ptolemy admits it is quite plausible to suppose the heavens immobile and the earth turning on the same axis from west to east very *nearly one revolution a day* As far as the appearances of the stars are concerned he goes on nothing would perhaps keep things from being in accordance with this simpler conjecture

Why then does Ptolemy reject a supposition which is not only plausible but also in accounting for the appearances *simpler*? In part the ans er may be that he does so because the contrary supposition conforms to our ordinary sense-experience of the earth s immobility and the motions of the heavens from east to west But that is far *from being the most* important part of the answer Ptolemy indicates the crucial part when he tells us that the otherwise plausible supposition of a rotating earth becomes altogether absur hen we consider the speed and direction of the motions of bodies within the earth s own atmosphere His strongest count against the supposition is that it does not conform to the Aristotelian physics which

has come to be called the Copernican revolution represents one of the great crises certainly one of the most dramatic turning points in the development of astronomy and of physics and natural science generally

The Copernican revolution did not take place by the improvement and enlargement of astronomical observations alone nor even by the effect of these on alternative mathematical formulations If it had not been accompanied by the radical shift from ancient to modern physics —especially with regard to the diversity or uniformity of the world s matter—the Copernican hypothesis concerning the celestial motions would have been no more than a mathematical alternative to the Ptolemaic hypothesis Copernicus seems to advance it only as such but in the hands of Kepler Galileo and Newton it becomes much more than that They rather than Copernicus seem to accomplish the revolution connected with his name

When their contribution is neglected or inadequately grasped the Copernican revolution appears to be as is often popularly supposed merely a shift in astronomical theory The problem being to organize mathematically the *apparent* motions of the heavens Copernicus offers an alternative solution to that of Ptolemy Instead of treating the earth as stationary and central in the cosmic system Copernicus attributes three motions to the earth by treating it as a planet which revolves around the sun spins on its axis and varies the inclination of its axis with reference to the sun

What is usually supposed to be revolutionary about this hypothesis is its effect on man s estimate of himself and his place or rank in the universe On either of the rival hypotheses the apparent motions of the heavens remain unaltered but not man s conception of himself of his earth or of the universe in which the earth s orbit cuts so small a figure As Kant suggests man s stature seems to shrink He becomes a mere speck in the universe which has been enlarged to infinity or at least to an unimaginable immensity He is displaced from its center to become a wanderer with his planet Humanity s self esteem according to Freud was thus for the first time deeply wounded he refers to the theory that is associated in our minds with the name of Copernicus as the first great outrage which humanity had to endure from the hands of science

It has been questioned whether this interpretation of the Copernican revolution fits all the documents in the case Freud may be accurately reporting a popular feeling which since the 18th century has become a widespread consequence of Copernican and post Copernican astronomy But in earlier centuries when the Ptolemaic system prevailed or even after Copernicus, the appraisal of man s rank seems to depend more upon the position he occupies in the hierarchy of God s creatures—below the angels and above the brutes—than upon the place or motion of the earth or the size of the world

Boethius for example finds the Ptolemaic universe large enough to remind man of the infinitesimal space he occupies. Dante too, comments on the smallness of the earth in the scheme of things When in his visionary travel Dante reaches the Empyrean he looks down upon the earth and with my sight he tells us, I returned through all and each of the seven spheres and saw this globe such that I smiled at its mean semblance and that counsel I approve as best which holds it of least account

Kepler a passionate Copernican deeply concerned with the human significance of astronomy can be found arguing that the new hypothesis involves something more fitting for man than the old In his last argument in defense of the Copernican view against that of Tycho Brahe as well as that of Ptolemy he declares it was not fitting that man who was going to be the dweller in this world and its contemplator should reside in one place as in a closed cubicle It was his office to move around in this very spacious edifice by means of the transportation of the Earth his home In order properly to view and measure the parts of his world the astronomer needed to have the Earth a ship and its annual voyage around the sun

Yet the very fact that Kepler argues in this manner may be interpreted as indicating his sense of the drastic implications for man of the altered structure of the universe Kepler may even be thought to announce the problem of the so called Copernican revolution when in denying that the earth can any longer be reckoned among the primary parts of the great

four arguments in especial. (1) From the nature of movable bodies. (2) From the nature of the motor virtue. (3) From the nature of the place in which the movement occurs. (4) From the perfection of the circle. He then takes each of these arguments, and answers each in turn.

WHAT IS EXTRAORDINARY about Kepler's attack upon the Ptolemaic astronomy cannot be understood without examining Ptolemy's defense of his theory, a defense which Copernicus meets in Ptolemy's own terms rather than, as Kepler does, by going outside them.

Though his expressed intention was to construct a mathematical theory of the celestial motions which would also conform to Aristotle's physics, Ptolemy, when he finished, confessed that the complications he had been compelled to add in order "to save the appearances" left him with a theory that did not conform to Aristotle's doctrine of the perfect circular motion of the heavenly spheres. Instead of abandoning Aristotle's physics, he defended his theory on the ground that astronomy, being mathematical rather than physical, could admit such "unrealistic" complications if they served the purposes of calculation and of saving the appearances."

In the thirteenth and last book of the *Almagest*, when he faces the fact that his mathematical devices have become exceedingly difficult—and strained from the point of view of the Aristotelian realities—Ptolemy writes: "Let no one, seeing the difficulty of our devices, find troublesome such hypotheses. ... It is proper to try and fit as far as possible *the simpler hypotheses* to the movements of the heavens; and if this does not succeed, then any hypotheses possible. Once all the appearances are saved by the consequences of the hypotheses, why should it seem strange that such complications can come about in the movements of heavenly things?" We ought not *to judge the simplicity* of heavenly things by comparison with what seems to be simple in the explanation of earthly phenomena. We *should* instead judge their simplicity from the unchangeableness of the natures in the heavens and their movements. For thus they would all appear simple, more than those things which seem so here with us."

Ignoring the supposition that simplicity must be judged *differently in different spheres*, Copernicus challenges Ptolemy *on his own grounds* when he proposes simpler hypotheses to fit the movements of the heavens. But in doing so, he seems to adopt the traditional view of the mathematical character of astronomical hypotheses. Yet, as will appear, he does not adopt this view in the unqualified form in which Osiander states it in his Preface to the *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres*.

"It is the job of the astronomer," Osiander writes, "to use painstaking and skilled observation in gathering together the history of the celestial movements, and then—since he cannot by any line of reasoning reach the true causes of these movements—to think up or construct whatever causes or hypotheses he pleases, such that, by the assumption of these causes, these same movements can be calculated from the principles of geometry, *for the past and for the future too.*"

"It is not necessary," he adds, "that these hypotheses should be true, or even probable; it is enough if they provide a calculus which fits the observations. When for one and the same movement varying hypotheses are proposed, as eccentricity or epicycle for the movement of the sun, the astronomer much prefers to take the one which is easiest to grasp."

What distinguishes Kepler from both Ptolemy and Osiander is the way in which he is concerned with the *truth* of alternative hypotheses in astronomy. He looks upon the truth of an hypothesis as something to be judged *not merely in mathematical terms according to the adequacy and simplicity of a calculating device*, but to be measured by its conformity to *all* the physical realities. At the very beginning of his *Epitome of Copernican Astronomy* he flatly declares that "astronomy is part of physics." And in the opening pages of the fourth *book, he insists* that astronomy has not one but two ends: to save the appearances and to contemplate the true form of the edifice of the World. He follows this immediately by observing that if astronomy had only the first end, Tycho Brahe's theory would be as satisfactory as that of Copernicus.

Early in his scientific career, before writing the *Epitome*, Kepler asserts that "one cannot

distinguishes between natural and violent motions assigns certain fixed directions to the natural motions of each of the four elements of matter and denies that these elementary kinds of terrestrial matter enter into the composition of the heavenly bodies

That Aristotle s physics and cosmology lie at the very heart of the issue is confirmed by the way in which Kepler later argues for the Copernican theory against Ptolemy He does not defend its truth on the ground that it accounts for observable facts which the Ptolemaic hypothesis cannot handle Nor does he prefer it merely because it is mathematically *the simpler hypothesis* On the contrary he specifically notes that anything which can be claimed on mathematical grounds for Copernicus over Ptolemy can be equally claimed for Tycho Brahe over Ptolemy (Brahe s theory *was that while the* other planets revolve around the sun the sun with its planets revolves around a stationary earth) According to Kepler the truth of these competing theories must finally be judged *physically* not *mathematically* and when the question is put that way as it is not by Copernicus himself Copernicans like Kepler Galileo and Newton take issue with what had been associated with the Ptolemaic theory—the physics of Aristotle

In order to examine this issue it is necessary to state briefly here certain features of Aristotle s physics which are more fully discussed in the chapters on Change Element Mechanics and Physics

Just as Ptolemy s astronomy conforms to what we see as we look at the heavens so Aristotle s physics represents a too simple conformity with everyday sense experience We observe *fire rising* and stones falling Mix earth air and water in a closed container and air bubbles will rise to the top while the particles of earth will sink to the bottom To cover a multitude of similar observations Aristotle develops the theory of the natural motions and places of the four terrestrial elements—earth air fire and water Since bodies move naturally only to attain their proper places the great body which is the earth already at the bottom of all things need not move at all Being in its proper place it is by nature stationary

Two other observations exercise a decisi influence on Aristotle s theory The naked ey sees no type of change in the heavenly bodi *other than* local motion or change of place Ur like terrestrial bodies they do not appear t come into being or perish they do not chan in size or quality Furthermore whereas th natural local motion of sub lunary bodies ap pears to approximate the path of a straight line the local motion of the celestial bodies appear to be circular rather than rectilinear

To cover these observations Aristotle s the ory posits a different kind of matter *for celestia and terrestrial bodies* An incorruptible matte must constitute the great orbs which are sub ject to local motion alone and have the mos perfect kind of local motion—that of a circle Since they are subject to generation and cor ruption to change of quality and quantity an are in local motion along straight lines terres trial bodies are of a corruptible matter

The interconnection of all these points i marked by Aquinas when he summarizes Aris totle s doctrine Plato and all who precede Aristotle he writes *held that all bodies ar of the nature of the four elements* and con sequently *that the matter of all bodies is th same* But the fact of the incorruptibility o some bodies was ascribed by Plato not to th condition of matter but to the will of th artificer God This theory Aquinas con tinues Aristotle disproves by the natura movements of bodies For since he says tha the heavenly bodies have a natural movement different from that of the elements it follow that they have a different nature from them For movement in a circle which is proper t the heavenly bodies is not by contraries where as the movements of the elements are mutuall opposite one tending upwards another down wards And as generation and corruptior are from contraries it follows that whereas th elements are corruptible the heavenly bodie are incorruptible

The same points which Aquinas relates in hi defense of the Aristotelian theory Kepler als puts together when he expounds that theory i order to attack it and the Ptolemaic astronomy which tries to conform to it By what argu ments did the ancients establish their opinio which is the opposite of yours? he asks By

But the unification of nature which Kepler began and Newton completed when set against Aristotle's physics may be even more radical. Newton's theory because of the amazing way in which it covered the widest variety of phenomena by the simplest most universal formula is considered by Kant to have established the truth of that which Copernicus at first assumed only as an hypothesis. But the larger contribution in Whitehead's opinion is the idea of the neutrality of situation and the universality of physical laws holding indifferently in every part.

Whatever position we take today concerning the kind of truth which is possessed by hypotheses in mathematical physics we now demand in the spirit of the three Copernicans—Kepler, Galileo and above all Newton—that physical hypotheses account at once for *all* the phenomena of the inanimate universe. Whatever the truth of modern as opposed to ancient physics the Newtonian universe is so thoroughly established in our minds and feelings that when we are reminded of the other universe in which men lived before the Copernican revolution we tend to think it quaint incredible preposterous superstitious none of which it was.

Finally from the point of view of our understanding of natural science itself the astronomical controversy we have been considering is almost an archetypical model. It is necessary of course to appreciate the real achievement of Ptolemy as well as of Copernicus and Kepler in order to realize how genuine and difficult the issues were. Facts unknown to all of them may now have closed the dispute decisively but issues in other spheres of modern science almost identical in pattern with that great astronomical one are not yet closed and to the degree that we are able to re-enact in our minds the motion of thought on both sides of the Copernican controversy we can confront comparable scientific issues—still open—with open minds.

Darwin for example finds in the astronomical controversy a precedent to which he can appeal in the defense of natural selection against its adversaries. The belief in the revolution of the earth on its own axis he writes was until lately not supported by any direct evidence. But the absence of direct evidence does not leave a scientific theory without foundation. Darwin argues, if it has the power to explain several large classes of facts, which it can hardly be supposed that a false theory would explain in so satisfactory a manner. Darwin defends the theory of natural selection as having such power. To those who object that this is an unsafe method of arguing he replies—citing an example from astronomy—that it has often been used by the greatest natural philosophers.

THE GREAT BOOKS of astronomy most lucidly exhibit the essential pattern of that kind of natural science which has, in modern times, come to be called mathematical physics. Though that phrase may be modern the ancients recognized the special character of the sciences which apply mathematics to nature and which consult experience to choose among hypotheses arising from different mathematical formulations.

Outlining a curriculum for liberal education Plato in the *Republic* groups music and astronomy along with arithmetic and geometry as mathematical arts or sciences. In that context he treats them as pure mathematics. Astronomy is no more concerned with the visible heavens than music is with audible tones. Music is rather the arithmetic of harmonies astronomy the geometry of motions. But in the *Timaeus* Plato turns mathematical formulae and calculations to use in telling what he calls a likely story concerning the formation and structure of the sensible world of becoming. Here rather than in the *Republic* we have according to Whitehead the initial conception of mathematical physics as well as deep insight into its nature and pattern.

Aristotle criticizes the notion of astronomy as a purely mathematical science. Just as the things of which optics and mathematical harmonies treat cannot be divorced from the sensible so the objects of astronomy are also the visible heavens. Astronomical experience Aristotle writes supplies the principles of astronomical science. Yet though its subject matter is physical and its method is in part empirical astronomy like optics and harmonics takes the form of mathematical demonstration and it is for this reason that Aquinas later calls such disciplines mixed and intermediate sciences.

leave to the astronomer absolute license to feign no matter what hypotheses He complains that astronomers too often constrain their thought from exceeding the limits of geometry

It is necessary to go beyond geometry into physics to test the consequences of competing hypotheses which are equally good mathematically You must seek the foundations of your astronomy he tells his fellow scientists in a more elevated science I mean in physics or metaphysics

Because Kepler thus conceives the task and truth of astronomy Duhem in his great history of astronomy calls him a realistic Copernican Galileo also Duhem thinks was a realistic Copernican To confirm by physics the Copernican hypotheses he writes is the center towards which converge Galileo s observations as an astronomer and his terrestrial mechanics

Newton was the third member of this triumvirate For him there remained the solution of the problem of deducing Kepler s formulation of the planetary orbits in a manner consistent with Galileo s laws of motion in the dynamics of bodies falling on the earth s surface But the very posing of this problem itself depended on the insight that terrestrial and celestial mechanics can proceed according to the same principles and laws That insight entailed the complete overthrow of the ancient physics with its division of the universe into two distinct parts having different kinds of matter and different laws of motion

Copernicus who despite Osiander s apologetics believed his theory to be true did not himself face the great point at issue in the Copernican revolution—the material uniformity of the physical universe We shall subsequently consider the question of the truth of astronomical hypotheses but whether or not Copernicus and the Copernicans had *in their own day* a right to believe their theory true it was the acceptance of the Copernican hypothesis as true which led Kepler and Galileo to deny the truth of Aristotelian physics

If the earth is not at the center and stationary then the basic doctrine of a natural direction in motion and a natural place of rest for the various elements is completely upset If the earth is one of the planets then anything true on the earth—or of the earth such as Gilbert s theory of the magnetic fields generated by the earth s axial rotation—could be equally true of all the other planets

Read the philosophy of magnetism of the Englishman William Gilbert writes Kepler for in that book although the author did not believe that the Earth moved nevertheless he attributes a magnetic nature to it by very many arguments Therefore it is by no means absurd or incredible that any one of the primary planets should be what one of the primary planets namely the Earth is Such a statement plainly shows that when the earth becomes a planet as it does in Copernican theory no obstacle remains to the assertion of a homogeneity between the earth and the other planets both in matter and motion The old physical dualism of a supralunar and a sublunar world is abandoned

Not the movement of the earth Whitehead remarks but the glory of the heavens was the point at issue for to assert the heavens to be of the same stuff and subject to the same laws as the rest of nature brings them down to the plane of earthly physics That is precisely what Newton finally does when in the enunciation of his Third Rule of reasoning in natural philosophy he dryly but explicitly completes the Copernican Revolution Those qualities of bodies which are found to belong to all bodies within the reach of our experiments, are Newton maintains to be esteemed the universal qualities of all bodies whatsoever

In the bifurcated world of ancient theory astronomy had a very special place among the natural sciences proportionate to the glory of the heavens But with Newton it could be completely merged into a general mechanics whose laws of motion have universal application That merger begun by Newton has been perfected since his day The last obstacle to the generalization lay in the apparent discrepancies between electrical phenomena on the subatomic scale and gravitational phenomena on the astronomic scale But in our own time the unified field equations of Einstein s theory of relativity embrace the very large and the very small motions of matter within a single conceptual scheme with radical consequences for the revision of the Newtonian or classical mechanics

The logic of such verification has already been suggested in the discussion of the geocentric and heliocentric hypotheses. It is further considered in the chapter on HYPOTHESIS. To be satisfactory an hypothesis must—in the language used ever since Simplicius— save the appearances, that is, account for the relevant phenomena. But two hypotheses (as for example the geocentric and heliocentric) may at a certain time, do an equally good job of saving the appearances. Then the choice between them becomes a matter of the greater mathematical elegance of one than the other.

That however does not give the mathematically superior theory a greater claim to truth. So far as reality is concerned it is only in Plato's words, a likely story or as Aquinas points out with reference to the geocentric hypothesis, the theory of eccentrics and epicycles is considered as established because thereby the sensible appearances of the heavenly movements can be explained not however as if this reason were sufficient since some other theory might explain them.

Two hypotheses may be equally satisfactory for the range of phenomena they were both devised to fit. But only *one of them may have the* quite amazing virtue of fitting other sets of observations not originally thought to be related to the phenomena for which the hypothesis was devised. The word consilience has been used to name the property of an hypothesis which in addition to saving a limited field of appearances succeeds in fitting many other phenomena which seem to have become related —to have *jumped together* under its covering explanation. The heliocentric hypothesis, as developed by Newton's laws of motion and theory of gravitation certainly has this property of consilience to a high degree for it covers both celestial and terrestrial phenomena and a wide variety of the latter.

Is the heliocentric hypothesis *true then? If* the truth of an hypothesis depends on the range of the phenomena it fits or saves, it might seem to be so, for by its consilience it accounts for *phenomena that the Ptolemaic theory* cannot handle. But though this may cause us to reject the unsuccessful hypothesis, does it establish beyond doubt the truth of the successful one? Or to put the question another way *is not our* judgment here a comparative one rather than absolute? Are we saying more than that one hypothesis is more successful than another in doing what an hypothesis should do? Are we logically entitled to regard that success as the sign of its exclusive truth or must we restrict ourselves to the more modest statement that as the better hypothesis, it simply tells a *more* likely story about *reality?*

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

The development of astronomy from Plato and Aristotle through Ptolemy Copernicus and Kepler to Galileo and Newton thus constitutes an extraordinary set of case histories for the study of what J B Conant calls the tactics and strategy of science and especially mathematical physics But astronomy has one peculiar feature which distinguishes it from other branches of mathematical physics It is empirical rather than experimental The astronomer does not control the phenomena he observes He does not like the physicist chemist or physiologist produce an isolated system of events by means of the laboratory arts

Harvey comments on this aspect of astronomy when he proposes an experiment that will enable the physiologist to do what the astronomer cannot do namely deliberately prepare phenomena for examination by the senses The astronomer must be content with the appearances as they are given Defending psychoanalysis against attack on the ground that it admits of no experimental proof Freud points out that his critics might have raised the same objection against astronomy experimentation with the heavenly bodies is after all exceedingly difficult There one has to rely on observation

Since the invention of the telescope the astronomer has had instruments of all sorts to increase the range and accuracy of his observations but the fact that the place where he uses such apparatus is called an observatory rather than a laboratory indicates that these instruments do not make astronomy an experimental science Nevertheless as Bacon points out the telescope enabled Galileo to do more than improve upon the accuracy of prior observations It brought within the range of observation certain celestial phenomena hitherto imperceptible to the naked eye such as the phases of Venus the satellites of Jupiter and the constitution of the Milky Way

Concerning the last of these Pascal later remarks that the ancients can be excused for the idea they had of the cause of its color The weakness of their eyes not yet having been artificially helped they attributed this color to the great solidity of this part of the sky but it would be inexcusable for us, he adds to retain the same thought now that aided by the advantages of the telescope we have discovered in the Milky Way an infinity of small star[s] more abundant splendor has made us recogn[ize] the real cause of this whiteness.

Because it is a mixed science both empir[ical] and mathematical astronomy advances no[t] only with the improvement and enlargeme[nt] of observation but also with new instr[uments and] developments in mathematics Kant gives [...] striking examples of how the work of the pu[re] mathematicians contributes to the advance [of] physics and astronomy Their discoveries a[re] often made without any knowledge of their ap[-] plication to natural phenomena They inve[s-] tigated the properties of the parabola, [he] writes in ignorance of the law of terrestr[ial] gravitation which would have shown them [its] application to the trajectory of heavy bodie[s]

So again they investigated the properties [of] the ellipse without a suspicion that a gravitatio[n] was also discoverable in the celestial bodies, a[nd] without knowing the law that governs it as th[e] distance from the point of attraction varies, an[d] that makes the bodies describe this curve in fr[ee] motion

So amazing are such mathematical anticip[a-] tions that Kant thinks Plato may be pardone[d] for supposing that pure mathematics coul[d] dispense with all experience in discovering th[e] constitution of things Whether or not Pla[to] goes to this extreme he does in the *Republ[ic]* seem to suggest the reverse of Kant s concep[-] tion of the relationship between mathemati[cs] and astronomy The spangled heavens shoul[d] be used as a pattern he writes and with [a] view to that higher knowledge —mathemat[-] ics Astronomy should be used to instigate di[s-] coveries in *pure* mathematics by suggesting goo[d] problems and by requiring formulations whic[h] transcend an interest in the truth about th[e] heavens

This twofold relation between mathematic[al] discovery and empirical observation is pre[s-] ent in the development of astronomy itself an[d] of all branches of mathematical physics. Bu[t] there is another aspect of the relationship whic[h] must be taken into account if we are to consid[er] the problem of truth in such sciences The wa[y] in which mathematical formulations fit th[e] phenomena measures the truth of rival hypoth[-] eses with respect to the same reality

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in **4** HOMER *Iliad*, BK II [265-283] **12d**, the number **4** is the number of the volume in the set; the number **12d** indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters **a** and **b** refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in **53** JAMES *Psychology*, **116a-119b**, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters **a** and **b** refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page, the letters **c** and **d** to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example, in **7** PLATO *Symposium*, **163b-164c**, the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., *Iliad*, BK II [265-283] **12d**.

BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay is indicated by a (*D*) following; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: *Nehemiah*, 7:45—(*D*) *II Esdras*, 7:46.

SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas*, consult the Preface.

1. The end, dignity, and utility of astronomy

OLD TESTAMENT: *Job*, 38:4-38

7 PLATO: *Symposium*, **156d** / *Gorgias*, **254c** / *Republic*, BK VII, **394d-396b** / *Timaeus*, **444a-452b; 455b-c** / *Laws*, BK VII, **728b-c; 729d-730d**; BK XII, **798b**

8 ARISTOTLE: *Metaphysics*, BK I, CH 2 [982^{b}11-17] **500d**; BK XI, CH 6 [1063^{a}10-17] **591b**; BK XII, CH 8 [1073^{b}3-8] **603d**

9 ARISTOTLE: *Parts of Animals*, BK I, CH 5 [644^{b}21-645^{a}5] **168c-d**

10 HIPPOCRATES: *Airs, Waters, Places*, par 2 **9b-c**

11 NICOMACHUS: *Arithmetic*, BK I, **812b-813a**

12 LUCRETIUS: *Nature of Things*, BK V [509-533] **67d-68a**

12 AURELIUS: *Meditations*, BK XI, SECT 27 **306b**

13 VIRGIL: *Aeneid*, BK VI [724-853] **233b-234a**

14 PLUTARCH: *Nicias*, **435b-d**

16 PTOLEMY: *Almagest*, BK I, **5a-6b**; BK III, **83a-b**; BK XIII, **429a-b**

16 COPERNICUS: *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres*, **505a-506a; 509a-b**; BK I, **510a-511a**

16 KEPLER: *Epitome*, BK IV, **846a-851a; 852a-853a; 888b-890a; 929a-b**; BK V, **961a-963a** / *Harmonies of the World*, **1050a-b**

18 AUGUSTINE: *Confessions*, BK V, par 3-6 **28c-** / *Christian Doctrine*, BK II, CH 29 **650d-651c**

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART I, Q 32, A 1, REP 2 **175d-178a**

21 DANTE: *Divine Comedy*, PARADISE, II [46-148] **108b-109b**; X [1-27] **120b-c**

25 MONTAIGNE: *Essays*, **69d-70c; 213d-215a; 255d-259d**

31 DESCARTES: *Meditations*, I, **76c**

32 MILTON: *Paradise Lost*, BK VIII [1-202] **232a-236b**

33 PASCAL: *Pensées*, **72 181a-184b; 206 211b-218a**

34 NEWTON: *Principles*, **1a-2a**

36 SWIFT: *Gulliver*, PART III, **94b-103a** passim

36 STERNE: *Tristram Shandy*, **229a**

41 GIBBON: *Decline and Fall*, **299b-c**

42 KANT: *Pure Reason*, **175b** [fn 1] / *Practical Reason*, **360d-361c**

46 HEGEL: *Philosophy of Right*, ADDITIONS, 1 **116c**

48 MELVILLE: *Moby Dick*, **365b-367a**

54 FREUD: *General Introduction*, **562c** / *Civilization and Its Discontents*, **779c** / *New Introductory Lectures*, **832a; 876b-d**

2. The method of astronomy

2a. Observation and measurement: instruments and tables

7 PLATO: *Republic*, BK VII, **394d-396b** / *Timaeus*, **452a-b**

9 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 3 b 46b-c

31 DESCARTES *Meditations*, I 76c

34 NEWTON *Principles*, 1a 2a BK III 269a-372a

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III, 94b-103a passim

42 KANT *Practical Reason*, 361c / *Judgement* 551a-552a

3. Causes in astronomy

3a. Formal archetypal causes: the number and the music of the spheres

7 PLATO *Phaedo*, [illegible] 1b-242b / *Republic* BK VII, 393d-396b BK X, 438c-439a / *Timaeus* 44 a 452b

8 ARISTOTLE *Heavens*, BK I, CH 2-5 359d-364a BK II, CH [illegible] 37 b,d-38 [illegible] / *Metaphysics*, BK I, CH 5 [illegible] 503d-504b CH 8 [illegible] 505a b BK XII, CH 8 603b-604a

11 NICOMACHUS *Arithmetic* BK I, 811a-814b

16 PTOLEMY *Almagest* BK I 8a BK IX 270b

16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres*, BK I, 511b

16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 846a-84 b 85 b-860b 863b-68 a passim 9 3a b 91 b-916a 9 b-9 8a 932a-933a / *Harmonies of the World*, 101 b-1018a 10 b-1080b esp 104 b-1060b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions*, BK [illegible] par 3-6 2 c 28c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* [illegible] [illegible] 149c

30 BACON *Novum Organum*, BK II, APH 48, 183c-d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics*, PART I, APPENDIX, 3 1d-372a

32 MILTON *Christs Nativity* [illegible] 4b-5a / *At a Solemn Musick* 13a-b / *Arcades* [illegible] 26b-2 / *Comus* [238-243] 38b / *Paradise Lost*, BK IV [illegible] 166b-16 b [illegible] 1 8b-179a [illegible] 185b-189a BK VIII [illegible] 232b-235b

34 NEWTON *Principles*, BK III GENERAL SCHOL, 369b-370a

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT I, DIV 9, 454c-d

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III, 96b-97a

47 GOETHE *Faust*, PROLOGUE [243 [illegible]] 7a

3b. Physical efficient causes: gravitation and action-at-a-distance

8 ARISTOTLE *Heavens*, BK II, CH 8 381a 382a, CH [illegible] 384b-c / *Meteorology* BK I, CH [illegible] d-4 2d / *Metaphysics* BK XII, CH 8 603b-605a esp [illegible] 604a-c

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things*, BK [illegible] [509-533] 6 d-68a

16 KEPLER *Epitome*, BK IV 8 b-900a 922a b 933a-9 2a passim 9 a-960a BK V 96 a-96 a

28 GILBERT *Loadstone* BK VI 106a-121a,c

30 BACON *Novum Organum*, BK II, APH 3 37 168a-169c, APH 4 1 6a-17 APH 45 183b-c

31 DESCARTES *Rules*, IX, 15c / *Discourse* PART V 55b-c

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [illegible] 148a BK VIII [illegible] 234b-235b

34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III, PROP 1-9 2 6a 2 a esp [illegible] 281b-282b PROP 5 SCHOL [illegible] GENERAL SCHOL, 371b-3 a / *Optics*, BK III, 531b 540a 541b

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge*, SECT 102 103 [illegible] d-433a passim

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT I, DIV 9, 454c-d

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III 94b-103a 118b-119a

42 KANT *Pure Reason*, 8d [illegible]

45 FARADAY *Researches in Electricity* 670a-673d 81 a b 824a-b 832b [illegible]

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE II 694c-695c

4. The relation of astronomy to the other liberal arts and sciences: the place of astronomy in the educational curriculum

7 PLATO *Gorgias* 254b-c / *Republic* BK VII, 391b-398c esp [illegible] 390b / *Laws* BK [illegible] 728b-729d, BK XII, 97b-798b

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK II, CH [illegible] [illegible] 270a-c / *Metaphysics* BK XI, CH 6 [illegible] 591b BK XII CH 8 [illegible] 603d

11 NICOMACHUS *Arithmetic* BK I, 812b-813d

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid*, BK I [illegible] 233b-234a

16 PTOLEMY *Almagest* BK I, 5a 6a

16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* BK I 510a b

18 AUGUSTINE *Christian Doctrine* BK II, CH 29, 651b-c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART II II, Q 9, [illegible] REP 3 424b-425a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan*, PART I, [illegible]d

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, BK I 79c BK II, 82c-d

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 63d [illegible] d [illegible]

30 BACON *Novum Organum*, BK I, APH 80 120a b

31 DESCARTES *Meditations* I, 5c

5. Astronomy and cosmology: the theory of the world or universe as reflecting astronomical conceptions

7 PLATO *Timaeus* [illegible] 2b 455a-b

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics*, BK IV CH 5 [illegible] 291d 292a / *Heavens* 359a-405a,c / *Meteorology* BK I, CH 3 445a-44 d / *Metaphysics* BK XII, CH 8 603b-605a

11 ARCHIMEDES *Sand-Reckoner* 520a-b

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things*, BK I [951 1113] 1 d 14d, BK II [1048-1104] 28b-29a BK V [illegible] 83a

14 PLUTARCH *Numa Pompilius* 55a b

16 PTOLEMY *Almagest*, BK I 10b

16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres*, BK I, 511b 516a-529a esp 516a-517b

16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 853b-8[illegible]

(2 *The method of astronomy* 2a. *Observation and measurement instruments and tables*)

8 Aristotle *Prior Analytics* bk i ch 30 [46a18–27] 64a / *Posterior Analytics* bk i ch 13 [78^{b}31–79^{a}7] 108b-c / *Heavens* bk i ch 3 [270^{b}1–24] 361c 362a bk ii ch 4 [287a31–^{b}14] 379a ch 11 383b ch 12 [292a2–9] 383c / *Metaphysics* bk xii ch 8 [1073^{b}17–1074a17] 604a-c

9 Aristotle *Parts of Animals* bk i ch i [639^{b}7–12] 161c-d

16 Ptolemy *Almagest* bk i 24b 26a bk i-iii 29a 86b bk iii-iv 93a 119b bk iv-viii 123a 269a bk ix 273a 290b bk ix-xiii 296a 465b

16 Copernicus *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* bk ii-iii 557b 626a bk iii 631b 652b 657b 674b bk iv-v 680a 739b bk v 744b 812a bk vi 818a 838a

16 Kepler *Epitome* bk iv 907b 908b

18 Augustine *Confessions* bk v par 3–6 27c 28c / *Christian Doctrine* bk ii ch 29 651b-c

19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 32 a i rep 2 175d 178a

21 Dante *Divine Comedy* paradise ii [46–105] 108b-d

22 Chaucer *Franklin's Tale* [11,582–605] 360b

23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part iv 267a-b

24 Rabelais *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk i 29c

28 Harvey *Circulation of the Blood* 320b

30 Bacon *Novum Organum* bk i aph 109 129b bk ii aph 39 170b-c aph 45 176a aph 46 178a-b

32 Milton *Paradise Lost* bk i [284–291] 99b bk iii [588–590] 148a bk v [261–263] 181a

33 Pascal *Vacuum* 358a

34 Newton *Principles* bk iii phenomena 272a 275a prop 41–42 342a 368b / *Optics* bk i 412a 423b

35 Berkeley *Human Knowledge* sect 58–59 424a-b

36 Swift *Gulliver* part iii 102a

41 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 299b-c

48 Melville *Moby Dick* 365b 367a

54 Freud *New Introductory Lectures* 815a

2b The use of hypotheses the heliocentric and geocentric theories

7 Plato *Phaedo* 241c 242b 247c / *Republic* bk vi 386d 387d bk vii 395c 396b bk x 438c 439a / *Timaeus* 447b-d 452a-b / *Laws* bk xii 797d 798a

8 Aristotle *Heavens* bk i ch 3 [270^{b}1–24] 361c 362a bk ii ch i 375b-d 376a ch 8 381a 382a ch 11 [291^{b}10]–ch 13 [293^{b}33] 383b 385b ch 14 [296a24–297a9] 387d 388c / *Meteorology* bk i ch 7 [344^{a}5–9] 450b / *Metaphysics* bk xii ch 8 [1073^{b}17–1074a17] 604a-c

9 Aristotle *Motion of Animals* ch 3 234a-c

11 Archimedes *Sand Reckoner* 520a-b

12 Lucretius *Nature of Things* bk v [5 6–533] 67d 68a [720–730] 70c

14 Plutarch *Numa Pompilius* 55a-b

16 Ptolemy *Almagest* bk i 7a 8b 9a 12b bk iii 83a 86b 93a bk iv 120a 122b bk ix 270b 273a 291a 296a bk xiii 429a-b

16 Copernicus *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* 505a 506a 507a 508b bk i 513b 515b 517b 521a bk iii 628b-629a 653b 656b bk iv 675b 678a bk v 740a-b

16 Kepler *Epitome* bk iv 852a 853a 857b 860b 887a 890a 907b 916a bk v 964b 966a 967a / *Harmonies of the World* 1014b 1016a

19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 32 a i rep 2 175d 178a

25 Montaigne *Essays* 257d 261c 276c

28 Gilbert *Loadstone* bk vi 107c 116a

30 Bacon *Novum Organum* bk ii aph 5 139a aph 36 165c 166b aph 46 178b-c aph 48 186b-d

32 Milton *Paradise Lost* bk iii [552–587] 147b 148a bk iv [589–597] 165a-b bk viii [66–178] 233b 236a esp [122–158] 234b 235b

33 Pascal *Provincial Letters* 165a / *Vacuum* 368b 369a

34 Newton *Principles* bk iii phenomenon ii 273d 274a general schol 371b-372a

36 Sterne *Tristram Shandy* 226b-227a

42 Kant *Pure Reason* 8d [fn 2]

43 Mill *Liberty* 284a-b

49 Darwin *Origin of Species* 239c

51 Tolstoy *War and Peace* bk xiii 563a-b epilogue ii 694d 696d

2c The relation of astronomy to mathematics the use of mathematics by astronomy

7 Plato *Republic* bk vii 394d 396b *Timaeus* 451b-c 455b

8 Aristotle *Posterior Analytics* bk i ch 13 [78^{b}31–79a16] 108b-c / *Physics* bk ii ch 2 [193^{b}25–194a11] 270a-c / *Heavens* bk ii ch 14 [297a3–9] 388c / *Metaphysics* bk iii ch 2 [997^{b}13–998a19] 516b-d bk xii ch 8 [1073^{b}1–17] 603d 604a bk xiii ch 3 [1078a9–14] 609

9 Aristotle *Parts of Animals* bk i ch 1 [639^{b}6–12] 161c-d

11 Nicomachus *Arithmetic* bk i 813d 814a

16 Ptolemy *Almagest* bk i 5a 6a 14a 24b 26a 28b

16 Copernicus *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* 507a 508a bk i 510a-b 532b 556b

16 Kepler *Epitome* bk v 964b 965a 968a 986b passim

18 Augustine *Confessions* bk v par 3–6 27c 28 / *Christian Doctrine* bk ii ch 29 651b-c

19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 3 a i rep 2 175d 178a part i-ii q 35 a 8 ans 779c 780c

20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part ii-ii q 9 a 2 rep 3 424b-425a

(5 *Astronomy and cosmology the theory of the world or universe as reflecting astronomical conceptions*)

17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR I 35a 39d
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE X [7 21] 120b c
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 213d 215a
31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART V 54d 56a
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK II [890–920] 130b 131a [1010–1055] 133a 134a BK III [418–429] 144b [501–539] 146b 147a [552–587] 147b 148a BK VII [261–273] 222b 223a [551–557] 229a [617–625] 230b BK VIII [66–178] 233b 236a BK X [282–329] 280b 281b
33 PASCAL *Pensees* 72 181a 184b
34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III HYPOTHESIS I–PROP 12 285a 286a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK IV CH III SECT 24 320c d
42 KANT *Practical Reason* 360d 361a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE II 695c d
54 FREUD *General Introduction* 562c

6 Astronomy and theology astronomy as affecting views of God creation the divine plan and the moral hierarchy

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 1 1 19 / *Joshua* 10 12–13—(*D*) *Josue* 10 12–13 / *Job* 9 6–9 38 1–38 / *Psalms* 19 1–6 147 4—(*D*) *Psalms* 18 1–7 146 4 / *Jeremiah* 33 22 51 15—(*D*) *Jeremias* 33 22 51 15
APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 43—(*D*) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 43 / *Song of Three Children* 34–51—(*D*) OT *Daniel* 3 56–73
NEW TESTAMENT *I Corinthians* 15 40–41
7 PLATO *Republic* BK VII 396a / *Timaeus* 455b c / *Statesman* 586c 589c / *Laws* BK VII 729d 730d BK XII 797d 798b
8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK II CH 4 [196 25–^{b}4] 272d 273a BK VIII 334a 355d esp CH 4–6 338d 346b CH 10 353b 355d / *Heavens* BK II CH 1 375b d 376a / *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 6–8 601b 605a
11 NICOMACHUS *Arithmetic* BK I 811a 814b
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK V [55–771] 61d 71a esp [55–234] 61d 64a [1161–1217] 76b 77a
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK XI SECT 27 306b
14 PLUTARCH *Nicias* 435b-c
15 TACITUS *Histories* BK V 295c
16 PTOLEMY *Almagest* BK I 5a 6b passim
16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* BK I 510a 511a
16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 853b 854a 915b-916a 933a / *Harmonies of the World* 1017b-1018a 1025a b 1048a 1061a 1071b 1080b-1085b
17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR II CH 1 40a 41a TR IX CH 8–9 70a 72a / *Fourth Ennead* TR III CH 17 150d 151b
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK V par 3–6 27c 28c BK XIII par 6–48 112a 124a / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 16 644d 645a CH 29 650d 651c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 7 ANS and REP 2 138d 140a Q 50 A 3 ANS and REP 3 272a 273b Q 58 A 1 300c 301a Q 63 A 1 REP 2 325c 326c A 7 ANS 331c 332b QQ 66–68 343d 359b Q 70 362c 367a Q 104 A 2 REP 1 525a 526a Q 110 A 1 REP 2 3 564c 565d Q 115 AA 3–6 588c 592d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q 5 A 2 736d 737c PART III SUPPL Q 77 AA 1 3 943a 947a Q 91 AA 2 3 1017c 1022c
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL VII [61–96] 10b c XXXIV [100–139] 52b-d PARADISE I [94–142] 107b-d II [46 148] 108b 109b IV [22 63] 110d 111b VIII [16–39] 116d 11[illegible] [91–148] 117d 118c X [1 45] 120b-d XIII [52 84] 126a b XXII [124–154] 140d 141b XXVII [97–120] 148b-c XXVIII 148d 150b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 213d 215a
27 SHAKESPEARE *Troilus and Cressida* ACT I SC III [85–101] 109a
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK I APH 89 124a d
31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART V 54d 56a
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [694 732] 150b-151b BK V [153 184] 178b 179a BK VIII [66–178] 233b-236a esp [66–84] 233b-234a
33 PASCAL *Pensees* 72 181a 184b 194 204b 242 217b 218a
34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III GENERAL SCHOL 369b 371a / *Optics* BK III 542a 543a
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 226a b 22 b-c
42 KANT *Practical Reason* 360d 361a
47 GOETHE *Faust* PROLOGUE [243 266] 7a b
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 239c d
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE II 695d 696d
54 FREUD *General Introduction* 562c / *New Introductory Lectures* 832a 876b d

7 Astronomy and the measurement of time calendars and clocks days and seasons

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 1 4–5 14 18 / *Isaiah* 38 7–8 60 19–21—(*D*) *Isaias* 38 7–8 60 19–21 / *Jeremiah* 33 20 25—(*D*) *Jeremias* 33 20 25
APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 43 6–8—(*D*) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 43 6–8
NEW TESTAMENT *Revelation* 21 23 24 22 5—(*D*) *Apocalypse* 21 23–24 22 5
5 AESCHYLUS *Prometheus Bound* [454 461] 44c d
5 ARISTOPHANES *Clouds* [607–626] 496a b
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK II 49d 50a 79c
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK V 487d
7 PLATO *Republic* BK VII 394d 396b / *Timaeus* 451a d
8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK IV CH 14 [223^{b}12 224 1] 303c d / *Metaphysics* BK X CH 1 [1052^{b}34 1053 12] 579b-c

16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 888b 893b 929a 933a BK V 968a 979b esp 975a-9 7b 984b-985b / *Harmonies of the World* 1018a b
17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR I, C I 8 39c d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I Q 66 A 2, ANS 345d 347b
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL, Q — A 2, A 5 945a 946b
28 GILBERT *Loadstone* BK VI 110b-d
28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences* FOURTH DAY 245b-d
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 48 186b-d
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost*, BK V [616-62] 188b-189
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 2, 181a
34 NEWTON *Principles* BK I, PROP II 42b-43b PROP 17 48b-50a

8c(3) The laws of celestial motion: celestial mechanics

16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 888a-895b passim 897 90 a passim esp 897a, 904b-905a 933a 952a passim BK V 975 979b / *Harmonies of the World*, 1018a b 1019b-1020b
34 NEWTON *Principles* BK I, PROP 1 3 and SCHOL 32b-35b O 4 COROL VI 36a PROP II 13 42b-46a esp PROP 1 42b-43b PROP 15 46b-4 a PROP 17 48b-50a BK II PROP 51-53 and SCHOL 259 267a BK III 269 372a passim esp RULE I-III 270a 271a, PHEN OMENA V I PROP 7 272a 282b, PR P 3 286a b PROP 35, SCHOL 320b-324a, PROP 40 337b-338a, GENERAL SCHOL, 369a, 371b-372a
35 HUME *Human Understanding* S CT I DIV 9, 454c d
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 8d [fn 2]
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XI 563b EPILOGUE II, 694d-695c

8d. The creation of the heavens

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 1-8 14 9 1 4 / *Nehemiah*, 9 6—(D) *II Esdras* 9 6 / *Job* 26 7 37 18 38 / *Psalms* 8 3 4 19 1 89 1 10 2, 136 5-9 148 1-6—(D) *Psalms* 8.4-5 18:2 88 2 1 26 13, 5-9 48 1-6 / *Proverbs* 3 9 8:27 / *Jeremiah*, 3 35 51 5—(D) *Jeremias* 31 35 5 15 / *Amos* 5.8
NEW TESTAMENT *Acts* 14 5 17:24—(D) *Acts* 14 14 17.24 / *Hebrews* 1 0 / *II Peter* 3 5 / *Revelation* 14 7—(D) *Apocalypse* 4 7
7 PLATO *Timaeus* 450c-452b
8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK III, CH I [5 b13 19] 335b / *Heavens* BK I CH 10- 2 370d 375d
9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I, CH I [64 3 9] 164c d
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK V [416-508] 66c-67 [I 4 3] 76d
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XI par 4 11 90a 92b BK XII par 2-9 99c 101 par 14 4 102b-110a BK XI par 6-48 112a 124a / *City of God*, BK XI CH 7 326a-c, CH 9 326d 327d
CH 19-21 332b-333d CH 3 33+c 335c BK XII CH 15 351b-352d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 46, A 1 REP 2 3 5 250a 252d A 3 ANS and REP 1 255a-d Q 66 A 1 ANS and REP to CONTRARY 343d 345c A 3 347b-348d A 4 ANS and REP 5 348d 349d Q 67 A 4 352a 354a Q 68 A 1 354a-355c Q 70 AA 1 2 362c 365a
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL, VII [73-81] 10b PARADISE II [121 148] 116b-c X [1-6] 120b XXIX [13 45] 150b-c
28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences* THIRD DAY 214d
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 1 b-d
31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART V 54b-56a
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [08-,35] 150b-151b BK VII [192 356] 221b 225b BK VIII [15 1 8] 232b-236a
34 NEWTON *Optics* BK III 542a 543a

9 The particular heavenly bodies

9a. The sun, its position, distance, size and mass

OLD TESTAMENT *Joshua* 10 12-14—(D) *Josue* 10 12 14 / *Psalms* 136 7-8—(D) *Psalms* 135 7-8 / *Isaiah* 13 9-11 30.26 60 19- — (D) *Isaias* 13 9-11 30 26 60 19-20 / *Joel* 2 10,31 3 15 / *Amos* 8 9
APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 43 1-5—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 43 1-5
NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 24 29-30 / *Mark*, 13:24 25 / *Luke* 23.44 45
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK II 53d 54b 79c BK IV 130d 131a
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II, 394c
7 PLATO *Cratylus* 98a / *Apology* 204d 205a / *Republic* BK VI 385c 386c / *Timaeus* 451b-d
8 ARISTOTLE *Heavens* BK II CH 7 [89a6-35] 380d CH 12 [291b 9- 92b 7] 383c 384b CH 13 [293b34 294 12] 385c / *Meteorology* BK I CH 8 [345b1-9] 451c d
11 ARCHIMEDES *Sand Reckoner* 520a b
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK V [564-574] 68b-c [592 4] 68d 0b [,51 771] 0d 71a
14 PLUTARCH *Pericles* 138d
16 PTOLEMY *Almagest* BK III 77a 107a BK V 171b-182b BK 7 215a 222b
16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* BK I 520b-529a BK III 646a-674b BK IV 710b-714a 716a 731a
16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 854b-856a 857b-860b 873a-876a 882a-883b 885b-886b 895b-90 907b-916a passim / *Harmonies of the World*, 1014b-1016a 1080b-1085b
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God*, BK III CH 15 176d 177a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 70 A 1 REP 5 362c 364b Q 119 A 1 ANS 604c 607b
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I I SUPPL, Q 9 A REP 1 1016b-1017 A 2 101 c 1020c
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY IV [55-84] 58a b PARADISE I [38-63] 106c d X [1 48] 120b-d

(8 *The heavenly bodies in general* 8b *Soul and intellect in the heavenly bodies*)

CH 30 174b-c CH 35 177c CH 42 180d-181b TR VIII CH 2 207a

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK VII CH 6 248a-b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 18 A 1 REP 1 104c-105c Q 47 A 1 ANS 256a-257b Q 50 A 3 272a-273b Q 51 A 3 REP 3 277a-278c Q 52 A 2 279b-280a Q 66 A 2 ANS 345d-347b Q 70 A 3 365b-367a Q 110 A 1 REP 2-3 564c-565d A 3 ANS 566d-567b Q 115 A 4 REP 1 589d-590c Q 117 A 4 REP 1 599b-d PART I-II Q 6 A 5 REP 2 648b-649a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL Q 79 A 1 ANS 951b-953b Q 91 A 2 REP 10 1017c-1020c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL VII [67-96] 10b-c PARADISE I [103-126] 107b-c II [112-138] 109a VIII [16-39] 116d-117a [97-114] 118a XIII [52-72] 126a XXVIII 148d-150b XXIX [37-45] 150c

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 213d-215a

28 GILBERT *Loadstone* BK II 38b BK V 104b-105d

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 482 258a

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 226b

47 GOETHE *Faust* PROLOGUE [243-270] 7a-b

8c Celestial motion: periodicity and the great year

7 PLATO *Republic* BK X 438c-439a / *Timaeus* 451a-452b / *Statesman* 586c-587b / *Laws* BK VII 730a-c

8 ARISTOTLE *Heavens* BK I-II 359a-389d / *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 8 603b-605a

9 ARISTOTLE *Motion of Animals* CH 3 [699-11] CH 4 [700-5] 234a-235a

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK V [509-533] 67d-68a [614-649] 69a-c

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK VI SECT 13 271b BK XI SECT 27 306b

16 PTOLEMY *Almagest* BK I 7a-8b 12b-14a BK IV 109a-112b

16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* BK I 513b-514b

16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 928a-933a

17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR II CH 1 40a-41a / *Fourth Ennead* TR IV CH 8 162b-d

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK V par 3-6 27c-28c / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 29 651b-c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 32 A 1 REP 2 175d-178a Q 115 A 3 ANS 588c-589c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II-II Q 2 A 3 ANS 392d-393c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE II [112-148] 109a-b XXVII [97-120] 148b-c XXVIII [1-78] 148d-149c

28 GILBERT *Loadstone* BK VI 110b-c

28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences* FOURTH DAY 245b-d

30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 46 177d APH 48 185c-d

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [726-732] 151a BK VII [339-386] 224b-225b

34 NEWTON *Principles* BK II PROP 53 SCHOL 266a-267a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XIV SECT 19-22 158b-159d passim

54 FREUD *Civilization and Its Discontents* 779c

8c(1) The eternity of celestial motion

7 PLATO *Timaeus* 447b-c 450b-451a 460c-d

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK VIII CH 1-2 334a-337b CH 8-9 348b-353b / *Heavens* BK I CH 2 [269^b2-10] 360c-d CH 3 [270^b17-26] 361d-362a CH 9 [279a12-$^b4$] 370b-d BK II CH 1 375b-d 376a CH 6 379c-380c / *Metaphysics* BK IX CH 8 [1050^b20-27] 576c-d BK XII CH 7 [1073a3-10] 603a-b CH 8 [1073^a26-38] 603c

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK V [55-60] 61d-62a [110-125] 62c-d [235-246] 64a-b [351-379] 65c-66a [1209-1217] 76d-77a BK VI [601-607] 88b

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK IX SECT 28 293d-294a

16 PTOLEMY *Almagest* BK XIII 429a-b

16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 846a-848b 888b-891a

17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR IX CH 3-5 67b-68b CH 7-8 69c-70d / *Third Ennead* TR VII CH 7-8 122d-124c CH 11-13 126a-129a / *Fourth Ennead* TR IV CH 7-8 161d-162d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 10 A 2 REP 2 41d-42c A 4 ANS 43b-44b A 5 ANS 44b-45c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL Q 77 A 2 ANS 945a-946b Q 91 A 2 1017c-1020c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE I [73-81] 107a

30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 35 163a-b

34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III PROP 10 284a-285a / *Optics* BK III 540a-541b

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III 98a-b

8c(2) The form of celestial motion: circles, the equant, ellipses

7 PLATO *Republic* BK VII 394d-396b BK X 438c-439a / *Timaeus* 451a-452b / *Laws* BK VII 730a-d

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK VIII CH 8-9 348b-353b / *Heavens* BK I CH 2-5 359d-364a BK II CH 4 [287a2-31] 378c-379a CH 5 379b-c CH 8 381a-382a CH 12 [293a4-14] 384c / *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 6 [1071^b32] CH 7 [1072a22] 601d-602b CH 8 [1073^b17-1074a14] 604a-c

16 PTOLEMY *Almagest* BK I 7a-8b BK III 83a-86b BK V 148b-157a BK IX 270b-291a 296a

16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* 507a-508a BK I 513b-514b BK III 628b-629a BK IV 675b-678a esp 677b-678a BK V 740a-b 784b-785b

16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 868b 893b 929a 933a BK V 968a 979b esp 975a-977b 984b-985b / *Harmonies of the World* 1018a b
17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR I CH 8 39c d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 66 A 2, ANS 345d 34 b
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL, Q 77 A 2, A S 945a 946b
28 GILBERT *Loadstone* BK VI 110b-d
28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences* FOURTH DAY 245b-d
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 48 186b-d
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK V [616-62] 188b-189
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 72, 181a
34 NEWTON *Principles* BK I PROP 11 42b-43b PROP 17 48b-50a

8c(3) The laws of celestial motion: celestial mechanics

16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 888a-895b passim 897a 907a passim, esp 897a, 904b-905a 933a 952a passim BK V 975a 979b / *Harmonies of the World* 1018a b 1019b-1020b
34 NEWTON *Principles* BK I PROP I 3 and COROL 32b-35b PROP 4 COROL VI 36a PROP 11 13 42b-46 esp PROP 11 42b-43b PROP 15 46b-47a PROP 17 48b-50 BK II PROP 51-53 and SCHOL 259 267a BK III 269a 372a passim esp RUL I 1 270a 271a, PHENOMENON I PROP 7 272 282b PROP 13 286a b PROP 35 SCHOL 320b-324a, PROP 40 337b 338a, GENERAL SCH L, 369a, 371b-372
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT IV 9 454c d
42 KANT *Pure Reason*, 8d [fn 2]
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XIII 563b EPILOGUE II, 694d-695c

8d The creation of the heavens

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 1 1-8 14 19 1 4 / *Nehemiah* 9 6—(D) *II Esdras* 9 6 / *Job* 26 7 37 18 38 / *Psalms* 8 3 4 9 1 89 11 2 25 136 5-9 148 -6—(D) *Psalms* 8 4 5 8 2 88 2 1.26 135 5-9 48 1-6 / *Proverbs* 3 19 8.27 / *Jeremiah* 31 35 51 5—(D) *Jeremias* 3 35 51 5 / *Amos* 5.8
NEW TESTAMENT *Acts* 14 15 17.24—(D) *Acts* 4 4 17.24 / *Hebrews* 1 / *II Peter* 3 5 / *Revelation* 14 7—(D) *Apocalypse* 4 7
7 PLATO *Timaeus* 450c-452b
8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK VI I, CH I [251b13 19] 335b / *Heavens* BK I CH 10- 2 370d 375d
9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH I [641b 3 29] 164c d
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK V [416-508] 66c-67 [12 4 213] 76d
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XI par 4 11 90 92b BK X I par 2-9 99c 101c par 14 4 102b-110a BK X par 6-48 112 124 / *City of God* BK XI CH 7 326a-c CH 9 326d 327d C 1 19-21 332b-333d CH 23 334c 335c BK XII CH 15 351b-352d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 46 A I REP 4 3 5 -50a 252d A 3 ANS and REP I 55a-d Q 66 A I ANS and REP TO CONTRARY 343d 345c A 3 347b-348d A 4 A S and REP 5 348d 349d Q 67 A 4 352a 354a Q 68 A I 354a-355c Q 70 AA I 2 362c 365a
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL, VII [73-81] 10b PARADISE VII [121 148] 116b-c X [1-6] 1 0b XXIX [13 45] 150b-c
28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences* THIRD DAY 214d
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 17b-d
31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART V 54b-56a
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [708-735] 150b-151b BK VII [192 386] 221b 225b BK VIII [15 1 8] 232b-236a
34 NEWTON *Optics* BK III 542a 543a

9 The particular heavenly bodies

9a The sun: its position distance, size, and mass

OLD TESTAMENT *Joshua* 10 12 14—(D) *Josue* 10 12 14 / *Psalms* 136 7-8—(D) *Psalms* 135 7-8 / *Isaiah* 13.9-11 30.26 60 19-20—(D) *Isaias* 13 9-11 30 26 60 19- 0 / *Joel* 2 10 31 3 15 / *Amos* 8 9
APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 43 1-5—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 43 1-5
NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 24 29-30 / *Mark* 13:24 25 / *Luke* 23.44 45
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK II 53d 54b 79c BK IV 130d 131a
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 394c
7 PLATO *Cratylus* 98a / *Apology* 204d 205a / *Republic* BK VI 385c 386c / *Timaeus* 451b-d
8 ARISTOTLE *Heavens* BK II CH 7 [289a26-35] 380d CH 12 [291b29-292b27] 383c 384b CH 13 [293b34 294 12] 385c / *Meteorology* BK I CH 8 [345b -9] 451c d
11 ARCHIMEDES *Sand Reckoner* 520a b
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK V [564-574] 68b-c [592 7 4] 68d 70b [751-771] 70d 71a
14 PLUTARCH *Pericles* 138d
16 PTOLEMY *Almagest* BK III 77a 107a BK V 171b-182b BK VI 215a 222b
16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* BK I 520b-529a BK III 646a 674b BK IV 710b-714a 716a 731a
16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 854b-856a 857b-860b 873a 876a 882a 883b 885b-886b 895b-905 907b-916a passim / *Harmonies of the World*, 1014b-1016a 1080b-1085b
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK I CH 15 176d 177a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 70 A I REP 5 362 364b Q 119, A I ANS 604c-607b
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II SUPPL, Q 9 A I REP 1016b-1017c A 2 1017c 1020c
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY IV [55-84] 58a-b PARADISE I [38-63] 106c d X [48] 120b-d

(9 *The particular heavenly bodies* 9a *The sun: its position, distance, size, and mass*)

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 257d-258b
28 GILBERT *Loadstone* BK VI 112d-113a
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 36 165c-166b
31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART V 54d-56a passim / *Objections and Replies* 231a-233c
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [555-623] 147b-149a / BK IV [539-543] 164a / BK VII [354-373] 224b-225a / BK VIII [66-168] 233b-235b
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 72 181a
34 NEWTON *Principles* BK I PROP 66 118a-128b / BK III PHENOMENON III 273d-274a / PROP 2 276a-b / HYPOTHESIS I-PROP 12 285a-286a / PROP 25 299b-300b / PROP 36 324a-b / PROP 40 337b-338a / *Optics* BK III 518a-b
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III 98a-b
45 FARADAY *Researches in Electricity* 819d

9b The moon: its irregularities

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis*, 1:14-18 / *Psalms*, 136:7-9—(D) *Psalms*, 135:7-9 / *Isaiah*, 13:9-11; 30:26; 60:19-20—(D) *Isaias*, 13:9-11; 30:26; 60:19-20 / *Joel*, 2:10,31; 3:15
APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus*, 43:6-8—(D) OT, *Ecclesiasticus*, 43:6-9
NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew*, 24:29-30 / *Mark*, 13:24-25
7 PLATO *Cratylus* 98a-b / *Apology* 204d-205a / *Timaeus* 451b-d
8 ARISTOTLE *Heavens* BK II, CH II [291b18-23] 383b / CH 12 [291b29-292b27] 383c-384b / CH 14 [297b21-31] 389b-c
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK V [471-479] 67b / [575-584] 68c / [629-649] 69b-c / [705-771] 70b-71a
14 PLUTARCH *Solon* 74a / *Aemilius Paulus* 220d-221b / *Nicias* 435b-d / *Dion* 789b-790a
16 PTOLEMY *Almagest* BK IV-VI 108a-222b
16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* BK IV 675a-731a
16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 876a-878a / 918a-928a / 952a-960a
17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR III CH 5 43d-44a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I, Q 70, A I, REP 5 362c-364b
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE II [46-148] 108b-109b
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK III 188c
26 SHAKESPEARE *Romeo and Juliet*, ACT II, SC II [107-110] 295b / *Midsummer-Night's Dream*, ACT II, SC I [103-114] 357a-b
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 36 167a-b
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK II [662-666] 125b / BK III [708-735] 150b-151b / BK V [257-266] 180b-181a / BK VII [346-386] 224b-225b / BK VIII [122-158] 234b-235b / *Samson Agonistes* [86-89] 341b
33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 164a / *Pensées* 18 174b-175a / 817 330b
34 NEWTON *Principles* BK I PROP 43-45 92b-101a / PROP 66 118a-128b / BK III PHENOMENON VI 275a / PROP 3-4 and SCHOL 276b-278b / PROP 22-38 294b-329a
34 HUYGENS *Light* CH I 554b-555a

9c The planets: their eccentricities, retrogradations, and stations

7 PLATO *Republic* BK X 438c-439a / *Timaeus* 451a-d
8 ARISTOTLE *Heavens* BK II CH 2 [285b28-33] 377b-c / CH 7-12 380c-384c / *Metaphysics* BK XII, CH 8 603b-605a
16 PTOLEMY *Almagest* BK IX-XIII 270a-465b
16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* BK I 521b-529a / BK V-VI 732a-838a
16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 860b-872b / 878b-882a / 888b-905a / 907b-910a / 928a-952a passim / BK V 961a-1004a / *Harmonies of the World* 1015b-1080b
17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR III CH 5 44a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I, Q 32, A I, REP 2 175d-178a
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE II [46-148] 108b-109b / X [1-27] 120b-c / XXII [124-154] 140d-141b
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 29c
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 36 165c-166b
31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART V 54d-56a passim
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [481-483] 146a / [573-587] 148a / BK V [166-170] 179a / [618-627] 188b-189a / BK VII [557-564] 229a-b / BK VIII [122-152] 234b-235b / BK IX [48-51] 248b / BK X [657-661] 288b
33 PASCAL *Vacuum* 368b-369a
34 NEWTON *Principles* BK I PROP 1-3 and SCHOL 32b-35b / PROP 4, COROL VI 36a / PROP 11 42b-43b / PROP 15 46b-47a / PROP 17 48b-50a / PROP 57-63 111b-115a / PROP 65-69 116b-130b / BK III PHENOMENON I-V 272a-275a / PROP 1-2 276a-b / PROP 5-6 278b-281b / PROP 8-10 282b-285a / PROP 13-19 286a-291b
34 HUYGENS *Light* CH I 556a-557b
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III 102a
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 227a
45 FOURIER *Theory of Heat* 171b
45 FARADAY *Researches in Electricity* 632b
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XIII 563b

9d The earth: its origin, position, shape, and motions

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis*, 1:1-10 / *Job*, 38:4-7 / *Psalms*, 90:2; 102:25; 119:90—(D) *Psalms*, 89:2; 101:26; 118:90 / *Proverbs*, 3:19; 8:23-29 /

9d 10

Isaiah 45:12 48:13—(D) Isaias 45:12 48:13 / Jeremiah, 51:15—(D) Jeremias 51:15

NEW TESTAMENT Hebrews 1:10

7 PLATO Phaedo 241b-242b 247b-c / Timaeus 442b

8 ARISTOTLE Heavens, BK II CH 13-14 384d-389d

9 ARISTOTLE Motion of Animals CH 3 [699a2]-CH 4 [699b9] 234b-235a

11 ARCHIMEDES Sand Reckoner 520a-b

12 LUCRETIUS Nature of Things, BK [416-508] 66c-6 c [534-563] 68a-b

14 PLUTARCH Numa Pompilius 55a-b

16 PTOLEMY Almagest BK I 8b-12b BK II, 40a-44b

16 COPERNICUS Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres BK I 511b-513a 514b-521a 529a-532a

16 KEPLER Epitome BK IV 854a-b 873a-8 6a 911b-928a

17 PLOTINUS Fourth Ennead, TR I CH 6-27 171b-172a

28 GILBERT Loadstone BK I 23b-25d BK VI 106a-121a,c

30 BACON Novum Organum, BK II, APH 36 16 c 166b

31 DESCARTES Discourse PART V 54d 56a passim

32 MILTON Paradise Lost BK II [, 2 734] 150b-1 1b BK IV [996- 004] 174a BK [5-7-5 9] 187b-188a BK II [216-33] 221b-224b BK [3S] 232b-233a [66-165] 233b-235b BK IX [99-118] 249b-250a BK X [668-6-8] 289a

33 PASCAL Provincial Letters 163a / Pensées 2, 181a / Vacuum, 368b-369

34 NEWTON Principles BK I PROP 66, COROL XXII 12 b-128b BK I R S-2 288b-294b

35 BERKELEY Human Knowledge SECT 58 234a-b

36 SWIFT Gulliver PART III 98a-b

45 FARADAY Researches Electricity 819d

51 TOLSTOY War and Peace BK XIII 563b EPILOGUE II 695d-696d

9e. The fixed stars: the precession of the equinoxes

OLD TESTAMENT Genesis 1:14 8 / Psalms 36:7-9—(D) Psalm 35:7-9

APOCRYPHA Ecclesiasticus 43:9-10—(D) OT Ecclesiasticus 43:9-11

7 PLATO Timaeus, 451d-4 2a

8 ARISTOTLE Heavens BK II CH 12 380c-384c Meteorology BK I CH 8 [345b1-9] 4 1c-d

11 ARCHIMEDES Sand-Reckoner 520a-b

12 LUCRETIUS Nature of Things, BK V [509-533] 67d-68a [5 5-59] 68d

14 PLUTARCH Lysander 358d 3 9c

16 PTOLEMY Almagest BK 7 8b BK II 77a-b BK II 223 269a

16 COPERNICUS Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres BK I 51 b-520b BK I 585b-621b BK II, 622a-651b esp 622a 646a

16 KEPLER Epitome BK IV 882a 887a 88 b-888a 918a

19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I Q 0, A 1 REP 5 362c 364b

21 DANTE Divine Comedy PARADISE, II [46-148] 108b-109b

24 RABELAIS Gargantua and Pantagruel, BK I 29c BK II, 69d 0a

28 GILBERT Loadstone BK VI 107c 116a 11 c 121a,c

30 BACON Novum Organum, BK II APH 36, 165c 166b APH 48 185c d

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ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the ideas and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:

I. Works by authors represented in this collection.
II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

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Chapter 6 BEAUTY

INTRODUCTION

TRUTH goodness and beauty form a triad of terms which have been discussed together throughout the tradition of western thought

They have been called transcendental on the ground that everything which *is* is in some measure or manner subject to denomination as true or false good or evil beautiful or ugly But they have also been assigned to special spheres of being or subject matter—the true to thought and logic the good to action and morals the beautiful to enjoyment and aesthetics

They have been called the three fundamental values with the implication that the worth of anything can be exhaustively judged by reference to these three standards—and no others But other terms such as pleasure or utility have been proposed either as additional values or as significant variants of the so called fundamental three or even sometimes as more fundamental Pleasure or utility for example has been held by men like Spinoza or Mill to be the ultimate criterion of beauty or goodness

Truth goodness and beauty singly and together have been the focus of the age old controversy concerning the absolute and the relative the objective and the subjective the universal and the individual At certain times it has been thought that the distinction of true from false good from evil beautiful from ugly has its basis and warranty in the very nature of things and that a man s judgment of these matters is measured for its soundness or accuracy by its conformity to fact At other times the opposite position has been dominant One meaning of the ancient saying that man is the measure of all things applies particularly to the true good and beautiful Man measures truth goodness and beauty by the effect things have upon him according to what they *seem* to him to be What seems good to one man may seem evil to another What seems ugly or false may also seem beautiful or true to different men or to the same man at different times

Yet it is not altogether true that these three terms have always suffered the same fortunes For Spinoza goodness and beauty are subjective but not truth Because he has persuaded himself that all things which exist are made for him man Spinoza says judges that to be of the greatest importance which is most useful to him and he must esteem that to be of surpassing worth by which he is most beneficially affected The notions of good and evil beauty and ugliness do not conform to anything in the nature of things The ignorant says Spinoza nevertheless call the nature of a thing good evil sound putrid or corrupt just as they are affected by it For example if the motion by which the nerves are affected by means of objects represented to the eye conduces to well being the objects by which it is caused are called *beautiful* while those exciting a contrary motion are called *deformed*

BEAUTY HAS BEEN most frequently regarded as subjective or relative to the individual judgment The familiar maxim, *de gustibus non disputandum* has its original application in the sphere of beauty rather than truth and goodness Truth is disputable Hume writes not taste No man reasons concerning another s beauty but frequently concerning the justice or injustice of his actions Thus even when it was supposed that judgments of the true and the good could have a certain absoluteness or universality—or at least be considered as something about which men might reach agreement through argument—opinions about beauty were set apart as useless to dispute Beauty being simply a matter of individual taste it

ford no basis for argument or reasoning
jective ground for settling differences
on.

the ancient skeptics down to our own
n have noted the great variety of traits,
arply opposed, which have been con
beautiful at different times and places.
ny its forms, Montaigne says of beau
cording to our appetite and liking
s paint it black and tawny with great
lips, big flat noses, and load the cartr
twixt the nostrils with great rings of gold
ke it hang down to the mouth In
the greatest ears are the most beautiful
ey stretch them out as far as they can by

There are elsewhere, nations that take
care to blacken their teeth, and hate to
em white elsewhere people that paint
red The Italians fashion beauty gross
massive the Spaniards, gaunt and slender
us one makes it white another brown
oft and delicate another strong and v g
; Just as the preference in beauty is
by Plato to the spherical figure the
ureans give it to the pyramidal or the
re and cannot swallow a god in the form
ball."

ike Montaigne Darwin gives an extensive
unt of the things men have found beauti
many of them so various and contradictory
it would seem there could be no objective
s for judgments of beauty If any consensus
und among individuals about what is beau
l or u is the skeptics or relativists usually
lain it by reference to the prevalence of
tain prejudices, or customary standards,
ich in turn vary with different tribes and
tures, and at different times and places.

Beginning in the sphere of beauty subjec
ism or relativism spreads first to judgments
good and evil, and then to statements about
uth, never in the opposite direction. It be
mes complete when, as so frequently happens
our own time, what is good or true is held
be just as much a matter of private taste or
stomary opinion as what is beautiful.

The problem of the objectivity or subjec
ivity of beauty can, of course be separated
from similar problems with regard to truth and
goodness, but any attempt to solve it will neces-
arily both draw on and bear on the discussion
of these related problems. The degree to which
the three problems must be considered in de-
dependently is determined by the extent to
which each of the three terms requires the con-
text of the other two for its definition and anal
ysis.

BEAUTY IS, PERHAPS not definable in any strict
sense of definition. But there have been, never
theless, many attempts to state with the brevi
ty of definition, what beauty is. Usually notions
of goodness, or correlative notions of desire and
love enter into the statement.

Aquinas, *for example*, declares that "the
beautiful is the same as the good, and they
differ in aspect only The notion of good is
that which calms the desire while the notion
of the beautiful is that which calms the desire
by being seen or known. This, according to
Aquinas, implies that beauty adds to goodness
a relation to the cognitive faculty so that good
means that which simply pleases the appetite
while the *beautiful* is something pleasant to
apprehend."

Because of its relation to the cognitive pow-
er Aquinas defines the beautiful as "that which
pleases upon being seen (*id quod visum placet*)
Hence he continues, beauty consists in due
proportion, for the senses delight in things duly
proportioned because *the sense too is a*
sort of reason as is every cognitive power

The pleasure or delight involved in the per
ception of beauty belongs to the order of know
ing rather than to desire or action. The know
ing furthermore seems to be different from
that which is proper to science, for it is con
cerned with the individual thing rather than
with universal natures, and it occurs intuitively
or contemplatively rather than by judgment
and reasoning. There is a mode of truth pe-
culiar to the beautiful, as well as a special kind
of goodness.

Fully to understand what Aquinas is *saying*
about beauty we are required to understand
his theory of goodness and truth. But enough
is immediately clear to give meaning to Eric
Gill's advice to those who are concerned with
making things beautiful Look after goodness
and truth he says, and beauty will take care
of herself.

To define beauty in terms of pleasure would

seem to make it relative to the individual for what gives pleasure—even contemplative pleasure—to one man may not to another It should be noted however that the pleasure in question is attributed to the object as its cause It may be asked therefore what in the object is the cause of the peculiar satisfaction which constitutes the experience of beauty? Can the same object just as readily arouse displeasure in another individual and a consequent judgment of ugliness? Are these opposite reactions entirely the result of the way an individual feels?

Aquinas appears to meet this difficulty by specifying certain objective elements of beauty, or conditions as he calls them Beauty includes three conditions he writes *integrity* or *perfection* since those things which are impaired are by that very fact ugly due *proportion* or *harmony* and lastly *brightness* or *clarity* whence things are called beautiful which have a bright color Quite apart from individual reactions objects may differ in the degree to which they possess such properties—traits which are capable of pleasing or displeasing their beholder

This does not mean that the individual reaction is invariably in accordance with the objective characteristics of the thing beheld Men differ in the degree to which they possess good perception—and sound critical judgment—even as objects differ in the degree to which they possess the elements of beauty Once again in the controversy concerning the objectivity or subjectivity of beauty there seems to be a middle ground between the two extreme positions which insists upon a beauty intrinsic to the object but does not deny the relevance of differences in individual sensibility

William James would seem to be indicating such a position when in his discussion of aesthetic principles he declares We are once and for all so made that when certain impressions come before our mind one of them will seem to call for or repel the others as its companions As an example he cites the fact that a note sounds good with its third and fifth Such an aesthetic judgment certainly depends upon individual sensibility and James adds to a certain extent the principle of habit will explain [it] But he also points out that to explain *all* aesthetic judgements in this way would be absurd for it is notorious how seldom natural experiences come up to our aesthetic demands To the extent that aesthetic judgments express inner harmonies and discords between objects of thought the beautiful according to James has a certain objectivity and good taste can be conceived as the capacity to be pleased by objects which *should* elicit that reaction

Kant s theory of the beautiful to take another conception must also be understood in the general context of his theory of knowledge and his analysis of such terms as good pleasure and desire His definition like that of Aquinas, calls an object beautiful if it satisfies the observer in a very special way—not merely pleasing his senses or satisfying his desires in the ways in which things good as means or ends fit a man s interests or purposes The beautiful according to Kant pleases *immediately apart from all interest* The pleasure that results from its contemplation may be said to be the one and only disinterested and *free* delight for with it no interest whether of sense or reason extorts approval

The aesthetic experience is for Kant also unique in that its judgment is represented as *universal i e* valid for every man yet at the same time it is incognizable by means of any universal concept In other words all judgements of taste are singular judgements they are without concept in the sense that they do not apply to a class of objects Nevertheless they have a certain universality and are not merely the formulation of a private judgment When we call the object beautiful Kant says we believe ourselves to be speaking with a universal voice and lay claim to the concurrence of every one whereas no private sensation would be decisive except for the observer alone and *his* liking

In saying that aesthetic judgments have subjective not objective universality and in holding that the beautiful is the object of a necessary satisfaction Kant also seems to take the middle position which recognizes the subjectivity of the aesthetic judgment without denying that beauty is somehow an intrinsic property of objects With regard to its subjective character Kant cites Hume to the effect that

"although critics are able to reason more plausibly than cooks, they must still share the same fate. The universal character of the aesthetic judgment however keeps it from being completely subjective and Kant goes to some length to refute the notion that in matters of the beautiful one can seek refuge in the adage that every one has his own taste.

The fact that the aesthetic judgment requires universal assent even though the universal rule on which it is based cannot be formulated does not of course preclude the failure of the object to win such assent from many individuals. Not all men have good taste or having it have it to the same degree.

THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS—selective rather than exhaustive—show the connection between definitions of beauty and the problem of aesthetic training. In the traditional discussion of the ends of education there is the problem of how to cultivate good taste—the ability to discriminate critically between the beautiful and the ugly.

If beauty is entirely subjective, entirely a matter of individual feeling, then except for conformity to standards set by the customs of the time and place no criteria would seem to be available for measuring the taste of individuals. If beauty is simply objective—something immediately apparent to observation as are the simple sensible qualities—no special training would seem to be needed for sharpening our perception of it.

The genuineness of the educational problem in the sphere of beauty seems therefore to depend upon a theory of the beautiful which avoids both extremes and which permits the educator to aim at a development of individual sensibilities in accordance with objective criteria of taste.

THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS also provide background for the problem of beauty in nature and in art. As indicated in the chapter on ART, the consideration of art in recent times tends to become restricted to the theory of the fine arts. So too the consideration of beauty has become more and more an analysis of excellence in poetry, music, painting and sculpture. In consequence the meaning of the word aesthetic has progressively narrowed until now it refers almost exclusively to the appreciation of works of fine art, where before it connoted any experience of the beautiful in the things of nature as well as in the works of man.

The question is raised then whether natural beauty or the perception of beauty in nature involves the same elements and causes as beauty in art. Is the beauty of a flower or of a flowering field determined by the same factors as the beauty of a still life or a landscape painting?

The affirmative answer seems to be assumed in a large part of the tradition. In his discussion of the beautiful in the *Poetics* Aristotle explicitly applies the same standard to both nature and art. To be beautiful, he writes, a living creature and every whole made up of parts must not only present a certain order in its arrangement of parts but also be of a certain magnitude. Aristotle's notion that art imitates nature indicates a further relation between the beautiful in art and nature. Unity, proportion and clarity would then be elements common to beauty in its every occurrence, though these elements may be embodied differently in things which have a difference in their mode of being, as do natural and artificial things.

With regard to the beauty of nature and of art Kant tends to take the opposite position. He points out that the mind cannot reflect on the beauty of nature without at the same time finding its interest engaged. Apart from any question of use that might be involved he concludes that the interest aroused by the beautiful in nature is akin to the moral, particularly from the fact that nature in her beautiful products displays herself as art, not as a mere matter of chance, but as it were designedly according to a law-directed arrangement.

The fact that natural things and works of art stand in a different relation to purpose or interest is for Kant an immediate indication that their beauty is different. Their susceptibility to disinterested enjoyment is not the same. Yet for Kant, as for his predecessors, nature provides the model or archetype which art follows, and he even speaks of art as an imitation of nature.

The Kantian discussion of nature and art moves into another dimension when it con

siders the distinction between the beautiful and the sublime We must look for the sublime Kant says ' not in works of art nor yet in things of nature that in their very concept import a definite end e g animals of a recognized natural order but in rude nature merely as involving magnitude In company with Longinus and Edmund Burke Kant characterizes the sublime by reference to the limitations of human powers Whereas the beautiful consists in limitation the sublime immediately involves or else by its presence provokes a representation of limitlessness which may appear indeed, in point of form to contravene the ends of our power of judgement to be ill adapted to our faculty of presentation and to be as it were an outrage on the imagination

Made aware of his own weakness man is dwarfed by nature s magnificence but at that very moment he is also elevated by realizing his ability to appreciate that which is so much greater than himself This dual mood signalizes man s experience of the sublime Unlike the enjoyment of beauty it is neither disinterested nor devoid of moral tone

Truth is usually connected with perception and thought the good with desire and action Both have been related to love and in different ways to pleasure and pain All these terms naturally occur in the traditional discussion of beauty partly by way of definition but also partly in the course of considering the faculties engaged in the experience of beauty

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Desire is sometimes thought of as fundamentally acquisitive directed toward the appropriation of a good whereas love on the contrary aims at no personal aggrandizement but rather with complete generosity wishes only the well being of the beloved In this context beauty seems to be more closely associated with a good that is loved than with a good desired

Love moreover is more akin to knowledge than is desire The act of contemplation is sometimes understood as a union with the object through both knowledge and love. Here again the context of meaning favors the alignment of beauty with love at least for theories which make beauty primarily an object of contemplation In Plato and Plotinus, and on another level in the theologians the two considerations—of love and beauty—fuse together inseparably

It is the privilege of beauty Plato thinks, to offer man the readiest access to the world of ideas According to the myth in the *Phaedrus*, the contemplation of beauty enables the soul to grow wings This experience ultimately intellectual in its aim is described by Plato as identical with love

The observer of beauty is amazed when he sees anyone having a godlike face or form, which is the expression of divine beauty and at first a shudder runs through him and again the old awe steals over him then looking upon the face of his beloved as of a god he reverences him and if he were not afraid of being thought a downright madman he would sacrifice to his beloved as to the image of a god When the soul bathes herself in the waters of beauty her constraint is loosened and she is refreshed and has no more pangs and pains This state of the soul enraptured by beauty Plato goes on to say is by men called love

Sharply opposed to Plato s intellectualization of beauty is that conception which connects it with sensual pleasure and sexual attraction When Darwin for instance considers the sense of beauty he confines his attention almost entirely to the colors and sounds used as attractions of the opposite sex Freud likewise while admitting that psycho analysis has less to say about beauty than about most things claims that its derivation from the realms of sexual sensation seems certain

Such considerations may not remove beauty from the sphere of love but as the chapter on Love makes clear love has many meanings, and is of many sorts The beautiful which is sexually attractive is the object of a love which is almost identical with desire—sometimes with lust—and certainly involves animal impulses and bodily pleasures. The taste for the beautiful writes Darwin at least as far as female beauty is concerned is not of a special nature in the human mind

On the other hand Darwin attributes to man alone an aesthetic faculty for the appreciation of beauty apart from love or sex. No other animal he thinks, is capable of admiring such scenes as the heavens at night a beautiful landscape or refined music but such high tastes are acquired through culture and depend on complex associations they are not enjoyed by barbarians or by uneducated persons. For Freud however the appreciation of such beauties remains ultimately sexual in motivation, no matter how sublimated in effect. The love of beauty he says is the perfect example of a feeling with an inhibited aim. Beauty and attraction are first of all the attributes of a sexual object

The theme of beauty s relation to desire and love is connected with another basic theme—the relation of beauty to sense and intellect or to the realms of perception and thought The two discussions naturally run parallel

The main question here concerns the existence of beauty in the order of purely intelligible objects, and its relation to the sensible beauty of material things Plotinus holding that beauty of every kind comes from a form or reason, traces the beauty which is in bodies, as well as that which is in the soul to its source in the eternal intelligence This intelligible beauty lies outside the range of desire even as it is beyond the reach of sense perception. Only the admiration or the adoration of love is proper to it

THESE DISTINCTIONS in types of beauty—natural and artificial sensible and intelligible even perhaps material and spiritual—indicate the scope of the discussion though not all writers on beauty deal with all its manifestations.

Primarily concerned with other subjects many of the great books make only an indirect contribution to the theory of beauty the moral treatises which consider the spiritual beauty of a noble man or of a virtuous character the cosmologies of the philosophers or scientists which find beauty in the structure of the world—the intelligible not sensible order of the universe the mathematical works which ex h b t and sometimes enun iate an awareness of formal beauty in the necessary connection of ideas the great poems which crystallize beauty in a scene in a face in a deed and above all, the writings of the theologians which do not try to do more than suggest the ineffable splendor of God s infinite beauty a beauty fused with truth and goodness, all absolute in the one absolute perfection of the divine being The Divine Goodness observes Dante which from Itself spurns all envy burning in Itself so sparkles that It displays the eternal beauties.

Some of the great books consider the various kinds of beauty not so much with a view to classifying their variety as in order to set forth the concordance of the grades of beauty with the grades of being and with the levels of love and knowledge

The ladder of love in I lato s *Symposium* describes an ascent from lower to higher forms of beauty He who has been instructed thus far in the things of love Diotima tells Socrates and who has learned to see beauty in due order and succession when he comes toward the end will suddenly perceive a nature of wondrous beauty beauty absolute separate simple and everlasting which without diminution and without increase or any change is imparted to the ever growing and perishing beauties of all other things. He who from these ascending under the influence of true love begins to perceive that beauty is not far from the end.

The order of ascent according to Diotima begins with the beauties of earth and mounts upwards for the sake of that other beauty going from one fair form to all fair forms and from fair forms to fair practises and from fair practises to fair notions until from fair notions we come to the notion of absolute beauty and at last know what the essence of beauty is. This my dear Socrates she concludes, "is the life above all others which man should live in the contemplation of beauty absolute

For Plotinus the degrees of beauty correspond to degrees of emancipation from matter The more it goes towards matter the feebler beauty becomes A thing is ugly only because not dominated by a form and reason the matter has not been completely informed by the idea If a thing could be completely without reason and form, it would be abso-

siders the distinction between the beautiful and the sublime We must look for the sublime Kant says not in works of art nor yet in things of nature that in their very concept import a definite end e g animals of a recognized natural order but in rude nature merely as involving magnitude In company with Longinus and Edmund Burke Kant characterizes the sublime by reference to the limitations of human powers Whereas the beautiful consists in limitation the sublime immediately involves or else by its presence provokes a representation of limitlessness ' which may appear indeed in point of form to contravene the ends of our power of judgement to be ill adapted to our faculty of presentation and to be as it were an outrage on the imagination

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REFERENCES

To find the passa es cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the olume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER *Iliad*, BK I [65 83] 12d, the umber 4 is the number of the olume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

P GE SECTIO S When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower hal es of the page. For examp e, in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b, the passage begins in the u per half of page 1 6 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the pa e, th letters c and d to the upper and lower hal es of the right hand side of the page. For example, in 7 PLATO *Symposium*, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the ri ht hand side of page 164

AUTHO S DI IONS One or more of th main di isions of a work (such as PART BK, CH SECT) are som times included in the reference line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer tain cases e g *Iliad*, BK II [-65 283] 12d.

BI LE REFERENCES The references a e to book, chapter and erse. When the King James and Douay ersions differ in title of books or in the numbering of hapters or verses, the King James ersion is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (*D*) follows e g OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah*, 7.45—(*D*) *II Esdras*, 46.

SYMBOLS The bre iation "esp" calls the reader s attention to one or more especially relevant part of a whole eference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than ontinuously in the work or passa e cited.

For addit onal information concernin the style of the eferences, see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface.

The general theory of the beautiful

7 PLATO *Euthydemus*, 81a b / *Cratylus* 101 102a 113c-d / *Phaedrus* 126b-d / *Symposium*, 16 a-d / *Phaedo* 242c 243a / *Gorgias* 266d 26 a / *Republic* BK 3 0d 373c BK 7, 38oc / *Parmenides*, 490b-c / *Laws*, BK II, 654 -662a

8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK CH I [013 -0-24] 533b BK XII, CH 7 [10-2, 4] 601b-c

9 ARISTOTLE *Poetics* CH 7 [14 23 21 5] 682b-c

12 A LI *M ditations* BK III, SECT 2 259d 260a BK IV SECT 263a b

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead*, TR III, CH 10d TR 1 21a 26a / *Second Ennead*, TR IX, CH 17 6b-77 / *Fifth Ennead*, TR V CH 12, 23a-c TR VI I, CH I TR IX, CH 2 239b-247b / *Sixth Ennead*, TR II, CH 18, 2 8a TR III, CH 11, 28 b-c TR VII, CH 22 332d 333b CH 31 33 336d 338b

18 A GUSTINE *Co fessions* BK II, par 12 11 -d IV par 20 24b-c, par 24 2 25b-26a X par 53 84d-85a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* P T I, Q 5, 4 REP 2 2d 26c Q 9 3, RE 3 486b-487d A I-II, Q 2 A 1 REP 3 73 b-d

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 49, A 2, REP 1 2b-4a PART II-II, Q 180 A REP 3 604c-609c

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I, APPENDIX, 371b-372d

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 32 33 3 6a b

42 KANT *Judgement* 461 549d esp 479c-d, 483d, 491c, 493b-495a,c, 550a 560b-c 564d 565b

44 BOSWELL *Johnson*, 194b

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species*, 95a-d

52 DOSTO SKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK III, 54a b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 865a-b 886b-888a

54 FREUD *Civilization and Its Discontents* 775a c; 7 9b-d

1a. The beautiful and the good. beauty as a kind of fitness or order

7 PLATO *Lysis*, 21b-c / *Symposium*, 162d 163a 164c-d / *Gorgias*, 266d 67a / *Republic* BK III 333b-334b BK V 357d 358a / *Timaeus*, 4 4d-475a / *Statesman*, 594a-c / *Philebus* 637d-638a / *Laws* BK II 654a-65 b 660a 662a

8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK III, CH 3 [8 0-24] 16 d / *Physics* BK II, CH 3 [46 0-19] 329c 330a / *Metaphysics*, BK I, CH 3 [984 8- 2] 502d BK CH I [0 3 20--4] 533b BK XI CH 7 [0 23 4] 602b-c [10- 30- 0 3 2] 603a BK XIII, CH 3 [1 8 3 6] 609d-610a

lute ugliness But whatever exists possesses form and reason to some extent and has some share of the effulgent beauty of the One even as it has some share through emanation in its overflowing being—the grades of beauty as of being signifying the remotion of each thing from its ultimate source

Even separated from a continuous scale of beauty the extreme terms—the beauty of God and the beauty of the least of finite things—have similitude for a theologian like Aquinas The word *visum* in his definition of the beautiful (*id quod visum placet* that which pleases upon being seen) is the word used to signify the type of supernatural knowledge prom- to the souls of the blessed—the beatific vision i which God is beheld intuitively not known discursively and in which knowledge unite with love is the principle of the soul's union with God

An analogy is obviously implied In this lif and on the natural level every experience o beauty—in nature or art in sensible things o in ideas—occasions something *like* an act o vision a moment of contemplation of enjoy ment detached from desire or action and clea without the articulations of analysis or th demonstrations of reason

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1a The beautiful and the good beauty as a kind of fitness or order

1b Beauty and truth the beautiful as an object of contemplation 1.

1c The elements of beauty unity proportion clarity

1d The distinction between the beautiful and the sublime 12

2 Beauty in nature and in art

3 Beauty in relation to desire and love as object or cause

4 Beauty and ugliness in relation to pleasure and pain 1

5 Judgments of beauty the objective and the subjective in aesthetic judgments or judgments of taste

6 The role of the beautiful in education

7 Intelligible beauty 1

7a The beauty of God

7b The beauty of the universe

7c Beauty in the order of ideas

7d Beauty in the moral order 1

(1 *The general theory of the beautiful* 1a *The beautiful and the good beauty as a kind of fitness or order*)

9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH 5 [645 4-26] 168d 169a / *Ethics* BK IV CH 2 [1122 34 1123 33] 369a 370b passim / *Politics* BK VII CH 4 [1326 30-35] 530c / *Poetics* CH 7 [1450b-3 1451 15] 685b c
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK III CH I 175a 177c
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK II SECT I 256b d
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 47a
16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 868b
17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead*, TR VI 21a 26a / *Fifth Ennead* TR V CH 12 234a c TR VIII 239b 246c / *Sixth Ennead* TR VII CH 22 332d 333b
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par 12 11c d BK IV par 20 24b c par 24 27 25b 26a BK VII par 23 50b c / *City of God* BK XXII CH 24 610c 611b
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 5 A 4 REP I 25d 26c Q 91 A 3 486b 487d Q 96 A 3 REP 3 512a c PART I-II Q 27 A I REP 3 737b d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 49 A 2 ANS and REP I 2b-4a A 4 ANS 5a 6a Q 50 A 3 REP 2 8b 9a Q 54 A I ANS 22d 23d PART II II Q 180 A 2 REP 3 608c 609c
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 62a
42 KANT *Judgement* 476a 482b 486d-489a 521b 523c 540d 542a 544c 545b 546d 548c 550a 557c 558b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART II 266a 268b 280b 281b
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI 153b d
53 JAMES *Psychology* 755a 865b
54 FREUD *Civilization and Its Discontents* 779b d

1b Beauty and truth the beautiful as an object of contemplation

7 PLATO *Cratylus* 113c d / *Phaedrus* 124c 129d / *Symposium* 167a d / *Republic* BK V 370d 373c BK VI 383d 388a / *Theaetetus* 525c d / *Philebus* 630d 631d / *Laws* BK II 660a 661b
8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 7 [1072 23-b4] 602b c BK XIII CH 3 [1078 32-b6] 609d 610a
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK IV SECT 20 265a b
17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III CH I-2 10a d TR VI 21a 26a / *Fifth Ennead* TR VIII 239b 246c / *Sixth Ennead* TR VII CH 31-33 336d 338b
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK VII par 23 50b-c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 5 A 4 REP I 25d 26c Q 39 A 8 ANS 210a 213a PART I II Q 27 A I REP 3 737b-d A 2 ANS 737d 738c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II II Q 180 A 2 REP 3 608c 609c PART III SUPPL Q 94 A I REP 2 1040d 1041b
27 SHAKESPEARE *Sonnets* XIV 588b LIV 594c
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 184b d
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT I DIV 5, 452d-453a
42 KANT *Judgement* 476a 479d esp 479a d 484d 485b 496d 501d 502a 518a d 521b-523c 525a c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART II 266a 267a 278a c PART IV 346d 347a
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK III 153b d
53 JAMES *Psychology* 865b 866a 886b-888a
54 FREUD *New Introductory Lectures* 880b

1c The elements of beauty unity proportion clarity

7 PLATO *Republic* BK III 333b 334b BK IV 342b-c / *Timaeus* 448a c 474d-475a / *Sophist* 561b-d / *Statesman* 594a c / *Philebus* 630d 631d 637c 638a / *Laws* BK II 660a 661b
8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK VII CH 3 [246 10-b19] 329c 330a / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 3 [984b8-?] 502d BK XIII CH 3 [1078 39-b5] 610a
9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH 5 [645 4-26] 168d 169a / *Ethics* BK II CH 6 [1106b6-14] 352a BK IV CH 2 [1122 34 1123 33] 369a 370b passim CH 3 [1123b4 7] 370b / *Politics* BK III CH II [1281b10-15] 479b c CH 13 [1284b3-12] 482c d BK V CH 9 [1309b23-30] 512a BK VII CH 4 [1326 30-35] 530c / *Poetics* CH 7 [1450b23-1451 15] 685b-c
11 NICOMACHUS *Arithmetic* BK I 814a 820a 826d 827a BK II 839d 840b
16 KEPLER *Harmonies of the World* 1079b
17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR VI CH I 2 21a 22b / *Sixth Ennead* TR VII CH 22, 333b TR IX CH I 353d 354b
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK IV par 20 24b-c / *City of God* BK II CH 21 161b-c BK XI CH 22 334b BK XVII CH 14 464d BK XXII CH 19 604d 605a CH 24 610c 611b
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 5 A 4 REP I 25d 26c Q 39 A 8 ANS 210a 213a Q 91 A 3 486b-487d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 49 A 2 REP I 2b 4a Q 54 A I ANS 22d 23d PART II II Q 180 A 2 REP 3 608c 609c
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 184b
31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART II 44c d
33 PASCAL *Pensees* 28 176a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XII, SECT 5 148b
42 KANT *Judgement* 471b-473a 485c-491 493c-495a,c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 185c d PART I 219b c
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 277a b
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 301d 302a
53 JAMES *Psychology* 186b 755a

2. The distinction between the beautiful and the sublime

42 KANT *Judgement*, 473a, 480a–482b, 485a–488a, [illegible] esp 4[illegible], 497b–c, 501d–502a, 5[illegible]–51[illegible]

2. Beauty in nature and in art

7 PLATO *Symposium*, 16[illegible]a–d / *Republic*, BK III, 3[illegible]c–[illegible]b / *Timaeus*, [illegible] a–448[illegible] / *So*[illegible], [illegible]6 b–d / *Statesman*, 59[illegible]a–c / *Philebus*, 6[illegible]d–63 d

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics*, BK VII, CH 3 [[illegible]] 32[illegible]c–33[illegible]a / *Metaphysics*, BK XIII, CH 3 [illegible] 609d–6[illegible]a

9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals*, BK I, CH 5 [[illegible]] 6[illegible], 169a / *Politics*, BK III, CH 11 [[illegible]] 4[illegible]b–c; BK VIII, CH 5 [134[illegible]] [illegible] / *Poetics*, CH [illegible] 6[illegible]b–c

12 AURELIUS *Meditations*, BK III, SECT 2 2[illegible]d–[illegible]a; BK IV, SECT 20 [illegible]a–b

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead*, TR VIII, CH 1–3 [illegible]b–[illegible] 2 1a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I, Q [illegible], A 5, ANS 2[illegible]a–[illegible]a; Q 9[illegible], [illegible] 486b–487d

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I–II, Q [illegible], A [illegible], REP 1 [illegible]b–4a; Q [illegible], A [illegible], REP [illegible] 8[illegible]–5[illegible]a; Q [illegible], [illegible] ANS [illegible]d–23d

22 CHAUCER *Physician's Tale* [[illegible]] [illegible]b–36[illegible]a

23 MONTAIGNE *Essays*, 9[illegible]b–d, 230b–[illegible]3[illegible]c

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost*, BK V [[illegible]] 15[illegible]b

33 PASCAL *Pensées*, [illegible] 6[illegible]a; [illegible] 6[illegible]b; 134 19[illegible]a

42 KANT *Judgement*, 4[illegible]a–d, 48[illegible]–[illegible]a, [illegible]c–4[illegible]6c, [illegible]d–5[illegible]a, 5[illegible]b–5[illegible] 4b esp 5[illegible]c–d, 52[illegible]a–[illegible]c, 5[illegible]c–5[illegible]d esp 5[illegible]a–c, 5[illegible] a–5[illegible]b

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History*, PART I, 2[illegible]b–c, 2[illegible]b–d, [illegible] II, 25[illegible]a–[illegible]b

47 GOETHE *Faust*, PART [illegible] [[illegible]] 4a–b

48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick*, 2[illegible] b–2[illegible]b

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species*, 9[illegible]c–9[illegible]c, [illegible]c–d / *Descent of Man*, 5[illegible] 6[illegible]–[illegible]d

53 JAMES *Psychology*, 186b

3. Beauty in relation to desire and love, as object or cause

OLD TESTAMENT: *Genesis*, 3:6; 6:[illegible]; 12:[illegible]; [illegible]; [illegible]; 29:[illegible] / *Deuteronomy*, [illegible] / *I Samuel*, [illegible]–(D) *I Kings*, [illegible] / *II Samuel*, [illegible]; [illegible]–(D) *II Kings*, [illegible] / *Esther*, 2:[illegible] / *Proverbs*, 6:2[illegible]–[illegible] / *Song of Solomon*–(D) *Canticle of Canticles* / *Isaiah*, [illegible]–(D) *Isaias*, [illegible]

APOCRYPHA: *Judith*, [illegible]; [illegible]; [illegible]–(D) OT, *Judith*, [illegible] / *Ecclesiasticus*, [illegible]–(D) OT, *Ecclesiasticus*, [illegible] / *Susanna*–(D) OT, *Daniel*, 13

4 HOMER *Iliad*, BK III [[illegible]] 20b–c; BK XIV [[illegible]] 1[illegible]

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5 ARISTOPHANES *Ecclesiazusae* [611–634] 622a–b; [[illegible]–1111] 6[illegible]b–628a

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7 PLATO *Charmides*, 1[illegible]a / *Phaedrus*, 120a–c; 1[illegible]b–129d / *Symposium*, 1[illegible]d; 150c–161b–16[illegible]d / *Republic*, BK III, 333b–334b / *Timaeus*, 455a–c / *Laws*, BK V, 6[illegible]b; BK VIII, 35[illegible], [illegible]c–[illegible]a–c

8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics*, BK XII, CH [illegible] [[illegible]] 6[illegible]b–c

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things*, BK IV [[illegible]] 5[illegible]a–b

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses*, BK II, CH 2[illegible], 16[illegible]b

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid*, BK I [[illegible]] [illegible]a–[illegible]a; BK IV [[illegible]] 16[illegible]a–b; BK VIII [309–[illegible]] [illegible]a–b

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead*, TR I, CH [illegible] [illegible]a–d; TR VI, 21a–2[illegible]a / *Third Ennead*, TR V, CH 1 100c–1[illegible] / *Fifth Ennead*, TR V, CH 12 23[illegible]a–d; TR VIII, CH 9, 24[illegible]b–c / *Sixth Ennead*, TR VII, CH [illegible] [illegible]d–333b; CH [illegible] 3[illegible]b–333d

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions*, BK IV, par 1[illegible], 2[illegible]a–b; par 20, [illegible]b–c; par [illegible] [illegible]b–25a; BK VII, par 23, 5[illegible]b–c; BK X, par [illegible] [illegible]b–82a; par [illegible] 8[illegible]b–8[illegible]a / *City of God*, BK XII, CH 6, 3[illegible]a–b; BK XXII, CH [illegible], 6[illegible]c–611b

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20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART II–II, Q 15[illegible], A [illegible], REP 3 6[illegible]–60[illegible]c; PART III, Q 6, A 1, REP [illegible] [illegible]b–41b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy*, HELL, V [[illegible]] [illegible]d–8b; PURGATORY, XXVII [illegible]c–96a; XXX–XXXI [illegible]b–[illegible]b; PARADISE, XXVII [[illegible]] 148b; XXX [[illegible]] 151[illegible]–15[illegible]a

22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Criseyde*, BK II, STANZA [illegible] [illegible]b–[illegible]a / *Physician's Tale* 366a–37[illegible]a esp [[illegible]] 366a–3[illegible]b

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays*, 84b–8[illegible]a, [illegible]b–[illegible]; 310d–322a, 3[illegible]–399d, 432[illegible]–434c; 513a–[illegible]a

26 SHAKESPEARE *Love's Labour's Lost*, ACT IV, SC III [[illegible]] [illegible]d / *Romeo and Juliet*, ACT I, SC I [[illegible]] 23[illegible]d–238a; SC V [[illegible]] 2[illegible]b; ACT II, SC II [[illegible]] 2[illegible]b–c

27 SHAKESPEARE *Troilus and Cressida*, ACT II, SC II [[illegible]] 114b–c / *Antony and Cleopatra*, ACT II, SC II [[illegible]] 320d–321b / *Sonnets*, XX 5[illegible]b; XXI, 5[illegible]d–590a; LIV 59[illegible]; CXXX 60[illegible]a–b

29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote*, PART II, [illegible]d–[illegible]a

31 SPINOZA *Ethics*, PART I, APPENDIX, 3[illegible]d

32 MILTON *Comus* [[illegible]] [illegible]a–52a / *Paradise Lost*, BK VIII [500–[illegible]] [illegible] / *Samson Agonistes* [1003–1[illegible]] 361b

37 FIELDING *Tom Jones*, 1[illegible]b–c, 1[illegible]b–c, 5[illegible]d–[illegible]a, 1[illegible]b–c, 331b–332a

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality*, 3[illegible]d–3[illegible]a, 34[illegible]b–c

42 KANT *Judgement*, 4[illegible]a–[illegible]d

44 BOSWELL *Johnson*, [illegible]a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History*, PART I, 22[illegible]b–c

47 GOETHE *Faust*, PART II [[illegible]–6[illegible]] 1[illegible]a–16[illegible]a esp [[illegible]–[illegible]] 1[illegible]; [[illegible]] 1[illegible]b; [[illegible]] [illegible]b–[illegible]a

(3 *Beauty in relation to desire and love as object or cause*)

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 95c / *Descent of Man* 301c 366b-c 481c 482b 571b 576b passim
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 4a 5d 6b 49a b BK II 80d 81a BK III 113a 115a 120c 123a 141b d BK VI 235a 238a BK VIII 316d 317d BK XI 497d 498b 530c d BK XII 541b 542b EPILOGUE I 659a 660b c
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK III 53d 54b
53 JAMES *Psychology* 865b
54 FREUD *Civilization and Its Discontents* 775b-c

4 Beauty and ugliness in relation to pleasure and pain

7 PLATO *Gorgias* 266d 267a / *Philebus* 630d 631d / *Laws* BK II 654a 656c BK VII 720c d
8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK VI CH 7 [146 21-32] 200a b
9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH 5 [645 4-26] 168d 169a / *Ethics* BK III CH 10 [1118 1-16] 364c / *Politics* BK VIII CH 3 [1337^{b}27-1338 29] 543a-c CH 5 [1340 24-29] 545d / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 6 [1362^{b}5-9] 603b
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK III SECT 2 259d 260a
17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR VI CH 1-7 21a 25a passim / *Fifth Ennead* TR V CH 12 234a c
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X par 51-53 84b 85a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 5 A 4 REP 1 25d 26c Q 91 A 3 REP 3 486b-487d PART I-II Q 11 A 1 REP 2 666b d 667a Q 27 A 1 REP 3 737b-d Q 32 A 8 ANS 764c 765b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 62a c
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 184b d
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I APPENDIX 371d
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 32 176a b
42 KANT *Judgement* 471d 473a 476a-495a c esp 488a 489a 502d 503d 516d 518d 527b 528c esp 527d 528a 537a 539d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 220b c PART II 267b-268b
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [8697-8811] 211b-214a [11 288-303] 274b-275a
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 95a d / *Descent of Man* 301d 302a 568d 571b passim 577b d
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK IV 190d 192b
53 JAMES *Psychology* 157a 755a 757b esp 755a b 886b
54 FREUD *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 643c / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 775b

5 Judgments of beauty: the objective and the subjective in aesthetic judgments or judgments of taste

7 PLATO *Ion* 142a 148a c / *Symposium* 167a d / *Gorgias* 261a-c / *Republic* BK III 333b-334b / *Statesman* 593d 595a / *Laws* BK II 654a 656b 660a 662a BK III 675c 676b BK VII 720c d
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK III CH 11 [1281^b 1-15] 479b c
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [1141-1170] 59a b
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK III CH 1 175a 177c
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK III SECT 2 259d 260a BK IV SECT 20 265a b
17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR VI CH 2 3 21d 23a / *Sixth Ennead* TR III CH 11 287b-c
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK IV par 20 24b c BK VII par 23 50b c / *City of God* BK VIII CH 6 269b c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 5 A 4 REP 1 25d 26c PART I-II Q 27 A 1 REP 3 737b-d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II-II Q 180 A 2 REP 3 608c 609c PART III SUPPL Q 94 A 1 REP 2 1040d 1041b
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XI [79-120] 69c 70a XXVI [91-126] 93d 94b
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK IV 273d 274a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 230b-231c
26 SHAKESPEARE *Merchant of Venice* ACT V SC I [98 110] 431d
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I APPENDIX 371b 372d
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 32-33 176a b 105 193a 114 194b 381 238b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XII SECT 5 148a b
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT XII DIV 132 509c d
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 23d [fn 1] / *Judgement* 471b-473a 476a 495a c 513b 516b 516d 517c 524d 525a 540a 546d
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 202b 362b-c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 185c d PART II 264b 268c 280b c
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 95a d / *Descent of Man* 301c 302a 462d-463a 569c 571c 577d esp 575d 577b c 595c 596a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK IV 191b 192b BK VIII 318a 320b
53 JAMES *Psychology* 755b 757b 886b 888a

6 The role of the beautiful in education

7 PLATO *Symposium* 167a d / *Gorgias* 261a-c / *Republic* BK II-III 320c 334b esp BK III 333b 334b BK VIII 409d / *Laws* BK II 653a 663d BK III 675c 676b BK VII 720c d
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK VIII CH 3 542d 543d CH 5-7 544c 548a c
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK IV CH 11 242a d
17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III CH 1 2 10a d TR VI 21a 26a / *Fifth Ennead* TR IX CH 2 246d 247b
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK VII par 23 50b c
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 381 238b
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 24a

(7 *Intelligible beauty* 7c *Beauty in the order of ideas*)

33 PASCAL *Pensees* 33 176b
42 KANT *Judgement* 508b c 553b c
53 JAMES *Psychology* 755a 757a 758a

7d Beauty in the moral order

7 PLATO: *Charmides* 1b 2a / *Symposium* 164b 167b / *Republic* BK II III 320c 334b esp BK III 333b 334b BK V 357d 358a / *Theaetetus* 513a b 535c / *Philebus* 637c 638a / *Laws* BK II 654a c
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK II, CH 6 351c 352d BK IV CH 2 368d 370b CH 3 [1123b4-7] 370b / *Politics* BK III CH 11 [1281b10-15] 479b-c CH 13 [1284b3 12] 482c d BK V CH 9 [1309b18-1310 2] 511d 512b BK VII CH 4 [1326 30-35] 530c
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK III CH I 175a 177c BK IV CH II 242a d
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 47a
17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III CH 1-- 10a d TR VI 21a 26a passim / *Second Ennead* TR IX CH 17 76c / *Fifth Ennead* TR IX CH 2 246d 247b
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par 12 11c d / *City of God* BK II CH 21 161b c BK XVII CH 14 464d BK XXII CH 19 605b
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 93, A 8 REP 3 499b 500c Q 96 A 3 REP 3 512a-c PART I II Q 27 A 2 ANS 737d 738c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 105 A I CONTRARY 307d 309d PART II II Q 180 A 2 REP 3 608c 609c PART III SUPPL Q 82 A I REP 5 968a 970c
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XXVII 94c 96a XXX-XXXI 99b 102b PARADISE XIV [67-139] 127c 128b XXVII [88-96] 148b XXX [1-33] 151d 152a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 84b 85a
26 SHAKESPEARE *Merchant of Venice* ACT III SC II [73 107] 420d 421a
27 SHAKESPEARE *Twelfth Night* ACT I SC II [47-51] 2b / *Hamlet* ACT III SC I [103 116] 48a / *Sonnets* LIV 594c LXVI-LXX 596b-597a XCIII-XCVI 600b-601a
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 381d 382a
32 MILTON: *Comus* [417-475] 42b-44a
42 KANT *Judgement* 488b-489a 508b c 51b-523c 546d 548c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART II 266a 267a 276a d 278a c 280b c PART IV 346d 347a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XII 543b-544b EPILOGUE I 670c
53 JAMES *Psychology* 755a 757a

CROSS REFERENCES

For Other discussions of the relation of beauty to goodness and truth *see* GOOD AND EVIL 1c TRUTH 1c and for the relation of grades of beauty to degrees of perfection in being *see* BEING 3a
Unity order and proportion as elements of beauty *see* RELATION 5c
The consideration of beauty as an object of love or desire *see* DESIRE 2b LOVE 1d
The theory of the aesthetic judgment or the judgment of taste *see* SENSE 6 and for the controversy over the objectivity and universality of such judgments *see* CUSTOM 9a RELATION 6c UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 7c
The problem of cultivating good taste and critical judgment in the field of the fine arts *see* ART 7b POETRY 8a-8b
The context of the comparison of beauty in nature and in art *see* ART 2a-3 NATURE 2a 5d PLEASURE AND PAIN 4c(1)
Consideration of the kind of knowledge which is involved in the apprehension of beauty *see* KNOWLEDGE 6a(2) 6c(1)
Another discussion of sensible and intelligible beauty, *see* SENSE 6 and for the intelligible beauty of God and of the universe *see* GOD 4h WORLD 6d

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World*, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection
II Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas.*

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CROCE *Aesthetic as Science of Expression*
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Chapter 7 BEING

INTRODUCTION

THE words is and (is) not are probably the words most frequently used by anyone They are unavoidable by implication at least in every statement They have in addition a greater range of meaning than any other words

Their manifold significance seems to be of a very special kind for whatever is said *not to be* in one sense of being can always be said *to be* in another of its senses Children and practiced liars know this Playing on the meanings of being or with is and not they move smoothly from fact to fiction imagination to reality or truth to falsehood

Despite the obviousness and commonplaceness of the questions which arise with any consideration of the meanings of is the study of being is a highly technical inquiry which only philosophers have pursued at length Berkeley gives one reason why they cannot avoid this task Nothing seems of more importance he says towards erecting a firm system of sound and real knowledge than to lay the beginning in a distinct explication of what is meant by *thing reality existence* for in vain shall we dispute concerning the real existence of things or pretend to any knowledge thereof so long as we have not fixed the meaning of those words

In the whole field of learning philosophy is distinguished from other disciplines—from history the sciences and mathematics—by its concern with the problem of being It alone asks about the nature of existence the modes and properties of being the difference between being and becoming appearance and reality the possible and the actual being and non being Not all philosophers ask these questions nor do all who ask such questions approach or formulate them in the same way Nevertheless the attempt to answer them is a task peculiar to philosophy Though it often leads to subtleties it also keeps the philosopher in deepest touch with common sense and the speculative wonder of all men

As A TECHNICAL concept in philosophy being has been called both the richest and the emptiest of all terms in the vocabulary of thought Both remarks testify to the same fact namely that it is the highest abstraction the most universal of predicates and the most pervasive subject of discussion

William James is in that long line of philosophers which began with the early Greeks when he points out that in the strict and ultimate sense of the word existence everything which can be thought of at all exists as some sort of object whether mythical object individual thinker s object or object in outer space and for intelligence at large Even things which do not really exist have being insofar as they are objects of thought—things remembered which once existed things conceivable which have the possibility of being things imaginary which have being at least in the mind that thinks them This leads to a paradox which the ancients delighted in pondering that even nothing is something even non being has being for before we can say non being is not we must be able to say non being is Nothing is at least an object of thought

Any other word than being will tend to classify things The application of any other name will divide the world into things of the sort denominated as distinct from everything else Chair for example divides the world into things which are chairs and all other objects but being divides something or anything from nothing and as we have seen even applies to nothing

All other names Aquinas writes "are

ather less universal, or if convertible with it add something above it at least in idea hence in a certain way they inform and determine it." The concepts which such words express have therefore a restricted universality They apply to *all things of a certain kind* but not to *all things* things of every kind or type. With the exception of a few terms inseparably associated with being (or as Aquinas says, convertible with it) only being is common to all kinds of things. When every other trait peculiar to a thing is removed its being remains—the fact that it is in some sense

If we start with a particular of any sort classifying it progressively according to the characteristics which it shares with more and more things, we come at last to being According to this method of abstraction which Hegel follows in his *Science of Logic* being is the emptiest of terms precisely because it is the commonest. It signifies the very least that can be thought of anything On this view if all we are told of something is that it is—that it has being—we learn as little as possible about the thing We have to be told that a thing is a material or a spiritual being, a real or an imaginary being a living or a human being in order to apprehend a determinate nature Abstracted from every thing else being has only the positive meaning of excluding non being

There is an opposite procedure by which the term *being* has the maximal rather than the minimal significance Since whatever else a thing is, it is a being its being lies at the very heart of its nature and underlies all its other properties. Being is indeterminate only in the sense that it takes on every sort of determination. Wherever being is found by thought it is understood as a determined mode of being To conceive being in this way we do not remove every difference or determination, but on the contrary embrace all, since all are differences or determinations of being

Aquinas, for example conceives being taken simply as including all perfections of being" and in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, being without qualification is taken as the most proper name for God When Moses asked God His name he received as answer I AM THAT I AM Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM hath sent me unto you." Used in this sense being becomes the richest of terms—the one which has the greatest amplitude of meaning

BOTH WAYS OF thinking about being are relevant to the problem of the relations among the various meanings of being Both are also related to the problem of whether being is one or many—the problem first raised by the Eleatics, exhaustively explored in Plato's *Parmenides* and recurrent in the thought of Plotinus, Spinoza and Hegel.

The two problems are connected. If everything that is exists only as a part of being as a whole or if the unity of being requires everything to be the same *in being* then whatever diversities there are do not multiply the meanings of *being* Although he speaks of substance rather than of being Spinoza argues that there cannot be any substance excepting God and consequently none other can be conceived. From this it follows that whatever is, is in God and nothing can be or be conceived without God

Since there cannot be two *or more* substances of the same nature or attribute and since God is defined as a substance consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence " it is absurd in Spinoza's opinion to think of any other substance If there were any substance besides God it would have to be explained he says, "by some attribute of God and thus two substances would exist possessing the same attribute which is impossible

Spinoza's definition of substance attribute and mode or affection, combined with his axiom that everything which is, is either in itself or in another enables him to embrace whatever multiplicity or diversity he finds in the world as aspects of one being Everything which is not substance existing in and of itself exists in that one substance as an infinite attribute or a finite mode "The thing extended (*rem extensam*) and the thinking thing (*rem cogitantem*) he writes, are either attributes of God or affections of the attributes of God

If, on the contrary there is no unitary whole of being, but only a plurality of beings which are alike in being and yet are diverse in being from one another then our conception of being

must involve a system of meanings a stem of many branches Descartes for example distinguishes between an infinite being whose essence involves its existence and finite beings which do not necessarily exist of themselves but must be caused to exist The infinite being which is God causes but does not contain within itself other finite substances and among finite things Descartes holds ' two substances are said to be really distinct when each of them can exist apart from the other

In addition to God— that substance which we understand to be supremely perfect —Descartes defines two kinds of finite substance That substance in which thought immediately resides I call Mind he writes and that substance which is the immediate subject of extension in space and of the accidents that presuppose extension *e g* figure situation movement in space etc is called Body All these substances and even their accidents have being but not being of the same kind or to the same degree There are according to Descartes diverse degrees of reality or (the quality of being an) entity For substance has more reality than accident or mode and infinite substance has more than finite substance Its being is independent theirs dependent

The issue between Spinoza and Descartes—a single substance or many—is only one of the ways in which the problem of the unity or diversity of being presents itself Both Plato and Aristotle for example affirm a multiplicity of separate existences but though both are in this sense pluralists being seems to have one meaning for Plato many for Aristotle

According to Plato s distinction between being and becoming only the immutable essences the eternal ideas are beings and though they are many in number they all belong to one realm and possess the same type of being But for Aristotle not only do perishable as well as imperishable substances exist not only is there sensible and mutable as well as immaterial and eternal being but the being which substances possess is not the same as that of accidents essential is not the same as accidental being potential being is not the same as being actual and to be is not the same as to be conceived that is to exist in reality is not the same as to exist in mind

Again and again Aristotle insists that there are many senses in which a thing is said to be Some things are said to be because they are substances others because they are affections of substance others because they are in process towards substance or destructions or privations or qualities of substance or productive or generative of substance or of things which are relative to substance or negations of one of these things or of substance itself It is for this reason he continues that we say even of non being that it *is* non being and in another place he adds that besides all these there is that which is potentially or actually

All these senses of being according to Aristotle refer to one starting point namely substance or that which has being in and of itself That which is primarily *i e* not in a qualified sense he writes must be a substance But when he also says that that which is primarily is the what which indicates the substance of a thing he seems to be using the words substance and essence interchangeably This in turn seems to be related to the fact that although Aristotle distinguishes between actual and potential being and between necessary or incorruptible and contingent or corruptible beings he like Plato and unlike Aquinas Descartes or Spinoza does not consider whether the essence and existence of a being are identical or separate

It may be held that this distinction is implied since a contingent being is one which is able not to exist whereas a necessary being cannot *not* exist A contingent being is therefore one whose essence can be divorced from existence a necessary being one which *must* be precisely because its essence is identical with its existence But the explicit recognition of a real distinction between essence and existence seems to be reserved for the later theologians and philosophers who conceive of an infinite being as Aristotle does not

The infinity of a being lies not only in its possession of all perfections but even more fundamentally in its requiring no cause outside itself for its own existence That thing says Aquinas whose being differs from its essence must have its being caused by another That which has being but is not being is a being by participation Where Aristotle makes sub-

ance the primary type of being and the starting point of all its other meanings Aquinas makes the infinite being of God whose very essence it is to be the source of all finite and participated beings in which there is a composition of existence and essence or of that whereby they are and that which they are

Since being itself is that whereby a thing is, being belongs to God primarily and to all other things according to modes of derivation or participation God and his creatures can be called beings but Aquinas points out not in the identically same sense nor yet with utter diversity of meaning A similarity—a sameness in-diversity or analogy—obtains between the unqualified being of God and the being of all other things which have being subject to various qualifications or limitations.

All other questions about being are affected by the solution of these basic problems concerning the unity of being the kinds of being and the order of the various kinds If they are solved in one way—in favor of unity—certain questions are not even raised for they are genuine only on the basis of the other solution which finds being diverse The discussion in the chapters on SAME AND OTHER, and on SIGN AND SYMBOL, of sameness, diversity and analogy is, therefore, relevant to the problem of how things are at once alike and unlike in being

THE GREEKS NOTABLY Plato and Aristotle, began the inquiry about being They realized that after all other questions are answered there still remains the question What does it mean to say of anything that it is or is not? After we understand what it means for a thing to be a man, or to be alive, or to be a body we must still consider what it means for that thing simply to be in any way at all or to be in one sense and not to be in another

The discussion of being in itself and in relation to unity and truth rest and motion runs through many dialogues of Plato It is central in the Sophist and Parmenides The same terms and problems appear in Aristotle's scientific treatise which makes being its distinctive subject matter and which he sometimes calls first philosophy and sometimes theology It belongs to this science he declares to consider being qua being—both what it is and the properties which belong to it qua being

As pointed out in the chapter on METAPHYSICS it is an historical accident that this inquiry concerning being came to be called metaphysics That is the name which according to legend the ancient editors gave to a collection of writings in which Aristotle pursued this inquiry Since they came after the books on physics they were called metaphysics on the supposition that Aristotle intended the discussion of being to follow his treatise on change and motion.

If one were to invent a word to describe the science of being it would be ontology not metaphysics or even theology Yet metaphysics has remained the traditionally accepted name for the inquiry or science which goes beyond physics—or all of natural science—in that it asks about the very existence of things, and their modes of being The traditional connection of metaphysics with theology discussed in the chapters on THEOLOGY and METAPHYSICS seems to have its origin in the fact that Aristotle's treatise on being passes from a consideration of sensible and mutable substances to the problem of the existence of immaterial beings and to the conception of a divine being purely actual absolutely immutable

In a science intended to treat of that which is primarily and to which all the other categories of being are referred namely substance Aristotle says we must first sketch the nature of substance Hence he begins with what he calls the generally recognized substances. These are the sensible substances. He postpones until later his critical discussion of the Ideas and the objects of mathematics, for some say these are substances in addition to the sensible substances yet he directs his whole inquiry to the ultimate question whether there are or are not any besides sensible substances. His attempt to answer this question in the twelfth book makes it the theological part of his Metaphysics

THOUGH THEIR ORDER of discussion is different the metaphysicians of the 17th century like Descartes, Spinoza and Leibnitz, deal with many if not all major points in the analysis of being which the Greek philosophers initi

ated and the mediaeval theologians developed Later philosophers whose main concern is with the origin and validity of human knowledge come to the traditional metaphysical questions *through an analysis not of substance or essence existence or power but of our ideas* of substance and power

This transformation of the ancient problem of being is stated by Berkeley in almost epigrammatic form Considering what is meant by the term *exist* he argues from the experience of sensible things that their *esse* is *percipi* nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them Locke too although he does not identify being with perception makes the same shift on the ground that the first step towards satisfying several inquiries the mind of man was apt to run into was to make a survey of our own understandings examine our own powers and see to what things they were adapted

Once the problems of being are viewed first in terms of the mind the questions for the philosopher become primarily those of the relation of our definitions to real and nominal essences the conditions of our knowledge of existence and the identification of the real and ideal with perceptible matters of fact and intelligible relations between ideas

For Kant the basic distinction is between the sensible and supra sensible or the phenomenal and noumenal realms of being From another point of view Kant considers the being of things in themselves apart from human experience and the being of natural things or what is the same for him the things of experience The former are unconditioned the latter conditioned by the knowing mind which is formative or constitutive of experience

The sole aim of pure reason Kant writes is the absolute totality of the synthesis on the side of the conditions in order to preposit the whole series of conditions and thus present them to the understanding *a priori* Having obtained these conditions we can ascend through them until we reach the unconditioned that is the principles It is with these ideas of pure reason that metaphysics according to Kant properly deals Instead of *being* its object consists in three grand ideas God Freedom and Immortality and it aims at showing that the second conception conjoined with the first must lead to the third as a necessary conclusion

Hegel on the other hand does not approach the problem of being or reality through a critique of knowledge For Hegel as for Plotinus before him the heart of metaphysics lies in understanding that nothing is actual except the Idea or the Absolute and the great thing is to apprehend in the show of the temporal and the transient the substance which is immanent and the eternal which is present Plotinus calls the absolute not the Idea but the All one yet he tries to show that the One is the principle the light and the life of all things just as Hegel reduces everything to a manifestation of the underlying reality of the Absolute Idea

Despite all such changes in terminology despite radical differences in philosophical principle or conclusion and regardless of the attitude taken toward the possibility of metaphysics as a science the central question which is faced by anyone who goes beyond physics or natural philosophy is a question about being or existence It may or may not be asked explicitly but it is always present by implication

The question about God for example of free will or immortality is first of all a question about whether such things *exist* and *how* they exist Do they have reality or are they only fictions of the mind? Similarly questions about the infinite the absolute or the unconditioned are questions about that primary reality apart from whose existence nothing else could be or be conceived and which therefore has an existence different from the things dependent on it for their being Here again the first question is whether such a reality exists

Enough has been said to indicate why this discussion cannot consider all topics which have some connection with the theory of being To try to make this Introduction adequate even for the topics outlined here under which the references to the great books are assembled would be to make it almost co extensive in scope with the sum of many other Introductions—all, in fact which open chapters dealing with metaphysical concepts or problems

It is to be expected of course that the special

f the existence of God, of an immor
d of a free will should be treated in
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not be realized that such chapters
ETERNITY FORM, INFINITY IDEA
ONE AND MANY SAME AND OTHER,
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contexts. But two topics deserve fur
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T OF CHANGE OF motion—of coming to
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as never been denied at least not as an
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d by the senses. Galen for instance,
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ow in another whereas the underlying
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familiar paradoxes of Zeno are *reductio
urdum* arguments to show that *motion is*
nkable, full of self contradiction. The way
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e er is always was and will be, *that noth-*
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s *out* of being into nothingness.

e doctrine of Parmenides provoked many
criticisms. Yet his opponents tried to preserve the reality of change *without having to accord* it the fullness of being The Greek atomists, for example think that change cannot be explained except in terms of permanent beings—in fact eternal ones. Lucretius, who expounds their views, remarks that in any change something unchangeable must remain over that all things be not utterly reduced to nothing *for when* ever a thing changes and quits its proper limits, at once this change of state is the death of that which was before. The something unchangeable is thought to be the atom, the absolutely indivisible, and *hence impenetrable unit* of matter Change does not touch the being of the atoms, but only breaks up the union amongst them, and then joins anew the different elements with others and thus it comes to pass that all things change —that is, all things composite *not the simple bodies of solid singleness* — when the clashings, motions, arrangement position, and shapes of matter change about

In a conversation with Cratylus, who favors the Heraclitean theory of a universal flux Socrates asks *How can that be a real thing which* is never in the same state? How can we reasonably say Cratylus, he goes on that there is any knowledge at all, if every thing is in a state of transition and there is nothing abiding ?

When he gets Glaucon to admit in the *Republic* that being is the sphere or subject *matter* of knowledge and knowing is to know the nature of being Socrates leads him to see the correlation of being not being, and *becoming* with knowledge ignorance and opinion If opinion and knowledge are distinct faculties then the sphere of knowledge and opinion cannot be the same If being is the subject matter of *knowledge something* else must be the subject matter of opinion. It cannot be *not being* for of not being ignorance was assumed to be the *necessary correlative.*

Since opinion is not concerned either with being or *with not being* because it is obviously intermediate between knowledge and ignorance, Socrates concludes that if anything appeared to be of a sort which is and is not at the same *time that* sort of thing would appear also to lie in the interval between *pure being* and absolute not being and the corresponding

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t adds Plato was in a sense not wrong ig sophistic as deal ng with that which or the arguments of the sophists deal say above all with the accidental e accid ntal is akin to non being t thinks may be seen in the fact that which are in another sense come into id pass out of being by a process but which are accidentally do not But he rejects the accidental as an object of he does not like Plato or Plotinus, ex he whole realm of sensible changing from the phere of scientific knowledge n both metaphysics and physics treat of e substances the one with regard to thei le being the other with regard to their mutable—their becoming or changing

Plotinus on the other hand the true s have an intelligible object and contain tion of anything sensible They are di not to variable things suffering from ts of changes di ded in space to which ime of becoming and not being belongs the eternal being which is not divided ng always in the same way which is not and does not perish and has neither space nor situation but rests immovable in

cording to another view represented by e substance is as such unknowable wheth be body or spirit We use the word sub- ce to nam e the support of such qualities h are capable of producing simple ideas in which qual ties are commonly called acci ts. The sens ble accidents are all that we y know and we g ve the general name sub- ice to the supposed but unkno n sup- t of those qualit es e find ex sting Some hese sensible accidents are what Locke calls imary ualiti s —the powers or potentiali by which things affect one another and also r senses

But to th extent that our senses fail to dis ver the bulk texture and figure of the mi te pa ts of bodies on which their constitu ons and differences depend we are fain to ake use of their secondary qual ties, as the aract ristical not s and marks whereby to ame ideas of them in our m nd Neverthe ss, powers—which are qual ties or accidents of substances—seem t be for Locke the ultimate reality we can know The secondary sensible qualities he writes are nothing but the powers which corporeal substances have to produce several ideas in us by our sense which ideas —unlike the primary qualities— are not in the things themselves otherwise than as anything is in its cause

Hobbes exemplifies still another view A man can have no thought he says represent ing anything not subject to sense. Hobbes does not object to calling bodies substances but thinks that when we speak of an incorpo- real body or (which is all on) an incorporeal sub tance we talk nonsense for none of these things ever have or can be incident to sense but are absurd speeches taken upon credit (without any signification at all) from deceived Philosophers and deceived or deceiving Schoolmen.

He enumerates other absurdities, such as the giving of names of bodies to accidents or of acc.d nts to bodies e g by those who say that extension is body Criticism of the fallacy of reification—the fallacy first pointed out by Ockham and criticized so repeatedly in con temporary semantics—also appears in Hobbes warring against making substances out of ab- stractions or universals by giving the names of bodies to names or peeches.

WHENEVER A THEORY of knowledge is concerned with how we know reality as opposed to mere appearance it considers the manner in which existing beings can b known—by perception intuition or demonstration and with respect to demonstration it attempts to formulate the *conditions of valid reasoning about* matters of fact or real exis ence But it has seldom been supposed that reality exhausts the objects of our thought or knowledge We can conceive possibilities not realized in this world We can imagine things which do not exist in nature

The meaning of reality—of real as opposed to purely conceptual or ideal being—*is derived* f om the notion of thinghood of having being outside the mind not merely in it In tradition al controversies about the existence of ideas— *or of universals* the objects of mathematics or *relations—it is not* the being of su h things which is questioned but their reality their existence outside the mind If, for example

faculty is neither knowledge nor ignorance but will be found in the interval between them. This intermediate flux or sphere of becoming this region of the many and the variable can yield only opinion Being the realm of the 'absolute and eternal and immutable [Ideas] is the only object that one may be said to know

Aristotle would seem to agree with Plato that change partakes equally of the nature of being and not being and cannot rightly be termed either pure and 'simple He points out that his predecessors particularly the Eleatics held change to be impossible because they believed that what comes to be must do so either from what is or from what is not both of which are impossible ' It is impossible so they argued since what is cannot come to be (because it *is* already) and from what is not nothing could have come to be Aristotle concedes the cogency of this argument on one condition namely that the terms being and not being are taken without qualification But his whole point is that they need not be taken without qualification and should not be if we wish to explain change rather than make a mystery of it

The qualification Aristotle introduces rests on the distinction between two modes of being —the potentiality and actuality correlative with matter and form This makes it possible for him to maintain that a thing may come to be from what is not in a qualified sense He illustrates his meaning by the example of the bronze which from a mere lump of metal comes to be a statue under the hands of the artist The bronze he says was potentially a statue and the change whereby it came to be actually a statue is the process between potentiality and actuality While the change is going on the bronze is neither completely potential nor fully actual in respect of *being a statue*

Like Plato Aristotle recognizes that there is something indefinite about change The reason he explains is that it cannot be classed simply as a potentiality or as an actuality—a thing that is merely *capable* of having a certain size is not undergoing change nor yet a thing that is *actually* of a certain size. Change is a sort of actuality but incomplete hard to grasp but not incapable of existing

If to exist is to be completely actual the changing things and change itself do not fu exist. They exist only to the extent that th have actuality Yet potentiality no less th actuality is a mode of being That potential —power or capacity—belongs to being see also to be affirmed by the Eleatic Strang Plato s *Sophist* Anything which possesses a sort of power to affect another or to be affect by another he says if only for a single m ment however trifling the cause and howe slight the effect has real existence I hold he adds that the definition of being is simp power

The basic issue concerning being and becom ing and the issue concerning eternal as oppos to mutable existence recur again and again the tradition of western thought They are in volved in the distinction between corruptib and incorruptible substances (which is in tu connected with the division of substances in corporeal and spiritual) and with the nature God as the only purely actual or truly etern being They are implicit in Spinoza s distin tion between *natura naturans* and *natura na rata* and in his distinction between God knowledge of things under the aspect of ete nity and man s temporal view of the world process They are relevant to Hegel s Absolu Idea which while remaining fixed progressive reveals itself in the ever changing face of natu and history In our own day these issues en a Dewey Santayana and Whitehead in contr versy as yesterday they engaged Bradle William James and Bergson

As ALREADY NOTED Plato s division of realit into the realms of being and becoming has bearing on his analysis of knowledge and op ion The division relates to the distinction b tween the intelligible and the sensible and b tween the opposed qualities of certainty a probability or necessity and contingency our judgments about things The distinctio between essence and existence and betwe substance and accident separate aspects modes of being which function differently objects for the knowing mind

Aristotle for example holds that there ca be no scientific treatment of the *accidental* for the accidental is practically a mere nam

ideas exist apart from minds the minds of men and God they have real not ideal existence If the objects of mathematics such as numbers and figures have existence only as figments of the mind they are ideal beings

The judgment of the reality of a thing James thinks involves a state of consciousness *sui generis* about which not much can be said in the way of internal analysis The focus of this problem in modern times is indicated by James phrasing of the question Under what circumstances do we think things *real?* And James gives a typically modern answer to the question

He begins by saying that any object which remains uncontradicted is ipso facto believed and posited as absolute reality He admits that for most men the things of sense are the absolutely real world s nucleus Other things James writes may be real for this man or that—things of science abstract moral relations things of the Christian theology or what not But even for the special man these things are usually real with a less real reality than that of the things of sense But his basic conviction is that our own reality that sense of our own life which we at every moment possess is the ultimate of ultimates for our belief As sure as I exist! —this is our utter most warrant for the being of all other things As Descartes made the indubitable reality of the *cogito* go bail for the reality of all that the *cogito* involved so all of us feeling our own present reality with absolutely coercive force ascribe an all but equal degree of reality first to whatever things we lay hold on with a sense of personal need and second to whatever farther things continuously belong with these

The self or ego is the ultimate criterion of being or reality The world of living realities as contrasted with unrealities James writes is thus anchored in the Ego That is the hook from which the rest dangles the absolute support And as from a painted hook it has been said that one can only hang a painted chain so conversely from a real hook only a real chain can properly be hung *Whatever things have intimate and continuous connection with my life are things of whose reality I cannot doubt* Whatever things fail to establish this connection are things which are practically no better for me than if they existed not at all James would be the first to concede to any critic of his position that its truth and good sense depend upon noting that word practically for it is the world of practical realities with which he professes to be concerned

WE CAN IN CONCLUSION observe one obvious measure of the importance of *being* in philosophical thought The major *isms* by which the historians of philosophy have tried to classify its doctrines represent affirmations or denials with respect to being or the modes of being They are such antitheses as realism and idealism materialism and spiritualism monism dualism and pluralism even atheism and theism Undoubtedly no great philosopher can be so simply boxed Yet the opposing *isms* do indicate the great speculative issues which no mind can avoid if it pursues the truth or seeks the ultimate principles of good and evil

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

to 2b

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 51b-54b / *Meditations* I 89c d / *Objections and Replies* 139b-c 214d 215a

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP II DEMONST 358d SCHOL, 359a PART II, PROP 40 SCHOL 2 38 b-388a

33 PASCAL *Geometrical Demonstration*, 432b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH VII SECT 1 283a b

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 2 3 413b-d SECT 17 416a b SECT 45 46 421b-c SECT 48 422 SECT 81 428c d S CT 85-91 430a-431a SECT 139 440d

42 KANT *Pure Reason*, 43d-44a 52a b 107b-108a,c 133c 177b-187a esp 1 9c 182b 185c 18 197b-198a / *Pref Metaphysic l Elements f Ethics* 367d 368a / *Judgement* 603b-c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* ... 156d 15 b ... 224 b 233b-235a 237d 238d 251d 2 2d PART I 322a b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 636a-661b esp 639a-640a, 641a b, 643a-645b 871b-872a

2. Being and the one and the many

7 PLATO *Republic* BK III, 333b-d BK V 3 0 3 3c esp 3 2d 3 3c BK II 392b-394b BK X 42 -429c / *Parmenides* 486a 511d / *Theaetetus* 5a a-c 544d 54 c esp 547a / *Sophist* 564d 574c / *Statesman* 594d 595a / *Philebus* 610d 617d

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics*, ... CH 2 3 259b-262 / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 7 [985 34 b5] 506c ... III, CH 1 [996a4-8] 514c CH 4 [100 4 b ...] 519d 520c ... CH 6 [1 40b16-2] 564d ... CH 2 580b-d BK VI CH 2 [060a36-b 9] 588c d BK XI CH 2 [1 58 28-1060b ...] 621b-622c

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses*, BK I CH 4 110d 111a

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* ... SECT 3 257 b CT 29 266a SECT 40 267 b ... SECT 3 273a BK ... CT 36-45 277 278c BK ... CT 9 280b-c SECT 9 281a BK IX CT 8-9 292b-d ... X, CT 6-7 297a-c BK XII CT 3 310 b

17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR I CH 4 79d 80a TR II, CH 1 2 82c 83d TR ... CH 8-10 132d 136a ... IX, CH 3 137b-138a,c / *Fifth Ennead* CH 4-9 209d 213c ... II CH 1 214c 215a TR ... 2 222b-223c CH 15 6 224c 22a TR ... 226d 2 8b TR VI CH 6 23 b-d / *Sixth Ennead*, TR II 268d 280d TR ... CH ... 331-d TR ... CH 1 305c 306a CH 5-8 307 308c TR VI CH 5-6 312c 313d CH 8-16 314a 319d

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* ... PAR 15 17 23a-c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I, Q 3 A 3 16a-d Q 11 46d 50b Q 30, A 3 169b-1 0c Q 93, A 9, ... 500c 501c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE, ... 23] 109a

31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 123c-d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I DEF 2 355a DEF 6 355b PROP 5 16 356b-362a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH III S CT 19 259c 260a

42 KANT *Pure Reason*, 43d-44a 49c 51d esp 51c d 99a 102b 107b-c 173b-177b 193a 200c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 218c 224 b 232d 237d 238a

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XIV 608a b

2a Infinite being and the plurality of finite beings

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK I CH 8 [191a24 b12] 267a-c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 5 [986b18-98 a3] 504d 505a

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK IV SECT 29 266a SECT 40 26 a b BK XII, SECT 30 310a b

17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead*, TR II CH 1 2 82c 83d TR ... II, CH 6 122a d TR VIII CH 8-10 132d 136a / *Fourth Ennead* TR IX CH 2 205c 206a CH 5 206d 207a,c / *Fifth Ennead*, TR I, CH 4 7 209d 212c, TR III CH 11 12 222b-223c CH 15 16 224c 225a TR IV ... 6d 228b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK ... PAR 20-1 49d 50

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 3 ANS 16a d A ... REP 2 19 -c QQ ... 31a 38c Q 11 AA 3 4 49a 50b Q 13 A 11 73c 74b QQ 44 45 238a 250a Q 47 256a 259a Q 50 A 1 ... and ... 3 269b-2 0a Q 90, A 1 480d 481d, QQ 103 10 528a 545b

31 DESCARTES *Meditations* III, 84a b 85a-88d / *Objections and Replies* 121d 122c 123c-d 13 b-c

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I 355a 372d esp DEF 2 35 a DEF 6 355b PRO 16 356c 362a ROP 21 25 364a 365b PROP ... 365c 366a, P OP ... SCHOL 366b-c, PROP 30 366c-d PART II, PR P 45 S HOL 390b

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 121 195a

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 130b-133c / *Judgement* 550a 5 1a,c 564c 565d esp 565c-d 566c d 580c-d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 227d 228a 234d 235a

2b The unity of a being

8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 2 [b3-9] 5c / *Topics* BK IV CH ... [121 14 9] 169a [121b4-8] 169c ... 6 [12 a26-...] 176d 177a BK ... CH 4 [... 26-b2] 194c d / *Sophistical Refutations* CH [69 32 6] 233a / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 2 [1003b23 34] 522d, ... V CH 6 536a 537c CH 9 [1 18a3-9] 538d, BK VIII CH 6 569d 5 0d ... X, CH 1 2 578b,d 580d CH 3 [1054 33 35] 581 BK XI CH 1 [... b34 3] 606d BK XIII, C 1 2 [077 a 0-23] 608c / *Soul* BK II CH 1 [412b6-9] 642c

11 EUCLID *Elements* BK VII DEFINITIONS 1 12 a

11 NICOMACHUS *Arithmetic* BK II 840 b

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to For example in **4** HOMER *Iliad* BK II [265 283] **12d** the number **4** is the number of the volume in the set the number **12d** indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page For example in **53** JAMES *Psychology* **116a 119b** the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119 When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page For example in **7** PLATO *Symposium* **163b 164c** the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164

AUTHOR S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers, in brackets are given in certain cases *e g* *Iliad* BK II [265-283] **12d**

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (*D*) follows *e g* OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—(*D*) *II Esdras* 7 46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface

1 Diverse conceptions of being and non being being as a term or concept the meanings of *is* and *is not*

7 PLATO *Republic* BK V **370d 373c** / *Timaeus* **447b d 455c 458b** / *Parmenides* **486a 511d** / *Theaetetus* **517d 518b 520b 521d 522a** / *Sophist* **561d 563b** esp **562a 563a 565a 566b 567a 569a 571d 573b** passim

8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation* CH 3 [16b19 26] **25d 26a** CH 13 [23 18–26] **35b c** / *Prior Analytics* BK I CH 36 [48 40–b9] **66d** / *Posterior Analytics* BK II CH 7 [92b13] **126c** / *Topics* BK IV CH I [121 14–26] **169a b** [121b1–8] **169c** CH 6 [127 26–40] **176d 177a** BK VI CH 7 [146 21–32] **200a b** / *Sophistical Refutations* CH 5 [166b37–167a7] **229d** CH 7 [169a22 24] **232d** CH 25 [180 32–38] **248c** / *Physics* BK I CH 2 [185a20–b4] **260a b** CH 3 [186a23–187 10] **261b 262a** CH 5 [188 18–23] **263c** BK III CH 6 [206 13 34] **284b d** BK V CH I [225a20–29] **305b c** / *Generation and Corruption* BK I CH 3 **413c-416c** passim / *Metaphysics* BK I 10 **501c 511d** passim BK III CH 3 [**517b c** BK IV CH 2 [1003 33–b1 [1009a22–38] **528d** BK V CH VII CH I **550b d 551a** **552d 553b** BK IX CH I BK XI CH 2 [1060 36–b10] **588c** CH 3 [1060b31] 1061 10] **589a b** BK XII CH 2 [1069b15 34 **598d 599a** CH 4 [10,0b7–8] **599d 600a** / *Soul* BK II CH I [412b6–9] **642c**

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR VIII CH 3 **28a b** / *Third Ennead* TR VI CH 6–7 **109d 111c** TR VII CH 6 **122a d** / *Fifth Ennead* TR I CH 4 **209d 210c** TR II CH I **214c 215a** TR VI CH 6 **237b d** / *Sixth Ennead* TR II CH 7-8 **272a 273c**

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK VII par I 2 **43b-44a** / *City of God* BK VIII CH II **272c** BK XII, CH 2 **343c-d** / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 32 **633c d**

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I QQ 2 13 **10c 75b** passim esp Q 3 A 4 REP I **16d 17c**, Q II A I **46d 47d** Q 13 A 5 ANS and REP I **66b 67d** A 10 ANS **72c 73c** Q 14 A 9 ANS **83b d** Q 16 A 3 REP 2 **96b-d** Q 22 A 4 REP 3 **131c 132b** Q 29 A I REP 4 **162a 163b** QQ 44 45 **238a 250a** Q 48 A 2 REP 2 **260c 261b** Q 54 A 2 ANS **285d 286c** Q 104 **534c 538c** Q 105 A 5 ANS **542a 543b** PART I-II Q 2 A 5 esp REP 2–3 **618d 619c**

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theolo* Q A I REP I **54d 55c**

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31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART I 51b-54b / *M ... ns* IV 89c d / *Objections and Replies* 139b-c 214d 215a

31 SPI OZA *Ethics* PART I PROP II DEMO ST 358d CHOL, 359 PART II, PRO 40 SCI OL I 38 b-388a

33 P SCAL *Geometrical Demo stra. on,* 432b

35 LOCKE *Human Understandi g* BK III CH VII S CT I 283a b

35 BERKELEY *Human Kn wledge* SECT 2 3 413b-d S CT 17 416a b SECT 45 46 421b-c SECT 48 422a CT 81 4 8c d SECT 88-91 430a-431a ECT 139 440d

42 KA T *Pure Reason,* 43d-44a 52a b 107b-108a,c 133c 177b-187a esp 1 9c 182b 185c 187a 197b-198a / *Pref Metaphysic l Elements f Ethics* 367d 368a / *Judgement* 603b-c

46 HEG L *Phil ophy f History* INTR 156d 157b P RT I 224a b 233b-235a 237d 238d 2 1d 2 2d PART I 322a b

53 JAME *Psychology* 636a 661b esp 639a-640a, 641a b, 643a-645b 8 1b-872a

2*a* Being and the one nd the many

7 PLATO *Repub' c* BK II 333b-d BK V 370 3 3c esp 372d 373c BK I 392b-394b BK X, 42 c-429c / *Parmenides* 486a-511d / *Theaet t s,* 53 -c 544d 54 esp 547a / *S phist* 564d 574c / *S ... sm* 594d 595a / *Philebus* 610d 61 d

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12 EPIC ETUS *Discourses,* BK I CH 4 120d 121a

12 A ELIUS *M ... ations* K II SE T 3 257a b ... SECT 9 266a SECT 40 267a b BK S CT 30 273 BK I CT 6-45 277c 278c ... II, ECT 9 280b-c SECT 19 81a K IX SECT 8-9 292b-d K X S CT 6-7 297 -c K XII 3 310 b

17 PLOTINUS *Third Enne d* TR I CH 4 79d 80a TR I, CH I 82c 83d TR I CH 8- o 132d 136a TR IX, H 3 137b-138a,c / *F fth Ennead* TR CH 4-9 209d 213c TR II, CH I 214c 215a TR II, H 12 222b-223c CH 15 6 224c 226a TR I 226d 228b K CH 6 237b-d / *Si h Ennead,* TR II 268d 280d TR H I 301c-d TR CH I 305c 306a C I 5-8 307a 308c TR VI CH 5-6 312c 313d CH 8-16 314 319d

18 A GUSTI *Co f ss ons* BK IV *par 13 7* 23a-c

19 AQUI AS *Summa Theologic* PART I, Q 3 3 16a d Q 11 46d 50b Q 3 A 3 169b-1 0c Q 93 9, 500c 501c

21 D T *D ine Comedy* AD E, [12 3] 109a

31 DESC ES *O ections and Replies* 123c-d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PA T I DEF 2 355a DEF 6 355b PROP 5 16 356b-362a

35 LOCKE *Human Underst ding* BK III CH III SECT 19 259c 260a

42 KA T *Pure Reason,* 43d-44a 49c 51d esp 51c d 99a 101b 107b-c 173b-177b 193a 200c

46 HEGEL *Philoso hy of History* PART I 218c 224a b 232d 237d 238a

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XIV 608a b

2*a* Infinite be ng and the plurality of finite be ngs

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK I CH 8 [191a24 b12] 267a-c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 5 [986b18-98 a1] 504d 505a

12 AUR LIUS *Meditations* BK IV S CT 29 266a SECT 40 267a b BK XII, SECT 30 310a b

17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR II CH I 2 82c 83d TR VII CH 6 122a d TR VIII CH 8-10 132d 136a / *Fourth Ennead* TR IX CH 2 205c 206a CH 5 206d 07a,c / *Fifth Ennead,* TR I C 14 7 209d 212c TR II CH II 12 222b-223c CH 15 16 224c 225a TR IV 226d 228b

18 AUGUSTINE *Conf ssio s* BK VII par 0- I 49d 50a

19 AQUI S *Summa Theo og ca* PART I Q 3 A 3 ANS 16a d A 7 REP 2 19a-c QQ -8 31a 38c Q II A 3 4 49a 50b Q 13 A 11 73c 74b QQ 44 45 238a 250a Q 4 256a 259a Q 50 A I ANS and R P 3 269b-2 0a Q 90, A I 480d 481d, QQ 103 105 528a 545b

31 DE C RT S *Medit ...* S III 84a b 86a 88d / *Obj ct ons and Replies* 121d 122c 123c d 139b-c

31 SP NOZA *Ethics* PART I 355a 372d esp DEF 355a DEF 6 355b PROP 6 356c 362a, PROP 21 5 354 363b PROP 28 363c 366a, PROP 9, SCHOL 366b-c, PROP 30 366c d PART II, PROP 45 SCHOL 390b

33 PASCAL *Pensees* III 195a

42 KANT *Pur Re o* 130b-133c / *J dgement* 550 S 1a,c 564c 565d esp 565c-d 566c d 580c-d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* P RT 227d 228a 234d 235a

2*b* The unity of a be ng

8 ARI TOTLE *Categori s* CH 2 [b3-9] 5c / *T p ics* K IV CH [121 14 19] 169a [1 1b4-8] 169c CH 6 [127a26-40] 1 6d 177 BK VI CH 4 [141a26-b2] 194c d / *S histical Refutations* CH 7 [169 32 36] 233a / *Metaphys cs* BK I CH 2 [1003 23 34] 522d, BK CH 6 536a 537c CH 9 [1018a3-9] 538d K VIII H 6 569d 570d BK X CH I 2 578b d 580d CH 3 [1054 33 35] 581a BK XII CH I [10 5b34 3] 606d K XI H 2 [1077a20-23] 608c / *S ul* BK II CH I [412 6-9] 642c

11 EU LID *Elements,* BK II DEFINITIONS I 12 a

11 NI OMA H *Arithmetic* BK II 840a b

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to For example, in **4** HOMER *Iliad* BK II [265 283] **12d**, the number **4** is the number of the volume in the set the number **12d** indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in **53** JAMES *Psychology* **116a 119b** the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119 When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page For example in **7** PLATO' *Symposium* **163b 164c** the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164

AUTHOR S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases *e g* *Iliad* BK II [265–283] **12d**

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a *(D)* follows *e g* OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—*(D) II Esdras* 7 46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface.

1 Diverse conceptions of being and non being: being as a term or concept the meanings of *is* and *is not*

7 PLATO *Republic* BK V **370d 373c** / *Timaeus* **447b d 455c 458b** / *Parmenides* **486a 511d** / *Theaetetus* **517d 518b 520b 521d 522a** / *Sophist* **561d 563b** esp **562a 563a 565a 566b 567a 569a 571d 573b** passim

8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation* CH 3 [16b19–26] **25d 26a** CH 13 [23 18–26] **35b-c** / *Prior Analytics* BK I CH 36 [48 40–b9] **66d** / *Posterior Analytics* BK II CH 7 [92b13] **126c** / *Topics* BK IV CH I [121 14–26] **169a b** [121b1–8] **169c** CH 6 [127a26–40] **176d 177a** BK VI CH 7 [146 21–32] **200a b** / *Sophistical Refutations* CH 5 [166b37 167a7] **229d** CH 7 [169a22–24] **232d** CH 25 [180 3–38] **248c** / *Physics* BK I CH 2 [185 20–b4] **260a b** CH 3 [186a23–187a10] **261b-262a** CH 5 [188 18–23] **263c** BK III CH 6 [206 13 34] **284b d** BK V CH I [225a20–29] **305b-c** / *Generation and Corruption* BK I CH 3 **413c 416c** passim / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 3–10 **501c 511d** passim BK III CH 3 [998b14–28] **517b c** BK IV CH 2 [1003 33–b10] **522b** CH 5 [1009a22–38] **528d** BK V CH 7 **537c 538b** BK VII CH I **550b d 551a** CH 4 [1030 17–b14] **552d 553b** BK IX CH 10 [1051 34–b2] **577c** BK XI CH 2 [1060 36–b10] **588c** CH 3 [1060b31 1061 10] **589a b** BK XII CH 2 [1069b15 34] **598d 599a** CH 4 [1070b7–8] **599d 600a** / *Soul* BK II CH I [412b6–9] **642c**

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR VIII CH 3, **28a b** / *Third Ennead* TR VI CH 6–7 **109d 111c** TR VII CH 6 **122a d** / *Fifth Ennead* TR I CH 4 **209d 210c** TR II CH I **214c 215a** TR VI CH 6 **237b-d** / *Sixth Ennead* TR II CH 7–8 **271a 273c**

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK VII par 1 2 **43b-44a** / *City of God* BK VIII CH II **272c** BK XII CH 2 **343c d** / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 3 **633c d**

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I QQ 2 II **10c 75b** passim esp Q 3 A 4 REP I **16d 1** 6 Q II A I **46d 47d** Q 13 A 5 ANS and REP I **66b 67d** A 10 ANS **72c 73c** Q 14 A 9 ANS **83b d** Q 16 A 3 REP 2 **96b d** Q 22 A 4 REP 3 **131c 132b** Q 29 A I REP 4 **162a 163b** QQ 44 45 **38a 250a** Q 48 A 2 REP 2 **260c 261b** Q 54 A 2 ANS **285d 286c** Q 104 **534c 538c** Q 105 A 5 ANS **542a 543b** PART I II Q 2 A 5 esp REP 2–3 **618d 619c**

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 61 A I REP I **54d 55c**

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20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART I-II, Q AN 1d-18a Q 3, REP 1 10 c 10b Q 5, 4 181b-d PART II-II, Q 23, A 3, REP 3 48a-d PART III, Q A 9, A 1d 51c IX III SUPPL, Q 4, A 1 REP 3 92c 9 6c

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31 DESCARTES Discourse PAR IV 52d / Meditations, III, 84a-b / Objections and Replies, 111d 112a 121d 12 c AXIOM 13 a, 13 b-c 211b-d

31 SPINOZA, Ethics, PART I, APPENDIX, 3 c-d PART IV PREF 422b,d-424a ART ROP 40, DEMO 46 c

3 MILTON Paradise Lost BK V [469-490] 183b-186a

35 LOCKE Human Understanding BK II, CH XXI, SECT 1 8c CH XXIII, S CT S 211b-d SECT 6 213c-d K III, CH 2, S CT 1 2 1b-2 b BK IV CH XVI, S CT 12 3 b-3 1a

42 KANT Pure Reason, 206d 20 / Judgement, 556b-558b 566d 56

46 HEGEL Philosophy of History PART I, 224a-d 233b-2 a 23 d 23d

51 TOLSTOY War and Peace K V 21 c

53 JAMES Psychology 639a-643b esp 641b-644a

3b. Being as the object of love and desire

7 PLATO Phaedrus 124c 1 5a Symposium, 165b-167d / Republic BK 3, 369c-375b BK 3 6d, BK IX, 422c-425b esp 423b-424d

8 ARISTOTLE Physics, BK I, CH 9 [92 16- 4] 268b-c / Metaphysics, BK I, CH 3 [4]-CH 4 [985] 5 d 5 c CH 6] 506c-d, BK XII, CH 602a-603b CH 10 605d-606d

9 ARISTOTLE Ethics, BK IX, CH [116 34 1168 1] 421b-c CH 9 [14] 4 3d-424b

17 PLOTINUS First Ennead, TR VI, CH 24c 25a / Fifth Ennead, TR II, CH 9, 244b-c TR IX, CH 1 246c-d

18 AUGUSTINE Christian Doctrine K I, CH 5 625d-6 6a

19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 5 23b-28b Q 16, A 4 ANS and REP 1 2 9 a-c Q 19, 1 ANS 108d-109c Q A 2, A 3 and REP 4 121b-12 a Q 48 A 1 ANS and REP 4 259b-260c PART I-II, Q 1 A 8 615a-c Q 2, A ANS and REP 3 618d-619c Q 8 1 ANS and REP 3 655b-656a Q 2, A 21c 722c Q 2 A 3 38 739c Q 9, A 1 REP 1 745a-c A 5 74 c 48b

21 DANTE Divine Comedy PARADISE, I [103 14] 107b-d

30 BACON Advancement of Learning 3a-c

31 SPINOZA Ethics PART III, PROP 4-9 398d 399c PROP 13 400b-d PART IV PROP 19-2 4 9d-430c

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8 ARISTOTLE Interpretation, CH 3 [6 19- 6] 25d 26 / Prior Analytics BK I, CH 46 [5 40- 9] 66d / Metaphysics, K II, CH 1 511b,d 512b BK V CH [10 3 4] 538a CH 9 [10 16- 6] 546c-d BK 1, CH 4 550a,c, BK IX, CH 0 5 c 5 8a,c

17 PLOTINUS Third Ennead, TR VII CH 8 132d 133c / Fifth Ennead, TR III, CH 5 218b TR V CH 1 2 228b-229d TR I, CH 6 23 b-d

18 AUGUSTINE Confessions, BK 1, par 10 15b-d BK par 4 48b-c, K III, par 16 3 48c 50c / City of God, BK XI, CH 0, 32 d / Christian Doctrine BK I, CH 34 634b-c

19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3, A 4, REP 2 16d 1 c Q 4, A 9, REP 1 83b-d Q 6 94b-100d Q 1 A 1 100d-101d A 4 REP 2 10 c 104b Q 8 A 4, REP 3 10 d 108c Q 44, A 1 ANS 238b-239a, Q 79, 9, REP 3 422b-423d Q 10, A 1, AN 60 c-60 b PART I-II, Q 3, A AN 6 8a-d, Q A 5 22 22c Q 9, A 5, AN 4 c 48b

21 DANTE Divine Comedy PARADISE, IV [1 4-1 6] 112a XXXIII [49 4] 1 6d

31 DESCARTES Discourse PART IV 51b-54b / Objections and Replies, 124c 125b AXIOM X 131b 226d 229c-d

31 SPINOZA Ethics, PART I, AXIOM 6 355d PART II, PROP 0, SCHOL 3 6d 3 a PROP 0-382d 383a PROP 32 38 c PROP 43 3 3c-389b PROP 44, COROL and DEMONST 390a

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17 PLOTINUS *Fourth Ennead* TR II CH I 139c 140c / *Sixth Ennead* TR VI CH 11-16 315d 319d TR IX CH 1-2 353d 355a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 6 A 3 REP I 29c 30b Q II AA 1-4 46d 50b passim Q 39 A 3 ANS 204c 205c Q 76 385c 399b passim Q 103 A 3 ANS 530a c PART I-II Q 12 A 3 REP 2-3 670d 671b Q 17 A 4 ANS 688d 689c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q 2 A I ANS and REP 2 710a 711c A 9 719d 720c Q 17 806d 809d Q 19 A I REP 4 816a 818b PART III SUPPL Q 83 A 3 REP 4 978c 980d

31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 153b 154a 213d 214a 224d 225d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 12-13 359b d PART II DEF 7 373c

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XIII SECT 26 154b c CH XVI SECT I 165c d CH XXIII SECT 1-6 204a 205c CH XXIII SECT 37-CH XXIV SECT 3 213d 214d CH XXVII 218d 228c BK III CH VI SECT 2-5 268c 269d SECT 10 271b SECT 49 282c

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT I 413a b SECT 12 415b c SECT 99 432b

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 120c 129c esp 121a 124d 126a 128b / *Judgement* 566c d

53 JAMES *Psychology* 104a 107b esp 104a b 215b 216a 406b

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7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 124c 125b / *Republic* BK VI-VII 383d 398c / *Timaeus* 447b-448b

8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK VI CH 5 [143 9-12] 196c CH 6 [145 19-27] 198d 199a CH 8 [146b9-147 11] 200c 201a CH 12 [149b31 39] 204b c / *Generation and Corruption* BK II CH 10 [336b28-30] 438d / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 6 [988 8 16] 506a b CH 7 [988b6-16] 506c d CH 9 [992 29-34] 510c BK XII CH 7 602a 603b CH 10 [1075 11-24] 605d 606a BK XIV CH 4 [1091 29]-CH 5 [1092 17] 624a 625a

9 ARISTOTLE *Generation of Animals* BK II CH I [731b26-29] 272a / *Ethics* BK I CH 6 [1096 23-29] 341c

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III 10a 12b TR VII CH I 26c TR VIII CH 3-12 28a 34a / *Fifth Ennead* TR III CH 15-16 224c 226a TR IX CH 10 250c / *Sixth Ennead* TR V CH I 305c 306a TR VII CH 24-26 333d 334d CH 28 335b d

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK III par 10 15b d par 12 16b BK IV par 24 25b c BK V par 20 32d 33a BK VII par 3-7 44a-45d par 16-23 48c 50c / *City of God* BK XI CH 22 333d 334a BK XII CH 3 343d 344b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 2 ANS 15c 16a QQ 4-6 20c 30d Q 13 A II REP 2 73c 74b Q 21 A I REP 4 124b 125b Q 22 A I ANS 127d 128d Q 25 A 6 ANS 149a 150a Q 48 AA 1-3 259b 262a Q 73 A I 370a 371a A 3 REP 3 371d 372c Q 74 A 3 REP 3 375a 377a c PART I-II Q 2 A 5 618d 619c Q 18 AA I 4 694a 696d esp A I ANS and REP I 694a d A 2 ANS 694d 695c Q 29, A 5 ANS 747c 748b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 55 A 3 REP 2 24c 25b Q 55 A 4 REP I 28c 29d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I APPENDIX 369b-372d PART II DEF 6 373c PART IV DEF I 2 424a

42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 278b-c / *Practical Reason* 307b c

3a The hierarchy of being: grades of reality degrees of intelligibility

7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 124c 126a / *Symposium* 167a d / *Republic* BK V 370c 373c BK VI VII 383d 398c BK IX 422c-425b esp 423b-424d / *Timaeus* 447a 455c / *Philebus* 637c 639a c

8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation* CH 13 [23 18 26] 35b c / *Topics* BK VI CH 4 [141 26-142a2] 194c 195c / *Heavens* BK I CH 2 359d 360d BK II CH 12 383b 384c BK IV CH 3 [310b32 311 3] 402b c / *Generation and Corruption* BK I CH 3 413c-416c BK II CH 10 [336b25 34] 438d / *Meteorology* BK IV CH 12 [389b23 390 17] 493d 494b / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 6 505b 506b CH 7 [988 34 b5] 506c CH 8 [989b21-990 8] 507d 508a CH 9 508c 511c BK II CH I [993b19-31] 512a b BK IV CH 4 [1008b32-1009 5] 528b BK IX CH 9 [1051 4 22] 577a b BK XII CH 5 [1071 30-36] 601a CH 7 602a 603b CH 10 603d 606d BK XIII CH 2 [1077 14-b14] 608b 609a BK XIV CH 4 [1091 29]-CH 5 [1092 17] 624a 625a / *Soul* BK III CH 4 [429 29-b4] 661c d

9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH 5 [644b20-645 5] 168c d / *Generation of Animals* BK II CH I [731b24-33] 272a b / *Ethics* BK I CH 6 [1096 17-23] 341b c

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK VI [724 751] 230b-231a

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR VII CH I 26a d TR VIII CH 3-10 28a 33a CH 12 33d 34a / *Second Ennead* TR III CH 11-12 46b c CH 16-18 48b 50a TR IX CH 3 67b c / *Third Ennead* TR II CH 1-2 82c 83d TR VIII CH 8 10 132d 136a / *Fourth Ennead* TR VIII CH 6 203d 204b / *Fifth Ennead* TR II CH I 214c 215a TR III CH 11-12 222b 223c TR IV 226d 228b / *Sixth Ennead* TR VI CH 18 320c 321b TR VII CH 28-29 335b-336b

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK VIII CH II 272c BK XI CH 16 331a-c CH 22 334b-c BK XII CH 2-5 343c 345b BK XIV CH 13 387d / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 8 626c 627a CH 32 633c d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2 A I REP 2 10d 11d A 3 ANS 12c 14a Q 3 A I ANS

Being as the object of lo e and desire

4 Being and truth

(4 *Being and truth*)

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 36a 37b 91d 93b 102c 103a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO par 23 17d PART III par 280 94d 95a / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 156d 157b PART I 237d 238a

53 JAMES *Psychology* 141a b 636a 852a

4*a* Being as the pervasive object of mind and the formal object of the first philosophy metaphysics or dialectic

7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 125a b / *Republic* BK V 368c 373c BK VI-VII 383d 398c / *Parmenides* 486a-491c esp 489a c 507c 509a / *Theaetetus* 535b 536a / *Sophist* 561d 574c esp 571a c / *Philebus* 633a 635a esp 634b 635a / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810d

8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK VI CH 12 [149ᵇ3 23] 203d 204a / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 9 [992ᵇ18-993 10] 511a c BK II CH I [993ᵇ19-31] 512a b BK IV 522a 532d BK VI CH I-BK VII CH I 547b d 551a BK XI CH 3-6 589a 592b

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III 10a 12b / *Fifth Ennead* TR I CH 4 209d 210c TR V CH I-2 228b 229d TR IX CH II 250c 251a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q I A I REP I-2 3b-4a Q 3 A 4 REP I 16d 17c Q 5 A 2 24b 25a Q II A 2 REP 4 47d 48d Q 14 A 9 REP I 83b d Q 16 AA 3-4 96b 97c Q 79 A 7 ANS 420d 421c A 9 REP 3 422b 423d Q 82 A 4 REP I 434c-435c Q 87 A 3 REP I 467b 468a PART I-II Q 3 A 7 ANS 628a d Q 9 A I ANS and REP 3 657d 658d Q 10 A I REP 3 662d 663d

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 94 A 2 ANS 221d 223a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART IV 269b 270c

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 40a 48d esp 40a 41b 43a c 43d 45a

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 53b d / *Objections and Replies* 261a

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 44 COROL 2 and DEMONST 390a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH VII SECT 7 132d

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 1a-4a c 119a c 120b [fn 1] / *Judgement* 551a 552c 603d 607c esp 606d 607c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PREF 6a 7a PART III par 360 113d 114a c / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 156d 157b PART I 234b-c 245d 246c

4*b* Being as the measure of truth in judgments of the mind clarity and distinctness as criteria of the reality of an idea

7 PLATO *Euthydemus* 71c 74a esp 72b c / *Cratylus* 85a 89b / *Parmenides* 507c-509a esp 508d 509a / *Sophist* 558c d 575a 577b

8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 5 [4 10 ᵇ12] 8b 9a CH 10 [12ᵇ6 15] 17d 18a CH 12 [14ᵇ10-21] 20b / *Interpretation* CH 3 [16ᵇ19-26] 25d 26a *Prior Analytics* BK II CH 2 [53ᵇ11 26] 72d 7. / *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 19 [81ᵇ17 2 111c d / *Physics* BK I CH I 259a b / *Metaphysics* BK IV CH 3-8 524b 532d BK V CH [1017 31-34] 538a CH 29 [1024ᵇ22 39] 546c 547a BK VI CH 4 550a c BK IX, CH 10 577c 578a c BK XI CH 4-6 589d 592b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 4 REP 2 16d 17c Q 14 A 8 REP 3 82c 83b Q 16 AA I-2 94b-96b Q 16 A 8-Q 17 A I 99d 101d Q 21 A 2 ANS 125c d PART I II Q 2 A 3 ANS 617b-618a

22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida* BK IV STANZA 154 108b

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 56b

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 51b 54b / *Meditations* I IV 75a 89b IV V 92d 96a VI, 98c d / *Objections and Replies* 108a 115a c 121b 122c 124c 125b 126b-127c DEF III IV 130b POSTULATE IV-VII 131a c AXIOM VI 132a AXIOM X 132b PROP II III 132c 133a 237c 238b 257d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II DEF 4 373b PROP 32 385c PROP 43 388c 389b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH III SECT 24-25 120a d BK II CH VIII SECT I-6 133b 134a CH XIII SECT II 150d 151b SECT 25 26 154a c CH XXIII SECT 5 205a b SECT 15 208c d SECT 32 212c d CH XXXI 243c 248b passim esp SECT 19 247a b BK III CH VI SECT 46-47 281d 282b BK IV CH V SECT 7-9 330b 331a CH X SECT 7 350d 351a CH X SECT 19-CH XI SECT I 354a c CH XI SECT 12 357c d

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 36b c 85d 88a 179c 182b / *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 367d 368a / *Judgement* 603d 604b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 141a 142a 636a 638a 641a 879b 882a esp 881a b

5 Being and becoming the reality of change the nature of mutable being

7 PLATO *Cratylus* 94c d 99b 104b 113c 114a c / *Phaedrus* 124c 126c / *Symposium* 165c 166b 167a d / *Phaedo* 231b 232b 247b-248c / *Republic* BK II 322d 323a BK V 368c 373c BK VI-VII 383d 398c BK VIII 403a b / *Timaeus* 442a 477a c esp 447a d 455c-458b / *Parmenides* 486a 511d / *Theaetetus* 517d 534b / *Sophist* 561d 574c / *Statesman* 587a b / *Philebus* 610d 617d 631d 635a esp 634b 635a / *Laws* BK X 760a 765c

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK I 259a 268d esp CH 8 267a d BK II CH I 268b d 270a BK III CH I-3 278a 280c CH 6 [206ᵃ18-ᵇ16] 284c 285a BK IV CH II [219ᵇ23 31] 299c d BK VI CH 6 319c 321a / *Heavens* BK I CH 3 360d 362a CH 9 [277ᵇ29-278ᵇ9] 369a d BK IV CH 3 [310ᵇ22 311 12] 402b-c CH 4 [311ᵇ29-33] 403c / *Generation and Corruption* BK I CH 3 413c 416c BK II CH 9 II 436d 441a c / *Meta*

6 The cause of existence

(6 *The cause of existence*)

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [80–134] 137a 138a BK VII 217a 231a esp [162–169] 220b [601–640] 230a 231a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XV SECT 12 165b c CH XXVI SECT 1–2 217a c

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 2–4 413b-414a SECT 25–33 417d 419a SECT 36 419c d SECT 45–46 421b c SECT 48 422a SECT 88–91 430a 431a SECT 146 150 442a 443b

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VIII DIV 74 484a

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 140b d 145c 177b 179b / *Practical Reason* 334b 337a c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 245d 246c

7 The divisions or modes of being

7a The distinction between essence and existence existence as the act of being

OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 3 14

8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK IX CH 3 [1047 30–b2] 572c

17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR VII CH 6 122a d / *Fifth Ennead* TR V CH 13 234d 235a

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XI CH 10 328c d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 4 16d 17c A 5 ANS and REP 1 17c 18b A 6 ANS 18c 19a A 7 ANS and REP 1 19a c Q 4 A 1 REP 3 20d 21b A 2 ANS and REP 3 21b-22b A 3 REP 3 22b-23b Q 6 A 3 29c 30b Q 7 A 1 ANS and REP 3 31a d A 2 ANS and REP 1 31d 32c Q 8 A 1 ANS 34d 35c Q 9 A 2 ANS 39c 40d Q 10 A 2 ANS 41d 42c Q 11 A 4 ANS 49d 50b Q 12 A 2 ANS and REP 3 51c 52c A 4 ANS and REP 3 53b 54c Q 13 A 11 ANS 73c 74b Q 25 A 1 REP 2 143d 144c Q 29 A 1 REP 4 162a 163b Q 34 A 1 REP 2 185b 187b Q 39 A 2 REP 3 203b-204c Q 44 A 1 238b 239a Q 50 A 2 REP 3 270a 272a Q 54 A 1 ANS and REP 2 285a d A 2 REP 2 285d 286c A 3 ANS and REP 2 286c 287b Q 75 A 5 REP 4 382a 383b Q 88 A 2 REP 4 471c 472c PART I II Q 3 A 7 ANS 628a d

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 52d 53a / *Meditations* V 93a 96a / *Objections and Replies* 110a 112a 112d 113b 126b-127c POSTULATE V 131b-c AXIOM I 131d AXIOM X PROP I 132b c 158b 162a passim 217d 218a

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I DEF 8 355c AXIOM 7 355d PROP 7 356c PROP 8 SCHOL 2 356d 357d PROP 11 358b 359b PROP 17 SCHOL, 363b-c PROP 20 363d 364a PROP 24 25 365a b PROP 34 369a PART II DEF 2 373b AXIOM I 373c PART III PROP 7 399a PART IV DEF 3 424a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH V SECT 1–6 263d 265a BK IV CH IX SECT 1 349a

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 179c 182b 191d 192b

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 280 94d 95a / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 165a b 178c d PART I 233d 234b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 640b [fn 1] 644b

7b The distinction between substance and attribute accident or modification independent and dependent being

8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 2 [1 20–b9] 5b-c CH 5 6a 9a CH 7 [8 12–b24] 13a d / *Topics* BK V CH 4 [133b15 134 4] 184d 185b / *Sophistical Refutations* CH 7 [169 33 36] 233a CH 22 [178b37–179 10] 246c / *Physics* BK I CH 2 [185a20]–CH 3 [187 10] 260a 262a / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 9 [990b22–991a2] 509a [992b18 24] 511a BK IV CH 4 [1007a20–b18] 526c 527a BK V CH 7 [1017 23 31] 537d 538a CH 11 [1019 1–14] 540a BK VII CH 3 [1029a7 26] 551c d CH 4–6 552b 555a BK VIII CH 3 [1043b18–24] 568a b CH 4 [1044b8 20] 569b BK IX CH 1 [1045b28 32] 570b CH 7 [1049 19–b1] 574d 575a BK X CH 2 580b d BK XII CH 1 [1069 18 25] 598a CH 4–5 599d-601a CH 7 [1072b4–13] 602c d

9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK II CH 2 [648b35]–CH 3 [649b22] 173b-174b

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK XII SECT 30 310a

17 PLOTINUS *Fourth Ennead* TR VIII CH 6 203d 204b / *Sixth Ennead* TR I CH 3 253a b CH 5 254c d CH 15 260c d CH 25 265b d TR II CH 14–15 276c 277b TR III CH 3 282a c CH 6 284a c CH 8 285b c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 6 18c 19a Q 6 A 3 ANS 29c 30b Q 7 A 2, A 3 31d 32c Q 9 A 2 39c 40d Q 11 A 1 REP 1 2 46d 47d A 2 REP 1 47d 48d A 4 REP 2 49d 50b Q 29 A 1 ANS and REP 3 162a 163b Q 39 A 3 ANS 204c 205c Q 40 A 1 REP 1 213b 214b A 2 REP 4 214b-215b Q 44 A 2 ANS and REP 1 239b 240a Q 45 A 4 244d 245c Q 54 A 1 285a d A 3 286c 287b Q 67 A 3 351b 352a Q 76 A 4 393a 394c A 6 396a d Q 77 A 1 399c 401b A 6 404c-405c Q 85 A 5 REP 3 457d 458d Q 90 A 2 ANS 481d-482c Q 115 A 1 ANS and REP 5 585d 587c PART I–II Q 7 A 1 ANS and REP 2 3 651d 652c A 4 REP 3 654b 655a Q 17 A 4 ANS 688d-689c Q 18 A 3 REP 3 695d 696b Q 29 A 2 REP 1 745c 746b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 49 A 2 ANS and REP 3 2b-4a Q 50 A 2 7c-8a Q 52 A 1 ANS 15d 18a Q 53 A 2 REP 3 21a d Q 66 A 4 ANS 78c 79b PART II II Q 23 A 3, REP 3 485a d PART III Q 2 A 1 ANS 710a 711c PART III SUPPL, Q 70 A 1 ANS 893d 895d Q 79 A 1 REP 4 951b 953b Q 83 A 3 ANS 978c 980d

30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK I APH 66 114d 115a

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART I 41d PART IV 52d / *Meditations* III 81d 89a passim, esp

87b-88c / Objections and Replies DEF V 130b-c DEF IX 130d 135b-136b 136c 139b-c 153d 162d 16 d 170d 211b-c 228c 229c
SPINOZA Ethics PART I DEF 3-5 355b AXIOM 1 2 355c d PROP 1-9 355d 357d PROP 10 SCH L 358a b PROP 19 363c d RO 20 COROL 2 364a PRO 21 23 364a 365a
35 LOCKE Human Understanding BK I C I I I S CT 19 117c d K II CH XII SECT 3-6 147d 148c CH XI S CT 17 2 152 d CH XXI I 204a 214b esp SECT I 15 204a 208d CH XXXII SECT 24 247c d K III CH IX SECT 12 13 287d 288d
35 BERKELEY Human Knowledge S CT 1 7 413a-414c ECT 25 33 417d-419a passim E T 49 422b ECT 73 8 427b-428b ECT 88-9 430 431a ECT 101 10 4 2c-433a
42 KANT Pure Reason 33a d 74b-76c 130b-133 esp 131c d 140b d 143a / Practical Reason, 310d 311d / J d ement 529c 530 550a 5 1 c 566b-d 580c d
46 HEGEL Philosophy of Right DITIONS 6 121a b 39 122d / Philosophy of History L TRO, 160c 161 ART I 211a-c
53 JAMES Psychology 572 b

7b(1) The conceptions of substance

8 ARISTOTLE Categories 5 6a 9a CI 7 [b 2 ^{b}24] 13a d / Metaphysics K CH 8 538b-c BK I I I 550b d 570d BK X CH 2 580b-d K X I C I 98a-c BK XI CH 2 [1 —^{b}14 ^{b} 1] 608b-609a
12 AURELIUS Meditations BK II SECT 23 281b
17 PLOTINUS S th Ennead, TR I C I 3 252c 253b CH 257b-258b CH 25 265b-d TR II CH 2 281c 286d
19 AQ Summa Theologica PART I Q 3 5 2 17c 18b 6 18c 19 Q I A 3 49 -c Q 13 9 A 5 71b-72 QQ 29-43 161d 237 c passim, esp Q 9 163b-164b Q 45 4 244d 245c QQ 5 6 378a 399b passim Q 88 A 2, P 4 471 -472 P T -1 Q 4 A 688d 689c
20 AQ A Summa Theologica E II I Q 4 I A and RE 402 -403d P T II QQ 3 01b,d 30b Q 7 806d-809d passim PART III PL Q 83 974d 983b passim
23 HOBBES Leviathan P RT III 172b
30 B O Novum Organum K I A H 37 168d 169c
31 DESCARTES Objections and Replies D I 130b-d 153c 155c
31 SPINOZA Ethics RT DE 3 6 355b OP 1-9 355d 357d RO 11 4 358b-360 RO 15 I 360b-361d P 9 363c d RT II P O I 376c 377
35 LOCKE Human Understanding BK I CH II SS 5 9 117c d 4K CH XII CT 6 148b-c CH I CT 7 2 152a d XX 204 214b X I 6-13 240d 243b CH 4 247 d BK 21 273c d 42 280b-c H IX EC 1 -17 287d 290a BK IV CH I SECT 4 16 331d 336d passim esp SECT 11 334b-335b
35 BERKELEY Human Knowledge SECT 6-7 414b-c SECT 6- 7 418a b SECT 73 427b-c SECT 88-91 430a-431a SECT 135 136 440a b SECT 139 440d
42 KANT Pure Reason 15b-c 63a 63d-64a 69c 72c 74b- 6c 81b-83b 86c 87b 91d 93b 95a-d 100d 101b 121a 128b 131c d 137a 140c 162b-163a 186b-d / Judgement 565b-d 566d 567a
46 HEGEL Philosophy of Right PA T III par 146 55c d / Philosophy of History INTRO, 156d 157b PA T 211a-c 227d 2 8a
53 JAMES Psychology 221b 223a

7b(2) Corporeal and spiritual substances, composite and simple substances, the kinds of substance in relation to matter and form

8 ARISTOTLE Physics BK I CH 7 265b-267a K II CH 1 268b,d 270a K I CH 2 288b-289a / Heavens BK I CH 9 [27-^{b}26-2 ^{b}9] 369a d BK IV CH 4 [31- 12 17] 403d / Generation and Corruption BK I CH 3 413c-416c / Meteorology BK CH 12 493d-494d / Metaphysics BK I CH I [99^{b}13 18] 514a [995^{b}31 39] 514b [996 13 15] 514c CH 2 [997^{a}34-998 19] 516a-d CH 4 [999^{b}24 ^{b}23] 518a-c II 5 520c 521b CH 6 [1002^{b}11 32] 521b-d BK CI 8 536b-c BK VII VIII 550b d 5 0d K XI C I I [1059^{a}33 ^{b}14] 587b-c CH 2 [1 60^{a}3 2] 588a b [1060^{b}23 29] 588d 589a BK XII XIV 598a-626d / Soul BK I CH I - 64 a-644c
12 EPICTETUS Discourses K IV CH I 240d 241a
12 AURELIUS Meditations BK IV SECT I 265b- BK VII SECT 23 281b BK VIII SECT 11 286b BK XII ECT 3 310 b
17 PLOTINUS Second Ennead, TR IV CH 2 4 50b-51a CH 6 51d 52a TR V CH 2 58b-d / Third Ennead TR VI CH 7 9 110d 119a / Fourth Ennead TR VIII CH 6 203d 204b / Fifth Ennead TR CH 2 208c 209b TR IX CH 3 247b-d / S th Ennead TR I CH 27 8 266c 267c TR I CH 2 1 281c 286d TR CH 5-8 307 308c
18 AUGUSTINE Confessions K II par 1 2 43b-44a par 7 45a d par 16 48c-49a par 20 49d par 26 51c d BK XII par 5-6 100a-c par 8 101a b par 6 102d 103a par 18-22 103a 104b par 24 26 104c 10 b par 28-30 105c 106c par 38-4 108d 110a BK XIII par 48 124a / City of God BK XI CH 10 327d 328d
19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I Q 3 14 20c Q 6 A 3 R P 1 29c 30b Q 7 A 1 ANS 31 d Q 8 A REP 2 34d 35c A 2 35c 36b Q 9 A 2 REP 3 39c-40d Q 11 A 4 REP 3 49d 50b Q 14 A 2 REP 1 3 76d 77d Q 18 A 4 R P 3 107d 108c Q 9, A I R P 4 162a 163b 2 RE 3 5 163b-164b Q 40 A I REP 213b-214b Q 45 A 4 244d 245c Q 5 269 275a

(7b The distinction between substance and attribute, accident or modification, independent and dependent being. 7b(2) Corporeal and spiritual substances, composite and simple substances: the kinds of substance in relation to matter and form.)

[1075^b 13-14] 606b / *Soul* BK II CH 2 [413^b 24-29] 643d 644a

9 ARISTOTLE *Motion of Animals* CH 4 [699^b 12-700^a 5] 234d 235a

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [159-173] 3d 4b; [483-634] 7a 8d

16 PTOLEMY *Almagest* BK I 5a 6a; BK XIII 429a b

16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 929b 930b

17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR I CH 1 4 35a-37b; CH 8 39c d; TR IV CH 6 51d 52a / *Fourth Ennead* TR VII CH 10-12 198d 200a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 9 A 2 39c 40d; Q 10 A 2 REP 1 41d 42c; A 3 ANS and REP 1 42c 43b; A 5-6 44b-46d; Q 18 A 3 REP 3 106b 107c; Q 22 A ANS 128d 130d; Q 46 A 1 REP 2 3 250a 252d; Q 48 A ANS and REP 3 260c 261b; Q 50 A 5 274b-275a; Q 63 A 1 REP 2 325c 326c; Q 66 A 345d-347b; Q 68 A 1 ANS 354a 355c; Q A 6 383c 384c; Q 76 A 3 REP 1 2 391a 393a; Q 97 A 1 513c 514c; A 4 515d 516d; Q 104 A 1 REP 1 3 534c 536c; Q 113 A ANS 576d 577d; PART I-II Q 22 A 1 REP 3 720d 721c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II, Q 49 A 4 ANS 5a 6a; Q 85 A 6 182d 184a; PART II-II Q 24 A 11 ANS 498b 499c; PART III SUPPL Q 91 A 1 1016b 1017c; AA 4-5 1020d-1025b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE, VII [64-84] 115d 116a; [121 148] 116b c; XIII [52-87] 126a b

31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 121c-d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 6-8 356b 357d; PROP 12 13 359b-d; PROP 15 SCHOL, 361d

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I [116 156] 96a 97a; BK II [94-105] 113a b; BK VI [320 34] 203a b; [430-436] 205b

33 PASCAL *Vacuum* 358a

34 NEWTON *Optics* BK III 541b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH III, SECT 19 259c

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 141 441a b

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 121a 128b 203d 204c / *Practical Reason* 348d 349a

53 JAMES *Psychology* 221b 222b 224a b

1 Q 70 A 3 REP 2 365b 367a; QQ 75 76 378a 399b; Q 77 A 1 ANS and REP 2-3 6 399c-401b; Q 85 A 5 REP 3 457d 458d; Q 86 A 3 463b-d; Q 88 A 2 REP 4 471c 472c; Q 104 A 1 ANS and REP 1 534c 536c; Q 115 A 1 585d 587c; A 3 REP 588c 589c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 52 A 1 ANS 15d 18a; PART II-II Q 24 A 11 ANS 498b 499c; PART III Q 2 A 1 ANS and REP 2 710a 711c; PART III SUPPL Q 69 A 1 ANS and REP 2 885c 886c; Q 79 A 2 REP 953b 955c; Q 92 A 1 ANS 1025c 1032b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE VII [121 148] 116b c; XXIX [13-36] 150b c

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART III 172a 177c; PART IV 258b 261a 269d 271b

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 17b d / *Novum Organum* BK II APH 37 168d 169c

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 51d 52a / *Meditations* VI 96b 103d / *Objections and Replies* DEF VI VIII 130c d 153c 155c

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 15 360a 361d; PART II PROP 1-2 373d 374a; PROP 6 374d 375a; PROP 7 SCHOL 375b c

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XIII SECT 16-18 151d 152c; CH XV SECT 11 165a b; CH XXI SECT 2-4 178c 179c; CH XXIII SECT 5 205a b; SECT 15-37 208c 214b; CH XXVII SECT 2 219b c; BK III CH X SECT 15 295a c; BK IV CH III SECT 6 313c 315b; CH X SECT 9-19 351b 354c passim; CH XVI SECT 12 370c 371a

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 1 29 413a 418c; SECT 35-38 419c 420a; SECT 47-50 421c 422c; SECT 67-81 426b 428d; SECT 86-91 429c 431a passim; SECT 133 142 439c 441c

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 100d 101b 121a 128b 186b d 203d 204c / *Judgement* 557c 558b 565b d 566d 567a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 156d 157b 160c 161a 165a b; PART I 227d 228a

53 JAMES *Psychology* 118b 119b passim 220b 226a esp 221a 223a

7b(3) Corruptible and incorruptible substances

8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation* CH 13 [23 18 26] 35b c / *Heavens* BK I CH 1-3 359a 362a; CH 9 [279 12 ^b4] 370b d; BK I CH 10-BK II CH 1 370d 376a; BK III CH 6 396a c / *Metaphysics* BK III CH 2 [996 21 28] 514d; BK IV CH 5 [1009 36-39] 528d; BK V CH 5 [1015^b 9 16] 536a; BK IX CH 8 [1050^b 5] CH 9 [1051 21] 576b 577b; BK X CH 10 586c d; BK XI CH 6 [1063 10-17] 591b; BK XII CH 1 [1069 30-^b2] 598b-c; CH 2 [1069^b 24 27] 598d 599a; CH 3 [1070^a 20-27] 599c; CH 6-8 601b-605a; CH 10

7b(4) Extension and thought as dependent substances or as attributes of infinite substance

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 51d 52a / *Meditations* VI 96b-103d / *Objections and Replies* DEF VI VIII 130c d; PROP IV 133c; 135d 136b 152d 155d esp 153c 155c 224d 225d 231a 232d 248b

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 14 COROL 2 360a; PART II DEF 1 2 373a b; PROP 1 2 373d 374a; PROP 5-6 374c-375a; PROP 7 SCHOL 375b-c

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XIII, SECT 18 152a-c

42 KANT *Judgement* 580c d

i) Substance as subject to change and to different kinds of change: the role of accidents or modifications

8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 5 [4 10–b19] 8b-9a / *Physics*, BK I, CH 6- BK II CH 1 264c 270a BK III CH 1 3 278a-280c, BK VIII 304a 353d / *Generation and Corruption*, BK I, CH 1-5 403a-420b BK II, CH 9-10 436d-439c / *Metaphysics* BK I, CH 3 [983b-984b5] 501d 502c BK III, CH 4 [999a24-b24] 518a-c BK VII, CH 7-9 553a 558a BK VIII, CH 1 [1042a24-b] 566b-d CH 3 [1043b13-23] 568a b CH 4-5 568d 569d BK IX, CH 1 5 0b d 5 1b CH 3 5 2a-c CH 6-7 573c 575a BK XI CH 9 593d 594d CH 11 596a-d CH 1 [1068a7-b26] 596d-597d BK XII, CH 1-5 598a-601a / *Soul*, BK II CH 4 [416b3-1] 646d-647a

10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK I CH 2 16 b-168c CH 5 169b-c BK II, CH 4, 18 a-b BK III, CH 203b-205a CH 15, 214d-215d

17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead*, TR I CH 3 4 36b-37b TR I CH 6 51d 52a TR CH 1 2 60c 62b / *Third Ennead*, TR CH 7 19 110d 119a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I, Q 3 6, ANS 18c 19a Q 9, 2 39c-40d Q 41 3 219d 221c 5 222b-223b Q 44 A 239b-240a Q 45 A 1-5 242a-247 passim S 2 9b-250a Q 50, 5 274b-275a Q 53 280d 284d, Q 65 A 4 342b-343c Q 66, AA 1 2 343d 347b Q 6 A 3, AN and REP 1 351b-352a Q 3, A 3 371d 372c; Q 6 383c 384c Q 76, A 4 393a 394c Q 8 A 2, A and REP 4 409a-410a Q 90, ANS and R P 481d-482 Q 92, 3, EP 490c-491b Q 98, A 1 516d-517d, Q 1 4 534c 538c Q 0, AA 1 2 538d 540c; A 5, ANS 544a 543b Q 1 AA 1 3 585d-589c A 6, ANS 591d 592d Q 1 8 A 1 600a 601c Q 19 604c-608d ART I II, Q 22, 1 720d 721

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II, Q 51 2, ANS and REP 2 13c 14b Q 52, A 2 15d 19a Q 53 A RE 1 19d 1 REP 1 3 21a-d Q 2, A 3 349a-d P R III SUPPL, Q 5 3, AN 938a 939d, Q 80 A 4 959c 963a Q 82, A 1 2 968a-9 1a Q 83 A 1 9 4d 9 6b 5, ANS 981b-982c Q 84 983c 989b Q 6, AA 2 3 993c 996a,c

30 BACON *Novum Organum*, BK I, APH 66, 114a-b

31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 162d 165d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* ART I, PROP 6 356b-c, 0 12 3 359b-d, PRO 23 364d 365a, PROP 365c-366a AX 1, RO 3 377d 3 8c

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* K I, CH XXII SECT 1 203c-d CH XX I, ECT 2 217a-d III, CH CT 42 180b-c

42 KANT *Pure Reason*, 74b- 6c, 82a 83b 86c 8 b 141b,d 143a passim

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO, 156d 15 b 1, 8c-d

7b(6) The nature and kinds of accidents or modifications

8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 2 [1a 0–b9] 5b-c CH 4 5d-6a CH 7 [2a–b6] 6b-c [3a6– 1] 7b CH 6-9 9a 16d / *Prior Analytics*, K I, CH 13 [32b4 14] 48b-c / *Posterior Analytics*, BK I CH 4 [73b33 b16] 100b-d / *Topics* BK I, CH 9 147a b [71a33 b16] 100b-d / *Topics* BK I, CH 9 147a b / *Physics*, BK I CH 2 [185a20-186a4] 260a-d CH 4 [188a5-13] 263b BK II, CH 1 [19-b33 39] 269a BK I CH 3 [1 b1-8] 289b-c BK VI, CH 3 329a 330d / *Metaphysics*, BK CH 6 [1015b 16-34] 536a b CH 7 [10 7a23 30] 537d 538a CH 9 [17b27 10 8 3] 538c CH 30 547a-d BK II CH 1 [1 2 10-18] 550b CH 4-6 552b-555a BK III, CH 4 [1014b8- 0] 569b BK X CH 9 586a-c K XII CH 1 [1069a18- 5] 598a / *Sense and the Sensible* CH 6 [445b4 446a] 683b-684c

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [419- 82] 6c-7

17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead*, TR VI 60c-62d / *Sixth Ennead*, TR I, CH 4 24 253b-265b CH 30 268b-c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I Q 3 A 6 18c 19a Q 8, A 2 REP 3 35c 36b Q 9, ANS 39c-40d Q 28, A 2 158d 160 Q 29, A ANS and REP 4-5 163b-164b Q 44 A 2 ANS 239b-240a Q 45 A 4 ANS 244d 245c Q 54 A 1 285a-d A 286c 287b Q 66 A 1 REP 3 343d 345c Q 6 A 3 351b-352a Q 76 A 6 396a-d A 8 A 8 397d 399b Q 77 399b-407a passim Q 101 1 RE 1 522c 523a Q 108 5 ANS 555d 558b Q 115, 1 A 8 and REP 3 5 585d 58 c A 6 AN 591d 592d Q 116 A 1 ANS 592d-593d PART I-II Q 2, A 6 AN 619d 620d Q 7 651d-655a passim, Q 1 A 4 A 5 688d-689c Q 18 A 3 695d-696b Q 5 A 4 ANS and REP 2 774d 775d

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II QQ 49-54 1a 25d passim, esp Q 49, AA 1 2 1b-4a Q 56 A 1 REP 3 30a-c PART II 1 Q 23 A 3 REP 3 48a-d Q 4 A 5, ANS and REP 1 492b-493d PART III, Q 2, A 6 16b- 18b PART III SUPPL, Q 0, A 1 ANS 893d-895d Q 9, A 1 REP 4 951b-953b Q 8 A 3 9 8c 980d

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 5 a b 59c-d

30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK I APH 66 114d 115a

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART I 41d / *Objections and Replies* 13 b-136b 130c 162d 165d 2 8c 229c

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I D F 4-5 355b PROP 0 358a b OP 9, DEMONST 363c-d PROP 0 OL 2 36 PROP 21 3 364 365a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH III 133b-138b esp SECT 8-10 134b-d CH X I CT 3-6 147d 148c CH XIII, S CT 17 0 152a-d CH XXI, SECT 3 1 8d CT 75 200b-d CH XXIII, S CT 10 205d 206d SECT 7 213d 214b CH XXX, ECT 2 238b-c CH XXXI

(3) Potentiality and actuality in relation to matter and form

7d The distinction between real and ideal being, or between natural being and being in mind

(7 The divisions or modes of being 7d. The distinction between real and ideal being, or between natural being and being in mind)

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I APPENDIX 369b-372d esp 371c 372c PART II PROP 5-9 374c 376c
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXII SECT 2 201a b CH XXX SECT 2 238b-c CH XXXI SECT 2 239b-d CH XXXII SECT 14 18 245c 247a passim BK III CH III SECT 15-19 258b 260a CH VI 268b 283a passim esp SECT 2-3 268c d SECT 8 270b c BK IV CH II SECT 14 312b-d CH IV SECT 6-8 325a-c CH IX SECT 1 349a CH XI SECT 4-9 355b 357a
35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 1-96 413a 431d esp SECT 1 24 413a 417d SECT 29-44 418c 421a SECT 48-49 422a b SECT 82-84 428d 429c SECT 86-91 429c 431a
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT X DIV 44 468d 469c esp 469b-c SECT XII DIV 117 123 504a 506a
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 24a 33d esp 25c 26a 28a b 31d 32c 85d 93c 200c 209d 211c 212a / *Practical Reason* 295b d / *Judgement* 551a 553c 604a b
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 134c d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 153a c 158a 160b 188d 189a PART I 219d 220a 236a c 257c d PART IV 354b 364b c
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 385b
50 MARX *Capital* 11b c
53 JAMES *Psychology* 128a b 142a b 176a 177a 191b-192a 302a 639a 645b esp 640a 644b 645b 659a 660b 851b-852a 865b 866a 868b 879b 886a esp 881a 882a 889a 890a
54 FREUD *General Introduction* 597d 598a

7*d*(1) The being of the possible

7 PLATO *Republic* BK X-VI 368c 383a
8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK IX CH 3 572a c / *Soul* BK III CH 4 [429a18-23] 661c
17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR V CH 4-5 59c 60c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 7 A 2 ANS and REP 3 31d 32c Q 9 A ANS 39c 40d Q 14 A REP 3 76d 77d A 9 REP 1 83b d A 13 REP 2 3 86d 88c Q 18 A 4 REP 3 107d 108c Q 46 A 1 REP 1-2 250a 252d
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 33 SCHOL 1 367c d PART II PROP 8 375c 376a
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I 1c
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 85d 88a 95a d 97a b 176d 177a 179c 180c / *Judgement* 550a 578a esp 550c d 552c d 555a b 564a 565b 568a c 569a 570c 575b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 153a c 156d 157b 178a 179d
53 JAMES *Psychology* 233b [fn 1] 301b 302a

7*d*(2) The being of ideas universals rights

7 PLATO *Cratylus* 87d 89a 113c 114a c / *Phaedo* 224a 225a 228d 230c 231b-232b 240b 246c esp 242c 244b / *Republic* BK VI 368c 388a BK IX-X 426d-429c / *Timaeus* 447a d 457b 458a / *Parmenides* 486c-491a esp 489a-c / *Sophist* 567b 570a 574c / *Philebus* 610d 613a / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810b
8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 11 [77a5-9] 105d 106a CH 22 [83a23 35] 113c d CH 24 [85a31-b3] 116c [85b1, 2] 117a / *Topics* BK II CH 7 [113a24 33] 158d BK VI CH 8 [147a5 11] 201a / *Sophistical Refutations* CH 22 [178b37 179a10] 246c / *Physics* BK II CH 2 [193b31 194a6] 270b BK III CH 4 [203a4 9] 280d / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 6 505b 506b CH 9 508c 511c BK III CH 1 [995b13 18] 514a [995b27-996a10] 514b c CH 2 [997a34 b12] 516a b [998a6-13] 516d CH 4 [999b24 1000a4] 518c d [1001a4 b25] 519d 520c CH 6 [1002b11-31] 521b d [1003a5 17] 521d 522a c BK VII CH 8 [1033b19-1034a8] 556d 557b CH 10 [1035b28 32] 559b CH 13 16 562a 565a BK VIII CH 6 569d 570d BK IX CH 8 [1050b35 1051a2] 576d 577a BK X CH 2 [1053b9-23] 580b-c CH 10 586c d BK XI CH 1 [1059a34 b14] 587b-c CH 1 [1059b21]-CH 2 [1060a27] 587d 588b CH 2 [1060a36-b30] 588c 589a BK XII CH 1 [1069a27 37] 598b CH 3 [1070a4]-CH 5 [1071b2] 599b 601a BK XIII CH 1 [1076a17, 33] 607a b CH 4-5 610a 611d CH 10 618c 619a,c / *Soul* BK II CH 5 [417b17 28] 648b c
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 6 341b 342c passim
17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR V CH 3 58d 59c TR VI CH 3 62b-d / *Third Ennead* TR VIII CH 8 132d 133c / *Fifth Ennead* TR V CH 1 229a TR VII 238a 239b TR IX CH 5-8 248a 250a / *Sixth Ennead* TR V CH 5-8 307a 308c
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 9 3a / *City of God* BK VIII CH 6 269b-c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 8 A 4 REP 1 37c 38c Q 14 PREAMBLE 75c d Q 15 91b-94a Q 16 A 7 REP 2 99a d Q 18 A 4 107d 108c Q 29 A REP 4 163b-164b Q 44 A 3 240b 241a Q 47 A 1 REP 2 256a 257b Q 55 288d 291d Q 57 AA 1 2 295a 297a Q 65 A 4 342b-343c Q 76 A 2 REP 4 388c 391a Q 79 A 3 ANS 416a-417a Q 84 AA 1-7 440d-450b Q 85 A 1 ANS and REP 1 2 451c-453c A 2 ANS and REP 2 453d 455b A 3 REP 1 4 455b 457a A 8 ANS 460b-461b Q 86 A 4 REP 2 463d-464d Q 87 A 1 A 3 465a 466c Q 88 A 1 ANS 469a-471c A 2 ANS 471c 472c Q 105 A 3 ANS 540c 541b Q 110 A 1 REP 3 564c 565d A 2 ANS 565d 566d Q 115 A 1 ANS 585d 587c A 3 REP 2 588c 589c PART I II Q 29 A 6 ANS 748b-749a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q A 5 REP 2 715a 716b Q 4 A 4 ANS and REP 2 733a 734a PART III SUPPL Q 92 A 1 A 1025c 1032b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 55b c 59d PART IV 262a b

3 B con Advancement of Learning 43d 44c / Novum Organum, BK I APH 51 111c BK II PH 2 137b-c APH 17 149b-d

31 DESCARTES Meditations III 84 85a / Objections and Replies 121a-c DEF I IV 130a b XI M 1132a

31 SPINOZA Ethics P RT II PROP 37 40 386b-388b

35 LOCKE Human Understanding BK II CH I SECT 15 98d 99 BK II H III 133b-138b passim C XI SECT 8-9 145b-c CH XXI SECT 201a b CH XXX 238a 239b C XXX E T 2 239b d CH XXXII S CT 6-8 244b-d SECT 14 S 245c 247 BK III CH III SECT 11 20 2 a 260a CH V 1 263d 283a passim esp C I CT 32 33 277c 278c SECT 36-37 2 9 b K I CH IV SECT 4-5 324c-d SECT 11 12 326b-d CH VI SECT 4 331d 332b CH IX ECT 1 349a CH XI SECT 4-9 355b- 57a

35 BERKELEY Human Knowledge INTRO ECT 12 6 408a-409d SECT 2 4 413b-414a ECT 48-49 422 b CT 86-91 429c-431

35 HUME Human Understanding S CT XII 1 1 2 505 d

42 KANT Pure Reason 93c 99 112d 209d esp 112d 120c 121a 128b 129c 145c 173b-190a 237b / Fund Prin Metaphys c f M rals 281c 282d / Science of Right 404d-408b 416b-417b / Judgement 461a-c 489b-c 504d 505 528d 530c 542b-544c 551a 552c 5 0b-c

46 HEGEL Philosophy of Right P EF 6a 7 TR par I 9a PART I par 66-67 29 -c par 71 31b-c RT II par 84 64b par 280 94d 95a D ITI NS 2 115d / Philosophy f History I RO 156d 190b esp 156d 157b 158a 160b 165a b P RT I 364b-

53 JAMES Psychology 113a 115a esp 113b-114a 128a b 300a 313a passim esp 300a 301 304b 307 b 309 311a 641b-643a passim 6 9 b 865b 881b-882a

7d(3) The being of mathematical objects

7 PLATO Phaedo 228b-229d / Republic K VI 387b-c BK 392a 394c 395c 397a / Theaetetus 535b-c 541b d / S philist 562c-d / Phileb 636b-c / Seventh Letter 809c 810b

8 ARISTOTLE Posterior Analytics BK I CH 3 [9b6-1] 108c CH 18 [81 40-b5] 111b-c / Topics K 1 C 6 [143b1 33] 197b-c / Physics B I [193b 3 94 1]270a-c K H 4 [2 3 4-9] 2 0d c 5 [204 8-34] 282a b BK I II I [08 9-24] 287b-c CH 1 [2 9b5-8] 299b CH 14 [223a2 29] 303a / Metaphysics, K I 5 [985b22-986a21] 503d 504b H 6 [987b 34] 505c 506a I 8 [989b29-990a32] 508a 9 [99 9-992b18] 509d 511 K III C [995b 3 8] 514a [996a 3- 5] 514c I 2 [997b 2-998 19] 516b-d CH 5 [001b26]-CH 6 [100 b 5] 520c 521 K XIII CH 2 [10 8 28-28] 551 b c o [035a32 036 2] 559b-c CH 11 [1 3 b32 3a4] 560b-c K XI CH 2 [060a36 b19] 588c d CH 3 [1061 29 4]

589c BK XII C I I [1 69 30-37] 598b C I 10 [1075b-5 10,6 4]606c d BK XIII CH I [607a 610a CH 6-9 611d-618c BK XIV 619b d-626d / Soul BK III CH 7 [431b13 19] 664b

9 ARISTOTLE Ethics BK I CH 6 [109 17 19] 341b BK I CH 8 [1142 16-19] 391b

11 NICOMACHUS Arithmetic BK I 811a 812a 813d 814b

17 PLOTINUS Sixth Ennead TR VI 310d 321b

18 AUGUSTIN Confessions BK X, par 19 76a b / Christian Doctrine BK II CH 38 654b-c

19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I Q 5 A 3 REP 4 25a d Q 10 A 6, ANS 45 -46d Q 11 A 1 R P 1 46d-47d A 3 REP 2 49a-c Q 30 A 1 RE 4 167a 168a Q 44 A 1 REP 3 2 8b 239a Q 85 A 1 RE 2 451c-453c

20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica P RT III SU PL, Q 83 A 2 ANS 976c 978c A 3 REP 2 978c-980d

31 DESCARTES Rules XIV 30b-32a / Discourse PA T IV 52d 53a / Meditations I 76c V 93a d V I 96a b / Objections and Replies 169c 170 216d 217c 218c 228c 229a

35 LOCKE Human Understanding BK II CH XIII SECT 5-6 149b-d BK III CH III ECT 19 259c d BK V CH IV SECT 5-8 324d 325c

35 BERKELEY Human Knowledge IN RO S CT 12 6 408a-409d SECT 12 16 415b-416a SECT 118-128 436b-438d passim esp SECT 121 122 436d-437c, CT 125 126 438a-c

35 HUME Human Understanding SECT IV DIV O 458a b SECT XII DIV 122 505c d

42 KANT Pure Reason, 16a b 17d 18d 2 d 25b 31b-d 46a c 55c 62a d 68a-69c 86b c 87b-c 91c d 94b 95 11c-213c 21 c d / Practical Reason 312c / Judgement 551a 552c

53 JAMES Psychology 874a 8 8a passim 880b-881a

7d(4) The being of relations

7 PLATO Phaedo 242c 245b / Parmenides 489a / Sophist 570a 574c

8 ARISTOTLE Metaphysics K I C 9 [990b9-17] 508d K XIV CH I [1088 15 b4] 620b-d

9 ARISTOTLE Ethics K I CH 6 [1096a18 22] 341b-c

17 PLOTINUS Sixth Ennead TR CH 6-9 254d 257a

19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PA T I Q 13 A, ANS and R 2 4-5 68d 70d Q 8 A I 2 157c 160a A 4 A and REP 1 3 4 160 161d Q 4 A 2 EP 4 214b-215b Q 45 A 3 P I 3 244a d

20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica RT II Q 2 A 7 REP 2 718b-d

30 BACON Novum Organum BK I APH 45 110b

35 LOCKE Human Understanding BK I CH XXV S CT 1 214d 215b SECT 0 216d 217a CH XXX ECT 4 2 8d 239

35 BERKELEY Human Knowledge S CT 11 415a

42 KANT Pure Reason 24a 33d esp 31d 32c 61a 64a esp 62d 63c 72c 85d 99a 108a 119b

46 HEGEL Philosophy of History I TRO 156b-c

(7 The divisions or modes of being 7d The distinction between real and ideal being, or between natural being and being in mind)

31 Spinoza *Ethics* part i appendix 369b-372d esp 371c 372c part ii prop 5-9 374c 376c
35 Locke *Human Understanding* bk ii ch xxii sect 2 201a b ch xxx sect 2 238b c ch xxxi sect 2 239b d ch xxxii sect 14 18 245c 247a passim bk iii ch iii sect 15 19 258b 260a ch vi 268b 283a passim esp sect 2-3 268c d sect 8 270b c bk iv ch ii sect 14 312b-d ch iv sect 6-8 325a c ch ix sect 1 349a ch xi sect 4-9 355b 357a
35 Berkeley *Human Knowledge* sect 1-96 413a 431d esp sect 1-24 413a 417d sect 9 44 418c 421a sect 48-49 422a b sect 82-84 428d-429c sect 86-91 429c 431a
35 Hume *Human Understanding* sect v div 44 468d 469c esp 469b-c sect xii div 117-123 504a 506a
42 Kant *Pure Reason* 24a 33d esp 25c 26a 28a b 31d 32c 85d 93c 200c 209d 211c 212a / *Practical Reason* 295b d / *Judgement* 551a 553c 604a b
44 Boswell *Johnson* 134c d
46 Hegel *Philosophy of History* intro 153a c 158a 160b 188d 189a part i 219d 220a 236a c 257c d part iv 354b 364b c
48 Melville *Moby Dick* 385b
50 Marx *Capital* 11b c
53 James *Psychology* 128a b 142a b 176a 177a 191b-192a 302a 639a 645b esp 640a 644b 645b 659a 660b 851b 852a 865b 866a 868b 879b 886a esp 881a 882a 889a 890a
54 Freud *General Introduction* 597d 598a

7d(1) The being of the possible

7 Plato *Republic* bk v-vi 368c 383a
8 Aristotle *Metaphysics* bk ix ch 3 572a c / *Soul* bk iii ch 4 [429 18-23] 661c
17 Plotinus *Second Ennead* tr v ch 4-5 59c 60c
19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 7 a 2 ans and rep 3 31d 32c q 9 a 2 ans 39c 40d q 14 a 2 rep 3 76d 77d a 9 rep 1 83b d a 13 rep 2 3 86d 88c q 18 a 4 rep 3 107d 108c q 46 a 1 rep 1 250a 252d
31 Spinoza *Ethics* part i prop 33 schol 1 367c d part ii prop 8 375c 376a
38 Montesquieu *Spirit of Laws* bk i 1c
42 Kant *Pure Reason* 85d 88a 95a d 97a b 176d 177a 179c 180c / *Judgement* 550a 578a esp 550c d 552c d 555a b 564a 565b 568a c 569a 570c 575b
46 Hegel *Philosophy of History* intro 153a c 156d 157b 178a 179d
53 James *Psychology* 233b [fn 1] 301b 302a

7d(2) The being of ideas universals rights

7 Plato *Cratylus* 87d 89a 113c 114a c / *Phaedo* 224a 225a 228d 230c 231b-232b 240b 246c esp 242c 244b / *Republic* bk vi 368c 388a bk ix-x 426d 429c / *Timaeus* 447a d 457b 458a / *Parmenides* 486c-491a esp 489a c / *Sophist* 567b 570a 574c / *Philebus* 610d 613a / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810b
8 Aristotle *Posterior Analytics* bk i ch 11 [77ᵃ5-9] 105d 106a ch 22 [83ᵃ23 35] 113c-d, ch 24 [85ᵃ31-ᵇ3] 116c [85ᵇ14 22] 117a / *Topics* bk ii ch 7 [113ᵃ24 33] 158d bk vi, ch 8 [147ᵃ5-11] 201a / *Sophistical Refutations*, ch 22 [178ᵇ37 179ᵃ10] 246c / *Physics* bk ii ch 2 [193ᵇ31-194ᵃ6] 270b bk iii ch 4 [203ᵃ4 9] 280d / *Metaphysics* bk i ch 6 505b-506b ch 9 508c 511c bk iii ch 1 [995ᵇ13 19] 514a [995ᵇ27-996ᵃ10] 514b c ch 2 [997ᵃ34 ᵇ12] 516a b [998ᵃ0-13] 516d ch 4 [999ᵇ24 1000ᵃ4] 518c d [1001ᵃ4 ᵇ25] 519d 520c ch 6 [1002ᵇ11-31] 521b d [1003ᵃ5 17] 521d 522a c bk vii ch 8 [1033ᵇ19-1034ᵃ8] 556d 557b ch 10 [1035ᵇ28 32] 559b ch 13 16 562a 565a bk viii ch 6 569d 570d bk ix ch 8 [1050ᵇ35 1051ᵃ2] 576d 577a bk x ch 2 [1053ᵇ9-23] 580b c ch 10 586c d bk xi ch 1 [1059ᵃ34 ᵇ9] 587b c ch 1 [1059ᵇ21]-ch 2 [1060ᵃ2] 587d 588b ch 2 [1060ᵃ36-ᵇ30] 588c 589a bk xii ch 1 [1069ᵃ27 37] 598b ch 3 [1070ᵃ4]-ch 5 [1071ᵇ2] 599b 601a bk xiii ch 1 [1076ᵃ1 33] 607a b ch 4-5 610a 611d ch 10 618c 619a c / *Soul* bk ii ch 5 [417ᵇ17 28] 648b c
9 Aristotle *Ethics* bk i ch 6 341b 342c passim
17 Plotinus *Second Ennead* tr v ch 3 58d 59c tr vi ch 3 62b d / *Third Ennead* tr viii ch 8 132d 133c / *Fifth Ennead* tr v ch 1 229a tr vii 238a 239b tr ix ch 5 8 248a 250a / *Sixth Ennead* tr v ch 5-8 307a 308c
18 Augustine *Confessions* bk i par 9 3a / *City of God* bk viii ch 6 269b-c
19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 8 a 4 rep 1 37c 38c q 14 preamble 75c d q 15 91b 94a q 16 a 7 rep 2 99a d q 18 a 4 107d 108c q 29 a 2 rep 4 163b-164b q 44 a 3 240b 241a q 47 a 1 rep 2 256a 257b q 55 288d 291d q 57 a 1 2 295a-297a q 65 a 4 342b 343c q 76 a 2 rep 4 388c 391a q 79 a 3 ans 416a-417a q 84 a 1 7 440d-450b q 85 a 1 ans and rep 1 2 451c 453c a 2 ans and rep 2 453d 455b a 3 rep 1 4 455b 457a a 8 ans 460b 461b q 86 a 4 rep 2 463d 464d q 87 a 1 a 1 465a 466c q 88 a 1 ans 469a-471c a 2 ans 471c-472c q 105 a 3 ans 540c 541b q 110 a 1 rep 3 564c 565d a 2 ans 565d 566d q 115 a 1 ans 585d 587c a 3 rep 2 588c 589c part i ii q 29 a 6 ans 748b-749a
20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part iii q 2 a 5 rep 2 715a 716b q 4 a 4 ans and rep 2 733a 734a part iii suppl q 92 a 1 ans 1025c 1032b
23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part i 55b c 59d part iv 262a b

416c-d / *Metaphysics* BK I, CH 5 [986b25-987a1] 504d-505a CH 6 [987a29-b18] 505b-d BK XI, CH 5-6 528c-531c BK XI, CH 6 [1062b33-1063b8] 591a-d / *Soul*, BK I, CH 2 [404b7-405b9] 633d-635a CH 5 [409b18-411a] 639c-641a BK II, CH 5 647b-648d BK III, CH 12 [424b26]-BK III, CH 2 [426a25] 656a-658c
11 NICOMACHUS *Arithmetic* BK I, 811 -d
17 PLOTINUS *Fifth Ennead*, TR CH 228b-229c TR CH 5 248a-249a / *Sixth Ennead*, TR I, CH 28 266c-267c esp CH 8 67b-c
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK III, par 1 15b-d IV par 15 17 23a-c par 3 50b-c / *Christian Doctrine* BK II, CH 38 654b-c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I, Q 6 7, A 3 351b-352a Q 8 3 ANS 410a-411d Q 86, A 3 463b-d
5 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 291d-293d
1 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 51c-53b / *Meditations* 74a,c II 81d
5 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 2-3 413b-d SECT 5-7 417d-418b SECT 85-91 430a-431a SECT 135-142 440a-441
12 KANT *Pure Reason* 34a-72c esp 34a-c, 39-c, 41-42b, 45b-59b, 61 64a, 65d-72 / *Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals* 281 282d / *Judgement* 603d-604b

Being and becoming in relation to intellect: abstraction and intuition

7 PLATO *Cratylus* 113c-114a,c / *Phaedrus* 125a-126c / *Symposium* 16 a-d / *Phaedo* 224a-226c 228a-232a / *Republic* BK I 333b-334b BK 368c-375b BK 376d-382a-c, BK II, 383d-398c / *Timaeus* 447b-d 450b-c 455c-458b *Theaetetus* 534d-536b / *Sophist* 565a-569 esp 568a-569a / *Philebus* 610d-613a 615c-619d esp 619a-d 634b-635b / *Seventh Letter* 809c-810d
8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 8 104 b / *Topics* BK I CH [12 0- 6] 169a-b / *Physics*, BK I CH [19b 3 3] 299c-d BK II CH 3 [245 245] 330b-d / *Heavens* BK III, CH 1 [5 24] 390a-b / *Metaphysics* BK CH 5 [986 25-987a1] 504d-505a CH 6 [8 9- 8] 505b-d BK I, CH [99 4 6] 513d-514b CH 2 [995 8-99 34] 514d-516a 522a-532d BK 547b,d-550a,c BK CH [1039b0- 40a8] 563c-564a BK XI, CH -8 58 593d XII CH 7 602a-603b CH 9 603a-d / *Soul*, BK I, CH 2 [404b7-405 29] 633d-635a CH 5 [409b 8-41] 639c-641 BK 5 [4 2 4 8 3] 64 d-648c BK II CH 4-8 661b-664d
11 NICOMACHUS *Arithmetic* BK 811 d
17 PLOTINUS *Fifth Ennead*, TR CH 2 228b-229d TR CH 5 248a-249a / *Sixth Ennead*, TR I, CH 7 28 266c-267 esp CH 8 26 b-c
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK par 3 50b-c / *City of God*, BK XI CH 318c-d / *Christian Doctrine* BK II, CH 38 654b-c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 5 A 2 ANS 24b-25a Q 12 A 1 50c-51c AA 3 4 52c-54c Q 16 AA 2 3 95c-96d Q 5, A 2, ANS 150c-151 Q 34 A 1 REP 2 185b-187b Q 50 A A 5 and REP 1 270a-272a Q 54 A 2 285d-286c Q 8 A 1 A 5 407b-409a Q 9, AA 1 10 423d-424d passim Q 84 AA 1 2 440d-443c AA 6- 447c-450b Q 85 A 1 451c-453c 5 REP 3 457d-458d Q 86 A 1 461c-462a A 3 463b-d Q 88 468d-475a Q 89 A 4 476c-477a Q 10 A 3 ANS 540c-541b PART I II Q 3 A 8 ANS 628d-629c Q 1 A 1 REP 3 662d-663d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART II II Q 2, A 3 ANS 392d-393c PART III SUPPL, Q 92 A 1 1025c-1032b
31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 51c-53b / *Meditations* II, 81b-d
35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 25-27 41 d-418b SECT 85-91 430a-431a SECT 135-142 440a-441c
42 KANT *Pure Reason*, 38a 108a,c esp 39a-c, 41-93c / *Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals* 281 282d 28a 287d / *Judgement* 465a-c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I I par 343 110d-111a / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 160d-161c

8c Essence or substance as the object of definition, real and nominal essences

7 PLATO *Meno* 174a-179b passim / *Euthyphro* 196a-b / *Gorgias* 252d-253b / *Republic* BK 384 386c esp 385b-c / *Theaetetu* 514b-515c 54 549c / *Sophist* 551a-552c / *Laws* BK X, 763c-d / *Seventh Letter* 809a-810b
8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 5 [2a 19- b 4] 6b-8a / *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 113b-115b CH 33 [89a17 b5] 121d-122a BK CH 3 10 123c-128d CH 13 131b-133c / *Topics* BK I CH 4 [1 b 23] 144b-c CH 5 [101b3 102a5] 144d CH 8 [3b1] 146d CH 18 [108 38-b9] 152d [108b 9-32] 153a,c BK CH I [139a24-34] 192a BK 7, CH 4 BK VII CH 5 19 c-211a,c passim / *Physics* BK I CH 3 [186b 4 34] 261c-262a BK II CH 1 [193a30- 9] 269c-270a II 2 [94 11 4] 270c / *Meteorology* BK IV CH 12 493d-494d / *Metaphysics* BK CH 3 [983a24-29] 501c CH 5 [987a19-2] 505b CH 6 [987b35-b] 505c [987b30-33] 506a BK II CH 2 [994b 6-2] 513a-b BK III CH 2 [996b1 21] 515a-b BK IV CH 4 [1006a29-b 8] 525c-d [1007a20-b18] 526c-527 BK V CH 2 [1013a 7 8] 533b BK 7 CH [1025b28-1 26a6] 547d-548a BK VII CH 1 [1028a31 3] 550d CH 4-6 552b-555a CH 0- 7 558a-566a,c BK VIII CH 3 566d-568d CH 6 569d-570d BK X CH 7 [1064a19-28] 592 BK XII CH 9 [1074b37-1075a2] 605c BK XIII CH [1078b 0] 608d-609a CH 4 [1 8 8-3] 610b-c / *Soul*, BK CH 1 631a-632d BK II BK [412 b24] 642a-d BK II CH 6 [4 b26-31] 663b-c
9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK CH 1 [641a14-3] 163d-164a CH 2 3 165d-167d

(*7d The distinction between real and ideal being, or between natural being and being in mind* *7d(4) The being of relations*)

53 JAMES *Psychology* 157b 161a esp 158b 159b 458a 459b 865b 873a b 879b-886a esp 884b-885a 889a 890a

7*d*(5) The being of fictions and negations

7 PLATO *Sophist* 561d 564b 571d 574c esp 573a 574c

8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK I CH 9 [990^{b}9 15] 508d BK IV CH 2 [1004 9-15] 523a BK V CH 7 [1017 18] 537d [1017 31-34] 538a BK VII CH 4 [1030 24-27] 553a CH 7 [1032^{b}1-6] 555b c BK IX CH 3 [1047 30-^{b}2] 572c BK XII, CH 1 [1069 18-24] 598a

9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK II CH 24 [1402 3-6] 651b c

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [722-748] 53d 54a

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK III par 12 16b / *City of God* BK XI CH 22 333d 334c BK XII CH 7 340c d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 13 A 7 ANS 68d 70d Q 34 A 3 REP 5 188b 189a Q 48 A 2 esp REP 2 260c 261b Q 51 A 2 ANS 276b 277a PART I-II Q 8 A 1 REP 3 655b 656a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 50d 53c 57b-c PART IV 262a d

31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 157b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH VIII SECT 1-6 133b 134a BK III CH III SECT 19 259c 260a

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 345c

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 62d 63a 174d 175b

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 160a

53 JAMES *Psychology* 639a 644a esp 642b [fn 2]

54 FREUD *General Introduction* 597b 598a esp 598a

7*e* The distinction between appearance and reality between the sensible and supra sensible between the phenomenal and noumenal orders

7 PLATO *Cratylus* 113c 114a c / *Phaedrus* 124d 127a / *Symposium* 167a d / *Phaedo* 224a 225a 228a 232a / *Republic* BK V 370d 373c BK VI 383d 388a BK VII 396d 398c / *Timaeus* 447a d 450b c 455c 458a esp 457c 458a / *Theaetetus* 534d 536a / *Sophist* 567a 568c / *Statesman* 595b c / *Philebus* 634b 635b / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810d

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK I CH 4 [187 27-^{b}7] 262b c / *Metaphysics* BK V CH 29 [1024^{b}22-27] 546c d

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK II [308-332] 19a b

17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR VI CH 1 60c 61b / *Fourth Ennead* TR VIII CH 6 203d 204b / *Sixth Ennead* TR III CH 1 2 281a 282a

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par 10 11a b BK III par 10 15b d BK VII par 23 50b-c BK X par 13 74c d par 16-19 75b-76b / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 38 654b-c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I, Q 18, A 2 ANS 105c 106b

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 291b 294b

31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 238a b 257d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I APPENDIX 372a c

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH VIII 133b 138b passim esp SECT 7 10 134b d, SECT 15-20 135c 136c CH XXIII SECT 5 205a b SECT 15 208c d SECT 29 211d 212a SECT 32 212c d CH XXXI SECT 6-13 240d 243b BK III CH III SECT 15-18 258b 259c CH VI 268b 283a passim esp SECT 9 270d 271a BK IV CH XVI SECT 12 370b 371a

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 25 27 417d-418b SECT 86-91 429c-431a passim SECT 101-102 432c 433a SECT 135 142 440a-441c SECT 148 442b d

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT IV DIV 29 461a d

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 15c 16c 19a 19d 20c 27b 33d 53b 59b esp 58a b 86c 88c 93c 99a 101b 108a c 112b d 113c 115a 153a-c 164a 165c 172c 173a 227a 228b / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 281c 282d / *Practical Reason* 292a c 307d 314d 319c 321b 328a 329a 331a 337c 340a 342d esp 340c 341c 348b 353d / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 383c-d / *Science of Right* 416b-417b / *Judgement* 465a c 474b 475d 500c d 501d 502a 506d 507a 510b c 530a 541a 542a 543a 543c 544c 551a 552c 558d 560c 564a c 570b-572b esp 571c 572a 574b-577a 579a 581a-b 584c d 587d 588a 594d [fn 1] 599d 600d 603a b 604a b 606d 607c 611c 613a c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 82-83 34d 35a ADDITIONS 52-53 124d 125a / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 156d 157b PART III 270d 271c PART IV 349b 350a

48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 120a 121a 385b

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI 168b c

53 JAMES *Psychology* 185a b 234a b 503a b 569b 570a 606b 608b esp 608a b 648a

54 FREUD *Unconscious* 430b c

8 Being and knowledge

8*a* Being and becoming in relation to sense-perception and imagination

7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 126b d / *Phaedo* 224a 225a 231b 232a / *Republic* BK III 333b 334b BK V 368c 373c BK VI VII 383d 398c / *Timaeus* 447b d 450b c 453b 454a 455c-458b esp 457b 458a / *Theaetetus* 517b 536b / *Sophist* 565a 569a esp 568a 569a / *Philebus* 610d-613a

8 ARISTOTLE *Generation and Corruption* BK I, CH 3 [318^{b}18 319 2] 415c d CH 4 [319^{b}5 4]

ic

5c-d / *Metaphysics* BK I, CH 5 [986a23] 504d-52a, CH 6 [987a29-b1a] 505b-d BK IV CH 3-6 525-531c, BK XI, CH 6 [1062b] 591c-d *Soul*, BK I, CH 2 [404b-405b] 633d-634a CH 5 [409b-411b] 639c-641a BK II, CH 5 64 b-645d BK I CH 1 [424a-b] 656a-656c
NICOMACHUS Arithmetic BK I, 811c-d
PLOTINUS Fifth Ennead, TR CH 1 58b-239c TR IX, CH 5 248a-249a / Sixth Ennead, TR II, CH 3 266c 26 c esp CH 5 6 b-c
AUGUSTINE Confessions BK III, par 10 15b-d BK IV par 15 23a-c BK XI, par 23 30b-c / Christian Doctrine BK I CH 5 624b-c
AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I, Q 6 A 3, A 5 351b-3 Q 5 3 A 5 410a-411d Q 56, A 3 463b-d
MONTAIGNE Essays, 292d 293d
DESCARTES Discourse PART I 51c 53b / Meditations 74a-c 81d
BERKELEY Human Knowledge SECT 3 413b-d SECT 5 7 41 d-418b SECT 88-91 430a-431a SECT 135 14- 440a-441
KANT Pure Reason, 34a 2c esp 34a c, 39a-c, 41 42b, 45b-59b, 61a-64a, 65d 72c / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 81c 282d / Judgement 603d-604b

8b. Being and becoming in relation to intellect: abstraction and intuition

7 PLATO Cratylus 113c 114a. Phaedrus 125a 126c / Symposium 16 a-d / Phaedo 4a 226c 228a 232a Republic BK III 333b-334b BK 1, 368c 375b BK 376d 382a-c BK I 11, 383d 398c / Timaeus 447b-d 450b- 455c-458b Theaetetus 534d 536b / Sophist 565a 569a esp 568a 569a / Philebus 610d-613a 615c-619d esp 619a-d 634b-635b / Seventh Letter 809c 810d
8 ARISTOTLE Posterior Analytics BK I CH 8 104 b / Topics BK I CH [121b-b 6] 169a b / Physics BK CH II [19 3 31] 239c d BK I CH 3 [24 245 5] 330b-d / Heavens BK III, CH 1 [298 5 4] 390a b Metaphysics BK CH 5 [986b 5-987a1] 504d 505a CH 6 [987a29- 8] 505b-d BK I I CH [993 4 6] 513d 514b CH 2 [996a 8-997a34] 514d 516a BK 522a 532d BK 547b,d 550a,c BK VI CH [1 39 0- 4 8] 63c 564a BK XI CH -8 58 a 593d BK XII CH 7 602 603b CH 9 605a d / Soul BK I CH 2 [404b7 40 29] 633d 635a CH 5 [409b18-411b] 639c-641a 5 [4 2 4 5 3] 647d 648c BK II CH 4-8 661b-664d
11 NICOMACHUS Arithmetic BK I 811a d
17 PLOTINUS Fifth Ennead, TR CH 1 2 228b-229d TR X CH 5 248a 249 / Sixth Ennead, TR CH 7 S 266c 267 esp CH 8 26 b-c
18 AUGUSTINE Confessions, BK I, par 23 50b-c / City of God, BK XI CH 10 328c d / Christian Doctrine BK II 13 654b-c

19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART I Q ART 1b-5a Q 1-, A 1 50c 51c AA 3 4 52a 54c Q 10, AA 3 95c-96d Q 5 AAS 150c-151a Q 34 A 1 REP 185b-187b Q 50, AA 1-2 AND REP 2 0a 272a Q 54 A 2 85d 286c Q 75, A 1 ANS 407b-409a Q 79, AA 1 10 413d-424d passim Q 84 A 1-2 440d-443 AA 6- 447c-450b 451c-453c A 5 REP 3 45 d 458d Q 86, 1 461c-462a 463b-d, Q 85 465d-473a Q 89, A 4 4 6c-4 Q 10- A ANS 540c 541b PART I-II, Q 3 ANS 6 d-629c Q 10 A 1 REP 3 662d-663d
20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART II II, Q A ANS 392d-393 PART III SUPPL, Q Q- A 1 1025c 1032b
31 DESCARTES Discourse PART I 51c 53b / Meditations, II 81b-d
35 BERKELEY Human Knowledge SECT 5-7 417d-418b SECT 88-91 430a-431a SECT 135-14 440a-441c
42 KANT Pure Reason, 38a 108a,c esp 39a-c, 41c 93c / Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals, 281c 282d 285a 287d / Judgement 465a c
46 HEGEL Philosophy of Right PART I I par 343 110d 111a / Philosophy of History INTRO, 160d 161c

8c. Essence or substance as the object of definition: real and nominal essences

7 PLATO Meno 1 4a 179b passim / Euthyphro 196a b / Gorgias 252d 253b / Republic BK I 384a 386c esp 385b-c / Theaetetus 514b-515c 54 c 549c / Sophist 561a 552c / Laws BK X 63c-d / Seventh Letter 809a 810b
8 ARISTOTLE Categories CH 5 [13-3b24] 6b 8a / Posterior Analytics, BK I CH 2 113b-11 b CH 33 [89 17 b5] 121d 122a,c BK II CH 3 10 123c-128d CH 13 131b-133c / Topics BK I CH 4 [10 23] 144b-c CH 5 [01b37 1 5] 144d CH 8 [103b 11] 146d CH 18 [108 38-b9] 152d [100b 9-32] 153a c K I CH I [139a24 34] 192a K I CH 4 BK VII CH 5 194c-211a c passim / Physics BK I CH 3 [86b14 34] 61c 262a BK I CH I [193 30-b19] 269c 70a CH [194 1 14] 2 0c / Meteorology K IV CH 12 493d-494d / Metaphysics BK I CH 3 [983 4- 9] 501 H 5 [98 19-] 505b c 6 [98 35-b] 505c [987b30 33] 506a K II C I 2 [994b 16-27] 513a b BK III CH 2 [996b 21] 515a b BK I CH 4 [1006a 9-b18] 525c d [100 0-b 8] 526c 527a BK V CH 2 [1013 7 28] 533b, BK VI CH I [10 5 31 3] 550d CH 4-6 552b 555a CH 10-17 558a 566a c BK VI I C 1 2 3 566d 568d CH 6 569d S 0d A XI CH 7 [1064 19-28] 592c BK XII CH 9 [1074b 37 10 5] 605c BK XI CH [10- 1] 608d 609a CH 4 [0-8b 8-3] 610b-c / Soul, BK I CH 1 631a 632d K I CH I [412 1 b24] 642a d K III C 6 [4 b26-31] 663b-c
9 ARISTOTLE Parts of Animals BK I C I [64 14 3] 163d 164a CH 2 3 165d 167d

(*7d The distinction between real and ideal being, or between natural being and being in mind 7d(4) The being of relations*)

53 James *Psychology* 157b 161a esp 158b 159b 458a 459b 865b 873a b 879b 886a esp 884b-885a 889a 890a

7d(5) The being of fictions and negations

7 Plato *Sophist* 561d 564b 571d 574c esp 573a 574c

8 Aristotle *Metaphysics* bk i ch 9 [990^{b}9 15] 508d bk iv ch 2 [1004 9-15] 523a bk v ch 7 [1017 18] 537d [1017 31-34] 538a bk vii ch 4 [1030 24-27] 553a ch 7 [1032^{b}1-6] 555b c bk ix ch 3 [1047 30-^{b}2] 572c bk xii, ch i [1069 18-24] 598a

9 Aristotle *Rhetoric* bk ii ch 24 [1402 3-6] 651b c

12 Lucretius *Nature of Things* bk iv [722-748] 53d 54a

18 Augustine *Confessions* bk iii par 12 16b / *City of God* bk xi ch 22 333d 334c bk xii ch 7 346c d

19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 13 a 7 ans 68d 70d q 34 a 3 rep 5 188b 189a q 48 a 2 esp rep 2 260c 261b q 51 a 2 ans 276b 277a part i ii q 8 a i rep 3 655b 656a

23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part i 50d 53c 57b c part iv 262a d

31 Descartes *Objections and Replies* 157b

35 Locke *Human Understanding* bk ii ch viii sect 1-6 133b 134a bk iii ch iii sect 19 259c 260a

40 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 345c

42 Kant *Pure Reason* 62d 63a 174d 175b

46 Hegel *Philosophy of History* intro 160a

53 James *Psychology* 639a 644a esp 642b [fn 2]

54 Freud *General Introduction* 597b 598a esp 598a

7e The distinction between appearance and reality between the sensible and supra sensible between the phenomenal and noumenal orders

7 Plato *Cratylus* 113c 114a c / *Phaedrus* 124d 127a / *Symposium* 167a d / *Phaedo* 224a 225a 228a 232a / *Republic* bk v 370d 373c bk vi 383d 388a bk vii 396d 398c / *Timaeus* 447a d 450b c 455c 458a esp 457c 458a / *Theaetetus* 534d 536a / *Sophist* 567a 568c / *Statesman* 595b c / *Philebus* 634b 635b / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810d

8 Aristotle *Physics* bk i ch 4 [187 27-^{b}7] 262b c / *Metaphysics* bk v ch 29 [1024^{b}22-27] 546c d

12 Lucretius *Nature of Things* bk ii [308-332] 19a b

17 Plotinus *Second Ennead* tr vi ch i 60c 61b / *Fourth Ennead* tr viii ch 6 203d 204b / *Sixth Ennead* tr iii ch 1-2 281a 282a

18 Augustine *Confessions* bk ii par 10 11a bk iii par 10 15b-d bk vii par 23 50b bk x par 13 74c d par 16-19 75b-76b / *Christian Doctrine* bk ii ch 38 654b-c

19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q a 2 ans 105c 106b

25 Montaigne *Essays* 291b-294b

31 Descartes *Objections and Replies* 238a 257d

31 Spinoza *Ethics* part i appendix 372a-c

35 Locke *Human Understanding* bk ii ch vi 133b 138b passim esp sect 7 10 134b-d sect 15 20 135c 136c ch xxiii sect 5 205a sect 15 208c d sect 29 211d 212a sect 212c d ch xxxi sect 6-13 240d 243b bk iii ch iii sect 15 18 258b 259c ch 268b 283a passim esp sect 9 270d 271a bk iv ch xvi sect 12 370b-371a

35 Berkeley *Human Knowledge* sect 23 2 417d-418b sect 86-91 429c-431a passim sect 101-102 432c 433a sect 135 142 440a 441c sect 148 442b d

35 Hume *Human Understanding* sect iv div 29 461a d

42 Kant *Pure Reason* 15c 16c 19a 19d 20c 27b 33d 53b 59b esp 58a b 86c 88c 93c 99a 101b-108a c 112b d 113c 115a 153a-c 164a 165c 172c 173a 227a 228b / *Fund Prin. Metaphysic of Morals* 281c 282d / *Practical Reason* 292a c 307d 314d 319c 321b 328a 329a 331a 337c 340a 342d esp 340c 341c 348b 353d / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 383c d / *Science of Right* 416b-417b / *Judgement* 465a c 474b 475d 500c d 501d 502a 506d 507a 510b c 530a 541a 542a 543a 543c 544c 551a 552c 558d 560c 564a c 570b-572b esp 571c 572a 574b 577a 579a 581a b 584c d 587d 588a 594d [fn 1] 599d 600d 603a b 604a b 606d 607c 611c 613a,c

46 Hegel *Philosophy of Right* part i par 82-83 34d 35a additions 52-53 124d 125a / *Philosophy of History* intro 156d 157b part ii 270d 271c part iv 349b-350a

48 Melville *Moby Dick* 120a 121a 385b

52 Dostoevsky *Brothers Karamazov* bk vi 168b c

53 James *Psychology* 185a b 234a b 503a b 569b 570a 606b 608b esp 608a b 648a

54 Freud *Unconscious* 430b c

8 Being and knowledge

8a Being and becoming in relation to sense perception and imagination

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The discussion of unity goodness and truth as properties of being or as convertible with being *see* GOOD AND EVIL 1b ONE AND MANY 1 SAME AND OTHER 1a TRUTH 1b

Other treatments of the distinction between being and becoming and of the problem of the reality of mutable as compared with immutable being *see* CHANGE 1 10c ETERNITY 4a-4b MATTER 1 NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 2c

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Considerations relevant to the distinction between potentiality and actuality or matter and form *see* CHANGE 2a DESIRE 2a FORM 2c(1) HABIT 1a INFINITY 1b 4c MATTER 1-1a 3b MIND 2b 4c NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 1 for considerations relevant to the distinction between the real and the ideal *see* IDEA 3c 6a-6b KNOWLEDGE 6a(3) and for the controversy over the real existence of ideas, forms, mathematical objects universals *see* FORM 1a 2a MATHEMATICS 2b SPACE 5 UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 2a-2c

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8d The role of essence in demonstration the use of essence property and accident in inference

8e The accidental in relation to science and definition

8f Judgments and demonstrations of existence their sources and validity

Chapter 8 CAUSE

INTRODUCTION

EXPLANATION is an inveterate human tendency. Even philosophers who think that we cannot attain to knowledge of causes get involved in explaining why that is so. Nor will their disputes about the theory of causes ever remove the word "because" from the vocabulary of common speech. It is as unavoidable as the word "is." "The impulse to seek causes," says Tolstoy, "is innate in the soul of man."

The question "Why?" remains after all other questions are answered. It is sometimes the only unanswerable question—unanswerable either in the very nature of the case or because there are secrets men cannot fathom. Sometimes, as Dante says, man must be "content with the *quia*"—the knowledge *that* something is without knowing why. "Why?" is the one question which it has been deemed the better part of wisdom not to ask; yet it has also been thought the one question which holds the key to wisdom. As Virgil writes, in one of his most famous lines, *Felix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas* (Happy the man who has been able to know the causes of things).

The question "Why?" takes many forms and can be answered in many ways. Other knowledge may prove useful in providing the answers. A definition, for example, which tells us what a thing is, may explain why it behaves as it does or why it has certain properties. A narrative, which tells us how something happened by describing a succession of events, may also be part of the total explanation of some event in question.

In other circumstances, a demonstration or a statement of grounds or reasons may be explanatory. "How do you know?" is often a concealed form of the "Why" question. To answer it we may have to give our reasons for thinking that something or other is the case, or perhaps give the genesis of our opinion. Things as different as a logical demonstration and a piece of autobiography seem to be relevant *in accounting* for our convictions as, *in accounting* for our behavior, we may refer to our purposes and to our past.

THE GREEK WORD for cause, from which our English word "aetiology" is derived, came into the vocabulary of science and philosophy from the language of the law courts. In its legal sense it was used to point out where the responsibility lay. A suit at law is based upon a cause of action; he who demands redress for an injury suffered is expected to place the blame. The charge of responsibility for wrongdoing—the blame or fault which is the cause for legal redress or punishment—naturally calls for excuses, which may include a man's motives.

In the context of these legal considerations, two different meanings of cause begin to appear. One man's act is the cause of injury to another in the sense of being responsible for its occurrence. If the act was intentional, it probably had a cause in the purpose which motivated it.

These two types of cause appear in the explanations of the historians as well as in trials at law. Herodotus and Thucydides, trying to account for the Persian or the Peloponnesian war, enumerate the incidents which led up to the outbreak of hostilities. They cite certain past events as the causes of war—the factors which predisposed the parties toward conflict and even precipitated it. The historians do not think they can fully explain why the particular events become the occasions for war except by considering the hopes and ambitions, or as Thucydides suggests, the fears of the contestants. For the ancient historians at least finding the causes includes a search for the motives

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection
II Works by authors not represented in this collection

For the date place and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

I

AQUINAS *On Being and Essence*
DESCARTES *The Principles of Philosophy* PART I 51-54
HOBBES *Concerning Body* PART II CH 8 10
BERKELEY *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous*
HUME *A Treatise of Human Nature* BK I PART I SECT VI PART II SECT VI
KANT *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*
HEGEL *The Phenomenology of Mind* VIII
—— *Science of Logic* VOL I BK I SECT I SECT III CH I (c) 3 BK II SECT I CH I SECT II CH I SECT III CH 2 3 (A)
—— *Logic* CH 7-8
W JAMES *Some Problems of Philosophy* CH 2-3

II

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS *Against the Physicists* BK II CH 5
PORPHYRY *Introduction to Aristotle's Predicaments*
PROCLUS *The Elements of Theology* (C 1)
BOETHIUS *In Isagogem Porphyrii Commenta*
—— *De Trinitate* (*On the Trinity*)
ERIGENA *De Divisione Naturae*
BONAVENTURA *Itinerarium Mentis in Deum* (*The Itinerary of the Mind to God*)
DUNS SCOTUS *Tractatus de Primo Principio* (*A Tract Concerning the First Principle*)
CRESCAS *Or Adonai* PROPOSITIONS 18-25
ALBO *The Book of Principles* (*Sefer ha Ikkarim*) BK II CH I
G PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA *Of Being and Unity*
CAJETAN *De Conceptu Entis*
SUAREZ *Disputationes Metaphysicae*
JOHN OF SAINT THOMAS *Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus Ars Logica* PART II QQ 2 13-19
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C S PEIRCE *Collected Papers* VOL I par 545-56 VOL VI par 3 7-372 385
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ROYCE *The World and the Individual* SERIES I (1-4 9)
CASSIRER *Substance and Function* PART I PART II, CH 6
HUSSERL *Ideas General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology*
GARRIGOU LAGRANGE *God His Existence and Its Nature* PART II APPENDIX 2
BERGSON *Creative Evolution*
—— *The Creative Mind* CH 3 6
MCTAGGART *The Nature of Existence* BK I
MOORE *Philosophical Studies* CH 6
DEWEY *Experience and Nature* CH 2 8 10
HEIDEGGER *Sein und Zeit*
B RUSSELL *The Analysis of Matter* CH 23
SANTAYANA *The Realm of Essence* CH I II
WHITEHEAD *Process and Reality*
LOVEJOY *The Great Chain of Being*
A F TAYLOR *Philosophical Studies* CH III
BLONDEL *L'être et les êtres*
WEISS *Reality*
SARTRE *L'être et le néant*
—— *Existentialism*
MARITAIN *An Introduction to Philosophy* PART II (5-7)
—— *The Degrees of Knowledge* CH 4
—— *A Preface to Metaphysics* LECT I-IV
—— *Existence and the Existent*
GILSON *L'être et l'essence*
—— *Being and Some Philosophers*

The attack on final causes does not, at the beginning at least, reject them completely. Bacon, for example, divides natural philosophy into two parts, of which one part, "physics, inquireth and handleth the material and efficient causes; and the other, which is metaphysics, handleth the formal and final causes." The error of his predecessors, of which he complains, is their failure to separate these two types of inquiry. The study of final causes is inappropriate in physics, he thinks.

"This misplacing," Bacon comments, "hath caused a deficiency, or at least a great improficiency in the sciences themselves. For the handling of final causes, mixed with the rest in physical inquiries, hath intercepted the severe and diligent inquiry of all real and physical causes, and given men the occasion to stay upon these satisfactory and specious causes, to the great arrest and prejudice of further discovery." On this score he charges Plato, Aristotle, and Galen with impeding the development of science, not because "final causes are not true, and worthy to be inquired, being kept within their own province; but because their excursions into the limits of physical causes hath bred a vastness and solitude in that tract."

Such statements as "the hairs of the eyelids are for a quickset and fence about the sight," or that "the leaves of trees are for protecting of the fruit," or that "the clouds are for watering of the earth," are in Bacon's opinion "impertinent" in physics. He therefore praises the mechanical philosophy of Democritus. It seems to him to inquire into the "particularities of physical causes" better "than that of Aristotle and Plato, whereof both intermingled final causes, the one as a part of theology, the other as a part of logic."

As Bacon's criticisms indicate, the attack on final causes in nature raises a whole series of questions. Does every natural change serve some purpose, either for the good of the changing thing or for the order of nature itself? Is there a plan, analogous to that of an artist, which orders the parts of nature, and their activities, to one another as means to ends? A natural teleology which attributes final causes to everything seems to imply that every natural thing is governed by an indwelling form working toward a definite end, and that the whole of nature exhibits the working out of a divine plan or design.

Spinoza answers such questions negatively. "Nature has set no end before herself," he declares, and "all final causes are nothing but human fictions." Furthermore, he insists, "this doctrine concerning an end altogether overturns nature. For that which is in truth the cause it considers as the effect, and *vice versa*." He deplores those who "will not cease from asking the causes of causes, until at last you fly to the will of God, the refuge of ignorance."

Spinoza denies that God acts for an end and that the universe expresses a divine purpose. He also thinks that final causes are illusory even in the sphere of human action. "When we say that having a house to live in was the final cause of this or that house," we do no more than indicate "a particular desire which is really an efficient cause, and is considered as primary because men are usually *ignorant of the causes of their desires*."

Though Descartes replies to Pierre Gassendi's arguments on behalf of final causality by saying that they should "be referred to the efficient cause," his position more closely resembles that of Bacon than of Spinoza. When "we behold the uses of the various parts in plants and animals," we may be led to admire "the God who brings these into existence"; but that does not imply, he adds, "that we can divine the purpose for which He made each thing. And although in Ethics, where it is often allowable to employ conjecture, it is at times pious to consider the end which we may conjecture God set before Himself in ruling the universe, certainly in Physics, where every thing should rest upon the securest arguments, it is futile to do so."

The elimination of final causes from natural science leads Descartes to formulate Harvey's discoveries concerning the motion of the heart and blood in purely mechanical terms. But Harvey himself, as Boyle points out in his *Disquisition About the Final Causes of Natural Things*, interprets organic structures in terms of their functional utility; and Boyle defends the soundness of Harvey's method—employing final causes—against Descartes.

Guided as it is by the principle of utility or function, Harvey's reasoning about the circula-

which underlie other causes and help to explain how other factors get their causal efficacy

Thucydides explicitly distinguishes these two kinds of causes in the first chapter of his history. After noting that the immediate cause of the war was the breaking of a treaty he adds that the real cause was one which was formally most kept out of sight namely the growth of the power of Athens and the alarm which this inspired in Lacedaemon

It is sometimes supposed that Thucydides owes his conception of causes to the early medical tradition That might very well be the case for Hippocrates constantly seeks the natural causes of disease and in his analysis of the various factors involved in any particular disease he tries to distinguish between the predisposing and the exciting causes

But the classification of causes was not completed in the Athenian law courts in the Greek interpretation of history or in the early practice of medicine Causes were also the preoccupation of the pre Socratic physicists Their study of nature was largely devoted to an analysis of the principles elements and causes of change Concerned with the problem of change in general not merely with human action or particular phenomena such as crime war or disease Greek scientists or philosophers from Thales and Anaxagoras to Empedocles Democritus Plato and Aristotle tried to discover the causes involved in any change Aristotle carried the analysis furthest and set a pattern for all later discussions of cause

THE EXPLANATION OF a thing according to Aristotle must answer all of the queries comprehended under the question why This question can be answered he thinks in at least four different ways and these four ways of saying why something is the case constitute his famous theory of the four causes

In one sense he writes that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists is called cause —the material cause In another sense the form or the archetype is a cause—the formal cause Again the primary source of the change or coming to rest is a cause—the efficient cause Again the end or that for the sake of which a thing is done is a cause—the final cause This he concludes perhaps exhausts the number of ways in which the term cause is used

The production of works of art to which Aristotle himself frequently turns for examples, most readily illustrates these four different kinds of causes In making a shoe the material cause is that out of which the shoe is made—the leather or hide The efficient cause is the shoemaker or more precisely the shoemaker s acts which transform the raw material into the finished product The formal cause is the pattern which directs the work it is in a sense, the definition or type of the thing to be made which beginning as a plan in the artist s mind appears at the end of the work in the transformed material as its own intrinsic form. The protection of the foot is the final cause or end—that for the sake of which the shoe was made

Two of the four causes seem to be less discernible in nature than in art The material and efficient causes remain evident enough The material cause can usually be identified as that which undergoes the change—the thing which grows alters in color or moves from place to place The efficient cause is always that by which the change is produced It is the moving cause working on that which is susceptible to change e g the fire heating the water the rolling stone setting another stone in motion

But the formal cause is not as apparent in nature as in art Whereas in art it can be identified by reference to the plan in the maker s mind it must be discovered in nature in the change itself as that which completes the process For example the redness which the apple takes on in ripening is the formal cause of its alteration in color The trouble with the final cause is that it so often tends to be inseparable from the formal cause for unless some extrinsic purpose can be found for a natural change—some end beyond itself which the change serves —the final cause or that for the sake of which the change took place is no other than the quality or form which the matter assumes as a result of its transformation

THIS SUMMARY of Aristotle s doctrine of the four causes enables us to note some of the basic issues and shifts in the theory of causation.

reason of which is that matter does not receive form, save in so far as it is moved by an agent; for nothing reduces itself from potentiality to act. But an agent does not move except from the intention of an end." Hence in operation the order of the four causes is final, efficient, material, and formal; or, as Aquinas states it, "first comes goodness and the end moving the agent to act; secondly, the action of the agent moving to the form; thirdly, comes the form."

THE THEORY OF causes, as developed by Aristotle and Aquinas, proposes other distinctions beyond that of the four causes, such as the difference between the essential cause or the cause *per se* and the accidental or coincidental cause. As indicated in the chapter on CHANCE, it is in terms of coincidental causes that Aristotle speaks of chance as a cause.

A given effect may be the result of a number of efficient causes. Sometimes these form a series, as when one body in motion sets another in motion and that moves a third; or, to take another example, a man is the cause of his grandson only through having begotten a son who later begets a son. In such a succession of causes, the first cause may be indispensable, but it is not by itself sufficient to produce the effect. With respect to the effect which it fails to produce unless other causes intervene, it is an accidental cause. In contrast, an essential cause is one which, by its operation, immediately brings the effect into existence.

Sometimes, however, a number of efficient causes may be involved simultaneously rather than successively in the production of a single effect. They may be related to one another as cause and effect rather than by mere coincidence. One cause may be the essential cause of another which in turn is the essential cause of the effect. When two causes are thus simultaneously related to the same effect, Aquinas calls one the principal, the other the instrumental cause; and he gives as an example the action of a workman sawing wood. The action of the saw causes a shaping of the wood, but it is instrumental to the operation of the principal cause, which is the action of the workman using the saw.

These two distinctions—between essential and accidental causes and between principal and instrumental causes—become of great significance in arguments, metaphysical or theological, concerning the cause of causes—a first or ultimate cause. Aristotle's proof of a prime mover, for example, depends upon the proposition that there cannot be an infinite number of causes for a given effect. But since Aristotle also holds that the world is without beginning or end and that time is infinite, it may be wondered why the chain of causes cannot stretch back to infinity.

If time is infinite, a temporal sequence of causes reaching back to infinity would seem to present no difficulty. As Descartes points out, "you cannot prove that that regress to infinity is absurd, unless you at the same time show that the world has a definite beginning in time." Though it is a matter of their Jewish and Christian faith that the world had a beginning in time, theologians like Maimonides and Aquinas do not think the world's beginning can be proved by reason. They do, however, think that the necessity of a first cause can be demonstrated, and both adopt or perhaps adapt the argument of Aristotle which relies on the impossibility of an infinite regression in causes.

The argument is valid, Aquinas makes clear, only if we distinguish between essential and accidental causes. "It is not impossible," he says, "to proceed to infinity *accidentally* as regards efficient causes... It is *not* impossible for man to be generated by man to infinity." But he holds "there cannot be an infinite number of causes that are *per se* required for a certain effect; for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to infinity." In the latter case, it should be observed, the cooperating causes are simultaneous and so, if there were an infinity of them, that would not require an infinite time. The crux of the argument, therefore, lies either in the impossibility of an infinite number of simultaneous causes or in the impossibility of an infinite number of causes related to one another as instrumental to principal cause.

Among causes so related, Descartes, like Aquinas, argues that there must be one first or principal cause. "In the case of causes which are so connected and subordinated to one another that no action on the part of the lower is possible without the activity of the higher; e.g., in

tion of the blood—especially its venal and arterial flow in relation to the action of the lungs—appeals to final causes He remarks upon the need of arguing from the final cause in his work on animal generation It appears advisable to me he writes to look back from the perfect animal and to inquire by what process it has arisen and grown to maturity, to retrace our steps as it were from the goal to the starting place

Kant generalizes this type of argument in his *Critique of Teleological Judgement* No one has ever questioned he says the correctness of the principle that when judging certain things in nature namely organisms and their possibility we must look to the conception of final causes Such a principle is admittedly necessary even where we require no more than a *guiding thread* for the purpose of becoming acquainted with the character of these things by means of observation Kant criticizes a mechanism which totally excludes the principle of finality—whether it is based on the doctrine of blind chance of Democritus and Epicurus or the system of fatality he attributes to Spinoza Physical science he thinks can be extended by the principle of final causes without interfering with the principle of the mechanism of physical causality

THE TENDENCY TO dispense with final causes seems to prevail however in the science of mechanics and especially in the domain of inanimate nature Huygens for example defines light as the motion of some sort of matter He explicitly insists that conceiving natural things in this way is the only way proper to what he calls the true Philosophy in which one conceives the causes of all natural effects in terms of mechanical motions

Mechanical explanation is distinguished by the fact that it appeals to no principles except matter and motion The material and the moving (or efficient) causes suffice The philosophical thought of the 17th century influenced by that century s brilliant accomplishments in mechanics tends to be mechanistic in its theory of causation Yet being also influenced by the model and method of mathematics thinkers like Descartes and Spinoza retain the formal cause as a principle of demonstration if not of explanation Spinoza in fact claims that the reliance upon final causes would have been sufficient to keep the human race in darkness to all eternity, if mathematics which does not deal with ends, but with the essences and properties of forms, had not placed before us another rule of truth

Nevertheless the tendency to restrict causality to efficiency—a motion producing a motion—gains headway By the time Hume questions man s ability to know causes the term *cause* signifies only *efficiency* understood as the energy expended in producing an effect Hume s doubt concerning our ability to know causes presupposes this conception of cause and effect which asserts that there is some connection between them some power in the one by which it infallibly produces the other The identification of cause with the efficient type of cause becomes a commonly accepted notion even among those who do not agree with Hume that we are ignorant of the manner in which bodies operate on each other and that their force and energy is entirely incomprehensible to us.

The narrowing of causality to efficiency also appears in the doctrine more prevalent today than ever before that natural science describes, but does not explain—that it tells us *how* things happen but not *why* If it does not require the scientist to avoid all reference to causes, it does limit him to the one type of causality which can be expressed in terms of sequences and correlations The exclusion of all causes except the efficient tends furthermore to reduce the causal order to nothing but the relation of cause and effect

The four causes taken together as the sufficient reason for things or events do not as such stand in relation to an effect in the sense in which an effect is something separable from and externally related to its cause That way of conceiving causation—as a relation of cause to effect—is appropriate to the efficient cause alone When the efficient cause is regarded as the only cause having a power proportionate to the reality of its effect the very meaning of *cause* involves relation to an *effect*

In the other conception of causation the causal order relates the four causes to one another Of the four causes of any change or act the first says Aquinas is the final cause the

he regular processes of nature still another and of divine causation is presupposed by the religious belief in supernatural events, such as the elevation of nature by grace and the deviations from the course of nature which are called miracles All these considerations, and especially the matter of God s miraculous intervention in the regular course of nature have been subjects of dispute among theologians and philosophers (and sometime physicists and historians) Some of those who do not deny the existence of a Creator or the divine government of the universe through natural law nevertheless question the need for divine cooperation with the action of every natural cause, or God s intervention in the order of nature

Throughout these controversies the theory of causes defines the issues and determines the lines of opposing argument But since other basic notions are also involved in the debate of these issues the further consideration of them is reserved for other chapters especially GOD NATURE and WORLD

THE DISCUSSION OF CAUSE takes a new turn in modern times. The new issues arise not from different interpretations of the principle of causality but from the skeptic s doubts concerning our ability to know the causes of things, and from the tendency of the physical sciences to limit or even to abandon the investigation of causes.

According to the ancient conception of science, knowledge to be scientific must state the causes of things The essence of scientific method according to the *Posterior Analytics* of Aristotle, consists in using causes both to define and to demonstrate. Sometimes genus and differentia are translated into material and formal cause sometimes a thing is defined genetically by reference to its efficient cause and sometimes teleologically by reference to its final cause.

The degree to which this conception of science is realized in particular fields may be questioned. The treatises of the astronomers for example do not seem to exemplify it as much as do Aristotle s own physical treatises or Harvey s work on the circulation of the blood Yet until modern developments in mathematical physics, the ascertainment of causes seems to be the dominant conception of the scientific task *and until the separation* widens between the experimental and the philosophical sciences the possibility of knowing causes is not generally doubted

Galileo s exposition of the new mechanics explicitly announces a departure *from* the traditional interest of the natural philosopher in the discovery of causes The aim he says in his *Two New Sciences* is not to investigate the cause of the acceleration of natural motion concerning which various opinions have been expressed by various philosophers but rather to investigate and to demonstrate some of the properties of accelerated motion The various opinions about causes are referred to as fantasies which it is not really worth while for the scientist to examine.

This attitude toward causes especially efficient causes characterizes the aim of mathematical physics both in astronomy and mechanics For Newton it is enough—in fact he says it would be a very great step in philosophy — to derive two or three general principles of motion from phenomena though the causes of those principles were not yet discovered And therefore I scruple not to propose the principles of motion and leave their causes to be found out In other passages Newton disparages the search for hidden or occult causes as no part of the business of science.

Hume goes further He insists that all causes are hidden By the very nature of what causes are supposed to be and because of the manner in which the human mind knows, *man* can have no knowledge of how causes really produce their effects. We never can by our utmost scrutiny he says discover anything but one event following another without being able to comprehend any *force* or *power* by which the cause operates or any connexion between it and its supposed effect

All that men can be referring to when they use the words cause and effect Hume thinks is the *customary* sequence of one object followed by another and where all objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second So far as any knowledge based upon reason or experience can go the relation of cause and effect is simply one of succession, impressed upon the mind by a

the case where something is moved by a stone itself impelled by a stick which the hand moves we must go on until we come to one thing in motion which first moves But for Descartes unlike Aquinas this method of proving God as the first cause of all observable effects has less elegance than the so called ontological argument in which the conception of God as a necessary being incapable of not existing immediately implies his existence

The argument from effect to cause is traditionally called *a posteriori* reasoning in contrast to *a priori* reasoning from cause to effect According to Aristotle and Aquinas the latter mode of reasoning can only demonstrate the nature of a thing not its existence Aquinas furthermore does not regard the ontological argument as a form of reasoning at all but rather as the assertion that God s existence is self evident to us which he denies

The various forms which these arguments take and the issue concerning their validity are more fully discussed in the chapters on BEING GOD, and NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY But here it is worth noting that Kant questions whether the *a posteriori* method of proving God s existence really differs from the ontological argument It *is* according to him not only illusory and inadequate but also possesses the additional blemish of an *ignoratio elenchi*—professing to conduct us by a new road to the desired goal but bringing us back after a short circuit to the old path which we had deserted at its call Hence the causal proof does not in Kant s opinion succeed in avoiding the fallacies which he along with Maimonides and Aquinas finds in the ontological argument

THE ANALYSIS OF CAUSATION figures critically in the speculation of the theologians concerning creation providence and the government of the world

The dogma of creation, for example requires the conception of a unique type of cause Even if the world always existed—a supposition which as we have seen is contrary to Jewish and Christian faith but not to reason—the religious belief in a Creator would remain a belief in that unique cause without whose action to preserve its being at every moment the world would cease to be

On the assumption that God created the world in the beginning it is perhaps easy enough to see with Augustine how the creating and originating work which gave being to all natures differs from all other types of causation which cause motions or changes or even the generation of things rather than their very existence It may however be more difficult to understand the creative action of God in relation to a world already in existence

But a theologian like Aquinas explains that as long as a thing has being so long must God be present to it as the cause of its being—a doctrine which Berkeley later reports by saying that this makes the divine conservation to be a continual creation Aquinas agrees that the conservation of things by God is not by a new action but by the continuation of that action whereby He gives being But in the conservation of things Aquinas thinks that God acts through natural or created causes whereas in their initiation being is the proper effect of God alone

The dogma of divine providence also requires a theory of the cooperation of the first cause with natural or secondary causes Dante in describing the direction which providence gives to the course of nature uses the image of a bow Whatsoever this bow shoots falls disposed to its foreseen end even as a thing directed to its aim That God governs and cares for all things may be supposed to reduce nature to a puppet show in which every action takes place in obedience to the divine will alone Natural causes would thus cease to be causes or to have any genuine efficacy in the production of their own effects

Some theologians have tended toward this extreme position but Aquinas argues contrariwise that natural causes retain their efficacy as instrumental causes subordinate to God s will as the one principal cause Since God wills that effects be because of their causes he writes all effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the will of God and in another place he says whatsoever causes He assigns to certain effects He gives them the power to produce those effects so that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures

In addition to the role of divine causality in

for the theologian, nothing is exempt from God's will. Since the realm of nature includes human nature, must not human acts be caused as are all other natural events? Are some human acts free in the sense of being totally uncaused, or only in the sense of being caused differently from the motions of matter? Are causality and freedom opposed principles within the order of nature, appropriate to physical and psychological action; or do they constitute distinct realms—as for Kant, the realms of phenomena and noumena, the sensible and the supra-sensible; or as for Hegel, the realms of nature and history?

The different answers which the great books give to these questions have profound consequences for man's view of himself, the universe, and his place in it. As the issue of necessity and chance is central in physics or the philosophy of nature, so the issue of determinism and freedom is central in psychology and ethics, in political theory and the philosophy of history, and above all in theology. It makes opponents of James and Freud, of Hegel and Marx, of Hume and Kant, of Spinoza and Descartes, of Lucretius and Marcus Aurelius. It raises one of the most perplexing of all theological questions for Augustine, Aquinas, Pascal, and for the two great poets of God's will and man's freedom—Dante and Milton.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

customary transition That one event leads to another becomes more and more probable—but never more than probable—as the sequence recurs more and more frequently in experience

Hume's skepticism about causes and his re interpretation of the meaning of cause gains wide acceptance in subsequent thought es pecially among natural scientists William James for example considering the principle that nothing can happen without a cause declares that we have no definite idea of what we mean by cause or of what causality consists in But the principle expresses a demand for *some* deeper sort of inward connection between phenomena than their merely habitual time sequence seems to be The word cause' is in short an altar to an unknown god an empty pedestal still marking the place for a hoped for statue Any really inward belonging together of the sequent terms he continues if dis covered would be accepted as what the word cause was meant to stand for

Though Hume holds that we cannot pene trate beyond experience to the operation of real causes imbedded in the nature of things he does not deny the reality of causation as a principle of nature On the contrary he denies that anything happens by chance or that any natural occurrence can be uncaused It is uni versally allowed Hume says with approval that nothing exists without a cause of its exist ence and that chance when strictly examined is a mere negative word and means not any real power which has anywhere a being in na ture But though there is no such thing as *chance* in the world our ignorance of the real cause of any event has the same influence on the understanding and begets a like species of belief or opinion

In other words Hume's position seems to be that man's ignorance of real causes and the mere probability of his opinions about custom ary sequences of cause and effect indicate human limitations not limits to causal deter mination in the order of nature itself Adversar ies of Hume coming before as well as after him in the tradition of the great books take issue with him on both points

Against Hume's determinism which is no less complete than Spinoza's Aristotle for example, affirms the existence of chance or real contingency in the happenings of nature. Against Hume's reduction of statements about causes to probable opinion Kant insists that, in the metaphysics of nature such judgments can be made with absolute certainty These related issues are discussed in the chapters on CHANCE FATE and NECESSITY AND CONTIN GENCY

In the development of the natural sciences since Hume's day his translation of cause and effect into observed sequences or correlations reinforces the tendency which first appears with Galileo and Newton to *describe* rather than to *explain* natural phenomena Yet to the extent that the findings of science bear fruit in technology man's control over nature seems to confirm Bacon's view of science rather than Hume's—at least to the extent that the appli cation of scientific knowledge to the production of effects implies a knowledge of their causes.

THE PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY—that nothing happens without a cause or sufficient reason or as Spinoza puts it nothing exists from whose nature an effect does not follow —has been made the basis for denials of human free dom as well as of chance or contingency in the order of nature The problem of man's free will is discussed in the chapters on FATE LIBERTY and WILL but we can here observe how the problem is stated in terms of cause with re spect to both divine providence and natural causation

If God's will is the cause of everything which happens if nothing can happen contrary to His will or escape the foresight of His providence then how is man free from God's foreordination when he chooses between good and evil? If as the theologians say the very act of free choice is traced to God as to a cause in what sense can the act be called free ? Is it not neces sarily determined to conform to God's will and to His plan? But on the other hand if every thing happening from the exercise of free choice must be subject to divine providence must not the evil that men do be attributed to God as cause?

The problem takes another form for the scien tist who thinks only in terms of natural causes, especially if he affirms a reign of causality in nature from which nothing is exempt—just as,

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad*, BK II [265 283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set, the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119 When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164

AUTHOR S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases e g *Iliad* BK II [265 283] 12d

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a *(D)* follows e g OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—*(D) II Esdras* 7 46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface

1 The general theory of causation

7 PLATO *Euthyphro* 195c d / *Phaedo* 226d 228a 240b 246c / *Timaeus* 447b d / *Philebus* 615c 619d / *Laws* BK X 760a 765c

8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK II CH 11–12 128d 131b / *Physics* BK II CH 3–9 271a 278a c / *Metaphysics* BK III CH 2 [996 18 997 14] 514d 515d BK V CH 1–2 533a 534c BK VI CH 2 [1026^{b}4–1027 15] 549a b BK VII CH 17 565a 566a c BK VIII CH 3 [1043^{b}5–14] 567d 568a CH 4 568d 569b CH 6 569d 570d BK X CH 1 [105-^{b}8–14] 579a BK XII CH 4 5 599d 601a BK XIV CH 6 625d 626d

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12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK V SECT 8 269d 270b

17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR I CH 1 78a c CH 4 79d 80a CH 10 82b / *Fourth Ennead* TR IV CH 31 174d 175c / *Sixth Ennead* TR VII CH 2 322b 323a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2 A 3 12c 14a Q 3 A 4 ANS 16d 17c Q 33 A 1 REP 1 180d 181c Q 49 264d 268a c passim Q 52 A 3 ANS 280a d Q 65 A 1 339b 340b A 3 341c 342b Q 82 A 3 REP 1 433c-434c Q 87 A 2 REP 3 466c 467b, Q 103 A 7 533b-d Q 104 AA 1–2 534c 537b Q 105 AA 1 2 538d 540c A 5 542a 543b Q 106 A 3 547c 548b Q 115 AA 1–2 585d 588c Q 115 A 6, Q 116 A 4 591d 595c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 51 AA 1–3 13c 15a Q 75 A 1 137d 138c A 4 140a d Q 76 A 1 141a c PART III SUPPL, Q 76 A 1 939d 941a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 80b-c

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 42a-46a

31 DESCARTES *Meditations* III 84b 86b / *Objections and Replies* 111d 112a 121b-c AXIOM I–IV 131d 212a 212c

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I DEF 1 355a DEF 7 355b AXIOM 3–5 355d PROP 3 356a PROP 8 SCHOL 2 357b d PROP 36 369b APPENDIX 369b-372d PART II PROP 7 COROL and SCHOL 375a c

34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III RULE I II 270a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 1–5 178b 179d SECT 19 182b c CH XXII SECT 11 203c d CH XXVI SECT 1 217a d

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 25 33 417d-419a passim SECT 60–66 424b-426a

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT III DIV 18 SECT VIII DIV 75 457c 485a passim

(1 *The general theory of causation.* 1b *The order of causes: the relation of cause and effect*)

16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 854b 940b-941a
17 PLOTINUS *Fifth Ennead* TR II CH I 214c 215a / *Sixth Ennead* TR VII CH 2 322b 323a
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XII CH 24-25 358a 359a BK XXII CH 2 587b 588a CH 24 609a 612a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2 A 3 12c 14a Q 3 A I ANS 14b 15b A 2 ANS 15c 16a A 4 ANS 16d 17c A 6 ANS 18c 19a A 7 ANS and REP I 19a c A 8 ANS and REP 1-2 19d 20c Q 4 A 2 ANS 21b 22b A 3 ANS and REP 4 22b-23b Q 5 A 2 REP I 24b 25a A 4 ANS 25d 26c Q 8 A I 34d 35c Q 13 A 5 ANS and REP I 66b-67d A II REP 2 73c 74b Q 18 A 3 ANS 106b-107c Q 19 AA 4-5 111c 113c A 6 ANS and REP 3 113c 114d A 7 REP 2 114d 115d A 8 116a d Q 22 AA 2-3 128d 131c Q 23 A 5 ANS 135d 137d Q 36 A 3 ANS and REP 4 194c 195d Q 39 A 2 REP 5 203b 204c Q 41 A I REP 2 217d 218c A . ANS 218c 219d Q 42 A 2 ANS 225d 227a A 3 ANS and REP 2 227a d Q 44 A I REP I 238b 239a A 2 239b 240a Q 45 A 2 REP 2 242d 244a A 3 244a d A 5 ANS 245c 247a Q 46 A I REP 6 250a 252d A 2 REP I 253a 255a Q 48 A I REP 4 259b 260c Q 50 A I ANS 269b 270a Q 52 A 3 ANS 280a d Q 63 A 8 REP I 332c 333b Q 65 A 3 341c 342b Q 75 A I REP I 378b 379c Q 82 A 3 REP I 433c 434c A 4 434c 435c Q 87 A 2 REP 3 466c 467b Q 88 A 3 REP 2 472c-473a Q 90 A 3 482c 483a Q 103 AA 6-8 532b 534b Q 104 A I ANS 534c 536c A 2 536c 537b Q 105 538d 545b Q 112 A I ANS 571d 573a Q 114 A 3 ANS 583b d QQ 115-116 585c 595c Q 118 A 2 REP 3 601c 603b PART I II Q I A 2 610b 611b Q 46 A I ANS 813b-814a
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21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE II [112-148] 109a b
22 CHAUCER *Tale of Melibeus* par 37 417b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 78c 79a 79d 80a
28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences* FIRST DAY 135c 136b
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 390c 415b-416c 426a-429b 442c-443c 445c 447a b
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 43a d
31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART V 55d 56a / *Meditations* III 84b 86b 87c 88c / *Objections and Replies*, 110a 112a esp 111d 112a 1 b-121c AXIOM I-V 131d 132a AXIOM VIII 13 b PROP II 132c 158b-161d passim 212a 213b-d 229c d
31 SPINOZA *Ethics*, PART I DEF I 355a AXIOM 3-5 355d PROP 3 356a PROP 8 SCHOL 2 357b d PROP II 358b-359b PROP 21 9 364a 366c esp PROP 28 365c 366a PROP 33 367b 369a PROP 36 369b APPENDIX 369b 3 2d PART II DEF 5 373b-c DEF 7 373c PROP COROL and SCHOL 375a c LEMMA 3 378d 3 9a PROP 48 DEMONST 391a PART III DEF 2 395d 396a PROP I 3 396a 398c PART V AXIOM 2 452c
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK V [469-49] 185b 186a
33 PASCAL *Pensees* 505 261a b / 369a
34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III RULE I II 270a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 1-5 178b 179d SECT 19 182b c CH XXII SECT II 203c d CH XXVI SECT I 2 217a d
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42 KANT *Pure Reason* 15a b 17c d 47b-c 57c d 58d 59b 63b 67d 68b [fn I] 6c 83b esp 81c d 95a d 140b d 145c 152a 153a 187c 189c 214b d [fn I] / *Pract. Reason* 311d 314d 339a / *Judgement* 550a 551a c 553c 555a 561c 562a c 577c 5 8a 582c 583b
45 FARADAY *Researches in Electricity* 582b-584 passim
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 9b c 10d 65a-66 / *Descent of Man* 285b-c
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK X 447c-448d BK XI 470a c EPILOGUE I 650b c EPILOGUE II 675a 696d
53 JAMES *Psychology* 772b 884b 885a

2. Comparison of causes in animate and in animate nature

7 PLATO *Phaedo* 241d 242b / *Laws* BK X 763a 765d
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16 KEPL R *Epitome* BK IV 930b 931b 959a 960a

19 AQ I AS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 8 A I REP 3 34d 35c Q 14, A 8 ANS 82c 83b Q 18 A 3 AN 106b-107c Q 22 A 2 ANS 128d 130d Q 7 A 3 365b-367a Q 98 A I ANS 516d 517c P RT I II Q I A 2 610b 611b

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27 SHAKESPEA E *Othello* ACT SC II [7-14] 239

28 H RVEY *On A imal Generat on* 385a-c

31 DE CARTES *Meditations* IV 90a b / *Objec tions and Replies* 215a b

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8 AR TLE *Metaphysics* BK IX CH 5 573 -c

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12 A ELI S *Medita ons* BK V SECT 8 269d 270b

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33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 154b-159a / *Pen sees* 821 331b 332a

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35 HUME *Hum n Under ta ding* SECT VIII 478b-487a

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42 KANT *Pure Rea on* 113b-115a 132d 133a 140b d 145c 164a 171a 234c 235a 236d 237a 238b / *Fund. Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 264d 265a 275b 279b d 287d esp 282c 286a c / *Pract al Reason* 292a 293b 296a d 301d 302d 310b-321b esp 314b-d 320c 321b 327d 329a 331 337a,c / *Intro Metaphy ic of Mo als* 383c 386b-387a,c 390b 392d 393c / *Judgement* 463a-465c 571 572a 587a 588a 594d [fn 1]

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48 M LVILLE *Moby D ck* 158b-159a

51 TOLSTOY *War a d P ace* BK IX 342a 344b BK X 389a 391c BK X 469a-472b K XIII 563 572 BK XV 619d 621b EP LOGUE I 645a 650c EPILOGUE II 688a 696d

53 JAMES *Psy hology* 84a 94b esp 85a 87b 88b-90b 291a 295b 388a 820b-826a esp 825b-826b [fn 2]

54 F EUD *Origin and Development of Psycho A lysis* 13c / *General Int oduction* 454b-c 486c-487a

4 The n lysis of means and ends in the pract cal order

7 PLA O *Lysis* 23a b / *Laches* 29b-c / *Gorgias* 262a 264b 280b-d / *Republic* BK II 310c d

8 ARI TOTLE *T pics* BK II C I I [116b22 36] 163b-c / *H avens* BK I CH 12 [292 14-b26] 383d 384b / *Metaphys cs* K II CH 2 [994b8-16] 512d 513a BK V CH 2 [0 3 32 b3] 533c [1013b25 28] 533d 534a BK IX, CH 8 [050 4-b1] 575d 576b / *So l* BK I CH 0 665d 666d

5 Cause in relation to knowledge

5a Cause as the object of our inquiries

5b Cause in philosophical and scientific method: the role of causes in definition, demonstration, experiment hypothesis

(5 *Cause in relation to knowledge* 5b *Cause in philosophical and scientific method: the role of causes in definition, demonstration, experiment, hypothesis.*)

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 217d 218a 239c-240d

50 MARX *Capital* 10b 11b

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XI 470a c BK XIII 563b EPILOGUE II 675a 696d passim esp 677b-680b 687b 688a 694d 695c

53 JAMES *Psychology* 89b 90a 324b 668a 671a esp 670a b 745b 824b 825a 884b 886a

54 FREUD *General Introduction* 454b c 483d 484a

5c The nature and sources of our knowledge of causes

7 PLATO *Meno* 188b 189a / *Phaedo* 240c 245c / *Republic* BK VI 383d 388a / *Timaeus* 455a c 465d 466a

8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 2 [71^{b}33-72 6] 98b c BK II CH 19 136a 137a c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 1-2 499a 501c BK II CH 1 [993^{b}19-31] 512a b BK III CH 2 [996 18-^{b}26] 514d 515b

10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK I CH 4 169a

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XI CH 7 326a-c CH 29 339a b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 13 A 5 ANS 66b 67d Q 14 A 8 REP 1 82c 83b Q 19 A 5 ANS 112d 113c Q 57 A 2 ANS 295d 297a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 53a b 60a b 63a 78c d 79b 80a

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 442c 443c

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 42a-c 43a c 45a-46a 46c-47c / *Novum Organum* BK I APH 48 110d 111a APH 99 127b c BK II 137a 195d

31 DESCARTES *Discour e* PART VI 62a b / *Objections and Replies* 110a b

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I AXIOM 4 355d APPENDIX 369b 372d

33 PASCAL *Pen ces* 234 235 216b / *Great Experiment* 388b

34 NEWTON *Optics* BK III 543a b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 1-7 178b 180a CH XXV SECT 11-CH XXVI SECT 2 217a d

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT III DIV 18-SECT VIII DIV 75 457c 485a passim SECT IX 487b 488c passim SECT XI 497b-503c passim esp DIV 105 498d 499a DIV 115 503b c

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK V 335b 337a

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 15a b 17c d 46d-47c 57c 58b 58d 59b 66d 67b 76c 83b 85a b 86c d 95a d 110b 164a 171a 194d 195a 214b d [fn 1] 225c 226b / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 285c 286a / *Practical Reason* 294c 295d 311d 314d / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 387a b / *Judgement* 562d 563b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 88a 90b passim

5d The limits of our knowledge of causes

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7 PLATO *Republic* BK VI 383d 388a / *Timaeus* 447b d

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK II CH 4 [196^{b}5-7] 273a / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 2 [982^{b}28-983^{a}11] 501a b BK III CH 2 [996 18-^{b}26] 514d 515b

9 ARISTOTLE *Generation of Animals* BK II CH 6 [742^{b}17-743 1] 283d 284a

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK V [526-533] 67d 68a BK VI [703-711] 89c d

16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* 505a 506a

17 PLOTINUS *Sixth Ennead* TR VIII CH 11 348b-c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 14 A 8 ANS 57b 58b Q 19 A 5 REP 2 112d 113c Q 57 A 3 ANS 297b-298a

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY III [34-45] 56a b XVIII [49-60] 80b-c

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 54a 78a 80c

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 80b 82b 271b-273b 497b-502c passim

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 45a 46a / *Novum Organum* BK II APH 2 137b c

31 DESCARTES *Meditations* IV 90a b / *Objections and Replies* 110a b 215a b

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I APPENDIX 369b 372d PART IV PREF 422b d-423c

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 184 241 205a 217b passim, esp 233 241 213b 217b

34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III GENERAL SCHOL 371b 372a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 4 178d 179c SECT 70 197a b CH XXIII SECT 28-29 211b 212a BK IV CH III SECT 10-16 315c 317c SECT 28-29 322a 323a CH VI SECT 5 16 332b 336d passim CH XVI SECT 12 370b c

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42 KANT *Pure Reason* 46d 47c 140b d 145c 171a 172c 234c 235a / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 267d 268a 285c d / *Practical Reason* 291a 292a 294c 295d 313b 314d / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 390b / *Judgement* 550a 551a c 557c 558b 564a c 584c d 611d 613a c

45 FOURIER *Theory of Heat* 169a

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 65a 92d 94c passim

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK IX 342a 344b BK X 405a b BK XI 469a-470c BK XIII 563a b EPILOGUE I 646c 647b 650b-c EPILOGUE II 675a 696d esp 687d 688a 693c

53 JAMES *Psychology* 90a 822b 885b-886a

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7 PLATO: *Phaedo* 241b-242b / *Timaeus* 447d-448a 465d-466a

8 ARISTOTLE: *Posterior Analytics*, BK II, CH 11 [94^b8-95^a9] 129b-d / *Physics*, BK I, CH 9 [192^a16-24] 268b-c; BK II, CH 1 [193^b12-19] 269d-270a; CH 2 [194^a27-^b9] 270d-271a; CH 3 [194^b33-195^a2] 271b-c; [195^a22-26] 271d; CH 8-9 275d-278a,c / *Heavens*, BK II, CH 12 [292^a14-^b26] 383d-384b / *Meteorology*, BK I, CH 12 [389^b22-390^a2] 493d-494c / *Metaphysics*, BK I, CH 2 [982^b4-11] 500d; CH 7 [988^b6-15] 506c-d; CH 9 [992^a29-34] 510c; BK II, CH 2 [994^b8-16] 512d-513a; BK III, CH 2 [996^a22-36] 514d-515a; BK V, CH 2 [1013^a33-^b3] 533c; CH 4 [1014^b34-1015^a1] 535b; BK XII, CH 7 [1072^b1-4] 602c; CH 10 [1075^a12-^b16] 605d-606c / *Soul*, BK II, CH 4 [415^b15-22] 645d-646a; CH 8 [420^b16-23] 652a; BK III, CH 9 [432^b21-26] 665b-c; CH 12-13 667a-668d passim / *Sleep*, CH 2 [455^b13-28] 698b-c

9 ARISTOTLE: *Parts of Animals*, BK I, CH 1 [639^b8-640^a12] 161d-162b; [641^b10-642^a4] 164c-165d; CH 5 [645^a23-36] 169a; BK II-IV 170a-229d passim, esp BK II, CH 1 [646^a25-^b2] 170b-d; BK III, CH 2 [663^b22-23] 191b; BK IV, CH 2 [677^a15-19] 206d-207a / *Gait of Animals*, CH 2 [704^b12-18] 243c; CH 12 249b-d passim / *Generation of Animals*, BK I, CH 1 [715^a1-11] 255a; CH 4 [717^a13-25] 257b-260b; BK II, CH 5 [741^b4] 282c; CH 6 [742^a16-^b17] 283b-d; [744^a36-^b25] 285c-286a; BK III, CH 4 296b-c; BK V, CH 1 [778^b6-15] 309a; BK V, CH 1 [778^a15-^b19] 320a-321a; CH 8 [788^b22-789^a15] 330c-331a / *Politics*, BK I, CH 2 [1252^b30-1253^a1] 446a-b; CH 8 [1256^b8-26] 450b-c

10 GALEN: *Natural Faculties*, BK I, CH 6, 170b-c; CH 12, 171b-172b; CH 12, 172d-173c; CH 13, 174d-175c; BK II, CH 3, 185a-186d; CH 4, 187a; BK III, CH 1, 199a-c; CH 3, 200a-201a

12 LUCRETIUS: *Nature of Things*, BK I [1021-1037] 13c-d; BK II [1052-1063] 28b-c; BK IV [823-857] 55a-b; BK V [76-90] 62a-b; [156-234] 63a-64a

12 AURELIUS: *Meditations*, BK V, SECT 8 269d-270b; BK VI, SECT 40 277d

16 COPERNICUS: *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres*, BK I, 511b

16 KEPLER: *Epitome*, BK IV 846b-847b; 857b-860b; 863b-887a passim; 913a-b; 915b-916a; 925b-928a; 932a-933a / *Harmonies of the World*, 1023b-1080b esp 1049b-1050a

17 PLOTINUS: *Second Ennead*, TR II, CH 1, 40a-41a / *Fifth Ennead*, TR VIII, CH 7 242d-243c

18 AUGUSTINE: *City of God*, BK XI, CH 22 333d-334c; BK XII, CH 4-5 344b-345b; BK XIX, CH 13-14 518c-520c; BK XXII, CH 24, 610c-611c

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART I, Q 2, A 3, ANS and REP 2 12c-14a; Q 5, A 2, REP 1-2 24b-25a; A 4 25d-26c; Q 6, A 1, REP 2 28b-d; Q 18, A 3, ANS 106b-107c; Q 19, A 1, ANS 108d-109c; A 4, ANS 111c-112c; Q 22, A 2, ANS 128d-130d; Q 23, A 1, ANS and REP 1-2 132c-133b; Q 36, A 3, ANS 194c-195d; Q 44, A 4 241a-d; Q 48, A 1, REP 4 259b-260c; Q 59, A 1, ANS 306c-307b; Q 60, A 5, ANS 313b-314c; Q 65, A 2 340b-341b; Q 70, A 3, ANS 365b-367a; Q 76, A 5, ANS 394c-396a; Q 78, A 1, REP 3 407b-409a; Q 82, A 4, ANS 434c-435c; Q 85, A 3, REP 1 455b-457a; Q 91, A 3 486b-487d; Q 92, A 1, REP 1 488d-489d; Q 98, A 1, ANS 516d-517c; Q 103 528a-534b passim; Q 105, A 5, ANS 542a-543b; PART I-II, Q 1, A 2 610b-611b; A 3, ANS and REP 3 611b-612a; A 6, ANS 614a-c; A 8 615a-c; Q 2, A 5, REP 3 618d-619c; Q 8, A 1, ANS 655b-656a; Q 9, A 1, ANS 657d-658d; Q 12, A 5, ANS 672a-c; Q 21, A 1, ANS and REP 1 2 71 a-d

20 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART III SUPPL, Q 91, A 3, ANS and REP 4 938a-939d

21 DANTE: *Divine Comedy*, PURGATORY, XVIII [19-39] 80a-b; PARADISE, I [94-142] 107b-d

23 HOBBES: *Leviathan*, PART I, 50a; PART IV, 271d

28 HARVEY: *Motion of the Heart*, 302c / *Circulation of the Blood*, 309b-d / *On Animal Generation*, 349a-b; 355c-d; 390b-c; 402c; 418b-c; 439c-440a; 442d-443c; 447a-b; 453c; 454b-c; 461a-c; 462c-d

30 BACON: *Advancement of Learning*, 43a-d; 45a-46a / *Novum Organum*, BK I, APH 48 110d-111a

31 DESCARTES: *Discourse*, PART II, 44c-45a / *Meditations*, IV, 90a-b / *Objections and Replies*, 215a-b

31 SPINOZA: *Ethics*, PART I, APPENDIX 369b-372d; PART IV, PREF 422b,d-424a; DEF 7 424b

33 PASCAL: *Pensées*, 72, 184b; 75, 185b-186a

34 NEWTON: *Principles*, BK III, GENERAL SCHOL, 371a / *Optics*, BK III, 528b-529a

35 LOCKE: *Human Understanding*, BK II, CH I, SECT 15, 125b

35 BERKELEY: *Human Knowledge*, SECT 60-66 424b-426a passim; SECT 107 433d-434a

35 HUME: *Human Understanding*, SECT V, DIV 44 469b-c; SECT XI, DIV 111 501b-c

36 STERNE: *Tristram Shandy*, 229b-230a

42 KANT: *Pure Reason*, 187a-190a; 205a-209b; 239a-240b / *Judgement*, 467d-470b; 473a-474b; 523c-d; 550a-613a,c esp 550a-562a,c, 568c-570b, 575b-578a, 587a-588a

46 HEGEL: *Philosophy of History*, INTRO, 157b-c; 161d-162a

49 DARWIN: *Origin of Species*, 40c-d; 41c-42a; 60b-61d passim; 95d-97a esp 96b; 217d-218a / *Descent of Man*, 593d

51 TOLSTOY: *War and Peace*, EPILOGUE I, 646c-647b; 650b-c; EPILOGUE II, 687d-688a

53 JAMES: *Psychology*, 4a-6b; 671b [fn 1]

54 FREUD: *Narcissism*, 401b / *Instincts*, 415b / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*, 651d-654c passim, esp 654a-c

7. The causality of God or the gods

7a Divine causality in the origin and existence of the world: creation and conservation

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 1-2; 7:4 / *Nehemiah* 9:6—(D) *II Esdras* 9:6 / *Job* 26:7; 37:18; 38:1-42:2 / *Psalms* 8 esp 8:3-5; 19:1; 33:6-9; 74:16-17; 89:11-12; 95:4-5; 96:5; 102:25; 104; 115:3; 119:73; 121:2; 136:5-9; 146:5-6; 148:1-6—(D) *Psalms* 8 esp 8:4-6; 18:2; 32:6-9; 73:16-17; 88:12-13; 94:4-5; 95:5; 101:26; 103; 113:3; 118:73; 120:2; 135:5-9; 145:5-6; 148:1-6 / *Proverbs* 3:19-20; 8:23-29 / *Isaiah* 40:26-28; 42:5; 44:24; 45:7-12,18; 48:13; 65:17—(D) *Isaias* 40:26-28; 42:5; 44:24; 45:7,12,18; 48:13; 65:17 / *Jeremiah* 10:12; 27:5; 31:35; 51:15-16—(D) *Jeremias* 10:12; 27:5; 31:35; 51:15-16 / *Amos* 5:8 / *Zechariah* 12:1—(D) *Zacharias* 12:1

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7 PLATO *Timaeus* 447a-452d; 465d-466a / *Sophist* 577d-578b

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [146-158] 2d-3a; BK V [146-234] 63a-64a

17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR IX, CH 1-12 65d-73d / *Fifth Ennead* TR II, CH 1 214c-215a; TR VIII, CH 7 242d-243c

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions*, BK I, par 10 3b-c; BK VII, par 16-23 48c-50c; BK XI, par 4-11 90a-92b; BK XII, par 2-9 99c-101c; par 14-40 102b-110a; BK XIII, par 6-48 112a-124a / *City of God*, BK VII, CH 29-31 261a-262a; BK XI, CH 4-24 324a-336a; BK XII, CH 10-27 348b-360a,c; BK XXII, CH 1 586b,d-587b / *Christian Doctrine*, BK I, CH 32 633c-d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I, Q 8, A 1 34d-35c; A 2, ANS 35c-36b; A 3, ANS and REP 1 36b-37c; Q 9, A 2, ANS 39c-40d; Q 21, A 4, REP 4 126c-127c; QQ 44-46 238a-255d; Q 50, A 1, ANS 269b-270a; A 3, ANS 272a-273b; Q 56, A 2, ANS and REP 4 292d-294a; Q 57, A 2, ANS and REP 2 295d-297a; Q 61 314d-317c; Q 65 339a-343c; Q 75, A 6, REP 2 383c-384c; Q 84, A 3, REP 2 443d-444d; QQ 90-93 480c-501c; Q 94, A 3, ANS 504a-505a; Q 104, A 1 esp REP 4 534c-536c; Q 118, AA 2-3 601c-604b; PART I-II, Q 17, A 8, REP 2 692a,c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy*, PURGATORY, XXV [37-78] 91d-92a; PARADISE, VII [121-148] 116b-c; X [1-6] 120b; XIII [52-84] 126a-b; XIX [40-...] 135c; XXIX [13-45] 150b-c

22 CHAUCER *Knight's Tale* [2987-3010] 209a-b

23 HOBBES *Leviathan*, PART III, 173d; PART IV, 251a-b

28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences*, FOURTH DAY, 245b-d

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 17b-d

31 DESCARTES *Discourse*, PART V, 54d-56a / *Meditations*, III, 87b-88c / *Objections and Replies*, AXIOM IX 132b; PROP III 132d-133a; 137d-138a; 214c; 215a-b; 228a-c; 229c-d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics*, PART I, PROP 16-18 362a-363c; PROP 25 365b; PROP 33, SCHOL 2 368c-369a

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost*, BK I [650-659] 108b; BK II [345-353] 118b-119a; BK III [708-...] 150b-151b; BK IV [720-735] 168a-b; BK V [468-505] 185b-186a; [577-594] 187b-188a; [800-868] 192b-194a; BK VII [59-640] 218b-231a esp [139-161] 220a-b; [216-550] 221b-229a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 482 258a

34 NEWTON *Optics*, BK III, 542a-543a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding*, BK II, CH XV, SECT 12 165c; BK IV, CH X, SECT 15 352d-353a; SECT 18-19 353c-354c

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge*, SECT 25-33 417d-419a esp SECT 29-33 418c-419a; SECT 45-46 421b-c; SECT 48 422a passim; SECT 57 423d-424a; SECT 146-150 442a-443b

35 HUME *Human Understanding*, SECT XII, DIV 132 509d [fn 1]

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 81d-82a; 143a-145c / *Judgement* 597a-599d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History*, PART I, 245d-246c; PART IV, 361a-b

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 239c-d; 243d

7b Divine causality in the order of nature or change: the first cause in relation to all other causes

7 PLATO *Timaeus* 455a-b; 465d-466a / *Statesman* 587a-589c

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics*, BK VII, CH 1-2 326a-329a; BK VIII 334a-355d / *Heavens*, BK II, CH 12 383b-384c / *Generation and Corruption*, BK II, CH 10 [336b25-34] 438d; [337a15-23] 439a-b / *Metaphysics*, BK I, CH 2 [983a7-9] 501b; BK XII, CH 4 [1070b22-35] 600b; CH 5 [1071a30-36] 601a; CH 6-10 601b-606d

10 HIPPOCRATES *Sacred Disease* 154a-156a; 160b-d

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things*, BK I [146-158] 2d-3a; BK II [167-183] 17a-b; [1090-1104] 29a; BK VI [43-95] 80d-81c; [379-422] 85b-d

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses*, BK I, CH 6 110c-112b; CH 14 120d-121c

16 KEPLER *Harmonies of the World* 1049b-1050a

17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead*, TR II, CH 2 41a-c / *Third Ennead*, TR II-III 82c-97b passim; TR VIII 129a-136a / *Fifth Ennead*, TR I, CH 2 208c-209b

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20 AQUI S *Summa The logica* PART I I Q 79 A 2 AN 157b-158a Q 85 A 6 182d 184 Q 109 A I A S 338b-339c Q II A I RE 2 347d 349a P T II II Q 9 A 2 A S 424b-425a Q 8 4 NS 464c-465a PA T II Q 6 A I REP I 740b-741b Q 13 3 CONTR RY 782b-783b P RT III UPPL Q 74 A 2 RE 3 926c 927c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE I [94 142] 107b-d [II 48] 109 b X II [52-84] 126a b XX II [97 20] 148b-c

22 CH C *Kn ght s Tale* [987 3040] 209 210 / *T le of M libeus* par 37 38 417b 418a

23 HOBBE *Leviath* P RT I 78d 79a 79d 80 T III 241c 242a P T IV 272b c

28 H Y *O A mal Generat o* 390d 391a 406b-407b 416b-c 426a-429b 443a-c 490d 493a

30 B CON *Adv ncement of Learning* 2c d 4b-c / *N w Atlantis* 203a b

31 DE TES *D scourse* PA T V 55d 56a / *M dit t ns* 87c 88c IV 90a b / *Objec t nd Replies* 110a 123b AXIOM IX 132b 158a 162a 213b-d 229c d

31 SP OZA *Ethics* T I O 16-18 362 363c 4 29 365a 366c PROP 33 367b-369 D 369b 372d P RT II PRO 5 7 374c 375c PROP 9- D 376a 377 P P 45 390a b

32 MILTO *Par dise Lost* K V [468-474] 185b

33 P SCAL *Pensée* 77 186a 5 3 262a

34 NEWTO *Principles* BK III RAL S H L 369b 371a / *Optics* K I L 528b-529a

35 LOCKE *Human Understa ding* BK II CH XXI SECT 2 178c CH XXIII SECT 28 211b-d BK IV CH III SECT 28 29 322a 323

35 BE KELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 25 33 417d-419a passim esp SECT 29-33 418c-419a SECT 51-53 422d-423a SECT 57 423d-424a SECT 60-66 424b-426 SECT 105 109 433b 434b passim SECT 146-153 442a-444a passim esp S CT 150 443d-443b

35 H ME *Human Understa di g* SECT VII DIV 54-57 474b-475d

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 140b d 145c 164a 165c 171a 172c 177b-179b 183b [fn I] 184b c 187a 189c esp 188c 189a 190a b 191a d 205a 209 239a 240b / *Practical Reason* 334b-335 345a c / *Judgement* 564 567b 572b-578a 581b 582c 587a 592d 597a 599d

46 HEG L *P losophy f History* INTRO 161d 162a PART I 245d 246c

48 MEL ILLE *Moby Dick* 396b 397a

49 DA W N *Or gin f Species* 243b-d

7c D e c sality n the go ernment of the uni erse p o dence and free w ll

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(7 *The causality of God or the gods. 7c Diune causality in the government of the universe providence and free will*)

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(7 *The causality of God or the gods. 7c Divine causality in the government of the universe providence and free will*)

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The distinction between necessary and contingent causes and for the conception of chance in relation to cause *see* CHANCE 1a–1b, NATURE 3c 3c(1) NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 3a 3c

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The role of ends or final causes in the order of nature and the structure of the universe *see* DESIRE 1 GOD 5b NATURE 3c(3) WORLD 1c 6c and for the general theory of means and ends, *see* GOOD AND EVIL 4b 5c JUDGMENT 3 PRUDENCE 3a 4b WILL 2c(2)–2c(3)

The discussion of cause as an object of knowledge and in relation to the methods and aims of philosophy science and history *see* ASTRONOMY 3a–3b DEFINITION 2d HISTORY 3b KNOWLEDGE 5a(3) MECHANICS 2c PHYSICS 2b REASONING 5b(4)–5b(5) SCIENCE 1b(1) 4c

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection.
II Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date place and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

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46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART III 307a b PART IV 338b c 348d 349a

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK V 219b 220a

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK I 11a b BK V 127b 137c passim BK VII 171a 177b 189d 190a

8 The operation of causes in the process of history

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 21d 22a BK IX 291b c

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK I 354d 355a BK IV 462a b

7 PLATO *Statesman* 587a 589c / *Laws* BK III 663d 666d BK IV 679a c

9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK V 502a 519d passim

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [449 482] 6c 7a

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK V SECT 8 269d 270b BK VII SECT 1 279b SECT 49 282d BK IX SECT 28 293d 294a BK X SECT 27 2[illegible]

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* 103a 379a esp BK I [254 2[illegible]] 110a 111a BK VI [713-853] 230a 234a

14 PLUTARCH *Camillus* 107c / *Timoleon* 201a 203b

15 TACITUS *Annals* BK III 49c BK VI 91b-d / *Histories* BK I, 190a b

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK I PREF 129a d CH 36 149c d BK II CH 2 3 150c 151c BK IV CH 33 206c d BK V CH 1 207d 208c CH 11 [illegible] 216c 230a c BK XI CH 1 322b d 323a CH 18 331d 332a BK XIV CH 28 BK XV CH 1 397a 398c BK XV CH 21-22 415b-416c BK XVIII CH 1 2 472b d 473d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL VII [61-96] 10b-c PURGATORY XVI [52 114] 77b 78a PARADISE VI [28 111] 113d 114d

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23 HOBBES *Leviathan*, PART I 76c d

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 464b-465c passim

26 SHAKESPEARE *Julius Caesar* ACT IV SC III [215 224] 590d

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 34c

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 505 261a b 619-641 284b-290a

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III 121a b

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK VIII 56b-57c BK XVII 122a 125a c

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 348a c

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 456d 457a,c 609b c 630b d 634a c

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 451c-453a c 590a b

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 3 33c

43 MILL *Representative Government* 327b d 332d passim esp 331b 332d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART II par 115 42b c PART III par 340-360 110b 114a c esp par 342 110d d par 347 111b c / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 155c 156d 170b 173a 175c 190b 201a c esp 190b d 194b 196a 203a 206a c PART I 235d 237a 258b-d PART II 262c 263d 274a 275a 281d 282d 283c 284a c PART III 300a 301c PART IV 337d 342a

49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 323a b 327a 328d

50 MARX *Capital* 7b 8a 11d passim 377c 378d

50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 416c 417a c 419b d 425b passim 428b d

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK IX 342a 3[illegible] BK X 389a 391c 430b 432c 447c-448c BK XI 469a 472b BK XIII 563a 575a BK XIV 588a 590c 609a 613d BK XV 618b-621b EPILOGUE I 645a 650c EPILOGUE II 675a 696d

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK V 127b 137c

54 FREUD *War and Death* 761a c / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 781a 782d 787a 788d 791b d 799a 802a c esp 801d 802a c / *New Introductory Lectures* 834b c 882b 884c

Chapter 9 CHANCE

INTRODUCTION

ONE sense in which we use the word "chance" does not exclude the operation of causes. The chance event in this sense is not uncaused. But within this meaning of chance there is the question of *how* the chance event is caused.

On one view what happens by chance is distinguished from what happens by nature in terms of a difference in manner of causation—the difference between the contingent and the necessary. On another view the chance event does not differ causally from that which happens regularly or uniformly. The difference lies not in the pattern of causes, but in our knowledge of them. The chance event is unpredictable or less predictable because of our ignorance of its causes, not because of any real contingency in the order of nature.

There is still a third sense of "chance" in which it means that which happens totally without cause—the absolutely spontaneous or fortuitous.

These three meanings of *chance* at once indicate the basic issues in which the concept is involved. The third meaning is the most radical. It stands in opposition to the other two. Their opposition to one another can be considered after we examine the sense in which chance excludes every type of cause.

THE DOCTRINE OF absolute fortuitousness is indeterminism in its most extreme form. The familiar phrase "a fortuitous concourse of atoms" indicates the classical statement of this doctrine and identifies it in the great books with the theory of atomism. It would be *more* precise to say "with Lucretius' version of that theory," because it is with regard to chance that he departs from the teachings of Democritus and Epicurus, and adds an hypothesis of his own.

The swerve of the atoms, according to Lucretius, accounts for the origin of the world, the motions of nature, and the free will of man. But nothing accounts for the swerve of the atoms. It is uncaused, spontaneous, fortuitous.

When the atoms are being carried downwards straight through the void by their own weight they push a little from their path at times quite undetermined and at undetermined places, yet only just so much as you would call a change of trend. If they did not swerve, all things would fall downward through the deep void like drops of rain, nor could collision come to be, nor blows be brought to pass among the atoms; thus nature would never have brought anything to being.

Since the atoms differ in shape, size, and weight, it might be supposed that the heavier atoms, falling straight yet more rapidly, would overtake and hit the lighter atoms, thus bringing about their grouping or interlocking. But this supposition, says Lucretius, is contrary to reason. It may hold for things falling through water or thin air, but through the empty void "all things, even of unequal weight, move with an equal velocity through the unresisting void. Therefore heavier things will never be able to fall on the lighter from above nor of themselves bring about the blows sufficient to produce the varied motions by which nature carries things on. Wherefore, Lucretius concludes, the atoms "must swerve a little."

Once the atoms have collided, the way in which they are locked together in the patterns of composite things, and all the subsequent motions of these things, can be accounted for by reference to the natural properties of the atoms. The atomic sizes, shapes, and weights determine how they behave singly or in combination. But the swerve of the atoms is not so determined. It is completely spontaneous.

MALEBRANCHE *Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion* VII
LEIBNITZ *Discourse on Metaphysics* XV–XXII
—— *New Essays Concerning Human Understanding* BK II CH 26
VOLTAIRE *Candide*
—— Change or Generation of Events Final Causes in *A Philosophical Dictionary*
T REID *Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind* I
SCHOPENHAUER *On the Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason*
—— *The World as Will and Idea* VOL III SUP CH 26 APPENDIX
BROWN *An Inquiry into the Relation of Cause and Effect*
—— *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind* VOL I pp 189–220 VOL II pp 128–134
COMTE *The Positive Philosophy* INTRO, CH I BK III CH I
W HAMILTON *Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic* VOL I (38–40)
WHEWELL *The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences* VOL I BK III CH 1–4 BK IX CH 6 BK X CH 5 VOL II BK XI CH 7
HELMHOLTZ *Popular Lectures on Scientific Subjects* VIII
WUNDT *Die Prinzipien der mechanischen Naturlehre*
JEVONS *The Principles of Science* CH 11
LOTZE *Logic* BK I CH 2 (B)
P A JANET *Final Causes*
C S PEIRCE *Collected Papers* VOL VI par 66–87 393–394
DOMET DE VORGES *Cause efficiente et cause finale*
WATTS *The Reign of Causality*
VENN *Principles of Empirical or Inductive Logic* CH 2
FRAZER *The Golden Bough* PART I CH 3
PEARSON *The Grammar of Science* CH 4
BRADLEY *The Principles of Logic* BK III PART II, CH 2
—— *Appearance and Reality* BK I CH 6
BOSANQUET *Science and Philosophy* 8
BERGSON *Creative Evolution*
BROAD *Perception Physics and Reality* CH 1–2
HENDERSON *The Order of Nature*
W E JOHNSON *Logic* PART III CH 3 11
MEYERSON *Identity and Reality* CH I
—— *De l'explication dans les sciences*
DUCASSE *Causation and the Types of Necessity*
WHITEHEAD *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge* CH 16
—— *Symbolism Its Meaning and Effects*
EDDINGTON *The Nature of the Physical World*, CH 14
MCTAGGART *The Nature of Existence* CH 24 6
SANTAYANA *The Realm of Matter* CH 7
M R COHEN *Reason and Nature* BK I CH 4(2) BK II CH 2
LENZEN *The Nature of Physical Theory* PART IV CH 16
WEYL *The Open World* LECT II
MARITAIN *A Preface to Metaphysics* LECT V VII
A J TOYNBEE *A Study of History*
PLANCK *Where Is Science Going?* CH 4–5
—— *The Philosophy of Physics* CH 2
DEWEY *Logic the Theory of Inquiry* CH 22
B RUSSELL *Principles of Mathematics* CH 55
—— *Our Knowledge of the External World* VIII
—— *Mysticism and Logic* CH 9
—— *The Analysis of Matter* CH 30–31 35
—— *Human Knowledge Its Scope and Limits* PART IV CH 9–10 PART VI CH 5–6

that the cause of the coincidence is unknown to us, but rather holds that no such cause exists to be known.

THE CONCEPTION OF THE chance event as an uncaused coincidence of causes is an ancient as well as a modern doctrine. In his *Physics* Aristotle distinguishes between what happens by nature and what happens by chance in terms of different types of causality. Chance, he writes, is "reckoned among causes; many things are said both to be and to come to be as a result of chance." But the fact that its effects cannot "be identified with any of the things that come to pass by necessity and always, or for the most part," at once distinguishes the causality of chance from that of nature.

"The early physicists," Aristotle observes, "found no place for chance among the causes which they recognized." "Others there are who, indeed, believe that chance is a cause, but that it is inscrutable to human intelligence, as being a divine thing and full of mystery." But to Aristotle himself "it is clear that chance is an accidental cause," and "that the causes of what comes to pass by chance are infinite." For this reason, he explains, "chance is supposed to belong to the class of the indefinite and to be inscrutable to man." Though he distinguishes between spontaneity and chance, he says that both are causes of effects which, though they might result from intelligence or nature, have in fact been caused by something *incidentally*.

What happens by nature happens regularly or for the most part through causal necessity. This necessity results from the operation of essential causes, causes in the very nature of the moving things. When the regularity fails, it is due to the intervention of some accidental cause. What happens by chance, then, or contingently, is always due to an accidental (or better, incidental) cause. As indicated in the chapter on CAUSE, an accidental as opposed to an essential cause is, in Aristotle's theory, one which does not *by itself* produce the given effect. It does so only through the conjunction of other causes. But since it does not determine these other causes to operate, the effect—*contingent on their combined activity*—is produced by chance, that is, by the contingency of several incidental causes working coincidentally.

A world in which chance really exists is remarkably different from a world in which necessity prevails, in which everything is determined by causes and there are no uncaused coincidences. William James vividly epitomizes their difference by calling the world of absolute necessity or determinism—the world of Spinoza or Hegel—a "block universe," in contrast to what he describes as a "concatenated universe." Voltaire before him, in his *Philosophical Dictionary*, had used the phrase "the concatenation of events" to express the meaning of chance.

The phrase evokes the right image: the picture of a world in which many concurrent lines of causality, exercising no influence upon one another, may nevertheless concatenate or be joined together to produce a chance result. The block universe presents the contrasting picture of a world in which each motion or act determines and is determined by every other in the fixed structure of the whole.

Spinoza claims, for example, that "in nature there is nothing contingent, but all things are determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and act in a certain manner." Chance, in other words, does not exist in nature. "A thing is said to be contingent," Spinoza writes, "only with reference to a deficiency in our knowledge. For if we do not know that the essence of a thing involves a contradiction, or if we actually know that it involves no contradiction, and nevertheless we can affirm nothing with certainty about its existence because the order of causes is concealed from us, *that thing* can never appear to us either as necessary or impossible, and therefore we call it either contingent or possible." Hence, for Spinoza, contingency or chance is illusory rather than real—a projection of the mind's ignorance or of its inadequate knowledge of causes.

The issue between real indeterminism and absolute determinism—further discussed in the chapters on FATE and NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY—inevitably raises theological questions. Just as the theologian must reconcile man's free will with God's predestination, so must he, if he accepts its reality, also reconcile chance with divine providence, apart from which nothing can happen either necessarily or contingently.

For Augustine it would seem that divine

If each motion is always due to another and the new always springs from the old in a deter mined order and if the atoms do not by swerving break through the decrees of fate so that cause does not follow cause through infinite time whence asks Lucretius is it wrested from fate this will whereby we move forward where pleasure leads each one of us and swerve likewise in our motions neither at a fixed time nor at a fixed place but only when and where the mind itself has prompted us? The answer he gives is that there must be in the atoms another cause of motion besides blows and weights whence comes this power born in us since we see that nothing can come to be from nothing

BEING ABSOLUTELY fortuitous the swerve of the atoms is absolutely unintelligible There is no answer to the question why they chance to swerve at undetermined times and places This unintelligibility may not however make the fortuitous either unreal or impossible It can be argued that chance may exist even though for our limited understanding it remains mys terious

The same problem of intelligibility arises with respect to that meaning of chance wherein it is identified with coincidence or contingency Here as in the case of the absolutely fortuitous chance belongs to reality or nature Some things always come to pass in the same way and others for the most part writes Aristotle as an observer of nature but there is also a third class of events besides these two—events which all say are by chance Things of this last kind he goes on to say are those which come to pass incidentally —or accidentally

According to this theory a real or objective indeterminism exists Chance or contingency is not just an expression of human uncertainty born of insufficient knowledge Contingency however differs from the fortuitousness or spontaneity of the atom s swerve in that it is a product of causes not their total absence Of the contingent event there is no definite cause in Aristotle s opinion but there is a chance cause *i e* an indefinite one

In the chance happening two lines of action coincide and thereby produce a single result This is our ordinary understanding of the way accidents happen The chance meeting of friends who run across each other in a rail station after a separation of many years coincidence—a coinciding of the two separate and independent lines of action wh brought each of them to the same station the same time coming from different pla going to different places and proceeding der the influence of different causes or p poses That each is there can be explained the operation of causes That both are th together cannot be explained by the ca determining their independent paths

So understood the chance event exempl what Aquinas calls a clashing of two cause And what makes it a matter of chance is t fact that the clashing of these two causes, asmuch as it is accidental has no cause Pr cisely because it is accidental this clashin causes is not to be reduced to a further pre isting cause from which it follows of necessity

The illustration is not affected by consider tions of free will Whether men have free w or not whether free acts are caused or are Kant suggests uncaused and spontaneous, th event we call a chance meeting remains acc dental or more precisely a coincidence Wha ever the factors are which control the motio of each man they operate entirely within tha single man s line of action Prior to the meetin they do not influence the other man s conduc If we could state the cause for the coinciden of the two lines of motion it would have to b some factor which influenced both lines Wer there such a cause and were it known to us w could not say that the meeting happened by chance It would still be a coincidence in the merely physical sense of coming together but it would not be a coincidence causally

That free will is irrelevant to this meaning of chance can be seen from the fact that the col lision of particles which produces atomic fission is regarded as resulting from chance or coinci dence in a manner no different from the acci dental meeting of friends Causes control the speeds and directions of the colliding particles, but no cause determines their collision or in other words there is no cause for the coinci dence of two separate lines of causation Con temporary physics affirms a real or objective indeterminism insofar as it does not merely say

Regardless of what the objective situation is, the assurance with which we predict anything reflects the state of our knowledge about it.

The ancients who, for the most part, regard chance as real and objective, treat probability as subjective. For them the different degrees of probability which men attach to their statements measure the inadequacy of their knowledge—and the consequent uncertainty of their opinions about matters which cannot be known but only guessed. Holding different theories of the distinction between knowledge and opinion, both Plato and Aristotle exclude the accidental and the contingent along with the particular from the objects of science. Since in their view certitude belongs to the essence of science—or of knowledge as contrasted with opinion—science for them deals not only with the universal but with the necessary.

In the *Republic* Socrates assigns opinion to the realm of becoming—the realm of changing and contingent particulars. Unlike Plato, Aristotle does not restrict knowledge to the realm of eternal and immutable being, but he does insist that physics, as a science of changing things, preserve the certitude of science by concerning itself only with the essential and the necessary. "That a science of the accidental is not even possible," he writes, "will be evident if we try to see what the accidental really is." It is a matter of chance that cold weather occurs during the dog-days, for this occurs neither always and of necessity *nor for the most part, though it* might happen sometimes. The accidental, then, is what occurs, but not always nor of necessity nor for the most part. Now ... it is obvious why there is no science of such a thing.

Though he disagrees with Aristotle and Aquinas about the reality of chance or contingency, Spinoza agrees with them that knowledge—at least adequate knowledge—has the necessary for its object. Of individual things, he says, "we can have no adequate knowledge ... and this is what is to be understood by us as their contingency." To be true to itself and to the nature of things, reason must "perceive things truly, that is to say, as they are in themselves, that is to say, not as contingent but as necessary."

The position of Aquinas is worth stating for comparison. To the question whether our intellect can know *contingent* things, he replies that "the contingent, considered as such, is known directly by sense and indirectly by the intellect, while the universal and necessary principles of contingent things are known by the intellect. Hence," he goes on, "if we consider knowable things in their universal principles, then *all science is of necessary things.* But if we consider the things themselves, thus some sciences are of necessary things, some of contingent things."

Among the sciences of contingent things, Aquinas includes not only "the sciences of nature," but also "the moral sciences," because the *latter, dealing with human action, must reach down to contingent particulars. In the sphere* of morals as of nature, certainty can be achieved only on the level of universal principles. Deliberation about particular acts to be done moves on the level of probable opinion. In contrast to the moral scientist, the man of action must weigh chances and make decisions with regard to future contingencies. It would be as foolish, Aristotle says, to expect the certitude of scientific demonstration from an orator or a judge as to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician.

IT IS NOT SURPRISING that the modern theory of probability—or, as it was later called by Boole, Venn, and others, the "logic of chance"—should have its origin in the sphere of practical problems. Pascal's correspondence with Fermat illustrates the early mathematical speculations concerning formulae for predicting the outcome in games of pure chance. For Pascal the logic of chance also has moral implications. If we are willing to risk money at the gaming table on the basis of calculated probabilities, how much more willing should we be to act decisively in the face of life's uncertainties, even to risking life itself on the chance of eternal salvation.

"When we act ... on an uncertainty, we act reasonably," Pascal writes, "for we ought to work for an uncertainty according to the doctrine of chance." If the chance of there being an after life is equal to the chance of there being none—if the equiprobability reflects our equal ignorance of either alternative—then,

providence leaves no room for chance among natural things After noting that causes are sometimes divided into a fortuitous cause a natural cause and a voluntary cause he dismisses those causes which are called fortuitous by saying that they are not a mere name for the absence of causes but are only latent and we attribute them either to the will of the true God or to that of spirits of some kind or other

In certain places Aquinas seems to talk in much the same fashion—as though chance existed only for our limited intellects and not for God Nothing he declares hinders certain things from happening by luck or chance if compared to their proximate causes but not if compared to divine providence according to which nothing happens at random in the world as Augustine says The example he uses to illustrate his point is that of two servants who have been sent by their master to the same place the meeting of the two servants although to them it appears a chance circumstance has been fully foreseen by their master who has purposely sent them to meet at one place in such a way that one has no knowledge of the other In such a way also all things must of necessity come under God s ordering from which it follows that God directly causes the action of even accidental causes and their coincidence The chance event would then be necessitated by God It would be determined by His will however indeterminate it might appear to us

Yet in other places Aquinas writes that God wills some things to be done necessarily some contingently To some effects He has attached unfailing necessary causes from which the effects follow necessarily but to other defectible and contingent causes from which effects arise contingently For some minds this may only deepen the mystery rather than solve it At least it leaves many questions unanswered

Does Aquinas mean that a coincidence of causes is not itself uncaused? Does he mean that God causes the concatenation of events and that a sufficient reason for every contingency exists in God s will? If so is chance an illusion a function of our ignorance of divine providence? May chance be quite real on the level of nature where no natural causes determine the coincidence while not real—at least not in the same sense—for God? Or does the statement that what divine providence plans to happen contingently happens contingently mean that chance remains a real feature of the universe even for God?

One thing is clear In one sense of the word, the Christian theologians completely deny chance If chance means something which God does not foresee something unplanned by His providence then according to their faith nothing happens by chance It is in this sense also that what happens by chance is opposed to what happens on purpose or has a final as well as an efficient cause As the chapter on CAUSE indicates those who deny final causes in nature sometimes use the word chance to signify not lack of cause nor even contingency but only the blindness of causality—working to no end

The controversy discussed in the chapter on WORLD—between those who see in the structure of the universe the grand design of a divine plan and those who attribute whatever order there is in nature to blind chance—further indicates the sense in which theologians like Augustine and Aquinas deny chance But if chance means no more than *contingency* then to affirm chance excludes not providence but fate at least that sense of fate according to which everything is blindly necessitated Here it is Spinoza s statement that in nature there is nothing contingent but all things are determined from the necessity of the divine nature which opposes the statement of Aquinas that the mode both of necessity and contingency falls under the foresight of God

THE THEORY OF chance has obvious bearings on the theory of knowledge especially with regard to the distinction between knowledge and opinion and between certainty and probability

On any view of chance—whether it is real or illusory—when men call a future event contingent they mean that they cannot predict it with certitude So far as human prediction goes it makes no difference whether the future event is necessarily determined and we lack adequate knowledge of its causes or the event has a genuine indeterminacy in the way it is caused or

medicine and astrology When the proconsul tells him that, as compared with medicine, astrology is a false art, Augustine, at this time himself much given to the books of the horoscope-casters," asks how the fact that "many things were foretold truly by [astrology]" can be explained. The proconsul answered, very reasonably that it was due to the force of chance, which is always to be allowed for in the order of things." Thus, Augustine says later "I saw it is obvious that such things as happened to be said truly from the casting of horoscopes were true not by skill but by chance and such things as were false were not due to want of skill in the art but merely that luck had fallen the other way"

Neither art itself, nor skill in its practice, can ever be perfect enough to remove chance entirely for the artist deals with particulars. Yet the measure of an art is the certainty which its rules have as directions for achieving the desired result and the skill of the artist is measured by the extent to which he succeeds by rule and judgment rather than by chance.

When Aristotle quotes Agathon s remark that art loves chance and chance loves art," he explains its sense to be that chance and art are concerned with the same objects"—that which does not come to be by nature nor from necessity Hence art sometimes fails, either from uncontrollable contingencies or from insufficient knowledge of causes. All causes," says Hume, are not conjoined to their usual effects with like uniformity An artificer who handles only dead matter may be disappointed of his aim, as well as the politician, who directs the conduct of sensible and intelligent agents."

IN THE REALM OF human affairs—in morals, politics, and history—the factor of chance is usually discussed in terms of good and bad fortune. The word fortune"—as may be seen in the root which it shares with fortuitous"—has the same connotations as "chance." Aristotle treats fortune as the kind of chance that operates in the sphere of human action rather than natural chance. Fortune, he thinks, can be attributed properly only to intelligent beings capable of deliberate choice. The sense of this distinction between chance and fortune seems to be borne out in history by the fact that fortune, unlike chance, receives personification in myth and legend Fortune is a goddess or like the Fates whom she combats, a power with which even the gods must reckon.

The doctrine of chance or fortune occupies an important place in moral theory Aristotle s classification of goods tends to identify external goods with goods of fortune—the goods which unlike knowledge and virtue we cannot obtain merely by the exercise of our will and faculties. Considering the elements of happiness, Aquinas groups together wealth honor fame, and power as goods of the same sort because they are due to external causes and in most cases to fortune.

The goods of fortune, as well as its ills, consist in things beyond man s power to command and, in consequence, to deserve. Recognizing the unpredictable operation of fortune, Epictetus, the Stoic, argues that we must make the best of those things that are in our power and take the rest as nature gives it." We have the power to deal rightly with our own impressions." Hence the Stoics advise us to control our reactions to things even though we cannot control the things themselves. Yet men will always ask, as Hamlet does, Whether tis nobler in the mind to suffer the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, or to take arms against a sea of troubles, and by opposing end them?

The fact that the goods and ills of fortune are beyond our power to control raises the further question of man s responsibility regarding them. We can hardly be held responsible for everything that happens to us, but only for those things which are subject to our will. This traditional moral distinction between the good or evil which befalls us by fortune and that which we willfully obtain or accomplish parallels the legal distinction between accidental and intentional wrongdoing

What is true of the individual life seems to apply to history—the life of states and the development of civilization generally For the most part the historians—Herodotus and Thucydides, Plutarch, Tacitus, and Gibbon—find fortune a useful principle of interpretation. To Machiavelli history seems to be so full of accidents and contingencies— great changes in affairs beyond all human conjecture —that he tries to advise the prince how to make

Pascal argues we ought to wager in favor of immortality and act accordingly There is here the infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain a chance to gain against a finite number of chances of loss and what you stake is finite

Like Pascal Hume thinks that we must be content with probability as a basis for action The great subverter of *Pyrrhonism* or the excessive principles of skepticism he writes is action and employment and the occupations of common life But unlike the ancients Hume also thinks we should be content with probabilities in the sphere of the natural sciences Certitude is attainable only by the mathematician who deals with the relations between ideas Since the natural sciences deal with matters of fact or real existence and since to know such things we must rely entirely upon our experience of cause and effect we cannot reach better than probable conclusions

The scientist according to Hume, weighs opposite experiments He considers which side is supported by the greater number of experiments to that side he inclines with doubt and hesitation and when at last he fixes his judgment the evidence exceeds not what we properly call *probability* All probability then supposes an opposition of experiments and observations A hundred instances or experiments on one side and fifty on another afford a doubtful expectation of any event, though a hundred uniform experiments with only one that is contradictory reasonably beget a pretty strong degree of assurance

Hume applies the logic of chance to weighing the evidence against and the testimony in favor of miracles as well as to contrary hypotheses in science As much as Spinoza he denies the existence of chance or contingency in the order of nature Chance is entirely subjective It is identical with the probability of our opinions In the throw of dice the mind he says considers the turning up of each particular side as alike probable and this is the very nature of chance to render all the particular events comprehended in it entirely equal But there may also be a probability which arises from a superiority of chances on any side and according as this superiority increases and surpasses the opposite chances the probability receives a proportionate increase The case Hume asserts is the same with the probability of causes as with that of chance

Since Hume s day the theory of probability has become an essential ingredient of empirical science The development of thermodynamics in the 19th century would have been impossible without it This is also true of the quantum mechanics and atomic physics of our own time. But like the doctrine of chance the theory of probability tends in one of two directions *either* toward the subjective view that probability is only a quality of our judgments, measuring the degree of our ignorance of the real causes which leave nothing in nature undetermined *or* toward the objective view that there is genuine indeterminism in nature and that mathematical calculations of probability estimate the real chance of an event s occurring

The element of chance also has a bearing on the general theory of art The hypothesis of the melody which a kitten might compose by walking on the keyboard is obviously intended to contrast a product of chance with a work of art The competent musician knows with certainty that he can do what the meandering kitten has only one chance in many millions of ever accomplishing

In proportion as an art is developed and to the degree that its rules represent a mastery of the medium in which the artist works, chance is excluded from its productions This point is strikingly exemplified in the history of medicine If there had been no such thing as medicine Hippocrates suggests and if nothing had been investigated or found out in it all practitioners would have been equally unskilled and ignorant of it and everything concerning the sick would have been directed by chance On the same principle Galen distinguishes the physician from the empiric who, without knowing the cause pretends that he is able to rectify the failures of function. The empiric works by trial and error—the very opposite of art and science for trial and error can succeed only by chance The physician, learned and skilled in medicine works from a knowledge of causes and by rules of art which tend to eliminate chance

Augustine reports a conversation with the proconsul concerning the relative merits of

medicine and astrology When the proconsul tells him that as compared with medicine astrology is a false art Augustine at this time himself much gi en to the books of the horoscope-casters, asks how the fact that "many things ere foretold truly by [astrology]" can be explained. The proconsul answered, very rea sonably that it was due to the force of chance which is always to be allowed for in the order of things. Thus, Augustine says later I saw it as obvious that such things as happened to be said truly from the casting of horoscopes were true not by skill but by chance and such things as were false were not due to want of skill in the art but merely that luck had fallen the other way "

Neither art itself nor skill in its practice can ever be perfect enough to remove chance entirely for the artist deals with particulars. Yet the measure of an art is the certainty which its rules have as d rections for achieving the desired result and the skill of the artist is measured by the extent to which he succeeds by rule and judgment rather than by chance.

When Aristotle quotes Agathon s remark that art lo es chance and chance loves art " he explains its sense to be that chance and art are concerned with the same objects"—that which does not come to be by nature nor from necessity Hence art sometimes fails, either from uncontrollable contingencies or from insufficient knowledge of causes. All causes, says Hume are not conjoined to their usual effects with like uniformity An artificer who handles only dead matter may be disappointed of his aim, as well as the politician who directs the conduct of sensible and intelligent agents.

IN THE REALM OF human affairs—in morals, politics, and history—the factor of chance is usually discussed in terms of good and bad fortune. The word fortune —as may be seen in the root which it shares with fortuitous — has the same connotations as chance Aristotle treats fortune as the kind of chance that operates in the sphere of human action rather than natural chance. Fortune he thinks, can be attributed properly only to intelligent beings capable of deliberate choice. The sense of this distinction between chance and fortune seems to be borne out in history by the fact that fortune unlike chance rece ves personification in myth and legend Fortune is a goddess or like the Fates whom she combats, a power with which even the gods must reckon.

The *doctrine* of chance or fortune occupies an important place in moral theory Aristotle s classification of goods tends to identify external goods with goods of fortune—the goods which unlike knowledge and virtue we cannot obtain merely by the exercise of our will and faculties. Considering the elements of happiness, Aquinas groups together wealth, honor fame and power as goods of the same sort because they are "due to external causes and in most cases to fortune.

The goods of fortune as well as its ills, consist in things beyond man s power to command and, in consequence to deserve Recognizing the unpredictable operation of fortune Epictetus, the Stoic, argues that "we must make the best of those things that are in our power and take the rest as nature gives it " We have "the power to deal rightly with our own impressions." Hence the Stoics advise us to control our reactions to things even though we cannot control the things themselves. Yet men will always ask, as Hamlet does, Whether tis nobler in the mind to suffer the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, or to take arms against a sea of troubles, and by opposing end them?

The fact that the goods and ills of fortune are beyond our power to control raises the further question of man s responsibility regarding them. We can hardly be held responsible for everything that happens to us, but only for those things which are subject to our will This traditional moral distinction between the good or evil which befalls us by fortune and that which e willfully obtain or accomplish parallels the legal distinction between accidental and intent onal wrongdoing

What is true of the individual life seems to apply to history — the life of states and the development of ci ilization generally For the most part the historians—*Herodotus* and Thucydides, Plutarch, Tacitus, and Gibbon—find fortune a useful principle of interpretation. To Machiavelli history seems to be so full of accidents and contingencies— great changes in affairs beyond all human conjecture"— that he tries to advise the prince how to make

Pascal argues we ought to wager in favor of immortality and act accordingly There is here the infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain a chance to gain against a finite number of chances of loss and what you stake is finite

Like Pascal Hume thinks that we must be content with probability as a basis for action The great subverter of *Pyrrhonism* or the excessive principles of skepticism he writes is action and employment and the occupations of common life But unlike the ancients Hume also thinks we should be content with probabilities in the sphere of the natural sciences Certitude is attainable only by the mathematician who deals with the relations between ideas Since the natural sciences deal with matters of fact or real existence and since to know such things we must rely entirely upon our experience of cause and effect we cannot reach better than probable conclusions

The scientist according to Hume, weighs opposite experiments He considers which side is supported by the greater number of experiments to that side he inclines with doubt and hesitation and when at last he fixes his judgment the evidence exceeds not what we properly call *probability* All probability then supposes an opposition of experiments and observations A hundred instances or experiments on one side and fifty on another afford a doubtful expectation of any event, though a hundred uniform experiments with only one that is contradictory reasonably beget a pretty strong degree of assurance

Hume applies the logic of chance to weighing the evidence against and the testimony in favor of miracles as well as to contrary hypotheses in science As much as Spinoza he denies the existence of chance or contingency in the order of nature Chance is entirely subjective It is identical with the probability of our opinions In the throw of dice the mind he says considers the turning up of each particular side as alike probable and this is the very nature of chance to render all the particular events comprehended in it entirely equal But there may also be a probability which arises from a superiority of chances on any side and according as this superiority increases and surpasses the opposite chances the probability receives a proportionate increase The case Hume asserts is the same with the probability of causes as with that of chance

Since Hume s day, the theory of probability has become an essential ingredient of empirical science The development of thermodynamics in the 19th century would have been impossible without it This is also true of the quantum mechanics and atomic physics of our own time. But like the doctrine of chance, the theory of probability tends in one of two directions *either* toward the subjective view that probability is only a quality of our judgments, measuring the degree of our ignorance of the real causes which leave nothing in nature undetermined *or* toward the objective view that there is genuine indeterminism in nature and that mathematical calculations of probability estimate the real chance of an event s occurring

THE ELEMENT OF chance also has a bearing on the general theory of art The hypothesis of the melody which a kitten might compose by walking on the keyboard is obviously intended to contrast a product of chance with a work of art The competent musician knows with certainty that he can do what the meandering kitten has only one chance in many millions of ever accomplishing

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use of fortune in order to avoid being ruined by it Such advice can be followed because in his opinion Fortune is the arbiter of one half of our actions but still leaves us to direct the other half or perhaps a little less

Hegel on the contrary does not admit chance or fortune in his view of world history as a necessary development out of the concept of the mind s freedom alone For Tolstoy also either necessity or freedom rules the affairs of men Chance he writes does ' not denote any really existing thing but only a certain stage of understanding of phenomena Once we succeed in calculating the composition of forces involved in the mass movements of men we shall not be obliged to have recourse to chance for an explanation of those small events which made these people what they were but it will be clear that all those small events were inevitable

As the contingent is opposed to the necessary as that which happens by chance is opposed to that which is fully determined by causes so fortune is opposed to fate or destiny This opposition is most evident in the great poems especially the tragedies which depict man s efforts to direct his own destiny now pitting his freedom against both fate and fortune now courting fortune in his struggle against fate

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

CHAPTER 9 CHANCE

REFERENCES

To find the passa es cited use the numbers in hea y type, which are the olume and pa e numbers of the passages referred to. For example in 4 H MER I ad BK II [265 283] 12d, the number 4 is the n mber of the olume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12

P GE S CTIO S When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower hal es f the page. For example in 53 J M s Psychology 116a 119b, the passage begins in the upper half f page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower hal es of the left hand side f the page, the l tters c and d to the u per and lower hal es of the right hand side f the page F r example n 7 PLATO Sympo m 163b-164c, the passa e begins in the lower half of the left hand sid of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164

A TH R S DI O S One or more f the main d isions of a work (uch as PA T BK, C T SECT) a e sometimes ncluded in the ref rence line numbers, in brackets, are gi en in cer ta cases e g Iliad BK II [65 83] 12d.

BIB E REFERE CES The references are to book, chapter and erse. When the King James and Douay ersions differ in t tle f books or i the numbering of chapters or erses, the King James rsion s cited first and the Douay ind cated by (D) follows e g OLD TESTA ME Nehemiah 7 45—(D) II Esdras 46

S M OLS Th bbre iatio esp call the read r s ttention to one or more especially el nt pa ts of a wh le ef re c passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermit t tly rather than continuously in the work or passa e cited

For dditi nal nf rmation conc rning the st le of the ref re ces, see the E planation of Ref enc Styl f r g neral guidance in the use of The G eat Ideas consult the P eface.

1 The conception of chance

1 Cha ce as the co ncid nce of causes

7 PLATO Timaeus 455a b
8 ARI TL Interpretatio CH 9 [18 5-9] 28c / Prior Analytics K I H 13 [3 4 14] 48b-c / Posteri Analytics, K I 1 [95 3-9] 129d / T pic CH 6 [2 2] 157d 158a II H I [1 6 1] 162d 163a / Phy ic K I CH 4-6 272c 275a CH 8 275d 277b / Heavens, I [83 30- 6] 375a-c K I 5 [87b2 6] 379b CH 8 [289 2 8] 381b K CH 3 [3 0a23 3] 401d / Metaphysics, K C 3 [02-a 3 9] 547a-c, B I CH 2-3 548c 549d K X H 8 593a d K X I, CH 3 [0a4-9] 599b / Memory and Reminiscence CH 2 [452 30- 6] 694b
9 ARI TOTL Parts of A imals BK CH I [640a 33] 162b-d / Rhetoric K I CH 0 [369a3 5] 612 d
12 A ELI M ditations K II ECT 3 25 a b
17 PLOTI F urth Ennead TR I I CH 16 150c / Si h Enn d TR III H 347c d
18 A GU TI E Co f ssi ns BK par 4-6 20a d K par 8- 45d-47 passim
19 AQ I Summa Theologica R Q 22 2, EP 128d 130d Q 47 A AN 256a 257b Q 5 A 3 ANS 297b-298a Q 3 5 R P I 531b-532b A LP 2 533b-d Q 115 A 6 S nd REP 3 591d 592d Q 116, A I 592d 593d
23 HO ES Leviathan, ART I 272b
31 S OZA Ethics P RT III DEF I 3 395d 396a
35 H ME Huma U derstanding SECT VI 469d 4 0d passim CT VI I DI 67 480c-481a
42 KANT J gement 566a b
51 TOLSTOY War d Peace K IX 342a 344b BK XII 584d 585b
53 J M Psychology 71 91a 92 765b 857b-858a passim

1b Chance as the absol tely fortuitous, the spontaneous or uncaused

8 A ISTOTLE Physics BK II CH 4 [196a25 b4] 272d 273 C I 6 [198a5 14] 275a
12 LUC ETIUS Nature of Thing K I [1022 1029] 13c d K II [184 293] 17b-18d esp [284 93] 18c d [1 48- 066] 28b-c BK [181 194] 63b-c [4 6-431] 66c-d
17 PLOTI US Third Ennead, TR I CH 3 79b-c
18 AUGU TINE City f God, BK IV H 18 197c 198a
19 AQU Summa Theologica, P T I Q 16 A I RE 94b-95c Q A 2, N 128d 130d Q 47 A I A S 256a 257b

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42 KANT *Pure Reason* 132d 133a 140b d 143a / *Practical Reason* 331c 332a / *Judgement* 566a b
54 FREUD *General Introduction* 454b c

2 The issue concerning the existence of chance or fortune

2a The relation of chance to causality philosophical or scientific determinism

7 PLATO *Republic* BK X 438c 439a / *Timaeus* 455c 456a 465d-466a / *Statesman* 587a 589c esp 587a b / *Laws* BK X 759d 765d
8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation* CH 9 28a 29d / *Posterior Analytics* BK II CH 11 [95 3-9] 129d / *Physics* BK II CH 4 5 272c 274b CH 8 [199 33-^{b}26] 276c 277a / *Heavens* BK II CH 5 [287^{b}22-26] 379b CH 8 [289^{b}22 28] 381b BK IV CH 3 [310^{a}23-31] 401d / *Generation and Corruption* BK II CH 6 [333 35-^{b}20] 434b c / *Metaphysics* BK V CH 30 547a d BK VI CH 2 [1027 8 18] 549b CH 3 549c d BK XI CH 8 [1065 6 ^{b}4] 593b d BK XII CH 3 [1070 4-9] 599b / *Memory and Reminiscence* CH 2 [45 30 ^{b}6] 694b
9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH 1 [640 12-^{b}4] 162b 163a / *Ethics* BK III CH 3 [1112 30-33] 358b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 10 [1369 31-^{b}5] 612c d
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK II [184 307] 17b 19a [1048 1066] 28b c BK V [55-58] 61d [181 194] 63b c [306-310] 65a [416-431] 66c d
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK VII SECT 1 279b SECT 49 282d BK IX SECT 28 293d 294a SECT 35-36 294d 295a SECT 39 295a BK X SECT 27 299d
17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR I CH 2 78d CH 3 79b c TR II CH 1 82c / *Fourth Ennead* TR III CH 16 150c d TR IV CH 33 176b d / *Sixth Ennead* TR VIII CH 9 10 347a 348a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 14 A 13 REP 1 86d 88c Q 19 A 8 116a d Q 22 A 2 REP 1 128d 130d A 4 131c 132b Q 103 A 5 REP 1 531b 532b A 7 REP 2 533b d Q 115 A 6 591d 592d Q 116 A 1 592d 593d A 3 594c 595a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 113b-c PART IV 272b
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 412c 413a
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 45b c
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I DEF 7 355b AXIO 1 3 355d PROP 16 362a PROP 21 23 364a 365a PROP 26-29 365b 366c PROP 33 36 367b 369b PART II PROP 31 COROL 385c PROP 44 389b 390a PART III 395a d PROP 2 SCHOL 396d 398b PART IV PREF 422b d-424a DEF 3 4 424a APPENDIX 447c d PART V PROP 6 DEMONST 454a
34 NEWTON *Optics* BK III 542a b
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VI DIV 46 469d, DIV 47 470b SECT VIII 478b 481a passim esp DIV 67 480c 481a, DIV 74 484a c
38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK II 397a
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 72c 85d esp 74b-76c 91d-92c 132d 133a 140b d 143a 153a 164a-172c 184b-c / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 285c d / *Practical Reason* 331c 333a / *Judgement* 558b c, 564a c 566a b 587a-c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 342 110c d / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 156b-158a
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 159a
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 37c d 65a / *Descent of Man* 593d
50 MARX *Capital* 10b 11b
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK IX 342a 344b BK X 389a 391c BK XI 469a 472b EPILOGUE I 646c 650c esp 646c 647b EPILOGUE II 675a 696d
53 JAMES *Psychology* 71a 90b-93a esp 91a 92a 377b 387b 388a 765b 823a 825a passim
54 FREUD *General Introduction* 454b c 486c 487a / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 660c

2b The relation of chance to fate providence and predestination

OLD TESTAMENT *Proverbs* 16 33 / *Jonah* 1 1 10 —(*D*) *Jonas* 1 1-10
NEW TESTAMENT *John* 6 44 45 64-65—(*D*) *John* 6 44-45 65 66 / *Acts* 1 15 26 13 48 / *Romans* 8 28 11 36 esp 8 28 30 9 15 10 13 14 11 5 / *Ephesians* 1 4 2 10
4 HOMER *Iliad* BK XXIV [522 551] 176d 177a
5 AESCHYLUS *Prometheus Bound* [507-520] 45a b
5 SOPHOCLES *Trachiniae* [93 140] 171a b / *Philoctetes* [169 200] 183d 184a
5 EURIPIDES *Helen* [712 720] 304d 305a / *Heracles Mad* [60-81] 365c d
7 PLATO *Laws* BK IV 679a c
8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK II CH 4 [196^{b}5 7] 273a / *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 10 [1075 11 24] 605d 606a
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 9 [1099^{b}8 24] 345a b
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 6 110c 112b CH 12 118d 120b CH 16 121d 122d BK III CH 17 191d 192a BK IV CH 3 224b d
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK II SECT 3 257a b SECT 11 258a b BK III SECT 11 262a b BK IV SECT 3 263c BK IX SECT 28 293d 294a BK XII SECT 14 308c
13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK I [194 209] 108a b [595 624] 119b 120a BK XII [631-649] 370b 371a
14 PLUTARCH *Camillus* 107c
15 TACITUS *Annals* BK VI 91b d / *Histories* BK I 194a c
17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR II CH 1 2 82c 83d TR III CH 2 93d / *Fourth Ennead* TR III CH 16 150c-d

3 Chance, necessity and design or purpose in the origin and structure of the world

4 Cause and chance in relation to knowledge and opinion, the theory of probability

5 The control of chance or contingency by art

(5 The control of chance or contingency by art)

8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK II CH II [95 3-9] 129d / *Metaphysics* BK I CH I [980^b25-981 5] 499b BK XII CH 3 [1070 4 9] 599b
9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH I [640 25-33] 162d / *Ethics* BK I CH 9 [1099^b18-24] 345a b BK II CH 4 [1105 18-26] 350d BK III CH 3 [1112 19-^{b}12] 358a c BK VI CH 4 [1140 10-23] 388d 389a / *Politics* BK I CH II [1258^b35-36] 453b BK II CH II [1273^b17-24] 470b BK VII CH 13 [1332^a28-32] 537a / *Rhetoric* BK I CH I [1354 1 11] 593a CH 5 [1361^b39-1362 4] 602c
10 HIPPOCRATES *Ancient Medicine* par 1 1a b
13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK XII [391-440] 364b 365b
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 57 A 3 ANS 297b-298a PART I-II Q 14 A 4 ANS 679b d
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE, VIII [52-84] 126a b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 52c 53c 377a d
26 SHAKESPEARE *Richard II* ACT III SC IV [29-66] 340c d
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 50c 51d 56b 57b 85c 86c 90b 91a / *Novum Organum* BK I APH 8 107c d APH 82 121a APH 108 109 128d 129c BK II APH 31 159d 161a
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VIII DIV 67 480c 481a
43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 452a b
47 GOETHE *Faust* PRELUDE [134-157] 4a b
50 MARX *Capital* 183b 184a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK IV 188a 190c BK IX 359a 365c BK X 425b 426a 441b 442c 445d 448c 456a 459d esp 458c 459d BK XI 471c 472b 505a 507a esp 505d 506a 507a BK XIII 563c 575a esp 563c 564d 570d 572a 573c 575a 582a 587d esp 584c 585b BK XIV 609a 613d BK XV 618b 621b
53 JAMES *Psychology* 673a b

6 Chance and fortune in human affairs the mythology of Fortune

6a Chance and fortune in the life of the individual

OLD TESTAMENT *Ecclesiastes* 9 11
4 HOMER *Iliad* 3a 179d esp BK XXIV [522 551] 176d 177a
5 AESCHYLUS *Persians* [909-1076] 24d 26d
5 SOPHOCLES *Oedipus the King* 99a 113a c esp [1522 1530] 113c / *Antigone* [1155 1171] 140d 141a / *Trachiniae* [1-48] 170a c [293-306] 172c d [932-946] 178b / *Philoctetes* [500-506] 186c
5 EURIPIDES *Heracleidae* 248a 257a c esp [853-866] 255d / *Suppliants* [263 270] 260c [549-557] 263a / *Trojan Women* 270a 281a c esp [1200-1206] 280a b / *Heracles Mad* 365a 377d esp [474 496] 369a
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 7b 8a 46c BK III 91d 92b 98a 99a 116a b BK VII 225b-d, 252b c
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II, 398c d /
7 PLATO *Euthydemus* 69a 71a / *Republic* BK X 439b 440c
8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK II CH 5 [197^a5 3] 274a b
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 9-10 345a 346c BK VII CH 13 [1153^b14 24] 405a / *Politics* BK VII CH I [1323^b22 36] 527c d / *Rhetoric* BK I, CH 5 [1361^b39 1362 11] 602c d CH 10 [1368^b33 1369^a7] 612a b [1369 31 ^{b}5] 612c d BK II CH 12 [1388^b31 1389 1] 636a CH 15-17 638a 639a
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK II SECT 3 25 a b SECT 17 259b d BK III SECT 4 260b-261a SECT 10 11 261d 262b BK IV SECT 6 263d SECT 33 36 266c d SECT 44 267b SECT 49 268a c BK V SECT 8 269d 270b SECT 4 272c SECT 27 272d BK VI SECT II 27 SECT 20 276a SECT 39 277d SECT 58 279d BK VII SECT 8 280b SECT 34 282a SECT 54 283b SECT 57-58 283c d SECT 68 284c d SECT 75 285c BK VIII SECT 17 286d SECT 3 287d 288a SECT 35 288b SECT 44 47 89a-c SECT 51 289d 290a BK IX SECT 28 293d 294a BK X SECT 3 296d SECT 5-6 296d 29 b SECT 25 299c SECT 33 300c 301a SECT 3 301b BK XII SECT 3 307b d SECT II 14 308b c
13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK I [194 09] 108a b [59 624] 119b 120a BK XII [391 440] 364b 365b [631-649] 370b 371a
14 PLUTARCH *Solon* 66b d 74c 75c / *Sulla* 370c 371b / *Sertorius* 457b d 458b / *Pompey* 535c d / *Demetrius* 739c 740d 744b c
15 TACITUS *Annals* BK VI 91b d / *Histories* BK IV 281a b
17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR III CH 10 46a b / *Third Ennead* TR II III 82c 97b passim / *Fourth Ennead* TR III CH 16 150c d
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK IV par 4-6 20a d BK VII par 8 10 45d 47a / *City of God* BK IV CH 18 19 197c 198b
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL VII [49-99] 10a c XV [22-99] 21b 22a PARADISE VIII [94 148] 118a c
22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida* BK I STANZA 120 122 16b 17a BK II STANZA 40-42 26b-27a BK III STANZA 89 66a BK IV STANZA 4 94a STANZA 55-56 95b 96a / *Words of the Host* [12 226-231] 371a / *Tale of Melibeus* par 42 419a b / *Monk's Tale* 434a 448b
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I. Works by authors represented in this collection.

II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

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Chapter 10 CHANGE

INTRODUCTION

FROM the pre-Socratic physicists and the ancient philosophers to Darwin Marx and James—and in our own day Dewey and Whitehead—the fact of change has been a major focus of speculative and scientific inquiry

Except by Parmenides and his school the existence of change has never been denied Nor can it be without rejecting all sense-perception as illusory which is precisely what Zeno s paradoxes seem to do, according to one interpretation of them But if argument cannot refute the testimony of the senses, neither can reasoning support it. The fact of change, because it is evident to the senses, does not need proof.

That change is, is evident but *what* change is, is neither evident nor easy to define. What principles or factors are common to every sort of change, how change or becoming is related to permanence or being what sort of existence belongs to mutable things and to change itself—these are questions to which answers are not obtainable merely by observation. Nor will simple observation without the aid of experiment, measurement and mathematical calculation discover the laws and properties of motion.

The analysis of change or motion has been a problem for the philosophers of nature They have been concerned with the definition of change its relation to being the classification of the kinds of change. The *measurement* of motion on the other hand and the mathematical formulation of its laws have occupied the experimental natural scientists. Both natural philosophy and natural science share a common subject matter though they approach it by different method and with different interests. Both are entitled to use the name physics for their subject matter

The Greek word *phusis* from which physics comes has, as its Latin equivalent, the word *natura* from which nature comes. In their original significance both words had reference to the sensible world of changing things, or to its underlying principle—to the ultimate source of change The physics of the philosopher and the physics of the empirical scientist are alike inquiries concerning the nature of things not in every respect but in regard to their change and motion The conclusions of both inquiries have metaphysical implications for the nature of the physical world and for the character of physical existence.

The philosopher draws these implications for being from the study of becoming The scientist in turn, draws upon philosophical distinctions in order to define the objects of his study Galileo, for example in separating the problem of freely falling bodies from the motion of projectiles, employs the traditional philosophical distinction between natural and violent motion The analysis of time and space (basic variables in Newtonian mechanics) the distinction between discontinuous and continuous change and the problem of the divisibility of a continuous motion—these are philosophical considerations pre-supposed by the scientific measurement of motion.

WE HAVE SO FAR used the words change and motion as well as becoming as if all three were interchangeable in meaning That is somewhat inaccurate even for the ancients who regarded all kinds of change except one as motions it is much less accurate for the moderns who have tended to restrict the meaning of motion to local motion or change of place. It is necessary therefore to examine briefly the kinds of change and to indicate the problems which arise with these distinctions.

In his physical treatises, Aristotle distinguishes four kinds of change. When the change

from contrary to contrary is *in quantity* he writes it is growth and diminution when it is *in place* it is motion, when it is *quality* it is alteration but when nothing persists of which the resultant is a property (or an accident in any sense of the term) it is coming to be and the converse change is passing away Aristotle also uses other pairs of words — generation and corruption becoming and perishing —to name the last kind of change

Of the four kinds of change only the last is not called ' motion But in the context of saying that becoming cannot be a motion Aristotle also remarks that every motion is a kind of change He does not restrict the meaning of motion to change in place which is usually called local motion or locomotion There are then according to Aristotle s vocabulary three kinds of motion (1) local motion in which bodies change from place to place (2) alteration or qualitative motion in which bodies change with respect to such attributes as color texture or temperature (3) increase and decrease or quantitative motion in which bodies change in size And in addition there is the one kind of change which is not motion— generation and corruption This consists in the coming to be or passing away of a body which while it has being exists as an individual substance of a certain sort

Becoming and perishing are most readily exemplified by the birth and death of living things but Aristotle also includes the transformation of water into ice or vapor as examples of generation and corruption One distinctive characteristic of generation and corruption in Aristotle s conception of this type of change is their instantaneity He thinks that the other three kinds of change are continuous processes taking time whereas things come into being or pass away instantaneously Aristotle thus applies the word motion only to the continuous changes which time can measure He never says that time is the measure of change but only of motion

But the contrast between the one mode of change which is not motion and the three kinds of motion involves more than this difference with regard to time and continuity Aristotle s analysis considers the subject of change—that which undergoes transformation—and starting point and goal of motion Every m tion he says proceeds from something a to something, that which is directly in motio being distinct from that to which it is in m tion and that from which it is in motion for i stance—we may take the three things wood, hot and cold of which the first is that which is in motion the second is that which to which the motion proceeds and the third is that from which it proceeds

In the alteration which occurs when the wood changes quality just as in the increase or decrease which occurs with a body s change in quantity and in the local motion which occurs with a body s change of place *that which changes* persists throughout the change as the same kind of substance The wood does not cease to be wood when it becomes hot or cold the stone does not cease to be a stone when it rolls from here to there or the organism an animal of a certain kind when it grows in size. In all these cases the substratum —that which is the subject of change— persists and changes in its own properties The body although persisting as the same body is now healthy and now ill and the bronze is now spherical and at another time angular and yet remains the same bronze

Because the substance of the changing thing remains the same while changing in its properties—*i e* in such attributes or accidents as quality quantity and place—Aristotle groups the three kinds of motion together as *accidental change* The changing thing does not come to be or pass away absolutely but only in a certain respect In contrast generation and corruption involve a change in the very substance of a thing When nothing perceptible persists in its identity as a substratum and the thing changes as a whole then according to Aristotle it is a coming to be of one substance, and the passing away of another

In such becoming or perishing it is matter itself rather than a body or a substance which is transformed Matter takes on or loses the form of a certain kind of substance For example when the nutriment is assimilated to the form of a living body the bread or corn becomes the flesh and blood of a man When an animal dies its body decomposes into the ele-

-nents of inorganic matter Because it is a change of substance itself, Aristotle calls the one kind of change which is not motion *substantial change* and speaks of it as a coming-to-be or passing-away simply —that is, not in a certain respect but absolutely or without qualification

These distinctions are involved in a long tradition of discussion and controversy They cannot be affirmed or denied without opposite sides being taken on the fundamental issues concerning substance and accident matter and form, and the causes of change or motion. The adoption or rejection of these distinctions affects one's view of the difference between inorganic and organic change, and the difference between the motions of matter and the changes which take place in mind The statement of certain problems is determined accordingly as, for example the problem of the transmutation of the elements, which persists in various forms from the physics of the ancients through mediaeval alchemy and the beginnings of modern chemistry to present considerations of radioactivity and atomic fission

SINCE THE 17TH CENTURY motion has been identified with local motion I can conceive no other kind of motion, Descartes writes, and do not consider that we ought to conceive any other in nature As it is expressed "in common parlance motion he says, is nothing *more than the action by which any body passes from one place to another*

This can hardly be taken to mean that change of place is the only observable type of change That other kinds of change are observable cannot be denied The science of mechanics or dynamics may be primarily or exclusively concerned with local motions, but other branches of natural science certainly chemistry deal with qualitative transformations and the biological sciences study growth and decay birth and death

The emphasis on local motion as the only kind of motion while it does not exclude apparent changes of other sorts, does raise a question about their reality The question can be put in several ways Are the various *apparently* different kinds of change *really* distinct or can they all be reduced to aspects of one underlying mode of change which is local motion? Even supposing that the kinds of change are not reducible to one another is local motion primary in the sense that it is involved in all the others?

When mechanics dominates the physical sciences (as has been so largely the case in modern times) there is a tendency to reduce all the observable diversity of change to various appearances of local motion. Newton for example explicitly expresses this desire to formulate all natural phenomena in terms of the mechanics of moving particles. In the Preface to the first edition of his *Mathematical Principles* after recounting his success in dealing with celestial phenomena he says, I wish we could derive the rest of the phenomena of Nature by the same kind of reasoning from mechanical principles, for I am induced by many reasons to suspect that they may all depend upon certain forces by which the particles of bodies by some causes hitherto unknown are either mutually impelled towards one another and cohere in regular figures or are repelled and recede from one another

The notion that all change can be reduced to the results of local motion is not however of modern origin. Lucretius expounds the theory of the Greek atomists that all the phenomena of change can be explained by reference to the local motion of indivisible particles coming together and separating Change of place is the only change which occurs on the level of the ultimate physical reality The atoms neither come to be nor pass away nor change in quality or size

But though we find the notion in ancient atomism, it is only in modern physics that the emphasis upon local motion tends to exclude all other kinds of change. It is characteristic of what James calls the modern mechanico-physical philosophy to begin by saying that the *only* facts are collocations and motions of primordial solids, and the only laws the changes of motion which changes in collocation bring James quotes Helmholtz to the effect that the ultimate goal of theoretic physics is to find the last *unchanging* causes of the processes of Nature If to this end "we imagine the world composed of elements with unalterable qualities, then Helmholtz continues, the only

changes that can remain in such a world are spatial changes i e movements and the only outer relations which can modify the action of the forces are spatial too or in other words the forces are motor forces dependent for their effect on spatial relations

In the history of physics Aristotle represents the opposite view No one of the four kinds of change which he distinguishes has for him greater physical reality than the others Just as quality cannot be reduced to quantity or either of these to place so in his judgment the motions associated with these terms are irreducible to one another Yet Aristotle does assign to local motion a certain primacy Motion in its most general and primary sense he writes is change of place which we call locomotion He does not mean merely that this is the primary sense of the word but rather that no other kind of motion can occur without local motion being somehow involved in the process Showing how increase and decrease depends on alteration and how that in turn depends on change of place he says that of the three kinds of motion it is this last which we call locomotion that must be primary

THE SHIFT IN MEANING of the word motion would not by itself mark a radical departure in the theory of change but it is accompanied by a shift in thought which has the most radical consequences At the same time that motion is identified with local motion Descartes conceives motion as something completely actual and thoroughly intelligible For the ancients becoming of any sort had both less reality and less intelligibility than being

Aristotle had defined motion as the actuality of that which is potential in a respect in which it is still potential to some degree According to what Descartes calls its strict as opposed to its popular meaning motion is the transference of one part of matter or one body from the vicinity of those bodies that are in immediate contact with it and which we regard as in repose, into the vicinity of others This definition—contrasted with the Aristotelian conception which it generally supersedes in the subsequent tradition of natural science—is as revolutionary as the Cartesian analytical geometry is by comparison with the Euclidean Nor is it an unconnected fact that the analy geometry prepares the way for the differen calculus that is needed to measure variable tions their velocities and their acceleratio

The central point on which the two defi tions are opposed constitutes one of the m fundamental issues in the philosophy of natu Does motion involve a transition from pot tial to actual existence or only the substitut of one actual state for another—only a tran portation as Descartes says from one place another?

While motion is going on the moving thi according to Aristotle s definition must be partly potential and partly actual in the same respect The leaf turning red *while it is altering* has not yet fully reddened When it becomes as red as it can get it can no longer change in that respect Before it began to change it was actually green and since it could become red, it was potentially red But while the change is in process the potentiality of the leaf to become red is being actualized This actualization progresses until the change is completed

The same analysis would apply to a ball in motion Until it comes to rest in a given place, its potentiality for being there is undergoing progressive actualization. In short motion involves some departure from pure potentiality in a given respect and never complete attainment of full actuality in that same respect. When there is *no* departure from potentiality motion has not yet begun when the attainment of actuality is complete the motion has terminated

The Aristotelian definition of motion is the object of much ridicule in the 17th century Repeating the phrasing which had become traditional in the schools— the actualization of what exists in potentiality, in so far as it is potential —Descartes asks Now who understands these words? And who at the same time does not know what motion is? Will not every one admit that those philosophers have been trying to find a knot in a bulrush? Locke also finds it meaningless What more exquisite jargon could the wit of man invent than this definition which would puzzle any rational man to whom it was not already known by its famous absurdity to guess what word it could ever be supposed to be the explication of If

fully asking a Dutchman what *beweeginge* was, Locke continues should have received this explication in his own language that it was *actus entis in potentia quatenus in potentia* ask whether any one can imagine he could thereby have guessed what the word *beweeginge* signified?

Locke does not seem to be satisfied with any definition of *motion* The atomists, who define motion to be a passage from one place to another what do they more than put one synonymous word for another? For what is *passage* other than *motion*? Nor will the successive application of the superficies *of one body* to those of another which the Cartesians give us prove a much better definition of motion when well examined. But though Locke rejects the definition of the atomists and the Cartesians on formal grounds, he accepts their idea of *motion* as simply change of place whereas he dismisses the Aristotelian definition as sheer absurdity and rejects the idea that motion or change necessarily involves a potentiality capable of progressive fulfillment.

As we have already remarked the omission of potentiality from the conception of motion is a theoretical shift of the deepest significance. It occurs not only in Descartes *Principles of Philosophy* and in the atomism of Hobbes and Gassendi, but also in the mechanics of Galileo and Newton According to these modern philosophers and scientists, a moving body is *always actually* somewhere It occupies a different place at every moment in a continuous motion. The motion can be described as the successive occupation by the body of different places at different times Though all the parts of the motion do not coexist the moving particle is completely actual throughout It loses no reality and gains none in the course of the motion since the various positions the body occupies lie totally outside its material nature It would, of course, be more difficult to analyze alteration in color or biological growth in these terms but it must be remembered that efforts have been made to apply such an analysis through the reduction of all other modes of change to local motion

The principle of inertia first discerned by Galileo, is critically relevant to the issue between these two conceptions of motion. It is stated by Newton as the first of his axioms or laws of motion Every body he writes continues in its state of rest or of uniform motion in a right line unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it As applied to the motion of projectiles, the law declares that they continue in their motions, so far as they are not retarded by the resistance of air or impelled downwards by the force of gravity

In his experimental reasoning concerning the acceleration of bodies moving down inclined planes, Galileo argues that a body which has achieved a certain velocity on the descent would if it then proceeded along a horizontal plane continue infinitely at the same velocity —except for the retardation of air resistance and friction. Any velocity once imparted to a moving body he maintains, will be rigidly maintained as long as the external causes of acceleration or retardation are removed So in the case of projectiles, they would retain the velocity and direction imparted to them by the cannon were it not for the factors of gravity and air resistance Bodies actually in motion possess their motion in themselves as a complete actuality They need no causes acting on them to keep them in motion but only to change their direction or bring them to rest

The motion of projectiles presents a difficulty for the theory which describes all motion as a reduction of potency to act If everything that is in motion, with the exception of things that move themselves, is moved by something else how is it Aristotle asks, that some things, *e g* things thrown continue to be in motion when their movent is no longer in contact with them? This is a problem for Aristotle precisely because he supposes that the moving cause must act on the thing being moved throughout the period of the motion For the potentiality to be progressively reduced to actuality it must be continuously acted upon

Aristotle s answer postulates a series of causes so that contact can be maintained between the projectile and the moving cause The original movent he writes gives the power of being a movent either to air or to water or to something else of the kind naturally adapted for imparting and undergoing motion The motion begins to cease when the motive force pro-

duced in one member of the consecutive series is at each stage less than that possessed by the preceding member and it finally ceases when one member no longer causes the next member to be a movent but only causes it to be in motion It follows that inertia must be denied by those who hold that a moving body *always* requires a mover or even that a body cannot sustain itself in motion beyond a point proportionate to the quantity of the impressed force which originally set it in motion

FOR THE ANCIENTS the basic contrast between being and becoming (or between the permanent and the changing) is a contrast between the intelligible and the sensible This is most sharply expressed in Plato s distinction between the sensible realm of material things and the intelligible realm of ideas What is that which always is and has no becoming Timaeus asks and what is that which is always becoming and never is? He answers his own question by saying that that which is apprehended by intelligence and reason is always in the same state but that which is conceived by opinion with the help of sensations and without reason is always in a process of becoming and perishing and never really is

Even though Aristotle differs from Plato in thinking that change and the changing can be objects of scientific knowledge he too holds becoming to be less intelligible than being precisely because change necessarily involves potentiality Yet becoming can be understood to the extent that we can discover the principles of its being—the unchanging principles of change In pursuing the truth Aristotle remarks—and this applies to the truth about change as well as everything else— one must start from the things that are always in the same state and suffer no change

For Aristotle change is intelligible through the three elements of permanence which are its principles (1) the enduring substratum of change and the contraries—(2) that to which and (3) that from which the change takes place The same principles are sometimes stated to be (1) matter (2) form and (3) privation the matter or substratum being that which both lacks a certain form and has a definite potentiality for possessing it Change occurs when the matter undergoes a transformation in which it comes to have the form of which it was deprived by the possession of a contrary form.

Neither of the contrary forms changes. Only the thing composite of matter and form changes with respect to the forms of its matter Hence these principles of change are themselves unchanging Change takes place *through* not *in* them As constituents of the changing thing they are the principles of its mutable being principles of its *being* as well as of its being *mutable*

The explanation of change by reference to what does not change seems to be common to all theories of becoming Lucretius, as we have already seen explains the coming to be and passing away of all other things by the motions of atoms which neither come to be nor pass away The eternity of the atoms underlies the mutability of everything else

Yet the atoms are not completely immutable. They move forever through the void which, according to Lucretius is required for their motion Their local motion is moreover an actual property of the atoms For them *to be* is *to be in motion* Here then as in the Cartesian theory no potentiality is involved and motion is completely real and completely intelligible.

THE NOTIONS OF time and eternity are inseparable from the theory of change or motion As the chapters on TIME and SPACE indicate local motion involves the dimensions of space as well as time but all change requires time and time itself is inconceivable apart from change or motion Furthermore as appears in the chapters on TIME and ETERNITY the two fundamentally opposed meanings of eternity differ according to whether they imply endless change or absolute changelessness

Eternity is sometimes identified with infinite time It is in this sense that Plato in the *Timaeus* refers to time as the moving image of eternity and implies that time which belongs to the realm of ever changing things resembles the eternal only through its perpetual endurance The other sense of the eternal is also implied—the sense in which eternity belongs to the realm of immutable being The eternal in this sense as Montaigne points out is not merely that which never had beginning nor never

shall have ending, but rather that to which one can bring no mutation.

There are two great problems which use the word "eternity" in these opposite senses. One is the problem of the eternity of motion: the question whether motion has or can have either a beginning or an end. The other is the problem of the existence of eternal objects—immutable things which have their being apart from time and change.

The two problems are connected in ancient thought. Aristotle, for example, argues that "it is impossible that movement should either have come into being or cease to be; for it must always have existed." Since "nothing is moved at random, but there must always be something present to move it," a cause is required to sustain the endless motions of nature. This cause, which Aristotle calls "the prime mover," must "be something which moves without being moved, being eternal, substance, and actuality."

Aristotle's theory of a prime mover sets up a hierarchy of causes to account for the different kinds of motion observable in the universe. The perfect circular motion of the heavens serves to mediate between the prime mover which is totally unmoved and the less regular cycles of terrestrial change. The "constant cycle" of movement in the stars differs from the irregular cycle of generation and destruction on earth. For the first, Aristotle asserts the necessity of "something which is always moved with an unceasing motion, which is motion in a circle." He calls this motion of the first heavenly sphere "the simple spatial movement of the universe" as a whole. Besides this, there are other spatial movements—those of the planets—which are eternal, but are "always acting in different ways," and so are able to account for the other cycle in nature—the irregular cycle of generation and corruption.

In addition, a kind of changelessness is attributed to all the celestial bodies which Aristotle calls "eternal." Eternally in motion, they are also eternally in being. Though not immovable, they are supposed to be incorruptible substances. They never begin to be and never perish.

The theory of a world eternally in motion is challenged by Jewish and Christian theologians who affirm, as an article of their religious faith, that "in the beginning God created heaven and earth." The world's motions, like its existence, have a beginning in the act of creation. Creation itself, Aquinas insists, is not change or motion of any sort, "except according to our way of understanding. For change means that the same thing should be different now from what it was previously.... But in creation, by which the whole substance of a thing is produced, the same thing can be taken as different now and before, only according to our way of understanding, so that a thing is understood as first not existing at all, and afterwards as existing." Since creation is an absolute coming to be from non-being, no pre-existent matter is acted upon as in generation, in artistic production, or in any of the forms of motion.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL and theological issues concerning creation and change, eternity and time are further discussed in the chapters on CAUSE, ETERNITY, and WORLD. Other problems arising from the analysis of change must at least be briefly mentioned here.

Though less radical than the difference between creation and change, the difference between the motions of inert or non-living things and the vital activities of plants and animals raises for any theory of change the question whether the same principles apply to both. The rolling stone and the running animal both move locally, but are both motions *locomotion* in the same sense? Augmentation occurs both in the growth of a crystal and the growth of a plant, but are both of them *growing* in the same sense? In addition, there seems to be one kind of change in living things which has no parallel in the movements of inert bodies. Animals and men learn. They acquire knowledge, form habits and change them. Can change of mind be explained in the same terms as change in matter?

The issues raised by questions of this sort are more fully discussed in the chapters on ANIMAL, HABIT, and LIFE. Certain other issues must be entirely reserved for discussion elsewhere. The special problems of local motion—such as the properties of rectilinear and circular motion, the distinction between uniform and variable motion, and the uniform or variable accelera

tion of the latter—are problems which belong to the chapters on ASTRONOMY and MECHANICS Change furthermore is a basic fact not only for the natural scientist but for the historian—the natural historian or the historian of man and society The considerations relevant to this aspect of change receive treatment in the chapters on EVOLUTION HISTORY, and PROGRESS

Even these ramifications of discussion do not exhaust the significance of change The cyclical course of the emotions and the alternation of pleasure and pain have been thought inexplicable without reference to change of state in regard to desire and aversion—the motion from want to satisfaction or from possession to deprivation Change is not only a factor in the analysis of emotion but it is also itself an object of man s emotional attitudes It is both loved and hated sought and avoided

According to Pascal man tries desperately to avoid a state of rest He does everything he can to keep things in flux Our nature consists in motion he writes complete rest is death. Nothing is so insufferable to man he continues as to be completely at rest without passions without business without diversion, without study He then feels his nothingness, his forlornness his dependence his weakness, his emptiness Darwin does not think that the desire for change is peculiar to man. The lower animals, he writes are likewise capricious in their affections aversions and sense of beauty There is also reason to suspect that they love novelty for its own sake

But men also wish to avoid change The old Prince Bolkonski in *War and Peace* could not comprehend how anyone could wish to alter his life or introduce anything new into it This is not merely an old man s view For the most part it is permanence rather than transiency the enduring rather than the novel which the poets celebrate when they express man s discontent with his own mutability The withering and perishing of all mortal things, the assault of time and change upon all things familiar and loved have moved them to elegy over the evanescent and the ephemeral From Virgil s *Sunt lacrimae rerum et mentem mortalia tangunt* to Shakespeare s Love is not love which alters when it alteration finds the poets have mourned the inevitability of change.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

CHAPTER 10: CHANGE

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to For example in **4** HOMER *Iliad* BK II [265 283] **12d**, the number **4** is the number of the volume in the set the number **12d** indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page For example in **53** JAMES *Psychology* **116a 119b** the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119 When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page For example in **7** PLATO *Symposium* **163b 164c** the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164

AUTHOR S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases *e g* *Iliad* BK II [265 283] **12d**

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a *(D)* follows *e g* OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—*(D) II Esdras* 7 46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface.

1 The nature and reality of change or motion

7 PLATO *Cratylus* **86b 89b 94c d 99b 104b 112a 114a c** / *Phaedrus* **124c 126c** / *Symposium* **165c 166b** / *Phaedo* **231c 232b** / *Republic* BK II **322d 323a** BK V **370a 373c** / *Timaeus* **447b d 455c 458b** passim **460c d** / *Parmenides* **504c 505c** / *Theaetetus* **517d 534b** esp **517d 518b 532a 534b** / *Sophist* **564d 574c** / *Statesman* **587a b** / *Philebus* **632a d** / *Laws* BK X **760a 765d** esp **762b 765d**

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK I CH 2 [184^{b}15 185 14] **259b d** CH 4–9 **262a 268d** BK III CH 1–3 **278a 280c** BK IV CH 11 [219^{b}9–31] **299b d** BK VI CH 6 **319c 321a** / *Heavens* BK IV CH 3 [310^{b}22 311 12] **402b c** CH 4 [311^{b}29–33] **403c** / *Generation and Corruption* BK II CH 10 [336^{b}25–34] **438d** / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 3 **10 501c 511d** passim BK IV CH 2 [1004^{b}27–29] **523d** CH 5 [1010^{a}6–38] **529c 530a** CH 8 [1012^{b}22–33] **532d** BK IX CH 3 [1047 10 29] **572b-c** CH 6 **573c 574c** CH 8 [1049^{b}29 1050 3] **575c d** CH 10 [1051^{b}28–30] **578a** BK XI CH 6 **590d 592b** CH 9 **593d 594d** CH 11–12 **596a 598a c** esp CH 11 [1067^{b}15–1068^{a}7] **596b d** CH 12 [1068^{b}20–25] **597c d** BK XII CH 5 [1070^{b}36–1071 4] **600b c** / *Soul* BK I CH 3 [406^{b}11–14] **636a** BK III CH 7 [431 1–8] **663c**

9 ARISTOTLE *Generation of Animals* BK V CH 1 [778^{b}2–7] **320c d** / *Ethics* BK X CH 4 [1174 13 ^{b}14] **428b-429a**

10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK I CH 2 **167b-168c**

11 NICOMACHUS *Arithmetic* BK I **811b d**

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [146-448] **2d 6c** BK II [62–332] **15d 19b** [1105 1114] **29a 30a c** BK V [235 415] **64a 66c**

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK IV SECT 35 36 **266d** SECT 42 43 **267b** SECT 46 **267c** BK V SECT 23 **272b** BK VI SECT 15 **275a b** BK VII SECT 18 **281a** SECT 50 **283a** BK VIII SECT 6 **285d 286a** BK IX SECT 19 **293b** SECT **293d 294a**

16 KEPLER *Harmonies of the World* **1051b**

17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR I CH 3 4 **36b-37b** TR V **57d 60c** / *Sixth Ennead* TR I CH 15 22 **260c 264c** TR III CH 21–28 **293a 297b**

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK IV par 15 17 **23a-c** BK VII par 17–18 **49a b** BK XI par 6 **90c d**

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2 A 3 ANS **12c 14a** Q 9 A 1 ANS and REP 1 **38c-39c** Q 10 A 4 REP 3 **43b 44b** A 5 ANS **44b-45c** Q 18 A 1 ANS **104c 105c** A 3 REP 1 **106b 107c** Q 23 A 1 REP 3 **132c 133b** Q 53 A 1 REP 2–3 **280d 282a** A 3 ANS **283b-284d**

(2 *The unchanging principles of change*)

2b The factor of opposites or contraries in change

7 Plato *Symposium* 165c 166b / *Phaedo* 226d 228a 243c 246c / *Republic* bk iv 350d 351b / *Theaetetus* 519d 520b / *Sophist* 565a c / *Laws* bk x 760a c 762b 764c

8 Aristotle *Categories* ch 5 [4 10-^{b}19] 8b 9a ch 10 [13 17-37] 18d 19a ch 14 [15^{b}1 16] 21b c / *Physics* bk i ch 5-9 263c 68d bk ii ch 1 [193 19 22] 270a bk iii ch 1 [201 4-8] 278c bk iv ch 9 [21, 20-^{b}26] 297a c bk v ch 1 [224 27-225 12] 304d 305a [225 34-^{b}9] 305d ch 2 [226 23-^{b}9] 306d 307a ch 3 [226^{b}24-34] 307c ch 5 310a 311a ch 6 [230^{b}27-231 2] 312b c bk vi ch 4 [234^{b}10 21] 316d 317a bk viii ch 2 [252^{b}9 11] 336b c ch 7 [-60 29 ^{b}1] 346b c / *Heavens* bk i ch 3 [270 13 23] 361b c ch 4 362a c ch 8 [277 13-34] 368b c ch 12 [283^{b}17-23] 375c d bk iv ch 3 401c-402c ch 4 [311^{b}29-312 22] 403c d / *Generation and Corruption* bk i ch 4 416c 417a ch 7 421d 423b bk ii ch 1-5 428b d 433d esp ch 4-5 431b-433d / *Metaphysics* bk i ch 8 [989 18 29] 507b c bk ii ch 2 [994 19 ^{b}(] 512c d bk iv ch 7 [1011^{b}29-38] 531d bk viii ch 5 569b d bk ix ch 9 [1051 4 13] 577a bk x ch 7 [1057^{a}18-34] 584c d bk xi ch 9 [1065^{b}5-14] 593d 594a ch 11 596a d bk xii ch 2 598c 599a ch 10 [1075^{a}25-34] 606a / *Soul* bk ii ch 4 [416^{a}18-^{b}8] 646c d / *Longevity* ch 3 710d 711b

9 Aristotle *Generation of Animals* bk i ch 18 [724 20-^{b}13] 264b d bk iv ch 3 [768 2-7] 309c / *Ethics* bk viii ch 8 [1159^{b}19-23] 411d

10 Galen *Natural Faculties* bk i ch 2 167b d

17 Plotinus *Third Ennead* tr vi ch 8 111c d / *Sixth Ennead* tr iii ch 22 293d 294c ch 27 296b-297a

19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 19 a 1 ans 108d 109c q 23 a 1 rep 3 132c 133b q 26 a 1 rep 2 150b c q 58 a 7 rep 3 305c 306b q 62 a 7 rep 1 322d 323b part i ii q 18 a 8 rep 1 699d 700b q 23 a 2 724c 725c

28 Harvey *On Animal Generation* 408c d

31 Spinoza *Ethics* part iii prop 4-6 398d 399a part iv prop 29-35 431d-434a part v axiom 1 452c

42 Kant *Pure Reason* 27a 76c 83b esp 76c d 91d 93c

46 Hegel *Philosophy of History* intro 160c d 165a b 178a d 179b d

3 Cause and effect in motion the relation of mover and moved or action and passion

7 Plato *Phaedrus* 124b c / *Gorgias* 267c 268a / *Timaeus* 460c d / *Laws* bk x 760a 765d esp 761b-765d

8 Aristotle *Categories* ch 9 [11^{b}1-7] 16c d / *Physics* bk iii ch 1 [200^{b}29 32] 278b ch 2 [20 2]-ch 3 [202^{b}29] 279 280c bk vii ch 1 326a 329a bk viii ch 10 [66^{b}27 6-] 354b-d / *Heavens* bk i ch 3 [2,0 12 1,] 36 ch 7 [275 1-^{b}29] 366a 367a ch 8 [277^{b}1-8] 368c d bk iii ch 2 [300^{b}8 301 12] 391d 392c [301^{b}2-32] 392d 393b bk iv ch 3 401c 402c / *Generation and Corruption* bk i ch 6 [3 3^{b}1- 34] 421b-c ch 7-9 421d-426c bk ii ch 9-10 436d-439c / *Metaphysics* bk i ch 6 [987^{b}30- 988 8] 506a ch 7 [988 31-^{b}16] 506c d, bk v ch 2 [1013^{b}3 10] 533c d bk ix ch 1-5 570b d 573c ch 7 [1048^{b}35 1049 18] 574c d, bk xi ch 9 [1066 27 34] 594d bk xii ch 1 [1069^{b}35-1070 9] 599a b [1070 21 30] 599c d, ch 4 [1070^{b}22]-ch 8 [1074^{b}14] 600b-605a ch 10 [1075^{b}1-37] 606b d / *Soul* bk ii ch 2 647b 648d bk iii ch 2 [426^a-6] 658a b

9 Aristotle *Motion of Animals* ch 8 [702 22] 237b c / *Generation of Animals* bk i ch 2 [729 9]-ch 21 [729^{b}21] 269b 270a bk ii ch 4 [740^{b}18-26] 281c d bk iv ch 3 [768^{b}16-24] 310b c

10 Galen *Natural Faculties* bk i ch 2 168b c bk iii ch 7 203b c

12 Lucretius *Nature of Things* bk ii [80-141] 16a d [184-293] 17b-18d

16 Kepler *Epitome* bk iv 854b 855b 940b 941a 959a 960a

17 Plotinus *Sixth Ennead* tr i ch 15 2 260c 264c tr iii ch 23 294d 295a

19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 8 a 1 ans and rep 34d 35c q 41 a 1 rep 2 217d 218c q 44 a 2 rep 2 239b 240a q 48 a 1 rep 4 259b 260c q 60 a 1 rep 2 310b-311a q 75 a 1 rep 3 378b-379c q 80 a 2 a 428a d q 115 a 1 585d 587c part i ii q 1 a 3 ans and rep 1 611b 612a a 6 ans 614a c q 9 a 4 ans 660a d q 2 720b d 723b q a 4 726a 727a

20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i ii q 113 a 8 367d 368c

28 Gilbert *Loadstone* bk ii 26d-40b passim bk vi 109a b 112d

28 Galileo *Two New Sciences* third day 202a 203a

28 Harvey *On Animal Generation* 423d

31 Descartes *Meditations* iii 87c 88a / *Objections and Replies* axiom ii 131d 212a

31 Spinoza *Ethics* part ii axiom 1-5 373c d lemma 3 378d 379a part iii def 1 3 395d 396a prop 1-4 396a 398d part iv axiom prop 7 424c 426b part v axiom 2 452 prop 3-4 453a d

34 Newton *Principles* def iii iv 5b 6a law i iii 14a b

35 Locke *Human Understanding* bk ii ch xxi sect 1-5 178b 179d sect 74 199d 200b ch xxii sect 11 203c d ch xxiii sect 28 2 211b 212a

35 Hume *Human Understanding* sect iii div 18 sect viii div 74 457c 484c passim esp sect vii div 6

42 KA Pure Reason 15a b 43a b 6c 83b 91d 93c

M tion and rest, contrary motions

7 PLATO Cratylus 112b / Republic BK I 350d 351b / T maeus 453b-c 460c d / Sophist 567a 574c / Statesman 587a 589c esp 587a b
8 ARISTOTLE Categories CI 4 [5b 6] 21b-c / Physics BK CH 5-6 310a 312d / II auens BK I CH 4 362a c / Metaphysics 11 C I 2 [004b 29] 523d BK XI CH 12 [068b20-25] 597c-d / Soul BK CH 3 [4 6a22 2,] 635c
10 G LEN Nat ral Faculties BK I CH 2, 167b d
11 NICOMACHUS A ithmetic BK II 832c
16 COP RNICU Revolut ons of the H nly Spher s BK I 517b-518a 519b-520b
16 KEPLER Epitome BK I 931b
17 PLOTI S S th Ennead TR III CH 24 295b-c CH 27 296b-297a
19 AQU Summa Theologica P RT I Q 10 A 4 REP 3 43b-44b Q 8 A I REP 2 104c 105c Q 53 A 3 ANS 283b-284d Q 73 2 A 5 371b-d P RT I II Q 6 A I 644d 646a 4 647b-648a Q 9, A 4 REP 2 660a d Q 4 A 3 799c 800b
20 AQ I AS S mma Theologica P RT III SU PL, Q 75 3 NS and REP 3-, 938a 939d Q 84 A 3 2 985d 989b
23 HOBB S Lev athan PART I 50a
28 G LE Loadsto e K I 26a b BK I 110b
30 B C Novum Orga m BK II, PH 3, 163a
31 SPINOZA Ethics PART I XIO I I 378c LEMMA I 3 378c 379a
34 NEWTON Principles, D F I 5b LAW I 14a

5 The m asure of motion

5a. Tim or duration as the measure of motion

7 PLATO Tima 450c-451d / Parmenides 504c 505c
8 ARI OTL Phy ic K V CH 10-14 297c 304a,c BK I 312b d 325d esp c 2 314a 315d / Gener t n d Corrupt n, K I C I I [337a22 34] 439b-c / Met physic BK I 3 [020a25 33] 541c K X CH I [053a9 2] 579c K II H 6 [I 71b6-I] 601b
9 ARISTOTL Ethic BK X CH 4 [I 4 2 b 4] 428b-429a
12 A ELI M ditat ns K I SECT 5 275a b
17 PLOTI U Third Enne d CH 7 3 122d 129a / Fo rth Enne d TR IV H 15 165c-d / S th Ennead, TR CH 5 254c-d H 6 260d 261 TR C 2 294c
18 A TI Co f BK XI par I 40 92b-99 BK X I p r 9 101b-c / City f G d K CH 6 325 d K XI CH 5 351b-352d
19 AQ S mm Theologica RT I, Q 7 A 3 P 4 32c 33 Q A I 40d 41d AA 4-6 43b-46d Q 53 3 283b-284d Q 57 3 K 297b-298a Q 63 5 329a 330c

A 6 REP 4 330c 331c Q 66 A 4 REP 4 348d 349d PA T I II Q 31 2 A S and RL I 753c 754a
0 AQ INAS Summa Theol gi a P T II Q 113 A 7 REP 5 366a 367c PART III SUPPL, Q 84 A 3 985d 989b
21 D TE Divine Comedy P R I E XXV I [106-120] 148b c
28 G LILEO T o New Science THI D D 201a 202a
30 B CON Novum Organum BK II I I 4(I C 179a
31 SPI OZA Ethics PART II DEF 5 373b-c
32 M LTO P radise Lost BK V [580-582] 188a
33 PASCAL Geometrical Demonst or 432b-433b 434a-439b passim
34 NEWTON Princ ples DEFI ITIO S, SCI OL, 8b-10a 12a b
35 LOCKE Human Undert nding BK II CH XIV SECT 22 159d CH XVIII SECT 2 I 4a b
36 STERNE Trist m Shandy 292a 293a
42 KANT Pure Reason 27a 29c d 71c 76c
45 FOURIER Theory f Heat 249a 251b

5b The di isib lity and continuity of motion

8 ARI TOTLE Physics BK I CH II [219 10 13] 298d 299 BK V C I 4 308b 310a K VI 312b d 325d BK II CH I [242 32 b4] 326c d BK III CH 7 [261a28]-CH 8 [265 12] 347c 352a / Metaphysics BK V CH 6 [1016b4 7] 536b c CH 13 [I 20a25 33] 541c BK X CH I [1052 15 21] 578b BK XI CH 6 [1071b8 11] 601b
9 A IS OTLE Ethics K X CH 4 [11,4 9 14] 428d-429a
17 PLOTINU Third Ennead TR VII, CH 8-9 123b-125d
19 AQ I AS Summa Theol gica P RT I Q A 3 REP 4 32c 33c Q 53 280d 284d
20 AQUIN S mma Theologica P RT I II, Q 113 A 7 366a 367c
28 GALIL O Two New Sciences THIRD D Y 201 202a
30 B CON No m O ganum BK II AP I 6 139b c H 41 173d 174b
31 DESCARTES Meditat ons II 87c d / Obj c I ns and Replies 213b-c
33 PA CAL Geometrical Demonstrat o 434a 439b
34 NEWTON Principles BK I LEMMA II SCH L, 31b-32a
42 KANT Pure Reaso 26b-27a 74b 76c
51 TOLSTOY W ar and Peace BK XI 469a d

6 The kinds of change

7 PLATO T maeus 449b-450c esp 450a / Par menides 492a-493b esp 492d-493b 504c 505 / Th aetet s 533a b / Law s K X 762b-763b
8 ARISTOTL Cate ies CH 14 20d 21c / Phys ics K I CH I [00b32 201 4] 278b-c BK V CH I 2 304a 307b CH 5 310 311 BK I CH 4 330d 333 / H e K I C I 2 [268b15 269 8] 359d 360 BK V CH 3 401 -402c /

(6 *The kinds of change*)

Generation and Corruption BK I CH 1–5 409a 420b esp CH 4 [319^{b}32–320^{a}2] 417a / *Metaphysics* BK II CH 2 [994 19–^{b}6] 512c d BK VII CH 9 [1034^{b}8–19] 557d 558a BK XI CH 9 [1065^{b}7–14] 593d 594a CH 11 [1067^{b}1] CH 12 [1068^{b}25] 596a 597d BK XII CH 2 [1069^{b}8 14] 598d / *Soul* BK I CH 3 [406 12 21] 635c

9 ARISTOTLE *Generation of Animals* BK I CH 18 [724 20–^{b}13] 264b d

10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK I CH 2 167b d CH 5 169b c

17 PLOTINUS *Sixth Ennead* TR III CH 21 27 293a 297a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 44 A 2 ANS 239b 240a Q 45 A 1 REP 2 242a d Q 66 A 1 ANS 343d 345c Q 118 A 2 REP 2 601c 603b PART I–II Q 1 A 3 ANS 611b 612a Q 23 A 2 ANS 724c 725c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I–II Q 107 A 1 ANS 325c 327b PART III SUPPL Q 84 A 2 REP 1 4 984c 985d, A 3 ANS 985d 989b

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 407c 409b

30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK I APH 66 114d 115c

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXII SECT 11 203c d

6a The reducibility of all modes of motion to one kind of change

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK VIII CH 7 [260 26–^{b}14] 346b c / *Generation and Corruption* BK I CH 1–5 409a 420b

10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK I CH 2 167b 168b

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [418 448] 6b c BK II [730–1022] 24b 28a BK III [417–869] 35c 41a BK IV [522 817] 51a 54d

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 61a c PART III 173a PART IV 271a b

30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK I APH 50 111b

34 NEWTON *Principles* 1b 2a / *Optics* BK III 541b

34 HUYGENS *Light* CH 1 553b 554a

45 FOURIER *Theory of Heat* 169a b 182a b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 882a 884b

6b The primacy of local motion

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK IV CH 1 [208 28–33] 287a BK VIII CH 1 [250^{b}15–18] 334a CH 7 346b 348a / *Heavens* BK I CH 2 [268^{b}15–17] 359d BK IV CH 3 [310^{b}22 34] 402b / *Generation and Corruption* BK II CH 10 437d 439c / *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 6 [1071^{b}2 11] 601b [1071^{b}32 38] 601d CH 7 [1072^{b}4 10] 602c CH 8 [1073^{a}24 39] 603c

9 ARISTOTLE *Motion of Animals* CH 5 235c d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 67 A 2 REP 3 350b 351a Q 78 A 3 ANS 410a 411d Q 110 A 3 ANS 566d 567b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL Q 84 A 2 REP 1 4 984c 985d

6c Comparison of change in living and non-living things

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK VII CH 2 [244^{b}1 245 12] 328b d BK VIII CH 4 338d 340d CH 6 [259 20 ^{b}31] 345a d / *Heavens* BK I CH [275^{b}26–28] 367a BK II CH 2 [284^{b}30– 376c / *Soul* BK II CH 4 [415^{b}22 416^{b}31] 646a 647b

9 ARISTOTLE *Motion of Animals* CH 1 [698 21] 233b CH 4 [700 5 27] 235b-c CH 6 235d 236b CH 7 [701^{b}1]–CH 8 [702^{b}12] 236d 238a / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH 21 22 26 271a BK II CH 1 [734 17–735 15] 274c 275d CH 4 [740 13–18] 281a

10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK I CH 7 170c 171a BK II CH 3 186c d

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK II [700– 23d 24b [1105 1174] 29a 30a c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 18 A 1 104c 105c Q 27 A 2 ANS 154c 155b PART I II Q 17 A 9 REP 2 692d 693d

27 SHAKESPEARE *Othello* ACT V SC II [7– 239a

28 GILBERT *Loadstone* BK III 67b-d

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 412b 415b

30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 27 15 b 158d

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART V 59a 60c / *Objections and Replies* 156a d

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH II SECT 11 140b-c CH XXIII SECT 22 209d SECT 28 29 211b 212a CH XXVI SECT 2 21 b-d CH XXVII SECT 5 220b c BK IV CH X SECT 354a c

42 KANT *Judgement* 579d 580a 582b-c

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49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 62a b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 4a 6b 68a 69b 71a

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7 PLATO *Laws* BK X 764c 765a

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK VII CH 3 [247^{b}1 248 8] 330b d / *Generation and Corruption* BK II CH 6 [334 10–15] 435a / *Metaphysics* BK II CH 2 571c 572a / *Soul* BK I CH 3 635b 63 b CH 4 [408 29–^{b}31] 638a d BK II CH 5 [417 21 ^{b}21] 647d 648b BK III CH 11 [434 16– 667a

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [177 32b d

17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR VI CH 1 3 106b 108c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 14 A 15 89b 90b Q 18 A 1 ANS 104c 105c A REP 1 106b 107c Q 19 A 7 114d 115d Q AA 1–2 153b 155b Q 34 A 1 REP 2 185b-187b Q 46 A 2 REP 3 253a 255a Q 50 A 1 REP 269b 270a Q 73 A 2 ANS 371b d Q A 5 REP 2 382a 383b Q 78 A 3 ANS 410a 411d Q 82 A 2 REP 2 3 432d 433c Q 9 A 2 ANS 503a 504a PART I II Q 2 A 1

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7 PLATO T maeus 460c d 471b- / La s K X, 762b-d

8 A STOTL Ph ics BK III CH 5 [5a10-206a8] 283b-284b K IV CH 1-9 287a 297c / H avens BK I C I 7 [74b30-33] 366a [27 b30-8] 367 b CH 8 [2,6a22 27] 367b-c [277b14 23] 368d 369a BK II H 376b-377c K CH 6 [3 5a27 28] 396c BK IV CH 1-5 399 -404d / Met physics BK CI 13 [20a 25 33] 541 K X CH 6 [1 48b9-17] 574 K X CI O [06a8-33] 595c 596a / S l BK CH 3 [406a1 21] 635c

10 G Natur l Faculties BK C 6 181a d K I H I 183b d 184c C 6 188c 191 B CH 14 5 213b-214c

11 NICOM CH S Arithmetic BK II 832c

12 L C TI Nature f Things K [329-448] 5b-6c [9,8 00] 12d 13b [5 082] 14 c [80- 5] 16a 18a K I [830-839] 91b- [998 4] 93c-94

16 PT EM Almag st 10b-11b

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19 AQU S mma Theologica RT I Q 8 3 34d 35c 4 37c 38c Q 52 I 2 278d 280 Q 53 2 280d 283b

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28 G Lo d st ne BK II 32 K 110b-c

28 G LILEO Two New Sciences FI ST D Y 157b-160a passim TH RD DAY 202d

30 B CON Novum Orga um BK II APH 37 168d 169c APH 45 176a 177c A H 48 180a

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33 P C L Vacuum 366a 367a 3 0a / W ght of Air 405b-415b passim

34 NEWTO Principles DEFINITIONS SCHOL 8b-13a BK III GENERAL SCHOL, 3 0a 372a / Optics BK III 520a 522b 542a 543

35 LOCKE Human Understandi g BK II CH XIII SECT 23 153c d CH X II SECT 4 168b-d

35 BERKEL Y Human Knowledge SECT 110-117 434b-436a

42 K T Pure Reason 29c d 31d 32a 55c 56a 84b-c 135d [fn 2]

45 F RAD Y Rese rches n Electricity 513d 514c 685d 686c 816b d 819a c 824a b 855a c

7b Natural and violent motion

7 PLATO Timaeus 463d-464b

8 A ISTOTLE Physics BK I CH I [2 5b9 22] 287b CH 8 [215 I 13] 294c d K V CH 6 [230 18-23 19] 311c 312d BK VIII C I 4 338d 340d / He vens BK I C I 2 [68b12] CH 3 [2 0a13] 359d 361b C I 7 [274 30-33] 366a [275b12 29] 366d 367a CH 7 [2,6a8]- C 8 [277b25] 367b-369a C I 9 [2 b 22 279a8] 370a b BK II C I 13 [294b31 295a2] 386b-d BK III CH 2 391c 393b CH 5 [3 4b 11 23] 395d 396a CH 6 [305a22 28] 396c / Generat o and Corrupt n BK II CH 6 [333b 22 33] 434c-d / So l, BK I C I 3 [406a12 29] 635c d

12 LUC ETIUS Nature of Th gs BK I [I 52 1094] 14a-c K II [184 215] 17b-d

16 PTO EMY Almagest BK I 11 b BK III 86b K IX 270b

16 CO R. I S Revol ti s f the He v ly Sphere K I 517b-520b pa sim

16 K PLE Epit me BK I 929b-930b

17 PLOTI S Second Ennead TR I CH 8 39d

19 AQUI S S mma Theologica P RT I Q 18 I P 2 104c 105c Q 105 A 4 RE I 541c 542 A 6 P I 543b-544a P RT I I Q 6 I A. S d REP 3 644d-646a A 4 647b 648a 5 NS and R 2 3 648b-649a Q 41 A 3 799c 800b

20 AQ INA S mm Theologica P RT III L PL, Q 75 A 3 NS and P 3-5 938a 939d Q 9 2 A S nd RE 6 1017c 1020c

21 D D ine Comedy PARA S I [94 142] 107b-d

23 HOB E Lev athan PART I 50a PART IV 271d

28 G L E T Lo d tone BK I 109a b 110b-d

28 G L L O Two New Scienc s FI ST D Y 157d 158a THIRD D 200 d 203d FOURTH D Y 238a b

30 B N N um Org m K I PH 66 115b-c BK II H 36 164a 168d pass m APH 48 179d 188b

7c Kinds of local motion

7c(1) Rectilinear and rotary or circular motion

7 Plato *Republic* bk iv 350d 351b / *Parmenides* 492d 493b / *Laws* bk x 762b d 764b 765a

8 Aristotle *Physics* bk iv ch 5 [212^{a}31–^{b}2] 291d bk vii ch 4 [248^{a}10–^{b}6] 330d 331b bk viii ch 8–9 348b 353b / *Heavens* bk i ch 2–6 359d 365c ch 7 [274^{b}22–29] 365d 366a [275^{b}12–18] 366d ch 8 [277^{a}12–26] 368b c [277^{b}8–18] 368d / *Metaphysics* bk xii ch 6 [1071^{b}10–11] 601b ch 7 [1072^{a}20–22] 602b / *Soul* bk i ch 3 [406^{b}26–407^{b}13] 636b 637b

16 Ptolemy *Almagest* bk i 6a 7a 8b bk iii 86b bk ix 270b

16 Copernicus *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* bk i 514a 517b 518a 519b 520b

16 Kepler *Epitome* bk iv 887a 913a 931b 933a

17 Plotinus *Second Ennead* tr i ch 3 36b c ch 8 39c d tr ii ch 1 40b c ch 2 41b c / *Sixth Ennead* tr iii ch 24 295b c

19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 7 a 3 ans 32c 33c q 66 a 2 ans 345d 347b

28 Gilbert *Loadstone* bk vi 110b c

28 Galileo *Two New Sciences* fourth day 240d 245b c

30 Bacon *Novum Organum* bk ii aph 35 163a d aph 48 186b d

34 Newton *Principles* def iii 5b def v 6a 7a definitions schol 11b 12a law i 14a laws of motion schol 19b 20a bk i prop 1–3 and schol 32b 35b bk ii prop 53 schol 266a 267a

7c(2) Uniform or variable motion

8 Aristotle *Physics* bk iv ch 8 [215^{b}24–216^{a}21] 295a d bk v ch 4 [228^{b}15–229^{a}7] 309d 310a

12 Lucretius *Nature of Things* bk ii [225–242] 17d 18a

28 Galileo *Two New Sciences* first day 157b 160a third day 197b 198b 200a d 203d 205b d 209a c 224d

30 Bacon *Novum Organum* bk ii aph 48 186b-d

34 Newton *Principles* def iii–iv 5b 6a law i ii 14a b corol iv–vi 18a 19b

7c(3) Absolute or relative motion

12 Lucretius *Nature of Things* bk iv [387–390] 49b

16 Copernicus *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* bk i 514b 515a 519a bk ii 557a b

16 Kepler *Harmonies of the World* 1015a b

28 Gilbert *Loadstone* bk vi 115a d

30 Bacon *Novum Organum* bk ii aph 36 165c 166b

34 Newton *Principles* definitions schol 8b-13a esp 9a b corol v vi 19a b bk i, prop 57–61 111b 114b

35 Locke *Human Understanding* bk ii ch xiii, sect 7–10 149d 150d passim

35 Berkeley *Human Knowledge* sect 110–115 434b-435c

53 James *Psychology* 511b-512a

7c(4) Terrestrial and celestial motion

7 Plato *Statesman* 587a b / *Laws* bk vii 729d 730d bk x 763d 765c

8 Aristotle *Heavens* 359a-405a c esp bk i, ch 2–3 359d 362a / *Metaphysics* bk ix ch 8 [1050^{b}20–28] 576c d bk xii ch 2 [1069^{b}24–27] 599a ch 6 [1071^{b}32]–ch 7 [1072^{a}22] 601d 602b / *Soul* bk i ch 3 [406^{b}26–407^{b}13] 636b-637b

9 Aristotle *Motion of Animals* ch 3 234a c

16 Ptolemy *Almagest* bk i 5a 6a 7a 8b 1… bk iii 86b 87a bk ix 270b bk xiii 429a b

16 Copernicus *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* bk i 513b 514b 517b 518a 519b-520b

16 Kepler *Epitome* bk iv 888b-895b 89… 905a passim esp 904b 905a 929a 933a 934b-935b 940b 941a 959a 960a

17 Plotinus *Second Ennead* tr i ch 1–4 35a-37b tr i ch 8–tr ii ch 2 39c-41c

19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 66, a 2 ans 345d 347b q 70 a 3 365b-367a

20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i ii q 49, a 4 ans 5a 6a part iii suppl, q 84 a 3 rep 2 985d 989b

28 Gilbert *Loadstone* bk vi 110b c

28 Galileo *Two New Sciences* fourth day 245b d

30 Bacon *Novum Organum* bk ii aph 35 163a b aph 36 165d 166a aph 48 186b d

34 Newton *Principles* 1a 2a bk iii 269a-3… passim esp rule i iii 270a 271a prop 1–7 276a 282b prop 35 schol 320b 324a general schol 371b 372a / *Optics* bk iii 540a-541b

7d The properties of variable motion: the laws of motion

8 Aristotle *Physics* bk iv ch 8 [215^{a}24–216^{a}21] 295a d bk vii ch 4 330d 333a

9 Aristotle *Motion of Animals* ch 1–4 233a-235c passim / *Gait of Animals* ch 3 243d 244a / *Generation of Animals* bk ii ch 3 [768^{b}16–24] 310b c

12 Lucretius *Nature of Things* bk ii [80–99] 16a b [184–250] 17b-18b

16 Kepler *Epitome* bk iv 894a 899a 900a 905a 906b 933b 934b 936a 937a 938b 939a

23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part i 50a part iv 271d

28 Gilbert *Loadstone* bk ii 56b c

28 Galileo *Two New Sciences* first day 15… b-172d passim third day fourth day 19… 260a c

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30 B co Novum Org num BK II APH 35 163c d P I 36, 166b-c 167b-c APH 48 1 9d-188b
31 Sp oz Ethics P RT II AXIOM I LEMMA 7 3 8c 380b
34 N wto Principles DEF III 5b L WS OF MOTI 14a 24a K I P O I 17 and SC IOL 32b-50a RO 30-69 and SCHOL 6a 131 ROP 94-98 and SCHOL 152b-15 b BK II 159a 26 a passim / Optics, BK III, 540a 542a
34 H T ENS Light CH I 558b-563b
35 Lock Human Understanding K II CH XXI SECT 4 178d 1 9c CH XXIII SECT 209a CT 2 209d, SECT 8-29 211b-212a
35 B RKELEY Human Kn ledge SECT 5 422c S CT 0 432d-433a
35 H M Human Under t nding S CT I I 460c SECT II 57 475d 4 6b [(n]
38 Mo ESQUIE Spirit f Laws K I 1b
45 Fou Theory f Heat 169a b
51 T LSTO W r and P ace PILOG I 694d 69c

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The crease and decrease of n nim te bodies

7 Plato Timae 460c d / Laws BK X, 762b-c
8 Ari totle P ysics K CH I [09a2 9] 288a H 6 [3b 9-] 293b CH 9 296b-29 BK II, CH 2 [4 2 18] 328d 329a BK I CH 3 [253b1 3] 337d / Heavens BK I H 3 [0a-3 36] 361 / Generation and Corruption BK CH 6 [333 35 3] 434b / Soul, K II CH 4 [415b28-416a18] 646a-c
10 Gale Natural Faculties K I, CH 7 1 0c 171 K CH 3 186c-d
12 Luc eti Nature f Th gs BK I [31 3-8] 5a K [6 9] 15d 16a [1 5 1 74] 29 30a,c K [235 323] 64 -65b
19 Aqu Summa Theol gica ART Q 119 A 604c 60 b
20 Aqu Summ Theologica ART I Q 52, AA 15d 19a II II Q 24 A 5 492b-493d 6 A 493d-494b ART I, Q 12 REP I 54c 55c
23 H Leviathan RT I 271d 272a
28 Gali o T o New Sciences FIRST 139b-141d 151 154b
28 H On Animal Genera n, 412b
30 B co Novum Org num, K II, H 40, 171a 1 2d 48 180 181a 184 -c
34 N w Principle K III P O 6 CO L V 281b Optics K I, 539b
45 La oi Element f Chemistry 9a 15c esp 9a 10b
45 Fourier Theory f Heat 184 185b 192a b

8b Growth n li g o ganism

7 Plato T maeus 4 1d-472a
8 Ari totle Phy ics K I, CH I [93 3 9] 269d 2 0 K CH I [241a3- 2] 325c K I CH 7 [60 29-b1] 346b-c / Generat n and Corruption, K I C I 2 [315 26-b3] 410d 411 c I 5 417b-420b BK II CH 6 [333 35 b3] 434b C I 8 [335a1 14] 436c / Metaphysics BK V CI 4 [1014b20-26] 535a / Soul, BK II, CH 4 [415b28-416a18] 646a c
9 Ari totle History of Animal K CH 19 [550b-6-31] 77d CH 33 [55 I 24] 84d 85a BK VII CH I [582 21 25] 107d / Motion f Animals CH 5 235c d / Generation f Ani al BK I CH 18 [723a9 23] 263a b CH 2 [30a33 b9] 2 0d BK II C I I [733b1 4] 273d [735a13 6] 275d 276a CH 4 [39b34 41 2] 280d 281d CH 6 [744b28-745b9] 286a d
10 G LE Natural Faculties BK I, CH 2 16 b-d CH 5 169b-c CH , 1 0c 171a CH II 172b-d K II I 3 185a 186d
12 Lucretius Nature f Thi gs K I [146 64] 2d-4b K II [1105 11,4] 29a 30a,c BK I [858-8-6] 55b-c
28 G lileo T o New Sciences SECO D DAY 187b-d
28 Har ey Circulation f the Blood 320a b / On Animal Generation 353b-354a 388c d 408c 409b 412b-415b esp 415a 441 -443b 494a d
49 D win Origin f Species, 71a-c

9 Change of quality

7 Pl to Par enides 509a 510a / Theaetetus 533a 534a
8 A istotle Categories CH 5 [4 10-b19] 8b-9 CH 14 [15a14 32] 20d 21a / T pics BK VI, CI 6 [145 2 13] 198c d / Physics BK I, CH [19b5 9] 266b BK C 2 [2-6a26- 9] 306d [2 I 9] 307a BK VI CH 10 [241a-6-32] 325b-c BK VII CH 2 [44b1 245a12] 3-8b-d H 3 329 330d BK II CH 7 [260a 6-b14] 346b-c / Heavens, BK I H 3 [270a26-36] 361c H 12 [-83b17 23] 375c-d / Generation and Corruption, BK I CH I 4 409 -417a esp CH 4 416c 417 / Met physics BK I, CH 8 [989a18] 50 b-c, K V CH 21 544a b BK XI C I 12 [068b15 9] 597c / Sense and the Sensible C I 6 [446b27 447a9] 685b-c
10 Galen Natur l Faculties BK I CH 167b-168b
17 Ploti Third Ennead, TR I CI 8-1 111c 113a
19 Aqui Summa Theologica P RT I Q 48 4 s and RE 3 262a 263a
20 Aq I Summa Theologica P RT I II Q 50 I 3 6a 7b Q 52, A I s and RE 3 15d 18a T II SUPPL, Q 82 3 A nd 2 9 1a 972d Q 91 A I R 2-4 1016b-1017c
23 Ho s Leviatha PART III 172b
34 N wto Opt cs K II 541b
35 Locke Human Understandi g BK II CH XX I 2 217a-d
35 B rkele H m n Kn ledg SECT 33 417d-419a passim esp CT 25 26 417d 418a

(9 *Change of quality*)

9*a* Physical and chemical change: compounds and mixtures

7 Plato *Timaeus* 448b-d 459d-462b
8 Aristotle *Topics* bk vi ch 14 [151a20–32] 206a / *Heavens* bk i ch 3 [270a26–36] 361c ch 5 [271^{b}18–23] 362d-363a bk iii ch 3 393c-d ch 8 [306^{b}22–29] 398a / *Generation and Corruption* bk i ch 2 [315^{a}28–33] 410d ch 10 426c-428d bk ii ch 6–8 433d-436d / *Meteorology* bk iii ch 6 [378a13]-bk iv ch 12 [390^{b}21] 482c-494d / *Metaphysics* bk vii ch 17 [1041^{b}12–33] 565d-566a,c / *Sense and the Sensible* ch 3 [440a33–^{b}13] 677d-678a
9 Aristotle *Parts of Animals* bk ii ch 1 [646a12–24] 170a-b
12 Lucretius *Nature of Things* bk i [635–920] 8d-12b bk ii [730–864] 24b-26a
12 Aurelius *Meditations* bk x sect 7 297b-c
17 Plotinus *Second Ennead* tr i ch 6–8 37d-39d tr vii ch 1–2 62d-64b
19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 71 a 1 rep 1–2 367a-368b q 76 a 4 rep 4 393a-394c q 91 a 1 484a-485b
20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i-ii q 50 a 1 rep 3 6a-7b part iii q 2 a 1 ans 710a-711c part iii suppl q 74 a 1 rep 3 925c-926c a 5 929d-931b q 80 a 3 rep 3 958b-959c q 82 a 1 ans 968a-970c
28 Gilbert *Loadstone* bk i 13b-14d bk ii 29c-30a
28 Galileo *Two New Sciences* first day 148c-d
28 Harvey *On Animal Generation* 495c-496d
30 Bacon *Novum Organum* bk i aph 50 111b bk ii aph 7 139c-140a aph 48 181a-183a
34 Newton *Optics* bk iii 517b-518a 531b-542a esp 541b
35 Locke *Human Understanding* bk ii ch xxvi sect 1–2 217a-d
45 Lavoisier *Elements of Chemistry* part i-ii 22c-86a,c part iii 87c-d 103b-c 105d-117a 128c esp 117a-118a
45 Fourier *Theory of Heat* 169b
45 Faraday *Researches in Electricity* 309a-312a 312c-313d 314a-b 315a-b 327a-422a,c passim 541b-d 584a-c passim
53 James *Psychology* 68a-b 104a-105a 876a

9*b* Biological change: vital alterations

7 Plato *Laws* bk ii 659c-d bk vii 713d
8 Aristotle *Physics* bk vii ch 3 [246a10–^{b}19] 329c-330a
9 Aristotle *History of Animals* bk v ch 19 [551a13–552^{b}5] 78a-79b ch 30 [556^{b}5–9] 83b bk vii ch 1 106b-d-108a bk ix ch 50 [631^{b}19–632a32] 157a-c ch 49b [632^{b}14–633a9] 157d-158c / *Motion of Animals* ch 5 235c-d ch 7 [701^{b}1]-ch 8 [702a22] 236d-237c ch 11 [703^{b}8–21] 239b-c / *Generation of Animals* bk i ch 18 [724a20–^{b}13] 264b-d bk ii ch 1 [733^{b}1–17] 273d-274a ch 5 [741^{b}5–] 282c ch 6 [742a8–16] 283a bk v ch 1 [–] 15–20] 320a-b ch 3 [782a1–20] 324a-b
10 Galen *Natural Faculties* bk i ch 5 166b ch 8 171a bk iii ch 7 203c-204c
12 Lucretius *Nature of Things* bk iv [1037–1057] 57c-d
25 Montaigne *Essays* 292d-293d
28 Harvey *On Animal Generation* 412a-413b 450b-d
31 Spinoza *Ethics* part iv prop 38–39 436b-437a
49 Darwin *Origin of Species* 10a-c 61d-62a 219d-222a esp 221b-222a 224b-c / *Descent of Man* 354c-355a
51 Tolstoy *War and Peace* epilogue i 665a-d
53 James *Psychology* 68b-73b
54 Freud *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 655a-657d esp 655b 656b-657c / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 770b

10 Substantial change: generation and corruption

7 Plato *Symposium* 165c-166b / *Phaedo* 226d-228a / *Republic* bk viii 403a-b bk x 434c-436a / *Parmenides* 504c-d 509a-d / *Laws* bk x 761b-762c
8 Aristotle *Topics* bk vii ch 3 [153^{b}31–] 209a / *Physics* bk ii ch 1 [193^{b}19–22] 270a / *Generation and Corruption* 409a-441a,c / *Metaphysics* bk i ch 3 [983^{b}8–19] 501d ch 8 [988^{b}22–989^{b}24] 506d-508a bk ii ch 2 [994a19–^{b}8] 512c-d bk vii ch 7–9 555a-558a bk xi ch 11 596a-d bk xii ch 2–3 598c-599d / *Soul* bk ii ch 4 [416^{b}8–17] 646d-647a
10 Galen *Natural Faculties* bk i ch 2 167d-168b ch 5 169b-c ch 12 172d-173c
12 Lucretius *Nature of Things* bk ii [569–580] 22b [865–1022] 26a-28a bk iii [117–135] 31c-d [203–230] 32c-33a [323–349] 34b-c [417–869] 35c-41a bk v [783–836] 71b-72a
12 Aurelius *Meditations* bk vii sect 23 281b sect 25 281c
18 Augustine *Confessions* bk vii par 18 49a-b
19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 15 a 1 ans 91b-92a q 19 a 9 ans 116d-117d q 27 a 2 154c-155b q 33 a 2 rep 4 181c-182b q 41 a 5 ans and rep 1 222b-223b q 44 a 2 ans 239b-240a q 45 a 2 rep 2 242d-244a q 50 a 5 rep 3 274b-275a q 53 a 3 ans 283b-284d q 65 a 4 ans 342b-343c q 66 a 1 ans 343d-345c a 2 ans 345d-347b q 67 a 3 rep 1 351b-352a q 71 a 1 rep 1 367a-368b q 72 a 1 rep 5 368b-369d q 76 a 6 ans 383c-384c q 90 a 2 ans 481d-482c q 96 a 1 ans 510b-511b q 119 604c-608d part i-ii q 22 a 1 ans and rep 3 720d-721c
20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i-ii q 53 a 1 19d-21a a 3 21d-22d q 85 a 6 182d-184a q 110 a 2 rep 3 349a-d part ii-ii q 1 a 7 rep 3 385c-387a part iii suppl q 75 a 3 ans 938a-939d q 79 a 1 rep 3–4 951b-953b

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1 CHAUCER Knight's Tale [3011 034] 209b
3 HOBBES Leviathan P 1 249b-250a
3 GILBERT Loadstone BK 104d 105d
0 BACON Novum Organum, K II, APH 35 162c
1 DESCARTES Objections and Replies 227c d
1 SPINOZA Ethics PART 1 0 6 356b-c
5 LOCKE Human Understanding A II, CH XX 1 SECT 2 21 a-d passim BK III, CH 1, ECT 19 259c 260a
12 KANT Pure Reason, 4b- 6c 82a-83b
15 LAVOISIER Elements of Chemistry PART I 41b-c
46 HEGEL Philosophy of History INTRO 18 a b 189b-190a
53 JAMES Psychology 9 b-98a passim
54 FREUD Beyond the Pleasure Principle 652b-653c 655a-65 d

10a. Substantial change in the realm of bodies: the transmutation of the elements

7 PLATO Timaeus 456b-c 458b-460b
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Chapter 11 CITIZEN

INTRODUCTION

CITIZEN like comrade has been and still is a revolutionary word Both words have been titles proudly adopted by men to mark their liberation from the yoke of despotism or tyranny Both titles are still sought by those who have not yet gained admission to the fraternity of the free and equal

The rank and status of citizenship first appeared in the ancient world with the beginning of constitutional government in the city states of Greece The Greeks were conscious of this fact and proud of it In terms of it they set themselves apart from the barbarians who were subjects of the Great King of Persia or the Egyptian Pharaoh The Spartan heralds according to Herodotus thus address the Persian commander Thou hast experience of half the matter but the other half is beyond thy knowledge A slave s life thou understandest but never having tasted liberty thou canst not tell whether it is sweet or no Ah! hadst thou known what freedom is thou wouldst have bidden us fight for it not with the spear only but with the battle axe

Not only Herodotus and Thucydides but also the great tragic poets notably Aeschylus in the *Persians* record this Hellenic sense of distinction from the surrounding peoples who still lived in childlike submission to absolute rule But the Greeks were also conscious that their political maturity as self governing citizens was as Aristotle intimates in the *Politics* a recent development from the primitive condition in which tribal chieftains ruled despotically

The basic distinction between *subjection* and *citizenship* is inseparable from the equally basic distinction between absolute and limited or between despotic and constitutional government The difference between these two modes of government is treated in the chapter on CONSTITUTION It is sufficient here to note that the difference in the authority and power possessed by rulers—according as it is absolute or limited—corresponds with a difference in the status the degree of freedom and the rights and privileges of the people ruled

IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND citizenship it is necessary to understand the several ways in which men can belong to or be parts of a political community There are two divisions among men within a community which help us to define citizenship

According to one of these divisions, the native born are separated from aliens or foreigners In the Greek city states it was almost impossible for aliens to become citizens. Plutarch notes that Solon s law of naturalization which he qualifies as of doubtful character would not allow strangers to become citizens unless they were in perpetual exile from their own country or came with their whole family to trade there The *metics* or aliens who were allowed in the city were usually a class apart

In Rome the situation was different it was possible for outsiders to receive the high honor of Roman citizenship The aspiring genius of Rome Gibbon writes sacrificed vanity to ambition and deemed it more prudent as well as honourable to adopt virtue and merit for her own wheresoever they were found among slaves or strangers enemies or barbarians.

Most modern republics set up naturalization proceedings for the regular admission of some if not all immigrants to membership in the state Yet a difference always remains between a citizen and a denizen or mere resident Accordingly Rousseau criticizes Bodin for confusing citizens with townsmen M D Alembert he says has avoided this error and in

his article on Geneva has clearly distinguished the four orders of men (or e en five counting mere fore ners) who d vell in our town of which two only compose the Republic

Accordin to a second way in which men are divided within the political community free men are separated from slaves. The latter thou h they may be native-born, are not members of the political community but merely part of its property A slave accord in to Aristotle is one who being a human bein, is also a possession But he says in another place, property even thou h living beings are included in it is no part of a state for a state is not a community of living beings only but a community of equals.

On this principle Aristotle excludes more than the chattel sla e from the status and privilege of citizenship We cannot consider all those to be citizens, he writes who are necessary to the existence of the state for example children are not citizens equally with grown-up men In ancient times and among some nations, he continues the artisan class were sla es or fore gners and therefore the majority of them are so now The best form of state will not admit them to citizenship

The slaves who minister to the wants of individuals, and the mechanics or laborers who are the servants of the community" are to be counted as its "necessary people but not as members of the state When he discusses the size and character of the population for an ideal state Aristotle says, we ought not to include everybody for there must always be in cities a mult tud of slaves and sojourners and foreign ers but we should include only those who are members of the state and who form an essential part of it.

The exclus on of slaves and resident aliens from membership in the political community has a profound bearin on the meaning of the pol tical concept expressed by the words the people The *people* is not the same as the *popu-lat o* —all those human beings who live with in the state s borders. E en in soc et es which have abolished chattel slavery and in which suffrage tends to be unrestricted infants and al ens remain outside the pale of pol t cal life The *people* is always a part—th active polit ical part—of the populat on.

THE DISTINCTION OF citizen from sla e infant or alien does not complete the picture The subjects of a king are not slaves nor are they citizens of a republic Yet like citizens subjects have membership in the political community They constitute the people the king serves as well as rules unless he is a tyrant for only if he is a tyrant does he treat them as if they were his property to be used for his own pleasure or interest Sometimes a distinction is made between first and second class citizens and then the latter who occupy an in ermediate position between citizensh p and slavery are regarded as subjects. Since there are many forms of government Aristotle writes, there must be many varieties of citizens, and especially of cit izens who are subjects so that under some governments the mechanic and the laborer will be citizens, but not in others. The whole meaning of citizenship changes for Aristotle when the working classes are admitted to it

From a somewhat different point of view Aquinas holds that a man can be said to be a citizen in two ways first absolutely secondly in a restricted sense A man is a citizen absolutely if he has all the rights of citizenship for instance the right of debating or voting in the popular assembly On the other hand any man may be called citizen only in a restricted sense if he dwells within the state even lowly people or children or old men who are not fit to enjoy power in matters pertaining to the common welfare. Those who are thus disfranchised but are not slaves are subjects rather than citizens in the full sense.

It is possible of course for men to have the dual status of subject and citizen as is the case now in England and the self governing dom n ions of the Brit sh commonwealth This double status does not blur th distinction betw een cit izen and subject rather it signifies the mixed nature of a form of government which is both royal—at least in its vestiges of monarchy—and constitutional In the time of Locke when a great constitutional victory had been won against the despotism of the last Stuart the En lish people did not yet regard themselves as citizens Observing that the title of citizen has never been given to the subjects of any prince not even the ancient Macedonians Rousseau finds h mself compelled to add not

even the English of today though they are nearer liberty than anyone else

Unlike citizens the subjects of a king especially of one claiming absolute power have no voice in their own government and no legal means for protecting their natural rights as men So long as the absolute ruler does not tyrannize he governs for the welfare of his people and so though a despot in the sense of wielding absolute power over political inferiors he is benevolent in the sense of serving rather than using them But if he ceases to be benevolent and turns tyrannical his subjects have no recourse except rebellion They must resort to violence in order to emancipate themselves from a condition which amounts to slavery

A citizen on the other hand is safeguarded in his legal as well as in his natural rights and in some modern republics at least he is provided with juridical means for rectifying supposed injustices For citizens the right of rebellion is the *last* not the *only* resort

THE DISTINCT CONDITIONS of slavery subjection and citizenship can be summarized by defining three ways in which rulers are related to the persons they rule These three relations seem to have been first clearly differentiated by Aristotle

He finds all three relationships in the structure of the household as that is constituted in antiquity Of household management he writes there are three parts—one is the rule of a master over slaves another of a father and a third of a husband In each case the kind of rule differs the freeman rules over the slave after another manner from that in which the male rules over the female or the man over the child

As we have already seen Aristotle conceives the slave as a piece of property When he says that the slave wholly belongs to his master or that he is a part of his master a living but separated part of his bodily frame he is obviously considering only the chattel slave There are as the chapter on SLAVERY indicates other kinds or degrees of slavery less extreme than this

But chattel slavery more clearly than the attenuated forms of servitude defines the nature of mastery The master manages or uses the slave as he manages and uses other instruments—inanimate tools or domesticated animals The rule of a master Aristotle declares is exercised primarily with a view to the interest of the master Yet it accidentally considers the slave since if the slave perish, the rule of the master perishes with him

Thus conceived the slave lacks every vestige of political liberty He is treated as radically inferior to his master—almost as if he were something less than a man He has no voice in his own government nor is his welfare the paramount consideration of his ruler In short we have slavery when one man governs another in the way in which a man manages his property using it for his own good

When one man governs another in the way in which good parents administer the affairs of children as members of the household we have the type of rule which also appears in the relation between absolute kings or benevolent despots and their subjects "The rule of a father over his children is royal Aristotle writes for he rules by virtue of both love and of the respect due to age exercising a kind of royal power A king Aristotle adds is the natural superior of his subjects but he should be of the same kin or kind with them and such is the relation of elder and younger father and son

From the analogous type of rule in the family we see two differences between the condition of a slave and that of a subject under absolute or despotic rule in the state The inferiority of children unlike that of slaves is not their permanent condition It is an aspect of their immaturity They are temporarily incapable of judging what is for their good and so need the direction of their superiors in age experience and prudence But children have some equality with their parents, to the extent that their humanity is recognized as the reason why they should not be ruled as slaves but governed for their own welfare

The government of children Aristotle declares is exercised in the first instance for the good of the governed or for the common good of both parties but essentially for the good of the governed In the same way the subjects of a benevolent despot or of any absolute monarch who rules paternalistically are said to be

overned for their own good They are served ot used by their rulers and to this extent hey ha e a degree of politicall berty But thev o not have the complete liberty which exists only ith self government

That occurs only under constitutional rule which for Aristotle has an imperfect analogue n the family in the relation of husband and wife In the state however it is perfectly represented by the relation between the holders of publ c office and *other* citizens In the con ti tutional state Aristotle says "the cit zens rule and are ruled by turns for the idea of a constitutional state implies that the natures of the citizens are equal and do not d ffer at all The citizen in other words is one who has the power to take part in the deliberative or judicial administration of the state Rousseau *seems* to have a similar conception of the citizen as both ruling and ruled though he uses the word subject to des gnate the citizen *as ruled* "The people he writes are called *cit zens* as sharing in the sovereign power and *subjects* as being *under* the laws of the State

Because the man who holds office in a constitut onal government is first of all a *citizen* himself, and only secondly *an off cial* ested with the authority of a pol tical office the citizen is a man ruled by his equals and ruled as an equal. Observing these facts Aristotle describes citizenship as the one *ind finite* office set up by a constitution *It is* indefinite both in tenure and by comparison with the various *magistracies* or other offices which have more definitely assigned funct ons. Since *a citizen is* ruled only by other citizens, and since he has the *opportunity* of ruling others in turn citizenship involves political l berty in the fullest sense This does not mean freedom *from* government but freedom through *self government*—all *the* freedom a man can have in society l berty under law and proportioned to justice.

Two of these three pol tical conditions—slavery and subjection—naturally receive fuller treatment n the chapter on SLAVERY The d scussion of the third citizenship belongs not only to th s chapter but also to the chapter on CONSTITUTION and to other chapters which deal with forms of constitutional government such as ARISTOCRACY DEMOCR CY and OLIGARCHY

FOR THE SAME REASON that the revolutionists against absolutism or despotism in the 18th century use the phrase free government for republican institutions they also use citizen to designate a free man a man who possesses the political liberty and equality which they regard as the natural right of men because they are men In this *respect* they do *not* differ substantially from their Greek or Roman ancestors who prize constitutional government and citizenship as *conditions* of freedom and equality

Furthermore like the constitutionalists of antiquity *the republicans* of the 18th century are with few if any exceptions, *not* democrats in the sense of extending the rights and privileges of *citizen hip to all* adults In the 18th century slavery still exists and a *large part* even of those who are not in economic bondage remains outside the pale of citizenship disqualified by accidents of birth such as *race or sex* and by the lack of sufficient wealth or *property* which makes it necessary for them to labor in order to live It is not only an ancient oligarch like Aristotle who thinks that the ruling class should be the owners of property for they are citizens, and the citizens of a state should be in good circumstances whereas mechanics should have no share in the state In the 18th century as well as in ancient Greece extending the privileges of citizenship to indentured apprentices, day laborers or journeymen is a form of rad calism known as extreme democracy

Kant may be taken as representative of an enlightened point of view in the 18th century He finds that *there* are three juridical attributes that belong by right to the *citizens* 1 con titutional freedom as the right of every citizen to have to obey no other law than *that to which* he has given his consent or approval 2 civil equality as the right of the citizen to recognize no one as a superior among the people in relation to himself and 3 political independence as the right to o e his existence and continuance in society not to the a bitrary will of another but to his own ri hts and powers as a *member* of the commonwealth

The last attribute leads Kant to distinguish between acti e and passive citizenship Although he admits that this appears to stand in contrad ction to the definition of a citizen as

such he concludes that there are some in the community not entitled to the full privileges of citizenship It is his contention widely shared in the 18th century that suffrage which properly constitutes the political qualification of a citizen presupposes the independence or self sufficiency of the individual citizen among the people

Consequently he denies suffrage to every one who is compelled to maintain himself not according to his own industry but as it is arranged by others Such a restriction he says includes the apprentice of a merchant or tradesman a servant who is not in the employ of the state a minor and all women They are passive parts of the state and do not have the right to deal with the state as active members of it to reorganize it or to take action by way of introducing certain laws Kant insists however that it must be made possible for them to raise themselves from this passive condition in the State to the condition of active citizenship

THE FOREGOING DISCUSSION shows the connection between the idea of citizenship and the two revolutionary movements which John Stuart Mill notes in the history of political thought and action The first is the movement to obtain recognition of certain immunities called political liberties or rights which it was to be regarded as a breach of duty in the ruler to infringe and which if he did infringe specific resistance or general rebellion was held to be justifiable This is the revolutionary effort to overthrow despotism and to establish constitutional government with the status of citizenship for at least some part of the population—frequently much less than half of the total

The second revolutionary movement goes further It presupposes the existence of government by law and aims to perfect it It therefore seeks to obtain the establishment of constitutional checks by which the consent of the community or of a body of some sort supposed to represent its interests is made a necessary condition to some of the more important acts of the governing power Since according to Mill it aims to make the consent of the governed effective through an adequate representation of their wishes this movement inevitably leads to the fight *against* franchise restrictions and for universal suffrage which would admit every normal adult human being to the freedom and equality of citizenship

The first revolution has a long history It begins with the Greek city states which, having won this victory against the Persians lost it to the Macedonian conquerors It happens again with the establishment of the Roman republic after the expulsion of the Tarquins, and again is undone when the Caesars assume absolute power This part of the story is told with varying emotions by Plutarch and Polybius, Tacitus and Gibbon During the Middle Ages the same struggle appears in the various efforts to establish the supremacy of law particularly through the development of customary and canon law The revolution still continues in the 17th and 18th centuries and the new heights it reaches are reflected in the writings of a constitutionalist like Locke and republicans like Rousseau Kant and the American Federalists The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States are perhaps the classic documents of this historical phase

The second revolution particularly as identified with the fight for universal suffrage is a relatively recent event Its roots may go back as far as Cromwell s time to the activity of the Levellers and in the 18th century to the writings of John Cartwright But what is, perhaps, its first full expression does not appear until Mill s *Representative Government* In that book, Mill lays down the principles of the franchise reforms which began in the 19th century but which as in the case of woman suffrage or the repeal of the poll tax were carried through only yesterday or are still in progress.

Yet the struggle for universal suffrage—or as Mill would say against treating any human being as a political pariah —does have an ancient parallel in the conflict between democratic and oligarchical constitutions in Greek political life and thought These two types of constitution were opposed on the qualifications for citizenship and public office The oligarchical constitution restricted both to men of considerable wealth At the other extreme as Aristotle observes the most radical forms of Greek democracy granted citizenship to the working classes and gave no advantage to the rich in

filling the magistracies for they selected officials from the whole citizenry by lot

The parallelism goes no further than that Greek democracy even when it denied special privileges to the propertied classes never contemplated the abolition of slavery or the political emancipation of women

THERE ARE OTHER differences between ancient and modern institutions which affect the character of citizenship The problem of who shall be admitted to citizenship is fundamental in both epochs Insofar as it connotes the condition of political liberty and equality the status of citizenship remains essentially the same But the rights and duties the privileges and immunities which belong to citizenship vary with the difference between ancient and modern constitutionalism

Even if they had been written the constitutions of the ancient world would not have declared the rights of man and the citizen nor would they have had bills of rights appended to them The significance of these modern innovations (which begin perhaps with Magna Carta) lies not in a new conception of citizenship but in the invention of juridical means to endow the primary office of citizenship with sufficient legal power to protect it from invasion by government

In *The Federalist* Hamilton maintains that bills of rights are in their origin stipulations between kings and their subjects abridgments of prerogative in favour of privilege reservations of rights not surrendered to the prince Defending the absence of a special bill of rights in the original Constitution he insists that the Constitution is itself in every rational sense and to every useful purpose a bill of rights It declares and specifies the political privileges of the citizens in the structure and administration of the government and defines certain immunities and modes of proceeding which are relative to personal and private concern

Nevertheless, the right of free speech and free assembly and the right to trial by a jury of peers along with the immunity from unwarranted searches and seizures or from *ex post facto* laws and bills of attainder provided by the early amendments to the Constitution do give the citizen additional protection against interference in the performance of his civic duties such as independent political thought and action or in the exercise of his human privileges such as freedom of religious worship The invention of these constitutional devices sprang from the bitter experience of coercion and intimidation under Star Chamber proceedings royal censorship and unlimited police power A citizen who can be coerced or intimidated by his government differs only in name from the subject of an absolute despot

In addition to having these legal safeguards modern differs from ancient citizenship in the way in which its rights and privileges are exercised The machinery of suffrage is not the same when citizens act through elected representatives and when they participate directly in the deliberations and decisions of government by voting in the public forum

THE PROBLEM OF EDUCATION for citizenship is in some respects stated in almost identical terms by such different political philosophers as Plato and John Stuart Mill

In both the *Republic* and the *Laws* Plato emphasizes that education is the constraining and directing of youth towards that right reason which the law affirms By this he means not only that education will affect the laws but also that the laws themselves have an educational task to perform The educational program is thus planned and conducted by the state The guardians—the only citizens in the *Republic* in the full sense of the term—are trained for public life first by the discipline of their passions and second by the cultivation of their minds Their passions are disciplined by music and gymnastics their minds cultivated by the liberal arts and dialectic

In the democracy which Mill contemplates as an ideal the most important point of excellence is to promote the virtue and intelligence of the people themselves He does not outline a specific curriculum for the training of citizens but it is clear that he thinks their education cannot be accomplished in the schools alone The superiority of democracy according to Mill lies in the fact that it calls upon the citizen to weigh interests not his own to be guided in case of conflicting claims by another

rule than his private partialities to apply at every turn principles and maxims which have for their reason of existence the common good and he usually finds associated with him in the same work minds more familiarized than his own with these ideas and operations whose study it will be to supply reasons to his understanding and stimulation to his feeling for the general interest In this school of public spirit a man becomes a citizen by doing the *work of a citizen and so learning to act like one*

If the future citizen is to act like a free man must he not also be trained in youth to think like one? Vocational training prepares a man to be an artisan not a citizen Only liberal education is adequate to the task of creating the free and critical intelligence required for citizenship Hence in a state which rests on universal suffrage the educational problem becomes greatly enlarged in scope if not in intrinsic difficulty

With the advent of universal suffrage which Mill advocates the state must face the responsibility for making liberal education available to every future citizen To say that all normal children have enough intelligence to become citizens but to regard the native endowment of a large number of them as incapable of liberal education makes a travesty of citizenship Will the child who cannot profit by liberal education be able to discharge the duties of the office to which he will be admitted upon coming of age?

THE TRAINING OF CHARACTER is always more difficult than the training of mind In education for citizenship the problem of moral training involves the question—discussed in the chapter on VIRTUE—whether the good man and the good citizen are identical in virtue

For Aristotle and seemingly also for Mill the virtue of the good man under an ideal constitution *would be identical with that of the* good citizen As both ruling and being ruled the good citizen ought to be capable of both Aristotle writes He should know how to govern like a freeman and how to obey like a freeman—these are the virtues of a citizen And although the temperance and justice of a ruler are distinct from those of a subject the virtue of a good man will include both for the virtue of the good man who is free and also a subject *e g* his justice will not be one but will comprise distinct kinds the one qualifying him to rule, the other to obey

The virtues of the citizen direct him primarily in the performance of his obligations to the state But if the welfare of the state is not the ultimate end of man if there are higher goods which command human loyalty if man s common humanity takes precedence over his *membership in a particular state then one* virtue does not exhaust human excellence More may be morally required of the good man than of the good citizen The virtues of the saint and the patriot may be of a different order

On this question the great books reveal a fundamental disagreement among moralists and political philosophers who differ as Plato and Hegel differ from Augustine and Aquinas, or from Locke and Mill on the place of the state in human life

The ancients frequently appeal to a law higher than that of the state Socrates forever stands as the classic example of one who would rather die than disobey his inner voice—the command of his conscience A Stoic like Marcus Aurelius is willing to give unqualified allegiance *to the* political community only when it is the ideal city of man embracing the whole human brotherhood My city and my country so far as I am Antoninus he says is Rome but so far as I am a man —whose nature is rational and social — it is the world

For Christian theologians membership in the city of God is a higher vocation than citizenship in any earthly community—even when that is the city of man at its best The city of God demands a higher order of virtue than the city of man Referring to the earthly city Augustine says that the things which this city desires cannot justly be said to be evil for it is itself in its own kind better than all other human goods *For it desires earthly peace for* the sake of enjoying earthly goods It is all right for men to seek these things for they are good things and without doubt the gifts of God But Augustine goes on to say if they neglect the better things of the heavenly city which are secured by eternal victory and peace never ending and so inordinately covet these present good things that they believe them to be th

only desirable things," then in Augustine's opinion they are misdirected in their love

In giving precedence to the commandments of God the theologians do not deprecate the commands of the state or the obligations of citizenship But those who belong to both cities may find themselves faced with a conflict between the law of the state and the divine law In such circumstances, the faithful have no choice They must obey God before man Laws that are contrary to the commandments of God " Aquinas holds do not bind a man in conscience and "should not be obeyed

THIS CONFLICT BETWEEN human and divine law finds expression in antiquity in the *Antigone* of Sophocles. It was not Zeus who had published me that edict Antigone says of the human law she disobeys nor deemed I that the decrees were of such force that a mortal could override the unwritten and unfailing statutes of heaven For their life is not of to-day or yesterday but from all time and no man knows when they were first put forth

The problem which Antigone faces can occur in as many other ways as there are possibilities of tension between individual conscience or desire and political obligation Whatever form this takes the conflict confronts the political philosopher with all the questions that constitute the problem of the individual and society or man and the state

To what extent and in what respects is the individual's personality sacred and inviolable by the state? How much freedom from government has the individual a right to demand? How much individual sacrifice has the state a right to expect? Is the state merely a means in the individual's pursuit of happiness or the end to which all other goods must be ordered? Is man made for the state or the state for man?

To questions of this sort the answers range from philosophical anarchism at one extreme to equally philosophical totalitarianism at the other with all degrees of individualism and communism in between. The general problem of man and the state with all its controversial issues runs through many other chapters—such as CONSTITUTION, GOOD AND EVIL, LAW, LIBERTY and STATE—but we have placed its principal formulation in this chapter because the concept of citizenship signifies the ideal condition of the human individual as a member of the political community

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

rule than his private partialities to apply at every turn principles and maxims which have *for their reason of existence the common good* and he usually finds associated with him in the same work minds more familiarized than his own with these ideas and operations whose study it will be to supply reasons to his understanding and stimulation to his feeling for the general interest In this school of public spirit a man becomes a citizen by doing the work of a citizen and so learning to act like one

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25 M NT IG E *Essays* 7 d 46d 48a 51 passim 381a 388c 480b 482b 486b 489b 490 491d
26 SHAKES EA E *2nd Henry VI* ACT I SC I [180-206] 35 d / *Henry V* ACT I SC II [174 22] 535d 536b
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29 CE V NTES *Do Q x te* PA T I 68b 73 177a b
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38 MONTESQU EU *Spirit of La s* BK I 2d 3a BK 18d 19d 31c BK V I 52a b BK I 69 C BK II 92b-c BK XX I 199b-200 c K X 221c 222a BK XX II 229a
38 RO S *Ineq ality* 323d / *Politic l Econ my* 368d 369c 374a 375b 376a b / *Soci l C tr ct* BK I 389d 390c 391b 394d K I 396d 399a 406a c BK II 407c-408b BK I 425a 427a
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7 PLATO *Protagoras* 45d-46a
9 A STOTLE *Politics* BK III CH 1-5 471b d 475d C 13 [1283b27 1284 3] 481d-482a
20 AQUINA *Summa Theol gica* PA T I II Q 105 A 3 REP 2 316a 318b
21 DANTE *Di n Comedy* PARADISE V II [115-148] 118b-c
38 MO TE QUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 4a 6b
38 R SE U *Political Eco my* 368d 369c / *Social Contract* K I 391b-393b BK III 407b-d 420d
42 K NT *Scienc of R ght* 436c 437c esp 436d 449d-450
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43 MILL *Representative Government* 349a 350a
46 H GEL *Ph sophy of R ght* ADDITIO S 47 124a b

2a The st tus or office of citi ensh p in relation to the principle of constitutional go ern ment

6 THUCYDIDE *Peloponnesia W* BK II 396c 397c
9 A ISTOTLE *Pol t cs* BK I CH 12 [1259b5-8] 454a K III CH I [1275a2 -b21] 472a c C I 4 [1 7 b7 13] 474c d
20 AQUIN S *Summa Th l gi* P T I II Q 105 A 2 NS 309d 316a
31 S INO *Ethics* BK IV PROP 37 C OL 2 435d
38 M TESQUIEU *Spirit f La s* BK II 4 7c BK III 9a 11 BK 18b d 25a BK I I 51a 52b BK XI 68b d 75 BK XI 84b d-85 BK XIX 142 143 145c 146a c
38 RO S EAU *I q l ty* 358b-c / *Social C tr ct* BK I 392 esp 392b [f t] BK III 424a d BK I 425d-427a
42 K NT *P e R a n* 113b 115 / *Sci e of R ght* 401b 436c 437c 438d-439 / *J dgment* 586a 587
43 CONSTITUTION O HE U S AMENDMENTS XIV SECT I 18c

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To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad* BK II [265 283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119 When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164

AUTHOR S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases e g *Iliad* BK II [265-283] 12d

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a *(D)* follows e g OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—*(D) II Esdras* 7 46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface

1 The individual in relation to the state

5 AESCHYLUS *Suppliant Maidens* [366 401] 5c 6a / *Seven Against Thebes* [1005-1078] 38b 39a c

5 SOPHOCLES *Antigone* 131a 142d / *Ajax* [1071 1090] 152b [1226 1263] 153c 154a / *Philoctetes* 182a 195a c

5 EURIPIDES *Heracleidae* [500-534] 252c d / *Suppliants* [338 364] 261b c / *Phoenician Maidens* [991-1020] 387a b [1625-1682] 392b d / *Iphigenia at Aulis* 425a 439d esp [1255 1275] 436c [1368 1401] 437c d

5 ARISTOPHANES *Acharnians* 455a 469a c

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 6c 7a

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 395d 399a 402b-404a BK VI 511c d

7 PLATO *Apology* 200a 212a c / *Crito* 213a 219a c esp 216d 219a c / *Republic* BK IV 342a d 350a d BK V 365c d BK VI 379d 380c BK VII 390b 391b 401a b BK VIII 401d 416a esp 402b c / *Laws* BK III 672d 676b BK V 692c 693c BK VI 707b 708a BK VII 721d BK IX 754a b BK XI 775d 778a BK XII 791c

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 2 [1094^b5 10] 339c d BK V CH 11 [1138 4 13] 386b c / *Politics* BK I CH 2 [1253 19-39] 446c d BK II CH 1 [1260^b37-1261^a7] 455b d CH 2 [1261 15-30] 455d 456a CH 5 [1264^b16 25] 459d 460a BK III CH 6 [1278^b15 29] 475d-476a BK VII, CH 1-3 527a 530a CH 9 [1329 2 24] 533c CH 13 [1332^a28-38] 537a BK VIII CH 1 [1337 27-32] 542b

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK II [1-61] 15a d BK III [59-93] 30d 31b [978 1002] 42d-43a BK V [1105 1135] 75c d

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 19 125b 126c BK II CH 10 148c 150a BK III CH 22 195a 201a

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7 PLATO *Protagor s* 43b-47c / *Meno* 174d 176a esp 1 5d 176a / *Apology* 200a 212a,c / *Crito* 213a 219a,c / *Rep blic* BK I 346a 355a / *Statesma* 605d-608d / *Laws* BK I I 669b-670c 672d-674d BK V 686d-691b K 1 706b-c K I I 740d 741a
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43 MILL *Liberty* 267b d 268c / *Representative Government* 344d 350a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART II 272a d

2b The distinction between citizen and subject the distinction between the subjects of a constitutional monarchy and of a despotism

5 EURIPIDES *Suppliants* [338-456] 261b 262b
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7 PLATO *Laws* BK VIII 733d 734a
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK I CH 1 [1252a7 17] 445a b CH 7 [1255b16-20] 449b BK III CH 5 475a d passim CH 6 [1278b30-1279a22] 476a c CH 14 [1285 17-29] 483b c CH 15 [1286b8-14] 484d 485a CH 17 486c 487a BK VII CH 14 [1332b14 27] 537b c
15 TACITUS *Annals* BK XI 106a d
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23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 104d 106b 113c 115a 150c 151a 154b c
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 383c d
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VII SECT 87-94 44a 46c CH XI 55b 58b CH XIV SECT 163-164 63a c
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK III 11a 13c BK IV 13b,d 15c BK V 25d 26d BK V-VI 30c 34d BK VI 36a b BK VII 47d 48a BK XII 93c 96a c BK XIX 142a 146a c passim
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 356b d 359a b / *Social Contract* BK I 392a esp 392b [fn 1] BK III 417c 420d BK IV 426b c
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 14a 15c passim 16c 17b 17d 521a 523a c
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 81c 82a 161c 162a
42 KANT *Science of Right* 436d 437c 450b d
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 42 138d 139c NUMBER 43 142b-c NUMBER 54 171a b
43 MILL *Liberty* 267b d 268c / *Representative Government* 339d 340c 341d 344d passim 348c 355b 427a b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* ADDITIONS 155 142a b / *Philosophy of History* PART I 213b PART II 271c d PART IV 356d
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK IX 384c 388a c passim

2c The character and extent of citizenship under different types of constitutions

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 107c 108c
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7 PLATO *Republic* BK VIII IX 401d-420d / *Laws* BK VIII 733d 734a
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VIII CH 11 413b d passim / *Politics* BK III CH 1 471b d 472c CH 5 475a d CH 13 [1283b44 1284 3] 482a BK IV CH 3 488d 489b CH 8-9 493c 494d BK V CH 1 [1301a25-1302 15] 502b 503b BK VI CH 4 [1319b2-32] 523a b CH 6 524b-c / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 8 [1365b 9 1366 3] 608a b
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK I SECT 14 253b c
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* xxiia d BK II, 4a 7c BK III 9a 11a BK V 18b d 25a 33a c passim BK XI 68b d 75a BK XII 84b d 85c BK XIII 99b 100c
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK IV 271a b
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 223c 224a 403b-404d
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 114b d / *Science of Right* 450b d
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 10 51c 52d passim NUMBER 14 60b c
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6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 39b-c
7 PLATO *Republic* BK VIII 401d 416a / *Statesman* 605d 608d / *Laws* BK V 690d 691b
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK II CH 9 [1270a33 39] 466c BK III CH 1-5 471b d-475d BK VI CH 4 [1319b2-32] 523a b CH 6 524b c BK VII, CH 14 [1326 5 b25] 530a d CH 9 533a d passim esp [1329 18-30] 533c d / *Athenian Constitution* CH 21 562b-c CH 26 par 3 4 565a CH 42 572b d / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 8 [1365b29-1366 3] 608a b
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39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK III 168d 169a BK IV 269d 271d
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 14a d 15c 17a b
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43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U S ARTICLE I SECT 8 [204 205] 13b AMENDMENTS XIV SECT 1 2 18c d XV 19b XIX 19d XXIII 20d
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 42 138d 139c passim NUMBER 5 165a c NUMBER 54 171a b NUMBER 57 177a 178c d
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14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 45b 48b c / *Coriolanus* 174b d 175a / *Aristides* 263d / *Lysander* 361a d / *Agesilaus* 480b d 481a / *Cleomenes* 659d 660a / *Demosthenes* 699c 700a
15 TACITUS *Histories* BK I 191c d BK IV 267c d
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18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK II CH 21 161b-162d BK XIX CH 17 522b 523a CH 21 524a 525a CH 24-26 528b 529a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 61 A 5 58b 59d Q 92 A 1 esp REP 3 213c 214c
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38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* xxiia d BK III 9b 12a BK IV 13b d 15a 15c 16a BK V 18d 19d 21b 23a 31b c BK VII 44d-45c BK VIII 51a 52c 55c d BK XIX 137a c
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 323a 328a 360b d [fn 1] 366b d / *Political Economy* 369b 370a 372a 377b / *Social Contract* BK II 402b 403a BK III 411a c 412a b BK IV 428a 432b passim 434b 435a
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK V 337d 338c 340c 343d 346c 347d
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 630b d 631a 644b 645c
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 55 174c d
43 MILL *Representative Government* 329b 330a 334b 336c 341c passim esp 337a b 346c 350a passim
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46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 268 84c d / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 171b c PART II 272a d PART IV 365b c
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7 PLATO *Protagoras* 43a 47c / *Crito* 213a 219a c / *Republic* BK II III 320c 339a BK IV 34_b d BK V 366a c BK VI 380d 381a / *Statesman* 607b 608d / *Laws* BK I II 640a 663d esp BK I 644b 645c BK VII 713c 731d BK VIII 73_b-735a
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38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK IV 13b,d 18d
38 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 373c 377b / *Social Contract* BK II 402b-403a
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK V 303b-305c 337d 343d 347c d
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 6b 669a b
42 KANT *Judgement* 586a 587a
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 27 95c d
43 MILL *Liberty* 317d 319b 320a-c 321d 323a c / *Representative Government* 336c 341d passim esp 339a 340c 349a 350a 381b-38_d passim 417c-418d 424b c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 187 65a c par 239 76d par 315 104c ADDITION 5, 98 133a 147 140c 166 145b c 183 149d 149a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK VI 244d 245c
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12 EP CTETUS *D sco se* BK I CH 3 138a c K I H 5 143d 144 BK IV CH 3 224b-d

12 A R LIUS *M d tat ons* K I I SE T 11 262a b S CT 13 262 BK IV SECT 23 265c

18 AU USTIN *Co f ssio s* BK III par 15 17a b / *City f God* BK I R F 129a d BK V CH 15 16 220d 221b BK XI CH I 322b d 323a BK XIV CH 28-BK X CH 4 397a-400 BK X III C I I 2 472b-473d H 47 500d 501b BK XIX CH I 516d 517b CH 14 520a-d CH 7 522b 523a H 21 524a 525a H 23 26 528b-529a

19 AQUI : *S mm Theol gica* PART I II Q 21 A 4 s nd R 3 719d 720 c

21 D T *Divine Comedy* URGATORY I I [79-96] 72d X I [85 114] 77d 78a XIX [127 141] 82d 83a

23 HOB ES *Lev atha* P T 151a c PART I I 198d 199 240a 246a c ART IV 275 277d

32 M LTO *P ad se Lost* BK XII [485-55] 329b-331a

35 LOCKE *Toler t o* 15d 16c 17b

38 MO TESQ U *Sp it f Laws* K XX V XX I 200 215a BK XXVI 218a 219d

38 ROUS E U *I equal ty* 327a-c 358d 359a / *S cial Contr ct* K 401 -402a BK IV 435a 439c esp 437d-438c

40 GI BO *De lm and Fall* 193c 194 226a b 291d 292d 299b 300d passim

42 KANT *Science of Right* 444 -c

43 CONSTITUT N OF THE U S RT CLE V [591 599] 16d AMEND E NTS I [6 5-6] 17

43 M LL *Liberty* 279a d

46 H G *Phi l phy f R ght* R I par 0 84d 89c DDITI S 162 143b 144c / *Ph o ophy of H story* R 205d 206a,c P RT 216b-217c 245d 247b P R III 308b-c 309d 310 310d 311a AR IV 316a d 321b 322a 325d 326b 331b-d 333b-c 336c 337d 345c 346c 350b- 351b-354 365b-c

52 DO TOE SK *Brother Ka ama ov* K 5 28d 32a BK 127b 137c passim

8 The id a of world c ti nsh p th pol t cal b oth hood of man

12 E CTETUS *Discou ses* BK CH 9 114c 116b C 13 120b-c BK II H 148c 150a c 164d 165 BK I CH I 187 b CI 199 d c 4 203 210

12 A R LI S *Medit t ns* K I SECT 4 260b-261a CT 262a b K IV ECT 3 4 263b-264 I 44 2 8b-c

13 V L *Aeneid* BK I [54 29( ] 110a 111a BK V 845-8 3] 233b 234

18 AUG TI *City f G d* BK X X C 7 515a-c I 522d

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38 ROU *I q l* 3 5b c / *P litical Eco my* 369a b 373 / *Social Cont ct* I 437

42 KANT *Science of R ght* 452c d 455a-458a c / *Judgement* 586a 587a

43 M LL *Representative Government* 424c-428a passim esp 426a b

49 DARWIN *Descent f M n* 317c d

51 TOLSTOY *War and Pe ce* BK VI 244d 245d BK X 466b c

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54 FR UD *War a d Death* 755a 761c esp 755b-757c / *Civilization and Its D scontents* 785d 788d

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6 H R DOTUS *History* BK III 104b 108d esp 107c 108c BK IV 152d 153b BK V I 1c I 5b BK VI 193b-c BK II 245b

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7 P ATO *La s* BK I I 672d 676b

9 ARISTOTLE *P litics* BK II CH 12 4 0b-4 1d BK III CH 15 [1 86 8 21] 484d-485a BK IV CH 13 [1297b16- 8] 498a BK V CH 4 [1304 15-38] 505d 506a / *Athenian Constitut on* CH I 41 553a 572a passim e p CH 41 571c 572a

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40 GIB ON *D cl and F ll* 14a d 15c 29c d 90d 92 521a 523a c

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CROSS REFERENCES

For Other considerations of the issues involved in the relation between the individual and the state *see* GOOD AND EVIL 5d HAPPINESS 5b JUSTICE 10b STATE 2f 3c 3e 8c

The context of the concept of citizenship in the theory of constitutional government or government by law rather than by men *see* CONSTITUTION LAW 7a–7b LIBERTY 1d 1f 1g MONARCHY 1a(1) TYRANNY 5–5d

Other comparisons of citizens with subjects or slaves *see* JUSTICE 9d SLAVERY 6a–6c

The bearing of different types of constitution on the character of citizenship and especially on the extent of the franchise *see* CONSTITUTION 5–5b DEMOCRACY 4–4a(2) 5b(2) OLIGARCHY 5–5a

The political machinery such as elections and representation by which the citizen exercises his suffrage *see* CONSTITUTION 9–9b DEMOCRACY 5b–5b(4) GOVERNMENT 1h

The consideration of civic virtue in relation to virtue generally *see* VIRTUE AND VICE 7b and for the problem of education for citizenship *see* ARISTOCRACY 5 DEMOCRACY 6 EDUCATION 8d STATE 7d VIRTUE AND VICE 7a

Another discussion of the distinction between the city of man and the city of God *see* STATE 2g and for matters relevant to the ideal of world citizenship *see* LOVE 4c STATE 10f WAR AND PEACE 11d

Descriptions of the historical struggle for citizenship and for the extension of the franchise *see* LABOR 7d LIBERTY 6b SLAVERY 6c TYRANNY 8

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection

II Works by authors not represented in this collection

For the date place and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

I

MACHIAVELLI *The Discourses* BK I

MONTESQUIEU *Considerations on the Causes of the Grandeur and Decadence of the Romans*

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II

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BODIN *The Six Bookes of a Commonweale* BK I CH 6–7 BK III CH 8

HOOKER *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity*

PUFENDORF *De Officio Hominis et Civis Juxta Legem Naturalem (Of the Duties of Man and of the Citizen According to Natural Law)*

DIDEROT *Citoyen*

MABLY *Des droits et devoirs du citoyen*

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BURKE *Letter to the Sheriffs of Bristol*

—— *On the Reform of the Representation in the House of Commons*

PAINE *Rights of Man*

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TOCQUEVILLE *Democracy in America*

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FUSTEL DE COULANGES *The Ancient City*

T H GREEN *Principles of Political Obligation* (H)

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HOBHOUSE *The Metaphysical Theory of the State*

BRYCE *The Hindrances to Good Citizenship*

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G NEWMAN *Citizenship and the Survival of Civilization*

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MARITAIN *The Rights of Man and Natural Law*

EWING *The Individual the State and World Government*

Chapter 12. CONSTITUTION

INTRODUCTION

THE idea of a constitution as establishing and organizing a political community, the principle of constitutionality as determining a generic form of government having many varieties, and the nature of constitutional government—these three problems are so intimately connected that they must be treated together. We have used the word "constitution" to express the root notion from which all other matters considered in this chapter are derived.

It is impossible to say precisely what a constitution is in a way that will fit the political reality of the Greek city states, the Roman republic and its transformation into the empire, mediaeval kingdoms and communes and their gradual metamorphosis into the limited monarchies and republics of modern times. No definition can adequately comprehend all the variations of meaning to be found in the great works of political theory and history. But there are a number of related points in the various meanings of "constitution" which indicate what is common to the understanding of such diverse thinkers as Plato and Locke, Aristotle and Rousseau, Kant and Mill, Montesquieu and Hegel, Aquinas, Hobbes and the American Federalists.

IT HAS BEEN SAID that the constitution *is the form of the state*. This can be interpreted to mean that the political, as opposed to the domestic, community requires a constitution in order to exist, just as a work of art has the very principle of its being in the form which the artist imposes upon matter. In the context of his general theory of political association, Aristotle's remark that "the man who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors" may imply that the idea of a constitution is the creative principle by which the state was originally formed—or at least differentiated from the tribe and family.

Kant gives explicit expression to the notion that the invention of constitutions is coeval with the formation of states. "The act by which a People is represented as constituting itself into a State," he writes, "is termed the Original Contract," and this in turn signifies "the rightfulness of the process of organizing the Constitution."

In this sense, the constitution appears to be identical with the organization of a state. It would then seem to follow that every state, no matter what its form of government, is constitutional in character. But this would leave no basis for the fundamental distinction between constitutional and non-constitutional—or what is usually called "absolute," "royal," or "despotic"—government.

That basic distinction among forms of government is as old as Plato and Aristotle. It is first made by Plato in the *Statesman* in terms of the role of law in government. It occurs at the very opening of Aristotle's *Politics* with his insistence on the difference between the king and the statesman, and between royal and political government. But Locke seems to go further than the ancients when he says that "absolute monarchy ... is inconsistent with civil society, and so can be no form of civil government at all."

In addition to affirming the gravity of the distinction between constitutional and non-constitutional government, he seems to be denying that the latter can constitute the form of a truly *civil* society, as opposed to a domestic society or the primitive patriarchate of a tribe. Yet Locke obviously does not deny the historic fact that there have been communities which otherwise appear to be states, that have their character or form determined by absolute

government His point therefore seems to be that among types of government absolute monarchy does not fit the nature of civil society

If constitution is used merely as a synonym for form or type then even a state under absolute monarchy or despotic government can be said to have a constitution Since every state is of some type it can be said that it has a certain constitution or that it is constituted in a certain way If however we use the word constitution to conform to the distinction between constitutional and non constitutional government we are compelled to say that there are states which do not have constitutions

With this distinction in mind the statement that the constitution is the form of the state takes on a different and more radical meaning It signifies that there are communities larger than and distinct from the family or the tribe which cannot be called states in the strict sense because they do not have constitutions Hegel for instance points out that it would be contrary even to commonplace ideas to call patriarchal conditions a constitution or a people under patriarchal government a state or its independence sovereignty In such conditions what is lacking he writes is the objectivity of possessing in its own eyes and in the eyes of others a universal and universally valid embodiment in laws Without such an objective law and an explicitly established rational constitution its autonomy is not *sovereignty*

From this it would appear that a despotically governed community such as ancient Persia is a political anomaly It is intermediate between the family and the state for it is like a state in its extent and in the size and character of its population yet it is not a state in its political form The truly political community is constitutionally organized and governed In this sense the English words political and constitutional become almost interchangeable and we can understand how these two English words translate a single word in Greek political discourse

As THE FORM of the state the constitution is the principle of its organization Whether written or unwritten whether a product of custom or explicit enactment a constitution Aristotle writes is the organization of offices in a state, and determines what is to be the governing body and what is the end of each community

The idea of political office—of officials and official status—is inseparable from the idea of constitution That is why the concept of citizenship is also inseparable from constitution As the chapter on CITIZEN indicates citizenship is the primary or *indefinite* office set up by a constitution Citizenship is always the prerequisite for holding any other *more definite office in a constitutional government* from juryman to chief magistrate In specifying the qualifications for citizenship a constitution sets the minimum qualifications for all other offices which usually though not always, demand more than citizenship of the man who is to fill them

A political office represents a share of political power and authority Those are to be called offices Aristotle explains to which the duties are assigned of deliberating about certain measures and of judging and commanding especially the last for to command is the especial duty of a magistrate As representing a share of political power and authority a political office can be said *to constitute* a share of sovereignty That would not seem to be true however for those who like Rousseau maintain that sovereignty is indivisible Yet Rousseau also admits that each magistrate is almost always charged with some governmental function and *exercises* a function of sovereignty

Since it is an arrangement of offices a constitution is therefore also a division or partition of the whole sovereignty of government—or at least of the exercise of sovereignty—into units which have certain functions to perform and which must be given the requisite power and authority to perform them These units are political offices defined according to their functions and vested with a certain power and authority depending on their place and purpose within the whole

Hamilton s maxim that every power ought to be in proportion to its object formulates the equation by which the function of an office or its duties determines its rights and power

privileges and immunities And except for the provision of a temporary dictatorship in the early Roman constitution or its modern constitutional equivalent in emergency grants of power political offices under constitutional government always represent limited amounts of power and authority—limited in that each is always only a part of the whole

A CONSTITUTION defines and relates the various political offices It determines the qualifications of office-holders But it does not name the individuals who from all those qualified shall be selected for any office Because its provisions have this sort of generality a constitution has the character of law This is equally true of written and unwritten constitutions of those shaped by custom and those enacted by constituent assemblies.

Unlike all other man made laws a constitution is the law which creates and regulates government itself rather than the law which a government creates and by which it regulates the conduct of men their relation to one another and to the state This is perhaps the basic distinction with regard to the laws of the state

The fundamental law in every commonwealth says Hobbes is that which being taken away the commonwealth faileth and is utterly dissolved Montesquieu distinguishes what he calls the law politic which constitutes the state *from ordinary legislation* and Rousseau likewise divides the laws into the political or fundamental laws and the civil laws —those which determine the *form of the government* and those which the government once it is *constituted* enacts and enforces

In addition to being the source of all other positive laws of the state—for it sets up the very machinery of lawmaking—a constitution is fundamental law in that it establishes the standard of legality by which all subsequent laws are measured Aristotle observes that the justice or injustice of laws varies of necessity with constitutions What *may* be a just enactment in one state may be unjust in another according to the difference of their constitutions

In American practice and that modeled upon it a law which violates the letter or spirit of the constitution is judged *to be unconstitutional* and is deprived thereby of the authority of law

Every act of a delegated authority Hamilton writes in *The Federalist* contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised is void No legislative act therefore contrary to the Constitution can be valid To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is greater than his principal that the servant is above *his master* that the representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves that men acting by virtue of powers may do not only what their powers do not authorize but what they forbid.

THE CONCEPTION of a constitution as a law or set of laws antecedent to all acts of government inevitably raises *the question of how or* by whom constitutions are made If the provisions of a constitution were precepts of natural law they would according to the theory of *natural* law be discovered by reason not positively instituted But though constitutions have the character of positive law they cannot be made as other positive laws are made—by legislators *i e* men holding that office *under the constitution*

The generally accepted answer is that a constitution is made by the people who *form* the political community But as Madison observes some evidence exists *to the contrary* It is not a little remarkable he writes that in every case *reported* by ancient history in which government has been established with deliberation and consent the task of framing it has not been committed to an assembly of men but has been performed by some individual citizen of pre-eminent wisdom and approved integrity He cites many examples from Plutarch to *support* this observation but he adds the comment that it cannot be ascertained to what extent these lawgivers were clothed with the legitimate authority of the people In some cases however he claims that the *proceeding* was strictly regular

The writers of *The Federalist* are of course primarily concerned with a constitution that is not the work of one man but the enactment of a constituent assembly or constitutional convention *From* their knowledge of British law they are also well aware that a constitution may

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Hamilton s maxim that every power ought to be in proportion to its object formulates the equation by which the function of an office or its duties determines its rights and powers

be arbitrary and at plea ure so it ou ht to be x rcised by established and promulgated laws both the people may know th ir duty nd be safe and secure within the limits of the aw and the rulers too kept within their due bounds.

As Locke states the distinction between government by laws and government by men it seems to be identical with the distinction between constitutional and non constitutional ernment In the latter an individual man invests himself with sovereignty and as sovereign, puts himself above all human law being both its source and the arbiter of its legality Such government is absolute for nothing limits the power the sovereign man exercises as a prerogative vested in his person In constitutional government men are not sovereigns but office-hold rs having only a share of the sovereignty They rule not through *de facto* power but through the juridical power wh ch is vested in the *office* they hold That power is both created and limited by the law of the constitut on which defines the various offices of government

ALTHOUGH ABSTRACTLY or in theory absolute and constitut onal government are clearly distinct—more than that opposed—political history contains the record of intermediate types These can be regarded as imperfect embodiments of the principle of constitutionality or as attenuations of absolute rule by *const t* tional encroachments Despite their *incompatibility* in principle h storic circumstances have managed to combine absolute with constitutional government It is this *combination* which media val jurists and philosophers call the mixed reg me or the *regimen regale et pol tscum* royal and political government

It may be thought that a foreshadowing of the mediae al mixed regime can be found in Plato s *Laws* in the passage in which the Ath nian Stranger says that monarchy and democracy are the two mother forms of states from which th rest may be truly derived He then asserts th t to comb ne l berty with wisdom, yo mu t have both these forms of gov ernment n a mea ure Since *the* Persian despotism is cited a the highest form of monar hy nd the Athenian constitut on as the archetype of democracy the combination proposed would seem to be a mixture of absolute with constitutional government But the Athenian Stranger also says that there ought to be no great and unmixed powers if the arbitrary is to be avoided and since the whole tenor of the book as indicated by its title is to uphold the supremacy of la v it is doubtful that a truly mixed regime is intended—a government which is *partly* absolute and *partly* constitutional

Aristotle furthermore gives us reason to think that such a mixture would be unthinkable to a Greek. At least in his own vocabulary the terms *royal* and *political* are as contradictory as *round* and *square* Royal or kingly government for Aristotle is absolute monarchy or the arbitrary rule of a sovereign over all In royal government there are no political offices and no citizens The ruler is sovereign in his own person and the ruled are subject to his will which is both the source of law and exempt from all legal limitations

To Aristotle political government means pure constitutionalism. It exists only where the citizens rule and are ruled in turn for when the state is framed upon the principle of equality and likeness the citizens think they ought to hold office by turns To the generic form of constitutional government Aristotle sometimes g ves the name of polity though he also uses *this name* for the mixed constitution which combines d mocratic with oligarchical criteria for citizenship and public office The mixed constitution is *not to* be confused with the mixed regime for it is a mixture of *d fferent* constitutional principles not of constitutionalism itself with absolute government When the word polity signifies constitutional government generally it has the meaning which the Romans express by the word republic and which the constitutionalists of the 18th century call free government

The d stinctive characteristics of such government—whether *it* is called political republican constitutional or free—lie in the fact that the citizens are both rulers and *ruled* that no *man* not even the chief magistrate is above the la v that all *political* power or authority is derived from and limited by the constitution wh ch be ng popular in origin cannot be changed except by the people as a hole

sometimes be the product of custom growing and altering with change of custom But however it is exercised the constitutive power is held by them to reside in the constituents of the state the sovereign people This power may be exercised through force of custom to produce an unwritten constitution or through deliberative processes to draft a written one but it can never be exercised by a *government except with popular consent* since all the powers of a duly constituted government derive from its constitution In the American if not the British practice the amendment of the constitution also involves at least indirectly an *appeal to the people*

Rousseau assigns the constitutive power to a mythical figure he calls the legislator or the law giver describing him as the man who sets up the Republic Yet Rousseau says of this special office that it nowhere enters into the constitution He thus reaffirms the essential point that a constitution cannot create the office of constitution making

These remarks in the *Social Contract* have another significance Rousseau tries to distinguish the formation of a government by the constitution (the political or fundamental law made by *the* legislator) from the formation of the state by the social contract entered into by *the people in their original act of association* But is not the constitution also a formative contract or convention? If it is popular in origin either through custom or enactment is there more than a verbal difference between these two contracts—the one which establishes a political society and the one which establishes its government?

For Hobbes and seemingly also for Locke the compact by which men abandon the state of nature and establish a civil society results at the same time in *the establishment of a government* It is Hobbes writes as if every man should say to every man I authorize and give my right of governing my self to this Man or to this Assembly of men on this condition that thou give up thy right to him and authorize all his actions in like manner According to Rousseau there is only one contract in the State and that is the [original] act of association For him the institution of government is not a contract

The reality and significance of the difference between these three political philosophers would seem to depend on the precise historical meaning each gives to the hypothesis of men living in a state of nature prior to political association If prior to the state men live in non political societies and if the state as opposed to the family or the despotically ruled *community begins to exist only* when it is constituted then the formation of the state and the formation of its government would seem to be the product of a single convention

THE PRINCIPLE OF constitutionality is also *necessary in order to understand the* familiar distinction between government by laws and government by men Except for the divine sort of government which is above both law and lawlessness Plato employs 'the distinction of ruling with law or without law to divide the various forms of government into two groups The principle of law and the absence of law will bisect them all the Eleatic Stranger says in the *Statesman*

In the ordinary meaning of law as an instrument of government it is difficult to conceive government by laws without men to make and administer them or government by men who do not issue general directives which have the *character of law Government* always involves both laws and men But not all government rests upon the supremacy of law a supremacy which consists in the equality of all before the law and the predominance of regular law as opposed to arbitrary decision Nor is all government based upon a law that regulates the officials of government as well as the citizens, and determines the legality of official acts legislative judicial or executive That law is of course the constitution

Locke makes a distinction between governing by absolute arbitrary power and governing by settled standing laws It is his contention that whatever form the commonwealth is under the ruling power ought t govern by declared and received laws and ne by extemporary dictates and undetermined resolutions for then mankind will be in a f worse condition than in a state of Nature All the power the government has being onl for the good of the society as it ought not

ganized into an objective constitution but only feudal monarchy

It is not until the 18th century that the slightest vestige of royal power comes to be regarded as inimical to law For Rousseau every legitimate government is republican for Kant the only rightful Constitution is that of a Pure Republic which in his view can only be constituted by a *representative system* of the people The writers of *The Federalist* take the same stand They interpret the aversion of the people to monarchy as signifying their espousal of purely constitutional or republican government In the tradition of the great books, only *Hegel* speaks thereafter in a contrary vein. *Constitutional monarchy* represents for him the essence of constitutionalism and the only perfect expression of the idea of the state

Because modern republics and even modern constitutional or limited monarchies have developed gradually or by revolution out of mixed *regimes* and because this development came as a reaction against the increasing absolutism or despotism of kings the principle of constitutionality has been made more effective in modern practice *than it* was in the ancient world In addition to asserting limitations upon governments *constitutions* have also provided means of controlling them. They have been given the *force* as well as the authority of positive law They have made office holders accountable for their *acts* and through such juridical processes as impeachment and such political devices as *frequent* elections and short terms of office they have brought the administration of government within the purview of the law

Following Montesquieu, the Federalists recommend the separation of powers with checks and balances as the essential means of enforcing constitutional limitations of office and of preventing one department of government from usurping the power of another The citizens are further *protected* from the misuse of power by constitutional declarations of their rights and immunities and constitutional government is itself safeguarded from revolutionary violence by such institutions as judicial review and by the availability of the amending power as a means of changing the constitution through due process of law

IN THE HISTORY of political change it is necessary to distinguish *change from* or *to* constitutional government and within the sphere of constitutional government the *change of* constitutions

Republics are set up and constitutions established by the overthrow of despots or with their abdication Republics are destroyed and constitutions overthrown by dictators who usurp the powers of government Violence or the threat of violence usually attends these changes

The other sort of change *may take place in* two ways either when one constitution replaces another *as frequently occurs in* the revolutions of the Greek city-states or when an enduring constitution is modified by amendment as is customary in modern republics. Every constitutional change is in a *sense revolutionary* but if it can be *accomplished* by due process of law violence can be avoided

All the changes in which *constitutional* government or constitutions are involved raise fundamental questions of justice Is republican government always better than absolute monarchy *and the mixed* regime—better in the sense of being *more* just better because it gives men the liberty and equality they justly deserve? Is it better relative to the nature and condition of certain peoples but not all or of a people at a certain stage of their development but not always? In what respects does one constitution embody more justice than another? What sorts of amendment or reform *can rectify the injustice* of a constitution? Without answering such questions we cannot discriminate between progress and decline in the *history* of constitutionalism

Divergent answers will of course be found in the great books Among the political philosophers there are the defenders of absolutism and those who think that royal government is most like the divine the exponents of the supremacy of the *mixed* regime the republicans who insist that nothing less than constitutional government is fit for free men and equals And there are those who argue that the justice of any form of government must be considered relative *to* the condition of the people so that republican government may be better only in some circumstances, not in all

The issue arising from these conflicting views

It is perhaps only in the Middle Ages that we find the mixed regime in actual existence That rule is called politic and royal Aquinas writes by which a man rules over free subjects who though subject to the government of the ruler have nevertheless something of their own by reason of which they can resist the orders of him who commands These words seem to present an accurate picture of the peculiarly mediaeval political formation which resulted from the adaptation of Roman law (itself partly republican and partly imperial) to feudal conditions under the influence of local customs and the Christian religion

The mediaeval mixed regime is not to be confused with modern forms of constitutional monarchy any more than with the mixed constitution or polity of the Greeks The so-called limited monarchy or kingship according to law Aristotle remarks is not a distinct form of government The chapter on MONARCHY deals with the nature of constitutional monarchy and its difference from the mixed regime as well as its relation to purely republican government The mediaeval king was not a constitutional monarch but a sovereign person in one sense above the law and in another limited by it

To the extent that he had powers and prerogatives unlimited by law the mediaeval king was an absolute ruler He was as Aquinas says quoting the phrase of the Roman jurists *legibus solutus*—exempt from the force of all man made law Aquinas also describes him as above the law insofar as when it is expedient he can change the law and rule without it according to time and place Yet he was also bound by his coronation oath to perform the duties of his office first among which was the maintenance of the laws of the realm—the immemorial customs of the people which define their rights and liberties The king s subjects could be released from their oath of allegiance by his malfeasance or dereliction in office

To this extent then the mediaeval king was a responsible ruler and the mixed regime was constitutional Furthermore the king did not have jurisdiction over customary law yet where custom was silent the king was free to govern absolutely to decree what he willed and even to innovate laws

MEDIAEVAL IN ORIGIN the institution of a government both royal and political or what Fortescue describing England in the 15th century called a political kingdom exerted great influence on modern constitutional developments As late as the end of the 17th century Locke s conception of the relation of king and parliament royal prerogative and legal limitations may emphasize the primacy of law but it does not entirely divest the king of personal sovereignty Locke quotes with approval the speech from the throne in 1609 in which James I said that the king binds himself by a double oath to the observation of the fundamental laws of his kingdom Tacitly as by being a king and so bound to protect as well the people as the laws of his kingdom and expressly by his oath at his coronation To this extent the British kingdom is as Fortescue had said political But the king also retains the prerogative to dispense with law and to govern in particular matters by decree apart from law and to this extent the government still remains royal

Locke recognizes the difficulty of combining the absolute power of the king in administration with the limitations on that power represented by Parliament s jurisdiction over the laws which bind the king To the question Who shall be judge of the right use of the royal prerogative? he replies that between an executive power in being with such prerogative and a legislative that depends upon his will for their convening there can be no judge on earth The people have no other remedy but to appeal to heaven

Montesquieu as well as Locke can conceive monarchy as distinct from despotism in no other terms than those of the mixed regime He separates despotism as lawless or arbitrary and absolute government from all forms of government by law and divides the latter into monarchies and republics Montesquieu insists that the ancients had no notion of the kind of monarchy which while it is legal government is not purely constitutional in the sense of being republican He calls this kind of monarchy Gothic government and as Hegel later points out it is clear that by monarchy he understands not the patriarchal or any ancient type nor on the other hand the type or

the theory of representation That begins in mediaeval treatises which recognize the consultative or advisory function of those who represent the nobles and the commons at the king's court But it is only in recent centuries—when legislation has become the exclusive function of representative assemblies—that the idea of representation and the theory of its practice assume a place of such importance that a political philosopher like Mill does not hesitate to identify representative with constitutional government

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

concerning constitutional and absolute government is treated in the chapters on CITIZEN MONARCHY and TYRANNY But one other issue remains to be discussed here It concerns the comparative justice of diverse constitutions Constitutions can differ from one another in the way in which they plan the operations of government or in the qualifications they set for citizenship and public office Usually only the second mode of difference seriously affects their justice

In Greek political life the issue of justice as between the democratic and the oligarchical constitution is a conflict between those who think that all free men deserve the equality of citizenship and the opportunity to hold office and those who think it is unjust to treat the rich and the poor as equals The latter insist that citizenship should be restricted to the wealthy and that the magistracies should be reserved for men of considerable means

Finding justice and injustice on both sides Aristotle favors what he calls the mixed constitution This unites the justice of treating free men alike so far as citizenship goes with the justice of discriminating between rich and poor with respect to public office Such a mixture he writes may be described generally as a fusion of oligarchy and democracy since it attempts to unite the freedom of the poor and the wealth of the rich The mixed constitution especially if accompanied by a numerical predominance of the middle class seems to him to have greater stability as well as more justice than either of the pure types of constitution which oppressive to either poor or rich provoke revolution

In modern political life the issue between oligarchy and democracy tends toward a different resolution The last defenders of the oligarchical constitution were men like Burke Hamilton and John Adams in the 18th century Since then the great constitutional reforms have progressively extended the franchise almost to the point of universal suffrage These matters are of course further treated in the chapters on DEMOCRACY and OLIGARCHY

POLITICAL REPRESENTATION with a system of periodic elections seems to be indispensable to constitutional government under modern conditions The territorial extent and populousness of the nation state as compared with the ancient city state makes impossible direct participation by the whole body of citizens in the major functions of government

Considering the ancient republics of Sparta, Rome and Carthage the writers of *The Federalist* try to explain the sense in which the principle of representation differentiates the American republic from these ancient constitutional governments *The principle of representation* they say was neither unknown to the ancients nor wholly overlooked in their political constitutions The true distinction between these and the American government lies *in the total exclusion of the people in their collective capacity* from any share in the *latter* and not in the *total exclusion of the representatives of the people* from the administration of the *former*

The Federalists then go on to say that the distinction thus qualified must be admitted *to leave a most* advantageous superiority in favor of the United States But to insure to this advantage its full effect we must be careful not to separate it from the other advantage of an extensive territory For it canno be believed that any *form of representative* government could have succeeded within the narrow limits occupied by the democracies of Greece.

In their opinion representative government *is not merely necessitated by the conditions of modern society but also has the* political advantage of safeguarding constitutional government from the masses As pointed out in the chapter on ARISTOCRACY where the theory of representation is discussed the officers of government *chosen by the whole body* of citizens are supposed—at least on one conception of representatives—to be more competent in the business of government than their constituents It is in these terms that the Federalists advocate *what they call republican* government as opposed to pure democracy

Like the idea of political offices the principle of representation seems to be inseparable from constitutionalism and constitutional government *Though the principle* appears to certain extent in ancient republics—whether oligarchies or democracies—ancient political writing *does not* contain a formal discussion of

he theory of representation. That begins in mediaeval treatises which recognize the consultative or advisory function of those who represent the nobles and the commons at the king's court. But it is only in recent centuries—when legislation has become the exclusive function of representative assemblies—that the idea of representation and the theory of its practice assume a place of such importance that a political philosopher like Mill does not hesitate to identify representative with constitutional government.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

REFERENCES

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The exposition of different types of constitutions and different forms of constitutional government in themselves and in relation to one another *see* ARISTOCRACY 1–2e CITIZEN 2c, DEMOCRACY 3–3c 4a(1)–4a(2) 4d OLIGARCHY 1–2 4 5a

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The idea of citizenship in relation to constitutional government *see* CITIZEN 2a–2b and for the conception of the statesman as a constitutional office holder *see* STATE 8

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Matters relevant to the conventional character of constitutions and the relation of the idea of a constitution to the theory of the social contract *see* CUSTOM AND CONVENTION 6a LAW 7c NATURE 2b STATE 3d

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Other discussions of the safeguards of constitutional government and of the theory and machinery of representation *see* ARISTOCRACY 6 DEMOCRACY 4b 5–5c GOVERNMENT 1h LIBERTY 1g

The problem of constitutional change and the stability of different types of constitution *see* ARISTOCRACY 3 DEMOCRACY 7–7a REVOLUTION 2a 3c(2) STATE 3g

The issues involved in the development of constitutional government and the establishment of liberty under law *see* GOVERNMENT 6 LIBERTY 6b MONARCHY 4e(2) PROGRESS 4a REVOLUTION 3a TYRANNY 4b 8

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection
II Works by authors not represented in this collection

For the date place and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

I

MACHIAVELLI *The Discourses* BK I
MILTON *The Tenure of Kings and Magistrates*
HUME *Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth*

II

POLYBIUS *Histories* VOL I BK VI
CICERO *De Republica (The Republic)*
MARSILIUS OF PADUA *Defensor Pacis*
FORTESCUE *Governance of England*
GUICCIARDINI *Dialogo e discorsi del reggimento di Firenze*
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a specifically human strength Courage does not consist only in conquering fear and in withholding the body from flight no matter what the risk of pain It consists at least as much in steeling the will reinforcing its resolutions, and turning the mind relentlessly to seek or face the truth.

Civil no less than martial action requires courage Weary of empire Marcus Aurelius summons courage each day for the performance of an endless round of duties. "In the morning when thou risest unwilling," he reminds himself, let this thought be present—I am rising to the work of a human being How he conceives the work of an emperor he makes plain. Let the deity which is in thee be the guardian of a living being manly and of ripe age and engaged in matter political, and a Roman, and a ruler who has taken his post like a man waiting for the signal which summons him from life and ready to go, having need neither of oath nor of any man's testimony The burdens are heavy the task difficult but not impossible, for a man "can live well even in a palace.

Civil courage is as necessary for the citizen as for the ruler This virtue in Mill's opinion is especially necessary for citizens of a free government. "A people may prefer a free government, he writes, but if, from indolence or carelessness, or cowardice or want of public spirit, they are unequal to the exertions necessary for preserving it if they will not fight for it when it is directly attacked if they can be deluded by the artifices used to cheat them out of it if by momentary discouragement or temporary panic or a fit of enthusiasm for an individual, they can be induced to lay their liberties at the feet even of a great man, or trust him with powers which enable him to subvert their institutions in all these cases they are more or less unfit for liberty and though it may be for their good to have had it even for a short time, they are unlikely long to enjoy it

The courage or pusillanimity of a people is sometimes regarded as the cause, and sometimes as the effect of their political institutions. "The inhabitants of Europe," Hippocrates writes, are more courageous than those of Asia for a climate which is always the same induces indolence but a changeable climate laborious exertions, both of body and mind and from rest and indolence cowardice is engendered and from laborious exertions and pains, courage This, according to Hippocrates, partly explains why the Asiatics readily submit to despotism and why the Europeans fight for political liberty But the character of the Europeans, he adds is also the result of their institutions because they are not governed by kings for where men are governed by kings, there they must be very cowardly and they will not readily undergo dangers in order to promote the power of another but those that are free undertake dangers on their own account and thus their institutions contribute not a little to their courage

For Hegel, on the contrary civic courage consists in undertaking dangers, *even to the point of sacrifice for the state* Moreover for him true courage is entirely a *civic virtue* "The intrinsic worth of courage as a disposition of the mind" he writes, is to be found in the genuine absolute final end the sovereignty of the state The work of courage is to actualize this final end, and the means to this end is the sacrifice of personal actuality Though he admits that courage is multiform, he insists that "the mettle of an animal or a brigand courage for the sake of honor the courage of a knight, these are not true forms of courage The true courage of civilized nations is readiness *for sacrifice in the service of the state* so that the individual counts as only one amongst many "

THE WORK OF MAN is learning as well as action. Man has a duty to the truth as well as to the state The ability to face without flinching the hard questions reality can put constitutes the temper of a courageous mind. "The huge world that girdles us about William James writes, puts all sorts of questions to us, and tests us in all sorts of ways. Some of the tests we meet by actions that are easy and some of the questions we answer in articulately formulated words. But the deepest question that is ever asked admits of no reply but the dumb turning of the will and tightening of our heart-strings as we say 'Yes, I will even have it so!' When a dreadful object is presented or when life as a whole turns up its dark abysses to our view then the worthless ones among us lose their hold on the situation altogether But the heroic

Chapter 13 COURAGE

INTRODUCTION

THE heroes of history and poetry may be cruel violent self seeking ruthless intemperate and unjust but they are never cowards They do not falter or give way They do not despair in the face of almost hopeless odds They have the strength and stamina to achieve whatever they set their minds and wills to do They would not be heroes if they were not men of courage

This is the very meaning of heroism which gives the legendary heroes almost the stature of gods In the Homeric age they do in fact contend with gods as well as men The two Homeric epics especially the *Iliad* are peopled with men who cannot be dared or daunted In Tennyson s poem Ulysses now restive in Ithaca remembering the years at Troy and the long voyage home says to his companions

> Some work of noble note may yet be done
> Not unbecoming men that strove with Gods
> and though
> We are not now that strength which in old days
> Moved earth and heaven that which we are we are
> One equal temper of heroic hearts,
> Made weak by time and fate but strong in will
> To strive to seek to find and not to yield

In the *Iliad* courage is the quality above all others which characterizes the great figures of Achilles and Hector Ajax Patroclus and Diomedes Agamemnon and Menelaus The only other quality which seems to be equally prized and made the subject of rivalry and boast is cunning—the craft of Odysseus that man of many devices and the cleverness in speech of Nestor Yet the best speech is only the prelude to action and except for the night expedition of Odysseus and Diomedes into the Trojan camp the great actions of the *Iliad* are unplanned deeds of prowess—stark not stealthy

The heroes have boundless passions and fear is among them When they are called fearless it is not because nothing affrights them or turns their blood cold Fear seizes them a does any with all its bodily force They are fearless only in the sense that they do not act afraid t[illegible] to act Their courage is always equal to the peril sensed or felt so that they can perform what must be done as if they had no fear of pa or death

Yet brave men often speak of coura e as if it were fearlessness and mark the coward as one who is undone by fear An ambush Idomeneus says in the *Iliad* will show who is cowa ly and who is brave the coward will change color at every touch and turn he is full of fears and keeps shifting his weight first on one knee and then on the other his heart beats fast as he thinks of death and one can hear the cha r ing of his teeth The brave man master s fear will appear to be fearless

This is the courage of men of *action* men in war found not only in the heroes of Troy s siege but in the stalwarts of all other battles— Leonidas at Thermopylae Aeneas and Tur engaged in single combat the conquerors in Plutarch the warrior nobility in Shakespeare the civilized Prince Andrew and youn Ros or in *War and Peace* It is the sort of courage wh h goes with physical strength with feats of e durance and as signified by the root mea in of *fortitude* which is a synonym for courage it is a reservoir of moral or spiritual strength to sustain action even when flesh and blood can carry on no further Such courage is a virtue i the primary sense of the Latin word *virtu*— *manliness* the spirit or strength of spiri re quired to be a man

THERE ARE OTHER orts of coura e The courage of the tragic hero of Oedipus and Anti one goes with strength of mind not body This perhaps even more than being lion hearted is

hose duty it is to make real the ideality im plicit within itself, i.e. to sacrifice itself. But whereas for Hegel courage seems to be the foremost political virtue Plato puts it last in the order of goods. Wisdom is chief the Athenian Stranger says in the *Laws* next follows temperance and from the union of these two with courage springs justice and fourth in the scale of virtue is courage

In the context of a different psychological analysis, and a theory of the virtues which considers them primarily as habits, Aristotle's conception of courage differs from Plato's in a number of respects. It is most closely allied with temperance These two virtues together belong to the irrational part of the soul—the passions or appetites—and are concerned with our attitude toward pleasure and pain They discipline us, both in feeling and action with regard to the pleasurable objects of desire and the painful objects of fear or aversion Aristotle seems to think courage more praiseworthy than temperance for it is harder *to face* what is painful than to abstain from what is pleasant

Just as the temperate man is one who habitually forgoes certain pleasures and seeks other pleasures moderately for the sake of achieving some greater good so the courageous man is one who can at any time endure pain and hardship or overcome fear of danger and death *in order* to achieve a paramount end Since death is the most terrible of all things, Aristotle declares that properly he will be called brave who is fearless in face of a noble death and of all emergencies that involve death But it must be for a noble end that the brave man endures and acts as courage directs.

The paramount end the greatest good which the moderation of temperance and the endurance of courage serve is for Aristotle happiness. Yet through their relation to justice which concerns the good of others and the welfare of the state temperance and courage help a man to perform his social duties whether as ruler or citizen in peace or war The man who acts lawfully will not only be just but also courageous and temperate for in Aristotle's view the law bids us do both the acts of a brave man e.g. not to desert our post nor take to flight nor throw away our arms, and those of a temperate man e.g. not to commit adultery nor to gratify one's lust Not only may the law-abiding man be called upon to be courageous in the respects which Aristotle indicates, but it may sometimes take great courage to uphold the law itself against many temptations to the contrary After the death of Moses the Lord spake unto Joshua and said unto him Be thou strong and very courageous that thou mayest observe to do according to all the law which Moses *my servant commanded thee* turn not from it to the right hand or to the left

The fourth virtue with which courage temperance and justice are associated in the conduct of private or public life is *prudence* or practical wisdom" Though Aristotle classifies prudence as an intellectual virtue *consisting in* the capacity for making a right *judgment* about things *to be done* he also regards prudence as inseparable in origin and exercise from these other three virtues which he calls moral rather than intellectual Later writers call the four virtues taken together—courage temperance justice and prudence—the cardinal virtues in order to signify as Aquinas explains, that the whole of moral life hinges upon them

The theory of the cardinal virtues and of *their* connection with one another in such wise *that* none can be perfect in the absence of the *others* is treated in the chapter on VIRTUE. The chapters on JUSTICE TEMPERANCE and PRUDENCE discuss the doctrine that each of these virtues is only a part of virtue which must be integrated with the other parts The special role which prudence plays in relation to virtues like courage and temperance—at least according to Aristotle's view that it is not possible to be good in the strict sense without practical wisdom nor practically wise without moral virtue —must be reserved for the chapter dealing with that virtue Nevertheless it is necessary to consider here how its dependence on prudence may qualify the meaning or nature of courage

THE CONNECTION which some writers see between courage and prudence affects the definition of courage in two ways The first involves the doctrine of the mean which enters into the consideration of all the moral virtues but especially courage and temperance

mind does differently It can face them if necessary without for that losing its hold upon the rest of life The world thus finds in the heroic man its worthy match and mate He can *stand* this Universe

Not only in answering questions but in asking them courage is required The story which St Augustine tells in the *Confessions* of his persistent questioning of doctrines and dogmas his refusal to rest in any creed which did not wholly satisfy his mind is a story of speculative courage capped by the fortitude with which he bore the agony of irresolution and doubt

Learning is never an easy enterprise nor truth an easy master The great scientists and philosophers have shown the patience and perseverance of courage in surmounting the social hardships of opposition and distrust as well as the intellectual difficulties which might discourage men less resolved to seek and find the truth The great religious martyrs as indomitable in their humility as soldiers are in daring have been as resolute—never yielding to a despair which would have dishonored their faith

In all these types of fortitude different motivations are apparent as diverse as the forms which courage takes under the various demands of life Not all the forms of courage may be equally admirable partly because they are unequal in degree but also partly because the courageous acts themselves or the purposes for which fortitude is needed are not of equal moral worth Yet the essence of courage seems to be the same throughout It sustains the honor of Don Quixote and in some sense even of Sir John Falstaff it burnishes the fame of Alexander and Caesar it fortifies Socrates and Galileo to withstand their trials Whether in the discharge of duty or in the pursuit of happiness courage confirms a man in the hard choices he has been forced to make

As THE CHAPTER on VIRTUE indicates the traditional theory of the moral qualities places courage or fortitude among the four principal virtues The other three are temperance justice and either wisdom or prudence according to the enumeration of different writers

Plato names these virtues when in the *Republic* he compares the parts of the state with the parts of the soul The same principles which exist in the State exist also in the individual Socrates says and they are three in number There is one with which a man reasons the rational part of the soul another with which he loves and hungers and thirsts and feels the flutterings of any other desire—the irrational or appetitive the ally of sundry pleasures and satisfactions The third part is passion or spirit which when not corrupted by bad education is the natural auxiliary of reason

Corresponding to these three parts of the soul there are or should be according to Plato three classes in the state the guardians or rulers the husbandmen and artisans or the workers and the auxiliaries or the soldiers

The virtues which belong to the several parts of the soul also belong to the corresponding parts of the state Wise is the man Socrates declares who has in him that little part which rules and which proclaims commands that part too being supposed to have a knowledge of what is for the interest of each of the three parts and of the whole Courageous is he whose spirit retains in pleasure and in pain the commands of reason about what he ought or ought not to fear

Temperance however instead of being exclusively the perfection of one part pervades the whole and is found according to Socrates in the man who has these same elements in friendly harmony in which the one ruling principle of reason and the two subject ones of spirit and desire are equally agreed that reason ought to rule Justice— the only virtue which remains when the other virtues of temperance and courage and wisdom are abstracted— is the ultimate cause and condition of the existence of all of them and while remaining in them is also their preservative It is the virtue which does not permit the several elements within a man to interfere with one another or any of them to do the work of others."

The political analogy finds justice in the well-ordered state where wisdom rules courage defends the laws and peace and temperance balances the economy Wisdom would belong most properly to the guardians courage to the auxiliaries while all three classes would need temperance Hegel also associates courage with the military class — that universal class which is charged with the defence of the state and

and men of sanguine temperament extremely self-confident or at least free from fear would be as courageous as those who succeed in mastering their fears in order to do what is expected of them. But as Aristotle observes, drunken men often behave fearlessly and we do not praise them for their courage Plato likewise presents a view of courage which requires forethought and a genuine concern for danger

I do not call animals which have no fear of dangers, because they are ignorant of them, courageous says Nicias in the *Laches* They are "only fearless and senseless There is a difference to my way of thinking he goes on between fearlessness and courage. I am of the opinion that thoughtful courage is a quality possessed by very few but that rashness and boldness, and fearlessness, which has no forethought are very common qualities possessed by many men many women many children and many animals. According to this conception of courage "courageous actions, Nicias says, are wise actions.

I LIVE WITH these considerations, the definition of courage would involve a reasonable a wise or prudent discrimination between what should be feared and what should be undertaken in spite of peril or pain As the Parson declares, in his discourse on the Seven Deadly Sins in the *Canterbury Tale* th virtue is so mighty and so vigorous that it dares to withstand sturdily and wisely to keep itself *from* dangers that are wicked and to wrestle against the assaults of the Devil For it enhances and strengthen the soul It can endure by long suffering the toils that are fitting

To be able to make decisions of this sort in particular cases a man must have some view of the order of goods and the end of life For a man to act habitually in a courageous manner he must be generally disposed to value certain things as more important than others, so that he is willing to take risks and endure hardships for their sake

Freud seems to be skeptical of what he calls the rational explanation for heroism according to which it consists in the decision that the personal life can *not* be so precious as certain abstract general ideals. More *frequent* in his opinion, that instinct and impulsive heroism which knows no such motivation and flouts danger in the spirit of Anzengruber's *Hans the Road Mender* Nothing can happen to *me* But Aquinas, who emphasizes rational motivation as much as Freud discounts it insists that courageous men face the danger on account of the good of virtue which is the abiding object of their will however great the danger be"

Courage as Aquinas conceives it though only a part of virtue in the sense of being one virtue among many nevertheless represents the whole moral life from one point of view The quality of courage he points out "overflows into the rest of the virtues, as these in turn enter into courage Whoever can curb his desires for the pleasures of touch, Aquinas writes, so that they keep within bounds, which is a very hard thing to do, for this very reason is more able to check his daring in dangers of death so as not to go too far which is much easier and in this sense fortitude is said to be *temperate*

"Again he continues, temperance is said to be brave because fortitude overflows into temperance This is true in so far as he whose soul is *strengthened* by fortitude against dangers *of death* which is a matter of very great difficulty is more able to *remain* firm against the onslaught of pleasures for as Cicero says, *it would be inconsistent for a man to be unbroken by fear and yet vanquished by cupidity or that he should be conquered by lust after showing himself to be unconquered by toil*

As the man who is temperate because he has rationally ordered his actions to a certain end can be expected to be courageous for the same *reason* so, according to Aquinas he will also be prudent since both his temperance and his courage result from a prudent or rational choice of means to the end he pursues.

Writing as a theologian Aquinas distinguishes what he calls the perfecting virtues of the religious life from "the social virtues of the political life—the virtues with which the moral philosopher is *concerned* He holds courage to be inseparable from the other virtues on either plane—whether directed to a *natural* or supernatural end—because it is the sameness of the end in each case which binds the virtues together "Thus prudence by contemplating the things of God, he explains, counts as nothing all the things of this world *and* temperance so

Aristotle originates the analysis of virtue as a mean between two vices because the vices respectively fall short of or exceed what is right in both passions and actions It requires prudence to decide what things should be feared when they should be feared and how much and so a prudent judgment is involved in fearing the right things at the right time and in the right manner—neither too much nor too little

The coward the rash man and the brave man Aristotle writes are concerned with the same objects but are differently disposed to them for the first two exceed and fall short, while the third holds the middle which is the right position and rash men are precipitate and wish for dangers beforehand but draw back when they are in them while brave men are keen in the moment of action but quiet beforehand

Aristotle is not the only one to define courage a a middleground between contrary extremes Most writers who devote any attention to the nature of courage come to somewhat the same conclusion Epictetus for example in declaring that we should combine confidence with caution in everything we do seems also to make courage a mean He points out that such a combination at first may appear a paradox since caution seems to be contrary to confidence and contraries are by no means compatible But this he says is only due to confusion There would be a paradox if we really called upon a man to use caution and confidence in regard to the same things as uniting qualities which cannot be united But as Epictetus explains caution and confidence can be united because they concern different objects

The difference in objects which he has in mind becomes clear in the light of the Stoic maxim Be confident in all that lies beyond the will s control be cautious in all that is dependent on the will Sharply distinguishing between what does and does not lie within our control Epictetus tells us to look with care and caution only to those things in which we can do evil by making an evil choice In such matters of will it is right to use caution But in other matters in things outside the will s control which do not depend on us we should use confidence

By uniting caution and confidence we avoid the extremes of foolhardiness a d cowa and achieve the mean in which Aristotle sa courage consists Both are necessary Cow ice is not the only vice opposed to courage The man who acts without caution in the face of danger recklessly disregarding what might be reasonably feared is foolhardy rather than co rageous even as the coward is held back by fear which his reason tells him should be ov rcome

Because he agrees that courage consists in avoiding both extremes Spinoza writes th flight at the proper time just as well as fight ing is to be reckoned as showing strength of mind These two acts are allied since it is b the same virtue of the mind that a man avoids danger and seeks to overcome i

To determine at a given moment whether to flee or to fight so as to avoid either foolhard ness or cowardice obviously involves a decision of reason Such a decision according to Sp noza, demands strength of mind by which he means the desire by which each person en deavours from the dictates of reason alone to preserve his own being Without rational di rection or as Aristotle would say without prudence one may be fearless but not co rageous

Those who like Hobbes do not include rea son or prudence as an essential element in the conception of courage treat courage as an emo tion rather than a virtue and tend to ide tif it with fearlessness making its oppos the condition of being over fearful Amongst th passions writes Hobbes *courage* (by which I mean the contempt of wounds and violent death) inclines men to private revenges, and sometimes to endeavor the unsettlin of the public peace and *timorousness* many times dis poses to the desertion of the public def nce

As Hobbes describes courage it may be of doubtful value to the individual or to the state. Melville seems to have this meaning of courage in mind when he says that the most reliabl and useful courage is that which arises from the fair estimation of the encountered peril —th lack of which makes an utterly fearless man a far more dangerous companion than a coward

If apparent fearlessness were coura then certain animals might be called coura cour

Plutarch, in his life of Lycurgus, shows how "the city was a sort of camp." The training and education of all was directed to military valor. "Their very songs had a life and spirit in them that inflamed and possessed men's minds with an enthusiasm and ardour for action. . . . The subject always serious and moral; most usually it was in praise of such men as had died in defence of their country, or in derision of those that had been cowards; the former they declared happy and glorified; the life of the latter they described as most miserable and abject." The result was, according to Plutarch, that "they were the only people in the world to whom war gave repose."

Both Plato and Aristotle criticize the constitutions of Crete and Sparta for making war the end of the state and exalting courage, which is only a part, above "the whole of virtue." Courage must be joined with the other virtues to make a man good, not only as a citizen but as a man. "Justice, temperance, and wisdom," says the Athenian Stranger in the *Laws*, "when united with courage, are better than courage only."

Furthermore, military courage is not even the whole of courage. While recognizing the need for it, Plato thinks that a wise statesman would put it in its proper place if men are to be trained to be good citizens, not merely good soldiers. Arguing that no sound legislator would order peace for the sake of war, and not war for the sake of peace," the Athenian Stranger suggests that a broader conception of courage than the Cretans and Spartans seem to have would recognize its use, not only in external warfare, but in the tasks of peace—in the struggle to lead a good life and build a good society. "What is there," he asks Megillus the Spartan and Clinias the Cretan, "which makes your citizens equally brave against pleasure and pain, conquering what they ought to conquer, and superior to the enemies who are most dangerous and nearest home?"

Nevertheless, through the centuries the type of courage which the poets and historians celebrate has been the bravery of men who put their very lives in jeopardy for their fellow men—the courage of the citizen doing his duty or, what is still more spectacular, of the soldier confronting the enemy. This fact among others is one reason why many writers, from the Greeks to Hegel, have found a moral stimulus in war or, like William James, have sought for its moral equivalent. On this point they are answered not merely by those who see only degradation in war, but also by the many expressions of the insight that peace can have its heroes too.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

far as nature allows neglects the needs of the body fortitude prevents the soul from being afraid of neglecting the body and rising to heavenly things and justice consists in the soul s giving a whole-hearted consent to follow the way thus proposed

WE ARE THUS brought to the second qualification upon courage which arises from its connection with prudence and through prudence with the other virtues Does it make any difference whether the end for which a man strives valiantly is itself something commendable rather than despicable? If not then the thief can have courage just as truly as the man who fears dishonor more than death *the tyrant can be courageous* no less and no differently than the law abiding citizen

In his advice to the prince Machiavelli seems to consider only the utility of courage Referring to the end which he says every man has before him namely glory and riches he points out that men proceed in various ways one with caution another with haste one by force another by skill one by patience another by its opposite and each one succeeds in reaching the goal by a different method Fortune he thinks plays a large part in their success and for that reason he holds no method certain Any method requires us to use fortune to the best advantage This demands courage and even audacity

It is better to be adventurous than cautious he writes because fortune is a woman and if you wish to keep her under it is necessary to beat and ill use her and it is seen that she allows herself to be mastered by the adventurous rather than by those who go to work more coldly She is therefore always woman like a lover of young men because they are less cautious more violent and with more audacity command her

It would appear that Machiavelli recommends courage or at least daring to those who wish to succeed in great undertakings whether the end in view is *commendable or not In either case* courage may improve the chances of success and it is success that counts According to their notions of courage as a virtue Plato Aristotle and Aquinas sharply disagree with this as we have already seen So do Kant and Hegel

It is the positive aspect the end and content Hegel writes which gives significance to the spiritedness of courageous actions. Robbers and murderers bent on crime as their end, adventurers pursuing ends planned to suit their own whims etc these too have spirit enough to risk their lives Because their ends are either malicious or unworthy the mettle of a brigand and even the courage of a knight do not seem to Hegel to be true forms of courage

According to Kant intelligence wit judgment and other talents of the mind however they be named or courage resolution perseverance as qualities of temperament are undoubtedly *good and desirable in many* respects but these gifts of nature may also become extremely bad and mischievous if the will which is to make use of them and which therefore constitutes what is called *character* is not good If a good will is necessary to make courage virtuous then the behavior of a scoundrel may look courageous but it can only be a counterfeit Without the principles of a good will such things as the ability to face dangers or to bear hardships Kant thinks may become extremely bad The coolness of a villain he adds *not only makes him far more dan*gerous, but also makes him more abominable in our eyes than he would have been without it

It may still remain true that courage can take many forms according to the variety of objects which inspire fear or according to the types of action which men find burdensome or painful But if the truly courageous man must always be generally virtuous as well then many of the appearances of courage do not spring from genuine virtue The conception of virtue as a habit adds the criterion of a settled disposition even the habitual coward may perform a single courageous act Nor should courage be attributed to those who by freak of temperament are utterly fearless The merit of virtue—overcoming fear—cannot be claimed by them

IN THE GREAT *political books especially those of antiquity the place of courage in the state and in the training of citizens receives particular* attention The constitutions of Crete and Sparta seem to make courage the only essential virtue *for the citizen*

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To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad* BK II [65 83] 12d the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119 When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164

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(3 *The passions in the sphere of courage fear daring, anger hope despair*)

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23 Hobbes *Leviatha* part ii 115d conclu s on 279b-c

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7 Plato *Apology* 200a 212a / *Cri* 213a 219a,c / *La s* k i 644a 645c k ii 673a-c k x 784d 786b

9 Aristotle *Ethics* bk iii ch 8 [6^{a}15 ^{b}24] 362b-363 / *Politics* bk v ch i [1312^{a} 8 39] 514d ch ii [313 34 ^{b}1 [516a b bk v i, ch 7 531d 532 ch 5 [1334 9-2] 539a / *Rhetoric* k i ch 9 [1366^{b} 4] 608d-609a

10 Hippocrates *Air W aters Places* par 16 15d 16 par 23 18a-c

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14 PLUTARCH *Theseus* 2c 9a esp 3a d / *Romulus Theseus* 30a b / *Coriolanus* 175d 176b / *Aemilius Paulus* 224d 229c / *Pelopidas* 232a 233a 238b 239c / *Flamininus* 302b / *Alexander* 542a d / *Caesar* 583b 585d 599b c / *Cato the Younger* 620a 648a c / *Cleomenes* 659d 660a / *Aratus* 826c 836d

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24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 32c 35a BK IV 265b

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27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT II SC II [575 633] 46b d ACT IV SC IV [39-66] 59b-c / *Troilus and Cressida* ACT II SC II 113c 115d / *Macbeth* ACT I SC VII 289b 290b / *Timon of Athens* ACT III SC V 406d-408a

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32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK IX [856-1016] 266a 269b

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38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 13d 14a 14d 15a BK XXVIII 239d 240a

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3 VIRGIL *Aeneid*, BK VIII [494-520] 272a 273a BK IX [590-620] 295a b BK XII [435-440] 365b
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41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 213a 214a
42 KANT *Practical Reason*, 325d 377d / *Judgement* 504a b
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14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 40c-45c / *Poplicola* 83b-84a / *Coriolanus* 177b-179a 180d 181b *Aemilius Paulus*, 226c 229c *Pyrrhus* 325c 330a *Aristides* 423a-430d / *Cato the Younger* 629a 631a,c / *Cleomenes*, 659d 660a *Demosthenes* 695d 701b / *Aratus* 825b-c

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6 HERODOTUS *History* BK V 1 5b BK VII 232c-233d 233a-c 239a-c
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II, 396b-399a 402c-404a BK IV 469d-470b 478d 479b BK V 484a-c BK VII, 555b-557b
7 PLATO *Apology* 200a 212a,c / *Crito* 213a 219a,c / *Laws* BK I, 644 645c BK II 6 5a-c BK XII, 784d 786b
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK III CH 8 [1116a 24] 362b-363a / *Politics* BK V CH 10 [1312a 15 9] 514d CH 11 [3] [516a b BK II, CH 7 531d 532c CH 5] 334 19-22] 539a / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 9 [1366b 14] 608d-609a
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14 Plutarch *Cato the Younger* 620a 648a c esp 643a 644b / *Cleomenes* 659d 660a / *Aratus* 826c 836d
15 Tacitus *Annals* bk xii 117a bk xvi 180d 184a / *Histories* bk iv 271b
17 Plotinus *Third Ennead* tr ii ch 8 86d 87b
20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i ii q 105 a 3 ans and rep 5 6 316a 318b
23 Machiavelli *Prince* ch v 8a c ch x 16b d ch xxvi 36b 37d
23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part ii 113b
25 Montaigne *Essays* 23b 24a
31 Spinoza *Ethics* part iv prop 72 73 446b 447a
32 Milton *Lord Gen Fairfax* 68b 69a / *Samson Agonistes* [888-90-] 359a
38 Montesquieu *Spirit of Laws* bk iii 12b c bk iv 15a c bk xiv 107b d bk xvii 122a b
38 Rousseau *Inequality* 324c / *Social Contract* bk i 388c bk iii 411b c bk iv 437d 438c
40 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 23c 523d 524a
41 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 223a 224a 324c 325a
42 Kant *Science of Right* 448d 449c
43 Mill *Liberty* 282b 283a / *Representative Government* 329b c
46 Hegel *Philosophy of Right* part iii par 324 107c d
47 Goethe *Faust* part ii [9855-9862] 239b
51 Tolstoy *War and Peace* bk xi 513d 515a epilogue i 668a 669c

7c Courage in war

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4 Homer *Iliad* 3a 179d esp bk iii 19a 23d bk vi [369-502] 43d 45a bk xii [310-328] 85b c bk xiii [206-294] 90b 91b bk xvi [493 501] 117c bk xxii [77-130] 156a c bk xxiii [1-367] 161a 165a
5 Aeschylus *Persians* 15a 26d esp [331 432] 18d 19d / *Seven Against Thebes* [630-723] 34a 35a
5 Euripides *Suppliants* [857-917] 266a b / *Phoenician Maidens* [697-747] 384a d [991-1030] 387a b
5 Aristophanes *Knights* [565-580] 477a b / *Wasps* [1060-1121] 520c 521b
6 Herodotus *History* bk vii 233a d 239a c 252a 259a esp 256d 257c bk ix 291c 292a 298c 304c 309d 310a
6 Thucydides *Peloponnesian War* bk i 367c 368a 370a c bk ii 389d 390b 396b 399a 402c 404a 411b-412c bk iv 457b c 460c d 469d 470b 478d 479b bk v 484a c 491b c 501a b bk vi 522b c 527b c bk vii 55[illegible] 557b 559b 560b 561a b
7 Plato *Laches* 32a c / *Symposium* 1[illegible] *Apology* 205d 206a / *Crito* 217b-c / *Re*[illegible] bk iii 324c 325b bk iv 347a d bk v 3[illegible] 367b / *Timaeus* 445d-446b / *Laws* bk i 6[illegible] 643a bk xii 784d 786b
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13 Virgil *Aeneid* bk ii 124a 146b bk ix x[illegible] 279a 379b
14 Plutarch *Lycurgus* 40c-45c / *Po*[illegible] 83b 84a / *Coriolanus* 177b-179a / *Aem*[illegible] *Paulus* 219d 229c / *Pelopidas* 232a 23[illegible] 238b 239c / *Marcellus* 246b d 261a c / *Mar*[illegible] *lus Pelopidas* 261a 262d / *Philopoemen* 29[illegible] 302a c / *Pyrrhus* 328c 330a / *Nicias* 423a 43[illegible] / *Caesar* 583b 585d / *Cleomenes* 659d 660a 661a 663c / *Demosthenes* 695d 703b / [illegible] 826c 836d
15 Tacitus *Annals* bk ii 44d-45a bk iii 49[illegible] 50a bk xii 117a b / *Histories* bk i 210c 211c 212b bk ii 226d 227a 232d 23[illegible] bk iii 246b c 248b c 249a
20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i-ii q 105 a 3 ans and rep 5-6 316a 318b
22 Chaucer *Troilus and Cressida* bk i st[illegible] 68-70 10a bk ii stanza 88-93 33a b bk v stanza 258 154a
23 Machiavelli *Prince* ch x 16c-d ch xiii 17d 21a
23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part ii 115d
24 Rabelais *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk [illegible] 32c 35a bk iv 297b d
25 Montaigne *Essays* 3a 5a 20d 22a 23[illegible] 24a 25c 26d 53c 55d 95d 97b 302b 30[illegible] 327d 329d 336c 337a 532d 533a
26 Shakespeare *1st Henry VI* act iv sc [illegible] 23d 25a / *3rd Henry VI* act v sc iv [1-[illegible]] 101a c / *Richard III* act v sc iii [237 3[illegible]] 146b 147c / *King John* act v sc i [44 [illegible]] 399[illegible] 400a / *1st Henry IV* act i sc iii 437d 440d act ii sc iii 443b-444b act iv sc iii [1-29] 459b c / *Henry V* act iii sc i 543[illegible] 544b act iv sc iii [1-78] 555c 556c sc [illegible] 558a b
27 Shakespeare *Hamlet* act iv sc iv [46-[illegible]] 59b c / *Troilus and Cressida* act ii sc ii 113[illegible] 115d / *Coriolanus* act i sc iv [8-63] 356[illegible] 357c sc vi [55-87] 358d 359a act ii sc [illegible] [86-135] 365a-c / *Timon of Athens* act iii sc v 406d-408a / *Cymbeline* act v sc [illegible] 479d-480d

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The virtues most closely related to courage see JUSTICE PRUDENCE TEMPERANCE.

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ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below a works not included in Great Books of the Western World, but relevant to the idea and topics th which this chapter deals. These works are di ided into two groups

I. Works by a thors represented in this collection.
II. Works b thors not represented in this collection.

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Chapter 14 CUSTOM AND CONVENTION

INTRODUCTION

THE contrast between the artificial and the natural is generally understood in terms of the contribution which man does or does not make to the origin or character of a thing Works of art are man made The artificial is somehow humanly caused or contrived The contrast between the natural and the conventional or customary involves the same point of difference Though customs are not in the strict sense *made* by man as are works of art they do grow only as the result of the kind of acts which men perform voluntarily rather than instinctively Similarly conventions like contracts are social arrangements or agreements into which men enter voluntarily

The fundamental notions with which this chapter deals are thus seen to be closely related to ideas and distinctions treated in the chapters on ART and NATURE For example the distinction between human action and production or doing and making helps us to understand how the conventional and the artificial differ from one another as opposites of the natural Art involves voluntary making Customs result from voluntary doing In both cases the distinction between the voluntary and the instinctive—the latter representing the natural—seems to be presupposed

A third term—habit—is traditionally associated with the consideration of the voluntary and the instinctive Like these others it seems to have a critical bearing on the discussion of custom and art Aristotle for example conceives art as an *intellectual virtue* that is a habit of mind an acquired skill For Hume the customary and the habitual are almost the same Whether they are to be identified or are only connected causally the relation of habit to custom not only throws some light on the nature of custom but also calls our attention to the fact that the words custom and convention cannot be treated simply as synonyms

In the tradition of the great books the word convention has at least two meanings, in only one of which is it synonymous with custom When convention is used to signify habitual social practices it is for the most part, interchangeable with custom In this significance the notion of convention like that of custom is an extension of the idea of habit What habit is in the behavior of the individual, customary or conventional conduct is in the behavior of the social group

The other meaning of convention" does not connote the habitual in social behavior but stresses rather the voluntary *as opposed* to the instinctive origin of social institutions arrangements or practices For example different sorts of family organization are conventional in the sense that at different times or in different communities men have set up their domestic arrangements in different ways In each case they tend to perpetuate the particular institution which they or their ancestors originated Whatever is conventional about social institutions might have been otherwise if men had seen fit to invent and adopt different schemes for the organization of their social life This indicates the connection between the two senses of the word convention for all customs are conventional in origin and all conventions become customary when perpetuated

THE FACT THAT men can depart *from* as well as abide by their conventions—that they can transgress as well as conform to custom—seem to indicate that custom and convention belong to the sphere of human freedom Yet there is also a sense in which custom is a constraining force which reduces the tendency of individuals to differ from one another and which b

effect of moulding them alike and regimenting their lives

The repressive effect of custom can be seen according to Freud in the neurotic disorders from which men suffer when their instinctive impulses come into conflict with accepted customs. Discussing the influence of custom upon the developing individual he says that its ordinances frequently too stringent exact a great deal from him much self restraint much renunciation of instinctual gratification. It becomes therefore one of the aims of psychoanalytic therapy to release the individual from bondage to custom or at least to make him conscious of the way in which certain desires have been submerged or distorted and his whole personality shaped by the constraints which the mores and taboos of the tribe have imposed upon him.

Considered in relation to society custom also seems to exercise a conservative if not repressive effect. Established customs tend to resist change. They are sometimes thought to impede progress. But to the extent that they conserve the achievements of the past they may be indispensable to progress because they provide the substance of what we call tradition. A passage in Bacon's *Advancement of Learning* illustrates these apparently contrary effects of custom.

Over-emphasis upon either antiquity or novelty seems to Bacon a disease of learning or an obstacle to its advancement. Antiquity envieth there should be new additions, he writes and novelty cannot be content to add but it must deface. If custom tends to support antiquity against novelty it may also encourage inventions or discoveries which genuinely enhance the tradition without defacing it. Antiquity deserveth that reverence Bacon says, that men should make a stand thereupon and discover what is the best way but when the discovery is well taken then to make progression. As the preserver of antiquity custom thus appears to afford a basis for progress.

One other fact about customs which most commentators from Herodotus to Montaigne and Freud have observed their variety and variability. Customs differ from time to time and from place to place. But this diversity and variation in custom does not necessarily mean that no uniformity at all exists in the actions of men. Were there no uniformity in human actions Hume points out it would be impossible to collect any general observations concerning mankind. At least enough uniformity is found in his opinion for it to be universally acknowledged that human nature remains still the same. To whatever extent human behavior is purely natural or instinctive it is common to all members of the species and does not like customary conduct vary remarkably from one part of the human race to another or from generation to generation.

The diversity and variation of customs seems therefore to be of their essence and to show that they are both man made and voluntary in origin. If they were not devices of men Augustine writes, they would not be different in different nations and could not be changed among particular nations. The distinction between nature and convention can be formulated therefore, partly in terms of the contrast between the constant and the variable and partly in terms of the difference between the instinctive and the voluntary.

The early Greeks had an apt way of expressing this. As Aristotle phrases their insight they referred to the natural as that which everywhere has the same force and does not exist by people's thinking this or that as, for example "fire burns both here and in Persia. The conventional and those things which are not by nature but by human enactment are not everywhere the same. The laws of Persia differ from the laws of Greece and in Greece or in Persia they change from time to time.

THE VARIABILITY of custom in contrast to the constancy or uniformity of nature puts the distinction between nature and convention at the service of the skeptic. One form of the skeptical attack upon natural law universal moral standards, and the objectivity of truth or beauty consists in making custom the only measure of the acceptability of human actions or judgments. To say for example as Hume does that the connection which the mind seems to make between cause and effect is based on custom rather than reason has the skeptical effect which Hume intends. It substitutes the arbitrary for the rational. It dispossesses reason as a source of

either the validity or the intelligibility of our conclusions concerning cause and effect

As the chapters on KNOWLEDGE and OPINION indicate the skeptical argument takes other forms The reduction of all human judgments to opinion makes the differences between men in either action or thought unresolvable by argument or debate One opinion can predominate over another only by force or by the weight of numbers When it predominates by weight of numbers it prevails by custom or convention It is the opinion which the majority have agreed upon at a given time or place To settle every controversy about what men should think or do by counting heads is to hold that everything is a matter of opinion and purely conventional

Whether the skeptic reduces everything to opinion or to convention he achieves the same effect What he means by calling everything an opinion or a convention is equally inimical to reason In either case the willful or arbitrary is enthroned in reason s place and only force can be finally decisive The two ideas—opinion and convention—seem to be corollaries of one another Both imply a kind of relativity Opinion normally suggests relativity to the individual custom or convention relativity to the social group Either may be involved in the origin of the other The individual may form his opinions under the pressure of prevailing customs of thought or action the customary beliefs or practices of a society or culture may and usually do result from opinions which have come to prevail

The Greek sophists we learn from the dialogues of Plato appealed to the distinction between nature and convention and to the distinction between knowledge and opinion in exactly the same way They used the notions of opinion and convention with equal force in their efforts to question absolute standards of conduct and the objectivity or universality of truth The most familiar of all the sophistical sayings—the remark attributed to Protagoras that man is the measure of all things —is interpreted by both Plato and Aristotle to mean that what men wish to think or do determines *for them* what is true or right Man s will governs his reason and convention or the agreement of individual wills decides what is acceptable to the group

In the *Gorgias* which is named after another of the leading sophists of the day Plato puts into the mouth of Callicles the sophistic position that there is no law or standard of justice except the rule of the stronger Insisting that convention and nature are generally at variance with one another Callicles attempts to show that all of Socrates efforts to discover an absolute standard of justice come to naught, because he cannot help but resort to the popular and vulgar notions of right which are not natural but conventional

As they appear in Plato s dialogues the sophists are obviously impressed by the kind of formation which fills the *History* of Herodotus —information about the great diversity of human beliefs and practices which anyone could discover for himself if he traveled as Herodotus did from people to people observing their institutions and collecting their legends Herodotus himself does not explicitly draw the skeptical conclusion yet his own suspended judgment on many matters betokens a turn of mind made cautious by the impact of contrary opinions and conflicting customs

In the Hellenistic period when the mainstream of Greek philosophy divides into a number of Roman schools of thought the skeptical position receives what is perhaps its fullest and most explicit statement But in the writings of Lucian and Pyrrho to take two examples it is not so much the conflict of customs as it is what Lucian calls the warfare of creeds which occasions universal doubt Yet whatever the source of doubt Pyrrhonism states the traditional denials of the skeptic in their most extreme form The senses are entirely untrustworthy Reason is both impotent and self-deceiving Men possess no knowledge or science No truth is self evident none can be demonstrated

THE CRITICAL TEMPER of the Greek sophists and of an observer of men and manners like Herodotus reappears later in the questionings of Montaigne—sharpened somewhat perhaps by his acquaintance with the Roman skeptics In his case perhaps more than any other it is the implications of custom which everywhere expatiated on in his *Essays* give them their skeptical tone Not himself a traveler in distant

is Montaigne traverses the world of time space by reading He becomes conversant with the strange customs of the aborigines and the Orient through the reports of returned explorers He culls from the historians and geographers of antiquity every difference in custom which their books set forth as fact or fable Montaigne's insatiable appetite for collecting and comparing customs is not an aimless fascination on his part with the spectacle of human variety It steadfastly leads him to the conclusion which is for him the only one possible Since every belief or practice can be paired with its opposite in the customs of some other time or place no belief or practice can demand unqualified or universal assent 'There is nothing' he writes 'which custom does not or may not do and therefore with every good reason it is that Pindar calls her the ruler of the world

To say as Montaigne does that 'the taste for good and evil depends in good part upon the opinion we have of them' and that 'everyone is well or ill at ease according as he so finds him self' amounts to saying that all moral judgments are matters of opinion either individual or customary in origin Beauty too is a matter of taste We fancy its forms Montaigne thinks, according to our own appetite and liking As may be seen in the chapter on BEAUTY Montaigne assembles an abundance of evidence to show that standards of beauty vary with different peoples The tastes or preferences of one group are as unaccountable as they are frequently revolting to another

Even in the field of speculative thought about the nature of things, Montaigne regards the thing men hold to be true as nothing more than prevailing opinion—the cultural conventions of a time or place We have no other level of truth and reason he declares than the example and idea of the opinions and customs of the place wherein we live there is always the perfect religion there the most perfect government there the most exact and accomplished usage of all things

Of all human deceptions or impostures none is worse than that which flows from a man's unwillingness to qualify every remark with the admission that 'this is the way it seems to me' In Montaigne's view there is no greater folly in the world than the failure to recognize that we reduce truth and falsity to the measure of our capacity and the bounds of our sufficiency When new ideas or the strange beliefs of others at first seem incredible simply because they are not our own we shall find that it is rather custom than knowledge that takes away their strangeness. For his own part Montaigne makes his emblem the question What do I know? This he says sums up his Pyrrhonian philosophy

ACCORDING TO the modern social scientist who claims that custom is the ultimate standard of conduct and that it provides the only criterion of moral judgment no questions can be raised about the goodness or evil of particular customs The customs of one people cannot be judged by another at least not objectively or impartially for those who judge must do so on the basis of their own customs Since there is no arbiter above conflicting customs to say which is right, a particular custom has validity only for the group in which it prevails Within that social group the character or conduct of its individual members is measured by conformity to the prevailing customs

The *descriptive* science of sociology or comparative ethnology thus tends to replace the *normative* science of ethics—or moral philosophy The only scientifically answerable questions about human conduct take the *form* of How do men behave? or How *have* they acted individually or in groups? but not How *should* they ? The study of *morality* as in Sumner's *Folkways* becomes a study of the mores—how the customs which measure conduct develop and dominate or as in the writings of Freud it becomes a study of how the individual is psychologically formed or deformed by the mores of his tribe and culture according to the way in which the growing child reacts to the pressures which the community imposes through parental discipline

With these views many philosophers and theologians both ancient and modern take issue But their opposing doctrine seldom goes so far as to deny that morality has certain conventional aspects In arguing that there are no innate practical principles Locke for example like Montaigne cites instances of contradictory customs to show that there is scarce that principle of morality to be named or rule of virtue

to be thought on which is not somewhere or other slighted and condemned by the general fashion of whole societies of men governed by practical opinions and rules of living quite opposite to others

But Locke does not leave this observation of the diversity of customs unqualified He goes on to assert that though perhaps by the different temper education fashion maxims or interest of different sorts of men it fell out that what was thought praiseworthy in one place escaped not censure in another and so in different societies virtues and vices were changed yet as to the main they for the most part kept the same everywhere For since nothing can be more natural than to encourage with esteem and reputation that wherein every one finds his advantage and to blame and discountenance the contrary it is no wonder that esteem and discredit virtue and vice should in a great measure everywhere correspond with the unchangeable rule of right and wrong which the law of God hath established Even in the corruption of manners the true boundaries of the law of nature which ought to be the rule of virtue and vice were pretty well preferred

For Locke then as for many others there appear to be underlying the variety of customs moral principles of universal validity that draw their truth from the nature of man which represents a constant and common factor throughout the diversity of cultures Accordingly it would seem to follow that just as habits are modifications of instinct or developments of the individual s native capacities for action so customs are conventional elaborations of what is natural to man as a social animal On this theory the conventional cannot be understood except by reference to the natural i e the nature of man or society

THE VIEW THAT conventions have a natural basis is most readily exemplified by Aristotle s theory of natural and legal (or conventional) justice and by the teaching of Aquinas concerning natural and positive law For the Greeks the legal and the conventional are almost identical so that it is a kind of justice rather than a kind of law which Aristotle calls natural Roman philosophers like Cicero and Roman jurists like Gaius and Ulpian make what seems to be an equivalent distinction in terms of law rather than justice In his analysis Aquinas follows the Latin not the Greek vocabulary

The Roman system of jurisprudence Gibbon tells us distinguished between those laws which are positive institutions and those which reason prescribes the laws of nature and nations The former are man made—the result of custom and prejudice This holds true of both written and unwritten laws, although only the unwritten precepts are now usually called customary laws These customary laws are positive in the sense that they are humanly instituted or enacted—posited by the will of the legislator rather than merely discovered by the reason of the philosopher They are conventional in the sense that they represent some voluntary agreement on the part of the members of the community they govern whether that consist in obeying the edicts of the emperor or in giving consent to the enactments of the senate

So far as it is conventional the law of one community differs from another and within the history of a single community the positive law changes from time to time But such bodies of law however modified by accident or custom, the Roman jurists Gibbon says conceived as drawn from the rule of right The fact that reason prescribes this rule was their explanation of certain common elements which all bodies of positive law seem to contain

The principles underlying all codes of civil law whether discovered directly by reason or drawn inductively as Grotius later suggests from the comparative study of diverse legal systems comprise the precepts of what the Romans and later Aquinas call natural law Thus these writers seem to re affirm though in somewhat different language Aristotle s point that what is naturally just is the same for all men everywhere and always while the laws of Greece and Persia represent diverse conventional determinations of the universal principles of justice

The theory of natural right and natural law as expressed in the writings of Hobbes Locke and Kant as well as in the ancient and mediaeval tradition is of course more fully treated in the chapters on JUSTICE and LAW But one example of the distinction between natural and conventional justice may be instructive here

Aquinas conceives positive rules as determinations of rather than deductions from natural law He treats such precepts as Thou shalt not kill and Thou shalt not steal as conclusions that reason can draw deductively from the first principle of natural law which is sometimes stated in the form of the command *do good harm no one and render to each his own* Because these precepts are the prescriptions of reason rather than enactments of the state they can be interpreted as declaring that murder and larceny are always and everywhere unjust But what sort of killing and taking of what is not one's own shall be defined as murder and theft and how offenders shall be tried judged and punished—these are matters which natural justice or the precepts of natural law leave open for determination by the positive laws of each community according to its own constitution and its local customs.

The theory thus exemplified of the relation between conventional and natural justice or between positive and natural law applies to moral rules and ethical standards generally For the same reason that a positive law which violates natural justice cannot be called just even though it is harmonious with the customs of the community so no rule of conduct however much it represents prevailing custom can be approved as morally right if it violates the right as reason sees it The defenders of natural law which is also sometimes called the law of reason proclaim the existence of an absolute standard above the diversity and conflict of customs by which their soundness is measured

Conflict in ethical doctrines raise many issues concerning what it is right for men to do or good for them to seek but the moralists at least agree that morality is based on reason or nature For them the facts of human nature or the intuitions of reason will ultimately decide the point in issue However far apart Plato and Aristotle Aquinas and Hegel Kant and Mill may be in their conceptions or analyses of the right and the good they stand together at least negatively on the question of how their disputes can be resolved not by appealing to the mores of the tribe or by looking to the conventions of the community as a measure or by letting the customs of the majority decide

The deepest of all moral issues therefore exists between those who think that morality somehow derives from nature or reason and those who like the ancient sophists or Montaigne or Freud find its source in custom and convention According to the side a man takes on this issue he does or does not believe it possible to discover standards independent of custom thereby to judge whether customs are good bad or indifferent On one belief public manners are conventional determinations of moral principles or they are sometimes violations of them just as positive laws are either determinations or violations of natural law On the other belief the individual may be approved or condemned for conforming to or transgressing the manners or mores of his group but those manners or mores, whether they are liked or disliked by the individual are above any tenable, objective criticism.

The controversy in jurisprudence and moral its between the naturalists or rationalists who appeal to man s nature or reason, and the positivists who hold that human customs cannot be appealed from, parallels a controversy in the theory of knowledge or science The parallel issue considered at greater length in the chapters on HYPOTHESIS and PRINCIPLE, can be stated by the question whether the foundation of science —even of such sciences as logic and mathematics—consists of postulates or axioms.

Axioms, like the precepts of natural law are supposed to have a universality derived from the nature of human reason. They are self-evident truths, compelling assent Postulates on the contrary are like rules of positive law—voluntarily accepted assumptions which when agreed upon by the experts in a certain science become its conventional basis. In science as in law the positivists recognize *nothing* beyond the agreement of men to determine what shall be *taken for granted* as true or just.

THE DIFFERENCE between nature and convention also enters into the traditional discussion of two of the most characteristic activities of man speech and political association

No one disputes whether the faculty of speech is natural to man. It is as natural *for man* to speak as for dogs to bark or birds to sing But the question is whether any human language

having a certain vocabulary and syntax is natural or conventional The answer seems to be dictated at once by the facts of the matter

Human languages exist or have existed in great number and diversity and those which still endure have gradually developed and are undoubtedly subject to further change Hence according to the traditional understanding of the natural and the conventional these various tongues must represent conventional languages —originally invented by this human group or that perpetuated by custom altered by the conventions of usage In contrast the expressive sounds instinctively made by other animals show themselves to be natural by the fact that they are common to all members of a species and do not change as long as the species endures

Nevertheless as the chapter on LANGUAGE indicates the writers of the great books consider the hypothesis of a natural human language The Old Testament story of the Tower of Babel is sometimes interpreted as implying the existence of one language for all men before God confounded their speech and diversified their tongues The story of Adam s giving names to the various species of plants and animals in the Garden of Eden is also cited by those who think there can be natural as well as conventional signs In Plato s *Cratylus* the attempt is made to discover the natural names for things or at least to discern some natural basis for the words of a conventional language like Greek

These who reject the hypothesis of a single human language from which all others have developed by diversification or who regard a purely natural language as impossible in the very nature of the case sometimes acknowledge the possibility of certain common elements—principles of syntax if not words—present in all human languages The discovery of the common rules of speech was the object of the speculative grammarians in the Middle Ages and of those who like Arnauld and others later tried to formulate a universal grammar On their view all languages even if they are conventional as written or spoken may have the same natural basis in the fact that they are all used to express what men can naturally perceive or think

As in the case of language so in the case of society the question is whether the family and the state are wholly natural wholly conventional or partly one and partly the other—the institutions being erected by choice and custom upon a natural basis And as in the case of language here too the great books do not for the most part give either of the extreme answers They do not say that the state is entirely natural that it is the expression of human instinct as the bee hive and the ant mound are instinctive formations Nor do they say that the state is completely conventional that it comes into existence *only* as the result of voluntary association on the part of men contracting to live together in a political community

While Aristotle says that man is by nature a political animal and that the state is, therefore a creation of nature he also distinguishes between the ways in which men and other animals are gregarious Unlike the association of animals which he attributes to instinct the society of men rests on reason and speech Man is the only animal he writes endowed with the gift of speech intended to set forth the expedient and the inexpedient and therefore likewise the just and the unjust Because of these things cities differ from one another as bee hives or ant mounds do not

The diversity of states represents for Aristotle a deliberate inventiveness on the part of reason and an exercise of free choice—certainly in so far as states are politically constituted each with its own constitution Aristotle s remark that while a social impulse is implanted in all men by nature yet he who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors may look self-contradictory but its two parts can be read quite consistent with one another if the first is taken as signifying the natural basis of the state (in a social impulse) and the second as saying that a certain convention (a constitution) is required to shape that impulse before any state is actually established

As Aristotle is sometimes interpreted to hold the theory that the state is entirely natural so Hobbes Locke and Rousseau are often read as maintaining the opposite extreme—that it is entirely conventional The extreme interpretation is based on the sharpness with which each of them distinguishes between men living in a state of nature and in a state of civil society

ough they d ffer among themselves in their position of these two conditions of man they m to agree that for men to pass from a state nature whether hypothetical or historical in uch men li e in anarchy or at least in isola in it is necessary for them to enter into a ntract or compact ith one another Since is social contract is the ong nal or origi ting convention by which the common ealth or civil society is established it would em to follow that on their view the state is itirely a product of convention and in no ay natural

Yet Hobbes Locke and Rousseau each in is own way add a qualification in favor of the aturalness of the state just as Aristotle qualifies is remark that the state is a creation of na ure by praising the man ho first founded he state The exponents of the social contract heory of the state s origin find in the nature of nan or in his reason an instinct a need or a law h ch impels or bids him to seek assoc ation ith others for the sake of advantages which he annot enjoy apart from civil society This suf ices to affirm the existence of a natural basis or the convention or contract which establ shes he state

These apparently opposed theories of what is natural and what con entional about the state hus appear to approach each other though one starts from an emphasis on the state s natural ness the other from its conventional origin The hole problem is of course further treated in the chapters on FAMILY and STATE but one point which the foregoing d scuss on suggests receives special consid ration in still another chapter The point concerns the relation between the idea of a constitution and the idea of a social contract Both ar conce ed as the bas c or primary co vention which establ hes the t t The quest on whether the two ideas re nt rchangeable or only analogou s exam ned n the chapter on CONSTITUTIO

C STO I IS BOTH a cause and an effect of habit The hab t of the indi idual certainly reflect the cu tom of the commun ty n wh ch he l ves and n turn the l g c stoms of any soc al group get the r v tal ty from the habits of its members A cu tom which does not command general compliance is as dead as a language no longer spoken or a law no longer observed This general compliance consists in nothing more than a certain conformity among the habits of individuals.

The continuity between custom and statute as parts or phases of the positive law rests upon the relation of both to habit Custom accord ing to Aquinas, has the force of a law abolishes law and is the interpreter of law precisely be cause it operates through the habits of the peo ple. By repeated external actions such as produce a custom the inward movement of the will and the conceptions of the reason are most revealingly declared and according to Aquinas, all law proceeds from the reason and will of the lawgiver The law which a prince or a people enacts to become effective as social regulation must develop a particular habit of conduct in many ind viduals Then and only then does a new enactment obtain the full force of law To remain effective it must continue to have the support of the customs of the coun try

Without that support it may be a law on the books but not in practice for the authority of a la cannot long prevail against a contrary cus tom except through a degree of coercion so oppressive as to produce rebellion That is also why the customary or unwritten rule—usually the primitive form of positive law—is less flex ible less amenable to change or modification Custom is a conservative factor There is nothing more d fficult to take in hand writes Machiavell nothing more perilous to con duct or more uncertain in its success than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things The innovator has for enemies all tho e who have done well under the old con d tions and luke arm defenders in those who may do well under the new

Just as custom may either support the written law or render it ineffective so custom works in opposite directions as a social force It is both a facto of cohesion and of divis on among men— a cause of what is called social sol darity and a barrier separating peoples from one another When the Athenians refuse to ally themselves with the Persians they chide the Spartans ac cord n to Herodotus for fearing that they "might make terms with the barbarian For all the gold on earth they tell the Spartan

envoys they *could not* take part with the Medes To do so would betray our common brotherhood with the Greeks our common language the altars and sacrifices of which we all partake, and the common character which we bear'

The barbarians or the gentiles—to use the traditional names for aliens or foreigners—are excluded by a social not a geographic boundary line the line drawn between those who share a set of customs and all outsiders. When the stranger is assimilated the group does not adopt him he adopts the customs of the community The very word community implies a multitude having much in common More important than the land they occupy are the customs they share

The Federalists advocating the political u… of the thirteen American states, could urge … feasibility on the ground that a social union al… ready existed Providence has been pleased t… give this one connected country Jay wr… to one united people—a people descended fr… the same ancestors speaking the same la… professing the same religion attached to th… same principles of government very simila… their manners and customs

Those who today advocate world fede… union cannot similarly point to a world soc… already in existence They *can* only hope th… if the separate states were *to unite* political… the social cohesion of the world's people m… subsequently develop as a result of the foste… of universal customs by universal law

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

1 The distinction between nature and convention its application to the origin of the state and of language

2 The origin development and transmission of customs

3 The conflict of customs their variation from place to place

4 The change of customs their variation from time to time

5 Custom and convention in the moral order

- 5a The conventional determination of moral judgments the moral evaluation of conventions
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6 Custom in relation to law

- 6a Constitutions social contracts positive laws and manners as conventions
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7 Custom in social life

- 7a Custom as unifying a community
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- 7d The influence of custom on the liberty of the individual

8 Custom in relation to order and progress the factors of tradition and invention

9 The bearing of custom on thought

- 9a Custom as a source of opinion and belief its influence on judgments of beauty
- 9b The conventionality of truth postulation choice among hypotheses

REFERENCES

To find th passages c ed, use the numbers n hea y type, which are the volume and pa e numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER *Iliad*, BK II [6, 283] 12d, the numbe 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

P GE S CTIONS When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the pper and lower hal es of th page. For example, in 53 J MES *P chology* 116a 119b, the passa e begins in the upper half of page 1 6 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower hal es of the left hand sid of the page, the letters and d to the upper and lower hal es of the right hand side of the page. For example, in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b-164c, the passa e begins in the lower half of the left hand sid of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of pa e 164

AUTHOR DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as RT BK, CH S CT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers, in brackets, are given in cer tain cases e g *Iliad* BK II [265 83] 12d.

BI L REFERE CES The references are to book, chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numberin of chapters or erses, the K James ersion is cited first and the Dou indicated by a (D) follows e g OLD TEST MENT *Nehemiah* 45—(D) II *Esdras*, 46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader s attention to one or more especiall relevant parts of a whole reference passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit tentl rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concernin the st le of the ref rences, see the Explanation of Referenc St le for general guidance in the use of *The Gre t I* as consult the Preface.

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48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 228b 229b
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54 FREUD *Civilization and Its Discontents* [illegible] 800c / *New Introductory Lectures* 834b c

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6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 22d 23a 31a 3[illegible] 35b c 39a c 44b 45b 48a c BK II 56c 6[illegible] 80a c BK III 93d 94a 97d 98a 111b 11[illegible] BK IV 128c d 129c 130b 132a b 134a 13[illegible] 138c 142b 144b 154b 158d passim BK V 160b 161c BK VI 195d 196c BK VII 23[illegible] 253b d
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20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q [illegible] A 2 ANS 231c 232b
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7a Custom as unifying community

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52 Dostoevsky *Brothers Karamazov* epilogue 406a c
54 Freud *War and Death* 756a d

7*b* Custom as a barrier between communities

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6 Herodotus *History* bk i 2a 31d 32a bk iv 137a 138c 143b 144b bk viii 287c d
7 Plato *Laws* bk iv 678c 679a
13 Virgil *Aeneid* bk i [520-543] 117b 118a bk ix [590-620] 295a b
14 Plutarch *Lycurgus* 46b c / *Themistocles* 99b c / *Marcus Cato* 287d 288c / *Alexander* 562b 563c
15 Tacitus *Histories* bk v 295b 296a
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30 Bacon *New Atlantis* 205d 207b
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38 Montesquieu *Spirit of Laws* bk xv 110a b bk xix 139c 140a bk xx 146a b bk xxv 206c 207c 208a c bk xxv 209a b
38 Rousseau *Inequality* 355b-c
40 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 15d 16b 179d 180a esp 179d 180d 181a 207b 211c esp 208b-d 638d 639a
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43 Mill *Liberty* 300a 302c passim / *Representative Government* 424c-428a passim esp 42… d 437b c
48 Melville *Moby Dick* 60b 65a
51 Tolstoy *War and Peace* bk vii 309b-c bk ix 362d 363a bk xi 515c 521c passim
52 Dostoevsky *Brothers Karamazov* epilogue 406a c
54 Freud *War and Death* 755c 757a passim / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 788b-c

7*c* Custom as determining economic needs or standards

7 Plato *Republic* bk ii 318a d
14 Plutarch *Marcus Cato* 285c d / *Lycurgus* 361a d
15 Tacitus *Annals* bk iii 58b d
25 Montaigne *Essays* 131b 132a 489b-490c
35 Locke *Civil Government* ch v sect 46-… 35a d ch xvi sect 184 68b d
38 Montesquieu *Spirit of Laws* bk xviii 129… c bk xix 136c 137b bk xxi 153a-c
39 Smith *Wealth of Nations* bk i 10b-12… bk … 383c d
50 Marx *Capital* 17d 18a 28d 29b 44d-4… 66c 67a 81b c 112a-c

7*d* The influence of custom on the liberty of the individual

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25 Montaigne *Essays* 22a-c 42b-c 46b-4… 143c 144a 307b 424d 426b esp 426a b
27 Shakespeare *Coriolanus* act ii sc ii [1… 164] 365c 366a sc iii [119-131] 367b
38 Montesquieu *Spirit of Laws* bk xii 8… bk xix 138a c 142a 145b c
38 Rousseau *Inequality* 324a b
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43 Mill *Liberty* 269b 271d 293b 302 307 312a passim
46 Hegel *Philosophy of Right* part iii par … 112d 113a additions 123 136d 137a / *Philosophy of History* part ii 279c 281b part iii 310d 311b part iv 333b-c
51 Tolstoy *War and Peace* bk viii 303a 305…
54 Freud *Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis* 20c d / *General Introduction* 452c … 573c / *War and Death* 755d 757c 759d / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 776b 80…

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9b The conventionality of truth postulation, choice among hypotheses

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51 Tolstoy *War and Peace* epilogue i 645a-646c
53 James *Psychology* 884b-886a
54 Freud *Instincts* 412a b

CROSS REFERENCES

For Other discussions of the distinction between nature and convention and for the examination of related distinctions *see* Art 2c Habit 1 7 Nature 2a-2c
The consideration of the natural and the conventional in language and society *see* Family 1 Language 2-2b Nature 2b 5c Sign and Symbol 1a-1f State 3b-3d
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The relativity of truth to the customs of the time and place and for the theory that the foundations of science are conventional *see* Hypothesis 3 Knowledge 4b 5c Opinion 3c Principle 3c(2) 5 Relation 6b Truth 7-7b Universal and Particular 7a
Matters relevant to the influence of custom on taste or judgments of beauty *see* Beauty 5 Nature 5d Relation 6c Universal and Particular 7c
The significance of nature and custom in the sphere of economic activity *see* Nature 5b Wealth 1 10b

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups

I. Works by authors represented in this collection.
II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

I

F. BACON Of Custom and Education in *Essays*
MONTESQUIEU *Persian Letters*
HUME *Of Some Remarkable Customs*
SMITH. *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, PART V
STERNE. *A Sentimental Journey*
HEGEL. *The Phenomenology of Mind*, ( )
MELVILLE. *Typee*
—— *Omoo*
DOSTOEVSKY *A Raw Youth*
FREUD. *"Civilized" Sexual Morality and Modern Nervousness*
—— *Totem and Taboo*

II.

HORACE. *Satires*
JUVENAL. *Satires*
Koran f
Tolury Sa s
SPENSER. *The Faerie Queene*
GRACIAN Y MORALES. *The Art of Worldly Wisdom*
BROWNE. *Hydriotaphia*
PEPYS. *Diary*
LE SAGE. *The Adventures of Gil Blas*
DEFOE. *Moll Flanders*
RICHARDSON *Pamela*
CHESTERFIELD *Letters to His Son*
VOLTAIRE. "Customs Usages," in *A Philosophical Dictionary*
SMOLLETT *The Expedition of Humphry Clinker*
GOLDSMITH. *The Citizen of the World*
—— *She Stoops to Conquer*
BENTHAM. *A Comment on the Commentaries* SECT 3 20
SHERIDAN. *The School for Scandal*
LAMB On the *Custom of Hissing at the Theatres*
AUSTEN. *Pride and Prejudice*
MANZONI *The Betrothed*
T. CARLYLE. *Sartor Resartus* K
LERMONTOV *A Hero of Our Own Times*
SAVIGNY *Vom Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft*
—— *Jural Relations*
GOGOL. *Taras Bulba*
—— *Dead Souls*
DICKENS *Bleak House*
THACKERAY *The History of Henry Esmond Esq*
LOTZE. *Microcosmos* BK VI CH 3
FLAUBERT *Madame Bovary*
TROLLOPE. *Barchester Towers*
DAUDET *Letters from My Mill*
BAGEHOT *Physics and Politics*
TYLOR. *Primitive Culture*
H JAMES *Daisy Miller*
MEREDITH. *The Egoist*
L. STEPHEN *The Science of Ethics*
MAINE. *Ancient Law*
—— *Lectures on the Early History of Institutions*
—— *Dissertations on Early Law and Custom*
LANG. *Custom and Myth*
WUNDT *Ethics* PART I, CH 3
FRAZER. *The Golden Bough*
TARDE. *The Laws of Imitation*
KOVALEVSKY *Modern Customs and Ancient Laws of Russia*
DUGUIT *L'état le droit objectif et la loi positive*
MANN *Buddenbrooks*
WESTERMARCK. *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*
SUMNER *Folkways*
T VEBLEN *The Vested Interests and the State of the Industrial Arts* CH 2
T S ELIOT Tradition and the Individual Talent, in *The Sacred Wood*
DEWEY *Reconstruction in Philosophy* CH 5
—— *Human Nature and Conduct* PART I-II
S LEWIS *Babbitt*
UNDSET *Kristin Lavransdatter*
VINOGRADOFF *Custom and Right*
MALINOWSKI. *Crime and Custom in Savage Society*
—— *The Sexual Life of Savages*
DIAMOND *Primitive Law*

Chapter 15 DEFINITION

INTRODUCTION

DEFINITION has been variously defined in the tradition of the great books These diverse conceptions of what a definition is raise many issues

At one extreme writers like Hobbes look upon definition as nothing more than an attempt to say what a word means—how it has been or is being used At the other writers like Aquinas regard definition as that act of the mind by which it expresses the nature of a thing or formulates its essence

In one technical view associated with the name of Aristotle to define is to state the genus and differentia by which the species of a thing is constituted In another theory of definition advanced by Locke and others any combination of traits which distinguishes one class or kind of thing from another defines the character common to all members of that class In still another view to be found in Spinoza definition consists in giving the cause or genesis of a thing in saying how the thing originated or was produced

Sometimes definition through causes employs the final rather than the efficient or productive cause and characterizes the thing by the end it naturally serves And sometimes as with William James definitions simply express the purposes or interests which we have in mind when we classify things to suit ourselves

In the tradition of the liberal arts of grammar rhetoric and logic these various conceptions of definition are connected with controversies concerning the power and activity of the human mind the relation of language to thought the structure of science or more generally the nature of knowledge and the constitution of reality with particular reference to the existence of universals and individuals and their relation to one another

These connections appear in the thought of Aristotle and Spinoza Hobbes and Locke Aquinas and William James Their views of the way in which definitions should be constructed or their conceptions of the function of definitions determine and reflect lines of agreement and opposition on many other matters The use of definitions in the great works of mathematics and natural science—by Euclid Descartes Galileo Newton Lavoisier and Darwin—tends to exemplify now one now another theory of definition Modern discussions of the nature of science and mathematics especially discussions influenced by the development of mathematical logic—from Whewell Mill and Poincaré to Whitehead Russell and Dewey—focus critical attention on the nature and role of definitions

MANY OTHER chapters provide an illuminating context for topics discussed in this one especially the chapters on LANGUAGE and LOGIC IDEA PRINCIPLE and REASONING PHILOSOPHY and SCIENCE and TRUTH Though the issues concerning definition cannot be resolved apart from this larger context of controversy about the mind reality and knowledge we can nevertheless formulate these issues in isolation. But in doing so we ought to bear in mind that they can be more readily understood in proportion as they are seen in the light of other relevant considerations

There is first of all the question about the object of definition What is being defined when men make or defend definitions? This question broadens into the problem of nominal as opposed to real definitions That is a complex problem which raises a number of further questions Are all definitions arbitrary expressing the conventions of our speech or the particular purpose we have in mind when we classify things? Or do some if not all definitions ex

ress the real natures of the things defined? Do hey classify things according to natural kinds which have reality apart from our mind and its nterests?

These issues are in turn related to the issue oncerning the limits of definition and its ulti te principles—whether all things, or only ome are definable and whether the indefin ble terms without which definition is itself mpossible can be arbitrarily chosen or must ways be terms of a certain sort The sense in hich definitions may be true or false and the nse in which they cannot be either have a earing on all these issues and through them ll run the divergent conceptions of how defini ions can or should be constructed

WHEN IN THE course of argument one man dismisses the opinion of another by saying That just a matter of definition the usual im lication is that the rejected opinion has no ruth apart from the way in which the man ho proposed it uses words. He may even be ccused of begging the question, of framing finitions which implicitly contain the con lusion he subsequently draws from them.

The underlying supposition here seems to be xpressed by Pascal when in his essay *On Geometrical Demonstration* he asserts that there is great freedom of definition and definitions are never subject to contradiction for nothing is more permissible than to give whatever *name* we please to a thing we have clearly pointed out He calls true definitions those which are arbitrary permissible and geometrical. The only restriction he would place upon our freedom to make definitions is that we must be careful not to take advantage of our freedom to impose names by giving the same name to two different things And even this case he claims, is permissible if we avoid confusion by not extending the consequences of one to the other

If we are free to make whatever definitions we please it would seem to follow that defini tions cannot be matters of argument and dif ferences of opinion which result from differ ences in definition would seem to be irreconcilable by any appeal to reason or to fact

Such a conception of definition as verbal does not seem to prevent Hobbes from holding that definitions are first principles or foundations of science In Geometry (which is the only science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind) men begin he writes at settling the signification of their words which settling of significations, they call *Definitions* and place them in the beginning of their reckoning This shows, Hobbes thinks how necessary it is for any man that aspires to true knowledge to examine the definitions of former authors and either to correct them where they are negligently set down or to make them himself For the errors of definitions multiply themselves, according as the reckoning proceeds

For Hobbes, then definition is verbal yet definitions can also be true or false and on the truth of definitions depends the distinction between knowledge and opinion "In the right definition of names, he says, lies the first use of speech which is the acquisition of science Only when discourse begins with th definitions of words can it reach conclusions that have the character of knowledge If the first ground of such discourse be not definitions then the end or conclusion is opinion.

Hobbes accurately reports the nature of geometry when he says that in that science defini tions serve as principles in reasoning or proof. The words b definition mark one of the steps in many Eucl dean proofs. Descartes and Spinoza proceeding in the geometrical manner place definitions at the head of their works as ultimate principles to be used in validating their conclusions But unlike Hobbes, these writers do not seem to regard their definitions as merely verbal Euclid goes further as we shall presently see and offers what amounts to proofs of his definitions, or at least of their geometrical reality Aristotle and Aquinas certainly take the position not only that definitions are principles, but also that definitions themselves are capable of being demonstrated. But they complicate the matter by insisting that definitions are neither true nor false since as Aristotle says they do not involve "the assertion of something concerning something

At least two questions seem to be involved in this familiar dispute about the arguability of definitions and their role in argumentation To avoid confusion, they should be kept distinct One is the question of the truth and falsity of

definitions It should be separated from even though it is related to the other question about whether all definitions are nominal i e concerned only with assigning meanings to the words by which we name things To understand what is involved in this second question it may be helpful to consider the relation of words thoughts and things in the process of definition

A DICTIONARY IS supposed to contain definitions It does in part—insofar as the meaning of any word is expressed in a phrase containing other words which are not synonyms for the word in question The combined meanings of these other words determine the meaning of the word being defined

For example one definition of the word brother is a male relative the son of the same parents or parent Another is a male member of a religious order These two definitions give different meanings for the same word. The dictionary is here recording two ways in which as a matter of historical fact the word has been used It has been and can be used in still other ways No one of these definitions can be called right and the others wrong

Dictionary definitions seem to be verbal and arbitrary in a number of ways That the word brother should carry any of the meanings which the dictionary records is an accident of English usage It is arbitrary that that particular sound or mark should be the name for a male relative who is the son of the same parents It would be equally arbitrary to restrict the meaning of the word brother to any one of its definitions

Nothing about a word limits the number of distinct meanings with which it can be used As Locke says every man has so inviolable a liberty to make words stand for what ideas he pleases that no one hath the power to make others have the same ideas in their minds that he has when they use the same words that he does A word is thus a conventional sound or mark which can be given any meaning convention assigns to it When that meaning is expressed *in other words* we have a verbal definition and such definitions are certainly nominal in this sense—that they state the meaning of a name

But are they merely nominal? Are they entirely arbitrary? That this word should be used to name this thing is arbitrary but that when it is so used a certain definition also applies may not be arbitrary Among the several verbal definitions of a word the one which applies in any particular case will depend upon the character of the thing which the word is used to name

For example if John and James are sons of the same parents the name brother applies, but not with the same definition which is required for the application of the name to Mark and Matthew who unrelated by blood are members of the same monastic order What the word brother is used to mean may be arbitrary but when it is used now of John and James and now of Mark and Matthew it would be misapplied if it did not carry the appropriate definition Which definition is appropriate in each case does not seem to be arbitrary since that appropriateness depends not on our will but on the objective facts of the case—the actual relation of the persons called brothers

Precisely because the word is used to name a thing the definition of the word as so used does more than state the meaning of the word It states something about the character of the thing named Definitions remain merely verbal only so long as the words they define are not actually used to name or to signify things in some way Whenever a thing is named or signified the definition which gives the meaning of the word must also signify something about the nature of the thing

In the natural order of ideas writes Lavoisier the name of the class or genus is that which expresses a quality common to a great number of individuals the name of the species, on the contrary expresses a quality peculiar to certain individuals only These distinctions are not as some may imagine merely metaphysical, but are established by Nature

YET IT MAY BE said that the definition is still nominal for it depends entirely on the meanings of the words which express it For example one definition of brother involves the meanings of such words as male and relative son parent and same If we were to

ok these words up in a dictionary the def tions we *found* would *involve the meanings* still *other* words, and so on in an endlessly rcular fashion Furthermore we would find he account of certain words such as relati e id same somewhat unsatisfactory as defin ons because the meaning of the defining words ould immed ately invol e the meanin of the ord to be defined To say that "same means not other or not different seems the same saying same means same Yet we must now the meaning of same for otherwise we uld not understand the meaning of brother" the definition of wh ch the word same" ppears.

That some words seem to have indefinable eanings suggests that not all meanings are erely verbal or nominal and that the mean ng of every word cannot be found *in* the mean ngs of other words. In the Preface to his dic ionary Dr Johnson observes that *as nothing* an be proved but by *suppos ng* something in uiti ely known and e dent without proof, so oth ng can be defined but by the use of words oo plain to admit of def nition Th e circular ty of the d ctionary *is thus* avoided When we race meanings from one vord to anoth er we inally *come* to words whose meanings we seem o understand immediately or at least without reference to the meanings of other words

Just as the arbitrary character of verbal def nitions seems to be remo ed by the *considera tion* of the things which words *name or signify* so the purely nominal character of *definitions seem to* be removed by *recourse to meanings* which are understood without further verbal xplanation—meanings which *may* in fact be incapable of such explanation

NOT ALL WRITERS gree w th Dr Johnson. All of them would dm t that some words must be left undefined in order to define others, but which hall be used as *indefinable* and wh ch shall be d fined is, in the opin on of some a matter of choice It i not som thin which *can* be determined by the order intrinsic to *our* ideas or meanings. Th ssue between the math emat cal log cians who think that we are free to choose our primiti e or indefinable terms, and those who l ke Aqu nas, th nk that ce ta n t rms, such as *being same one* and *rela tion impose* themselves upon our minds as prin ciples, *leaving us no* choice parallels the issue between the view that the principles of a sci ence consist of postulates voluntarily assumed and the view that they are axiomatic or un avoidable

Far from regarding such basic indefinable terms as clearest and most indisputable *in mean ing* Spinoza thinks that these terms signify ideas in the highest degree confused For him the true definition of any one thing ex presses nothing but the nature of the thing de fined But to arrive at the true definition it is necessary to discover the cause of the thing For every *existing* thing he writes, there is some certa n cause by *reason* of which it exists This cause must either be contained in the nature itself and d finition of the existin thing or it must exist outside the thin In the latter case the definition of the thing always involves a statement of the *external cause* of its existence

Accordingly Spinoza rejects the trad tional type of Aristotelian definition as purely sub jective—a matter of individual memory and imaginat on Those who have *more* frequently looked with admiration upon the stature of *men* he writes, by the *name man* will under stand an animal of *erect stature* while those who have been in the habit of fixing their thoughts on something else will form another common image of men describing man for in stance as an animal capable of laughter a biped without feathers, a rational animal and so on each person forming universal *images* of things according to the temperament of his own body

However the issue between Spinoza and Aris *totle* is resolved both seem to agree that more *is* involved in the process of definit on than *the* statement of verbal equivalences We have a definition Aristotle says not where we have a word and formula identical in meaning (for in that case all formulae or sets of words would be definitions) The formula which is expressed in a phrase or combinat on of words *must* state the nature *or* essence of a *thing* not just the meaning of a word 'The *formula* in which the term itself is not present but its meaning i expressed this, according to Aristotle i the formula of the essence of each thing and he

adds there is an essence only of those things whose formula is a definition

Even supposing the truth of these statements which Hobbes or Locke certainly would question the problem of real as opposed to nominal definition requires further examination To explore the matter further let us take two of the most famous definitions to be found in the great books Both are definitions of man — featherless biped and rational animal As we have seen these definitions must remain purely nominal—only stating the meaning of the word man —until that word is used to name some kind of thing If however we apply the word man to existing entities which combine the characteristics of having two legs and lacking feathers then featherless biped defines not the word man but a class of real that is existing things In addition to being nominal the definition is now also real in the sense that the class or kind which it determines has existing members

That animals exist may similarly be a fact of observation But animal is only one of the two terms in the other nominal definition of man In order to make rational animal more than a nominal definition it is necessary to verify the existence of animals which possess a certain characteristic *rationality* not possessed by all animals If rationality in some degree belonged to all animals then the word man (nominally defined by rational animal) would be synonymous with animal But unlike feathers the presence or absence of which seems readily observable the possession or lack of rationality is difficult to ascertain

Here we face two possibilities One is that we can never be sure that some existing animals are and some are not rational Then the definition rational animal will never become real It will always remain merely nominal the statement of a possible meaning for man but one which we cannot employ when we apply the word to name any existing thing The other possibility is that we can infer the existence of a special class of animals (distinguished by the possession of reason) from such evident facts as the activities of reading and writing activities not performed by all animals Then members of the class defined having been found to exist rational animal becomes a real definition of the beings to which we also arbitrarily [illegible] the name man

THE PROCESS of verification by which a [illegible] inal is converted into a real definition [illegible] regarded as the demonstration of a defin[illegible] Strictly speaking it is not th definition which is thereby proved It is rather a proposition in which the subject of the definition is affirmed to exist or in which a subject already known [illegible] exist is said to have a certain definition For example it is not the definition rational a[illegible] mal which is proved but the propos[illegible] there exists an animal which differs from other animals in being rational or the proposition the real being which we call man is both an animal and rational and he alone is ration[illegible] If these propositions cannot be proved ration[illegible] al animal remains a purely nominal definition

That definitions are not as such either true [illegible] false is unaffected by the distinction between real and nominal definitions The point is s[illegible] ply that a definition which is always lin[illegible] cally expressed by a phrase never a sentence neither affirms nor denies anything and so can not be either true or false Featherless biped or son of the same parents makes no assertion about reality or existence

Yet there is a special sense in which defi[illegible] tions can be true or false which does hav[illegible] bearing on the distinction between real and nominal definitions Pascal suggests three alter natives with regard to the truth or falsity of definitions If we find it impossible he writes it passes for false if we demonstra[illegible] that it is true it passes for a truth and as lo[illegible] as it cannot be proved to be either possible or impossible it is considered a fancy

According to Aquinas there are two ways in which a definition can be false In one way when the intellect applies to one thin[illegible] the definition proper to another as that of a circle to a man In another way by composi[illegible] a def inition of parts which are mutually repugnan[illegible] A definition such as a four footed rational ani mal would be of this kind for such a state ment as some rational animals are four foo[illegible] is false in itself

But the truth or falsity of that statement can conceivably be argued and therefore it is not so clear an example of a false definition as [illegible]

which in Pascal's terms plainly represents an impossibility. Suppose someone offered "round square" as the nominal definition of "rectacycle." The phrase "round square" expresses a self-contradiction and in consequence the definition is false. Its falsity is tantamount to the *impossibility* of there being any such figure as a *rectacycle* which has the definition proposed. The truth of a definition—which is nothing more than its freedom from self-contradiction—is equivalent to the *possibility* as opposed to the impossibility of the thing defined. To call the definition "son of the same parents" or "featherless biped" *true* is to say that the words defined—"brother" or "man"—signify possible existences. In short, only those nominal definitions which are true can ever become real, and they *become real only* when the possibility they signify is actually known to be realized in existence.

THE METHOD OF Euclid's *Elements* illustrates the foregoing points. Euclid defines certain geometrical figures, such as triangle, parallelogram, square. These definitions may appear to be free from contradiction, but that does not tell us whether they are more than nominal. The defined figures are possible, but the question is whether they exist in the space determined by Euclid's postulates.

To show that they do exist, Euclid undertakes to construct them according to his postulates which permit him the use of a straight-edge and a compass for purposes of *construction*. When in Proposition 1 Euclid proves that he can construct an equilateral triangle, he establishes the geometrical reality of the figure defined in *Definition 20*. A geometrical construction is thus seen to be what is called an existence proof. It converts a nominal into a real definition. Figures which cannot be constructed must be postulated, as, for example, the straight line and the circle. Postulates 1 and 3 ask us to assume that a straight line can be drawn between any two points and that a circle can be described with any center and radius. These postulates give Definitions 4 and 15 their geometrical reality.

Though *the method* of construction is peculiar to geometry, the relation of definitions to proof or postulates of existence is the same for all sciences. Until a definition ceases to be nominal and becomes real, it cannot be used scientifically in the demonstration of other conclusions; to use a merely nominal definition in the proof begs the question.

If the existence of the thing defined is either directly observable or self-evident, no proof or postulation of existence is required. In theology, for example, there are those who think that the existence of God is immediately seen in the definition of God. Descartes and *Spinoza* seem to be of this opinion.

Descartes argues that "eternal existence" is necessarily included in the idea of God as a supremely perfect Being. This is so evident, he declares, that "existence can no more be separated from the essence of God *than can its* having its three angles equal to two right angles be separated from the essence of a *triangle*, or the idea of a mountain from the idea of a valley." Concerning substance or God, Spinoza holds that since it pertains to its nature to exist, its definition must involve necessary existence and consequently *from its definition alone its existence must be concluded*.

On the other hand there are those who think *that* the existence of God must be proved by inference from *effect to cause*. Supposing that a man *understands* the meaning of the word "God," Aquinas maintains that it "does not therefore follow that he understands that what the name signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally." Hence he declares it is necessary to prove the existence of God, "accepting as a middle term the meaning of the name" but using an effect in "place of the definition of the cause in proving the cause's existence."

The difference between these two positions *might* be summed up by saying that Descartes and Spinoza, like Anselm before them, think *the definition of God is intrinsically real*, whereas Aquinas thinks we must *begin* with a nominal definition of God which becomes real only with proof of God's existence. For some confirmed atheists, any definition of God is *not* only nominal but false—the definition of an impossible being *incapable* of existing.

THERE IS STILL another issue about nominal and real definition. The point involved is the one raised by Locke's discussion of nominal and real

adds there is an essence only of those things whose formula is a definition

Even supposing the truth of these statements which Hobbes or Locke certainly would question the problem of real as opposed to nominal definition requires further examination To explore the matter further let us take two of the most famous definitions to be found in the great books Both are definitions of man — featherless biped and rational animal As we have seen these definitions must remain *purely nominal—only stating the meaning of* the word man —until that word is used to name some kind of thing If however we apply the word man to *existing entities which* combine the characteristics of having two legs and lacking feathers then featherless biped *defines not the word man but a class of real* that is existing things In addition to being nominal the definition is now also real in the sense that the class or kind which it determines has existing members

That animals exist may similarly be a fact of observation But animal is only one of the two terms in the other nominal definition of man In order to make rational animal more than a nominal definition it is necessary to verify the existence of animals which possess a certain characteristic *rationality* not possessed by all animals If rationality in some degree *belonged to all animals* then the word man (nominally defined by rational animal) would be synonymous with animal But unlike feathers the presence or absence of which seems readily observable the possession or lack of rationality is difficult to ascertain

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THE PROCESS of verification by which a nominal is converted into a real definition can be regarded as the demonstration of a definition Strictly speaking it is not the definition which is thereby proved It is rather a proposition in which the subject of the definition is affirmed to exist or in which a subject already known to exist is said to have a certain definition For example it is not the definition rational animal which is proved but the proposition there exists an animal which differs from other *animals in being rational* or the proposition the real being which we call man is both an animal and rational and he alone is rational *If these propositions* cannot be proved rational animal remains a purely nominal definition

That definitions are not as such either true or false is unaffected by the distinction between real and nominal definitions The point is simply that a definition which is always linguistically expressed by a phrase never a sentence neither affirms nor denies anything and so cannot be either true or false Featherless biped or son of the same parents makes no assertion about reality or existence

Yet there is a special sense in which definitions can be true or false which does have a bearing on the distinction between real and nominal definitions Pascal suggests three alternatives with regard to the truth or falsity of *definitions* If we find it impossible he writes it passes for false if we demonstrate that it is true it passes for a truth and as long as it cannot be proved to be either possible or impossible it is considered a fancy

According to Aquinas there are two ways in which a definition can be false In one way when the intellect applies to one thing the definition proper to another as that of a circle to a man In another way by composing a definition of parts which are mutually repugnant A definition such as a four footed rational animal would be of this kind for such a statement as some rational animals are four footed is false in itself

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If the existence of the thing defined is either directly observable or self evident no proof or postulation of existence is required In theol ogy for example there are those who think that the existence of God is immediately seen in the definition of God Descartes and *Spinoza* seem to be of this opinion

Descartes argues that *eternal existence is* necessarily included in the idea of God as a supremely perfect Being This is so evident he declares that existence can no more be separated from the essence of God than can its having its three angles equal to two right an les be separated from the essence of a *triangle or* the idea of a mountain from the idea of a val ley Concerning substance or God *Spinoza* holds that since it pertains to its nature to exist its definition must *involve necessary* existence and consequently *from its definition* alone its exi tence must *be conclud d*

On the other hand there are those who think that the existence of God must be proved by inference from effect to cause Supposing that a man understands the meaning of the word God Aquinas *maintains that* it does not *therefore* follo v that he understands that what the name signifies exists actually but only that it exists mentally Hence he declares it is nec essary to prove the existence of God accept ing as a middle term the meaning of the name but us ng an effect in place of the definition of the cause *in proving* the cause s ex stence

The difference between these two posit ons might be summed up by saying that Des artes and Spinoza like Anselm before them think *the d finition* of God is intrinsically real where as Aquinas thinks v e must begin with a nom inal definition of God which becomes real *only* with proof of God s existence For some con firmed atheists any definit on of God is not only nominal but false—the definition of an impos ble being incapable of existing

THERE IS STILL another issue about nominal and real *definitions* The point involved is the one raised by Locke s discuss on of nominal and real

adds there is an essence only of those things whose formula is a definition

Even supposing the truth of these statements which Hobbes or Locke certainly would question the problem of real as opposed to nominal definition requires further examination To explore the matter further let us take two of the most famous definitions to be found in the great books Both are definitions of man — featherless biped and rational animal As we have seen these definitions must remain purely nominal—only stating the meaning of the word man —until that word is used to name some kind of thing If, however we apply the word man to existing entities which combine the characteristics of having two legs and lacking feathers then featherless biped defines not the word man but a class of real *that is existing things In addition to being* nominal the definition is now also real in the sense that the class or kind which it determines has existing members

That animals exist may similarly be a fact of observation But animal is only one of the two terms in the other nominal definition of man In order to make rational animal more than a nominal definition it is necessary to verify the existence of animals which possess a certain characteristic *rationality* not possessed by all animals If rationality in some degree belonged to all animals then the word man (nominally defined by rational animal) would be synonymous with animal But unlike feathers the presence or absence of which seems readily observable the possession or lack of rationality is difficult to ascertain

Here we face two possibilities One is that we can never be sure that some existing animals are and some are not rational Then the definition rational animal will never become real It will always remain merely nominal the statement of a possible meaning for man but one which we cannot employ when we apply the word to name any existing thing The other possibility is that we can infer the existence of a special class of animals (distinguished by the possession of reason) from such evident facts as the activities of reading and writing activities not performed by all animals Then members of the class defined having been found to exist rational animal becomes a real definition of the beings to which we also arbitrarily as[illegible] the name man

THE PROCESS of verification by which a nominal is converted into a real definition can be regarded as the demonstration of a defini[illegible] Strictly speaking it is not the definition which is thereby proved It is rather a proposition in which the subject of the definition is affir[illegible] to exist or in which a subject already known to exist is said to have a certain definition For example it is not the definition rational animal which is proved but the propos[illegible] there exists an animal which differs from other animals in being rational or the propositio[illegible] the real being which we call man is both an animal and rational and he alone is ratio[illegible] If these propositions cannot be proved ratio[illegible] *al animal remains a purely* nominal defin[illegible]

That definitions are not as such either t[illegible] or false is unaffected by the distinction between real and nominal definitions The point is sim[illegible] ply that a definition which is always lingu[illegible] cally expressed by a phrase never a senten[illegible] neither affirms nor denies anythin and so can not be either true or false Featherless biped or son of the same parents makes no assertio[illegible] about reality or existence

Yet there is a special sense in which defini[illegible] tions can be true or false which does have [illegible] bearing on the distinction between real an[illegible] nominal definitions Pascal suggests three al[illegible] natives with regard to the truth or falsity o[illegible] definitions If we *find it impossible* [illegible] writes it passes for false if we demonstr[illegible] that it is true it passes for a truth and as lo[illegible] as it cannot be proved to be either possible o[illegible] impossible it is considered a fancy

According to Aquinas there are two ways [illegible] which a definition can be false In one wa[illegible] when the intellect applies to one thin[illegible] th[illegible] definition proper to another as that of a cir[illegible] to a man In another way by composing a de[illegible] inition of parts which are mutually repug[illegible] an[illegible] A definition such as a four footed rational a[illegible] mal would be of this kind for such a stat[illegible] ment as some rational animals are four foo[illegible] is false in itself

But the *truth or falsity* of that statemen[illegible] c[illegible] conceivably be argued and therefore it is n[illegible] so clear an example of a false definition as o[illegible]

out feet, it makes a difference, according to Aristotle, what terms are then used to differentiate footed animals into their proper subclasses.

"It is necessary," he insists, "that the division be by the differentia *of the differentia*; e.g., endowed with feet is a differentia of animal; again the differentia of animal endowed with feet must be of it *qua* endowed with feet. Therefore we *must not* say, if we are to speak rightly, that of that which is endowed with feet one part has feathers and one is featherless (if we do this we do it through incapacity); we must divide it only into cloven-footed and not cloven; for these are differentiae in the foot; cloven-footedness is a form of footedness. And the process wants always to go on so till it reaches the species that contains no difference. And then there will be as many kinds of foot as there are differentiae, and the kinds of animals endowed with feet will be equal in number to the differentiae. If then this is so, clearly the *last differentia* will be the essence of the thing and its definition."

As Aristotle quarrels with Plato's method of division, so William James takes issue with Aristotle's theory that a real essence is defined when the right differentia is properly chosen within a certain genus of things. He tends to follow Locke's notion that definitions indicate no more than the nominal essences of things, but he gives this theory a special twist by adding the notion that all our definitions merely group things according to the interest or purpose, whether theoretical or practical, which motivates our classification of them. This has come to be known as the pragmatic theory of definition.

"My thinking," writes James, "is first and last and always for the sake of my doing." After pointing out that Locke "undermined the fallacy of supposing that we can define the real essences of things," he goes on to say that "none of his successors, as far as I know, have radically escaped it, or seen that *the only meaning of essence is teleological, and that classification and conception are purely teleological weapons of the mind*. The essence of a thing is that one of its properties which is so *important for my interests* that in comparison with it I may neglect the rest.... The properties which are important vary from man to man and from hour to hour."

In a footnote James adds: "A substance like oil has as many different essences as it has uses to different individuals." The classification of natural as well as artificial objects should therefore proceed according to the advice Mephistopheles gives to the student in Goethe's *Faust*: "You will have more success," he says, "if you will learn to reduce all and to classify each according to its use." But if this is so, then no one scheme of classification, more than any other, represents the real structure or order of nature. Nature indifferently submits to any and all divisions which we wish to make among existing things. Some classifications may be more significant than others, but only by reference to our interests, not because they represent reality more accurately or adequately. It does not matter, therefore, whether we define by genus and differentia, by other characteristics in combination, or by reference to origins or functions.

Darwin's scheme of classification provides evidence relevant to this whole issue. As indicated in the chapters on ANIMAL and EVOLUTION, Darwin thinks that his genealogical classification of plants and animals comes nearer to the natural system of living organisms than the classifications proposed by his predecessors. "The Natural System," he writes, "is a genealogical arrangement, with the acquired grades of difference, marked by the terms varieties, species, genera, families, etc.; and we have to discover the lines of descent by the most permanent characters whatever they may be and of however slight vital importance." Hence forth, following his method, systematists will have only to decide "whether any form be sufficiently constant and distinct from other forms, to be capable of definition; and if definable, whether the differences be sufficiently important to deserve a specific name."

But Darwin's statement re-opens rather than resolves the great traditional questions. Are the various groupings made in classification divisions which the classifier finds useful to impose on nature, or do they *represent* lines of real distinction in the very nature of things? If the latter is the case, either wholly or in part, are we able to do more than approximate real distinction by whatever method of definition we employ? Can we discover real species, essen

essences It is also raised by Aristotle s discrimination between essential and accidental unities i e the difference between the unity signified by the phrase featherless biped and by the phrase black man Both phrases look like definitions Each designates a possible class of individuals and sets up the conditions for membership in that class or exclusion from it

The distinction between them does not rest according to Aristotle on the criterion of existence Both of the objects defined may exist but whereas the first is truly a species the second is only in Aristotle s opinion an accidental variety within the species *man* *Man* being a species can have a real essence and so any definition of man—whether featherless biped or rational animal —can be a real definition constituted by genus and differentia But *negro* or *aryan* not being a species but only a race or variety has no essence as such The definitions — black man and white man —indicate this in that they are constituted by two terms which are related as substance and accident not as genus and differentia

Though Aristotle distinguishes these two types of formulae as essential and accidental definitions rather than as real and nominal definitions the one principle of distinction is closely related to the other for only essential definitions can have real essences for their objects Accidental definitions do little more than state the meanings of words or express what Locke calls the nominal essences of things He doubts that the definition of anything except a mathematical object can ever grasp the real essence of a thing For him all definitions are nominal which is equivalent to saying that we never define by means of the true genus and differentia but always by accidental and external signs or by stating the component parts of a complex whole

Speaking of a man or gold Locke explains or any other species of natural substance as supposed constituted by a precise and real essence which nature regularly imparts to every individual of that kind whereby it is made to be of that species we cannot be certain of the truth of any affirmation or negation made of it For man or gold taken in this sense and used for species of things constituted by real essences different from the complex idea in the mind of the speaker stand for we know not what and the extent of these species, with such boundaries are so unknown and undetermined that it is impossible with any certainty to affirm that all men are rational or that all gold is yellow

THIS ISSUE HAS MANY ramifications. In one direction it leads into Aristotle s quarrel with Plato over the method of definition by division or dichotomy In the *Sophist* and the *Statesman*, the search for definitions proceeds by the division of a class of things into two sub-classes, one of which is then further subdivided and so on until a class is reached which has the characteristics of the object to be defined The attempt to define a sophist for example starts with the notion that he is a man of art and proceeds by dividing and subdividing the various kinds of art At one point in the course of doing this, the Athenian Stranger summarizes the process to that point

You and I he says to Theaetetus have come to an understanding not only about the name of the angler s art but about the definition of the thing itself One half of all art was acquisitive—half of the acquisitive art was conquest or taking by force half of this was hunting and half of hunting was hunting animals, half of this was hunting water animals—of this again the under half was fishing half of fishing was striking a part of striking was fishing with a barb and one half of this again being the kind which strikes with a hook and draws the fish from below upwards is the art which we have been seeking and which from the nature of the operation is denoted angling or drawing up And now following this pattern he continues let us endeavor to find out what a Sophist is

The pattern as illustrated indicates that in the course of division one of the two classes is discarded while the other is subject to further subdivision Aristotle s criticism of this procedure turns partly on the fact that the division is always dichotomous or into *two* subclasses and partly on the fact that the terms which Plato uses in a succession of subdivisions do not seem to have any systematic relation to one another If the class of animals for example is divided into those with and those with

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: *Iliad*, BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES: *Psychology*, 116a-119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: *Symposium*, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., *Iliad*, BK II [265-283] 12d.

BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (*D*), follows; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: *Nehemiah*, 7:45—(*D*) *II Esdras*, 7:46.

SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas*, consult the Preface.

1 The theory of definition

7 PLATO: *Meno*, 174a-177d / *Theaetetus*, 544d-549d / *Sophist*, 551a-579d / *Statesman*, 580a-608d / *Laws*, BK X, 763c-d / *Seventh Letter*, 809c-810d

8 ARISTOTLE: *Posterior Analytics*, BK II, CH 3-10 122c-128d; CH 13 131b-133c / *Topics*, BK VI [illegible] 192a-211a,c / *Metaphysics*, BK VII, CH 4-6 537b-555a; CH 10-12 558a-566a,c; BK VIII, CH 2-3 566d-568d; CH 6 569d-570d

9 ARISTOTLE: *Parts of Animals*, BK I, CH 2-4 165d-168c

1[illegible] A[illegible]: *[illegible]*, [illegible] XIII, SECT [illegible] 25[illegible]a-b

18 AUGUSTINE: *Christian Doctrine*, BK II, CH 35 653b-c

23 H[illegible]: *Leviathan*, PART I, 56b-d

30 BACON: *Novum Organum*, BK II, 137 195d; esp APH [illegible] 149b-d, APH [illegible] 153b-19[illegible]c

31 DESCARTES: *Rules*, XII, 23c-24

31 SPINOZA: *Ethics*, [illegible] I, PROP 8, SCHOL 2 [illegible]6d-35[illegible]d; P[illegible] II, PR[illegible] 4[illegible] SCHOL 1 38[illegible]b-3[illegible]a

33 P[illegible]AL: *Geometrical Demonstration*, 430b-434b, 442a-443b

35 LOCKE: *Human Understanding*, BK III, CH [illegible]-[illegible] 254d-[illegible]3a passim

35 H[illegible]: *Human Understanding*, SECT VII, DIV 4[illegible]-4[illegible] 470d-47[illegible]

4[illegible] K[illegible]: *Pure Reason*, 44c-4[illegible]b; 215d-21[illegible]a

44 BOSWELL: *Johnson*, 82a-c

53 JAMES: *Psychology*, 31[illegible]a-b; 668a-6[illegible]3b

1a. The object of definition: definitions as arbitrary and nominal or real and concerned with essence

7 PLATO: *Cratylus*, 104d-105b; 113a-114a,c / *Gorgias*, [illegible]52d-253b / *Republic*, BK VI, 384a-38[illegible]d; BK IX, 426d-427b / *Timaeus*, [illegible]4[illegible]b-455b / *Theaetetus*, 514b-515c; 54[illegible]c-5[illegible]9c / *Sophist*, 5[illegible]1a-d / *Philebus*, 6[illegible]0d-613a / *Laws*, BK X, 763c-d / *Seventh Letter*, 809a-810b

8 ARISTOTLE: *Categories*, CH 5 [[illegible]19-[illegible]24] 6b-8a / *Posterior Analytics*, BK I, CH [illegible] 113b-115b; CH 33 [88b30-89a1] 121b-c; BK II, CH 3-10 123c-128d; CH 13 131b-133c / *Topics*, BK I, CH 4 [1[illegible]3] 144b-c; CH 5 [101b37-10[illegible]5] 144d; CH 8 [10[illegible]-[illegible]11] 146d; CH 8 [108b38-[illegible]9] 152d [[illegible]19-3[illegible]] 153a; BK VI, CH 1 [139a24-34] 192a; BK VI, CH 4; BK VII, CH 5 194c-211a,c passim / *Physics*, BK II, CH 1 [19[illegible]-[illegible]9] 269c-270a / *Generation and Corruption*, BK I, CH 2 [31[illegible]-[illegible]] 413b / *Meteorology*, BK IV, CH 12 493d-494d / *Metaphysics*, BK I, CH 5 [[illegible]-98[illegible]1] 504c-505a [98[illegible]-9[illegible]] 505b; CH 6 [98[illegible]-[illegible]1] 505c [98[illegible]30-33] 506a; BK II, CH [illegible] [99[illegible]16-[illegible]] 513a-b; BK III, CH [illegible] [99[illegible]b-[illegible]1] 515a-b; BK IV, CH 4 525a-52[illegible]b; BK [illegible]

tially distinct from one another, and can our definitions formulate the essence of each?

THE SEARCH FOR definitions basically belongs to the activity of the human mind in all its scientific or dialectical efforts to clarify discourse to achieve precision of thought to focus issues and to resolve them

Men have no other way of coming to terms with one another than by defining the words they use to express their concepts or meanings They make terms out of words by endowing words with exactness or precision of meaning Definition does this and makes possible the meeting of minds either in agreement or in dispute Definition also makes it possible for any mind to submit itself to the test of agreement with reality Definition helps man to a k t or experience the only sort of question to which answers can be found

The search for definitions has perhaps its most dramatic exemplification in the dialogues of Plato Socrates usually leads the conversation in quest of them though it is only in certain dialogues such as the *Sophist* and the *Statesman* that the making of definitions is practiced in detail Two other books in this set are largely concerned with ways of reaching and defending definitions—Aristotle s *Topics* (which should be considered together with the opening chapters of his *Parts of Animals*) and Bacon s *Novum Organum*

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

2 The arıou methods of defin t on or classi fication

2a The use of di sion or d chotomy n defi n tion

2b Defin t on by genus and diff re ti prope ties

(1 *The theory of definition* 1a *The object of definition definition is as arbitrary and nominal or real and concerned with essence*)

ch 1 [1025b28 1026a6] 547d 548a bk vii ch 1 [1028a31-37] 550d ch 4-6 552b 555a ch 10-17 558a 566a c bk viii ch 2-3 566d 568d ch 6 569d 570d bk x ch 1 [1052b1-15] 578d 579a bk xi ch 5 590a d bk xiii ch 4 [1078b18-3] 610b c / *Soul* bk i ch 1 631a 632d bk iii ch 6 [430b26 31] 663b c

9 Aristotle *Parts of Animals* bk i ch 1 [641a14-31] 163d 164a ch 2-4 165d 168c

19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 1 a 7 rep 1 7a c q 2 a 1 rep 2 10d 11d a 2 rep 2 11d 12c q 3 a 3 ans 16a d a 5 ans 17c 18b q 17 a 3 102d 103c q 29 a 1 rep 1 3-4 162a 163b a 2 rep 3 163b 164b q 44 a 1 rep 1 238b 239a a 3 rep 3 240b 241a q 58 a 5 303c 304c q 75 a 4 ans 381b 382a, q 85 a 6 458d 459c q 116 a 1 contrary 592d 593d

20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part ii ii q 4 a 1 ans 402a 403d part iii q 2 a 2 ans 711d 712d q 60 a 4 rep 1 849c 850b

23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part i 55b c 56b 59c d part iv 270a c

25 Montaigne *Essays* 518d 519a

28 Galileo *Two New Sciences* first day 142d 143a

30 Bacon *Novum Organum* bk ii aph 4 137d 138b

31 Descartes *Rules* xiii 26b c / *Objections and Replies* postulate iv 131a b

31 Spinoza *Ethics* part i prop 8 schol 2 356d 357d part ii prop 40 schol 1 387b 388a part iii prop 4 398d

33 Pascal *Vacuum* 372b 373b 376b 377a / *Geometrical Demonstration* 430b-431b

35 Locke *Human Understanding* bk ii ch xxxi sect 6-13 240d 243b ch xxxii sect 18 246c 247a sect 24 247c d bk iii ch iii sect 11 20 257a 260a esp sect 18 20 259b 260a ch v sect 14 267b c ch vi 268b 283a ch x sect 17-21 295d 297b ch xi sect 15 24 303b 305d bk iv ch iv sect 11-17 326b 328d passim ch vi sect 4 16 331d 336d passim ch xii sect 9 360d 361b

35 Berkeley *Human Knowledge* intro sect 18 410a c

42 Kant *Pure Reason* 179d 182b 215d 216c / *Science of Right* 404d 423d-424b

45 Lavoisier *Elements of Chemistry* part i 10a b

46 Hegel *Philosophy of History* intro 176c 184d 185a

49 Darwin *Origin of Species* 27b 9a esp 29a

51 Tolstoy *War and Peace* epilogue ii 694b d

53 James *Psychology* 106a 185a b 668a 671a 882b-883a

1b The purpose of definition the clarification of ideas

7 Plato *Phaedrus* 120a b / *Meno* 174a 175b / *Euthyphro* 193c / *Seventh Letter* 809c-810b

8 Aristotle *Posterior Analytics* bk ii ch 13 [98a1-2] 133c d / *Topics* bk i ch 18 [108b17 37] 152b d bk vi ch 1 [139b11 15] 192b c ch 4 [141a26-32] 194c bk viii, ch 3 [158a31-159a2] 214d 215c / *Metaphysics* bk iv ch 4 525a 528b bk xi ch 5 590a-d / *Soul* bk i ch 1 [402b15 403a2] 631d-632a

9 Aristotle *Parts of Animals* bk ii ch 2 [648b1-5] 172d / *Rhetoric* bk ii ch 23 [1398a15 27] 646c

12 Aurelius *Meditations* bk iii sect 11 262a b

19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 85 a 3 rep 3 455b-457a

23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part i 56b 58d 59a part iv 269b c

28 Galileo *Two New Sciences* first day 142d 143a

30 Bacon *Advancement of Learning* 60b c 61b c / *Novum Organum* bk i aph 59 112b c

31 Descartes *Rules* xii 23c 24a xiii 26b c

33 Pascal *Geometrical Demonstration* 430b-434b passim

34 Newton *Principles* definitions schol, 8b

35 Locke *Human Understanding* bk iii ch iv sect 6-14 260d 263a

35 Hume *Human Understanding* sect vii div 62 478b-c div 74 484a-c

42 Kant *Pure Reason* 113b c / *Practical Reason* 293c 294b

44 Boswell *Johnson* 377d

45 Lavoisier *Elements of Chemistry* pref 4b 5c part i 10a b 21a 22c

45 Faraday *Researches in Electricity* 361a b

46 Hegel *Philosophy of Right* intro par 2 9b 10a

49 Darwin *Origin of Species* 207d 208a

51 Tolstoy *War and Peace* epilogue ii 694b d

53 James *Psychology* 314a b 669a 671a 871a b

1c The limits of definition the definable and the indefinable

7 Plato *Republic* bk vi 384a 388a / *Theaetetus* 544c 547c / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810b

8 Aristotle *Metaphysics* bk i ch 9 [992b24-993a1] 511a b bk ii ch 2 [994b16-27] 513a b bk v ch 3 [1014b3 13] 534d bk vii, ch 4-5 552b 554a ch 10 11 558a 561a ch 13 [1039a15-23] 563a ch 15 563c 564c bk viii ch 3 [1043b23-33] 568b bk x ch 8-9 585b 586c

17 Plotinus *Fifth Ennead* tr v ch 6 231b-d

19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 1 a 7 rep 1 7a-c q 2 a 1 rep 2 10d 11d a 2 rep 2 11d 12c q 3 a 3 ans 16a d a 5 a 3 17c 18b q 29 a 1 rep 1 162a 163b a 2 rep 3 163b-164b q 44 a 3 rep 3 240b 241a q 85 a 1 rep 2 451c-453c

49 D wi Orgi of Species 27c 29a passim esp 29a

53 J mes Psychology 184a 186a 314 b 668a 671a

3 The gramm tical or verbal aspects of defini tion

7 PLATO Charm des 6b-d / Craty l s 85a 114a c / Theaetetus 544d 545b / Laws BK X 763c d Seventh Letter 809c-810b

8 A STOTLE Categories CI 1 5 b H 5 [3 3 b9] 7c d / P sterior Analyt cs BK II CH 13 [97b27 39] 133b-c CH 14 [98 13 23] 133d 134a / Topics BK I C I 5 [0 b37 102 1] 144d CH 15 149d 152a CH 18 [1 8 17 37] 157b-d BK IV CH 3 [23a27 29] 171d CH 6 [127b5-6] 177a BK VI CH I [139b12 8] 192b-C I 2 14 192 206d pass m esp CH 10-11 201b-203d BK 1 206b d 211 passim BK VIII CH 3 [158b8 159 2] 215b-c / Metaphysics BK IV CH 4 525a 528b CH 7 [1012a22 24] 532b BK V I 1 4-5 552b-554a CH 15 [040a9- 4] 564 BK X CH I [1052b1 15] 578d 579a BK XI CH 5 590 d / Soul K I H I [4 2b5-8] 631 d

20 AQUI A S mma Theologica P RT II I Q 3 A I 402a-403d

23 HO BES Levi than P RT 56b-57c PA T 1 269b- 270a-c

31 D SCARTE Rules XII 23c 24 XIII 26b-

35 LOCKE Human Understanding K II H XX I SECT 3 201b-203c pass m BK III CH II ECT 256c 257a CH I SE T 6-7 260d C I V CT 4 264b ECT 10-1 266b d CH VI I CT I 27 c 2 8b

43 FE E ALIS UMB R 37 119b-120b

44 BO WELL Johnso 82a-c

45 LA R Element of Chemistry P ET 4a 5d AR I 10a 21 22c 25c 29d

45 F R Resea ches I EL ricity 361a 362

53 JAM S Psychology 171b 172a

4 The search fo defin t ons and the methods of defend g them

7 PLATO Charmid 4 13d / Lach s 31 37c / Meno 174 190a esp 174 179b / Republic 295a 356a esp K I 346a 355a The aetet 512 550a / S phist 552b-579d / Sta sm 580a 608d

8 A STT Posterio An lytics BK I C 10 172b d 178d I 3 14 23 b 131 / T pic K I 143a 211 esp K I H 4-9 144b-147b / Me phys K 5 [987a19-2] 505b CH 6 [98a-b] 505c [987b30-33] 506a BK IX C 6 [1 45a25 b9] 573c 574 8 XI I H 4 [a-5 8-32] 610b-c / So l K 631a 641d esp 1 631 632d K I H I [4 2 1]-c 4 [4 5a 1] 642 645c

9 A tot A Part f A im l B C I 2 4 165d 168c

12 A s M d at BK I SECT II 262 b

17 PLOTI US First En ead TR III CH 4 11a-c / F fth E ead TR V CH 6 231b d / S xth En n ad TR III CH 6-10 284a 286d

19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I Q 10 A I 40d-41d Q 29 A I 162a 163b

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The logical aspects of definition *see* IDEA 4a.

Other discussions of the object of definition and the problem of essences or universals, *see* BEING 8c NATURE 4a UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 2a–2c

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The use of definitions as *principles* in reasoning or proof and for the problem of demonstrating definitions, *see* PRINCIPLE 2a(2) REASONING 5b( )

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Chapter 16 DEMOCRACY

INTRODUCTION

OF all the traditional names for forms of government, "democracy" has the liveliest currency today. Yet like all the others, it has a long history in the literature of political thought and a career of shifting meanings. How radically the various conceptions of democracy differ may be judged from the fact that in one of its meanings democracy flourished in the Greek city-states as early as the fifth century B.C., while in another democracy only began to exist in recent times or perhaps does not yet exist anywhere in the world.

In our minds democracy is inseparably connected with constitutional government. We tend to think of despotism or dictatorship as its only opposites or enemies. That is how the major political issue of our day is understood. But as recently as the 18th century, some of the American constitutionalists preferred a republican form of government to democracy, and at other times, both ancient and modern, oligarchy or aristocracy, rather than monarchy or despotism, is the major alternative. Democracy has even stood for the lawless rule of the mob—either itself a kind of tyranny or the immediate precursor of tyranny.

Throughout all these shifts in meaning and value the word "democracy" preserves certain constant political connotations. Democracy exists, according to Montesquieu, "when the body of the people is possessed of the supreme power." ... the word indicates, democracy is the rule of the people. While there may be and in fact often has been a difference of opinion with respect to the meaning of "the people," this notion has been traditionally associated with the doctrine of popular sovereignty which makes the political community as such the origin and basis of political authority. In the development of the democratic tradition pa... modern times, this has been accompanied by the elaboration of safeguards for the rights of man to assure that government actually functions for the people and not merely for one group of them.

Although they are essential parts of democracy, neither popular sovereignty nor the safeguarding of natural rights provides the specific characteristic of democracy, since both are compatible with any other just form of government. The specifically democratic element is apparent from the fact that throughout the many shifts of meaning which democracy has undergone the common thread is the notion of political power in the hands of the many rather than the few or the one. Thus at the very beginning of democratic government we find Pericles calling Athens a democracy because "its administration favours the many instead of the few." Close to our own day, Mill likewise holds that democracy is "the government of the whole people by the whole people, in which ... the majority ... will outvote and prevail."

According as the many exercise *legal* power as citizens or merely actual power as a mob, democracy is aligned with or against constitutional government. The quantitative meaning of "many" can vary from *more than the few* to *all* or something approximating all, and with this variance the same constitution may be at one time regarded as oligarchical or aristocratic and at another as democratic. The way in which the many who are citizens exercise their power—either directly or through representatives—occasions the 18th century distinction between a democracy and a republic, though this verbal ambiguity can be easily avoided by using the phrases "direct democracy" and "representative democracy," as was sometimes done by the writers of *The Federalist* and their American contemporaries.

These last two points—the extension of the

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World*, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:

I. Works by authors represented in this collection.

II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*.

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Alexander Hamilton and others involved in the American constitutional debates, as for example James Wilson occasionally call this system a representative democracy but in *The Federalist* a republic is sharply differentiated from a democracy The great points of difference however turn out to be only the delegation of the government (in a republic) to a small number of citizens elected by the rest and the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country to which a republic may extend The difference as already noted is best expressed in the words representative and direct democracy

In Mill s *Representative Government* we find democracy identified with the ideal state "The ideally best form of government he writes is that in which the sovereignty or supreme controlling power in the last resort is vested in the entire aggregate of the community every citizen not only having a voice in the exercise of that ultimate sovereignty but being at least occasionally called on to take an actual part in the government by the personal discharge of some public function local or general Though Mill recognizes the infirmities of democracy and though he readily concedes that it may not be the best government for all peoples under all circumstances his argument for its superiority to all other forms of government remains substantially unqualified

IN MILL S CONSTRUCTION of the democratic ideal as providing liberty and equality for all the essential distinction from previous conceptions lies in the meaning of the word *all* The republicans of the 18th century in their doctrines of popular sovereignty and natural rights understood citizenship in terms of equality of *status* and conceived liberty in terms of a man s having a voice in his own government The ancients seeing that men could be free and equal members of a political community only when they lived as citizens under the rule of law recognized that the democratic constitution alone bestowed such equality upon all men not born slaves But generally neither the ancients *nor* the 18th century republicans understood liberty and equality *for all men to require the abolition of* slavery the emancipation of women from political subjection or the eradication of all constitutional discriminations based on wealth race or previous condition of servitude

With Mill *all* means every human person without regard to the accidents of birth or fortune "There ought to be no pariahs in a full grown and civilized nation he writes no persons disqualified except through their own default Under the latter condition he would withhold the franchise from infants idiots or criminals (including the criminally indigent) but with these exceptions he would make suffrage universal He sums up his argument by claiming that it is a personal injustice to withhold from any one unless for the prevention of greater evils the ordinary privilege of having his voice reckoned in the disposal of affairs in which he has the same interest as *other people* and whoever has no vote and no prospect of obtaining it will either be a *permanent* malcontent or will feel as one whom the general affairs of society do not concern. But it should be added that for Mill the franchise is not merely a *privilege or even a right* it is he says strictly a matter of duty How the voter uses the ballot has no more to do with his personal wishes than the verdict of a juryman He is bound to give it according to his best and most conscientious opinion of the public good Whoever has any other idea of *it is unfit to* have the suffrage

The notion of universal suffrage raises at *once* the question of the economic conditions prerequisite to the perfection of political democracy Can men exercise the political freedom of citizenship without freedom from economic dependence on the will of other men? It was com*monly thought* by 18th century republicans that they could not A power over a man s subsistence Hamilton declares amounts to a power over his will On that basis it was urged by many during the Philadelphia convention that a property qualification was necessary *for* suffrage

Kant also argues that suffrage presupposes the independence or self sufficiency of the individual citizen Because apprentices servants minors women and the like do not maintain themselves, each according to his own industry but as it is arranged by others he claims that they are mere subsidiaries of the Commonwealth and not active independent members of

franchise and a system of representation—mark the chief differences between ancient and contemporary institutions of democracy Today constitutional democracy tends to be representative and the grant of citizenship under a democratic constitution tends toward universal suffrage That is why we no longer contrast democracy and republic That is why even the most democratic Greek constitutions may seem undemocratic—oligarchical or aristocratic—to us

To the extent that democracy ancient or modern is conceived as a lawful form of government it has elements in common with other forms of lawful government which for one reason or another may not be democratic The significance of these common elements—the principle of constitutionality and the status of citizenship—will be assumed here They are discussed in the chapters on CONSTITUTION and CITIZEN The general theory of the forms of government is treated in the chapter on GOVERNMENT and the two forms most closely related to democracy in the chapters on ARISTOCRACY and OLIGARCHY

THE EVALUATIONS of democracy are even more various than its meanings It has been denounced as an extreme perversion of government It has been grouped with other good or other bad forms of government and accorded the faint praise of being called either the most tolerable of bad governments or the least efficient among acceptable forms It has been held up as the political ideal the only perfectly just state—that paragon of justice which has always been whether recognized or not the goal of political progress

Sometimes the same writer will express divergent views Plato for example in the *Statesman* claims that democracy has a twofold meaning according as it involves ruling with law or without law Finding it in every respect weak and unable to do either any great good or any great evil he concludes that it is the worst of all lawful governments and the best of all lawless ones The rule of the many is least efficient for either good or evil But in the *Republic* he places democracy at only one remove from tyranny On the ground that the excessive increase of anything often causes a reaction in the opposite direction tyranny is said to arise naturally out of democracy and the most aggravated form of tyranny and slavery out of the most extreme form of liberty

Similarly Aristotle in the *Politics* calls democracy the most tolerable of the three perverted forms of government in contrast to oligarchy which he thinks is only a little better than tyranny the worst of governments. Yet he also notes that among existing governments, there are generally thought to be two principal forms—democracy and oligarchy and the rest are only variations of these His own treatment conforms with this observation. He devotes the central portion of his *Politics* to the analysis of oligarchy and democracy In his view they are equal and opposite in their injustice, and to him both seem capable of degenerating into despotism and tyranny

Among the political philosophers of modern times a certain uniformity of treatment seems to prevail in the context of otherwise divergent theories Writers like Hobbes Locke and Rousseau or *Machiavelli Montesquieu* and Kant differ in many and profound respects. But they classify the forms of government in much the same fashion As Hobbes expresses it when the representative is one man then is the commonwealth a monarchy when an assembly of all that will come together then it is a democracy or popular commonwealth when an assembly of a part only then it is called an aristocracy Though Hobbes favors monarchy and Montesquieu either aristocracy or democracy these writers do not make the choice among the three traditional forms a significant expression of their own political theories For them the more important choice is presented by other alternatives for Hobbes between absolute and limited government for Montesquieu and Locke between government by law and despotism for Rousseau and Kant between a republic and a monarchy

The authors of *The Federalist* definitely show their preference for popular government as opposed to monarchy aristocracy or oligarchy They usually refer to it as a republic by which they mean a government which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure *for a limited period or during good behavior*

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In Mill s *Representative Government* we find democracy identified with the ideal state "The ideally best form of government he writes is that in which the sovereignty or supreme controlling power in the last resort is vested in the entire aggregate of the community every citizen not only having a voice in the exercise of that ultimate sovereignty but being at least occasionally called on to take an actual part in the government by the personal discharge of some public function local or general Though Mill recognizes the infirmities of democracy and though he readily concedes that it may not be the best government for all peoples under all circumstances his argument for *its superiority* to all other forms of government remains substantially unqualified

IN MILL S CONSTRUCTION of the democratic ideal as providing liberty and equality for all the essential distinction from previous conceptions lies in the meaning of the word *all* The republicans of the 18th century in their doctrines of popular sovereignty and natural rights understood citizenship in terms of equality of status and conceived liberty in terms of a man s having a voice in his own government The ancients seeing that men could be free and equal members of a political community only when they lived as *citizens under the rule* of law recognized that the democratic constitution alone bestowed such equality upon all men not born slaves But generally neither the ancients nor the 18th century republican understood liberty and equality *for all men* to require the abolition of slavery the emancipation of women from political subjection or the eradication of all constitutional discriminations based on wealth race or previous condition of servitude

With Mill *all* means every human person without regard to the accidents of birth or fortune "There ought to be no pariahs in a full grown and civilized nation he writes no persons disqualified except through their own default Under the latter condition he would withhold the franchise from infants idiots or criminals (including the criminally indigent) but with these exceptions he would make suffrage universal He sums up his argument by claiming that it is a personal injustice to withhold from any one unless for the prevention of greater evils the ordinary privilege of having his voice reckoned in the disposal of *affairs in* which he has the same interest as other people and whoever has no vote and no prospect of obtaining it will *either be a permanent malcontent* or will feel as one whom the general affairs of society do not concern But it should be added that for Mill *the franchise is not merely a privilege or even a right it is* he says strictly a matter of duty How the voter uses the ballot has no more to do with his personal wishes than the verdict of a *juryman* He is bound to give *it according* to his best and most *conscientious* opinion of the public good Whoever has any other *idea of it is* unfit to have the suffrage

The notion of universal suffrage raises at once the question of the economic conditions prerequisite to the perfection of political democracy Can men exercise the political freedom of citizenship without freedom from *economic dependence* on the will of other men? It was commonly thought by 18th century republicans that they could *not* A power over a man s *subsistence* Hamilton declares, amounts to a power over his will On that basis it was urged by many during the Philadelphia convention that a property qualification was necessary for suffrage

Kant also argues that suffrage presupposes the independence or self-sufficiency of the individual citizen Because *apprentices* servants minors women and the like do not maintain themselves each according to his own industry but as *it is* arranged by others he claims that they are mere subsidiaries of the Commonwealth and not active independent members of

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THE ANCIENT ISSUE between the democratic and the oligarchical constitution turns primarily on a question of justice not on the relative competence of the many and the few to rule Either form of government may take on a more or less aristocratic cast according as men of eminent virtue or ability assume public office but in neither case does the constitution itself guarantee their choice except possibly on the oligarchical assumption that the possession of wealth signifies superior intelligence and virtue

The justice peculiar to the democratic constitution Aristotle thinks arises out of the notion that those who are equal in any respect are equal in all respects because men are equally free they claim to be absolutely equal It does not seem to him inconsistent with democratic justice that slaves women and resident aliens should be excluded from citizenship and public office

In the extreme form of Greek democracy the qualifications for public office are no different from the qualifications for citizenship Since they are equally eligible for almost every governmental post the citizens can be chosen by lot rather than elected by vote Rousseau agrees with Montesquieu s opinion of the Greek practice that election by lot is democratic in nature He thinks it would have few disadvantages in a real democracy but he adds I have already said that a real democracy is only an ideal

The justice peculiar to the oligarchical constitution is according to Aristotle based on the notion that those who are unequal in one respect are in all respects unequal being unequal that is in property they suppose themselves to be unequal absolutely The oligarchical constitution consequently does not grant citizenship or open public office to all the freeborn but in varying degrees sets a substantial property qualification for both

Though he admits that the opposite claims of the oligarch and the democrat have a kind of justice Aristotle also points out the injustice of each The democratic constitution he thinks does injustice to the rich by treating them as equal with the poor simply because both are freeborn while the oligarchical constitution does injustice to the poor by failing to treat all free men regardless of wealth as equals Tried by an absolute standard Aristotle goes on to say they are faulty and therefore both parties whenever their share in the government does not accord with the preconceived ideas stir up a revolution.

Plato Thucydides and Plutarch as well as Aristotle observe that this unstable situation permits demagogue or dynast to encourage lawless rule by the mob or by a coterie of the rich Either paves the way to tyranny

To stabilize the state and to remove injustice Aristotle proposes a mixed constitution which by a number of different methods, attempts to unite the freedom of the poor and the wealth of the rich In this way he hopes to satisfy the two requirements of good government One is the actual obedience of citizens to the laws the other is the goodness of the laws which they obey By participating in the making of laws all free men the poor included, would be more inclined to obey them But since the rich are also given a special function there is according to Aristotle the possibility of also getting good laws passed since birth and education are commonly the accompaniments of wealth

To Aristotle the mixed constitution is perfectly just and with an aristocratic aspect added to the blend it approaches the ideal polity Relative to certain circumstances it h[illegible] greater right than any other form of government except the true and ideal to the name of the government of the best

Yet the true and the ideal or what he sometimes calls the divine form of government seems to be monarchy for Aristotle or rule by the one superior man and in his own sketch of the best constitution at the end of the Politics—the best practicable if not the ideal—Aristotle clearly opposes admitting all the laboring classes to citizenship

AS INDICATED IN the chapter on CONSTITUTION Aristotle s mixed constitution should be distinguished from the mediaeval mixed regime which was a combination of constitutional with non constitutional or absolute government rather than a mixture of different constitutional principles The mixed regime—or royal and political government —seems to have come into being not as an attempt to

concil conflicting principles of justice but is the inevitable product of a decaying feudalism and a rising nationalism Yet Aquinas claims that a mixed regime was established by the law for the people of Israel for it was partly kingdom since there is one at the head of all partly aristocracy in so far as a number of persons are set in authority partly democracy i e government by the people in so far as the rulers can be chosen from the people and the people have the right to choose their rulers In such a system the monarchical principle is blended with aristocratic and democratic elements to whatever extent the nobles and the commons play a part in the government But neither group functions politically as citizens do under purely constitutional government

The question of constitutional justice can however be carried over from ancient to modern times Modern democracy answers it differently granting equality to all men on the basis of their being born *human* It recognizes in wealth or breeding no basis for special political preferment or privilege By *these standards* the mixed constitution and even the most extreme form of Greek democracy must be regarded as oligarchical in character by a writer like Mill

Yet Mill no less than Aristotle would agree with Montesquieu s theory that the rightness of any form of government must be considered with reference to the humor and disposition of the people in whose favor it is established The constitution and laws Montesquieu writes should be adapted in such a manner to the people for whom they are framed that it would be a great chance if those of one nation suit another

Mill makes the same point somewhat differently when he says the ideally best *form* of government does not mean one which is practicable or eligible *in* all *states* of *civilization*. But although he is willing to consider the form of government *in relation* to the historic conditions of a people not simply by absolute standard Mill differs sharply from Montesquieu and *Aristotle in* one very important respect For him as we have seen representative democracy *founded* on universal suffrage is absolutely speaking the only truly just government—the only one perfectly suited to the nature of man Peoples whose accidental circumstances temporarily justify less just or even unjust forms of government such as oligarchy or despotism must not be forever condemned to subjection or disfranchisement but should rather be raised by education experience and economic reforms to a condition in which the ideal polity becomes appropriate for them.

THE BASIC PROBLEMS of democratic government—seen from the point of view of those who either attack or defend it—remain constant despite the altered conception of democracy in various epochs

At all times there is the question of leadership and the need for obtaining the political services of the best men without infringing on the political prerogatives of all men. The difference between the *many* and the *few* between the equality of men as free or human and their *individual inequality in virtue or talent* must always be given political recognition if not by *superiority in status* then by allocation of the technically difficult problems of *statecraft to the expert* or *specially* competent with only certain broad general policies left to the determination of a majority vote Jefferson and Mill alike hope that *popular* government may abolish privileged classes without losing the benefits of leadership by peculiarly gifted individuals The realization of that hope Jefferson writes Adams depends on leaving to the citizens the free election and separation of the *aristoi* from the *pseudo aristoi* of the wheat from the chaff

At all times there is the danger of tyranny by the majority and under the threat of revolution *the rise* of a demagogue who uses mob rule to establish a dictatorship Hobbes phrases this peculiar susceptibility of democracy to the mischief of demagogues by saying of popular assemblies that they are as subject to evil counsel and to be seduced by orators as a monarch by flatterers with the result that democracy tends *to degenerate* into government by the most powerful orator

The democratic state has seldom been tempted to undertake the burdens of empire without suffering from a discordance between its domestic and its foreign policy Again and again

Thucydides describes the efforts of the Athenians to reconcile their imperialism abroad with democracy at home

In his oration at the end of the first year of the Peloponnesian war Pericles praises the democracy of Athens and at the same time celebrates the might of her empire It is only the Athenians he says who fearless of consequences confer their benefits not from calculations of expediency but in the confidence of liberality But four years later after the revolt of Mitylene Cleon speaks in a different vein Thucydides describes him as being at that time by far the most powerful with the commons He tells his fellow citizens of democratic Athens that he has often before now been convinced that a democracy is incapable of empire but never more so than by your present change of mind in the matter of Mitylene He urges them to return to their earlier decision to punish the Mitylenians for he says if they reverse that decision they will be giving way to the three failings most fatal to empire —pity sentiment and indulgence

Diodotus who in this debate recommends a policy of leniency does not do so in the confidence of liberality which Pericles had said was the attitude of a democratic state toward its dependencies The question is not of justice Diodotus declares but how to make the Mitylenians useful to Athens We must not he continues sit as strict judges of the offenders to our own prejudice but rather see how by moderate chastisements we may be enabled to benefit in the future by the revenue producing powers of our dependencies It is far more useful for the preservation of our empire he concludes voluntarily to put up with injustice than to put to death however justly those whom it is our interest to keep alive

Twelve years later Alcibiades no democrat himself urges the Athenians to undertake the Sicilian expedition by saying we cannot fix the exact point at which our empire shall stop we have reached a position in which we must not be content with retaining but must scheme to extend it for if we cease to rule others we are in danger of being ruled ourselves In the diplomatic skirmishes which precede the invasion of Sicily Hermocrates of Syracuse tries to unite the Sicilian cities so that they may escape disgraceful submission to an Athenian master The Athenian ambassador Euphemus finds himself compelled to speak at first of our empire and of the good right we have to it but he soon finds himself frankly confessing that for tyrants and imperial cities nothing is unreasonable if expedient

The denouement of the Peloponnesian war and especially of the Syracusan expedition is the collapse of democracy not through the loss of empire but as a result of the moral sacrifices involved in trying to maintain or increase it. Tacitus commenting on the decay of republican institutions with the extension of Rome's conquests underlines the same theme It is still the same theme when the problems of British imperialism appear in Mill s discussion of how a democracy should govern its colonies or dependencies

The incompatibility of empire with democracy is one side of the picture of the democratic state in external affairs The other side is the tension between democratic institutions and military power or policy —in the form of standing armies and warlike maneuvers The inefficiency traditionally attributed to democracy under peaceful conditions does not from all the evidences of history seem to render democracy weak or pusillanimous in the face of aggression

The deeper peril for democracy seems to lie in the effect of war upon its institutions and on the morality of its people As Hamilton writes in *The Federalist* "The violent destruction of life and property incident to war the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights To be more safe they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to For example in **4** HOMER *Iliad* BK II [265 283] **12d** the number **4** is the number of the volume in the set the number **12d** indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page For example in **53** JAMES *Psychology* **116a 119b** the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119 When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page For example in **7** PLATO *Symposium* **163b 164c** the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164

AUTHOR S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers, in brackets are given in certain cases *e g* *Iliad* BK II [265-283] **12d**

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (*D*) follows *e g* OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—(*D*) *II Esdras* 7 46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface

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5 EURIPIDES *Suppliants* [399 462] **261d 262b**
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III **107c 108c**
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II **395d 399a** esp **396c d**
7 PLATO *Republic* BK I **301c d** BK VIII **408b 413d** / *Statesman* **598b-604b** esp **603d 604b** / *Laws* BK III **667c 676b** esp **672d 676b** BK IV **679c 682c** BK VI **699d 00c** BK VIII **733d 734a**
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK III CH I **471b d 472c** CH 6 [1278^b7-14] **475d** CH 7-8 **476c 477c** BK IV CH -6 **488b-493a** CH 11-12 **495b-497b** CH 16 [1301 10 15] **502c** BK V CH I **502a 503b** BK VI CH 1-6 **520a 524c** / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 8 **608a c**
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus Numa* **62b c** / *Solon* **70d 71c**
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 95 A 4 ANS **229b 230c** Q 105 A I ANS **307d 309d**
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II **104b 106d 114b 115a 150c 151a 154b c** PART III **228b** PART IV **273a b**
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH II **25d 28c** CH IV SECT 21 **29d** CH VII SECT 87-89 **44a d** CH VIII **46c 53c** passim CH X SECT 132 **55a b** CH XI **55b 58b** passim CH XIII SECT 1 3 **59b d**
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II III 4a **13d** esp BK II **4a 6b** BK III **9b-10c** BK V **18d 25a 31b-33a c** BK VI **34d 35c** BK VII, **44d-45b 47c-48a** BK VIII **51a 52c** BK IX **59c** BK XI **68b d 69c**
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* **359a b** / *Social Contract* BK I **391a 393c** BK II **395a 398b** BK III **410b-411c 413c 420a-424d**
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* **81d**
42 KANT *Pure Reason* **114b d** / *Science of Right* **436c d 445a c 450a-452a** esp **450a d**
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 9 **47a-48d** NUMBER 10 **51c 53a** NUMBER 14 **60a 61b** NUMBER 39 **125b 126b** NUMBER 48 **157c** NUMBER 63 **193d 194a**
43 MILL *Liberty* **267d 268c** / *Representative Government* **327a-442d** passim esp **341d 350a, 355b 356a 366c 367a 370a-372b**
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 2 3 **90c 92a** par 279 **93d 94c** / *Philosophy of History* INTRO **172d 175c** PART II **271c 2 4** esp **271d 272d 273d 274a 275b-276d**
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* **84b 85a**
50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* **429d 429c**

The derogation of democracy: the anarchic tendency of freedom and equality

5 EURIPIDES *Suppliants* [399-425] 261d 262a
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 107 108c
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK 533a-c
7 PLATO *Republic* BK III 408b-414b / *Laws* BK III 674c-676b BK I 681b-682c BK III 733d 734a
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VIII CH 10 [1160b7-9] 413b / *Politics*, BK IV CH 2 [1289b3] 488b-c CH 4 [1291b30-1292a37] 491b-d CH 6 [1292b40-1293a9] 492c BK V CH 9 [1310a25 36] 512c CH 11 [1313b33 1314] 516c BK VI CH 4 [1319b32] 523a b / *Athenian Constitution*, CH 28 565c 566b
14 PLUTARCH *Dion* 800c
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 114b-115a 150c 151a PART I 273a b
35 LOCKE *Civil Government*, CH IV SECT 21 29d CH VI SECT 57 37 b
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK III 10a BK VIII 51 52 BK X 68b d-69c
38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK II 424b
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 10 51 -d
43 MILL *Liberty* 298b-299a / *Representative Government*, 354b-355b 387b-c 403d
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 125c-d 127b-c 211b-c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right*, PART III, par 301 100b-101a par 3 8 107c 103a / *Philosophy of History* INTRO, 175b-c PART 366c 367a
50 MARX-ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 431c

2a Lawless mob-rule: the tyranny of the majority

5 EURIPIDES *Suppliant* [409 427] 261d 262a
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 108a
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK VI 525a b 533a-c
7 PLATO *Republic* BK VIII 411d-412d / *Statesman*, 598b-604b esp 603d-604b / *Laws* BK III 675c-676b BK I 681b-682c
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK II, CH 12 [ ] 470c-d BK III CH [ ] 478d 479a CH [1281b39- 8 41] 479d-480b BK IV CH 4 [92 4 37] 491b-d CH 6 [1292b40-1293a9] 492c BK V CH 9 [1310a25 36] 512 CH 10 [1312a40-b8] 514d 515a BK VI CH 4 [1319b2 3] 523a b
14 PLUTARCH *Agis* 648b,d 649b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* 114d 115a PART IV 273b
26 SHAKESPEARE *2nd Henry VI* ACT IV SC VII 61a-63b
27 SHAKESPEARE *Coriolanus* ACT C [225] 351 353d ACT I SC 1 [140-161] 3 0d 371a
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 8 345a b
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws*, BK 10a BK VI, 35c 36a BK VI I, 51a-52
38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK III 419b
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 14b
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 73b-c 94d
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 9, 47a-c NUMBER 10 50b-d NUMBER 22 84c d NUMBER 51 164a 165a NUMBER 58 181b-c NUMBER 63 192c 193a
43 MILL *Liberty* 268d 271c 298b-299a 302b-c / *Representative Government* 366c 380b passim esp 376b-c 406c d
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 260b 422c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 303 101c 102 ADDITION 180 148b / *Philosophy of History* INTRO, 172d 173a PART III 300a b PART I 365a

2b The incompetence of the people and the need for leadership: the superiority of monarchy and aristocracy

5 EURIPIDES *Suppliants* [399-462] 261d 262b
5 ARISTOPHANES *Knights* 470a-487a c
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 20 c 108c
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK III 425a-d BK V 504c 505a BK VI 520b-c 533a-c
7 PLATO *Republic* BK I 346e 347a BK VI 375d 376c BK VIII 409a-d 411d-414b / *Statesman* 598b-604b / *Laws* BK III 674d 676b
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK II CH 9 [1270b-] 466d BK III CH 10-13 478d-483a CH 15 [1286a2 b8] 484c-d / *Athenian Constitution* CH 28 565c 566b
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK XI SECT 23 306a
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 34d / *Lycurgus Numa* 62b-64a,c / *Agis* 648b d-649b / *Dion* 792d 80a,c esp 800c
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 94b-c PART II 104d 106d 129b-130a 152b-c PART IV 273a-b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 147b-148a
26 SHAKESPEARE *Julius Caesar* ACT I SC I-II 568b,d 572c
27 SHAKESPEARE *Coriolanus* ACT I SC I [1 225] 351 353d ACT II SC I [1 106] 361 362a ACT SC [140-161] 3 0d 371 ACT SC VI [74 156] 383a 384a
31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART I 44d-45a
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 8 345a b
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH XIX SECT 223 6c-d
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 4d 5a BK III 10c-d BK V 25c-d BK VI 51a 52c BK XI 71 -c 72b BK XIX 142c 143a
38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK II 401 -d BK III, 411a 412a
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 68b,d-69a
42 KANT *Science of Right* 450a-d
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 55 172d 173a NUMBER 58 181b-c NUMBER 63 192 -d
43 MILL *Liberty* 298b-299a 319d 323a,c passim / *Representative Government* 353b-354b 363b-366a 375a 377a

(*4a Liberty and equality for all under law* *4a(1) Universal suffrage the abolition of privileged classes*)

43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION VI [87-93] 6b
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U S ARTICLE I SECT 9 [289-295] 14a ARTICLE VI [597-599] 16d AMENDMENTS XIV SECT 1-3 18c 19a XV 19b XVII 19b c XIX 19d XXIII 20d
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 39 125c 126b NUMBER 57 177a b NUMBER 84 252a
43 MILL *Representative Government* 344d 346c 350a 369b 370a 380c 389b 394a 396d 403d
50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 416c d 425b c 428d 429c

4a(2) The problem of economic justice the choice between capitalism and socialism

5 EURIPIDES *Suppliants* [399-462] 261d 262b
5 ARISTOPHANES *Ecclesiazusae* 615a 628d
7 PLATO *Republic* BK III 341c d BK V 363b 365d / *Laws* BK V 691b 697a
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK V CH 2 [1130^{b}30]-CH 4 [1132^{b}20] 378b 380b / *Politics* BK II CH 5 458a 460a CH 6 [1265 27-37] 460c d CH 7 461d 463c BK V CH 1 502a 503b BK VI CH 3 521c 522a CH 5 [13 0 17-^{b}11] 523d 524b
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 36a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 105 A ANS and REP 1-6 309d 316a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 156b 157a
27 SHAKESPEARE *Coriolanus* ACT I SC I [1 22(] 351a 353d
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH V 30b 36a
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK IV 16a 17b BK V 19d 21d BK VII 44d 45b BK XIII 96a 102a c
38 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 375b d 377b d / *Social Contract* BK I 393d 394d BK II 405a d
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 28a d 61c d 109d 110d BK IV 201b d 239c 240a 287c d
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U S AMENDMENTS V [645-648] 17b XIII 18c XVI 19b
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 10 50b 53a NUMBER 35 113a 114b NUMBER 60 184d 186b NUMBER 79 233c
43 MILL *Liberty* 309a c / *Representative Government* 345b 346a 369b 370a / *Utilitarianism* 467a b 472d 473c
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 304c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART IV 356d
50 MARX *Capital* 33b 37a 104b 105a 113c 115c 377c 378d
50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 419a 434d esp 428d 429c 432b c 433b 434c d
54 FREUD *Civilization and Its Discontents* 787d 788b

4b The democratic realization of popular sovereignty the safeguarding of natural rights

5 EURIPIDES *Suppliants* [334 35?] 261b c [399-462] 261d 262b
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 107c d BK VII, 245b
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II, 396b 397c
7 PLATO *Laws* BK IV 681d 682c
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK III CH 1 471b d 47?c CH ([1278^{b}7 14] 475d / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 8 [1365^{b}22-31] 608a
14 PLUTARCH *Tiberius Gracchus* 678b-d
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 101a 10-d PART III 228b c PART IV 273a c
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 37 SCHOL 2 435b-436a
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH IV SECT 21 29c CH VII SECT 87-CH VIII SECT 99 44a 47c CH IX SECT 127 CH X SECT 132 54a 55b CH XI 55b 58b CH XIII SECT 149 59b-d CH XIX 73d 81d passim esp SECT 212 74a b, SECT 243 81d
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 4a 6b
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 323d 356b 359a / *Political Economy* 369b c / *Social Contract* BK I 387b d 392a BK II 395a 396a BK III 420a-424d
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 14b 91a d
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 94d
42 KANT *Science of Right* 429a c 434a 435a-458a c esp 436c 437c d 450a b 451c d
43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE [1 25] b [41-47] 2a [109-121] 3a b
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U S PREAMBLE 11a c AMENDMENTS I-X 1 a d XIII XV 18c 19b XIX 19d
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 10 49c 53a NUMBER 14 60c d NUMBER 22 84d 85a NUMBER 39 125a 128b NUMBER 40 131b NUMBER 41 144d 145a 146c d NUMBER 46 150b c NUMBER 51 164a 165a NUMBER 78 231a 232c NUMBER 83 246a b NUMBER 84 251b-254b
43 MILL *Liberty* 267a 274a / *Representative Government* 344d 350a 382b c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 279 93d 94d par 308 102c 103a / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 175b c PART II 272a d

4c The infirmities of democracy in practice and the reforms or remedies for these defects

5 EURIPIDES *Suppliants* [399-462] 261d 262b
5 ARISTOPHANES *Acharnians* 455a-469a c / *Knights* 470a 487a c esp [1111 1150] 483d 484b / *Wasps* 507a 525d / *Peace* 526a 541d esp [601-692] 532d 534a / *Birds* 542a 563d / *Frogs* [686 705] 572a b / *Lysistrata* [486-5?] 589a 590d / *Ecclesiazusae* [169-185] 617a
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 108a-c BK V 180c d

5 Democracy and representative government

5a The distinction between direct democracy and representative, or republican, government: the territorial limits of democracy

5b The theory of representation

(5 *Democracy and representative government* 5b *The theory of representation*)

NUMBER 52-66 165a 203a passim esp NUMBER 57 176d 178b NUMBER 63 192b 194a NUMBER 76 227a NUMBER 78 231a 232c
43 MILL *Liberty* 268b c / *Representative Government* 327a-442d passim esp 329d 330b 338a b 350a 355b 356b 370a 372b 389c 392b 401a-406a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 301-303 100b 102a par 308-311 102c 104a ADDITIONS 182 148c d / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 175b c

5b(1) Majority rule and minority or proportional representation

9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK III CH 10 478d-479a CH 13 [1283^{a}1-^{b}34] 481b d CH 15 [1286^{a}2-^{b}22] 484c 485a BK IV CH 8 [1294^{a}12-15] 493d 494a BK V CH 9 [1310^{a}25-35] 512c BK VI CH 2 [1317^{b}2-16] 520d CH 3 [1318^{a}19-^{b}5] 521c 522a CH 4 [1318^{b}21-26] 522b
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 301-303 227b 878 345a b
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VIII SECT 95-99 46c 47c CH X SECT 132 55a b CH XI SECT 140 58a
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 4b 6d
38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK I 391b BK IV 425d-427a esp 426d 427a
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK IV 269d 271d
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 91b
43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION V [49-73] 5d 6a
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U S AMENDMENTS XIV SECT 2 18d
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 10 49c 53a NUMBER 22 82a 83a NUMBER 35 113a 114b NUMBER 37 120b c NUMBER 43 141d 142d NUMBER 51 164a 165a passim NUMBER 54 170a 172b NUMBER 58 181d 182a NUMBER 62 189b d
43 MILL *Liberty* 268d 271c 298b 302c 307b 312a / *Representative Government* 366a 380b 386a 387d 406d-407d 410b c
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 261c d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 311-313 103d 104b / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 172d 173a PART IV 365a

5b(2) Ultimate limitations on the franchise

7 PLATO *Laws* BK VI 697d 700b BK VIII 740d 741a
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK IV CH 6 492b 493a BK VI CH 3 521c 522a CH 4 [1319^{b}2-32] 523a b BK VII CH 9 533a d / *Athenian Constitution* CH 4 554b d CH 42 572b d
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus Numa* 62b d
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 4a 5c
38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK IV 427c-432b
42 KANT *Science of Right* 436d 437c
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U S ARTICLE I SECT 2 [5 10] 11b
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 52 165a-c NUMBER 54 170a 172b NUMBER 57 177a
43 MILL *Representative Government* 375a b 380 389b passim esp 382c 383c 395b-396d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 31[illegible] 103d 104a

5b(3) Methods of election and voting

7 PLATO *Laws* BK VI 697a 705c BK XII 786b-787b
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK IV CH 9 [1294^{b}6-13] 494c CH 14 [1298^{b}13 1299^{a}1] 499a-c CH 15 [1300^{a}9-^{b}4] 500d 501b
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 45d
15 TACITUS *Annals* BK I 6a b / *Histories* BK IV 267d 268c
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH XIII SECT 154-158 60d 62b CH XIX SECT 216 74d
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 5b 6a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 324c 325b / *Social Contract* BK IV 426c-428a
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U S ARTICLE I, SECT 2 [5-10] 11b SECT 2 [17]-SECT 3 [67] 11b 12a SECT 4 [96 102] SECT 5 [107 109] 12b ARTICLE II SECT I [321 374] 14b-d AMENDMENTS XII 18a c XVII 19b-c XXII 20d
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 52-61 165a 188d passim NUMBER 62 189a b NUMBER 68 205b-207a
43 MILL *Representative Government* 370a-406a 412a 414d
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 176a b 251a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 309-311 103b 104a / *Philosophy of History* PART II 277c d

5b(4) The role of political parties factions

5 ARISTOPHANES *Lysistrata* [511-580] 590c
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK III 434c-438b BK IV 458d-459c 463a-465c BK V 502d 504a BK VIII 564a 593a c esp 568d 569a 575c 576c 577b d 579c 583c, 584b 585a 585d 586b 587a 590c
7 PLATO *Laws* BK V 695a c BK IX 744c d
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK IX CH 6 420c 421a / *Politics* BK V CH 9 [1309^{b}14 1310^{a}1] 511d 512b / *Athenian Constitution* CH 5 554d 555a CH 8 par 5 556c
14 PLUTARCH *Solon* 68d 75c d / *Pericles* 126c d / *Pompey* 521d
15 TACITUS *Annals* BK VI 97b-c / *Histories* BK II 224d 225a
23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* CH IX 14c d
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 121c d 148d 149b 150b
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK III 9d BK XIX 142b 143a
38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK II 396b-d BK III 424b
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK IV 269d 271a BK V 420c-421a

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40 GIBBON *Decline and F ll* 632b-635c
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 10 49c 53a NUM 43 141d 142d NUM ER 50 161d 162 passim NUMBER 51 164 165a NUMBER 60, 185b-187
43 MILL *Liberty* 289c-d / *Representative Govern ment* 366a 3 0a 371 372a 376a 37 412b-413a
44 BOSWELL *J hnson* 261 -d 374b-c
46 H EL *Philosophy of History* PART II 2 5b-d 279b ART I I 285d P RT IV 336a-c 366d 367
50 M RX E GELS *Communist Manif sto* 423d 425b

c The distribution of function and powers. ch cks and balances in representati e democracy

7 PLATO *Laws* K VI 697 70 c
9 AR TOTLE *Politics* K H 4-16 498b-502a,c K VI, CH 8 525b-526d / *Athenian Constitution* CH 4-69 572b-584a passim
1 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 34d 3 d / *So on* 70d 71
23 H *Leviathan,* RT II 103d 104b 150b 1 1 1 2a
35 LOCK *Civil Government* CH VIII S CT 10 49b-d H XII XIII 58-62b
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43 F RALIST NUMB R 47-48 153c 159a esp UM 48 1 7 NUM R 5 162d 165a UM ER 52, 167 b MB R 57 176d 179b UM R 8 180d NUM E 60 184d-185b M ER 6 189d 191c UM R 63 192 193c UM 66 200c 201d NUMB 69 207 210c passim UM 73 219b-221 UM ER 6, 226a 227b NUM R 8 230a 233a UM E 8 237d 239c
43 MILL *Representative Government,* 355b-356b 36 b-366a 369b-370a 401d-402b 406a 409c 412b-c
46 H EL *Philoso hy f Right* AR II par 2 2 89d 90c DITION S 147d 148a / *P losophy f History* NTRO. 192d 193a

d The ed cational task of d mocracy: the training of all citizens

5 E RIPI *S pplicants* [399-46] 261d 262b
6 THUCYDI *P loponnesian W ar* K II, 395d 397a

7 PL TO *Laws* BK III 675c-6 6b
9 ARI TOTLE *Politics* BK IV CH 9 [1294b19- 4] 49-c BK V CH 9 [1310a1 35] 512b-c BK VII CH 14 537b-538d BK VIII CH 1 542a b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan,* P RT II 114d 115a 153a 155c
3 MILTON *Areopagitica* 381a-412b esp 384b-389a
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I 15c 18d
38 ROUS *Political Economy* 375d 377b
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* K 340c 343d
43 FEDERALIST UM ER 2 90c-d NUMBER 84 253d 254b
43 MILL *Liberty* 317d 323a,c / *Representative Government,* 330a b 339a 341c 349a-350a 3 1 c 381b-382b 386b-387d 401a-406a passim 418b-d 420b-d 424b-c
50 MARX *Capital,* 237d 240d esp 238b-c
50 M RX E GELS *Communist Manif sto* 427c 429b

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5 ARISTOPH S *Ecclesiazusae* [169-155] 617a
6 HE ODOTUS *History* K III 120b-c
6 THUCYDID *Peloponnesian W ar* BK III 434c-438b BK III 579d 580a
7 PL TO *Rep blic* BK I 408b-414b / *Laws* K II 674d-676b
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK II CH 12 [127 3b2 12 4b22] 470b-d / *Athenian Constitution* CH 1 4 553a-572a esp CH 41 571c 572a / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 4 [1360a17 29] 600c
14 PLUTARCH *Theseu* 9a-d / *Themistocles* 96b-c / *Pericles* 121 141a,c / *Alcibiades* 166a 174d / *Phocio* 604b,d-619d / *Tiberius G c chus,* 675b-d 678b-d / *Caius G acchus* 681b d-689a, esp 683b-c
15 TACITU *Annals* K 1 2a
23 MACHI VELLI *Prince* CH 8a-c
23 HO B *Leviathan,* PART 114b-115a 150c 151a ART IV 273a b
26 SHAKESPE RE *Julius Caesar* 568a 590a,c
27 SH KE EAR *Cori an* 351a 392a,c
38 MO T SQ I U *Spirit f Laws* K III 9b-10c
38 RO SEAU *Social Contract* BK III 418a 419b
41 G BO *Decline and F ll,* 71d 73d passim 21 a b 218c 219a 427b-428b 562b-565a esp 562c-d 5 4b-582b esp 574b-577d 587b-588b
43 FED RALI NUM ER 29a 31a passim NUM ER 6 38d-41 passim UM ER 9- 47a 53a UM R 2, 82d-83d NUM ER 43 141a 142d NU R 44 146c-d NUMB 5 164 165a NU R 58 179c 182a passim N M R 63 192 19-
43 MILL *Liberty* 267d 269c / *Representative Government* 3 6b-c
46 H EL *P oso hy f History* ART II 271c 274 27 b-276a

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7a Demagoguery and the danger of revolution

5 Euripides *Suppliants* [399–462] 261d–262b
5 Aristophanes *Knights* 470a–487a,c esp [1111–1150] 483d–484b / *Wasps* [655–724] 515c–516d / *Peace* [601–692] 532d–534a
6 Herodotus *History* bk iii 108a–c
6 Thucydides *Peloponnesian War* bk iii 434c–438b bk iv 463a–465c 466a–469b bk vi 519c–d 520a–d 533a–c bk viii 575c–582c esp 575c–576c 577b–d 579c–581c 582a–c
7 Plato *Republic* bk viii 411d–414b / *Laws* bk ix 744c–d
9 Aristotle *Politics* bk ii ch 12 [1273^b36–1274 14] 470c–d bk v ch 1 [1302 8–16] 503b ch 5 506b–507a ch 8 [1308 11–24] 510a–b ch 9 [1309^b14–1310 12] 511d–512b bk vi ch 4 [1319^b2]–ch 5 [1320^b17] 523a–524b / *Athenian Constitution* ch 14–15 558d–559c ch 28–29 565c–566d ch 34 568c–569a
14 Plutarch *Theseus* 13a–14c / *Solon* 75c–76d / *Camillus* 117c–121a,c / *Coriolanus* 180b–d / *Pompey* 521c–d / *Caesar* 577a–604d esp 577d–583a / *Phocion* 604b,d–619d / *Cato the Younger* 628b–d / *Caius Gracchus* 681b,d–689a,c esp 684c–685c / *Dion* 792d–802a,c
15 Tacitus *Annals* bk i 1a–2a / *Histories* bk ii 224d–225a
23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part ii 105c–106d 127d–129d 152a–d
30 Bacon *Advancement of Learning* 23a–26a
35 Locke *Civil Government* ch xix sect 224–228 76d–78a
38 Montesquieu *Spirit of Laws* bk viii 52b–c bk xix 142d–143a
38 Rousseau *Social Contract* bk iii 419b
42 Kant *Science of Right* 439c–441d
43 Federalist number 1 30b number 9 47a–b number 21 78d–79a number 48 157c number 58 181b–c
43 Mill *Representative Government* 329b–330c
46 Hegel *Philosophy of History* part iii 300a–301c

7b The dangers of imperialism: the treatment of dependencies

5 Aristophanes *Lysistrata* [572–586] 590c–d
6 Thucydides *Peloponnesian War* bk ii 403b–c bk iii 425a–429a
7 Plato *Laws* bk vi 698c–d
14 Plutarch *Romulus* 21a–27c esp 22c / *Pericles* 129a–141a,c passim
15 Tacitus *Histories* bk ii 224d–225a
23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part ii 107a–107c
35 Locke *Civil Government* ch xvi 65d–70c
36 Swift *Gulliver* part iv 182b–183a
38 Montesquieu *Spirit of Laws* bk x 64a–d
39 Smith *Wealth of Nations* bk iv 252d–253a 267c–271d
40 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 79b–d 630b,d–631b
42 Kant *Science of Right* 413d 454a–455a
43 Declaration of Independence 1a–3b
43 Mill *Representative Government* 428a,b–433b–442d

7c The challenge of war and peace: the citizen army

5 Euripides *Suppliants* [399–462] 261d–262b
5 Aristophanes *Acharnians* 455a–469a,c / *Knights* 470a–487a,c / *Peace* 526a–541d esp [601–692] 532d–534a / *Lysistrata* 583a–599a,c esp [486–586] 589a–590d
6 Herodotus *History* bk v 175b–177d 178a–180c,d bk vii 232d–233d
6 Thucydides *Peloponnesian War* bk ii 402b–404d bk iii 425a–d 434c–438b bk vi 513d–514d 515d–516a bk viii 564a–c
7 Plato *Laws* bk i 640b–642b bk iii 674d–675c bk viii 732b–735a
9 Aristotle *Politics* bk vi ch 7 [1321a5–26] 524d–525a bk vii ch 9 [1329a2–17] 533b–c ch 14 [1333^b1–1334 10] 538b–d / *Athenian Constitution* ch 8 par 5 556c ch 15 559b–c ch 27 par 1–2 565a–b
23 Machiavelli *Prince* ch x 8a–c ch xii–xiii 17d–21a ch xxvi 36b–37d
35 Locke *Civil Government* ch xix sect 225–230 76d–78c
36 Swift *Gulliver* part ii 80a–b
38 Montesquieu *Spirit of Laws* bk iii 10a–c bk ix 58b–d 60a
38 Rousseau *Inequality* 324c / *Political Economy* 380b–d
40 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 4b–5c
42 Kant *Science of Right* 452d–458a,c esp 454d–455a 457a–458a,c / *Judgement* 586a–587a
43 Federalist number 6 40a–41a number 8 44c–47a number 22 83a–b number 29 98c–101a passim number 46 152b–153a
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CROSS-REFERENCES

For: The general theory of government and the forms of government, *see* GOVERNMENT; and for the forms of government most closely related to democracy, *see* ARISTOCRACY; OLIGARCHY.

The theory of constitutional or representative government, in itself and in contrast to monarchy or absolute government, *see* CONSTITUTION; MONARCHY.

Other discussions of the mixed constitution and the mixed regime, *see* ARISTOCRACY 2b; CONSTITUTION 3a, 5b; GOVERNMENT 2b; MONARCHY 1b(1).

Other expositions of the theory of the conditions relative to which democracy is a suitable form of government, *see* MONARCHY 4e(2); SLAVERY 6c; TYRANNY 4b.

The general discussion of political liberty and equality in relation to the rights of citizenship, *see* JUSTICE 9e; LIBERTY 1f.

The problem of suffrage and the debate concerning the extension of the franchise, *see* CITIZEN 2c–3; LABOR 7d; OLIGARCHY 4, 5a; SLAVERY 5b.

The relation between economic and political democracy, and the problems of economic as well as political justice, *see* LABOR 7f; LIBERTY 2d; SLAVERY 5a–5b.

The theory of popular sovereignty and natural rights, *see* GOVERNMENT 1g(3); JUSTICE 6–6e; LAW 7b–7c; STATE 2c; TYRANNY 5c.

The consideration of majority rule and the tyranny of the majority, *see* OPINION 7–7b; TYRANNY 2c.

Other discussions of the theory of representation, *see* ARISTOCRACY 6; CONSTITUTION 9–9b.

Matters relevant to the educational problems of democracy, *see* ARISTOCRACY 5; EDUCATION 8d; STATE 7d.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World*, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:

I. Works by authors represented in this collection.
II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*.

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PLUTARCH. "Of the Three Sorts of Government—Monarchy, Democracy, and Oligarchy," in *Moralia*

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SANTAYANA *Reason in Society*, CH 5
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MERRIAM *The New Democracy and the New Despotism*
—— *What Is Democracy?*
AGARD *What Democracy Meant to the Greeks*
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MARITAIN *Scholasticism and Politics*, CH III, V
—— *Ransoming the Time*, CH 2
—— *Christianity and Democracy*
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PERRY *Puritanism and Democracy*
SIMON *Community of the Free*, CH 4

Chapter 17 DESIRE

INTRODUCTION

\ Darwin, Mill, James, and Freud at the modern end of the great tradition, the word "[desi]re" primarily signifies a cause of animal and [hu]man behavior. It is one of the basic terms in [ps]ychological analysis, covering that whole [ra]nge of phenomena which are also referred to [by] such terms as *wanting, needing, craving, wish[in]g, willing*, all of which are discussed in con[n]ection with theories of instinct and emotion, [li]*bido* and love, motivation and purpose.

If we turn to traditional beginnings, to the [wri]tings of Plato, Aristotle, Galen, and Plotinus, we find that the psychological considera[ti]on of desire is part of a much larger context. The ancients are of course concerned with the [r]ole of desire in causing animal or human be[h]avior and with the causes of such desire, but [t]hey are also interested in tendencies which seem [t]o be present in plants as well as animals. Plato, [f]or example, attributes to plants "feelings of [p]leasure and pain and the desires which accom[p]any them." The vegetative activities of nu[tri]tion, growth, and reproduction seem to [s]pring from basic appetites—or in modern [p]hraseology, "biological needs"—inherent in [a]ll living matter.

Because hunger and thirst so readily sym[b]olize the essence of desire (or certainly repre[s]ent its most general manifestation in living [thin]gs) the words "appetite" and "desire" are [f]requently used as synonyms in the earlier [p]hase of the tradition. As Hobbes observes, [w]hen he proposes to use "appetite" and "de[si]re" as synonyms, desire is "the general name," and appetite is "oftentimes restrained to signify the desire for food, namely hunger and thirst." So, too, Spinoza says that "there is no difference between appetite and desire," yet he adds, [u]nless in this particular, that desire is gener[al]ly related to men in so far as they are con[sc]ious of their appetites, and it may therefore be defined as appetite of which we are conscious.

Spinoza here seems to be reflecting the distinction made by earlier writers between natural appetite and conscious desire which we today would perhaps express in terms of "need" and "wish." The ancient conception of tendencies inherent in all things—inanimate as well as living—which seek a natural fulfillment broadens the meaning of appetite or desire. When Aristotle says that "each thing seeks its own perfection," and that "nature does nothing in vain," he is thinking of non-living as well as living bodies. Wherever in the physical world things seem to have a natural tendency to move in a certain direction or to change in a certain way, there appetite belonging to the very nature of the moving thing operates as a cause. Adopting this view, Dante declares that "neither Creator nor creature was ever without love, either natural or of the mind," and in his *Convivio* he shows how each thing has its "specific love." The love, or desire, of the elements is their "innate affinity to their proper place"; minerals desire "the place where their generation is ordained," with the result that "the magnet ever receives power from the direction of its generation."

According to this view it is possible to speak of the natural desire of raindrops to fall or of smoke to rise. Such a manner of speaking may at first seem metaphorical—an expression of primitive animism or anthropomorphism—but the ancients, observing different natural tendencies in heavy and light bodies, mean this literally.

The sense of such statements is no different from what is meant when it is said that the sunflower without consciousness, naturally tends to turn toward the sun, or that all men by nature desire to know.

From its narrowest meaning with reference to the behavior of animals and men desire gains a wider connotation when it is conceived as covering the appetites found in living organisms But in its broadest significance it refers *to the innate tendency inherent in matter itself* As we shall presently see appetite desire or tendency is seated in matter according to that conception of matter which identifies it with potentiality or potential being These considerations are more fully treated in the chapters on Being Change and Matter but their significance for the notion of desire can be briefly indicated here

Plotinus suggests the basic insight when he describes matter as in beggardom striving as it were by violence to acquire and always disappointed Matter is that in natural things which is the reason for their motion and change Considering natural change Aristotle names what he thinks are its three principles In addition to something divine good and desirable he writes we hold that there are two other *principles* the one *contrary to it* the *other such* as of its own nature to desire and yearn for it These are respectively form privation and matter The relation between matter and form is expressed by Aristotle in terms of desire The form cannot desire itself he says for it is not defective nor can the contrary desire it for contraries are mutually destructive The truth is that what desires the form is matter as the female desires the male

Conceived most generally as natural appetite or tendency desire becomes a physical or metaphysical term *Natural appetite* says Aquinas is that inclination which each thing has of its own nature The significance of desire in this sense extends far beyond psychological phenomena to all things in motion under the impetus or inclination of their own natures rather than moved violently by forces impressed on them from without

In ancient physics every natural tendency has an end or fulfillment in which the motion governed by that tendency comes to rest *Eros* and *telos*—desire and end—are complementary concepts each implying the other as principles of physics *i e* as factors operating together throughout nature in the order of change The *telos* of each thing is the perfection which satisfies the tendency of its nature That nature does nothing in vain means simply that no natural desire—need or appetite—exists without the possibility of fulfillment

Considering the design of the universe and the relation of creatures to God theologians like Augustine and Aquinas use the concept of desire in both its psychological and its metaphysical sense

Considered metaphysically desire can be present only in finite beings for to be finite is to be in want of some perfection Hence desire can in no way enter into the immutable infinite and perfect being of God In desire Aquinas points out a certain imperfection is implied namely the lack of the good which we have not Since God is perfect desire cannot be attributed to Him except metaphorically Love however implies perfection rather than imperfection since it flows from the act of the will to diffuse its own goodness among others For that reason although the infinite perfection of God precludes desire it does not preclude love

The theologian goes beyond the metaphysician or physicist when he carries the analysis of desire to the supernatural plane As God is the supernatural efficient cause of all created things so God is also the supernatural final cause—the end or ultimate good toward which all creatures tend The metaphysical maxim that each thing seeks its own perfection is then transformed All things Aquinas writes by desiring their own perfection desire God Himself inasmuch as the perfections of all things are so many similitudes of the divine being Of those things which desire God some know Him as He is Himself and this is proper to the rational creature others know some participation of His goodness and this belongs also to sensible knowledge others have a natural desire without knowledge as being directed to their end by a higher intelligence

The existence in the creature of a desire for God raises difficult questions concerning the manner in which this desire is fulfilled A supernatural end cannot be attained by purely natural means *i e* without God s help The vision of God in which the souls of the blessed come to rest is according to the theologian the ulti

ate gift of grace Hence in man s case at least becomes ne essary to a k whether he can ha e purely natural desire to see God if the goal such desire cannot be achieved by purely tural means

The question is not whether men to whom od has revealed the promise of ultimate glory n conscious ly desire the beatific vision. Clear that is possible thou h to sustain such desire e theological virtue of hope inseparable from ith and charity may be required Rather the uestion is whether the beatific vision which is an s supernatural end can be the object of atural desire On this the theologians appear o be less clearly decided

Aquinas holds that "neither man nor any reature can attain final happiness by his nat ral powers. Yet he also seems to maintain at man has a natural desire for the perfect appiness of eternal life. The object of the ill, i.e of man s appetite he writes is the ni ersal good just as the object of the intel ect is the uni ersal truth Man s natural de re to know the truth—not just some truths ut the whole truth the infinite truth—would eem to require the vision of God for its fulfill nent Aquinas argues similarly from the will s atural des re for the infinite good Naught an lull man s will he writes, save the uni ersal good to be found not in any creature ut in God alone Some writers find this con irmed in the fact that whatever good a man ets his heart upon he pursues to infinity No m te amount of plea ure or power or wealth eems to sat sfy him. He always wants more But there no end to wanting more of such hings The infinity of su h desires must result n fru tration Only God says the theologian only an nfinite bein can satisfy man s infinite ra ing for all the good there is.

Seei man s restlessness no matter where he urns to find rest Augustine declares Thou madest us for Thyself and our heart is restless, u til t repose in Thee Pascal reaches the same con lusion when he considers the ennui of men wh ch results from the desperation of their unendin search Their error he ays lies does not lie in seekin excitement if they seek it only as a d ersion the e il is that they se k it as if the possession of the objects of their quest would make them really happy "

With regard to the frantic pursuit of diversions, he claims that both the censurers and the cen sured do not understand man s true nature and the misery of man without God In such restlessness and vain seeking the theologian sees evidence of man s natural desire to be with God

Admitting the same facts the skeptics inter pret the infinity of man s desire as a craving to be God. If this is not every man s desire it is certainly Satan s in Paradise Lost Skeptic or believer every man understands the question which Goethe and Dante among the great poets make their central theme At what mo ment amid man s striving and restlessness will the soul gladly cry Ah linger on thou art so fair? Confident that there can be no such moment Faust makes that the basis of his wager with Mephistopheles.

The two poets appear to give opposite an swers to the question. Faust finds surcease in an earthly vision of progressive endea or Heaven ly rest comes to the soul of Dante at the very momen it relinquishes its quest winning peace through surrender

IN THE BROADEST OR theological sense of the word God alone does not desire In the nar rowest or psychological sense only animals and men do The contrast of meanings is useful Natural appetite or tendency throws l ght on the nature of conscious desire.

In order to determine the nature and seat of desire, Socrates in the Philebus considers such things as hunger thirst and the like as in the class of desires. He points out that when we say a man thirsts, we mean to say that he is empty It is not drink he desires, but re- plenishment by drink, which is a change of state. This insight Socrates generalizes by say ing that he who is empty desires the op pos te of what he experiences for he is empty and desires to be full. In the Symposium using the words love and desire as if they were interchangeable, Socrates declares that he who desires something is in want of something" and love is of something which a man wants and has not.

In the psychological sphere desire and love are often identified—at least verbally The one word is frequently substituted for the other Here the fact already noted that God loves but

does not desire suggests the root of the distinction between desire and love Desire always involves some lack or privation to be remedied by a change whereas love certainly requited love implies the kind of satisfaction which abhors change Love and desire are of course frequently mixed but this does not affect their essential difference as tendencies They are as different as giving and getting Love aims at the well being of the beloved while desire seeks to enjoy a pleasure or possess a good

Not all writers however contrast the generosity of love with the acquisitiveness of desire Locke for example finds self interest and self seeking in both The meaning of love he observes is known to anyone who reflects upon the thought he has of the delight which any present or absent thing is apt to produce in him

For when a man declares in autumn when he is eating them or in spring when there are none that he loves grapes it is no more but that the taste of grapes delights him The meaning of desire is in Locke s opinion closely related It consists in the uneasiness a man finds in himself upon the absence of anything whose present enjoyment carries the idea of delight with it We desire in short the things we love but do not possess

The distinction between love and desire the question whether they are distinct in animals as well as in men and their relation to one another when they are distinct are matters more fully discussed in the chapter on LOVE It is enough to observe here that when writers use the two words interchangeably they use both words to signify wanting and seeking

In the case of animals and men the thing wanted is an object of conscious desire only if it is something known In addition to being known as an object of science is known it must also be deemed good or pleasant—in other words worth having For Locke desire as we have seen is no more than an uneasiness of the mind for want of some absent good which is measured in terms of pleasure and pain What has an aptness to produce pleasure in us is that we call *good* and what is apt to produce pain in us we call *evil* That which we consciously desire that which we judge to be desirable would thus be som[illegible] regard as good for us while the [illegible] would be that which we seek to avoid as somehow injurious rather than beneficial to us

There is no question that desire and aversion are psychologically connected with estimations of good and evil or pleasure and pain This is the case no matter how we answer the moralist s question Do we desire something because it is good or do we call it good simply because we desire it? The ethical significance of the question and of the opposite answers to it, is discussed in the chapter on GOOD AND EVIL.

THE METAPHYSICAL conception of natural desire provides terms for the psychological analysis of conscious desire and its object Viewed as belonging to the very nature of a thing, appetite according to Aristotle consists in the tendency toward something we do not have and which we need Both factors are essential—the privation and the capacity or potentiality for having what is lacked Privation in the strict sense is always correlative to potentiality

The writers who use these terms would not speak of the sunflower being deprived of wisdom even as they would not call a stone blind Blindness is the deprivation of sight in things which have by nature a capacity to see So when it is said that man by nature desires to know or that certain animals instinctively gregarious naturally tend to associate with one another in herds or societies the potentiality of *knowledge* or *social life* is indicated and precisely because of these potentialities ignorance and solitariness are considered privations.

We observe here two different conditions of appetite or desire As the opposite of privation is possession—or of lacking having—so the opposite states of appetite are the drive toward the unpossessed and satisfaction in possession. We do not strive for that which we have unless it be to retain our possession of it against loss and we do not feel satisfied until we get that which we have been seeking

If a man being strong desired to be strong says Socrates in the *Symposium* or being swift desired to be swift or being healthy desired to be healthy he might be thought to desire something which he already has or is This would be a misconception which we must avoid To anyone who says I desire to have simply what I

ve Socrates thinks we should reply You y friend having \ ealth and health and -ength want to have the continuance of :em When you say I desire that which I :ve and nothing else is not your meaning at you want to have in the future what you ,w have? This is equivalent to sayin that a n des res something which is for him non -istent and which he has not got from which ocrates draws the conclus on that everyone ,desires that which he has not already which is ture and not present and of which he is -1 want

The object of desire—natural or conscious— ius seems to be an altered condition in the esirer the result of un on with the object de- red Man s natural desire to know impels him o learn Every act of learning which satisfies his natural desire consists in a changed cond ion of his mind a change which both Plato nd Aristotle describe as a motion from igno ance to knowle lge

When we consciously desire food it is not e edible thing as such we seek but rather the ting of it Only the eating of it will quiet our sire with that change in our condition we ll nourishment That the edible thing is ly inc dentally the object of our desire may e seen in the fact that no way in which we can ossess food *other than eating it* satisfies hunger

THE DISTINCTION between natural and con c ous desire is complicated by other closely re- ated d stinctions which psychologists have nade Freud for example distinguishes be- tween conscious and unconscious des re Dar win separates instinctive from learned desires and James observes how a conscious desi e may become habitual and operate almost automat ically w thout our awareness of e ther its object or its action.

Part of the complication is verbal and can be removed by referring to natural desires as *non*-conscious rather than *un* conscious The word conscious literally means *with knowledge* Creatures which lack the faculty of knowing cannot desire consciously It does not follow however that senti nt or consc ous beings cannot have natural appet tes Man s natural desire to know s a case in point That natural human tendency is n t excl ded by the fact that many men also consciously seek knowl edge knowing what knowledge is and consider ing it something worth having

The instinctive desires of animals are not generally thought to operate apart from the perception of the object toward which the an imal is emotionally impelled The instinctive desire works consciously both on the side of perception and on the side of the emotionally felt impulse If because it is innate rather than learned or acquired through experience we call the instinctive desire natural it is well to remember that we are not here using the word to signify lack of consciousness Yet both instinctive and acquired desires may operate unconsciously

What Freud means by a repressed desire illustrates this point The repressed desire whether instinctual in origin or the result of some acquired fixation of the libido on object or ego would be a conscious tendency *if it were not repressed* Freud compares the process of re- pression to the efforts of a man to get from one *room* to another past the guard of a door keeper The excitations in the unconscious to begin with, remain unconscious When they have pressed forward to the threshold and been *turn d back* by the door keeper they are incapable of becoming conscious we call them then repressed Being repressed when applied to any single impulse means being *unable* to pass out of the unconscious system because of the door keeper s refusal of admit tance into the preconscious

The repressed desire is made to operate un consciously by being repressed which does not prevent it from influencing our conduct or thought but only from intruding its driving force and its goal upon our attention In con trast the desire which *works habitually* and *therefore to some extent unconsciously* is not repressed but merely one which no longer de- mands our full attention

DESIRE AND EMOTION are often identified in our des ription of the behav or of animals and men Sometimes however desire along with aver s on is treated as just one of the emotions and sometimes ll the emotions are treated as mani fe tations of just one type of conscious appetite namely animal as opposed to rational des re

does not desire suggests the root of the distinction between desire and love Desire always involves some lack or privation to be remedied by a change whereas love certainly requited love implies the kind of satisfaction which abhors change Love and desire are of course frequently mixed but this does not affect their essential difference as tendencies They are as different as giving and getting Love aims at the well being of the beloved while desire seeks to enjoy a pleasure or possess a good

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ital terms of psychoanalysis—conflict re-ssion rationalization sublimation to name) some—carry the connotation of moral es, even though they imply a purely psy-logical resolution of them.

Contrary to a popular misconception, Freud ressly declares that it is out of the question it part of the analytic treatment should con of advice to live freely The conflict be-een libidinal desires and sexual repression explains is "not resolved by helping one e to win a victory over the other Although eud thinks that what the world calls its de of morals demands more sacrifices than it worth he also declares that "we must be-- of overestimating the importance of ab-n nce in effecting neurosis.

What Freud calls emotional infantilism re-mbles to some degree what a moralist like istotle calls self indulgence or incontinence. o gi e vent to all the promptings of des re thout regard to the demands of society or cality is to revert to infancy—a state charac erized according to Freud by the irrecon-ilability of its wishes with reality Because hildren live at the beck and call of appetit nd it is in them that the desire for what is leasant is strongest," Aristotle thinks it fitting hat we should speak of self indulgence when t occurs in an adult as a childish fault.

Aristotle and Freud seem to be looking at the same facts of human nature and seeing them in the same light. What Freud describes as the conflict between the "pleasure-principle and the reality principle Aristotle—and with him Spinoza—treats as a conflict between the passions and the reason and Kant conceives in terms of the opposition between desire and duty What Freud says of the reality principle —that it "demands and enforces the postponement of satisfaction the renunciation of manifold possibilities, and the temporary endurance of pain —parallels traditional statements concerning the role of reason or of duty in the moral life Where the moralists speak of the necessity for regulating or moderating emotional desires, Freud refers to the need of domesticating them, as one would train a beast to serve the ends of human life

The implication in Aristotle and Spinoza as well as in Freud does not seem to be that man s animal appetites are in themselves bad but that if they are undisciplined or uncontrolled they cause disorder in the individual life and in society Some moralists, however take an opposite view For them desire is intrinsically evil, a factor of discontent and fraught with pain.

"While what we crave is wanting" Lucretius writes it seems to transcend all the rest then when it has been gotten, we crave *something else*" yet as often as a man gains something new he discovers afresh that he is not better off *Either our desires are unsatisfied and then* we suffer the agony of frustration or they are satiated and so are we—desperate with ennui Hence freedom from all desires, not just their moderation seems to be recommended for peace of mind as centuries later Schopenhauer recommended the negation of the will to live in order to avoid frustration or boredom.

Marcus Aurelius and the Stoics, and later Kant similarly urge us not to yield to the persuasions of the body and never to be over-powered either by the motion of the senses or of the appetites. But whereas the Stoics *would restrain desire because it is animal* and in order to avoid pain Kant argues that the renunciation of desire should be undertaken not *merely* in accordance with duty but from duty which must be the true end of all moral cultivation.

The opposition between these two views of desire in the moral life represents one of the major issues in ethical theory further discussed in the chapters on DUTY and VIRTUE. The doctrine of natural appetite is crucially relevant to the issue. If the naturalist in ethics is right he is so by virtue of the truth that natural tendencies are everywhere the measure of good and evil. If, however there is no truth in the doctrine of natural desire then the impulses which *spring from* man s animal passions can claim no authority in the court of reason.

The appetitive or driving aspect of emotion is indicated by William James in his analysis of instinctive behavior. The functioning of an instinct may be viewed, according to James, as a train of psychological events of a general reflex type ... called forth by determinate sensory stimuli in contact with the animal's body or at a distance in his environment, arousing "emotional excitement which goes with them." The emotional part of the instinctive behavior is at once an impulse to perform certain acts and the feeling which accompanies the acts performed. The sheep, instinctively recognizing the wolf as dangerous, fears and flees. It runs away because it is afraid and feels fear in the act of flight. When, in his theory of the emotions, James goes so far as to say that the feeling of fear results from running away, he does not mean to deny that the emotion of fear involves the impulse to flee.

In its aspect as impulse—or tendency to act—an emotion is a desire, consciously aroused by some perception and accompanied by conscious feelings. This conception of emotion has been [illegible] expressed in the tradition of the great books. Aquinas, for example, calls all the emotions or passions "movements of the sensitive appetite." But he also uses the word "desire" and "aversion" along with "love" and "hate," "anger" and "fear" to name specific emotions.

Hobbes recognizes the appetitive tendency which is common to all the emotions when he finds at their root what he calls "endeavor"—"these small beginnings of motion, within the body of man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions. This endeavor," he goes on to say, "when it is toward something which causes it, is called appetite or desire." Spinoza makes the same point in somewhat different terms. "Desire," he writes, "is the essence itself or nature of a person in so far as this nature is conceived ... [illegible] ... determined towards any action ... the nature or constitution ... or that ... his desire ... and the nature of one desire ... differ from another ... as the affects from which each desire arises differ. There are as many kinds of desire, therefore, as there are kinds of joy, sorrow, love, etc., and consequently ... as there are kinds of ... objects by which we are affected."

Those psychologists who find in man two distinct faculties of knowledge—the sense and the reason or intellect—also find in him two distinct faculties of appetite or desire. The distinction is perhaps most sharply made by Aristotle and Aquinas, who claim that "there must be one appetite tending towards the universal good, which belongs to reason, and another with a tendency towards the particular good, which appetite belongs to sense." The traditional name for the intellectual appetite or the faculty of rational desire is "will." In Spinoza's vocabulary, the effort of desire, "when it is related to the mind alone, is called *will*; but when it is related at the same time both to the mind and the body, is called *appetite*."

Psychologists who attribute these diverse modes of desire, as they attribute sensation and thought, to a single faculty called "mind" or "understanding," nevertheless deal with the whole range of appetitive phenomena, including both the animal passions and acts of will. James, for example, treats the instinctive and associated with the emotions as "automatic and reflex" movements, and separates them from "voluntary movements which, being desired and intended beforehand, are done with full prevision of what they are to be." In so doing he draws a line between emotional impulses and acts of will, even though he does not distinguish two appetitive faculties.

With or without the distinction in faculties, almost all observers of human experience and conduct seem to agree upon a distinction in types of conscious desire, at least insofar as they recognize the ever-present conflict between the passions and the will. These matters are more fully considered in the chapters on EMOTION and WILL.

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Contrary to a popular misconception, Freud expressly declares that "it is out of the question that part of the analytic treatment should consist of advice to 'live freely.'" The conflict between libidinal desires and sexual repression, he explains, is "not resolved by helping one side to win a victory over the other." Although Freud thinks that "what the world calls its code of morals demands more sacrifices than it is worth," he also declares that "we must beware of overestimating the importance of abstinence in effecting neurosis."

What Freud calls emotional infantilism resembles to some degree what a moralist like Aristotle calls self-indulgence or incontinence. *To give vent to all the promptings of desire* without regard to the demands of society or reality is to revert to infancy—a state characterized, according to Freud, by "the irreconcilability of its wishes with reality." Because children "live at the beck and call of appetite, and it is in them that the desire for what is pleasant is strongest," Aristotle thinks it fitting that we should speak of self-indulgence when it occurs in an adult as a "childish fault."

Aristotle and Freud seem to be looking at the same facts of human nature and seeing them in the same light. What Freud describes as the conflict between the "pleasure-principle" and the "reality-principle," Aristotle—and with him *Spinoza—treats* as a conflict between the passions and the reason; and Kant conceives in terms of the opposition between desire and duty. What Freud says of the "reality-principle"—that it "demands and enforces the postponement of satisfaction, the renunciation of manifold possibilities, and the temporary endurance of pain"—parallels traditional statements concerning the role of reason or of duty in the moral life. Where the moralists speak of the necessity for regulating or moderating emotional desires, Freud refers to the need of domesticating them as one would train a beast to serve the ends of human life.

The implication in Aristotle and Spinoza as well as in Freud does not seem to be that man's animal appetites are in themselves bad, but that if they are undisciplined or uncontrolled they cause disorder in the individual life and in society. Some moralists, however, take an opposite view. For them desire is intrinsically evil, a factor of discontent, and fraught with pain.

"While what we crave is wanting," Lucretius writes, "it seems to transcend all the rest; then, when it has been gotten, we crave something else"; yet as often as a man gains something new, he discovers afresh that "he is not better off." Either our desires are unsatisfied and then we suffer the agony of frustration, or they are satiated and so are we—desperate with ennui. Hence freedom from all desires, not just their moderation, seems to be recommended for peace of mind, as centuries later Schopenhauer recommended the negation of the will to live in order to avoid frustration or boredom.

Marcus Aurelius and the Stoics, and later Kant, similarly urge us "not to yield to the *persuasions of the body*," and "never to be overpowered either by the motion of the senses or of the appetites." But whereas the Stoics would restrain desire because it is animal, and in order to avoid pain, Kant argues that the *renunciation* of desire should be undertaken "not merely in accordance with duty ... but from duty, which must be the true end of all moral cultivation."

The opposition between these two views of desire in the moral life represents one of the major issues in ethical theory, further discussed in the chapters on DUTY and VIRTUE. The doctrine of natural appetite is crucially relevant to the issue. If the naturalist in ethics is right, he is so by virtue of the truth that natural tendencies are everywhere the measure of good and evil. If, however, there is no truth in the doctrine of natural desire, then the impulses which spring from man's animal passions can claim no authority in the court of reason.

The appetitive or driving aspect of emotions is indicated by William James in his analysis of instinctive behavior The functioning of an instinct may be viewed according to James as a train of psychological events of general reflex type called forth by determinate sensory stimuli in contact with the animal s body or at a distance in his environment arousing emotional excitements which go with them The emotional part of the instinctive behavior is at once an impulse to perform certain acts and the feeling which accompanies the acts performed The sheep instinctively recognizing the wolf as dangerous fears and flees It runs away because it is afraid and feels fear in the act of flight When in his theory of the emotions James goes so far as to say that the feeling of fear results from running away he does not mean to deny that the emotion of fear involves the impulse to flee

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REFERENCES

To find the passa es cited use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOM R *Iliad* BK II [6 5 53] 12d, the number 4 is th number of th olume in the set th number 12d indicates that the pa sage is in section d of pa 12

P GE SECTIO When the te t i printed in one colum the letters a and b refer to the u per and lower ha es of the page F r example in 53 JAM S *Psychol gy* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of pa 116 and end in the lower half of pa e 119 When th text is printed in tw columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and l wer hal es of the left hand sid of th pa e the l tters c nd d to the upper and low r hal es of the ri ht hand ide of the pa e. Fo example, in 7 PL TO *Sympo ium* 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of th left hand side f pa e 163 and ends in the upper half of the ri ht hand s de of pa e 164

AUTHOR S DI IS O On o more of the ma n d isions of a wo k (such s P R BK, CH CT) are sometimes included in th referen e line numbers, in brackets, are g en in cer tain cases g *Iliad* BK I [6 5 53] 12d.

B E REF R ES The references are to book, chapter and v rse When the Kin James and Doua ersion differ in title of book or in the numberin f chapters or verses, the Kin James version is ited first and the Doua indicated by a (D) follows e g OLD TE T N T *Jeremiah* 45—(D) *II Esdras* 46

SYM S The bb eviation "esp call th reader attenti n to one o m re especiall relevant parts f whole fe ence pass m signifies that the topic s d scussed interm t tentl rather than co tinuousl in the work or passa e cited.

For add tional information con ernin th tyle f the ref rences see th Explanation of R ference Styl for general guidance in th use of *Th Great Ide s* consult th Preface.

. Desir nd th ord of change *eros* and *telos*

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35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK CH II S CT 3 104b-d ECT 13 107d 108c K II, C I XX, ECT 6 177a-b CH XX., ECT 9-48 184d 190d passim, esp SECT 33 186a CT 3 198c 199c

38 ROUSSE U *Inequality* 338c 339b

42 KANT *Fund. Prin Metaphysic of Moral* 262a-c 2 1c-d 279b 282d 283d / *Practical Reason* 293d [fn 3] 298d 300a 303b-304b 341 342a / *Intro Metaphysic of Moral* 385a-386d

43 MILL *Representative Government* 3 6c 348c / *Utilitarianism*, 461 -464d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO, par 11 12a-b par 17 16c PA T II, pa 123 44a-b / *Philosophy of History* INTRO, 162a-c 164b-166b

49 DARWIN *Descent of Man*, 308a-314c passim 316a 317a

53 JAMES *Psychology* 4 7 8a-9a 13a 15a 51a b 767a 768a 788a 799b

54 FR UD *Interpretation f Dreams* 363b-364d 377c 378b / *Instincts*, 412 -41 a 418d-419a / *General Introduction* 453b-476a, passim, esp 469a-4 0c 473b-d / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 768b-c

(1 *Desire and the order of change eros and telos*)

54 Freud *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 639a 663d esp 651d 654c 662c 663d / *Ego and Id* 708d 712a esp 711c 712a / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 790a 791d 799a 800a / *New Introductory Lectures* 849c 851d

2 The analysis of desire or appetite

2a The roots of desire in need privation or potency the instinctual sources of the libido

7 Plato *Lysis* 24a-c / *Symposium* 162a 166b / *Republic* bk iv 352b d / *Philebus* 621c 622b
8 Aristotle *Physics* bk i ch 9 [192 16 24] 268b c
9 Aristotle *History of Animals* bk vii ch 1 [581 21-^{b}22] 107a b / *Parts of Animals* bk iii ch 14 [675^{b}25-30] 205b / *Ethics* bk iii ch 11 [1118^{b}8-18] 365a b / *Rhetoric* bk ii ch 13 [1389^{b}32-35] 637b
10 Galen *Natural Faculties* bk iii ch 6 202d 203a ch 8 205a 207b ch 13 211d 212d
12 Lucretius *Nature of Things* bk iv [858 876] 55b c bk v [156-173] 63a b
17 Plotinus *Third Ennead* tr v ch 1 100c 101c ch 10 105d 106b / *Fourth Ennead* tr iv ch 18 21 166d 168c
18 Augustine *Confessions* bk i par 1-6 1a 2c bk iii par 1 13b-c par 10 15b d bk iv par 15-19 23a 24b bk v par 1-2 27a c bk vii par 16-23 48c 50c
19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 5 a 3 rep 3 25a d q 19 a 1 rep 2 108d 109c q 59 a 2 ans 307c 308b q 81 a 2 429c 430c part i-ii q 27 a 3 ans and rep 3-4 738c 739c
21 Dante *Divine Comedy* purgatory xvii [91]-xviii [75] 79b 80c xx [124] xxi [75] 84c 85d passim paradise i [103-120] 107b-c
23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part i 61a d
27 Shakespeare *King Lear* act ii sc iv [263 274] 261c
28 Harvey *On Animal Generation* 347c 349a 350a 402a d
31 Descartes *Meditations* vi 97d 98a 99d 102d
31 Spinoza *Ethics* part iv prop 2-7 425a-426b
33 Pascal *Pensees* 100 191a 192b
35 Locke *Human Understanding* bk ii ch xx sect 6 177a b ch xxi sect 30-35 185a 186d esp sect 31 185c d
38 Rousseau *Inequality* 346b
43 Mill *Liberty* 295b-d
46 Hegel *Philosophy of Right* part iii par 190 195 66a 67a
51 Tolstoy *War and Peace* bk xiii 577a 578b esp 577d 578a bk xiv 605b-d bk xv 630c 631c epilogue i 665a d
53 James *Psychology* 51a b 767a
54 Freud *Interpretation of Dreams* 363 d / *Narcissism* 400c-402c / *Instincts* 412c-413a 414a d / *General Introduction* 574a 580a d 591d 592b 615b 616b 618d 619a / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 654a-c 657d 659a / *Group Psychology* 673b-c / *Ego and Id* 710c 711b / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 782c 791c esp 791a / *New Introductory Lectures* 846a 851d esp 846a 847b 849b 851c

2b The objects of desire the good and the pleasant

7 Plato *Euthydemus* 69a 71a / *Phaedrus* 120a 122a / *Symposium* 161d 167b / *Meno* 177d 178b / *Gorgias* 262a 264b 275b 280d / *Republic* bk ii 310c d bk iv 351b 352 d bk ix 422c-425b esp 423b 424d / *Philebus* 614a / *Laws* bk v 689c-690c bk vi 712b bk viii 735c 736c
8 Aristotle *Topics* bk ii ch 3 [110^{b}38 111^{a}6] 155d bk iii ch 1-4 162a 166b bk vi ch 8 [146 37-^{b}19] 200b-c [146^{b}36-147 11] 200d 201a / *Physics* bk i ch 9 [192 16 24] 268b c / *Metaphysics* bk i ch 2 [98 ^{b}1 27] 00d 501a [983 14 21] 501b-c bk xii ch 7 [1072 23-^{b}13] 602b-d / *Soul* bk ii ch 3 [414 28 ^{b}] 644c bk iii ch 7 [431 1 ^{b}1] 663c 664b ch 10 [433 13 ^{b}19] 665d 666c
9 Aristotle *History of Animals* bk viii ch 1 [589^{a}3-10] 115b / *Parts of Animals* bk ii ch 17 [661^{a}6-8] 188a / *Motion of Animals* ch 6 [700^{b}23-30] 236a / *Ethics* bk i ch 1 [1094 1-3] 339a ch 2 [1094 17 2] 339b bk vi ch 2 387d 388b bk vii ch 11 14 403c 406a c bk x ch 2 426c-427b ch 3 [1174^a 4-11] 428b ch 4 [1175 10-22] 429c ch 5 [1175^b-4-33] 430b / *Rhetoric* bk i ch 6-7 602d 607d ch 10 [1369 1 4] 61 b ch 11 [1370^{a}17 28] 613c
12 Lucretius *Nature of Things* bk ii [1-61] 15a d
12 Epictetus *Discourses* bk i ch 4 108d 110a
17 Plotinus *First Ennead* tr vi 21a 26a passim / *Third Ennead* tr v 100c 106b / *Fourth Ennead* tr iv ch 35 177d 178a / *Fifth Ennead* tr v ch 12 234a d / *Sixth Ennead* tr vii ch 30 336b-d
18 Augustine *Confessions* bk ii par 9-18 10d 13a bk x par 29-33 78d 80b / *City of God* bk xii ch 6 345b 346c bk xix ch 1 507a 509a / *Christian Doctrine* bk i ch 3 4 625b-c ch 22-30 629b 633b
19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i qq 5 6 23b 30d passim q 16 a 1 ans 94b-95c a 4 97a c qq 19-20 108d 124a passim q 26 a 2 ans 150c 151a q 48 a 1 ans and rep 4 259b 260c qq 59-60 306b 314c passim esp q 60 aa 3-5 311d 314c q 62 a 1 ans 317d 318c q 63 a 4 328b-329a qq 80-83 427a 440b passim q 104 a 3 rep 1 537b-d q 105 a 4 ans 541c 542a q 106 a 2 ans 546d 547c

P RT I-II QQ -5 609a-643d passim Q 8 655a 65 C Q -- A 2, ANS 721c 722c A 3 REP 2 722d 723b Q 23 723c 727a Q -6 I A 3 and REP 3 734a-d Q 27 737a 740a Q 30 749a-752b passim Q 33 A 2 766a 767a
20 AQUIN S *Summa Theologica* P RT I-II Q 94 A 2, ANS 221d 223a PART III SUPPL, Q 9[8] A 3 10-4 -c
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVII [91]-XVIII [75] 79b-80c P RADISE V [12] 112a-b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan*, P RT I 61a-62c 76c 77b 96a PART IV 272c
29 CER ANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 381d 382a
30 B CON *Advancement of Learning* 73a 74a
31 D C E *Discourse* PART III 50b
31 SPI OZA *Ethics*, PART III, PROP 4-13 398d 400d P OF 39, SCHOL 408b-d PRO 56 414a-d THE AFFECTS DEF I 3 416b-417 PART IV DEF I 424a PROP 9-13 426d-428a P OF 19-28 429d-431c PROP 63 443d-444a PROP 65-66 444b-d
33 P CAL *Pensées* 81 186b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* K I CH II, ECT 3 104b-d BK II CH II, ECT 3 131d 132a CH XX, SECT 6 177a-b CH XXI, CT 29-48 184d 190d passim, esp S CT 31 185c-d, SECT 42 188c SECT 55-56 192c 193b S CT 61-62 194b-d SECT -0 197a-b SECT 3 198c 199c
42 KANT *Fund. Prin. Meta hysic of Morals*, 264d 265b / *Practical Reason*, 298a 300d 31sc-317b 330c 331a 341 342a / *J dge ment*, 605d-606b [fn 2]
43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 448a-450b 461 -464d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right*, PART II par 23 124 44a-d / *Philosophy of History* PAR IV 319b-320a
47 GOETHE *Faust* ART I [194 216] 29b-30a PART II [11 559-586] 281b-28-a
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man*, 308a b 316a 317 592d
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* K XI 524c 527a K XII 560a 561c BK XIII 577a 578b esp 577d 578a BK XIV 60-b-d BK XV 630c 631
53 JAMES *Psychology* 198b-211a 808b-814b esp 812b-813a
54 FREUD *Instincts* 414 b 418d-420b esp 420a-b / *General Introduction*, 592c 93a *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 639a-640c / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 7-2a b

2c Desire as a cause of action. motivation or purpose voluntariness
7 PLATO *Cratylus*, 95a b / *S mposium* 163a 166b / *Republic* BK V 352d 353b / *Timaeus*, 4 4b-d / *Laws* BK VI 712b BK IX 751b-d
8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics*, BK I, CH [1013 9-16] 512d 513a K VI CH I [1 5[b]23 25] 547d K CH 5 [1 4[-]35 45[b]4] 573b-c K 7 [1049[b]5 12] 574c-d / *Soul* BK III CH 7 [431 8-b12] 663c-664b CH 9-11 664d 667a
9 ARISTOTLE *Motion of Animals* CH 6 II 235d 239d esp CH 6 23 d 235b, CH 10 238c 239a / *Ethics*, BK III CH I 355b,d-357b esp [1111[a]21 b3] 357a b C I 12 365d 366a,c BK VI CH 2 387d-388b / *Politics* BK II CH 7 [126-3-8] 62c-d / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 10 611c 613a
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK II [251 93] 18b-d BK IV [877-906] 55d 56a
17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR V CH 10 105d 106b / *Fourth Ennead*, TR IV CH 18-21 166d 168c / *Sixth Ennead*, TR VIII CH 4 344b-d
18 A GUSTINE *Confessions* BK IV par 2, 25c BK VIII par 19-27 58b-60c / *City of God* BK XII CH 6 345b-346c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I Q 14 8 A 5 and REP I 82c 83b Q 1[8] A 3 NS 106b-10 c Q 19, A 4 111c 112c Q 41 A 2 21.c 219d Q 5 A 4 REP 3 298a 299a Q 59, I REP 3 306c-30-b, Q -5, A 3, REP 3 380c-381b Q 8 A I ANS and REP 4 40-b-409a Q 80, A REP 3 4 8a-d Q 81 A 3 ANS and RE 2 430c-431d PART I-II Q I AA I-6 609b-614c Q 6 644a-651c QQ 16-17 684a-693d Q 2- A 2 R P 2 721 722c Q 28 A 6 744b-d
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURG TORY XVIII [19- 5] 80a-c
23 HOB ES *Leviathan*, P RT I, 53a 61a-c 64a-c 76c P RT II, 112d 113c
31 DE C TES *Discourse* P RT 60b
31 SPI OZ *Ethics*, P RT III, THE AFFECTS DEF I 416b-d P T IV DEF 7 424b PROP 19 4-9d P OF 59 442b-d
33 PASCAL *Provincial Letter* 24b-26b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH II SECT 3 104b-d SECT 13 107d 108c BK I, CH XX, SECT 6 177 b CH XXI, SECT 9 48 184d 190d passim, esp SECT 33 186a SECT 3 198c 199c
38 ROUSSE U *Inequality* 338c-339b
42 KANT *Fund Prin Meta hysic of Mo al* 262a-c 271c-d 279b 282d 283d / *Practical Reaso* 293d [fn 3] 298d 300a 303b-304b 341c 342a / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 385a 386d
43 MILL *Representative Government* 346c 348c / *Utilitarianism*, 461c-464d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO, par II 15a b par I 16c PART II, par 123 44a b / *Philoso hy of History* INTRO, 162a-c 164b-166b
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man*, 308a-314c passim 316a 317a
53 J M S *Psychology* 4 8a-9a 13a 15a 51 b 767a 68a 788a-799b
54 FREUD *Interpretation of Dream* 363b-364d 377 378b / *Instincts*, 412 -413a 418d-419a / *General Introduction* 453b-476a, passim esp 469a-70c 473b-d / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 768b-c

(1 *Desire and the order of change eros and telos*)

54 Freud *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 639a 663d esp 651d 654c 662c 663d / *Ego and Id* 708d 712a esp 711c 712a / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 790a 791d 799a 800a / *New Introductory Lectures* 849c 851d

2 The analysis of desire or appetite

2*a* The roots of desire in need privation or potency the instinctual sources of the libido

7 Plato *Lysis* 24a-c / *Symposium* 162a 166b / *Republic* bk iv 352b-d / *Philebus* 621c 622b

8 Aristotle *Physics* bk i ch 9 [192 16 24] 268b c

9 Aristotle *History of Animals* bk vii ch i [581 21 ^{b}22] 107a b / *Parts of Animals* bk iii ch 14 [675^{b}25–30] 205b / *Ethics* bk iii ch 11 [1118^{b}8–18] 365a b / *Rhetoric* bk ii ch 13 [1389^{b}32–35] 637b

10 Galen *Natural Faculties* bk iii ch 6 202d 203a ch 8 205a 207b ch 13 211d 212d

12 Lucretius *Nature of Things* bk iv [856-876] 55b c bk v [156–173] 63a b

17 Plotinus *Third Ennead* tr v ch i 100c 101c ch 10 105d 106b / *Fourth Ennead* tr iv ch 18–21 166d 168c

18 Augustine *Confessions* bk i par 1–6 1a 2c bk iii par 1 13b c par 10 15b d bk iv par 15–19 23a 24b bk v par 1–2 27a-c bk vii par 16–23 48c 50c

19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 5 a 3 rep 3 25a d q 19 a 1 rep 2 108d 109c q 59 a 2 ans 307c 308b q 81 a 2 429c 430c part i ii q 27 a 3 ans and rep 3 4 738c 739c

21 Dante *Divine Comedy* purgatory xvii [91]-xviii [75] 79b 80c xx [124] xxi [75] 84c 85d passim paradise i [103 120] 107b c

23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part i 61a d

27 Shakespeare *King Lear* act ii sc iv [263-274] 261c

28 Harvey *On Animal Generation* 347c 349a 350a 402a d

31 Descartes *Meditations* vi 97d 98a 99d 102d

31 Spinoza *Ethics* part iv prop 2–7 425a 426b

33 Pascal *Pensees* 100 191a 192b

35 Locke *Human Understanding* bk ii ch xx sect 6 177a b ch xxi sect 30 35 185a 186d esp sect 31 185c d

38 Rousseau *Inequality* 346b

43 Mill *Liberty* 295b-d

46 Hegel *Philosophy of Right* part iii par 190 195 66a 67a

51 Tolstoy *War and Peace* bk xiii 577a 578b esp 577d 578a bk xiv 605b d bk xv 630c 631c epilogue i 665a d

53 James *Psychology* 51a b 767a

54 Freud *Interpretation of Dreams* 363 3 / *Narcissism* 400c-402c / *Instincts* 412c-413a 414a d / *General Introduction* 574a 580a d 591d 592b 615b 616b 618d 619a / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 654a-c 657d-659a / *Group Psychology* 673b c / *Ego and Id* 710c 711b / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 8?c 791c esp 791a / *New Introductory Lectures* 846a 851d esp 846a 847b 849b 851c

2*b* The objects of desire the good and the pleasant

7 Plato *Euthydemus* 69a 71a / *Phaed* 120a 122a / *Symposium* 161d 166b / *Meno* 177d 178b / *Gorgias* 262a 264b 275b 280d / *Republic* bk ii 310c d bk iv 351b 35 d bk ix 422c 425b esp 423b-424d / *Philebus* 614a / *Laws* bk v 689c 690c bk vi 712b bk viii 735c 736c

8 Aristotle *Topics* bk ii ch 3 [110^{b}38 111] 155d bk iii ch 1–4 162a 166b bk vi ch 8 [146 37–^{b}19] 200b c [146^{b}36–147^{a}11] 200d 201a / *Physics* bk i ch 9 [192 16–24] 268b c / *Metaphysics* bk i ch 2 [982^{b}12 27] 500d 501a [983 14 21] 501b-c bk xii ch 7 [10 23–^{b}13] 602b d / *Soul* bk ii ch 3 [414 3 ^{b}] 644c bk iii ch 7 [431 1 ^{b}12] 663 -664b ch 10 [433 13 ^{b}19] 665d 666c

9 Aristotle *History of Animals* bk viii ch i [589 3 10] 115b / *Parts of Animals* bk ii ch 17 [661^{a}6–8] 188a / *Motion of Animals* ch 6 [700^{b}23 30] 236a / *Ethics* bk i ch i [1094 1–3] 339a ch . [1094 17 2] 339b bk vi ch 2 387d 388b bk vii ch 11 14 03a 406a c bk x ch 2 426c-427b ch 3 [1173^b 4–11] 428b ch 4 [1175 10–22] 429c ch 5 [1175^{b}24–33] 430b / *Rhetoric* bk i ch 6 602d 607d ch 10 [1369 1 4] 612b ch 11 [1370 17 28] 613c

12 Lucretius *Nature of Things* bk ii [1-61] 15a d

12 Epictetus *Discourses* bk i ch 4 108d 110a

17 Plotinus *First Ennead* tr vi 21a 26a passim / *Third Ennead* tr v 100c 106b / *Fourth Ennead* tr iv ch 35 177d 178a / *Fifth Ennead* tr v ch 12 234a d / *Sixth Ennead* tr vii ch 30 336b-d

18 Augustine *Confessions* bk ii par 9-18 1 13a bk x par 29–33 78d 80b / *City of God* bk xii ch 6 345b 346c bk xiv ch 1 50 509a / *Christian Doctrine* bk i ch 3 4 625b ch 22–30 629b 633b

19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i qq 5 23b 30d passim q 16 a 1 ans 94b-95c a 97a c qq 19–20 108d 124a passim q 26 a ans 150c 151a q 48 a 1 ans 2 d rep 259b 260c qq 59–60 306b 314c passim, esp q 60 aa 3–5 311d 314c q 62 a 1 ans 31 d 318c q 63 a 4 328b-329a qq 80–83 427a 440b passim q 104 a 3 rep 1 537b-d q 105 a 4 ans 541c 542a q 106 a 2 ans 546d 5

c Desire as a cause of action, motivation or purpose voluntariness

(2 *The analysis of desire or appetite*)

2d The satisfaction of desire possession and enjoyment

7 PLATO *Symposium* 162b c / *Gorgias* 275b 276b / *Republic* BK IX 421a-425b / *Philebus* 620a b
8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK VI CH 8 [146b13-19] 200c
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK III CH 10-11 364b 365d BK X CH 4-5 428b-430d esp CH 4 [1175 10-22] 429c
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [1003-1010] 43a BK IV [1073-1120] 58a d
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par 2-4 9b-d BK IV par 15 23a b BK VI par 9-10 37c 38b par 26 42d 43a BK VIII par 6-8 54c 55a / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 3-4 625b c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 5 A 6 ANS and REP 2 27c 28b PART I II Q I AA 7-8 614c 615c Q 2 A 6 619d 620d Q 3 A 4 625a 626b Q 4 AA 1-2 629d 631a Q 5 A 8 REP 3 642d 643d Q 11 666b d 669b Q 27 A 3 ANS 738c 739c Q 30 A 4 REP 3 751c 752b QQ 31-34 752b 772b
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II II QQ 28-29 527b 533a PART III SUPPL Q 69 A 4 ANS 889c 890c
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVIII [19 39] 80a b PARADISE III [34-90] 109d 110b XXXII [52-72] 155b c XXXIII [46-48] 156c
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 76c d
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 32 406b c PROP 35 36 406d 407c PROP 39 SCHOL 408b d
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 109 193b 194a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 346b
42 KANT *Practical Reason* 298a 300a 341c 342a / *Judgement* 470a 471b
43 MILL *Representative Government* 347b 348b / *Utilitarianism* 448d 449c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 45 23c d par 59 27a b PART II par 124 44b d PART III par 154 57c par 182 64a / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 165b-166a
47 GOETHE *Faust* esp PART I [2605-3216] 63b 79a PART II [9192 9573] 223b 232a
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 308a 309d passim 312b
53 JAMES *Psychology* 725b-726a 812a 813b
54 FREUD *Interpretation of Dreams* 363c d 377c d / *Instincts* 412d-413a / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 663a / *Ego and Id* 711d 712a / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 773b d

3 The modes of desire or appetite

7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 120b c
8 ARISTOTLE *Soul* BK III CH 9 [432b5-7] 665a
9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK I CH 11 [1370 17 27] 613c
17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR VI CH 4-5 108c 109d
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X par 9-33 78d 80b
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 6, A 1 REP 2 28b d Q 19 A 1 ANS 108d 109c Q 59 A 1 ANS 306c 307b Q 78 A 1 REP 3 407b 409a Q 80 427a-428d PART I II Q 5, A 8 REP 3 642d 643d Q 8 A 1 ANS 655b 656a Q 26 A 1 734a d
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVII [91] XVIII [75] 79b 80c esp XVII [91-96] 79b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 61a 62a
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 9 399b c PROP 56-57 414a-415b THE AFFECTS DEF 1 416b d PART IV PROP 59 442b-d APPENDIX I III 447a b PART V PROP 4 SCHOL 453b-d
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 119a b / *Descent of Man* 287d 289a
53 JAMES *Psychology* 8a 17b esp 8a 9a 13a 15a 47b 52b esp 49b 50a 51a 52a
54 FREUD *General Introduction* 591d 593b / *War and Death* 757d 759d esp 758d 759a

3a Natural appetite desires determined by nature or instinct

7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 120b c / *Symposium* 165b-c / *Republic* BK II 311b 312b / *Timaeus* 474b d / *Philebus* 621c 622b / *Laws* BK VI, 712b
8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK I CH 9 [192 16-24] 268b c BK VIII CH 4 [255 30-b31] 340a-c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH I [980a22 28] 499a
9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK V CH 8 [542 17-b4] 68d 69a BK VI CH 18 BK VII CH 2 97b 108c passim esp BK VI CH 18 97b-99c BK VII CH 1 106b d 108a BK VIII CH 1 [589 4-9] 115b / *Ethics* BK III CH 11 [1118b 8-18] 365a b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 11 [1370 18-25] 613c BK II CH 7 [1385 21 25] 631d
10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK III CH 6 202d 203a CH 8 205a 207b CH 13 211d 212d
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK II [1-61] 15a d BK IV [858-876] 55b-c [1037 1057] 57d
15 TACITUS *Histories* BK II 224d 225a
17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR V 100c 106b / *Fourth Ennead* TR III CH 28 157a b
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 6 A 1 REP 2 28b d Q 12 A 1 ANS 50c 51c A 8 REP 4 57b 58b Q 19 A 1 ANS 108d 109c A 4 111c 112c Q 26 A 2 ANS 150 151a Q 59 A 1 ANS 306c 307b Q 60 310a 314c Q 62 A 1 ANS 317d 318c Q 63 A 3 327b 328b Q 75 A 6, ANS 383c 384c Q 78 A 1 REP 3 407b-409a Q 80 A 1 ANS and REP 1 3 427b-428a Q 82, A 1 431d-432c PART I II Q 5 A 8 642d 643d Q 8 A 1 ANS 655b 656a Q 10 A 2 663d 664d Q 12 A 5 672a-c Q 13 A 2 673c 674c Q 26, A 1 ANS and REP 3 734a d A 2 ANS 734d 735c Q 27 A 2 REP 3 737d 738c Q 30 AA 3-4 750d 752b Q 34 A 1 REP 2 768c 769d Q 36 AA 1 2 780c 782b Q 40 A 3 794c 795a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 93 A ANS and REP 221d 223a Q 109, A 3 340c 341b PART III SUPPL, Q 93 A 1 ANS 1037d 1039a

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVII [...]-XVIII [...] 79b-80c XIX [1-6]-XXI [...] 8-c-85d passim, PARADISE, I [103-1..] 107b-c

22 CHAUCER *Merchant's Tale* [...] 490a-b

23 HOBBES *Leviathan*, PART I 50a 61a-d 76c-d PART IV 271d

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays*, 22-d 225a 483b-d

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation*, 347c 349a 350a 402a-d 405c-406a 4 6c-477a

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART V 60b / *Meditations*, VI, 97d-98a 99-103d / *Objections and Replies*, 125b 156a-d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III, 395a-d PROP 399a PART IV PROP 19 429d

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 81 185b / *Geometrical Demonstration* 4-5b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I, CH II, SECT 3 10-b-d

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO, SECT 3 40-b-c

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 338c-339b 3-5b

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 135b

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO, PAR 1 15a-b ADDITIONS 12 136c-d

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 119a / *Descent of Man* 287d-289a 304a 313a passim, esp 304b-d [...], 307d-309d, 310c 311b 371 372

53 JAMES *Psychology* 49b-50a 192b-193a 204b-211a esp 205b-206a, 709a-b 730a 737a esp 700a-701a, 712b-737a 799a-b 897b-892a esp 871b [...]

54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis*, 15d 18a / *Interpretation of Dreams* 363c-d / *Narcissism* 400c-407 esp 401b-c *Instincts* 414b-421c passim, esp 41-c-415d / *General Introduction* 569c 5..-d esp 574 -d / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 651d-65-c 659b-659d *War and Death*, 758a 59a 54.. [...] *Civilization and Its Discontents*, 78-a-788d esp 8.a-c 789b-791d / *New Introductory Lectures*, 837b-d 846a-851d esp 846a-847b 883b-c

3b Desires determined by knowledge or judgment

7 PLATO *Protagoras* 59a-62d / *Phaedrus* 120b-c *Phaedo* 621c-622b

8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK VI, CH 8 [...] 2-0d 2-1a / *Metaphysics* BK XII, CH 7 [...] 602b *Soul*, BK III, CH [...] 643d CH 3 [...] 644c-d [...] CH 3 [...] 660a CH [...] 663c-664b

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK III CH 3 [...] 359a *Rhetoric* BK I, CH [...] 613c

17 PLOTINUS *Fourth Ennead* TR III, CH 28 15 a-b TR IV CH [...] 158a-b / *Sixth Ennead*, TR III, [...] 3-3c 344d

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions*, BK X, PAR 9-33 -8d-80b / *City of God* BK XII CH 6 380b-c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 8 A 1 REP 3 40b-409a [...] 80-83 [...] a-440b PART I-II, Q [...] A [...] 3d [...]38- Q 40, A [...] -93d -94c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY X II [91]-X III [75] 79b-80c

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I, 61c-d

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART III 50b / *Meditations*, III, 82d-83a

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II AXIOM 3 373d PART IV PROP 59 442b-d PROP 61-6 443a-d APPENDIX, III 447b PART V PROP 4 SCHOL 453b-d

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 338c 339b

42 KANT *Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals* 254d 255b esp 255b-d [...]

49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 310c 313a passim, esp 312a-c

53 JAMES *Psychology* 13a-15a 51a 5-a 7[?]9b-730a

54 FREUD *General Introduction* 5-1d 504b 593a / *War and Death*, 758a 7 9a

3b(1) The distinction between sensitive and rational desire: emotional tendencies and acts of the will

7 PLATO *Republic* BK IX 421a-4 5b

8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK IX CH 5 573a-c BK XII, CH 7 [...] 602b / *Soul*, BK III, CH [...] 663c-664b CH 9 [...] 665a CH 10 [...] 665b CH 10 [...]-CH 11 [...] 666c-66 a / *Memory and Reminiscence* CH 2 [453a15-31] 69-b-d

9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK I, CH 10 [...] 1369a[...] 612a-b CH 11 [...] 613c

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead*, TR VI 21a 26a passim / *Third Ennead*, TR V CH 1 100c 101c TR VI, CH 4-5 108c 109d / *Fourth Ennead* TR IV CH 35 172a 173b / *Sixth Ennead* TR VIII, CH 4 343c 344d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I, Q 19, A 1 ANS 108d 109c Q 59, A 1 ANS and REP 1 305c 307b Q 79, A 1 REP 2 414a-d Q 80, A 2 428a-d Q 8-, A 2, REP 3 432d-433c A 5 43[?]c-436c Q 106 A 2 REP 3 5-6d 54 c PART I-II, Q 1 A -, REP 3 610b-611b Q 6 A 646a-c Q 1 A 2 667b-d Q 12, A 5 672a-c Q 13 673c-674c Q 1[?] 682a-c Q 15, A - 684d 685b Q 1 A 687d-688b Q 2-, A 3 722d 723b Q 4 A -, AN 727d-728c Q 5 A 1 ANS 734a-d Q 30 A 1 749a-d A 3 750d 751c Q 31 AA 3 4 75- 75[?]c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I III, Q 18 A 2 811d-812b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVIII [...] 80a-c

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I, 63a 6-a-c PART II, [illegible]

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART III 50b

(2 *The analysis of desire or appetite*)

2d The satisfaction of desire: possession and enjoyment

7 PLATO *Symposium* 162b-c / *Gorgias* 275b-276b / *Republic* BK IX 421a-425b / *Philebus* 620a-b

8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK VI CH 8 [146^{b}13-19] 200c

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK III CH 10-11 364b-365d / BK X CH 4-5 428b-430d esp CH 4 [1175^{a}10-22] 429c

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [1003-1010] 43a / BK IV [1073-1120] 58a-d

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par 2-4 9b-d / BK IV par 15 23a-b / BK VI par 9-10 37c-38b; par 26 42d-43a / BK VIII par 6-8 54c-55a / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 3-4 625b-c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 5 A 6 ANS and REP 2 27c-28b / PART I-II Q I AA 7-8 614c-615c; Q 2 A 6 619d-620d; Q 3 A 4 625a-626b; Q 4 AA 1-2 629d-631a; Q 5 A 8 REP 3 642d-643d; Q 11 666b-d-669b; Q 27 A 3 ANS 738c-739c; Q 30 A 4 REP 3 751c-752b; QQ 31-34 752b-772b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II-II QQ 28-29 527b-533a / PART III SUPPL Q 69 A 4 ANS 889c-890c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVIII [19-39] 80a-b / PARADISE III [34-90] 109d-110b; XXXII [52-72] 155b-c; XXXIII [46-48] 156c

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 76c-d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 32 406b-c; PROP 35-36 406d-407c; PROP 39 SCHOL 408b-d

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 109 193b-194a

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 346b

42 KANT *Practical Reason* 298a-300a; 341c-342a / *Judgement* 470a-471b

43 MILL *Representative Government* 347b-348b / *Utilitarianism* 448d-449c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 45 23c-d; par 59 27a-b / PART II par 124 44b-d / PART III par 154 57c; par 182 64a / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 165b-166a

47 GOETHE *Faust* esp PART I [2605-3216] 63b-79a / PART II [9192-9573] 223b-232a

49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 308a-309d passim, 312b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 725b-726a; 812a-813b

54 FREUD *Interpretation of Dreams* 363c-d; 377c-d / *Instincts* 412d-413a / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 663a / *Ego and Id* 711d-712a / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 773b-d

3 The modes of desire or appetite

7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 120b-c

8 ARISTOTLE *Soul* BK III CH 9 [432^{b}5-7] 665a

9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK I CH 11 [1370^{a}17-27] 613c

17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR VI CH 4-5 108c-109d

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X par 9-33 78d-80b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 6, A 1 REP 2 28b-d; Q 19 A 1 ANS 108d-109c; Q 59 A 1 ANS 306c-307b; Q 78 A 1 REP 3 407b-409a; Q 80 427a-428d / PART I-II Q 5, A 8 REP 3 642d-643d; Q 8 A 1 ANS 655b-656a; Q 26 A 1 734a-d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVII [91]-XVIII [75] 79b-80c esp XVII [91-96] 79b

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 61a-62a

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 9 399b-c; PROP 56-57 414a-415b; THE AFFECTS DEF I 416b-d / PART IV PROP 59 442b-d; APPENDIX, I-III 447a-b / PART V PROP 4 SCHOL 453b-d

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 119a-b / *Descent of Man* 287d-289a

53 JAMES *Psychology* 8a-17b esp 8a-9a, 13a-15a; 47b-52b esp 49b-50a, 51a-52a

54 FREUD *General Introduction* 591d-593b / *War and Death* 757d-759d esp 758d-759a

3a Natural appetite: desires determined by nature or instinct

7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 120b-c / *Symposium* 165b-e / *Republic* BK II 311b-312b / *Timaeus* 474b-d / *Philebus* 621c-622b / *Laws* BK VI 712b

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK I CH 9 [192^{a}16-24] 268b-c / BK VIII CH 4 [255^{a}30-^{b}31] 340a-c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH I [980^{a}22-28] 499a

9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK V CH 8 [542^{a}17-^{b}4] 68d-69a / BK VI CH 18 / BK VII CH 2 97b-108c passim esp BK VI CH 18 97b-99c / BK VII CH 1 106b-d-108a / BK VIII CH 1 [589^{a}4-9] 115b / *Ethics* BK III CH 11 [1118^{b}8-18] 365a-b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 11 [1370^{a}18-25] 613c / BK II CH 7 [1385^{a}21-25] 631d

10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK III CH 6 202d-203a; CH 8 205a-207b; CH 13 211d-212d

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK II [1-61] 15a-d / BK IV [858-876] 55b-c; [1031-1057] 57d

15 TACITUS *Histories* BK II 224d-225a

17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR V 100c-106b / *Fourth Ennead* TR III CH 28 157a-b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 6 A 1 REP 2 28b-d; Q 12 A 1 ANS 50c-51c; A 8 REP 4 57b-58b; Q 19 A 1 ANS 108d-109c; A 4 111c-112c; Q 26 A 2 ANS 150c-151a; Q 59 A 1 ANS 306c-307b; Q 60 310a-314c; Q 62 A 1 ANS 317d-318c; Q 63 A 3 327b-328b; Q 75 A 6 ANS 383c-384c; Q 78 A 1 REP 3 407b-409a; Q 80 A 1 ANS and REP 1, 3 427b-428a; Q 82 A 1 431d-432c / PART I-II Q 5 A 8 642d-643d; Q 8 A 1 ANS 655b-656a; Q 10 A 2 663d-664d; Q 12 A 5 672a-c; Q 13 A 2 673c-674c; Q 26, A 1 ANS and REP 3 734a-d; A 2 ANS 734d-735c; Q 27 A 2 REP 3 737d-738c; Q 30, AA 3-4 750d-752b; Q 34 A 1 REP 2 768c-769d; Q 36 AA 1-2 780c-782b; Q 40 A 3 794c-795a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theol gica* P RT I II Q 94 A 2 ANS and REP 2 221d 223a Q 109 A 3 340c 341b P RT III SUPPL Q 93 A I ANS 1037d 1039a

21 D NTE *Divine Comedy* PURG TORY X II [9]-X III [75] 79b 80c XX [-4]-XXI [75] 84c 85d pass m PARAD S I [103 120] 107b-c

22 CH UCER *Manciple s Tale* [17 104 144] 490 b

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* P RT I 50 61a d 76c d P R IV 271d

25 MONT IGNE *Essays* 224d 225a 489b-d

28 H VEY *On Animal Generation* 347c 349a 350a 402 -d 40 c 406a 476c-477a

31 DESCA TES *Discou se* PART V 60b / *Medi tati s* VI 97d 98a 99d 103d / *Objecti ns a d Repl s* 124b 156a d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* P RT III 395a d PROP 7 399 PART IV PRO 19 429d

33 P SCAL *Pens es* 81 186b / *Geometrical Dem nstratio* 440b

35 LOCK *H man U derst nd ng* BK I CH II SECT 3 104b-d

35 BE KELE *Human Knowledge* INTRO S CT 3 405b-c

38 ROU SE U *I eq ality* 338c 339b 346b

44 BO W LL *J hnso* 130b

46 HE L *Ph lo ophy of Right* NTRO par II 15 b D ITIC S I I 136c d

49 D RWIN *Origin of Sp cies* 119a / *Descent of Man* 287d 289 304a 313a pass m esp 304b d [fn 5] 307d 309d 310c 311b 371c 372c

53 J M S *Psychol gy* 49b-50a 198b-199a 204b-211a esp 205b-206a 209a b 700 737a esp 700a 701a 712b 737 799 b 890b 892 esp 891b [fn 2]

54 F EU *Origin a d Development of Psycho-A alysis* 15d 18a / *I terpretat on of Dre ms* 363c d / *Narci sism* 400 -402c esp 401b c / *I stincts* 414b-421 passim esp 414c-415d / *General Introd ct on* 569c 576d esp 574 d / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 651d-654c 658b 659d / *Wa and De th* 758a 759 764d 765 / *Ci l tion a d Its Discontent* 787a 788d esp 787 -c 789b-791d / *Neu I troductory Lectures* 837b-d 846a-851d esp 846a-847b 883b-c

3b Des res d te mined by knowledge or judg ment

7 PLATO *Protagor s* 59a 62d / *Ph drus* 120b c / *Ph leb* 621c 622b

8 A I TOTL *Topic* K S C 8 [146b 6-147a11] 200d 201a / *Met physics* BK X H 7 [1072a26-30] 602b / *So l* BK I C 2 [413b19- 4] 643d C I 3 [4 4a23- 16] 644c-d K C 3 [42 2 24] 660 CH 7 [431 8-b 2] 663c 664b

9 A TOTLE *Eth s* B III CH 3 [1 3 3 13] 359a / *Rhet ric* K I CH 11 [1370a17 28] 613c

17 PLOTI S *F urth Enne d* TR II CH 28 157 b TR I CH 20 168a b / *S xth E e d* TR CH 2 4 343 344d

18 AU USTINE *Confess ons* BK X par 29-33 78d-80b / *City of God* BK XIV CH 6 380b c

19 AQUI S *S mma Theolog ca* PART I Q 8 A I REP 3 407b-409a QQ 80-83 427a-440b PART I II Q 7 A 2 737d 738c Q 40 A 2 793d 794c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVII [91]-XVIII [75] 79b-80c

23 HOBBES *Lev athan* PART I 61c d

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART III 50b / *Med itat o s* III 82d-83a

31 S INOZA *Ethics* P RT II AXIO I 3 373d P RT IV PROP 59 442b-d PROP 61-62 443a-d A PENDIX III 447b PART V PROP 4 SCI OL 453b-d

38 ROUSSEAU *Ineq ality* 338c 339b

42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Mo als* 264d 265b esp 265b d [fn 1]

49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 310c 313a passim esp 312a-c

53 JA IES *Psychology* 13a 15a 51a 52a 729b-730

54 FREUD *General I troduction* 501d 504b 593a / *War and Death* 758a 759a

3b(1) The distinction between sensitive and rational desire emotional tendencies and acts of the will

7 PLATO *Republic* BK IX 421a-425b

8 ARISTOTLE *Meta hysics* BK IX CH 5 5 3a c BK XII CH 7 [1072a27 9] 602b / *Soul* BK II CH 7 [431 8-b12] 663c 664b C I 9 [432b 7] 665a CH 10 [433b5 13] 666b CH I [433b27]-CH II [434a22] 666c-667a / *Mem ry and Reminiscence* CH 2 [453 15 31] 695b-d

9 ARISTOTL *Rhetoric* BK I CH 10 [1368b28 369a4] 612a b CH 11 [1370a1 28] 613c

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR VI 21a 26a passim / *Third Enn ad* TR V CH I 100c 101c T VI CH 4-5 108c 109d / *Fourth En ead* TR IV CH 28 I 2a 173b / *Sixth Ennead* TR VIII CH 2 4 343c 344d

19 AQUIN *Summa Theologica* PA T I Q 19 I NS 108d 109c Q 59 A I ANS and P I 306 307b Q 79 A I REP 2 414a d Q 80 A 2 428a d Q 8 A 2 REP 3 432d-433c A 5 435c-436 Q 106 A 2 REP 3 546d 547c P RT I I Q I 2 REP 3 610b-611b Q 6 A 2 646a c Q II A 2 667b-d Q 12 A 5 672a-c Q 13 A 2 673 674c Q 15 A 2 682 -c Q 16 A 2 684d 685b Q 17 A 2 68 d 688b Q 22 A 3 722d 723b Q 24 A 2 AN 727d 728c Q 26 A I NS 734a d Q 30 A I 749a d A 3 750d 751c Q 31 A 3 4 754a 755c

20 AQUIN S *Summa Theologica* PART III Q 18 2 811d 812b

21 D NTE *D* *Comedy* P R ATORY X [9-75] 80a-c

23 HOB E *Lev ath* T 63a 64a RT I 162c

31 DE CART S *D sco se* P RT I 50b

(2 *The analysis of desire or appetite*)

2d The satisfaction of desire possession and enjoyment

7 Plato *Symposium* 162b c / *Gorgias* 275b 276b / *Republic* BK IX 421a 425b / *Philebus* 620a b
8 Aristotle *Topics* BK VI CH 8 [146^{b}13 19] 200c
9 Aristotle *Ethics* BK III CH 10-11 364b 365d BK X CH 4-5 428b 430d esp CH 4 [1175 10-22] 429c
12 Lucretius *Nature of Things* BK III [1003-1010] 43a BK IV [1073 1120] 58a d
18 Augustine *Confessions* BK II par 2 4 9b d BK IV par 15 23a b BK VI par 9 10 37c 38b par 26 42d 43a BK VIII par 6-8 54c 55a / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 3 4 625b c
19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 5 A 6 ANS and REP 2 27c 28b PART I II Q I AA 7-8 614c 615c Q 2 A 6 619d 620d Q 3 A 4 625a 626b Q 4 AA I 2 629d 631a Q 5 A 8 REP 3 642d 643d Q 11 666b d 669b Q 27 A 3 ANS 738c 739c Q 30 A 4 REP 3 751c 752b QQ 31-34 752b 772b
20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* PART II II QQ 28-29 527b 533a PART III SUPPL Q 69 A 4 ANS 889c 890
21 Dante *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVIII [19-39] 80a b PARADISE III [34-90] 109d 110b XXXII [52-72] 155b c XXXIII [46-48] 156c
23 Hobbes *Leviathan* PART I 76c d
31 Spinoza *Ethics* PART III PROP 32 406b c PROP 35-36 406d-407c PROP 39 SCHOL 408b d
33 Pascal *Pensées* 109 193b 194a
38 Rousseau *Inequality* 346b
42 Kant *Practical Reason* 298a 300a 341c 342a / *Judgement* 470a 471b
43 Mill *Representative Government* 347b 348b / *Utilitarianism* 448d 449c
46 Hegel *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 45 23c d par 50 27a b PART II par 124 44b d PART III par 154 57c par 182 64a / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 165b 166a
47 Goethe *Faust* esp PART I [605-3216] 63b 79a PART II [9192-9573] 223b-232a
49 Darwin *Descent of Man* 308a 309d passim 312b
53 James *Psychology* 725b 726a 812a 813b
54 Freud *Interpretation of Dreams* 363c d 377c d / *Instincts* 412d-413a / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 663a / *Ego and Id* 711d 712a / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 773b d

3 The modes of desire or appetite

7 Plato *Phaedrus* 120b c
8 Aristotle *Soul* BK III CH 9 [432^{b}5-7] 665a
9 Aristotle *Rhetoric* BK I CH 11 [1370 17 27] 613c
17 Plotinus *Third Ennead* TR VI CH 4-5 108c 109d
18 Augustine *Confessions* BK X, par 29-33 78d 80b
19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 6, A I REP 2 28b d Q 19 A I ANS 108d 109c Q 59 A I ANS 306c 307b Q 78 A I REP 3 407b 409a Q 80 427a-428d PART I II Q 5, A 8 REP 3 642d 643d Q 8 A I ANS 655b-656a Q 26 A I 734a d
21 Dante *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVII [91] XVIII [75] 79b 80c esp XVII [91-96] 95
23 Hobbes *Leviathan* PART I 61a 62a
31 Spinoza *Ethics* PART III PROP 9 399b c PROP 56-57 414a-415b THE AFFECTS DEF I 416b d PART IV PROP 59 442b-d APPENDIX I III 447a b PART V PROP 4 SCHOL 453b-d
49 Darwin *Origin of Species* 119a b / *Descent of Man* 287d 289a
53 James *Psychology* 8a 17b esp 8a 9a 13a 15a 47b 52b esp 49b 50a 51a 52a
54 Freud *General Introduction* 591d 593b / *War and Death* 757d 759d esp 758d 759a

3a Natural appetite desires determined by nature or instinct

7 Plato *Phaedrus* 120b c / *Symposium* 165b-c / *Republic* BK II 311b 312b / *Timaeus* 474b d / *Philebus* 621c 622b / *Laws* BK VI, 712b
8 Aristotle *Physics* BK I CH 9 [192 16-24] 268b c BK VIII CH 4 [255 30-^{b}31] 340a-c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH I [980^{a}22 28] 499a
9 Aristotle *History of Animals* BK V CH 8 [542 17 ^{b}4] 68d 69a BK VI CH 18 BK VII CH 2 97b 108c passim esp BK VI CH 18 9 b-99c BK VII CH I 106b d 108a BK VIII CH I [589 4-9] 115b / *Ethics* BK III CH 11 [1118^{b}8 18] 365a b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 11 [1370^{a}18-25] 613c BK II CH 7 [1385^{a}21 25] 631d
10 Galen *Natural Faculties* BK III CH 6 202d 203a CH 8 205a 207b CH 13 211d 212d
12 Lucretius *Nature of Things* BK II [1-61] 15a d BK IV [858-876] 55b c [1037 1057] 57d
15 Tacitus *Histories* BK II 224d 225a
17 Plotinus *Third Ennead* TR V 100c 106b / *Fourth Ennead* TR III CH 28 157a b
19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 6 A I REP 2 28b d Q 12 A I ANS 50c 51c A 8 REP 4 57b 58b Q 19 A I ANS 108d 109c A 4 111c 112c Q 26 A 2 ANS 150c 151a Q 59 A I ANS 306c 307b Q 60 310a 314c Q 62 A I ANS 317d 318c Q 63 A 3 327b 328b Q 75 A 6 ANS 383c 384c Q 78 A I REP 3 407b-409a Q 80 A I ANS and REP I 3 427b-428a Q 8 A I 431d 432c PART I II Q 5 A 8 642d 643d Q 8 A I ANS 655b 656a Q 10 A 2 663d-664d Q 12 A 5 672a c Q 13 A 2 673c-674c Q 26 A I ANS and REP 3 734a d A 2 ANS 734d 735c Q 27 A 2 REP 3 737d 738c Q 30 AA 3-4 750d 752b Q 34 A I REP 2 768c 769d Q 36 AA I 2 780c 782b Q 40 A 3 794c 795a

581b 617c 618a / *Group Psychology* 673b 674a 6 9a b 681c-683a 693 694b / *Civili ... on and Its D scontents* 783b-c / *New Intro ductory Lectures* 847d 848a

3d Des re and ersion as emotion loppos tes

7 PLATO *Republic* BK IV 352d 353a
8 A ISTOTLE *Soul* BK III C 1 7 [431 8 b9] 663c 664a
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 2 [1130 21 31] 387d 388a BK CH 2 [11/3 5 13] 427a b
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIV CH 6 380b c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 23 A 2 724c 725c A 4 7 b 727a Q 25 1 2 730b-732a A 3 R 3 732 733a Q 35 749a 752b Q 35 A 6 777b-778c
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 61a-d
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III 395a-422 c P PROP 12 13 400b-d, PRO 5 49 401a-411 PROP 51 411c-412a TH AFFECTS DEF 2 3 416d 417a DEF 6-7 417b-d P T IV DE 5 424b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* K I C I XX SECT 4-5 176d 177a
42 KANT *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 385 -c
53 JAMES *Psychology* 708a 709a
54 FREUD *Instincts* 418c-421a c esp 418c / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 659b-d / *G p Psych l gy* 677c-678c / *Ego and Id* 708d 710c esp 709d 710c / *War a d Death* 766a b / *Civilizat on and Its Discontents* 790a 791b

4 The eco omy of desire in human life

4 The conflict of desires w th one another

APOCRYPHA *S sanna* 2 24—(D) OT *D niel* 13:22 24
N W TE T MENT *Matthew* 6:24 8:2 2 26 36-45 / *Romans* 7 14 25 / *Ph lippia* 21 6 / *James* 4 1 10
7 PLATO *Ph edru* 128a-d
8 A I TOTL *Metaphysics* BK X CH 5 [1048 21 23] 573c / *So l* BK III CH 10 [433 5 3] 666b C1 [434 10-15] 666d-667a / *Mem ry d Rem iscence* H 2 [453 15 31] 695b-d
9 ARI TOTLE *Ethics* K V 1395 -406a,c
12 LU RETIUS *N ture of Thing* [10/3 10 3] 58a b
13 V L *Aeneid* BK [33 360] 176a 177a
18 A TINE *Co fessions*, K V par 1 12 21d 22b BK pa 39 81b-c par 41-64 81c 87d
19 AQ *Summ Theol gica* P R 1 0 6 6-7 649 -650d Q 9 2 REP 3 658d 659c Q 0 3 664d-665c
20 AQ *Summ Theologica* PA II 145 d R 1 Q 29 A 530b 531a Q 8 6 814d-815d P 1 Q Q 1 2 1063d 1065b
21 D T *D m Com dy* AD E 1 [27] 110d 111
25 MON *Essay* 297b-d 350d 354b
31 S OZA *Ethics* P R 1 1 395a-450d pa m

esp PART III PROP 31 405d-406a PART IV DEF 5 424b PROP 7 COROL 426b PROP 15 18 428a-429d PROP 60-61 442d-443b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* I TR par 17 16 ADDITIONS 13 118c
47 GOETHE *Faust* esp PART I [354-513] 11a 14b [614-68] 17a 18a [1110 111] 27b-28a
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 394a 397a
49 D WIN *Descent of Man*, 309c 313a 318d 319
50 MARX *Capital* 293c 294a
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Ka ama ov* BK III 53d 54b
53 JAMES *Psychology* 199b-204b 705a 706b 717a-718a 720b 734b-735a 791a 798b passim esp 794a 795a
54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis* 7a 8a / *Hysteria* 65c-66a 83c 83a 117a / *Interpret t on of Dreams* 3 0b / *Nar cissism* 407a-c / *Unconscious* 433d-436c esp 436b-c / *General Introduct on* 467b-476a,c esp 469c-470c 474d-475a 501d 504b 589c 593b esp 589c 591d 599d-600d 615b-616c 624b d 633d-635d / *Beyond the Pl asure Principle* 640c d / *Ego and Id* 699a-c 704d 712a 717a c passim / *Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety* 720a 733c passim esp 722b-d 724a 725a 731c d / *Civilizat on and Its Discontents* 783d 784a 789b-791d passim / *New Introductory Lectures* 843d 845a

4b The attachment of des re fixat ons projections dentifications transf rences

12 LUCRETIUS *N t re of Things* BK IV [1058 1072] 57d 58a
12 EPICTETUS *D scou ses* BK II CH 15 155c 156b
14 PLUTARCH *Solon* 66c d
25 MONTAIGN *Essays* 10b-11b
26 SHAKESPE RE *3rd Henry VI* ACT II SC II [123 195] 87c 88
31 S NOZ *Eth s* PART III PRO 13 17 400c 402 PRO 46 410c PART IV PROP 6 426a PRO 44 SCHOL 437d-438a
33 P SCAL *Pensé s* 81 186b
46 HE EL *Ph losophy of History* TRO 196d 197c
47 G O THE *Faust* P RT I [1583 1606] 38b-39
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* esp 135a 136b 156b-158b
53 J MES *Psychology* 648b-650b 707a 12b esp 707b 708a 734b-735b
54 FRE D *Origin and Develop ent of Psycho A alysis* 16b-18a 19a-c / *N rci* 399a 411a c esp 404d-406c, 409d-410d / *Instincts* 414b / *Gener l Introd ction* 557b 558d esp 558a b 569c 589c esp 574c-d 580a 581c 585b-586d, 589a-c 593d 597 599d 600d 616d-622b 623c-631b esp 628d 630d 634b-d / *Beyond the Pleasu e Principle* 644d 645d 648c / *Gr p P ychology* 678d 684a esp 678d 681a, 681b d [fn 4] / *Ego and Id* 703c 706c esp 704d 705c 711b-c 712b-c / *N w I tro-*

(3b Desires determined by knowledge or judgment. 3b(1) The distinction between sensitive and rational desire: emotional tendencies and acts of the will.)

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 48 SCHOL 391b-c; PART III PROP 9 SCHOL 399c; PROP 58-59 415c-416b; THE AFFECTS DEF I EXPL 416c-d; PART V PROP 32 460b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 30 185a-c

42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 264d-265b esp 265b-d [fn 1]; 271c-d; 279b; 282d-283b; 284d-285a / *Practical Reason* 301a-c; 303b-304b; 314d-317c; 330c-331a / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 385c-386b / *Judgement* 483d-484b; 605d-606b [fn 2]

43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 463c-464d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO par 19 16d-17a; par 25-26 18a-c; PART II par 139 48d-49b; PART III par 194 66c-d; ADDITIONS 1 136c-d; 131 137d / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 163a-164a; PART IV 362b-c

49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 310c-314c; 592d-593a

53 JAMES *Psychology* 8a-9a; 13a-15a; 767b-768a; 790a-799b passim, esp 794a-798b

54 FREUD *Hysteria* 110c / *Interpretation of Dreams* 377c-380d esp 377c-378b, 379d-380b / *General Introduction* 501d-504b; 590a-593b; 607d-608c; 615b-616c / *Ego and Id* 702c / *New Introductory Lectures* 837b-838d; 843d-844b

3b(2) Conscious and unconscious desires: habitual desire

7 PLATO *Republic* BK IX 416a-c

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK II CH 1 348b-d; 349b; CH 5 351b-c

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK VIII par 10-11 55c-56b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I, Q 87, A 2 466c-467b; PART I-II, Q 1, A 6, REP 3 614a-c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II, Q 50, A 3 8b-9a; A 5 10b-d; Q 56, A 4 32b-33c; A 6 34b-35a

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 9 SCHOL 399c; THE AFFECTS DEF I EXPL 416c-d

42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 262a-c / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 385c-386b

43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 463d-464d

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 119a-b

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK X 407c-d

53 JAMES *Psychology* 8b-9a; 90b-93a passim; 788a-792a

54 FREUD *Hysteria* 110b-c / *Interpretation of Dreams* 357b-358c; 363b-365c esp 364c; 369a-b; 377b-387a,c passim, esp 386d-387a / *Unconscious* 428a-443d esp 428a, 429d-430b, 432c-433d, 436b-437c / *General Introduction* 452a-c; 453b-476a,c esp 468a-469c, 473c-d; 501d-503d esp 503b-c; 531d-532b; 599d / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 643d-646a / *Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety* 720a

3c Desire and love: their distinction and connection

5 EURIPIDES *Iphigenia at Aulis* [543-589] 429d-430a

7 PLATO *Lysis* 20c-d; 23d-24d / *Phaedrus* 115a-129d esp 120b-c, 123b-124a / *Symposium* 164c-165b / *Laws* BK VIII 735c-736c

8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK II CH 22 [68a25-b7] 89d-90a / *Topics* BK VI CH 7 [146a9-12] 199d; BK VII CH 1 [152b6-9] 207c

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK III CH 11 [1118b8-18] 365a-b; BK VIII CH 1-8 406b-411d passim; CH 13-14 414d-416d; BK IX CH 1 416b-417c passim; CH 5 420a-c; CH 8 421d-423a

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [1037-1062] 57d-58a

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK III CH 24 203c-210a

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR V, CH 7; TR VI, CH 9 20a-26a

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par 1; BK III par 1 9a-13c / *City of God* BK XIV CH 7 380c-381c / *Christian Doctrine* BK III CH 10 661d-662a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I, Q 19, A 1, REP 2 108d-109c; A 2, ANS 109b-110b; Q 20, A 1, ANS and REP 2 120a-121b; A 2, REP 3 121b-122a; Q 60, A 3, ANS 311d-312b; PART I-II, Q 2, A 1, REP 3 615d-616c; Q 23, A 2 724c-725c; A 4 726a-727a; Q 25, A 2 731b-732a; A 3, ANS 732a-733a; Q 26 733d-737a; Q 27, AA 3-4 738c-740a; Q 28, A 1, ANS and REP 1-2 740b-741a; A 2, ANS 741a-742a; A 3, ANS and REP 2-3 742a-d; A 4 742d-743c; Q 30, A 2 749d-750d; Q 32, A 3, REP 3 760d-761c; A 8, ANS 764c-765b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II-II, Q 62, A 3, ANS and REP 3 61c-62b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy*, PURGATORY XV [40-81] 75d-76a; XVII [91]-XVIII [75] 79b-80c

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 61c-63a

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 83d-84a; 398c-399d; 424d-425a; 473a-b

27 SHAKESPEARE *Troilus and Cressida* ACT I, SC II [308-321] 107d-108a

29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 79d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III THE AFFECTS DEF 6 417b-c; PART IV APPENDIX 1-11 447a-b; XIX-XX 449a

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VIII [500-617] 243a-245b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XX SECT 4-6 176d-177b

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 345c-346b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 204b-209b passim

54 FREUD *Narcissism* 404d-406b; 409b-411a,c / *Instincts* 420a-421a / *General Introduction*

(4 *The economy of desire in human life* 4b *The attachment of desires fixations projections, identifications transferences*)

ductory Lectures 83?b 834b esp 832d 833b 847b 849b 855d 856d 862d 863c

4c The focusing of desires emotional complexes

54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psycho Analysis* 10c 16b 17d / *Interpretation of Dreams* 246a 248c / *Instincts* 415d 418c / *General Introduction* 529d 531d 557b 558d 569c 585a esp 574a 576d 580a 584c 593d 600d 607b 623c / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 644d 646a / *Group Psychology* 680c d / *Ego and Id* 704d 706d / *Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety* 724a 742a esp 724a 727c 733c 734d 739a 740b / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 774c d 792b 796c esp 794c 796c / *New Introductory Lectures* 833c 834a 847b 849b 855d 863c esp 856b 860a

4d The discharge of desires catharsis and sublimation

9 ARISTOTLE *Poetics* CH 6 [1449ᵇ28] 684a
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK III 190a c
32 MILTON *Samson Agonistes* 337a
42 KANT *Judgement* 509b d
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 308b c
53 JAMES *Psychology* 718a 719a
54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psycho Analysis* 2b 6c esp 4c 5a 8d 9a 11c 17b 20a d / *Hysteria* 26c 31a esp 27a c 62c 64a / *Interpretation of Dreams* 189b 193b 356d 373a esp 363c d 364d 365c 369a 370a / *Narcissism* 407c 408a / *General Introduction* 452c d 495a 499b esp 496a 497b 527c 539c esp 532d 535d 587d 588b 592c 593a / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 641d 643c / *Group Psychology* 693b 694b / *Ego and Id* 704b c 710c 712a / *Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety* 739a c 745a 751b d / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 773d 774c 781a c / *New Introductory Lectures* 847a b

5 Desire as ruler

5a Desire ruling imagination daydreaming and fantasy

7 PLATO *Republic* BK V 361a
8 ARISTOTLE *Dreams* CH 2 [460ᵇ33 ᵇ27] 704b d
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X par 42 82a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 77 A 1 ANS 145a d
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 52d 53a PART II 138d 139a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 37a b 405d-406a
26 SHAKESPEARE *3rd Henry VI* ACT III SC II [123-195] 87c 88a / *Richard II* ACT V SC V [1 41] 349d 350a
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* esp PART I 1b 2b, 18d 19b 50b 52d 134b 135d
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK V [95 1 8] 177b-178a / *Samson Agonistes* [599-605] 352b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 220c 221a
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [7271 7312] 178b-179a [10 039-066] 245a b
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK II 82a-d BK III 125b-c 146d 148c BK VI 254b-c BK X 394d 443c 444a BK XI 497c-499c BK XII 542d 543a 544a b BK XIV 601c 602d BK XV 615a 617a
53 JAMES *Psychology* 374a 375a
54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psycho Analysis* 18c d / *Hysteria* 115a 116a / *Interpretation of Dreams* 333c 336a esp 333c d 347d 349c / *General Introduction* 483b-c 486b 489c esp 486d-487a 487d-488a 599b-601b esp 599b 600b 600d 601b / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 774a c

5b Desire ruling thought rationalization and wishful thinking

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 11b d 21d 22a
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK IV 427d-428a BK IV 474a c BK V 506b 507a c
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK III CH 16 [1287ᵃ30-ᵇ3] 485c-486a
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [1141 1191] 59a d
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK II CH 18 161a 162b
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 9 A 2 ANS and REP 2 658d 659c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 44 AA 5 10 131d 137c Q 77 A 1 ANS 145a d
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 52d 53a
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK II 148d 150d 154a 156c 159d 163c 166a 168a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 210b 212a 273b 276a 490d 491d
26 SHAKESPEARE *3rd Henry VI* ACT III SC II [1 3-195] 87c 88a
27 SHAKESPEARE *Troilus and Cressida* ACT V SC II [106-114] 136a
28 GILBERT *Loadstone* BK III 60d 61a
28 HARVEY *Circulation of the Blood* 306a-c 309d
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK I APH 49 111a
31 DESCARTES *Meditations* IV 89a 93a / *Objections and Replies* 215d 216a
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 39 SCHOL 408b d
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 82-87 186b 189a 99-100 191a 192b / *Geometrical Demonstration* 439b-442a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 12 180d 181a SECT 67-69 195b-196c BK IV CH XX SECT 12 392c
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 1 29b 30a NUMBER 31 103c 104a NUMBER 50 162a b

5c

43 MILL *Liberty* 269d 270a
44 BOSWELL *Johns* 103b-c 106d
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 15b-16 BK II 82d 83a BK II 134a-c BK IV 170d 171c BK VI 238a BK IX 366d 367b BK X 426b BK XI 505 11b esp 509d 510a BK XIII 585b
53 JAMES *Psychology* 314b 381b-385b 643 646a 652a-657b 668a-671a
54 FREUD *Interpretation of Dreams* 363d 364b 379a 380d / *Narcissism* 400a / *Group Psychology* 682b-d / *Ego and Id* 716a / *War and Death* 760d 761a 765a 766b / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 774c d / *New Introductory Lectures* 873d-879c passim esp 874a d 876d 877b 878b-c

5c Desire ruling act on the unchecked expression of desires incontinence

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 4 7 6 2-5 29-34 34 397 2 / *Exodus* 16 3 / *Numbers* 11 4 35 16 1 35—(D) *Numbers* 11 4 34 16 1 35 / *I Samuel* 18 5 12 19 8-0—(D) *I Kings* 18 5 1 19 8-0 / *II Samuel* 1 3—(D) *II Kings* 1 3
APOCRYPHA *Wisdom of Solomon* 2 6-9—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 6-9
NEW TESTAMENT *Romans* 18 32 / *Philippians* 3 8 9 / *I Timothy* 6 9 0 / *James* 4 1 4 / *I John* 2 5 17
5 AESCHYLUS *Seven Against Thebes* [653 719] 34b-3 a
5 SOPHOCLES *Ajax* [47 090] 152a b / *Trachiniae* [431 492] 174a-c
5 EURIPIDES *Medea* [623-641] 217c
5 ARISTOPHANES *Clouds* [882 1 04] 499b 502a
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK II 95d 98b BK VI 222c d
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK III 436d-438b
7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 120 122a 128a 129c / *Republic* BK II 311b-312b BK III 326c 327b BK 352b-354d BK IX 416 -418c 425c 42 b / *Timaeus* 474b d / *Seventh Letter* 801b-c
8 ARISTOTLE *Soul* BK II 9 [433] CH I [435a2] 665 -667a
9 ARISTOTLE *Animals* BK CH I [58 21 b 2] 107 b / *Motion of Animals* 7 [0 6]-CH 8 [2a2] 236b 237c / *Ethics* BK 3 [11 b 3 26] 348a b BK III 9] 365 b c 2 [1 19 34 9] 366a BK 10 395a-403 CH 14 [154 2] 405d-406a *Politics* BK 7 [6-3-8] 462 d / *Rhetoric* BK CH 1 [1369a 22] 612b CH 12 [1389a3 b 1] 636b-d
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 18 161a 162b
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK I CT I 257d 258a
14 PLUTARCH *Antony* 748a 779d
15 TACITUS *Annals* BK III 57b 58d
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 25 25c BK VI par 11 13 38b 39c BK VIII par 25 27 60a c BK X par 40-0 81c 89a / *Christian Doctrine* BK III c 18 21 664d 666b
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 81 A 3 REP 2 430c-431d Q 83 A 1 REP 1 436d 438a PART I II Q 6 A 7 650a d Q 9 A 2 658d 659c Q 10 A 3 664d 665c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 75 A 2 3 138c 139d Q 77 144d 152a
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL V [1] III [64] 7a 11c XI [67-90] 15d 16a PURGATORY XVII [91 139] 79b-d XIX XX 1 81c 94c
22 CHAUCER *Manciple's Tale* [1 104 144] 490a b
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 65c-66b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 107a 112d 159a 167a 232b 238d 350d 354b 413 -416c 486b-49 a 527b 528a 538a 543a c
26 SHAKESPEARE *3rd Henry VI* ACT III SC II [123 195] 87c 88a ACT V SC VI [61-93] 103d 104a / *Richard III* 105 148a c / *Romeo and Juliet* ACT II SC VI [1 15] 300c
27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT III SC II [61 9] 49c d SC I [65-81] 55b-c / *Troilus and Cressida* ACT I SC II [101 124] 109b ACT II SC II 113 115d / *Othello* 205a 243a c esp ACT I SC I 229d 233a ACT V SC II [291 356] 242b-243a / *King Lear* ACT IV S 1 [1 9-134] 274c d / *Antony and Cleopatra* 311a 350d
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 1 18 424c 429d PROP 44 437c-438a PROP 60-61 442d 443b
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VIII [521-594] 243b-245 BK X [990-1066] 269 270b BK X I [79-90] 321a / *Samson Agonistes* [521-540] 351 b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH II SECT 3 104b-d BK II CH XXI SECT 9-48 184d 190d passim ECT 65-67 195b-196c
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 239b 243a
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 109 122d 123a
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 34d 39d passim esp 35 b 38a b 60 -c
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 174c 175 559a-c
42 KANT *Judgement* 586 587a
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 135c 136a 301c d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 162b-c 171 172b
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [2605 677] 63b 65a PART II [9695-9944] 235a 241b
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 15b-16a BK 201a-c K 248b-250 251d 252d K 321d 322d 329c 333 334d 335a 336b-337d
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK I 4a d BK I 39b-40 BK I 164b d
53 JAMES *Psychology* 718a 720a 799a 807a
54 FREUD *Group Psychology* 690b-c / *Ego and Id* 702c d / *New Introductory Lectures* 837b-839b

6 Desire as subject to rule

6a The regulation of desire by reason: the discipline of moral virtue or duty

OLD TESTAMENT: *Exodus*, 20:14, 17 / *Numbers*, 15:38-41 / *Deuteronomy*, 5:18, 21 / *Psalms*, 37:1-13 esp 37:7-8—(D) *Psalms*, 36:1-13 esp 36:7-8 / *Proverbs*, 7; 23:1-8; 25:16; 30:7-9

APOCRYPHA: *Ecclesiasticus*, 18:30-31; 23:5-6; 31:1-17—(D) OT, *Ecclesiasticus*, 18:30-31; 23:5, 6; 31:1-17

NEW TESTAMENT: *Romans*, 8:1-13 / *I Corinthians*, 13:4-8 / *Galatians*, 5:16-24 / *Colossians*, 3:5-15 / *I Thessalonians*, 4:3-8 / *I Timothy*, 6:3-12 / *Titus*, 2:11-14; 3:3-7 / *James*, 4:1-7 / *I Peter*, 2:11

5 AESCHYLUS: *Eumenides* [490-565] 86b-87a

5 EURIPIDES: *Iphigenia at Aulis* [543-589] 429d-430a

5 ARISTOPHANES: *Clouds* [882-1104] 499b-502a / *Lysistrata* 583a-599a,c

7 PLATO: *Phaedrus*, 128a-d / *Phaedo*, 225d-226c / *Gorgias*, 275b-280d / *Republic*, BK III, 326c-327b; BK IV, 346a-356a; BK IX, 416a-c; 425c-427b / *Laws*, BK VI, 712b; BK VIII, 735c-738c

8 ARISTOTLE: *Topics*, BK V, CH I [129a10-16] 179a / *Soul*, BK III, CH 9 [433a5-8] 665c; CH II [434a10-15] 666d-667a

9 ARISTOTLE: *Ethics*, BK I, CH 13 [1102b13-1103a3] 348a-c; BK III, CH 10-12 364b-366a,c; BK VI, CH 2 387d-388b; BK VII, CH 1-10 395a-403c passim / *Politics*, BK II, CH 7 [1266b26-1267a17] 462b-d

11 NICOMACHUS: *Arithmetic*, BK I, 826d-827a

12 AURELIUS: *Meditations*, 253a-310d esp BK II, SECT 16 259a; BK IV, SECT 24 265c-d; BK VII, SECT 55 283b-c

13 VIRGIL: *Aeneid*, BK IV, 167a-186b

14 PLUTARCH: *Coriolanus*, 174b-d; 175a / *Caius Marius*, 353d-354a,c

15 TACITUS: *Annals*, BK III, 57b-58d

17 PLOTINUS: *Fifth Ennead*, TR IX, CH 1-2 246c-247b

18 AUGUSTINE: *Confessions*, BK II, par 2-4 9b-d; BK III, par 1 13b-c; BK VI, par 18-26 40d-43a; BK VIII, par 1-2 52c-53b; par 10-11 55c-56b; par 25-27 60a-c; BK X, par 40-70 81c-89a / *City of God*, BK IX, CH 4-5 287a-289a; BK XIV, CH 8-9 381c-385b; BK XIX, CH 4 511d-512a / *Christian Doctrine*, BK I, CH 24 630c-631a; CH 27 631d; BK III, CH 18-21 664d-666b

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART I, Q 81, A 3 430c-431d; Q 95, A 2 507c-508a; Q 98, A 2 517d-519a; PART I-II, Q 10, A 3 664d-665c; Q 17, A 7 690d-692a; Q 24 727a-730a; Q 45, A 4, ANS 812b-813a

20 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART I-II, Q 50, A 3 8b-9a; Q 56, A 4 32b-33c; A 5, REP 1 33c-34b; QQ 59-60 45d-54d; PART III, Q 15, A 4 790d-791c

21 DANTE: *Divine Comedy*, PURGATORY 53a-105d esp XV [40]-XVIII [75] 75d-80c

22 CHAUCER: *Troilus and Cressida*, BK II, STANZA 82 99a / *Parson's Tale*, par 80 541b-542a

23 HOBBES: *Leviathan*, PART I, 95d-96b

25 MONTAIGNE: *Essays*, 89b-90c; 159a-16?a; 184a-d; 200d-205b; 232b-238d; 431c-432d; 486b-495a; 538a-543a,c

26 SHAKESPEARE: *Henry V*, ACT I, SC I [24-69] 533b-c

27 SHAKESPEARE: *Hamlet*, ACT I, SC III [5-51] 34b-d; ACT III, SC II [61-79] 49c-d / *Troilus and Cressida*, ACT I, SC III [101-124] 109b; ACT II, SC II 113c-115d / *Othello*, ACT I, SC III [3??-337] 212b-c

30 BACON: *Advancement of Learning*, 26a-c; 78a-d

31 DESCARTES: *Discourse*, PART III, 49b-d

31 SPINOZA: *Ethics*, PART III, PROP 2 396a-c; PROP 9, SCHOL 399c; PART IV, PREF 422b,d-424a; PROP 14-18 428a-429d; PROP 44-73 437c-447a; APPENDIX, I-III 447a-b; XXXII 450c-d; PART V, PREF 451a-452c; PROP 1-15 452d-456c; PROP 42 463b-d

32 MILTON: *Areopagitica*, 390b-391a

33 PASCAL: *Pensées*, 104 193a; 502 260b-261a

35 LOCKE: *Human Understanding*, BK I, CH II, SECT 13 107d-108c; BK II, CH XXI, SECT 46-54 189d-192c; SECT 71 197b-198a; SECT 73 198c-199c

42 KANT: *Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals*, 256b; 258b-c; 259a-c; 264d-265b / *Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics*, 378b-c / *Judgement*, 586a-587a

43 MILL: *Liberty*, 295a-d / *Representative Government*, 348a-b / *Utilitarianism*, 463d-464d

44 BOSWELL: *Johnson*, 135c-136a; 176d

46 HEGEL: *Philosophy of Right*, INTRO, par 19 16d-17a; PART III, par 149 56b; par 187 65a-c; ADDITIONS, 13-14 118c-d / *Philosophy of History*, INTRO, 162a-172b; PART III, 312d-313a

49 DARWIN: *Descent of Man*, 304a-305a; 310c-319a esp 310c-312c, 313d-314b, 318d-319a; 592b-593b

51 TOLSTOY: *War and Peace*, BK VI, 245b-c; 248b-250a; EPILOGUE I, 655c-656b

53 JAMES: *Psychology*, 80a-83b passim; 202a-204b; 797b-798a; 807a-808a; 816a-819a

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7 Desire and infinity

(7 *Desire and infinity* 7a *The infinite tendency of desires*)

27 SHAKESPEARE *Troilus and Cressida* ACT III SC II [82-90] 121a / *Macbeth* ACT IV SC III [57-99] 304a c
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 6-9 398d 399c
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 109 193b 194a 125-183 195b-204b
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 236b 238a
42 KANT *Judgement* 584d 585c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 185 64b d ADDITIONS 118 136a b
47 GOETHE *Faust* esp PART I [354 481] 11a 14a [602-784] 16b 20b [1671-1706] 40a 41a PART II [11 433-466] 278a 279a [11 559-586] 281b 282a
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI 164b d

7a(1) The pursuit of pleasure

APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 23 16-17—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 23 21-24
NEW TESTAMENT *John* 4 13-14
7 PLATO *Gorgias* 275b 277c / *Philebus* 628a d
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK III CH 12 [1119^{b}6-12] 366c / *Politics* BK I CH 9 [1257^{b}38-1258 14] 452a b
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [1003-1010] 43a [1076 1094] 44a c BK IV [1073-1120] 58a d BK V [1405-1435] 79b d
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK IV CH 9 237d 238a
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par 2-4 9b d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 30 A 4 751c 752b
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL V [25-45] 7b c
22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida* BK I STANZA 58-66 8b 9b / *Wife of Bath's Prologue* [5953 5960] 262a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 429a b
27 SHAKESPEARE *Antony and Cleopatra* ACT I SC I [1-55] 311b 312a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 42 45 188c 189d
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 283a b
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 364a b
42 KANT *Judgement* 584d 585b 586d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 185 64b d
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [3217 3250] 79a b
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK III 53b 54b

7a(2) The lust for power

OLD TESTAMENT *Isaiah* 14 12 14—(D) *Isaias* 14 12 14 / *Habakkuk* 2 5—(D) *Habacuc* 2 5
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK VII 215c 216b
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK V 506b c
7 PLATO *Gorgias* 275b-277c
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [59-86] 30d 31b [995-1002] 42d 43a
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK II CH 9 237d 238a
14 PLUTARCH *Pyrrhus* 319b 321a / *Pompey* 525a b 533a-c / *Caesar* 599b d / *Crasso* 706b-c
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIV CH 13 388 c 388c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 63 A 3 327b-328b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 76c d
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 350d 354b
26 SHAKESPEARE *Richard III* 105a 148a c / *Julius Caesar* ACT II SC I [10 34] 574c-d
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I [242 270] 98b-99a
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH XIX SECT 9 78a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 364a b

7a(3) The accumulation of wealth

OLD TESTAMENT *Ecclesiastes* 5 10 6 7—(D) *Ecclesiastes* 5 9 6 7 / *Habakkuk* 2 5 11—(D) *Habacuc* 2 5 11
APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 11 10 14 9—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 11 10 14 9 / *Baruch* 3 16-19—(D) OT *Baruch* 3 16 19
NEW TESTAMENT *Luke* 12 16 21
5 ARISTOPHANES *Plutus* [143 197] 630d 631b
7 PLATO *Gorgias* 275b 277c / *Republic* BK VIII 405c-408a 412a / *Laws* BK VIII 733b-d BK IX 751b d
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK I CH 9 [1257^{b}38 1258 14] 452a b BK II CH 7 [1266^{b}27 1267^b] 462b-463b
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [59-93] 30d 31b BK VI [1 42] 80a-c
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK IV CH 9 237d 238a
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 19 5d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 2 A 1 REP 3 615d 616c Q 30 A 4 ANS 751c 752b
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 84 A 1 174b 175a
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL, VII [52-66] 10a b
22 CHAUCER *Tale of Melibeus* par 18 408a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 122a 124c
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV APPENDIX XXVIII XXIX 450a
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 237a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 364a b
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 71b d
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 510b
43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 462c-463a
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 125a b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 185 64b d par 195 66d 67a
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [5505-6172] 136a 151a [11 151 287] 271b 274b esp [11 151 162] 271b [11 239-259] 273b 274a
50 MARX *Capital* 60d 62d esp 62a b 71d 72c esp 72a-c 292c 295a esp 293c 294a

CHAPTER 17 DESIRE

The restless search fo the nfinite the de sire for th vis on of God

OLD TESTAMENT *Exod s* 33:11 23 / *Psalms* 27 esp 27:4 27:8 42 43 63 73:25 28 84—(D) *Psalms*, 6 esp 26:4 68 41 42 62 ,72:25 28 83 / *Isaiah* 26:8-9—(D) *Isaias* 6:8-9
NEW TESTAMENT *John* 4 3 14 6 35 / *Philippians* 3:7- 2 / *I John* 3 1 3

7 PLATO *Symposium* 163 167d

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR 1 21a 26a passim / *Sixth Ennead*, TR IX 353d 360d

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* 1a 125 c esp BK I par 1-6 1a 2c, BK II par 15 12b-c BK II par 1 13b-c, par 8 14d 15a, BK I par 15 9 23 24b BK V par 1 2 27a-c, BK II par 6-23 48c 50c BK VIII par 1, 18 57d 58a, BK IX par 3 62a b BK X par 40 71 81c BK XI par 1 4 89b-90b BK XII par 1 101c, par 23 104b-c BK XIII 110d 125a / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 38 635c d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 6 A 1 REP 28b-d Q 12 A 1 ANS 50c 51c A 8 REP 4 57b-58b Q 26 A 2 ANS 150c 151a Q 54 2 A 28 d 286c Q 60 5 313b-314c Q 6 A 317d 318c PART I-II Q 2 A REP 3 615d-616c Q 5 A ANS 636d-637 Q 8 655a-657

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 109, A 3 340c 341b PART II II Q 27 A 6 524c 525c Q 28 A 3 528d 529c PART III SUPPL, Q 69 A 4 889c-890c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XV [40-81] 75d 76a X II [91]-XVIII [75] 79b-80c PARADISE IV [115]-V [12] 111d 112b XXII [b-] 140b XX T [S] 145d 146c XXXIII 156b-157d esp [46-48] 156c

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 80b-81a

31 DESCARTES *Meditations* III 88c d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV APPENDIX IV 447b-c PART V PROP 36 461a-c

32 MILTON *Sonnets* XI 66a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 72 183a b 125 183 195b-204b 463 255a 468 492 255b-259b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI S CT 45 47 189b-190b

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 224a 225a PART III 304c 306a

47 GOETHE *Faust* esp PART I [354 481] 11a 14a, [60 84] 16b-20b [1671 1706] 40a-41 PART II [11,433 466] 278a 2 9a [11 559-586] 281b-282a

48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 78a b

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XII 560a 561d BK XIV 608a b BK X 631a-c

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK III 53b-54b

CROSS REFERENCES

For Matters relevant to the metaphysical conception of desire *see* BEING 7c–7c(3) CHANGE 1 MATTER 1a 3b

Discussions bearing on the theory of natural appetite or desire *see* HABIT 3a HAPPINESS 1 NATURE 1a 2d, 3c(3)

Other discussions of the distinction between conscious and natural desire and of animal appetite in contrast to the human will *see* ANIMAL 1a(3) MAN 4b SENSE 3c WILL 1 2b(2)

The consideration of voluntary acts or movements, *see* ANIMAL 4b NATURE 3c(2) WILL 3a(1)–3a(2)

Other treatments of the objects of desire in general *see* BEING 3b GOOD AND EVIL 1a 3c HAPPINESS 1 4–4b PLEASURE AND PAIN 6a–6b and for particular objects of desire *see* HONOR 2b LIFE AND DEATH 8b WEALTH 10a–10b 10c(3)

The conception of pleasure as the satisfaction of desire *see* PLEASURE AND PAIN 6d

Another comparison of desire and love *see* LOVE 1c 2a–2a(4)

For the psychological analysis of emotional desires and impulses *see* EMOTION 3–3c(4) LOVE 2a(3)–2a(4) MEDICINE 6c(2)

Other discussions of the influence of emotional desires on imagination and thought *see* EMOTION 3b MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 8c, 8e OPINION 2a WILL 3b(1)

The psychological and ethical consideration of problems arising from the conflict between desire and reason or duty *see* DUTY 8 EMOTION 4–4b(2) LIBERTY 3a–3b MIND 1e(3) 9b VIRTUE AND VICE 5a WILL 2b( ) 9b

The discussion of man in relation to the infinite *see* INFINITY 6a MAN 10d and for the theological conception of man's ultimate rest in the vision of God *see* GOD 5b 6c(4) HAPPINESS 7c–7c(1) LOVE 5a(2) WILL 7d

(7 *Desire and infinity* 7a. *The infinite tendency of desires*)

27 SHAKESPEARE *Troilus and Cressida* ACT III SC II [82-90] 121a / *Macbeth* ACT IV, SC III [57-99] 304a c
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 6-9 398d 399c
33 PASCAL *Pensees* 109 193b 194a 125 183 195b 204b
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 236b 238a
42 KANT *Judgement* 584d 585c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 185 64b d ADDITIONS 118 136a b
47 GOETHE *Faust* esp PART I [354-481] 11a 14a [602-784] 16b 20b [1671-1706] 40a 41a PART II [11 433-466] 278a 279a [11 559-586] 281b 282a
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI 164b d

7a(1) The pursuit of pleasure

APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 23 16-17—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 23 21 24
NEW TESTAMENT *John* 4 13 14
7 PLATO *Gorgias* 275b 277c / *Philebus* 628a d
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK III CH 12 [1119b6-12] 366c / *Politics* BK I CH 9 [1257b38-1258 14] 452a b
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [1003-1010] 43a [1076 1094] 44a c BK IV [1073-1120] 58a d BK V [1405-1435] 79b d
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK IV CH 9 237d 238a
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par 2 4 9b d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 30 A 4 751c 752b
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL V [25 45] 7b c
22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida* BK I STANZA 58-66 8b 9b / *Wife of Bath s Prologue* [5953-5960] 262a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 429a b
27 SHAKESPEARE *Antony and Cleopatra* ACT I SC I [1-55] 311b 312a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 42-45 188c 189d
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 283a b
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 364a b
42 KANT *Judgement* 584d 585b 586d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 185 64b-d
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [3217-3250] 79a b
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK III 53b 54b

7a(2) The lust for power

OLD TESTAMENT *Isaiah* 14 12 14—(D) *Isaias* 14 12 14 / *Habakkuk* 2 5—(D) *Habacuc* 2 5
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK VII 215c 216b
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK V 506b c
7 PLATO *Gorgias* 275b-277c
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [59-86] 30d 31b [995 1002] 42d-43a
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK IV CH 9 237d 238a
14 PLUTARCH *Pyrrhus* 319b 321a / *Pompey* 525a b 533a c / *Caesar* 599b d / *Crassus* 706b-c
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIV CH 13 38[illegible] 388c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 6[illegible] A 3 327b 328b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 76c d
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 350d 354b
26 SHAKESPEARE *Richard III* 105a 148a c / *Julius Caesar* ACT II SC I [10-34] 574c d
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I [242 270] 98b 99a
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH XIV SECT 2[illegible] 78a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 364a b

7a(3) The accumulation of wealth

OLD TESTAMENT *Ecclesiastes* 5 10 6 7—(D) *Ecclesiastes* 5 9 6 7 / *Habakkuk* 2 5 11—(D) *Habacuc* 2 5-11
APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 11 10 14 9—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 11 10 14 9 / *Baruch* 3 16-19—(D) OT *Baruch* 3 16-19
NEW TESTAMENT *Luke* 12 16-21
5 ARISTOPHANES *Plutus* [143 197] 630d 631b
7 PLATO *Gorgias* 275b 277c / *Republic* BK VIII 405c-408a 412a / *Laws* BK VIII 733b-d BK IX 751b d
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK I CH 9 [1257b38-1258 14] 452a b BK II CH 7 [1266b27 1267[illegible]] 462b-463b
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [59-[illegible]] 30d 31b BK VI [1 42] 80a-c
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK IV CH 9 237d 238a
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 19 5d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q [illegible] A 1 REP 3 615d 616c Q 30 A 4 ANS 751c 752b
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 8[illegible] A 1 174b 175a
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL, VII [52-6[illegible]] 10a [illegible]
22 CHAUCER *Tale of Melibeus* par 18 408a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 122a 124c
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV APPENDIX XXVIII XXIX 450a
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 237a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 364a b
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 71b-d
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 510b
43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 462c 463a
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 125a b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 1[illegible] 64b d par 195 66d 67a
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [5505-61[illegible]] 136a 151a [11 151-28[illegible]] 271b 274b esp [11 151 16[illegible]] 271b [11 239 258] 273b 274a
50 MARX *Capital* 60d 62d esp 62a b 71d 72[illegible] esp 72a-c 292c 295a esp 293c 294a

Chapter 18 DIALECTIC

INTRODUCTION

THE words "dialectical" and "dialectician" are currently used more often in a derogatory than in a descriptive sense. The person who criticizes an argument by saying, "It's just a matter of definition," is also apt to say, "That may be true dialectically, but . . ." or "You're just being dialectical." Implied in such remarks is dispraise of reasoning which, however excellent or skillful it may be as reasoning, stands condemned for being out of touch with fact or experience.

Still other complaints against dialectic are that it plays with words, begs the question, makes sport of contradictions. When the theologian Hippothadeus almost convinces Panurge that he "should rather choose to marry once than to burn still in fires of concupiscence," Rabelais has Panurge raise one last doubt against the proposal. "Shall I be a cuckold, father?" he asks, "yea or no?" Hippothadeus answers: "By no means . . . will you be a cuckold, if it please God." On receiving this reply Panurge cries out: "O the Lord help us now! whither are we driven to, good folks? To the conditionals, which, according to the rules and precepts of the dialectic faculty, admit of all contradiction and impossibilities. If my Transalpine mule had wings, my Transalpine mule would fly. If it please God, I shall not be a cuckold; but I shall be a cuckold if it please him."

As a term of disapproval "dialectical" has been used by scientists against philosophers, by philosophers against theologians, and, with equal intent, by religious men against those who resort to argument concerning matters of faith.

The early Middle Ages witnessed a conflict between the mystical and the rational approaches to the truths of religion. Those for whom religious experience and revelation were the only avenue to God condemned the dialecticians—the philosophers or theologians who tried to use reason discursively rather than proceed by intuition and vision. With the Reformation and with the Renaissance, men like Martin Luther and Francis Bacon regarded dialectic as the bane of mediaeval learning. Because of its dialectical character, Luther dismissed all theological speculation as sophistry. Bacon for the same reason stigmatized scholastic philosophy as consisting in "no great quantity of matter and infinite agitation of wit."

On grounds which were common as well as opposite, both mystics and experimentalists attacked dialectic as a futile, if not vicious, use of the mind—as hair-splitting and logic chopping. Even when they admitted that it might have some virtue, they approved of it as a method of argument or proof proper enough perhaps in forensic oratory or political debate, but entirely out of place in the pursuit of truth or in approaching reality.

A CERTAIN CONCEPTION of dialectic is implicit in all such criticisms. The dialectician is a man who argues rather than observes, who appeals to reason rather than experience, who draws implications from whatever is said or can be said, pushing a premise to its logical conclusion or reducing it to absurdity. This aspect of dialectic appears to be the object of Rabelais' satire in the famous dispute between Panurge and Thaumast, which is carried on "by signs only, without speaking, for the matters are so abstruse, hard and arduous, that words proceeding from the mouth of man will never be sufficient for the unfolding of them."

In view of those who think that truth can be learned only by observation, by induction from particulars, or generalization from experience, the technique of dialectic, far from being a

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:

I. Works by authors represented in this collection.
II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*.

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—— *Athalie*
Bossuet. *Traité de la concupiscence*
Leibnitz. *New Essays Concerning Human Understanding*, BK II, CH 21
J. Butler. *Fifteen Sermons upon Human Nature*, I, II
Hutcheson. *A System of Moral Philosophy*, BK I, CH 2–3; BK II, CH 2
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E. Hartmann. *Philosophy of the Unconscious*
H. Sidgwick. *The Methods of Ethics*, BK I, CH 4
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T. H. Green. *Prolegomena to Ethics*, BK II, CH
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Bradley. *Collected Essays*, VOL I (14)
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B. Russell. *The Analysis of Mind*, LECT 3
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Fitzgerald. *The Great Gatsby*
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Beebe-Center. *The Psychology of Pleasantness and Unpleasantness*
Nygren. *Agape and Eros*
Rougemont. *Love in the Western World*
Maritain. *Scholasticism and Politics*, CH VI
D'Arcy. *The Mind and Heart of Love*

adds I am a man and the other has given his assent to this also the first draws his conclusion Then you are not a man

According to Augustine this sort of ensnaring argument should not be called dialectical but sophistical He makes the same sort of observation about the abuse of rhetoric in speech which only aims at verbal ornamentation on more than is consistent with seriousness of purpose That too he thinks should be called sophistical in order to avoid attaching the name of rhetoric to misapplications of the art

Dialectic for Augustine is the art which deals with inferences and definitions and divisions and is of the greatest assistance in the discovery of meaning Rhetoric on the other hand, is not to be used so much for a certain in the meaning as for setting forth the meaning when it is ascertained Dialectic in other words is divorced from the practical purpose of stating and winning an argument and given theoretical status as a method of inquiry

THIS CONCEPTION of dialectic *originates in the* dialogues of Plato Not himself a sophist either by profession or in aim Socrates found other uses for the analytical and argumentative device invented by the sophists The same skills of mind which were practically useful in the public assembly and in the law courts could be used or adapted for clarification and precision in speculative discussions They could also be used to find the truth implicit in the commonly expressed convictions of men and to lay bare errors caused by lack of definition in discourse or lack of rigor in reasoning

In the *Sophist* Plato separates the philosopher from the sophist not by any distinction in method but by the difference in the use each makes of the same technique And in the *Republic* one of the reasons Socrates gives for postponing the study of dialectic until the age of thirty is that youngsters when they first get the taste in their mouths argue for amusement and like puppy dogs they rejoice in pulling and tearing at all who come near them As a result of being vainly disputatious they get into the way of not believing anything which they believed before and hence not only they but philosophy and all that relates to it is apt to have a bad name with the rest of the world But when a man begins to get older he will no longer be guilty of such insanity he will imitate the dialectician who is seeking for truth and not the sophist who is contradicting for the sake of amusement

In the hands of the philosopher dialectic is an instrument of science There is according to Socrates no other method of comprehending by any regular process all true existence or of ascertaining what each thing is in its own nature It passes beyond the arts at the lowest level which are concerned with the desires or opinions of men or are cultivated with a view to production and constructions It likewise transcends the mathematical sciences which while they have some apprehension of true being leave the hypotheses which they use unexamined and are unable to give an account of them Using these as handmaids and helpers dialectic goes directly to the first principle and is the only science which does away with hypotheses in order to make her ground secure

The dialectic of Plato has an upward and a downward path which somewhat resemble the inductive process of the mind from facts to principles and the deductive process from principles to the conclusions they validate Dialectic says Socrates ascends by using hypotheses as steps and points of departure into a world which is above hypotheses in order that she may soar beyond them to the first principle of the whole By successive steps she descends again without the aid of any sensible object from ideas through ideas and in ideas she ends

As the disciplined search for truth dialectic includes all of logic It is concerned with every phase of thought with the establishment of definition the examination of hypotheses in the light of their presuppositions or consequences the formulation of inferences and proofs the resolution of dilemmas arising from opposition in thought.

WHEREAS FOR PLATO dialectic is more than the whole of logic for Aristotle it is less Dialectic is more than the process by which the mind goes from myth and fantasy perception and opinion, to the highest truth For Plato it is the

method of inquiry seems to have virtue only for the purpose of disputation or criticism The human faculties writes Gibbon are fortified by the art and practice of dialectics It is the keenest weapon of dispute he adds but more effectual for the detection of error than for the investigation of truth

Mill describes the Socratic dialectics so magnificently exemplified in the dialogues of Plato as a contrivance for making the diffi *culties of the question* present to the learn er s consciousness They were essentially a negative discussion of the great questions of philosophy and life he continues directed with consummate skill to the purpose of con vincing anyone who has merely adopted the commonplaces of received opinion that he did not understand the subject The school dis putations of the Middle Ages had a somewhat *similar object* In Mill s *opinion as a disci* pline to the mind they were in every respect inferior to the powerful dialectics which formed the intellects of the Socratic viri but the modern mind he says owes far more to both than it is generally willing to admit and the present modes of education contain nothing which in the smallest degree supplies the place either of the one or of the other

Disparaging comment on dialectic comes not only from those who contrast it unfavorably with the methods of experiment or empirical research It is made also by writers who trust reason s power to grasp truths intuitively and *to develop their consequences deductively* Sensitive to what may seem to be a paradox here Descartes writes in his *Rules for the Di rection of the Mind* It may perhaps strike some with surprise that here where we are dis cussing how to improve our power of deducing one truth from another we have omitted all the precepts of the dialecticians The dialec tician can proceed only after he has been given premises to work from Since in Descartes view dialectic provides no method for estab lishing premises or for discovering first princi ples it can contribute nothing at all to the discovery of the truth Its only possible use is to serve to explain at times more easily to others the truths we have already ascertained hence it should be transferred from Philosophy to Rhetoric

The connection of dialectic with disputation and rhetoric has some foundation in the his torical fact that many of the techniques of dialectic originated with the Greek sophists who had primarily a rhetorical or forensic aim. Comparable to the Roman rhetoricians and to the law teachers of a later age the sophists taught young men how to plead a case how to defend themselves against attack how to per suade an audience Skill in argument had for them a practical not a theoretical purpose not truth or knowledge but success in litiga tion or in political controversy The familiar charge that the method they taught enabled men to make the worse appear the better rea son probably exaggerates but none the less reflects the difference between the standards of probability in disputation and the standards of truth in scientific inquiry This has some *bearing on the disrepute of sophistry* and the derogatory light cast on the *dialectical* when it is identified with the *sophistical*

But there is another historical fact which places dialectic in a different light In the tra dition of the liberal arts especially in their Roman and mediaeval development dialec tic and logic are interchangeable names for the discipline which together with grammar and rhetoric comprises the three liberal arts known as the trivium In his treatise *On Christian Doctrine* Augustine uses the word dialectic in this way Whatever else it means, the identification of dialectic with logic implies *its distinction from rhetoric* and certainly from sophistry

Yet Augustine does not fail to observe the misuse of dialectic which debases it to the level of sophistry In the use of it he declares, we must guard against the *love of wrangling* and the childish vanity of entrapping an adversary For there are many of what are called *sophisms* he continues inferences in reasoning that are false and yet so close an imitation of the true as to deceive not only dull people but clever men too when they are not on their guard. He gives as an example the case of one man say ing to another What I am you are not The other man may assent to this thinking as Augustine points out that the proposition is in part true the one man being cunning the other simple. But when the first speaker

an organon of the universal and unl m ted exer cise of the understanding

When it is thus misused the exercise of the pure understanding becomes dialectical. The second part of our transcendental logic Kant writes, "must therefore be a critique of dialectical illusion and this critique we shall term Transcendental Dialectic—not meaning it as an art of producing dogmatically such illusion (an art which is unfortunatel too current among the practitioners of metaphysical juggling) but as a critique of understanding and reason in regard to their hyperphysical use.

Kant goes further than Aristotle in separating dialectic from science. With regard to the sensible or phenomenal world of experience science is possible with regard to the mind's own structure the supreme sort of science is possible But when reason tries to use its ideas for other objects, and then regards them as conceptions of actual things, their mode of application is *transcendent* and delusive Kant explains that "an idea is employed transcendentally when it is applied to an object falsely believed to correspond to it immanently when it is applied solely to the employment of the *understanding* in the *sphere of experience* and he maintains that when ideas are used transcendentally they do not give rise to science but "assume a *fallacious* and dialectical character

A conclusion of dialectical reasoning according to Kant is either opposed b a conclusion equally acceptable to reason— a perfectly natural antithetic"—as in the antinomies of pure reason o as in the paralogisms, the reasoning has specious cogency which can be shown to conclude falsely while the form is correct and unexceptionable In this balance of reason against itself l es the illusory character of the transcendental dialectic.

Where Aristotle recognizes that reason can be employed on both sides of a question because it involves competing probabilities, Kant in calling dialectic "a logic of appearance" explicitly remarks that this does not signify a doctrine of probability He further distinguishes what he calls "transcendental illusory appearance from empirical illusory appearance and ordinary logical illusion." The latter two can be corrected and totally removed But transcendental illusion, on the contrary" he writes, does not cease to exist even after it has been exposed and its nothingness has been clearly perceived by means of transcendental criticism

The reason for this, Kant explains, is that here we have to do with a *natural* and unavoidable illusion which rests upon subjective principles, and imposes these upon us as objective

There is, therefore he continues, a natural and unavoidable dialectic of pure reason" which arises because the mind seeks to answer questions well nigh impossible to answer such as how objects exist as *things in themselves* or how the nature of things is to be subordinated to principles. *In its effort to* transcend experience— in disregard of all the warnings of criticism —the mind *cannot* escape the frustration the dialectical illusion, which is an inseparable adjunct of human *reason* It is not Kant repeatedly insists, *that* the ideas of pure reason are *in their own nature* dialectical it is *from* their misemployment alone that fallacies and illusions arise"

FOR HEGEL AS for Plato dialectic moves *in the* realm of truth and ideas, not probabilities and illusions. But for Hegel dialectic is always the process of mind or of the Idea in interminable motion toward absolute truth—never resting in the intuition of that truth. The Idea he writes, "is self-determined it assumes successive forms which it successively transcends and by this very process of transcending its earlier stages, gains an affirmative and in fact a richer and more concrete shape."

The dialectical process is a motion in which contrary and defective truths are harmonized The synthesis of *thesis and antithesis* results in a more complete truth. To illustrate his meaning Hegel uses the example of building a house For such a purpose we must have in the first instance a subjective aim and design and as means, *the several substances* required for the work—iron, wood stones. In rendering these materials suitable *for our* purpose we make use of the elements fire to melt the iron wind *to* blow the fire, water to set the wheels in *motion*, in order to cut the wood etc"

Yet the house that we build is, according to

ultimate fruit of intellectual labor—knowledge itself and in its supreme form as a vision of being and unity That is why Socrates makes it the ultimate study in the curriculum proposed for training the guardians to become philosopher kings Dialectic he says is the coping stone of the sciences and is set over them no other science can be placed higher—the nature of knowledge can go no further

For Aristotle dialectic far from being at the summit of science and philosophy lies at their base and must be carefully distinguished from sophistry which it resembles in method Dialecticians and sophists assume the same guise as the philosopher Aristotle writes for sophistic is wisdom which exists only in semblance and dialecticians embrace all things in their dialectic and being is common to all things but evidently their dialectic embraces these subjects because these are proper to philosophy Sophistic and dialectic he continues turn on the same class of things as philosophy but philosophy differs from dialectic in the nature of the faculty required and from sophistic in *respect of the purpose of the philosophic life* Dialectic is merely critical where philosophy claims to know and sophistic is what appears to *be philosophy but is not*

According to Aristotle dialectic is neither *itself a science nor the method of science It is* that part of logic or method which he treats in the *Topics* and it differs from the scientific *method expounded in the Posterior Analytics* as argument in the sphere of opinion and probabilities differs from scientific demonstration *Unlike the conclusions of science the conclusions* of dialectical reasoning are only probable because they are based on assumptions rather *than self evident truths Since other and opposite* assumptions cannot be excluded one dialectical conclusion is usually opposed by another *in an issue of competing probabilities*

Intermediate between science and rhetoric dialectic can serve both In addition to its practical *employment in forensics it is* useful in the philosophical sciences because it develops skill in making and criticizing definitions and in asking or answering *questions* The ability to raise searching difficulties on both sides of a subject Aristotle says will make us detect more easily the truth and error about the several points that arise

Though it is primarily a method of arguing from assumptions and of dealing with disputes arising from contrary assumptions dialectic is also concerned with the starting points of argument The *Topics* considers how assumptions are chosen what makes them acceptable what determines their probability Here again Aristotle shows how the philosopher can make use of dialectic—as that process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries

There are four major expositions of dialectic in the tradition of the great books It is as pivotal a *conception in the thought* of Kant and Hegel as it is in the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle With differences which may be more *important than the similarities* the Kantian treatment resembles the Aristotelian the Hegelian the Platonic

Like *the division between the Posterior Analytics* and the *Topics* in Aristotle s *Organon*, the transcendental logic of Kant s *Critique of Pure Reason falls into two parts*—the analytic and the dialectic The distinction between his transcendental logic and what Kant calls general *logic is discussed in the chapter* on Logic, but here it must be observed that for Kant general logic considered as an organon must *always be a logic of illusion* that is, be dialectical He thinks that the ancients used the word dialectic in this sense to signify a sophistical *art for giving ignorance* nay even intentional sophistries the coloring of truth in which the thoroughness of procedure which logic requires *was imitated* *For his own purposes*, however he wishes dialectic to be understood in the sense of a critique of dialectical *illusion*

When *he comes to his own* transcendental logic therefore he divides it into two parts. *The first part* deals with the elements of pure *cognition of the understanding* and the principles without which no object at all can be thought This is the Transcendental Analytic and at the same time a logic of truth—a logic of science Since in his view it ought *properly to be only a canon for judging* of the empirical use of the understanding this kind of logic is misused when we seek to employ it as

IT IS ONLY IN the writings of H gel or his fol lowers that the meaning of dialectic is not limited to the activity of human thought. Hegel expressly warns that the loftier dia lectic is not an activity of subjective think ing appl ed to some matter externally but is rather the matter s ery soul puttin forth its branches and fruit organically It is the de velopment of the Idea which is the proper acti ity of its rationality If the whole world in its existence and development is the thought and thinkin of an Absolute Mind or the Idea then the events of nature and of history are moments in a dialectical process of cosmic pro portions. The principles of dialectic become the principles of change and change itself is conce ed as a progress or evolution from lower to higher from part to whole, from the inde terminate to the determinate

The dialectical pattern of history conceived by Hegel as the progressi e objectification of spirit is reconstructed by Karl Marx in terms of the conflict of material forces. Marx himself explicitly contrasts his dialectic with that of Hegel. "My dialectic method he writes, is not only different from the Hegelian but is its direct opposite H-gel he claims, thinks that the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of the Idea whereas his own view is that "the deal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind and translated into forms of thought.

Nevertheless, with respect to dialectic, Marx praises Hegel for being "the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner The only trouble is that with Hegel dialect c is standing on its head. It must therefore "be turned right sid up again a revolution which Marx thinks he accomplishes in his dialectical materialism.

Ha ing put dialectic on its proper basis, Marx constructs the whole of history in terms of a conflict of material forces, or of social classes in economic strife accord ng to a dialec tical pattern which pro ides "recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time lso the recognition of the negation of that stat of i ine table breaking up " History is thus iewed dialectically as in fluid move ment " yet it is also conceived as working towards a definite end—the revolution which has as its result the peace of the classless society Bourgeois industry by bringing about the con centration and association of the proletariat produces its own grave d ggers its fall and the victory of the proletariat are equally ine i table

In Marx s vocabulary the phrases historical materialism" and dialectical materialism are strictly synonymous But Marx s *protest to the contrary* notwithstanding a comparison of Marx and Hegel seems to show that a dialectic of history is equally capable of being conceived *in terms of spirit or of matter*

The question whether there is a dialectic of nature as well as a dialectic of history remains a point of controversy in Marxist thought de spite the bearing which Hegel s *Science of Logic* and *Phenomenology of Mind* might have upon the question. Engels tries in his *Dialectics of Nature* to give a fuller rendering of the Hege lian dialectic in strictly *materialistic* terms. Its universal scope including all of nature as well as all of his ory is also reflected in certain post Darwinian doctrines of cosmic evolution

CONSIDERATIONS RELEVANT to the Hegelian or Marxist dialectic will be found in the chapters on HISTORY and PROGRESS Without judging the issues which Hegel and Marx have raised in the thought of the last century it may be per missible to report the almost violent intellectual a ersion they have produced in certain quarters. Freud for example is as unsympathetic in his criticism of Marx and as uncompromising in his rejection of dialectical materialism, as James be fore him is extreme in the express on of his d s taste for Hegel Mocking the Hegelians who think that the glory and beauty of the psychic life is that in it all contradictions find their re conciliation James declares "With this intel lectual temper I confess I cannot contend

The Hegelian dialectic and what James calls the pantomime-state of mind are, in his opin ion, emotionally considered one and th same thing In the pantomime all common things are represented to happen in impossible ways, peo ple jump down each other s throats, houses turn inside out old women become young men

Hegel an opposite or antithesis of these elements The wind which has helped to build the house is shut out by the house so also are the violence of rains and floods and the destructive powers of fire so far as the house is made fire proof The stones and beams obey the law of gravity—press downward—and so high walls are carried up The result is that the elements are made use of in accordance with their nature and yet to cooperate for a product by which their operation is limited The initial opposition between the idea of a house and the elements is reconciled in the higher synthesis which is the house itself

While it shows the opposing theses and the resulting synthesis this example does not fully exhibit the dynamic character of the Hegelian *dialectic* If the resulting synthesis is not the whole truth it too must be defective and require supplementation by a contrary which is defective in an opposite way These two together then become the material for a higher synthesis another step in that continuing dialectical process which is the life of mind—both the subjective dialectic of the human mind and the objective dialectic of the Absolute Mind or *the Idea*

The thread of common meaning which runs *through these four conceptions of dialectic is* to be found in the principle of opposition In *each of them dialectic either begins or ends with some sort of intellectual conflict or de*velops and then resolves such oppositions

For Kant dialectical opposition takes the extreme form of irreducible contradictions from which the mind cannot escape It is a melancholy reflection he declares that reason in its highest exercise falls into an antithetic This comes about because all statements enunciated by pure reason transcend the conditions of possible experience beyond the sphere of which we can discover no criterion of truth while they are at the same time framed in accordance with the laws of the understanding which are applicable only to experience and thus it is the fate of all such speculative discussions that while the one party attacks the weaker side of his opponent *he infallibly lays* open his own weaknesses

For Hegel the opposition takes the milder form of contrary theses and antitheses They can be dialectically overcome by a synthesis which remedies the incompleteness of each half truth It is one of the most important discoveries of logic Hegel says that a specific moment which by standin in an opposition has the position of an extreme ceases to be such and is a moment in an organic whole by being at the same time a mean. The Hegelian opposition is thus also mediation

Dialectical opposition for Aristotle originates in the disagreements which occur in ordinary human discourse But just as disagreement is reasonable only if there are two sides to the question in dispute so reason can operate dialectically only with regard to genuinely arguable matters The familiar topics concernin which men disagree represent the commonplace issues of dialectic since for the most part they are formed from debatable propositions or questions Nobody in his senses Aristotl believes would make a proposition of what no one holds nor would he make a problem of what is obvious to everybody or to most people Each of the conflicting *opinions* will therefore have some claim to probability Here the dialectical process ends neither in a synthe*sis of incomplete opposites nor in a rejection* of both as illusory but having an eye to general *opinion it seeks to ascertain* the more reason*able view—the more tenable* or probable of the two

In the Platonic theory of dialectic the element of opposition appears in the tension between being and becoming the one and many or the intelligible and the sensible which is found present in every stage of the mind s dialectical ascent to the contemplation of ideas. So fundamental is this tension that Socrates uses it to define the dialectician as one who is able to see a One and Many in Nature —*by com*prehending scattered particulars in one idea and dividing it into species according to their *natural formation* Here as in the Hegelian theory the oppositions—*apparent* contradictions in discourse—can be resolved by dial ctic *and through their resolution* the mind then rises to a higher level

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T find the passa es cited use the numbers in hea y type, which are the volume and pa n mbers of the passages referred to. For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad* BK II [65 283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the olume in the set th number 12d indicates that the pas- sa is in section d of page 12

P GE SECTION When th text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lowe hal es of the pa e For exampl in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b, the passa e begins in the upper half of page 1 6 and e ds in the lower half of page 119 When the text is pri ted in two colu nns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower hal es of the left hand side f th page the letters and d t the upper and lower hal es of the ri ht hand side of the page F r exampl in 7 PLATO *S mposium* 163b-164c, the passa e begins in the lower half of the left hand side of pa e 16 and end i the upper half of the right hand side of pa e 164

AUTHOR DIVI IO S O e or more f the ma n d isions of a wo k (such as P RT K, CH SECT) ar som times included in the reference l ne numbers, in brackets, are g en in cer tain cases g *Iliad* K II [26 S3] 12d

B E REF R N E Th eferences are to books, chap er and erse. When the King James and Dou ers ons differ in t tle f books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the Kin James ersion s cited first and the Dou ind cated b a (*D*) follows e g OLD TEST ME T *Nehemiah* 7 45—(*D*) *II Esdras* 7 46

S M B LS The abbreviation esp calls the reader s attention to one or more especially rele ant parts of a whole reference passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermit tentl rather than continuously in the work or passa cited

For additional information concernin the st le f the ref rences, see the E planat on of Reference Style for general guida ce in th use t *The Great Id a* consult the Preface.

1 Definitions of dial ctic

7 PLATO *Cratylu* 85d-89a / *Phaedrus* 139d 140a / *Republic* K VI 387c-d K II 395d 398c / *Parmenide* 491a-c / *So his* 557a-b 571 -c / *Philebus* 611d-612b 634b-c / *Seventh Letter* 809c-810c

8 ARISTOTL *Prior Ana ytics* BK I CH 1 [4 1 b15] 39a-c *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH I [2 3] 106b *Topics* BK I CH 1 [100a 8 b31] 143a-c CH 2 [1 1b3 4] 144a / *Sophistical Refutations* H 2 [6 b3 4] 228a CH 1 [1 3-5] 236a b [1 b4] 23 a-c / *Generation and Corruption* BK CH [3 6 14] 411 -d *Meta hysic* B H [004b 5] 523d X H 3 [9-o] 589c-d *Soul* K CH [4 3 29- 8] 632c-d

9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* K CH 1 [1354 1-5] 593a [355] 594b H [1356 3 33] 595d 596a

17 PLOTINU *First Ennead* TR III CH 4-6 11 12b

20 AQ IN S *Summa Theologica* P T I-I Q 5 6, R 3 40a-41

31 DESC RTES *Rules*, X, 16d 17

42 KANT *Pure Re son* 36d 37d 59c-d 108a 111 esp 108a-d 227 235a esp 229b-c, 231c 232a / *Practical Reason*, 337 -c / *Judgement* 562a 564c esp 562d

43 MILL *Liberty* 287d 288a

46 H GEL *Philoso hy of Ri h* I TRO, par 31 19c 20a / *Philoso hy f History* INTRO, 179b-c 182d

2 Di erse theories of di lectic

2a Dialectic as the pursuit of truth and the con- templ tion of being

7 PL TO *Prot goras* 57a-c *P aedru* 139b- 140b / *Phaedo* 242b-c / *Re ublic* BK I 383d 388a BK 1 396d 398c / *Parmenide* 491 -d / *So hist* 5 6c 557b 571a-c / *S es man* 585c / *Philebus* 611d 612b 634b-635a / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810d

17 PLOTIN S *First Ennead* TR III 10a 12b esp CH 4-6 11 12b

42 KANT *Practic l Reason* 337a 338 / *J dgment* 5 1a-552

43 M LL *Liberty* 287c 288c

2a(1) The ascent from ppearance to reality o from op nion to knowledge the up- ward and downward paths of d alectic

7 PLATO *Republic* BK VI 383b-388a BK 391b-401d / *Sophist* 551a 579d esp 552b-c 561d 579d / *Statesman* 580a-608d esp 585d, 586c 589c-d 591 -c, 594d 596a 599a-c 608d / *Seventh Letter* 810a d

everything passes into its opposite with inconceivable celerity and skill And so in the Hegelian logic James continues relations elsewhere recognized under the insipid name of distinctions (such as that between knower and object many and one) must first be translated into impossibilities and contradictions, then transcended and identified by miracle ere the proper temper is induced for thoroughly enjoying the spectacle they show

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50 MARX *Capital*, 10a 11d esp 11b-d
54 FREUD *New Introductory Lectures* 882c

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46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right*, INTRO, par 6 18b-c; par 31 19c-20a; PART II, par 1-5 114 40a-42b esp par 109 41b; par 140 49b-54a; ADDITIONS 6 126d-127 / *Philosophy of History*, PART IV 360c-361a

2d( ) The dialectic of nature and of history: the actualization of freedom

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right*, INTRO, par 4 12d-13a; PART III, par 94 66c-d; par 340-344 110b-111; par 353-360 112b-114a / *Philosophy of History* 153a 369a, esp INTRO, 156c-190b, 203d 206a,c; PART IV 368d 369a,c

3. Types of dialectical opposition

3a The opposition between being and becoming, the one and the many, the same and the other

7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 126a-c 134b-c / *Symposium* 167a-d / *Republic*, BK III 333b-d; BK 370d-373c; BK VI 383d 398c / *Parmenides* 486a 511d / *Sophist* 564d 574c / *Statesman*, 594d 595a / *Philebus* 610d-613a; 615c-617d; 633a-635a esp 634b-635a / *Seventh Letter* 809c-810d

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53 JAMES *Psychology* 10 a b

3b The opposed premises of dialectical argument; dialectical problems and theses; the conflict of probabilities

8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics*, BK CH 1 [4 5] 39a-c / *Posterior Analytics*, BK I, CH 1 [25 35] 106b / *Topics*, BK I, CH 148a-c; CH 2 [5 34 33] 213d 214b / *Sophistical Refutations*, CH 2 [165b3 4] 278a / *Heavens*, BK I, CH 10 [4] 3 0d

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses*, BK II, CH 250d 151

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, 0 83 436d 438a

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 4 d 48d

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* 43d

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding*, BK IV, CH 9 369b-c

35 HUME *Human Understanding*, SECT X, DIV 86-9 488d-491c

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 108a d

3c The opposed conclusions of dialectical reasoning: the antinomies and paralogisms of a transcendental dialectic

9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric*, BK I, CH 1 [1355a-5 40] 59c-d

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 1a-4a,c; 7a 8b; 120c-173a esp 129c 130b, 133c; 174b-177b; 187a-192d; 200c 209d; 219a 220b; 229b-c / *Fundamental Principles of Metaphysic of Morals* 260d 261b; 283d-284d / *Practical Reason* 291a 29 a; 302a-d; 331c-33 a,c; 340a 342d; 348d 349 / *Science of Right* 40 405b / *Judgement* 540a 546d esp 543c 544c; 562a 578a,c; 562d 564c,575b-578a; 584c-d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right*, PART II, par 135 47b-d

3d Thesis and antithesis as moments in the advance toward dialectical synthesis

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 7a-8b; 43d-44a; 133c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right*, INTRO, par 1 16c; par 6 18b-c; par 31 33 19c 20d; PART I, par 104 39b-d; PART II, par 105 114 40a-42b esp par 109 41b; PART III, par 30 79d 80a; par 30 101a-c; par 353 360 112b-114a,c / *Philosophy of History* 153a 369a,c esp INTRO, 153a 190b; 203a 206a,c; PART 205b-d, 235d 236c, 238b 24 b-d, 25 a-c; PART II 2 9c-d; PART II 286c 287a, 303c 311d; PART IV 316a b 321d 32 c, 3 6d 327a, 333d-334d

53 JAMES *Psychology* 117b 238b [fn]

4 Dialectic in relation to philosophy and science

7 PLATO *Republic*, BK VI, 383d 398c esp BK 385d 388a; BK 396d 398c / *Parmenides* 490d-491a / *Sophist* 5 0a 574c esp 571 c / *Philebus* 610d-613a; 633a-635a esp 634b-635a / *Seventh Letter* 809c-810d

8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics*, BK I, CH 1 [ ] 39a-c / *Posterior Analytics*, BK I, CH 6 [8-] 103a b; CH 1 [35] 106b; CH 19 [ ] 111 -d; BK II, CH 5 [ ] 22 b / *Topics*, BK I, CH 1 143a 144a; CH 10-11 147b-148c; CH 13 [105b30-3] 149c; BK III, CH 3 [159a 14] 215c-d / *Sophistical Refutations*, CH 9- 1 234b-23 c / *Heavens*, BK I [ ] 3 0d / *Generation and Corruption*, BK I, CH 2 [316 5 14] 411 -d / *Metaphysics*, BK I, CH 1 [980a], BK II, CH 1 [993b 5] 499a 512a esp BK I, CH 3 [983a24] 501c-d; CH 506b-d; BK I, CH 10 [993a11]-BK II, CH 1 [993b15] 511c 512a; BK III 513b,d 522a,c esp CH 1 [99 3 b4] 513b d; BK I, CH 2 [1004b1] 523d; BK XI, CH 3 [106 -9b12] 589c d; BK XIII, CH 4 [1078b 8-32] 610b-c / *Soul*, BK I, CH 1 [403a 25 b19] 632b-d

(2a Dialectic as the pursuit of truth and the contemplation of being 2a(1) The ascent from appearance to reality or from opinion to knowledge the upward and downward paths of dialectic)

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III CH 4 6 11a 12b
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 113b 115c 173b 174a / *Judgement* 551a 552c
43 MILL *Liberty* 288a

2a(2) Definition division hypothesis and myth in the service of dialectic

7 PLATO *Charmides* 4a 13d esp 4b 5a b 6d 7c 10a / *Laches* 31c 37d / *Protagoras* 43d 45a 49a / *Phaedrus* 124b 129d 134a c 139d 140b / *Meno* 174a 190a c esp 175d 179d 180b 183b c / *Euthyphro* 192c 199a c esp 193a 193d 195b / *Phaedo* 242b 243c / *Republic* BK I II 297b 316b BK IV 346a 356a BK VI VII 386d 398c / *Timaeus* 462b c / *Parmenides* 486a 511d esp 491a d / *Sophist* 551a 579d esp 552b c 553d 554a 561b 570c 571d / *Statesman* 580a 608d esp 580d 582d 583c 586c 589c 591a d 594d 596a / *Philebus* 609a 639a c esp 610d 613a 615c 617d / *Seventh Letter* 809c-810d
8 ARISTOTLE *Generation and Corruption* BK I CH 2 [316^{a}5 14] 411c d / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 6 [987 29-^{b}7] 505b c [987^{b}30 33] 506a BK XIII CH 4 [1078^{b}18-32] 610b c / *Soul* BK I CH 1 [403 29 ^{b}8] 632c d
9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH 2-3 165d 167d
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 7 112b 113d
17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III CH 4 11a c

2b Dialectic as the method of inquiry argument and criticism in the sphere of opinion

8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK I CH 1 [24 21-^{b}15] 39a c / *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 11 [77 25-35] 106b CH 19 [81^{b}17 22] 111c d / *Topics* 143a 223a c / *Sophistical Refutations* 227a 253d esp CH 1-2 227a 228a CH 9 11 234b 237c CH 34 252c 253d / *Generation and Corruption* BK I CH 2 [316 2 14] 411c d / *Metaphysics* BK IV CH 2 [1004^{b}15-27] 523d
9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK I CH 1 2 593a 598b CH 4 [1359 30 ^{b}19] 599c d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 57 A 6 REP 3 40a 41a PART III Q 9 A 3 REP 2 765b 766b
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 60a c 65a c
31 DESCARTES *Rules* II 2c 3a IV 5b c X 16d 17a XIII 25b
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 299b
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 36d 37d 109b c / *Judgement* 600d 603d
43 MILL *Liberty* 287c 288c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO par 31 19c 20a PART II par 140 53a b / *Philosophy of History* PART IV 360c d

2b(1) Divisions of dialectic the theory of the predicables

8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK I VIII 143a 211a c esp BK I CH 2 143d 144a CH 4-6 144b 146a CH 12 148d / *Sophistical Refutations* CH 11 [171^{b}3-8] 236a b [172 ^{b}4] 237b c
9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK I CH 2 [1356 36-1358 33] 596a 598b
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 5 A 6 REP 3 40a 41a

2b(2) The technique of question and answer

7 PLATO *Protagoras* 50d 51b / *Euthydemus* 78a d / *Cratylus* 88d 89a / *Republic* BK VI, 375b c / *Sophist* 551d
8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK I CH 1 [24 21 ^{b}15] 39a c / *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 11 [77 25-35] 106b BK II CH 5 [91^{b}11 11] 125b / *Topics* BK VIII 211a 223a c / *Sophistical Refutations* CH 10 [171 27]-CH 11 [172^{b}6] 235d 236a CH 11 [17 15 21] 237a
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK III CH 2 1 8a d
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 65a
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 36a b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART II par 140, 53a b

2c Dialectic as the logic of semblance and as the critique of the illusory employment of reason beyond experience

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 1a 4a c esp 1a b 7a 8b 15c 16c 20a 36d 37b 53b 54b 59c d 93c 99a 101b 107b 108a 209d esp 108a 112d, 120c 121c 129c 130b 133d 157d 173b 174a, 175c d 185b c 190a 209d 217d 218a 219a 223d 227a 235a esp 229b c 231c 232a / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 260d 261c 283d 284d / *Practical Reason* 291a 292a 296a d 309b 310d 311d 313b-314d 320c 321b 335c 337a c / *Judgement* 461a c 540a 542a 543c 544c 551a 552c 562a 564c 570b-572b 606d 607c

2c(1) The division of logic into analytic and dialectic the distinction between general and transcendental dialectic

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 34a 37d esp 36a 37d 108a 111c

2c(2) The natural dialectic of human reason

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 1a 3b 7a 8b 20a 120c 121c 133d 192c 193b 217d 218a 227a 235a esp 229b c / *Practical Reason* 335c 337d 352b c / *Judgement* 570b 572b

2d Dialectic as the evolution of spirit or matter

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO par 32 33 20a d PART III par 342 344 110c 111a par 353 360 112b 114a c / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 153a 206a c esp 178a 179c 182d 183a, 203a 206a c PART I 208b d 236a-c 257a-c PART II 278a c PART IV 315a

50 MARX *Capital* 10a 11d esp 11b-d
54 FREUD *New Introductory Lectures* 882c

2d(1) The distinction between subjective and objective dialectic: the realization of the moral will

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO par 26 18b-c par 31 19c 20 PART II par 105 114 40a-42b esp par 109 41a b PART III par 140 49b-54a INTRO 5 67-72 126d 127c / *Philosophy of History* PART IV 360c 361a

2d(2) The dialectic of nature and of history: the actualization of freedom

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO par 4 12d 13a PART III, par 194 66c d par 340-344 110b-111a par 353 360 112b-114a,c / *Philosophy of History* 153a 369a, esp INTRO 156c 190b 203d 206a,c, PART IV 368d 369a,c

3 Types of dialectical opposition

3a The opposition between being and becoming the one and the many the same and the other

7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 126a-c 134b-c / *Symposium* 167 d / *Republic* BK II, 333b-d BK V 370d 373c BK VI-VII 383d 398c / *Parmenides* 486a 511d / *Sophist* 564d 574c / *Statesman*, 594d 595a / *Philebus* 610d-613a 615c-617d 633a-635a esp 634b-635 / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810d
8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK I CH 6 505b-506b BK II CH [993b20-23] 514 b BK IV CH 2 522b-524b esp [1004b15 26] 523d
11 NICOMACHUS *Arithmetic* BK II 839d 840b
17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR CH 4 11a-c / *Second Ennead* TR IV CH 5 51b-d / *Third Ennead* TR II 93b-c TR VI 119b-129a TR 136a 138a,c / *Fourth Ennead* TR CH 1 139c 140c / *Fifth Ennead* TR I CH 4-7 209d 212c TR 1 214c 215c TR 1 235b-237d / *Sixth Ennead* TR VI c 3 310d 312b TR X CH 1 353d 355a
53 JAMES *Psychology* 107a b

3b The opposed premises of dialectical argument: dialectical problems and theses: the conflict of probabilities

8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK I CH 1 [24a 5] 39a-c / *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH [77a25 35] 106b / *Topics* BK CH 1 143a-c BK VIII CH 2 [158a34 33] 213d 214b / *Sophistical Refutations* CH 2 [165b3 4] 228a / *Heavens* BK CH 10 [279b4] 370d
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I, CH 150d 151a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* Q 83 436d-438a
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 47d-48d
31 DESCARTES *Discourse* 43d
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK IV CH CT 9 369b-c
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT X DIV 86-91 488d-491c
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 108a-d

3c The opposed conclusions of dialectical reasoning: the antinomies and paralogisms of a transcendental dialectic

9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK I CH 1 [1355a28 40] 594c-d
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 1a-4a,c 7a 8b 120c 173a esp 129c 130b 133c 174b-177b 187a 192d 200c 209d 219a 220b 229b-c / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 260d 261b 283d 284d / *Practical Reason* 291a 292a 302a-d 331c 337a,c 340a 342d 348d 349a / *Science of Right* 407a-408b / *Judgement* 540a 546d esp 543c 544c 562a 578a esp 562d 564c, 575b-578a 584c d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART II par 135 47b-d

3d Theses and antitheses as moments in the advance toward a dialectical synthesis

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 7a 8b 43d-44a 133
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO par 17 16c par 26 18b-c par 31 33 19c 20d PART I par 104 39b-d PART I par 105 114 40a-42b esp par 109 41a b PART III par 256 79d 80 par 3 101 c par 353 360 112b-114a c / *Philosophy of History* 153a 369a,c esp INTRO 153a 190b 203a 206a,c PART I 208b-d, 235d 236c, 238b 245b-d, 257 c, PART I 279c-d, PART II 286c 287a, 303c 311d, PART IV 316a b 321d 322c, 326d 327a, 333d 334d
53 JAMES *Psychology* 117b 238b [fn 2]

4 Dialectic in relation to philosophy and science

7 PLATO *Republic* BK VI VII 383d 398c esp BK I, 386d 388a, BK VII 396d 398c / *Parmenides* 490d-491a / *Sophist* 570a 574c esp 571 c / *Philebus* 610d-613a 633a-635a esp 634b-635a / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810d
8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK I, CH 1 [24a 21 b 3] 39a-c / *Posterior Analytics* BK CH 6 [74b 8-25] 102c [75a 8 28] 103a b CH 1 [77a 2 35] 106b CH 19 [81b17 24] 111c-d BK II CH 5 [9 b 7] 125b / *Topics* BK I CH 143a 144 CH 0-11 147b-148c CH 14 [105b30-31] 149c BK III CH 3 [159a2 14] 215c-d / *Sophistical Refutations* CH 9-11 234b-237 / *Heavens* BK I, CH 10 [279b4 12] 370d / *Generation and Corruption* BK I CH 2 [316a 5 14] 411c-d / *Metaphysics* BK CH 1 [980a 20] BK II, CH 1 [993b 8] 499a 512a esp BK I CH 3 [983a24 b] 501c-d, CH 506b-d, BK I CH 10 [993a] BK II CH 1 [993b18] 511c 512a BK 51b d 522a,c esp CH 1 [99a 23 b4] 513b d BK IV CH [1004b1 27] 523d BK XI, CH 3 [1061a29 12] 589c-d BK XIII CH 4 [1078b 5 32] 610b-c / *Soul* BK I CH 1 [403a 25 9] 632b-d

(2a *Dialectic as the pursuit of truth and the contemplation of being* 2a(1) *The ascent from appearance to reality or from opinion to knowledge the upward and downward paths of dialectic*)

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III CH 4 6 11a 12b
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 113b 115c 173b 174a / *Judgement* 551a 552c
43 MILL *Liberty* 288a

2a(2) Definition division hypothesis and myth in the service of dialectic

7 PLATO *Charmides* 4a 13d esp 4b 5a b 6d 7c 10a / *Laches* 31c 37d / *Protagoras* 43d 45a 49a / *Phaedrus* 124b 129d 134a c 139d 140b / *Meno* 174a 190a c esp 175d 179d 180b 183b c / *Euthyphro* 192c 199a c esp 193a 193d 195b / *Phaedo* 242b 243c / *Republic* BK I II 297b 316b BK IV 346a 356a BK VI VII 386d 398c / *Timaeus* 462b c / *Parmenides* 486a 511d esp 491a d / *Sophist* 551a 579d esp 552b c 553d 554a 561b 570c 571d / *Statesman* 580a 608d esp 580d 582d 583c 586c 589c 591a d 594d 596a / *Philebus* 609a 639a c esp 610d 613a 615c 617d / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810d
8 ARISTOTLE *Generation and Corruption* BK I CH 2 [316 5 14] 411c d / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 6 [98, 29 b7] 505b c [987b30 33] 506a BK XIII CH 4 [1078b18 32] 610b c / *Soul* BK I CH I [403 29-b8] 632c d
9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH 2 3 165d 167d
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 7 112b 113d
17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III CH 4 11a c

2b Dialectic as the method of inquiry argument and criticism in the sphere of opinion

8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK I CH I [24 21 b15] 39a c / *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH II [77a25 35] 106b CH 19 [81b17 2] 111c d / *Topics* 143a 223a c / *Sophistical Refutations* 227a 253d esp CH 1-2 227a 228a CH 9 11 234b 237c CH 34 252c 253d / *Generation and Corruption* BK I CH 2 [316 5 14] 411c d / *Metaphysics* BK IV CH 2 [1004b15 -7] 523d
9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK I CH 1-2 593a 598b CH 4 [1359 30 b19] 599c d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 57 A 6 REP 3 40a 41a PART III Q 9 A 3 REP 2 765b 766b
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 60a c 65a c
31 DESCARTES *Rules* II 2c 3a IV 5b c X 16d 17a XIII 25b
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 299b
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 36d 37d 109b c / *Judgement* 600d 603d
43 MILL *Liberty* 287c 288c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO par 31 19c 20a PART II par 140 53a b / *Philosophy of History* PART IV 360c d

2b(1) Divisions of dialectic the theory of the predicables

8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK I VII 143a 211a c esp BK I CH 2 143d 144a CH 4-6 144b 146a CH 12 148d / *Sophistical Refutations* CH II [1 1b 3-8] 236a b [172 2 b4] 237b c
9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK I CH 2 [1356 36-1358 33] 596a 598b
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 57 A 6 REP 3 40a-41a

2b(2) The technique of question and answer

7 PLATO *Protagoras* 50d 51b / *Euthydemus* 78a d / *Cratylus* 88d 89a / *Republic* BK VI 375b c / *Sophist* 551d
8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK I CH I [24 21-b15] 39a c / *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH II [77a25-35] 106b BK II CH 5 [91b11 1] 125b / *Topics* BK VIII 211a 223a c / *Sophistical Refutations* CH 10 [171 27]-CH II [1,1b8] 235d 236a CH II [172 15 21] 237a
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK III CH 2 178a-d
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 65a
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 36a b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART II par 140 53a b

2c Dialectic as the logic of semblance and as the critique of the illusory employment of reason beyond experience

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 1a 4a c esp 1a b 7a 8b 15c 16c 20a 36d 37b 53b 54b 59c d 93c 99a 101b 107b 108a 209d esp 108a 112d, 120c 121c 129c 130b 133d 157d 173b 174a 175c d 185b c 190a 209d 217d 218a 219a 223d 227a 235a esp 229b c 231c 232a / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 260d 261c 283d 284d / *Practical Reason* 291a 292a 296a d 309b 310d 311d 313b-314d 320c 321b 335c 337a c / *Judgement* 461a c 540a 542a 543c 544c 551a 552c 562a 564c 570b-572b 606d 607c

2c(1) The division of logic into analytic and dialectic the distinction between general and transcendental dialectic

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 34a 37d esp 36a 37d 108a 111c

2c(2) The natural dialectic of human reason

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 1a 3b 7a 8b 20a 120c 121c 133d 192c 193b 217d 218a 227a 235a esp 229b c / *Practical Reason* 335c 337d 352b c / *Judgement* 570b 572b

2d Dialectic as the evolution of spirit or matter

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO par 32 33 20a d PART III par 342 344 110c 111a par 353 360 112b 114a c / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 153a 206a c esp 178a 179c 182d 183a 203a 206a c PART I 208b d 236a c 257a-c PART II 278a c PART IV 315a

50 MA x Ca t l 10 11d esp 11b-d
54 F EU New Introductory Lectu es 882c

(1) The d st nct on between subjects e and object ve d alectic the realization of the moral will

46 HEGEL Ph losophy of R ght INTRO par 6 18b-c par 31 19c-20a P RT II par 105 114 40 -42b e p par 109 41a b p r 140 49b 54a AD TIO 67 72 126d 127c / Philosophy f History PART IV 360c 361a

d(2) The d alect c of nat re and of history the actual z t on of freedom

46 HEGE Ph l sophy f R ght I TRO par 4 12d 13a PA T I I par 194 66c d par 340-344 110b-111 par 353 360 112b 114a c / Ph loso phy f H story 153a 369 c esp I TRO 156c 190b 203d 206a c P RT I 368d 369 c

3 Types of d alect cal oppos t on

3 The oppos t on between being and becom i g the one and the m ny the same a d the other

7 PLATO Phaed s 126a c 134b c / Sympos m 167a d / Republ c BK II 333b d B V 370d 373c BK I I 383d 398c / Parmenides 486a 511d / S ph st 564d 574c / St t sm 594d 595 / Ph l b s 610d 613 615c 617d 633a-635a esp 634b 635 / Seventh Letter 809c 810d

8 A ISTOTLE Met phys cs K I C I 6 505b-506b B II C I I [995b 25] 514 b BK I CH 2 522b-524b esp [004 15 26] 523d

11 NIC M HUS Arithmetic K II 839d 840b

17 PLOTI U F t E ad TR III II 4 11 -c / S co d E e d TR IV CH 5 51b d / Th d Fn ne d T I CH I 93b c TR I 119b 129a TR IX 136a 138a / F th En e d T II CH I 139 140c / F fth En ead T I CH 4 7 209d 212 TR II 214c 215c TR VI 235b 237d / S th E d T CH I 3 310d 312b IX C I I 2 353d 355a

53 J I Psychol gy 107a b

3b The opposed p em ses of d lect c l arg me t d lect cal p oblem d th s th co fl ct of prob b l t es

8 ARI OTLE Pri r An lyt s K I I [24 2 5] 39a-c / P ster r A lytics BK I CH I [77a25 35] 106b / Top cs K II 148a c BK VI 2 [157 34 b33] 213d 214b / S phist cal Ref tat C I 2 [165 3 4] 228a / H avens K C I [2 9 4 2] 370d

12 EP T U Disco se BK II C II 150d 151a

19 AQ S mm Theol g RT I Q 83 436d 438a

30 B Adv ement f Le rn g 47d-48d

31 D R D co RT I 43d

35 LOCK H m U derst d g BK IV CH I T 9 369b-c

35 HUME H man U derita d g SECT X DIV 86-91 488d-491c

42 KANT Pure Rea on 108a d

3c The opposed conclu ons of dialectical rea soning the antinomies and paralogisms of a transcendental d alectic

9 ARI TOTLE Rhetoric BK I CH I [1355 28 4] 594c d

42 K T Pure Reaso 1 -4a c 7a 8b 120c 173a esp 129c 130b 133c 174b 177b 187a 192d 200c 209d 219a 220b 229b-c / F d Pri Metaphysic of Mo als 260d 261b 283d 284d / Practical Reaso 291a 292a 302a d 331c 337 c 340a 342d 348d 349a / Science f R ght 407a 408b / J dgeme t 540a 546d esp 543c 544c 562a 578a esp 562d 564c 575b 578a 584c d

46 HEGEL Ph l sophy of R ght PART II par 135 47b-d

3d Thes s and antithesis as moments in the ad nce toward a d alectical synthesis

42 KANT Pure Reaso 7a 8b 43d-44a 133c

46 HEGEL Ph losophy of Right INTRO par 17 16c par 26 18b c par 31 33 19c 20d PART I par I 4 39b d P RT II par 105 114 40a-42b esp par 109 41a b PART III par 256 79d 80a par 302 101 c par 353 360 112b 114a c / Ph losophy of Hist ry 153a 369 c esp I TRO 153 190b 203a 206a,c PART I 208b d 235d 236c 238b 245b d, 257a-c PART II 279c d PA T III 286c 287a 303c 311d P RT I 316a b 321d 322c 326d 327a 333d 334d

53 J MES Psychology 117b 238b [fn 2]

4 D alect c in rel t on to ph losophy and sci e c

7 PLATO Rep bl c BK VI VII 383d 398c esp K VI 386d 388a BK VII 396d 398c / Pa menides 490d 491a / S phist 570a 574c esp 571a c / Ph l b s 610d 613a 633a-635a c ; 634b 635a / Seventh Letter 809c 810d

8 A I OTLE Pr Analytics BK I C I I [24 2 b 5] 39a c / Po teri A alyt cs BK I CH 6 [74b18 25] 102 [75 18 28] 103 b CH II [77a22 35] 106b C I 19 [81b17 24] 111c d BK II II 5 [9 b 7] 125b / T p cs BK I CH I 2 143a 144a CH 10-11 147b 148c c 14 [05b30 31] 149c BK VIII CH 3 [159 2 14] 215c d / Soph st cal R f tations C 9-11 234b 237c / He vens BK I I 10 [2 9b4 12] 370d / Generat o d Corr pt BK I C I 2 [316 5 14] 411c d / Met phy cs BK I CH I [98 20] K II C I I [993b18] 499 512a esp I C 3 [983 24 b7] 501c d C I 7 506b d BK I CH [993 1]-BK I CH I [993b18] 511c 512a BK III 513b d 522a esp C I I [995 23 b4] 513b d BK IV C 2 [04b15 27] 523d BK XI 3 [61 29-b12] 589 d BK XI I C I 4 [1 78 18 32] 610b-c / So l BK I C I I [4 3 25 b 9] 632b-d

CROSS REFERENCES

For The consideration of dialectic as logic or a part of logic, and of its relation to the other liberal arts, *see* Language 7; Logic 1, 1b, 3-3b; Rhetoric 1a.
Other discussions of the conception of dialectic as the highest science, the supreme form of knowledge or wisdom, see Metaphysics 1; Philosophy 2b; Science 1a(2); Wisdom 1a.
Other discussions of dialectic as a method of argument in the sphere of opinion, *see* Opinion 2c; Reasoning 5c; Rhetoric 4c-4c(3); and for matters relevant to the use of dialectic as a method of inquiry, *see* Definition 4; Hypothesis 1; Principle 3c(2).
The role of dialectic in the philosophy of history, see History 4a(2)-4a(3); Progress 1a.
The discussion of the types of opposition which have significance for dialectic, *see* Opposition 1c, 2b, 2e; Reasoning 5c.
Dialectic in relation to philosophy and theology, *see* Metaphysics 3c; Philosophy 3c; Theology 5.
Discussions of *sophistry* and for the condemnation of dialectic as sophistry, *see* Logic 5; Metaphysics 4a; Philosophy 6b; Theology 5; Truth 8e; Wisdom 3.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not ncluded in *Great Books of the W estern W orld* but rele ant to the idea nd top cs w th wh ch this chapter deals. These works are d ided i to two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection
II Works b authors not represe ted in this collection

For the date, place and other facts concerning the publ cation of the works cited consult the B bl ography of Add tional Readings wh ch f llows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas.*

I

AUGU TINE *Di e Prov dence and the Problem of Evil* BK II CH I -16
—— *Concernu g the T acher*
HOBB S *The Art of Sophistry*
HEGEL *The Phenomen logy of Mind*
—— *Science of Logic*
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II

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ER GE A *De D isio e Naturae* K V (4)
A ILARD *Sic et Non*
—— *D alectica*
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NICOL S OF CU *De Docta Ig antia*
MELA CHTI N *Dialectica*
RAMU *Dialecticae Institutiones*

J G FICHTE *The Science of Kn ledge* F RT III -D
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LOTZE *Logic* BK I CH 3 (c)
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BR DLEY *Appea a ce and Reality*
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TRO LTSCH *Gesammelte Schriften* OL III CH 3 (4)
LEN N *Select d W o ks* VOL XI (On Dialectics)
BUKH I *H st ical Mater alism*
ADLER *D alectic*
BUCHANAN *Poss bility*
SANTAY N *Reason in Science* CH 7
—— *The Realm of Esse ce* CH 7
WHITEH EAD *Proc ss and Real ty* ART I
J CKSO *D alect s*
B RUSSELL, *An I qu ry into Meanin and Truth* CH 24

Chapter 19 DUTY

INTRODUCTION

LOCKE discussing in the course of his essay on *Human Understanding* why a man must keep his word notes that we meet with *three different answers to this question* *If a* Christian be asked he will give as reason Because God who has the power of eternal life and death requires it of us But if a Hobbist be asked why? he will answer Because the public requires it and the Leviathan will punish you if you do not And if one of the old philosophers had been asked he would have answered Because it was dishonest below the dignity of a man and opposite to virtue the highest perfection of human nature to do otherwise

With these three answers Locke introduces *us to some of the alternative views on what is* perhaps the central problem concerning duty All three acknowledge the existence of duty and the force of obligation By accepting the question they affirm the proposition that a man *must* or *ought to* keep his word But why? What creates the *ought* or obligation?

Two *of the answers Locke cites—that of the* Christian and that of the Hobbist—seem to derive duty from the commands of law the law of God or of the state in either case a law to be enforced by the sanctions of a superior power *Accordingly the citizen has duties to the state* the religious man to God Yet it does not seem to be entirely the case that such duties rest exclusively on the *superior power* of God or the state Men who obey either divine or civil law *from fear of punishment alone* are said to act not from duty but from expediency—in terms of a calculation of risks and consequences

Obedience to law would appear to be acknowledged as a duty only by those who recognize the authority *of the law or the right of the* lawmaker to command They would be willing to obey the law even if no external sanction could be enforced against them by a superior power Those whom the law binds in conscience rather than by its coercive force obey the law because it is morally right to do so The sense *of the law's moral authority is for them the* sense of duty from which the dictates of conscience flow

Locke's third answer—that of the ancient philosophers—shows that duty is sometimes understood without reference to law divine or human We share this understanding whenever *having made a promise or contracted a* debt we feel an obligation to discharge it even if no superior commands the act Here furthermore the obligation seems to be to another individual—to a person who may be our equal *—rather than to the state or God*

As indicated by Locke's statement of this ancient view it is the honest or just man who acknowledges such obligations apart from the law or his relation *to any superior* Virtue may of course also direct a man to act *for the common welfare and to obey the laws of the state or the commandments of God* But the immediate source of the obligation to act in a certain way toward one's fellow men is placed by the ancients according to Locke in virtue the highest perfection of human nature On this view virtue *alone provides the motivation* Without it men would act lawfully only because of the law's coercive force Without it men would recognize no obligations to their fellow men or to the state

These two conceptions of duty—for the moment grouping the Christian and Hobbist answers together against the ancient view—may seem at first to be only verbally different It *seems certain that dutiful conduct* would frequently be the same on either view Yet they do conflict with one another and each if examined further presents difficulties

The theory that duty arises from a man s own virtue receives its classic expression as Locke intimates in the ancient philosophers particularly Plato and Aristotle It appears in the *Republic* for example when Socrates has to meet Glaucon s argument that men abide by moral rules not simply because they ought to but in order to avoid the pain of censure and punishment Glaucon claims that given the possession of Gyges ring which can render a man invisible to others no man would keep his hands off what was not his own when he could safely take what he liked He could in all respects be like a God among men

Against this Socrates sets his conception of the just man who does what he ought to do because it is just and because justice is essential to the very life and health of the soul According to Socrates way of thinking it is ridiculous to ask which is the more profitable to be just and act justly and practise virtue whether seen or unseen of gods and men or to be unjust We know that when the bodily constitution is gone life is no longer endurable though pampered with all kinds of meat and drinks and having all wealth and all power and shall we be told that when the very essence of the vital principle is undermined and corrupted life is still worth having to a man if only he be allowed to do whatever he likes with the single exception that he is not to acquire justice and virtue or to escape from injustice and vice

On this view it seems to be the *virtue of* justice which lies at the root of duty or obligation But for Plato justice though only one of the virtues is inseparable from the other three —temperance courage and wisdom It is almost indifferent therefore whether one attributes moral obligation to the particular virtue of justice or to virtue in general As the chapters on JUSTICE and VIRTUE indicate Aristotle differs from Plato both with respect to the virtues in general and to justice in particular For Aristotle it is justice alone not virtue in general or any other particular virtue which gives rise to duty or obligation.

Justice differs from the other virtues according to Aristotle in that it alone of the virtues is thought to consider another s good because it concerns the relation of a man to his neighbor The other virtues such as temperance and courage do not give rise to obligations *unless* they are somehow annexed to or united with justice Whenever Aristotle speaks of duties he does so with reference to the obligations that follow from justice— the duties of parents to children and those of brothers to each other those of comrades and those of fellow-citizens

Whereas for Aristotle justice always refers to the good of another or to the common good of all such virtues as temperance and courage when they are isolated from justice concern the well being of the individual himself That is why only justice entails duties which are obligations to act in a certain way for the welfare of others. If the good of no other individual is involved it seems that a man has no duty to be temperate or courageous even when he possesses these virtues

Precisely because of the essentially social character of justice Aristotle raises the question whether a man can treat himself unjustly or not He is willing to admit that a *man can* do justice or injustice to himself only in a metaphorical sense What he calls metaphorical justice is not a relation between a man and himself but a *relation* between one part of himself and another

Aquinas seems to follow Aristotle in connecting duty with justice and with no other virtue Justice alone of all the virtues he writes implies the notion of duty If he also intimates that duty may somehow enter into the acts of other virtues—as when he says that it is not so patent in the other virtues as it is *in justice —his* position still remains fundamentally Aristotelian Referring to that kind of metaphorical justice to which Aristotle appeals *in* stating the sense in which a *man* can treat himself unjustly Aquinas explains how all the other virtues can be said to involve the duty of the lower powers to reason Apart from this metaphorical duty of *the* passions to *obey reason* duty in the strict sense comes in the opinion of Aquinas only from the precepts of justice which concern the relation of one person to another

ON THIS THEORY duty is not co-extensive with morality the sense of duty is not identical with the *moral* sense and specific duties obligate a

man to other men even when no general law exists to be obeyed Difficulty is found with this theory by those critics who think that the whole of morality not simply one part of it involves duties Does not the sense of duty operate they ask *in matters which do not affect any other individual or even the common good?* Does a man for example have a duty to tell the truth only to others but not to seek it for himself? Kant as we shall see holds that there are private as well as public duties or in his language internal duties in the realm of ethics as well as external duties in the realm of jurisprudence

The Hobbist theory of duty seems to face *similar difficulties* The specific duties which are determined by the precepts of justice may as we have seen not always be the same as the specific duties imposed by civil law though they will be identical whenever the law of the state is itself an expression or determination of justice But when law rather than justice is the principle duty seems to consist primarily in obedience to the law or rather to the lawgiver who has superior power and authority Only secondarily or in consequence does it involve obligations to other men who are one s equals

With Hobbes for example justice and obligation as well begin only with the establishment of a constituted authority with the power of making laws Where there is no Common wealth he writes there is nothing unjust So that the nature of justice consisteth in keeping of valid covenants but the validity of covenants begins not but with the constitution of a *civil power sufficient to compel men to keep* them Duty and justice are both said to be laws of nature but Hobbes adds they are not properly laws but qualities that dispose men to peace and to obedience until a Commonwealth is once settled and then they become the commands of the Commonwealth *In other words it is the Sovereign power that* obliges men to obey them and obedience which is said to be part also of the law of nature is its proper expression

So far the two conceptions conflict or at least diverge But if the legal theory of duty goes no further than the enactments of the state the same question arises here as *before* Does a man have no duties apart from his relation to the state? Can duty be co extensive with morality if the only rules of conduct to be obeyed are laws imposed from without—regulations which have authority simply because they come from one who has the right to command? Again as we *shall see* Kant would say No

We have now stated the questions about duty *which raise difficulties for Aristotle and Hobbes* Though they differ in their theories of law and justice as well as in their conceptions of duty they seem to concur in thinking that doing one s duty does not exhaustively solve all moral problems

The same questions do not however seem to present *difficulties* to other moralists—*to* Kant and *to* the Stoics of antiquity such as Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus On the contrary their *moral philosophy by making the sphere of duty* co extensive with the whole of the moral life seems to prevent such questions from being raised

As we turn to examine their conception of duty we must observe that in two respects it alters Locke s threefold division of the answers *to the question Why must a man keep his* word? *In the first place* Locke s statement of the answer given by the ancient philosophers seems to have only Plato and Aristotle in mind certainly not the Stoics In the second place Locke s statement of the Christian position seems to associate it with the Hobbist answer against that of Plato and Aristotle That association may be justified on the ground that duty to God like duty to the state involves *obligation to a superior* But Aquinas as we have seen seems to agree with Aristotle about justice as a source of duty and as we shall see he also seems to agree with Kant and the Stoics about the pervasiveness of duty in the realm of morals Locke s statement of the Christian position which selects one aspect of it only may *therefore be inadequate*

The point which unites Kant the Stoics and Aquinas is their agreement concerning the existence of a law which is neither enacted by the state nor proclaimed by God in his *revealed* commandments This law the Stoics speak of as the law of reason Aquinas calls the natural law and Kant conceives to be the moral law within The common conception thus vari

ously expressed is more fully treated in the chapter on Law but that ampler discussion is not needed to perceive that the law of reason or of nature is a moral law in that its general principles and detailed precepts govern the entire range of moral acts.

Morality according to Kant consists in the reference of all action to the legislation which alone can render a kingdom of ends possible By this he means that the will is never to act on any maxim which could not without contradiction be also a universal law This law is also moral in the sense that it exercises only moral authority and should prevail even without the support of the external sanctions which accompany the positive commands of a superior 'The idea of duty Kant declares, "would alone be sufficient as a spring [of action] even if the spring were absent which is connected by for nsic legislation namely external compulsion.

Making the natural or moral law the principle of duty introduces the element of obligation into every moral act Whatever is right to do we are obliged to do in conformity to the law of nature or in obedience to the commands of the moral law We need no external promulgation of this law —*i.e.*, no express formulation in words by a lawgiver—for this law is inherent in reason itself Its various maxims or precepts can be deduced from what Aquinas calls the *first* principle of the practical reason and Kant the categorical imperative Or as the Stoics say since reason is the ruling principle in man man s duty *consists in* holding fast to it and going straight on so that it has what is its own

On this theory we are obliged in conscience to do whatever reason declares right whether or not others are directly involved The distinction between public and private morality—between the spheres of justice and the other virtues—is irrelevant to conscience Conscience according to Kant functions equally in the spheres of internal and external duty In both the realm of ethics and the realm of jurisprudence conscience applying the moral law dictates our duty in the particular case We stand in no different relation to ourselves and others since the *moral* law is universally and equally binding on all persons The obligation is in every case to obey the law *It is not a duty to* persons *except* as the moral law commands us to respect the dignity of the human person ourselves and others alike

The element of a superior commanding an inferior seems to be present in this conception of duty through the relation of reason to the will and appetites of man Acting dutifully consists in the submission of the will to reason and in overcoming all contrary inclinations or desires. But though Kant sometimes speaks in these terms he also conceives duty as carrying with it an obligation to God 'The subjective principle of a responsibility for one s deeds before God he says is contained though it be only obscurely in every moral self-consciousness

Nevertheless, Kant insists that the Christian principle of *morality* itself is not theological It rests, in his opinion on the autonomy of pure practical reason since it does not make the knowledge of God and his will the foundation of these laws, but only of the attainment of the *summum bonum* on the condition of following these laws, and it does not even place the proper *spring* of this obedience in the desired results, but *solely in the* conception of duty as that of which the faithful observance alone constitutes the worthiness to obtain those happy consequences.

It is through the summum bonum as the object and final end of pure practical reason that in Kant s view of Christian *moral ty* we pass from moral philosophy to *religion* that is, *to the recognition of all duties as divine commands* A Christian theologian like Aquinas, however seems to go further than Kant in *equating* conformity to the moral law—or the natural law of reason—with religious obedience to God Nor does he explain this equivalence by reference to the fact that God has made man s attainment of the *summum bonum*—or *eternal happiness*—depend on his free compliance with the *moral* law Rather for Aquinas the natural law is "nothing else than the rational creature s participation in the eternal law" of God—the imprint on us of the divine light. As God is the author of man s nature and reason, so is He the ultimate authority behind the commands of the natural law which He implanted in man s reason at creation

For a Christian theologian like Aquinas duty to God involves obedience to the moral law which reason can discover by itself no less than obedience to those positive commandments which God has revealed to man Aquinas seems to think that violation of the natural law is as much a sin as violation of the divine law Both involve a rupture of that order laid down by God the one in relation to the rule of reason in so far as all our actions and passions should be commensurate with the rule of reason the other in relation to the rule of the divine law Thus in all moral matters it would appear that duty is in Wordsworth s phrase stern daughter of the voice of God If the natural law commands us to use our faculties to the ends for which they were created then the possession of a mind imposes upon us what Socrates in the *Apology* calls man s duty to inquire If we fail to seek the truth we sin against God by sinning against our nature even though Thou shalt seek the truth is nowhere explicitly prescribed in Holy Writ

ETHICAL DOCTRINES can be classified according to the role which they assign to duty as a moral principle There is perhaps no more fundamental issue in moral philosophy than that between the ethics of duty and the ethics of pleasure or happiness This issue obviously belongs to the chapters on HAPPINESS and PLEASURE as well as the present one All three must be read together—and perhaps also the chapters on DESIRE LAW and VIRTUE—to complete the picture

According to the morality of duty every act is to be judged for its obedience or disobedience to law and the basic moral distinction is between right and wrong But where pleasure or happiness are central the basic distinction is between good and evil and desire rather than law sets the standard of appraisal An analysis of means and ends and a theory of the virtues are usually found in the ethics of happiness as a theory of conscience and sanctions is usually prominent in the ethics of duty

At one extreme there is the position which totally excludes the concept of duty This fact more than any other characterizes the Epicureanism of Lucretius The good life for him is one where nature craves for herself no more than this that pain hold aloof from the body and she in mind enjoy a feeling of pleasure exempt from care and fear The life he describes—so disciplined and moderated that all but the simplest pleasures are relinquished in the effort to avoid pain—seems to leave no place for obligation or social responsibility

In the much more elaborate moral philosophy of Aristotle virtue entails moderation in the avoidance of pain as well as in the pursuit of pleasure Though he admits that most pleasures might perhaps be bad without qualification Aristotle claims that the chief good which is happiness would involve some pleasure But even as a good pleasure is not the only good for there are other objects of desire

The happy man according to Aristotle is one who somehow succeeds in satisfying all his desires by seeking the various kinds of goods in some order and relation to one another Happiness itself is something that we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else Although we may also choose other things in some sense for themselves such as honor pleasure reason and every virtue still they are chosen for the sake of happiness since we judge them as the means by which we shall be happy

In Aristotle s ethics of happiness duty is not entirely excluded but neither is it given any independent significance As we have seen it s merely an aspect of the virtue of justice and amounts to no more than the just man s acknowledgment of the debt he owes to others or his recognition that he is under some obligation to avoid injuring other men and to serve the common good

At the other extreme there is the position which identifies the sense of duty with the moral sense In the Stoicism of Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus to live well is to do one s duty and to set aside all contrary desires It is thy duty the Emperor writes to order thy life well in every single act and if every act does its duty as far as is possible be content and no one is able to hinder thee so that each act shall not do its duty Man is not destined to be happy his happiness consists rather in doing what is required of him at his post of duty in the order of the universe The only good is a good will

— a dutiful will a will which conforms itself to the law of nature.

Kant's much more elaborate moral philosophy presents the same fundamental teachings. This is indicated by the fact that he associates what he calls *eudaemonism* (*i.e.* the ethics of happiness) with *hedonism* (*i.e.* the ethics of pleasure). Happiness, he writes, is "a rational being's consciousness of the pleasantness of life uninterruptedly accompanying his whole existence," and its basis is "the principle of self love." Therefore, according to Kant, both eudaemonism and hedonism commit the same error. Both "undermine morality and destroy its sublimity since they put the motives to virtue and to vice in the same class, and only teach us to make a better calculation." Both admit desire as a moral criterion of good and evil. Both are utilitarian in that they are concerned with consequences, with means and ends. Both measure the moral act by reference to the end it serves.

For Kant, "an action done from duty derives its moral worth not from the *purpose* which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it is determined, and therefore does not depend on the realization of the object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition by which the *action* has taken place without any regard to any object of desire."

"Duty," he goes on to say, "is the necessity of acting from respect for the law." From this he argues that duty, and consequently all *moral* action, must be done because it is right, because the law commands it, and for no other reason. The recommendation of any action solely on the ground that it will contribute to happiness as satisfying the inclination of the person and achieving the object of the will, is completely ruled out. That would be a judgment of pure expediency. Worse than *not* moral, it is, in the opinion of Kant, *immoral*.

"An action done from duty," Kant writes, "must wholly exclude the influence of inclination, and with it every object of the will, so that nothing remains which can determine the will except objectively the law, and subjectively pure respect for this practical law, and consequently the maxim that I should follow this law even to the thwarting of all my inclinations." The pre-eminent good which we call moral can therefore consist in nothing else than the conception of law in itself, which certainly is only possible in a rational being, in so far as this conception and not the expected effect determines the will.

This law which is the source of duty and of all moral action is Kant's famous "categorical imperative"—or, in other words, reason's unconditional command. According to its decree, Kant declares: "I am *never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law*." By obeying the categorical imperative, we can know and do our duty and rest assured that *our will is morally good*. "I do not, therefore, need any far reaching penetration to discern what I have to do," Kant writes, "in order that my will may be morally good. Inexperienced in the course of the world, incapable of being prepared for all its contingencies, I only ask myself: Canst thou also will that thy maxim should be a universal law? If not, then *it* must be rejected, and that not because of a disadvantage accruing from it to myself or even to others, but because it cannot enter as a principle into a possible universal legislation."

To say that a man *ought to* do this or refrain from doing that *in order to* achieve happiness is, *for Kant*, at best a conditional obligation, ultimately a specious one since he is not unconditionally *obliged* to be happy. Kant does not totally exclude happiness or the *summum bonum*. In fact he says that there is no need to maintain "an opposition" between them and morality. But he claims that "the moment duty is in question we should take no account of happiness." Just as Aristotle treats duty only in terms of justice, so Kant considers happiness to have a moral quality only insofar as to be worthy of it is an end set by the moral law.

TWO OTHER voices join in this great argument concerning duty and happiness. One is that of John Stuart Mill, whose *Utilitarianism* recognizes Kant as the chief opponent of an ethics of happiness. Though Mill differs from Aristotle on many points, particularly in regard to the virtues as means to happiness, Mill's answer to Kant can be read as a defense of Aristotle as well as of his own theory.

From Kant's point of view, they are both

utilitarians They both argue in terms of means and ends They both make purely *pragmatic* not moral, judgments—judgments of expediency instead of judgments of right and wrong

From Mill s point of view Aristotle like himself needs no other principle of morality than happiness an ultimate end which justifies every means that tends towards its realization The ultimate sanction of all morality external motives apart Mill writes is a subjective feeling in our own minds He asserts that when once the general happiness is recognized as the ethical standard it will appeal to a powerful natural sentiment Man s nature as a social being he holds tends to make him feel it one of his natural wants that there should be harmony between his feelings and aims and those of his fellow creatures

This conviction in persons who have it does not present itself to their minds as a superstition of education or a law despotically imposed by the power of society but as an attribute which it would not be well for them to be without This conviction rather than an internal sense of obligation or fear of external sanctions imposed by a superior power is for Mill the ultimate sanction of the greatest happiness morality —which aims at the greatest happiness for the greatest number

Where Mill answers Kant by excluding duty —even from considerations of justice—Aquinas seems to develop an analysis in which every moral act can be regarded as obeying or disobeying the natural law and yet at the same time be judged as a means which serves or fails to serve the ultimate end of man s natural desire The order of the precepts of the natural law is in the words of Aquinas according to *the order of natural inclinations* The dilemma set up by the opposition between duty and happiness seems to be denied or at least avoided by a theory which *finds a perfect parallelism* between the precepts of natural law and the objects of natural desire a parallelism resulting *from* their common source in the creation of human nature by God

THE TENSION between duty and desire—between obedience to rules of conduct and unrestrained indulgence—is one of the burdens which no other animal *except man* must bear It is a constant theme in the great poems It is *pivotal to the plot of most of* the great love stories It is a theme of tragedy for in whichever direction the tension is resolved—wh the[r] in *the line of duty* (as by Aeneas forsak[ing] Dido) *or* in disobedience to law (as by Adam[s] yielding to Eve in *Paradise Lost*)—ruin results

The *tragedy of being both rational and* an[i]mal seems to consist in *having to choose* between duty and desire rather than in making any particular *choice It may be significant* however that the tragic heroes of poetry more frequently abandon duty than desire or love though seldom without *mortal punishment* preceded by a deep sense of their transgression Sometimes, however they are self-deceived and cloak desire in the guise of duty

There is another source of tragic conflict in the sphere of duty Men are torn by competing loyalties obligations which pull th m in opposite directions In the basic relationships of the family the duty a man owes to his parents ofte[n] cannot be discharged without violating or neglecting obligations to his wife Wh n the moral law and the law of the state command contrary actions duty is weighed against duty in an ordeal of conscience Sometimes however one obligation seems to take clear precedence over another as in the mind of Sophocles Antigone for whom the king s edict loses its authority when it runs counter to the law of God Creon the king not Antigone his subject, may be the play s more tragic personage He sacrifices a dearly beloved son to uphold the authority h[e] considers it his duty as a ruler to maintain

If man is not a rational animal *or if* whatever his nature reason is not its ruling principle then the sense of duty would appear to be an imposture *that draws its driving force* from the emotional energies with which certain man made rules of conduct are invested Rather than *acting as a* counterweight to desire duty is itself the shape which certain desires take to combat others

Conscience or the *super ego* according to Freud is born of the struggle between the *ego* and the *id* Translated into popular language Freud tells us the *ego stands for reason* and circumspection while the *id stands for the* untamed passions What may originally have had a necessary function to perform in the psychic

economy can grow to play too dominant a part For the psychoanalyst not tragedy but neurosis results from an overdeveloped sense of duty When "the ego [ ] forced to acknowledge its weakness, Freud explains, it "breaks out into anxiety reality anxiety in face of the external world, normal anxiety in face of the super-ego, and neurotic anxiety in face of the strength of the passions in the id

THE RELATION of ruler and ruled in the domestic or the political community may seem at first to impose duties or obligations only on the ruled The ruler commands. His subjects are obliged to obey Does the ruler in turn have no duties, no obligations to those whom he governs? If he has none then neither have the persons he rules rights which he must respect. Such absolute rule—defined by a correlative absence of duties in the ruler and rights in the ruled—has been one conception of the relation between master and slave

In the state rulers who are merely office-holders are obligated by the duties of their office as well as vested with its authority and power The office-holder duty bound by the constitution, *is not an absolute ruler He is, in fact* a servant of the state not its master The mediaeval king who pledged himself in his coronation oath to discharge the duties of his office may not have been bound by human law but so long as his conscience kept him loyal to his pledge he recognized the supremacy of the natural law or of the law of God The self governing citizen of a republic is similarly duty bound only when he recognizes the supremacy of the common good

According to the theory of constitutional government rights and duties are correlative *The acknowledgment of duties signifies that the* holder of rights recognizes their limited or conditional character To consider oneself entirely exempt from duties or obligations is to regard one's rights as absolute Can anyone have absolute rights except on condition of being without a superior of any sort? One implied answer to this question is that neither despot nor state but only God, is autonomous or without duty

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to For example in **4** HOMER *Iliad* BK II [265 283] **12d** the number **4** is the number of the volume in the set the number **12d** indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page For example in **53** JAMES *Psychology* **116a 119b** the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119 When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page For example in **7** PLATO *Symposium* **163b 164c** the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164

AUTHOR S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases e g *Iliad* BK II [265–283] **12d**

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a *(D)* follows e g OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—*(D) II Esdras* 7 46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface

1 The concept of duty or obligation its moral significance

7 PLATO *Gorgias* **269d 270c**

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK II CH 5 **143d 144a**

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK III SECT 1 **259b d** SECT 6 **261a c** BK IV SECT 4 **264a** BK V SECT 6 **269b d** BK VI SECT 22–3 **276a b** SECT 26 **276b c** BK VII SECT 5 **280a b** BK VIII SECT 26 **287c** SECT 32 **287d 288a**

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK IX CH 4 **287d** BK XIX CH 14 16 **520c 522a** CH 19 **523b d** / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 22 30 **629b 633b**

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 99 A 5 **249a 250a** PART II II Q 4 A 7 REP 3 **407d 409a** QQ 183 189 **625a 700d** passim esp Q 183 A 1 REP 3 **625a 626a** A 3 **627a d**

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I **86c 87c** PART II **115a b**

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* **7a d 24c 25c 233a b 319b 383c 385a 467b 470a**

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* **74b 76a**

38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK I **388d 389a**

42 KANT *Pure Reason* **114d 115a 149d 150a 190c d 236d 237a** / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* **253d 254d 256a 279d** esp **276b-277a 282d 283d** / *Practical Reason* **305d 307d 325a d 327d 329a** / *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* **366d 367a 368a d 373b d** / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* **383a 390a c** esp **383a 384d 389a 390a c 391a c 392b-393a** / *Science of Right* **397c 398a 416b-417b** / *Judgement* **571c 572a 594c 596c** esp **595a d 605d 606b** [fn 2]

43 MILL *Liberty* **304c 306b** passim / *Utilitarianism* **453c 454a 468b-469b**

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART II par 133 135 **47a d** PART III par 148 150 **56a 57a** ADDITIONS 84 **129b** 95 **132b** / *Philosophy of History* INTRO **170d 171c** PART I **224a** PART IV **362c d**

49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* **304a 310d 314c** esp **313d 314a 592b-c**

2 Comparison of the ethics of duty with the ethics of happiness pleasure or utility

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK II CH 11 **150a 151b** CH 19 **162c 164b** BK III CH 24 **203c 210a**

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK II SECT 11 **12 258a c** BK VIII SECT 10 **286b** SECT 28 **287c** SECT 39 **288c** BK IX SECT 1 **291a c** SECT 7 **292b**

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK IX CH 4-5 **287a 289a** BK XIV CH 8-9 **381c 385b**

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19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 24, A 2 227d 225.
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, BK I 65c-66b
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 69d 76a
33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters*, 62b-68b
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations*, BK V 336c-d
42 KANT *Pure Reason*, 235a-b 236b-239a / *Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals*, 256a-257d 258d 264a 265b 267b-d 280d 281a 282b-283d 286a-c / *Practical Reason*, 291a 319b esp 298a-300a, 304d-307d 325a 331a 338c-340d esp 345d 347a / *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 365b-366d 369c 373b / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals*, 387b-388a 389a 390a,c / *Science of Right*, 446b-c / *Judgement* 478a-479c 584d 587 588b [fn 2] 591b-592a 594c 596c 605d-606b [fn 1]
43 MILL *Liberty* 296a-297b / *Utilitarianism* 445a-4 6a,c esp 5 c-461c, 464d-476a c
45 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART II, par 124 44b-d par 134 135 47b-d ADDITIONS 85-87 129b-d
53 JAMES *Psychology* 813a-814a
54 FREUD *Civilization and Its Discontents*, 800c-801b

3. The divisions of duty: internal and external duty: the realms of ethics and jurisprudence

7 PLATO *Gorgias*, 259d 270c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I, Q 16, A 4, REP 3 97a-c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II, Q 99, A 5, ANS 249a 250a Q 100, A 2, REP 2 252b-253a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan*, PART I, 95d 96a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays*, 7
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 74b-c
32 MILTON *Samson Agonistes* [1334 1379] 368b-369b
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 89d 91a, 96a-b
42 KANT *Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals*, 258d 270c; 272b-273a / *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 365a 379d esp 366d, 367b-368a, 370d 372a, 374a-c, 378a *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 383a 384a-c 386d 387a, 389a-390a,c 391 394a,c *Science of Right* 398a 399c 400b,d-401b
43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 458a-d 468b-469b
45 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I, par 79 33a-c PART II, par 137 141 48a 54d / *Philosophy of History* INTRO, 170d 171c 186b-c PART I, 207b-c 211 c 214d 216b PART III, 290a b
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE II, 687b

4. The sense of duty

5 AESCHYLUS *Choephoroe* 70a-80d esp [0-94] 80a-c *Eumenides* 81a-91d esp [435-666] 86a-88a
5 SOPHOCLES *Oedipus at Colonus* [1-509] 114a 118d / *Antigone* 131a 142d / *Electra* 156a 169a,c / *Philoctetes* 182a 195a,c
5 EURIPIDES *Hippolytus* 225a 236d esp [373-43] 228b-d / *Alcestis* 23 247a,c / *Heracleidae* 248a 25 a,c esp [745-83] 254d 255a / *Suppliants* 258a 269a,c esp [8 -97] 258d 263 / *Electra* 327a 339a,c / *Phoenician Maidens* [16 5 1-66] 392b-393d
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 39 d-398c
7 PLATO *Euthydemus* 70d 71b / *Meno* 183a b / *Apology* 206b-d / *Crito* 213a 219a c / *Republic* BK VII, 390b-391b
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses*, BK I CH 5 110b-c
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK VIII, SECT 32 28 d 288a
14 PLUTARCH *Marcus Cato* 2 6b d 290d esp 28 a / *Cato the Younger* 620a-648a,c esp 626d-627b, 632b-c
22 CHAUCER *Knight's Tale* [859-1004] 1 4a 1 6b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 301d-303c 467d-468b
26 SHAKESPEARE *As You Like It* ACT II SC III [6-63] 605a
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I, 81b-88b
32 MILTON *Comus* [170-220] 37a-38b / *Paradise Lost* BK III [194 197] 139b
42 KANT *Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals*, 253d 254b / *Practical Reason*, 325c-327d 333a-334a / *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics*, 3 5a b / *Judgement* 593a-d 599b-d
43 MILL *Utilitarianism*, 458b-461c esp 458b-c
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man*, 310a-314a esp 310c-d, 314 592b-c
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK VII, 275a BK X 465c-46 a BK XI 513d 514d 527b-528b
53 JAMES *Psychology* 80 a-808a

4a. The moral and social development of conscience: its dictates

OLD TESTAMENT *Proverbs*, 28 1 / *Ecclesiastes*, 2 2-(D) *Ecclesiastes*, 2 23
APOCRYPHA *Wisdom of Solomon*, 1 11-(D) OT *Book of Wisdom*, 17 0 / *Ecclesiasticus*, 14 2-(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 14 2
NEW TESTAMENT *Romans* 2 15 / *I Corinthians*, 8 / *I Timothy* 4 2 / *Titus*, 1 5
5 AESCHYLUS *Choephoroe* 70a-80d esp [010-10 6] 80a-d
12 AURELIUS *Meditations*, BK II, SECT 5 25 b-c BK I, SECT 4 260b-261 BK IV SECT 15 254d BK VIII, SECT 32 287d 288a
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions*, BK II par 9, 10d BK IV par 14 22d 23a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 79, A 1 3 425c-427a PART I II, Q 9, A 5-6 70d 708a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 96, A 4 233a-d
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XXVII [24 4] 95d-96a

6. Co nflicts between dutie of dive se origins

7 The rel tion of d ty to justice and to rights oaths and promises

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52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK IV 95b-100c
53 JAMES *Psychology* 807-808a
54 FREUD *General Introduction* 452-d 573c 624-625b / *War and Death* 758c 759d esp 59c-d 764c 65a / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 780b-802a,c esp 81a-d 783c-789b, 791b-d, 793d-794a, 800c-801b / *New Introductory Lectures* 853a b

9 The duties of command and obedience in family life

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* ... / *Exodus* 20 12 21 1 21,6-27 / *Leviticus* 19 3 / *Deuteronomy* 5 16 5 12-18 21 15 3 ... 23 / *Ruth* / *Proverbs* 20 30 1
APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus*, 3 1 18 4 30 7 19-8 3 1 13 33:24-3 —(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus*, 3 2 2 4 35 7 30 3 3 33 33
NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 5 3-6 / *II Corinthians* 12 14 / *Ephesians* 5 22-25 6 -9 / *Colossians* 3 8-4 1 / *I Timothy* 5 8 / *Titus*, 2 9- 1 / *Philemon* / *I Peter* 3 1
4 HOMER *Odyssey* BK I-II 183a 192d
5 SOPHOCLES *Oedipus at Colonus* [1 1 460] 118a b / *Antigone* 131 142d esp [631 680] 136c 137a / *Trachiniae* 170a 181 c esp [1 5- 1 5] 180a 181a
5 ARISTOPHANES *Clouds* [1 9-885] 498b-499b [32 1451] 504c 506b
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK II 56c BK III 104c 10a BK III 281
7 PLATO *Laws*, BK IV 683b-c BK XI 779b-781 *Seventh Letter* 803d-804a
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics*, BK VIII CH 9 [1159b25 60a9] 411d-412b CH 10 [1160b23]-CH 11 [61a9] 413a-c / *Politics*, BK I CH 1 3 453d-455a.
14 PLUTARCH *Agis* 654c-655a
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par 3-8 9b-10d BK XI par 47 123d / *City of God* BK IX, CH 4 6, 570c 522a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 105, 4 318b-321a
22 CHAUCER *Tale of Man of Law* [4 0 4 0] 239a *Wife of Bath Prologue* [5583-64] 2 6a 259b esp [5593-59 4] 261 b, [6385-64] 269a-b / *Tale of Wife of Bath* [66 9-66] 273a b / *Clerk Tale* 296a 318a esp [9053 9 8] 317a 318a / *Merchant's Tale* 319a 338a esp [9249-9266] 321a / *Franklin's Tale* [4] 351b-352b / *Tale of Melibeus* par 3-6 404b-407b / *Parson's Tale* par 9-80 541a b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II, 109c 110b 121a 155b
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, BK III, 219b-222b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays*, 184 191 410a-422b 427d-430a
26 SHAKESPEARE *Comedy of Errors* ACT II, SC 1 [1-43] 152a-c / *Taming of the Shrew* 199a 228a,c esp ACT V SC II [136-1 9] 227d 228a c / *Romeo and Juliet* ACT III SC [12 19] 308c 309b / *Midsummer Night's Dream* ACT I SC I [1 121] 352a 353c / *Merchant of Venice* ACT I SC II 408b-409c / *1st Henry IV* ACT II SC III 443b-444b
27 SHAKESPEARE *Othello* ACT I SC III [1 5 1 9] 210d 211a / *King Lear* 244a 283a,c
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 75c / *New Atlantis*, 207b-209d
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK IV [255-301] 158b-159a [440-50] 162a 163a [634-635] 166a BK VIII [452-594] 242a 245a BK X [144 156] 277b [8 6 -936] 293b-294b / *Samson Agonistes* [1 90]358b-359a [99 1060]361b-362b
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VI SECT 52-C 1 VII, SECT 86 36a-44a CH XV SECT 169-170 64c-65a SECT 1,3 174 65c-d
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 29b
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones*, 6b-c 21a 22d 100b-102a 10a 107b 108c 110c 120c 121a,c 124a 125c 126d 127b 136b-c 283c-d 312c 313a 321b-324b 340c 341d 359b-362c
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK V 22d 23a BK XXIII, 187b d 189d BK XXVI, 216a b
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 35 a b 364d-365b / *Political Economy* 367a 368c / *Social Contract* BK I 387d 388a
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 81b-84a 86b-d
42 KANT *Science of Right* 404d 419a-422d esp 419b-c, 420a-d 445c-446a
43 MILL *Liberty* 317c 318a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 1 4 61b ADDITION III 134d 135a / *Philosophy of History* PART I 211c 213a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK 7 249b-d 267 -d BK 7-VII 271 2 6b BK VII 291 292b 301b-302d BK III 305b-307a
54 FREUD *Interpretation of Dreams* 244 -c / *New Introductory Lectures* 8 6c

10 Political obligation: cares, functions, loyalties

OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 20 13 17 / *Leviticus* 19:9-20,32 3 5 14-35 / *Numbers* 35 / *Deuteronomy* 5:17-21 15 1 8-20 19 22 1 4 23:15 5 24 10-13 27 17-19,-4 25 / *Proverbs*, 3 8 16 10-15 28 5 18 29:2 4 12, 14 / *Jeremiah*, 9—(D) *Jeremias* 29 / *Zechariah* 8.16-1 —(D) *Zacharias* 8.16-1
NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 5:21 24 22 1 1 / *Mark* 1 4-1 / *Luke* 20:20- 6 / *Romans* 13 1 / *Titus* 3 / *I Peter* 2 13 19
4 HOMER *Iliad*, BK IX [1] 5 a 58d
5 AESCHYLUS *Seven Against Thebes* [1 —] 27a 28a
5 SOPHOCLES *Oedipus the King* [1 —] 99a-d / *Antigone* [631-680] 136c 137a / *Philoctetes* 182a 195a,c
5 EURIPIDES *Suppliants* [29 331] 261a b / *Iphigenia at Aulis* [368-1401] 437 -d

(10 *Political obligation cares functions loyalties*)

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK VII 223c d 239a c
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK I 355b c 359b 360c 370d 378c d BK II 395d 399a 402b-c 403b c 406a-407b BK III 430c 432c d BK VI 513a BK VII 555d 556a
7 PLATO *Apology* 206a d / *Crito* 213a 219a c esp 216d 219a c / *Republic* BK IV 342a d 344a BK VII 390b 391b 401a b / *Seventh Letter* 802b 804b 814b-c
9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK II CH 17 [1391 20-26] 638c d
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 23 128c d BK III CH 22 195a 201a
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK III SECT 4 260b-261a BK IX SECT 42 295c 296a c
13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK III [90-98] 149b BK IV [189 278] 172a 174b BK VI [845-853] 233b 234a
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 32a 48d esp 45a-c 48a b / *Numa Pompilius* 51c 52b / *Solon* 71d / *Marcus Cato* 276b d 290d esp 282a / *Crassus Nicias* 455d-456d / *Agesilaus* 480b d 481a 486d-487b / *Cato the Younger* 620a 648a c esp 626d 627b 632b-c / *Cleomenes* 659d 660a / *Galba* 859a b
15 TACITUS *Annals* BK II 32b d / *Histories* BK I 211c 212b BK II 234b 235a
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK III par 15 17a b / *City of God* BK XIX CH 6 514b 515a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 13 A 5 REP 3 675c 676b
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 61 A 5 REP 3 58b-59d Q 96 AA 4-6 233a 235d Q 105 AA 1-4 307d 318b
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY VI [76-151] 61c-62c
23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* CH IX-X 14c 16d passim CH XIV 21b 22a CH XVII 24a b CH XVIII 25a b CH XXI 32d 33a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 86c 96b PART II 101a 104d 110b 117b 132b 136b 138c d 143c d 152d 160a 164a c PART III 165a 199b 204a 245c 246a c PART IV 270c d 273b c CONCLUSION 279a 283a c
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK III 127b d 130a 131b d 133b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 7a d 24c 25c 48a 51a passim 67c d 303a c 381a 388c esp 383c d 386b d 486b 488b
26 SHAKESPEARE *Richard II* ACT V SC II [71]-SC III [146] 347a 349c / *1st Henry IV* ACT I SC II [218-240] 437c d ACT III SC II [93 161] 453d-454c / *2nd Henry IV* ACT IV SC V 494b 496d ACT V SC II [35 145] 498b-499b SC V [60-75] 502a / *Henry V* ACT IV SC I [123-301] 552d 554c
27 SHAKESPEARE *Coriolanus* ACT II SC III 366a 369a ACT V SC III [93 209] 388a 389b / *Henry VIII* ACT I SC II [18 102] 552d 553d
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 331a 336a 340b 343a 345a 348c 352b-356d 360d 364a 366d 369b
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 1a 2 24b 74b 75a
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 51 SCHOL 439d
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK II [430-456] 120b-121a / *Samson Agonistes* [843-902] 358a 359a
35 LOCKE *Toleration* 3a 16c 18c / *Civil Government* CH II SECT 4-6 25d 26c CH VI SECT 57-63 36d 38c CH VIII SECT 96-98 47a c SECT 113 122 51b 53c CH IX SECT 1 131 54b d CH XI SECT 134 135 55b 56b CH XII SECT 143 58c d CH XIII XIX 59b-81d passim
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART II 75b
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK III 12d 13c BK VI 68b d 75a BK XII 93c 95b
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 356b 359a 366c-d / *Political Economy* 367a 385a c passim esp 369c 370b 373b 377b c / *Social Contract* BK I 388c 391b 392b 393c BK II 396 398b BK III 414d 419a 421c 423a BK IV 427b
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK V 303b-304c
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 130b d 242c 245c passim 288b 289a 292b d 338d 339c 342a-c 577c d 630d
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 102d 103a 504 505a
42 KANT *Science of Right* 433a b 438d 439a 457a 458a c
43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 1a 3b passim
43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 5a 9d passim
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U S 11a 20d passim
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 40 130c 132a NUMBER 44 147a b NUMBER 6 190a b NUMBER 65 198a 200c passim NUMBER 70 212c 213c NUMBER 75 223c d NUMBER 76 225d 226b NUMBER 85 256d 257a
43 MILL *Liberty* 272b c 290d 291a 302d 303a 317c 319d / *Representative Government* 348c 350a 355b 362c 392b 393c 401a-406a 410a d 436b-c 439b-c
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 145b 247c d 355b d 379b-c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 290-296 97d 99b par 299 99c 100b par 309-311 103b 104a par 324 107a d / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 171b-c PART I 211b 214 PART IV 342c d 365b c
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [11 252 259] 249b-250a [10 455-500] 254b 255b
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK II 89b d BK V 206d 207a 232a 234a esp 233b 234a BK IX 365d 366a BK XI 475b-476c EPILOGUE I 668a 669c 670d 671a
54 FREUD *War and Death* 757b-c

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OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 4:2-5 8:18-2 1 --8 15:1 4 --7 19 ... 2 3 8 15-22 / *Exodus,* 1 15 35-40 / *Leviticus* passim, esp 1 6, / *Numbers* 9:1 14 19 / *Deuteronomy* 6 8 10-2 3:21 23 / *Joshua,* 22 1-6 24 14 -8-- (D) *I Samuel* 2 1-6 14 8 / *Judges* 11-8 40 / *I Samuel,* 15:10-35--(D) *I Kings* 15:10-35 / *II Kings* 1 16--(D) *II Kings,* 1 6 / *I Chronicles,* 10:29--(D) *I Paralipomenon,* 16:29 / *II Chronicles,* 1 29-31--(D) *II Paralipomenon,* 1 29-31 / *Ezra*--(D) *I Esdras* / *Nehemiah*--(D) *II Esdras* / *Psalms* passim / *Ecclesiastes* 5:2 1 3--(D) *Ecclesiastes* 5:1-6 1 13 / *Isaiah* 1 1 0--(D) *Isaias,* 1:11 -0 / *Daniel* 9 / *Micah* 6 8--(D) *Micheas* 6:6-8

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NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 4 1 11 5 33 36 6:1-8 6:18 --21 15:23 35 --22:34 3 / *Mark* 12:28-34 / *Luke* 21 4 1 13 9:23 --5:7-6 10:25 42 17:7 1 18 1 14 20:25 / *Acts,* 5:27-3 20:22- 4 / *Romans* 1 13 / *Ephesians* 4 esp 4 1 3- / *Colossians,* 3 / *I Timothy* 2-8 / *II Timothy* / *James* 5 3 18 / *I John* esp 2 3 1 2 3 3:23 4:7-5:3 / *II John*

4 HOMER *Iliad,* BK 1 [06-] 5b BK IX [45] 5 4]6 b BK XXIV [424 431] 175d / *Odyssey* BK II [1 5 84] 256b-257

5 AESCHYLUS *Suppliant Maidens* 3a 14a,c esp [600-709] 8d 10b / *Agamemnon* [360-398] 56a b / *Eumenides* [490-565] 86b-87

5 SOPHOCLES *Oedipus the King* [863-9 0] 107b-c *Oedipus at Colonus* [461-509] 118b-d *Antigone* 131a 142d esp [44 470] 134d 135a, [3 1353] 142d / *Ajax* [1 8--0] 149c-d [1 6-14-1] 154b-155a,c / *Electra* [058- 09] 164d 165a / *Philoctetes* [1440-444] 195a,c

5 EURIPIDES *S* 258a 269a,c esp [1] 258a b, [5 3-563] 262d 263b / *Electra* [6-2 2] 328c-d / *Bacchantes* 340a 352a,c / *Hecuba* [799-805] 359d

5 ARISTOPHANES *Birds* 542a 563d esp [-0 66] 557b-558b

6 HERODOTUS *History* 1 1d 172a 201d 202 281b-c BK IX 308a-c

7 PLATO *Euthyphro* 191a 199a,c / *Apology* 206b-d / *Timaeus* 44 a *Laws* BK IV 68 d 683b BK X, 769c 771b

8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* CH 1 [05 -6] 148c

9 ARISTOTLE *Politics,* BK II, H 9 [3- -6-34] 533d

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things,* BK VI [56-79] 81a b

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 16 121d 122d CH 27 132c 133a BK II CH 16 158b-d BK III CH 24 203c 210a BK IV CH 3 224b-d CH 12 242d 244a

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK I, SECT 17 255d 256d BK II SECT 13 258c BK V SECT 7 269d BK IX, SECT 1 791a-c SECT 40 295b

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK V [42 103] 188a 190a

14 PLUTARCH *Aemilius Paulus,* 214b-d

15 TACITUS *Histories* BK IV 282d 283b

16 KEPLER *Harmonies of the World* 1011

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27 SHAKESPEARE *Henry VIII* ACT I, SC II [435 45] 573c-d

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 80b-81a 100d 101a

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35 Locke *Toleration* 2a b 3b 4a 10d 11a 15d 16a 16c 17b / *Civil Government* ch ii sect 6 26b-c ch vi sect 56 36d
36 Sterne *Tristram Shandy* 255a 268a
37 Fielding *Tom Jones* 187d 188a
38 Rousseau *Social Contract* bk iv 435a 439c passim
40 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 81d 82b 180c 182c esp 181b c 184d 185d 191a 194a passim 226a b 291d 292d 350b d 533b d 593b d 599a passim esp 593b d
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43 Mill *Liberty* 296b d 310d 311a
44 Boswell *Johnson* 84b c 262b
46 Hegel *Philosophy of History* part i 225b
48 Melville *Moby Dick* 30a 36b 39a b
51 Tolstoy *War and Peace* bk i 50b-c bk iii 122b c bk v 218b 220a bk vi 271c d 272c 274a c bk xi 476c-480a
52 Dostoevsky *Brothers Karamazov* bk ii 83c-84a bk v 127b-137c bk vi 164a 165a 167b-170b

CROSS REFERENCES

For Other discussions of the issue between the ethics of duty and the ethics of happiness or pleasure *see* Happiness 3 Pleasure and Pain 6–6a 8b

Matters relevant to this issue *see* Desire 2b 3a Good and Evil 3a–3b(2) Justice 1e–1f 4 Law 3a(1) 4–4a 4c–4d Temperance 3 Virtue and Vice 1d 6a Will 8b(2) 8c–8d

Other treatments of conscience both psychological and ethical *see* Honor 2a Punishment 5c Sin 5 Temperance 3

The consideration of duty in relation to law justice and rights *see* God 3d Justice 1e 3 11b Law 2 4a 4c–4d 6a Religion 2 Will 8d

The conflict between duty and desire or love *see* Desire 6a–6b Love 3c

The treatment of specific duties domestic political and religious *see* Citizen 4 Family 6d God 3d Justice 11b Religion 2 State 8a Truth 8e

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection
II Works by authors not represented in this collection

For the date place and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

I

Epictetus *The Manual*
Hobbes *Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society* ch 13
Hume *A Treatise of Human Nature* bk iii part ii sect vii x
Fielding *Amelia*
A Smith *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* part iii
Kant *Lectures on Ethics* pp 11–47 116–253
—— *Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone*
Dostoevsky *Crime and Punishment*

II

Cicero *De Finibus (On the Supreme Good)*
—— *De Officiis (On Duties)*
Seneca *Moral Essays*
Maimonides *Eight Chapters on Ethics*
Boccaccio *Patient Griselda*
Beaumont and Fletcher *The Maid's Tragedy*
Sanderson *De Obligatione Conscientiae (On the Obligations of Conscience)*
Corneille *Le Cid*
—— *Horace*
—— *Polyeucte*
J Taylor *Of Holy Living*
—— *Ductor Dubitantium*
Racine *Andromaque*
Baxter *Chapters from A Christian Directory*
Pufendorf *De Officio Hominis et Civis Juxta Legem Naturalem (Of the Duties of Man and of the Citizen According to Natural Law)*

BUTLER. *Fifteen Sermons upon Human Nature* III, X, XIII
T REID *Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind* I I PART III CH 5-8
D STEWART *Outlines of Moral Philosophy* PART II CH 2
J G FICHTE *The Vocation of Man* PART III
WORDSWORTH. *Ode to Duty*
BENTHAM. *Deontology*
WHEWELL. *The Elements of Morality* BK II CH 5 12 BK V CH 2 10-7
MAZZINI *The Duties of Man*
MAURICE. *The Conscience*
P A JANET *The Theory of Morals* BK I CH 2
H. SIDGWICK. *The Methods of Ethics* BK II CH 5 BK II CH
BRADLEY *Ethical Studies* IV, V
T H GREEN *The Principles of Political Obligation* ( )
GUYAU *Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation ni sanction*
NIETZSCHE. *The Genealogy of Morals* II
BRENTANO *The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong* par 1-13
SPENCER *The Principles of Ethics* VOL II PART I CH 9-29 PART V VI
DEWEY The Idea of Obligation in *Outlines of a Critical Theory of Ethics*
—— *The Study of Ethics* CH 7-8
BOSANQUET *Science and Philosophy* 16
CROCE. *The Philosophy of the Practical* PART I SECT II PART II SECT I (IV) SECT II (I) PART III (IV)
ROYCE *The Philosophy of Loyalty*
MOORE. *Principia Ethica* CH 4
—— *Ethics* CH 4-5
PRICHARD *Duty and Interest*
N HARTMANN *Ethics* VOL I, *Moral Phenomena* SECT 4-6
KIRK *Conscience and Its Problems*
ROSS *The Right and the Good* I I II
BERGSON *Two Sources of Morality and Religion* CH I
MUIRHEAD. *Rule and End in Morals*

Chapter 20 EDUCATION

INTRODUCTION

THE great books assembled in this set are offered as means to a liberal or general education The authors of these books were educated men more than that they typified the ideal of education in their various epochs As their writings reveal their minds were largely formed or at least deeply impressed by reading the works of their predecessors Many of them were related as teacher and student sometimes through personal contact sometimes only through the written word Many of them were related as divergent disciples of the same master yet they often differed with him as well as with one another There is scarcely one among them—except Homer—who was not acquainted with the minds of the others who came before him and more often than not profoundly conversant with their thought

Yet not one of the writings in this set is specifically a treatise on education except Montaigne s essay *Of the Education of Children* *Some of these authors speak more or less fully* of their own education as does Marcus Aurelius in the opening book of his *Meditations* Augustine *in his Confessions Descartes in his Discourse* and Boswell Others refer to their educational experience in fictional guise as does Aristophanes in the argument in the *Clouds* between the Just and Unjust Discourses or Rabelais when he tells of Gargantua s schooling in Gargantua s letter to Pantagruel Sometimes they report the way in which other men were trained to greatness as does Plutarch or like Gibbon Hegel and Mill they describe and comment on the historic systems of education

In still other instances the great books contain sections or chapters devoted to the ends and means of education the order of studies the nature of learning and teaching the training of statesmen and citizens *as for example* Plato s *Republic* Aristotle s *Politics* Augustine s *Christian Doctrine* Bacon s *Advancement of Learning* Adam Smith s *Wealth of Nations* Hegel s *Philosophy of Right* and the psychological writings of James and Freud But in no case is education the principal theme of these books, as it is for most of the works cited in the list of Additional Readings among which will be found treatises on education by authors in this set

EDUCATION is not itself so much an idea or a subject matter as it is a theme to which the great ideas and the basic subject matters are relevant It is one of the perennial practical problems which men cannot discuss without engaging in the deepest speculative considerations It is a problem which carries discussion into and across a great many subject matters—the liberal arts of grammar rhetoric and logic psychology medicine metaphysics and theology ethics politics and economics It is a problem which draws into focus many of the great ideas—virtue and truth knowledge and *opinion art and science desire* will sense memory mind habit change and progress family and state man nature and God

This can be verified by noting the diverse contexts in which education is discussed in the great books In each connection we shall find some of the special questions which together make up the complex problem of education For example the nature of teaching and learning is examined in the wider context of psychological considerations concerning man s abilities the way in which knowledge is acquired and how it is communicated by means of language or other symbols *Different* conceptions of the nature of man and of the relation of his several capacities surround the question *of the ends of education* In this context

questions also arise concerning the parts of education—the training of man s body the f rmation of his character the cultivation of his mind—and how these are related to one another

The whole theory of the virtues and of habit formation is in olved in the question whether virtue can be tau ht or must be acquired in some other way and in related questions about the influence of the family and the state on the growth of character These questions are also asked in terms of general political theory Different views of the state are involved in questions about the division of responsibility *for education* among various agencies Questions *about the purpose* of education and what sort of education shall be given to the diverse classes in the state are d fferently raised and diff rently answered in the context of discussions of different forms of government

Thou h they are far from exhaustive these examples should nevertheless suffice to make the point that there can be no philosophy of education apart from *philosophy* as a whole It may therefore not be a disadvantage to find the discussion of education *in the great books* almost always imbedded in the context of some more general theory or problem.

ONE OPINION FROM wh ch there is hardly a dissenting voice in the great books is that education should aim to make men good as men and as c tizens If you ask what is the good of education Plato writes the answer is easy—that education makes good *men* and that good men act nobly and conquer their enemies in battle because they are good Men should enter upon learnin Bacon declares in order to gi e true account of their gift of reason to the benefit and use of men while William James stresses the need for a perfectly rounded development Thus it ould seem to be a common opin on in all ages that education should seek to dev lop the characteristic excellences of which men are capable and that its ultimate ends are human happ ness and the w lfare of society

W thin this area of general a reement there are of course diff rences whi h result from th d fferent v ews that re taken of man s relation to the state o to God If the good f the state takes precedence over individual happiness, then education must be directed to training men for the role they play as parts of a larger organism. Education then serves the purpose of preserving the state Of all things Aristotle says that which contributes most to the per manence of constitutions is the adaptation of educat on to the form of government The best laws, he continues, though sanctioned by every citizen of the state will be of no avail unless the young are trained by habit and edu cation in the spirit of the constitution

Rousseau seems to take a similar view when he calls for a system of public education run by the state Its object is to assure that the citizens are early accustomed to regard their individuality only in its relation to the body of th state and to be aware so to *speak* of *their own* existence merely as a *part of that* of the *state* Taught in this way the citizens Rousseau claims might at length come to identify themselves in some degree with this greater whole to feel themselves members of *their* country and to love it with that exquisite *feeling* which no isolated person has save for *himself*.

If *happiness* cannot be fully achieved on earth then whatever temporal ends education serves must themselves be ordered to eternal salvation *and the* whole process of human development *must* be a direction of the soul to God What did it profit me Augustine asks in his *Confessio s* that all the books I could procure of the so-called liberal arts I the vile slave of vile affections read by myself *and undertood?* For I had *my* back to th light and my face to the things enlightened whence my face with which I discerned the things enlightened was not itself *enlightened* Whatever was written either on rhetoric or log c geometry *mus c and arithmetic by* my self w thout much difficulty or any instructor I understood Thou knowest O Lord my God because both quickness of understanding and acuteness in discern ng is Thy gift yet did I not *thence* sacrifice to Thee Wherefore Au gustine concludes concerning this stage of his learnin it served not to my use but to my perd tion But August ne does not therefore conclude that under no circumstances can liberal education be put to good use In his

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IN THE CLASSIFICATION of the kinds of education, the word "liberal" is frequently used in a more restricted sense to signify not all education designed for free men, but only the improvement of the mind through the acquisition of knowledge and skill. In this sense liberal education is set apart from physical education which concerns bodily health and proficiency and moral education which concerns excellence in action rather than in thought.

These divisions are clearly made perhaps for the first time in Plato's *Republic*. The education described there begins in the early years with music and gymnastic. Gymnastic "presides over the growth and decay of the body." Music which includes literature as well as the *arts of harmony* and rhythm is said to educate its students "by the influence of habit by harmony making them harmonious, by rhythm rhythmical" and its function is to develop moral as well as aesthetic sensibilities.

The second part of Plato's curriculum "which leads naturally to reflection" and draws the soul towards being consists in the mathematical arts and sciences of arithmetic geometry *music and astronomy*. *The program is* capped by the study of dialectic to which all the rest is but "a prelude" for "when a person *starts on the discovery of the absolute by the* light of reason only and without any assistance of sense and perseveres until by pure intelligence he arrives at the perception of the absolute good he at last finds himself at the end of the intellectual world."

Up to this point the program can be taken as liberal education in the narrow sense of learning how and what to think. The fifteen years of *experience in civic* affairs and the tasks of government which Plato interposes at the age of thirty five seem to function as another phase of *moral training*. *This period provides* an opportunity of trying whether when they are drawn all manner of ways by temptation they will stand firm or flinch.

To the extent that physical training aims, beyond health at the acquirement of skill in a coordinated use of one's body it can be annexed to liberal rather than moral education. Plato notes for example that gymnastic should not be too sharply distinguished from music as the training of the body from the training of the soul. Gymnastic as well as music he claims, has in view chiefly the improvement of the soul and he considers the two as balancing and tempering one another.

Whether they produce competence in gymnastic or athletic feats or like the manual arts proficiency in productive work all bodily skills, even the simplest involve the senses and the mind as well as bones and muscles. They are *arts no* less than music or logic. Apart from their utility they represent a certain type of human excellence which will be denied only by those who can see no difference between the quality of a racehorse and the skill of his rider. Whether these skills as well as other useful arts are part of liberal education in the broader sense depends, as we have seen on the end for which they are taught or learned. Even the arts which are traditionally called liberal, such as rhetoric or logic can be degraded to servility if the sole motive for becoming skilled in them is wealth won by success in the law courts.

IN THE TWO traditional distinctions so far discussed "liberal education" seems to have a *somewhat different meaning* when it signifies the opposite of servile training and when it signifies the opposite of moral cultivation. In *the first case the distinction is based upon the* purpose of the education in the second it refers to the faculties or functions being cultivated. When the second is stated in terms of the distinction between the intellectual and the moral virtues liberal (*i.e.* intellectual) education is conceived as aiming at good habits of thinking and knowing and moral education is thought of as aiming at good habits of will desire or emotion along with their consequences in action.

Although he does not use these terms Montaigne seems to have the contrast between moral and intellectual training in mind when he criticizes the education of his day for aiming at nothing but to furnish our heads with knowledge but not a word of judgment or virtue. It is, to him a "pedantic education which not only fails to achieve the highest educational purpose but also results in a great evil in that all knowledge is hurtful to him who has not the science of goodness.

A too sharp separation of the intellect

treatise *On Christian Doctrine* he considers in detail how the liberal arts which serve so well in the study of Sacred Scripture may also serve to bring the soul to God

SUCH DIFFERENCES DO NOT however annul one consequence of the general agreement namely the conception that education is concerned with the vocation of man and prepares him in thought and action for his purpose and station in life In these terms Adam Smith argues for a minimum general education He claims that a man without the proper use of the intellectual faculties of a man is if possible more contemptible than even a coward and seems to be mutilated and deformed in a still more essential part of the character of human nature He explicitly points out that this is the condition of the great body of the people who by the division of labor are confined in their employment to a few very simple operations in which the worker has no occasion to exert his understanding or to exercise his invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties which never occur The result according to Smith is that the torpor of his mind renders him not only incapable of relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversation but of conceiving any generous noble or tender sentiment and consequently of forming any just judgment concerning many even of the ordinary duties of private life

When the vocation of man is thus understood a general or liberal education is vocational in that it prepares each man for the common conditions and callings of human life In this sense specialized training which by implication at least seems to be the object of Smith s criticism is not vocational It fits a man only for some specialized function according to which he or his social class is differentiated from some other man or class

In our day the word vocational is used in the opposite sense to mean specialized training whether it is preparation for the least skilled of trades or for the most learned of professions Since all men are not called to the practice of law or medicine—any more than all are called to productive work in the various arts and crafts or the tasks of commerce and industry—the training they may need to perform these functions does not fully develop their common humanity It is not adequate to make them good as men as citizens or as children of God

The traditional meaning of the word liberal as applied to education entails a distinction between free men and slaves Slaves like domesticated animals are trained to perform special functions They are not treated as ends but as means and so they are not educated for their own good but for the use to which they are put This is true not only of slaves in the strict sense of household chattel it is also true of all the servile classes in any society which divides its human beings into those who work in order to live and those who live off the work of others and who therefore have the leisure in which to strive to live well

In accordance with these distinctions Aristotle divides education into liberal and illiberal Certain subjects are illiberal by nature namely any occupation art or science which makes the body or soul of the freeman less fit for the practice or exercise of virtue" In this category Aristotle includes those arts which tend to deform the body and likewise all paid employments for they absorb and degrade the mind

It is not only the nature of the subject but also the end which education serves that determines whether its character is liberal or illiberal Even a liberal art becomes in Aristotle s opinion menial and servile if done for the sake of others A man s education will not appear illiberal only so long as he does or learns anything for his own sake or for the sake of his friends or with a view to excellence In other words to be liberal education must serve the use of leisure in the pursuit of excellence It must treat man as an end not as a means to be used by other men or by the state

It follows that any society which abolishes the distinction of social classes and which calls all men to freedom should conceive education as essentially liberal and for all men It should furthermore direct education in all its parts and phases to the end of each man s living well rather than to the end of his earning a living for himself or others

IN THE CLASSIFICATION of the kinds of education, the word "liberal" is frequently used in a more restricted sense to signify not all education deserved for free men, but only the improvement of the mind through the acquisition of knowledge and skill. In this sense liberal education is set apart from physical education which concerns bodily health and proficiency, and moral education which concerns excellence in action rather than in thought.

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In accordance with these distinctions Aristotle divides education into liberal and illiberal Certain subjects are illiberal by nature namely any occupation art or science which makes the body or soul of the freeman less fit for the practice or exercise of virtue In this category Aristotle includes those arts which tend to deform the body and likewise all paid employments for they absorb and degrade the mind

It is not only the nature of the subject but also the end which education serves that determines whether its character is liberal or illiberal Even a liberal art becomes in Aristotle s opinion menial and servile if done for the sake of others A man s education will not appear illiberal only so long as he does or learns anything for his own sake or for the sake of his friends or with a view to excellence In other words to be liberal education must serve the use of leisure in the pursuit of excellence It must treat man as an end not as a means to be used by other men or by the state

It follows that any society which abolishes the distinction of social classes and which calls all men to freedom should conceive education as essentially liberal and for all men It should furthermore direct education in *all* its parts and phases to the end of each man s living well rather than to the end of his earning a living for himself or others

toms. All of these related problems of moral education have a political aspect which appears in the issue concerning the state s right to censor or regulate the arts for morality s sake in the question of the primacy of the family or the state in the moral guidance of the young in the distinction between the good man and the good citizen or ruler and the possible difference between the training appropriate for the one and for the other

THE MAIN PROBLEM of intellectual education seems to be the curriculum or course of study The traditional attempts to construct an ideal *curriculum* turn on such questions as what studies shall be included what shall be their order and how shall they be taught or learned A variety of answers results from a variety of views of man s faculties or capacities the nature of knowledge itself the classification and order of the arts and sciences Especially important are the various conceptions of the nature and function of the liberal arts. Subordinate questions concern the place of the fine and useful arts in liberal education and the role of experience and experiment—both in contrast to and in cooperation with the role of books and teachers.

In addition to the problem of the curriculum and its materials, the theory of intellectual education necessarily considers methods of teaching and learning Here the various proposals derive from different views of the learning process—of the causes or factors at work in any acquisition of skill or knowledge

The contribution of the teacher cannot be understood apart from a psychological analysis of learning for the teacher is obviously only one among its many causes. It makes the greatest difference to the whole enterprise of learning whether the teacher is regarded as the principal cause of understanding on the part of the student or whether the teacher is as Socrates describes himself merely a midwife assisting the labor of the mind in bringing knowledge and wisdom to birth and thoroughly examining whether the thought which the mind brings forth is a false idol or a noble and true birth

This Socratic insight is later reformulated in the comparison which Aquinas makes, in his tract *Concerning the Teacher* between the art of teaching and the art of healing Both are cooperative arts arts which succeed only as ministers of nature which is the principal actor and not by acting like the art of the cobbler or sculptor to produce a result by shaping plastic but dead materials.

The comparison which Hippocrates makes of instruction in medicine with the culture of the productions of the earth" exhibits the same conception of teaching Our natural disposition he writes is as it were the soil the tenets of our teacher are as it were the seed instruction in youth is like the planting of the seed in the ground at the proper season the place where the instruction is communicated is like the food imparted to vegetables by the atmosphere diligent study is like the *cultivation of the fields and it is time which imparts* strength to all things and brings them to maturity

This conception of teaching as a cooperative art analogous to medicine or to agriculture underlies the principles of pedagogy in the *Great Didactic* of Comenius. It gives significance to the distinction that Aquinas makes between learning by discovery or from experience and learning by instruction or from a teacher—even as a person is healed in one way by the operation of nature alone and in another by nature with the administration of medicine

In addition to the technical considerations raised by the nature of the learning process the discussion of teaching deals with the moral or emotional aspect of the relation between teacher and student Without interest learning seldom takes place or if it does it cannot rise above the level of rote memory It is one thing to lay down a course of study another to motivate the student Though he does not hesitate to prescribe what is to be learned by the student Plato adds the caution that there must be no notion of forcing our system of education

More than interest is required Teaching Augustine declares is the greatest act of charity Learning is facilitated by love The courtesies between Dante and Virgil in the *Divine Comedy* present an eloquent picture of love between student and teacher master and dis

and the moral may be questioned or at least qualified by those who like Socrates tend to identify knowledge and virtue Yet they seldom go to the opposite extreme of supposing that no distinction can be made between the task of imparting knowledge to the mind and that of forming character Socrates for example in the *Meno* recognizes that a man cannot be made temperate courageous or just in the same way that he can be taught geometry

From another point of view the notion of moral training is questioned by those who like Freud think that the patterns of human desire or emotion can be beneficially changed apart from moral discipline It is the object of psychoanalysis he writes to strengthen the ego to make it more independent of the super ego to widen its field of vision and so to extend its organization that it can take over new portions of the id To do this is radically to alter the individual s behavior pattern It is reclamation work Freud says like the draining of the Zuyder Zee Emotional education so conceived is therapeutic—more like preventive and remedial medicine than moral training

Religious education is usually regarded as both intellectual and moral even as the science of theology is said to be both speculative and practical Citing the admonition of St James Be ye doers of the word and not hearers only Aquinas holds that religious education is concerned with the knowledge not only of divine things but also of the human acts by which man comes to God Since man is infinitely removed from God he needs for this purpose the grace of God which according to Aquinas is nothing short of a partaking of the divine nature

Both on the side of man s knowledge of God and on the side of his love and worship of God religious education involves the operation of supernatural factors—revelation grace sacraments Hence God is Himself the primary source of religious education But as the dispenser of the sacraments whereby grace is instrumentally caused the church according to Aquinas functions instrumentally in the service of the divine teacher

THE CONCEPTION OF THE means and ends of moral education will differ with different ethical theories of the good man and the good life and according to differing enumerations and definitions of the virtues It will differ even more fundamentally according to whether the primary emphasis is placed on pleasure and happiness or duty The parties to this basic issue in moral philosophy which is discussed in the chapters on DUTY and HAPPINESS inevitably propose different ways of forming good character—by strengthening the will in obedience to law or by habituating the appetites to be moderate or reasonable in their inclinations

On either theory the basic problem of moral education is whether morality can be taught and how The Greeks formulated this question in terms of virtue by asking whether such things as courage and temperance are *at all* teachable as geometry and horsemanship plainly are The problem remains essentially the same if the question is how the will can be trained Can it be trained by the same methods as those which work in the improvement of the understanding?

The answer to the question whichever way it is formulated depends on the view that is taken of the relation between moral knowledge and moral conduct Do those who understand the principles of ethics or who know the moral law necessarily act in accordance with their knowledge? Can a man know what is good or right to do in a particular case and yet do the opposite? St Paul seems to suggest this when he says For the good that I would I do not but the evil which I would not that I do If something more than knowledge or straight thinking is needed for good conduct how is it acquired and how can one man help another to acquire it? Certainly not by learning and teaching in the ordinary sense which applies to the arts and sciences Then how—by practice by guidance or advice by example by rewards and punishments or if by none of these then by a gift of nature or by the grace of God?

These questions are necessarily prior to any discussion of the role of the family the state and the church in the process of moral training They also provide the general background for the consideration of particular influences on character formation in men and children such things as poetry and music or laws and cus

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ciple Not only love but docility is required on the part of the student and respect for the student s mind on the part of the teacher In tellectual education may not be directly con cerned with the formation of character yet the moral virtues seem to be factors in the pursuit of truth and in the discipline of the learning process

We have already noted some of the political problems of education Of these probably the chief question is whether the organization and institution of education shall be private or pub lic Any answer which assigns the control of education largely or wholly to the state must lead to a number of other determinations

Who shall be educated all or only some? Should the education of leaders be different from the education of others? If educational opportunity is to be equal for all must the same kind as well as the same quantity of edu cation be offered to all? And in every case to what end shall the state direct the education of its members—to its own welfare and secur ity or to the happiness of men and the greater glory of God? Should education always serve the status quo by preserving extant customs and perpetuating existing forms of govern ment or can and should it aim at a better so ciety and a higher culture?

These are some of the questions with which statesmen and political philosophers have dealt answering them differently according to the institutions of their time and in accordance with one or another theory of the state and its government There are still other questions Is freedom of expression in teaching and dis cussion indispensable to the pursuit of truth and the dissemination of knowledge? To what extent shall the state control the content and methods of education or leave such determina tion to the teaching profession? *How shall pub-lic education be supported?* Should it be car ried beyond childhood and youth to all the ages of adult life and if so how should such education be organized outside of schools?

Mill for example holds it to be almost a self-evident axiom that the State should re-quire and compel the education up to a certain standard of every human being who is born its citizen Yet he deprecates the idea of a general state education as a mere contriv ance for moulding people to be exactly like one another

Discussing the pro s and con s of this issue Mill touches upon most if not all of the ques tions just raised He believes that the difficul ties could be avoided if the government would leave it to parents to obtain the education where and how they pleased and content itself with helping to pay the school fees of the poorer classes of children and defraying the entire school expenses of those who have no one else to pay for them Schools completely established and controlled by the state he maintains should only exist if they exist at *all as one among many competing experiments,* carried on for the purpose of example and stimulus to keep the others up to a certain standard of excellence

So far as the problem of adult education concerns citizenship Mill s answer like Mon tesquieu s and Plato s before him is that noth ing can take the place of active participation in political life Men become citizens by living and acting as citizens, under the tutelage of good laws and in an atmosphere of civic vir tue So far as the problem of adult education concerns the continued growth of the mind throughout the life of mature men and women the answer is not to be found in the great books in the words of their authors Yet the great books as a whole may constitute a solution to that problem

The authors of these books from Homer to Freud are the great original teachers in the tradition of our culture They taught one another They wrote for adults not children and in the main they wrote for the mass of men not for scholars in this or that specialized field of learning

The books exhibit these teachers at work in the process of teaching They contain more-over expositions or exemplifications of the lib-eral arts as the arts of teaching and learning in every field of subject matter To make these books and their authors work for us by working with them is it seems to the editors and pub-lishers of this set of books a feasible and de-sirable program of adult education

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

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38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws*, BK IV, 13b,d-16a

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 346d-347

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations*, BK V, 340b-343d

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1a. The ideal of the educated man

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12 EPICTETUS *Discourses*, BK I, CH 2[?] 132b-133b; BK III, CH 10 18[?]d-18[?]; CH 15 190a-191a; CH 1 193d-19[?]a; BK IV, CH 6 230b-232

12 AURELIUS *Meditations*, BK I 253a-256d; BK I, SECT 7 259b-d; BK IV, SECT 3 263b-264[?]; SECT 6 [?]64d; BK X, SECT 11 [?]298b-d

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, BK II, 81-83b

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays*, 59b-61c; 63d-80b esp 70d-[?]2b; 74b-75a

26 SHAKESPEARE *Taming of the Shrew*, ACT I, SC [?] [?] 20[?]c-203a / *Love's Labour's Lost*, ACT IV, SC II [22-[?]] 2[?]6c

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 1a-28d esp 1[?]b-27; 86b-c

3[?] DESCARTES *Rules* III [?]c-d

3[?] MILTON *Areopagitica* 39[?]a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 3[?] 37 1[?]7a-b

35 HUME *Human Understanding*, SECT [?] DIV 4 1a-4[?]

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38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 346d-347b

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations*, BK V, 340b-343d esp 343c-d

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 88c-d; 644b-6[?]5d esp 644d-645a

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 223a-d / *Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals* 260d-261d / *Practical Reason* 33[?]-338[?] / *Judgement* 50[?]-509a

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47 GOETHE *Faust*, PART I [1765-17[?]5] 42b

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53 JAMES *Psychology* [?]36b-73[?]a

1b. The disadvantages of being educated

5 EURIPIDES *Medea* [2[?]6-[?]0[?]] 214c-d

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12 EPICTETUS *Discourses*, BK I, CH 21 193d-195a; CH 2[?] [?]05c-206a; 207d-208a; BK IV, CH 1 221b-c; CH 8 235b-23[?]d

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18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions*, BK I, par 2[?]-[?]6 7a-c; BK IV, par [?]8-31 26a-2[?]a

22 CHAUCER *Miller's Tale* [3449-3464] 217a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan*, PART I, 56d; PART II, 150c-d

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, BK [?] 7[?]b-78b

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 55d-62a; [?]a-[?]7d; 150d-151a; 232d-2[?]0a; 3[?]1a-c; 397; 398; [?]48b-449a; 502; 504c; 508a; 512a; 520b-d

26 SHAKESPEARE *2nd Henry VI*, ACT I, SC II [9-[?]1] 58d-59a / *Love's Labour's Lost*, ACT I, SC I [5[?]-94] 254d-255b [143-1[?]4] 2[?]5d; ACT [?], SC II [69-[?]] 274d

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4[?] KANT *Pure Reason* 304d-30[?]a; 3[?]8a / *Judgement* 608b-c

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To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad* BK II [265–283] 12d the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119 When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164

AUTHOR S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases e g *Iliad* BK II [265 283] 12d

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e g OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—(D) *II Esdras* 7 46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface

1 The ends of education

4 HOMER *Iliad* BK IX [430–441] 61c

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7 PLATO *Protagoras* 45d 46d / *Apology* 201b c / *Republic* BK II III 320c 339a passim esp BK III 333b c 338a 339a 341b c BK VI VII 383d 398c / *Timaeus* 474b d / *Laws* BK I 648b 649d BK II 653a c 656b c BK VII 713c 731d passim BK XII 796b 799a c

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9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH I [639 1–15] 161a b / *Ethics* BK I CH 2 339b d CH 13 [1102 5 25] 347b-c / *Politics* BK II CH 5 [1263b36–1264 1] 459a BK VII CH 13 BK VIII CH 7 536b 548a c

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12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK IV SECT 3 263b 264a SECT 16 264d BK X SECT 11 12 298b d

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK VIII [508–519] 272b 273a

14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus Numa* 63d 64a / *Coriolanus* 174b d 175a

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III 10a 12b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 14 4c d par 16 5a b par 19 5d par 24 7a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q I A I 3b-4a Q 94 A 3 ANS 504a 505a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 153a 156b

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK II 81a 83b

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 55d 62a esp 60c 61c 64c 66b 69d 72a

26 SHAKESPEARE *Taming of the Shrew* ACT I SC I [1–40] 202c 03a

29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 145d

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 1a 28d c p 9c d 16d 17a

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31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV APPENDIX IV IX 447b c IX 448a

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43 MILL *Liberty* 303b-d / *Representative Government*, 344b-c 424b-c
45 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO, par ... 17a PAR III par 18 65a-c ADDITIONS 9 132c 133a
50 MARX *Capital*, 238b-c
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* K 47b-c K 7 244d 245d
53 JAMES *Psychology* 274b-275a 11b 712b
54 FREUD *New Introductory Lectures* 868d-871a esp 870a 871a

1a. The ideal of the educated man

PLATO *Lysis* 16c 18b / *Laches* 37c-d / *Republic* BK II 319c-320c BK III 338a 339a BK 1 388a-401d esp 390b-391b / *Timaeus*, 454a / *Laws* BK 649b-d BK II 653a-654a BK VI, 70 a b K XII 796b-799a,c
8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK I CH 3 144a b / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 1 499a 501 esp H 2 [982a5 20] 500b-c
9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH 1 [639a1 15] 161a b / *Politics* K II CH 13 K VIII, CH 7 536b-548a c passim / *Rhetoric* K I CH 8 [1365b3- 39] 608a b BK I, CH 6 [1354 33 35] 630d CH 8 [385a24 8] 632 CH 23 [399a1 1] 647
1 EPICTETUS *Discourses* K I, CH 2 132b-133b K III CH 1 185d 187a CH 15 190a 191a CH 21 193d 19 a BK I H 6 230b-232c
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* K I 253a 256d K SECT 17 259b-d K 1 SECT 3 263b-264 S CT 6 264d BK X SECT II 298b-d
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 81 -83b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 59b-61c 63d-80b esp 70d 72b, 74b-75a
25 SHAKESPEARE *Taming of the Shrew* ACT C [1 4] 20 c 203a / *Love Labour's Lost* CT 1 1 [2 34] 266c
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 1a 28d esp 17b-27 86b-c
31 DESCARTES *Rules* III 3c d
32 MILTON *Areopagitica* 397a
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 34, 37 177 b
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT I D 1 4 451 -45 c
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 99d 100a 2 4b-c
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 346d 347b
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK V 340b-343d esp 343c d
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 88c d 644b-645d esp 644d-645a
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 223a d / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 260d 261d / *Practical Reason* 337a 338c / *Judgement* 508c 509a

43 MILL *Liberty* 294b-296d / *Utilitarianism* 451c-452b
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 130b 283c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* ADDITIONS, 15 115d 65 126d 12 95 133a 119 136b
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [1-65 1-] 42b
50 MARX *Capital*, 176d 178a 238b-c
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* EPILOGUE 411b-412d
53 JAMES *Psychology* 36b-73 a

1b. The disadvantages of being educated

5 EURIPIDES *Medea* [276-305] 214c-d
5 ARISTOPHANES *Clouds* 488a 506d
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK I 370a-c
7 PLATO *Protagoras* 47a b / *Gorgias* 272b
9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK II CH 1 [1 93 9-33] 642a [1394b5 32] 642c CH 22 [1395b2 32] 643d CH 23 [1399a12 1] 647c
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK III CH 21 193d 19 a CH 24 205c 206a 207d 208a BK I CH 1 221b-c CH 8 235b-23 d
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK II SECT 3 25 a b
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 6 c K IV par 8-31 26a 2 a
22 CHAUCER *Miller's Tale* [3445-3463] 217a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 56d PART II 150c d
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK II 7 b-78b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 5 d 62a 5a 7d 150d 151a 232d 240a 321 c 397 398, 448b-449a 502c 504c 508a 51 a 520b-d
26 SHAKESPEARE *2nd Henry VI* CT 1 S II [9 1] 58d 59a / *Love's Labour's Lost* CT 1 SC 1 [55-94] 254d 255b [43 14] 2 5d CT SC II [69-] 274d
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 1a 28d esp 2 17b 30b-c 73d 74c
31 DESCARTES *Rules* II 2a b / *Discourse* PART I 42b-c
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I II SECT 0 110c 111 BK II CH XXX II S CT 3 248c
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 58a b PART III 94b-95a
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 99d 100a 158a 161d esp 158c 159a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 344d 345, 346d 348a 36 a-d 363a 366d
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK V 337a d 340b-c
42 KANT *Practical Reason* 304d 305a 358a / *Judgement* 608b-c
44 BOSWELL *Johnson*, 201b-c
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [354 41] 11a 12b [6 4 80-] 17 21 [1983 606] 38b-39a [803- 18 5] 43a T I [491 -49 2] 122 [6 8- 6218] 152 b
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK 19c 20b K V 215b-c

2 The kinds of education physical moral liberal professional religious

7 PLATO *Protagoras* 46b d / *Republic* BK II III 320c 339a esp BK III 333b 339a BK VI 380d 381a BK VII 391b 401a / *Sophist* 555b c / *Laws* BK I 649b d BK II 653a 663b esp 662d 663b BK VII 717b d 728b 730d BK VII 797b 798b
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK VII CH 15 [1334^b7-28] 539b d BK VIII CH 2-3 542b 543d
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK III CH 15 190a 191a
13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK IX [590-620] 295a b
17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III 10a 12b
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK III par 7 9 14c 15b BK IV par 28-31 26a 27a / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 8-42 639d 656d BK IV 675a 698a c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 105 A 4 ANS 318b 321a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 57b 61c esp 60b 61c 63d 75a passim
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 30b c 53d 54b
31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART I 42d 43a
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 34-37 177a b
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART IV 166b 167a
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK IV 15c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 197 67a b
50 MARX *Capital* 237d 238c
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 47b c BK VI 244d 245d

3 The training of the body and the cultivation of bodily skills gymnastics manual work

5 ARISTOPHANES *Cloud* [866 1114] 499a 502b esp [1002 1024] 500d 501a
7 PLATO *Protagoras* 46c / *Gorgias* 261a 262a 289d 290a / *Republic* BK II 310c d 320c 321a BK III 334b 335b BK VI 380d 381a BK VII 391c d 398c 399d / *Timaeus* 475b d / *Statesman* 599d 600a / *Laws* BK I 644b 646a BK II 653b 654a 663a b BK VII 717b d 721d 722c 726a 727c BK VIII 734a 735a
8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK VII CH 3 [246 10-^{b}19] 329c 330a / *Heavens* BK II CH 12 [292 14 ^{b}18] 383d 384b
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK II CH 6 [1106 35 ^{b}8] 352a / *Politics* BK IV CH I [1288^b10 20] 487a b BK VII CH 15 [1334^b7 28] 539b d CH 17 [1336 4 39] 541a c BK VIII CH 3 4 542d 544c
10 HIPPOCRATES *Articulations* par 52 109b 110a par 55 111c par 58 112b 113a / *Aphorisms* SECT I par 3 131a b SECT II par 49-50 133d
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK III CH 15 190a c
13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK IX [590-620] 295a b
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 40c-42a / *Coriolanus* 175b / *Philopoemen* 293d 294a
17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR II CH 8 86d 87b
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 50 A I ANS 6a 7b
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 28a 29b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 43d 66c 67a 73b c
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 53d 54a
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART IV 166b-167a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 335a b 348d 349a
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 42d 43c 53a BK V 337d 338a
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 5a b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 52 25c / *Philosophy of History* PART II 267b 268b
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 269b 271a 278c d
50 MARX *Capital* 164b 166a 170c 171b 237d 240c
53 JAMES *Psychology* 74a 75a 332a 774a

4 The formation of a good character virtue, a right will

5 EURIPIDES *Suppliants* [857-917] 266a b / *Hecuba* [592-602] 357d 358a
5 ARISTOPHANES *Clouds* [866 1114] 499a 502b
7 PLATO *Laches* 30a b / *Protagoras* 45d 46d / *Euthydemus* 66b 67b / *Phaedrus* 128a d / *Meno* 174a 190a c / *Republic* BK II 314b c BK II III 320c 339a / *Timaeus* 474c d / *Laws* 640a 799a c esp BK I 644b 645c 649b 650b 651a c BK II 653a b 656b c BK VI 706c BK VII 713c 731d / *Seventh Letter* 801b c
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 13 [1102^b 8 1103 3] 348c BK II CH 3 [1104^b4 14] 350a BK III CH 12 [1119 35 ^{b}19] 366a c / *Politics* BK II CH 7 461d 463c BK VII CH 13 BK VIII CH 7 536b 548a c
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [1 30] 30a b BK V [1 54] 61a d BK VI [1 42] 80a d
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* 105a 245a c esp BK I CH 1 5 105a 110c CH 18 124a 125a BK I CH 24 BK II CH 2 129a 141c BK II CH 21 4 166c 174b BK III CH 3 178d 180a CH 8 11 184b 187b CH 13 188b 189c CH 23 26 201a 213a,c BK IV CH 3 7 224b 235a CH 9-13 237d 245a c
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* 253a 310d esp BK I SECT 7-9 253b 254a SECT 11 254b SECT 14 16 254b 255d BK II SECT 17 259b d BK IV SECT 18 264d BK V SECT 14 271b SECT 16 271c d BK VI SECT 12 274c BK VII SECT 69 284d BK VIII SECT 1 285a b SECT 13 286c BK IX SECT 42 295c
13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK IX [590-620] 295a b
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus Numa* 63d 64a / *Pericles* 121a 122b / *Coriolanus* 174b d 175a
15 TACITUS *Annals* BK XIII 125d 126a
17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III CH 2 10d CH 6 11d 12b
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 13 31 4b-9a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 96 A 2 ANS 231c 232b Q 99 A 6 ANS 250a 251a Q 100 A 9 261b 262b Q 105 A 4 ANS 318b-321a Q 108 A 3 334a 336b

4 The po s b l ty a d limit of moral educa t on knowledge and rtue

(4 *The formation of a good character virtue a right will. 4a The possibility and limits of moral education knowledge and virtue*)

49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 313d 314b 317c 319a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK VI 244d 245d
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* EPILOGUE 411b 412d
53 JAMES *Psychology* 806a 808a
54 FREUD *General Introduction* 573c d 592b-c 596b-c 624d 625b / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 781a d 784a 789b 796d [fn 2] 800c 801a / *New Introductory Lectures* 870a-c

4b The influence of the family in moral training

OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 20 12 / *Deuteronomy* 5 16 6 6 7 11 18-19 27 16 / *Proverbs* 1 8-9 3 12 6.20-24 13 1 24 15 5 19 18 22 6 15 23 13 26 29 15 17
APOCRYPHA *Tobit* 4—(D) OT *Tobias* 4 / *Ecclesiasticus* 7.23 24 30 1-13—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 7 25-26 30 1-13
NEW TESTAMENT *Ephesians* 6 1-4 / *Colossians* 3.20-21
7 PLATO *Protagoras* 45d-47a / *Meno* 186a 187b / *Republic* BK V 366a-c / *Laws* BK V 687d 688a BK VII 713c 716d
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK X CH 9 [1180 25 b14] 435a c / *Politics* BK IV CH 11 [1295b14 18] 495d BK VII CH 17 [1336 23 b3] 541b-c
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK I 253a 256d esp SECT 1-4 253a SECT 14 254b c SECT 16 254d 255d
14 PLUTARCH *Marcus Cato* 286c 287b
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 14 15 4c 5a BK II par 2-8 9b 10d esp par 7 10b c BK III par 19-20 18b 19a BK IX par 19 22 67a d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 95 A 1 ANS 226c 227c Q 105 A 4 ANS 318b 321a
22 CHAUCER *Physician's Tale* [12 006-037] 367b 368a
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK II 83a b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 16c 43a c 63d 64b 66c 67a 184a 187d 344a c 414a d 534c d
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 251b
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 55 SCHOL 413d THE AFFECTS DEF 27 419a b PART IV APPENDIX XX 449a
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VI SECT 55-69 36c-40b CH XV SECT 170 64d 65a
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 29b 30a PART IV 166b
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 250b 251a
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 108c 110c 136a-c 217d 219c 283c d 310b 313b 359b 362c
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK IV 15c
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 326c 327a 327c 328a / *Political Economy* 376b 377a
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK V 337c d
42 KANT *Science of Right* 420b-421c
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 372c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 173 175 61a d par 239 76d ADDITIONS 111 134d 135a 147 140c
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK XII 395b d
54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis* 17d 18a / *Sexual Enlightenment of Children* 119a 122a c passim / *Narcissism* 408b / *Ego and Id* 704d 707d / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 794c 795a esp 795b [fn 2] / *New Introductory Lectures* 834b c 844b c 876b c

4c The role of the state in moral education law custom public opinion

5 ARISTOPHANES *Clouds* 488a 506d
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 35c d
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK I 370a c BK II 396d 397a
7 PLATO *Protagoras* 45b-47c / *Apology* 203c 204b / *Gorgias* 287c 291b / *Republic* BK II III 320c 339a BK VI 377a 379c / *Timaeus* 474c d / *Statesman* 607a 608a / *Laws* 640a 799a c esp BK I 643a 644a 645c 646d BK III 676b c BK IV 683d 685a BK V-VI 696c 697d BK VI 704a-c 710d 711c BK VII 713c 731d BK VIII 735c 738c, BK IX 757a BK XII 792c d / *Seventh Letter* 800b-c
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 9 [1099b29-32] 345b CH 13 [1102 8 25] 347c BK II CH 1 [1103b3 7] 349a BK V CH 1 [1129b12 24] 377a CH 2 [1130b20-30] 378b BK X CH 9 [1179b31 1180b28] 434c-435c / *Politics* BK II CH 5 [1263b36-1264 1] 459a CH 7 461d 463c BK VII CH 13-17 536b-542a c BK VIII CH 1 542a b
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK IV SECT 18 26 d
13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK VI [845-853] 233b 234a
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 32a-48d / *Lycurgus-Numa* 63d 64a / *Solon* 64b d 77a c passim / *Marcus Cato* 284b 286b / *Lysander* 361b d / *Agesilaus* 480b d 481a
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 14 16 4c 5b par 19-30 5d 8d BK VI par 35a c par 11 13 38b 39c / *Christian Doctrine* BK III CH 12 13 662c 663c CH 18 22 664d 666c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 92 A 1 213c 214c A 2 REP 4 214d 215a c Q 95 A 1 226c 227c A 3 228c 229b Q 96 AA 2 3 231c 233a Q 98 A 6 ANS 244c 245b Q 100 A 9 261b 262b Q 105 A 4 ANS 318b 321a
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVI [52-105] 77b d
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 149b-c 154a 156b PART IV 272c
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 42b 43c 46b-48b 60 61d 63d 64b 131b 132a
27 SHAKESPEARE *Measure for Measure* ACT II SC I [225 270] 181a c ACT III SC II [91 1 ?] 190c d
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 78d 80a

31 SPINOZA Ethics PART III THE AFFECTS DEF 27 419a b

32 MILTON Paradise Lost BK XII [285-306] 325b-326a / Areopagitica 383a 395b esp 394b-395a

33 PASCAL Pensées 6 173a

35 LOCKE Toleration 15 d / Human Understanding BK I CH II SECT 8 105d 106a SECT 20 110c 111a BK II CH XXI SECT 71 197d CH XXVIII SECT 10-12 230b 231c esp SECT 12 231b-c

35 HUME Human Understanding SECT I DIV 66 480b

36 SWIFT Gulliver PART I 29b-31a

38 MONTESQUIEU Spirit of Laws BK V 18b d 25c BK I 37d-43d BK XII 85c-86d 87c 88a BK XIX 104a 108d BK XVI 118a 119d BK XIX 138 14 a

38 ROUSSEAU Inequality 359d / Political Economy 375d 377b / Social Contract BK IV 434b-435a

39 SMITH Wealth of Nations BK V 340c 343d 346c 347d

40 GIBBON Decline and Fall 23 d 92c 94b passim 100c 101b 291d 292d

41 GIBBON Decline and Fall 93c 94a 161 162a 389c d

42 KANT Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals 263a b / Pref Metaphysical Element of Ethics 368d / Intro Metaphysic of Moral 383a b 387b 387d 388a

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 12 58b-c

43 MILL Liberty 269c 270c 294c 296b 303b-306c / Representative Government 336c 340c passim esp 337a b 342b-344d passim 346c 350a 381b-382b / Utilitarianism 456a d 457c-458b

46 HEGEL Philosophy of Right PART I par 53 56c 57c par 239 76d par 27 84d-85a 89a b par 315 104c ADDITIONS, 96-98 132c 133a 131 137d 162 143b-144 183 148d 149a / Philosophy of History PART IV 365c

49 DARWIN Descent of Man 310c 317d esp 317 c

51 TOLSTOY War and Peace BK V 244d 24 d K III 303 305b esp 303d 304b

52 DOSTOEVSKY Brothers Karamazov BK XII 398a-d

53 JAMES Psychology 190a 191a

54 FREUD Sexual Enlightenment of Children 122 / Narcissism, 408b / War and Death 757b-759d passim, esp 757 / Civilization and Its Discontents 781 c 784a-d 800b-d / New Introductory Lectures 834c

4d The effect upon character of poetry music and other arts the role of history and examples

4 HOMER Iliad BK IX [430-605] 61c-63b

5 ARISTOPHANES Acharnians [626-658] 462b-d / Wasps [1009-1070] 519d 520c / Frogs [1008-1098] 576b-577c [1482-1533] 581d 582a c

6 HERODOTUS History BK I 35c-d

7 PLATO Protagoras 46b-c / Phaedrus 136b-c / Republic BK II III 320c 339a BK IV 344b-d BK VII 388a-401d esp 391b-398c BK X 427c 434c / Timaeus 455c / Laws BK II 653a-663d BK III 6 5c 676b BK V 696b-d BK VII 717b-21a 724b-725d 726d 728b

9 ARISTOTLE Politics BK VII CH 17 [1336b30-b41] 541b-d BK VIII CH 3 542d 543d CH 5 7 544c 548a c

12 AURELIUS Meditations BK I 253a 256d esp SECT 15 16 254c 255d

13 VIRGIL Aeneid BK I [441 493] 115a 116b BK I [845-853] 233b-234a BK VIII [608-731] 278 278b

14 PLUTARCH Lycurgus 33d 34a 43b-d / Solon 76a / Pericles 121a 122b / Timoleon 195a b / Demetrius 726a d

15 TACITUS Annals BK XI 146b-147a BK XV 173a b BK X 1 183c 184a c

17 PLOTINUS First Ennead TR III CH 1 10a d

18 AUGUSTINE Confessions BK I par 20 27 6a 7d BK II par 2-5 13c 14b BK III par 11 13 38b-39c BK V par 1-6 71c 73a par 49-53 83c 85a BK XI par 1 89b-c / City of God BK I CH 31 33 147d 149a BK II CH 8 14 153d 157c BK IV CH 26-27 202a 203c / Christian Doctrine BK I CH 6 638a-d

19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I Q 1 A 2, REP 2 4a-c

21 DANTE Divine Comedy, PURGATORY XXII [55-93] 87a-c PARADISE, I [1 36] 106a b XVII [100-14] 133a-c

22 CHAUCER Intro to Man of Law's Prologue [4465 45 0] 234b-235b / Nun's Priest's Tale [1 444 452] 460a b / L Envoi 550a b

25 MONTAIGNE Essays 68b-69a 197a 199c

26 SHAKESPEARE Merchant of Venice ACT V SC I [66-88] 431b-c

29 CERVANTES Don Quixote PART I 12b-16c 186d 187c PART II 427c-429a

30 BACON Advancement of Learning 4c-6c 38c 39d esp 38d-39a 78a d 79c-80a 85a-c

31 DESCARTES Discourse PART I 43a b

31 SPINOZA Ethics PART III PROP 55 413b-414a

32 MILTON Paradise Lost BK IX [1 47] 247a 248a / Areopagitica 385a 386b

33 PASCAL Pensées II 173b-174a

35 HUME Human Understanding SECT I DIV 5 452a b

36 STERNE Tristram Shandy 250b- 1a

37 FIELDING Tom Jones 254a d

38 MONTESQUIEU Spirit of Laws BK IV 17b-18d

38 ROUSSEAU Inequality 365b-366b / Political Economy 376c 377

39 SMITH Wealth of Nations BK V 337d 338c 347d

40 GIBBON Decline and Fall, 94a b 234a-c 338d-339 449a b

41 GIBBON Decline and Fall 40d-41a 225a-c 311a 312a

(4 The formation of a good character virtue a right will 4a The possibility and limits of moral education knowledge and virtue)

49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 313d 314b 317c 319a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK VI 244d 245d
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* EPILOGUE 411b-412d
53 JAMES *Psychology* 806a 808a
54 FREUD *General Introduction* 573c d 592b c 596b-c 624d 625b / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 781a d 784a 789b 796d [fn 2] 800c 801a / *New Introductory Lectures* 870a c

4b The influence of the family in moral training

OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 20 12 / *Deuteronomy* 5 16 6 6 7 11 18-19 27 16 / *Proverbs* 1 8-9 3 12 6 20-24 13 1 24 15 5 19 18 22 6 15 23 13 26 29 15 17
APOCRYPHA *Tobit* 4—(D) OT *Tobias* 4 / *Ecclesiasticus* 7 23-24 30 1 13—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 7 25-26 30 1-13
NEW TESTAMENT *Ephesians* 6 1-4 / *Colossians* 3 20-21
7 PLATO *Protagoras* 45d-47a / *Meno* 186a 187b / *Republic* BK V 366a c / *Laws* BK V 687d 688a BK VII 713c 716d
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK X CH 9 [1180 25 ^{b}14] 435a c / *Politics* BK IV CH 11 [1295^{b}14 18] 495d BK VII CH 17 [1336 23 ^{b}3] 541b c
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK I 253a 256d esp SECT 1-4 253a SECT 14 254b-c SECT 16 254d 255d
14 PLUTARCH *Marcus Cato* 286c 287b
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 14-15 4c 5a BK II par 2-8 9b-10d esp par 7 10b c BK III par 19-20 18b 19a BK IX par 19 22 67a d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 95 A 1 ANS 226c 227c Q 105 A 4 ANS 318b 321a
22 CHAUCER *Physician's Tale* [12 006-037] 367b 368a
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK II 83a b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 16c 43a c 63d 64b 66c 67a 184a 187d 344a c 414a d 534c d
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 251b
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 55 SCHOL 413d THE AFFECTS DEF 27 419a b PART IV APPENDIX XX 449a
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VI SECT 55-69 36c-40b CH XV SECT 170 64d 65a
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 29b 30a PART IV 166b
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 250b 251a
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 108c 110c 136a c 217d 219c 283c d 310b 313b 359b 362c
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK IV 15c
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 326c 327a 327c 328a / *Political Economy* 376b 377a
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK V 337c d
42 KANT *Science of Right* 420b-421c
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 372c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 173-175 61a d par 239 76d ADDITIONS 111 134d 135a 147 140c
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK XII 395b d
54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psycho Analysis* 17d 18a / *Sexual Enlightenment of Children* 119a 122a c passim / *Narcissism* 408b / *Ego and Id* 704d 707d / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 791c 795a esp 795b [fn 2] / *New Introductory Lectures* 834b c 844b c 876b c

4c The role of the state in moral education law, custom public opinion

5 ARISTOPHANES *Clouds* 488a 506d
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 35c d
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK I 370a c BK II 396d 397a
7 PLATO *Protagoras* 45b-47c / *Apology* 203c 204b / *Gorgias* 287c 291b / *Republic* BK II III 320c 339a BK VI 377a 379c / *Timaeus* 474c d / *Statesman* 607a 608a / *Laws* 640 799a c esp BK I 643a 644a 645c-646d BK III 676b c BK IV 683d 685a BK V-VI 696c 697d BK VI 704a c 710d 711c BK VII 713c 731d BK VIII 735c 738c BK IX 757a BK XII 792c d / *Seventh Letter* 800b-c
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 9 [1099^{b}29-32] 345b CH 13 [1102 8-25] 347c BK II CH 1 [1103^{b}3 7] 349a BK V CH 1 [1129^{b}12 24] 377a CH 2 [1130^{b}20-30] 378b BK X CH 9 [1179^{b}31 1180^{b}28] 434 -435c / *Politics* BK II CH 5 [1263^{b}36 1264 1] 459a CH 7 461d-463c BK VII CH 13 17 536b-542a c BK VIII CH 1 542a b
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK IV SECT 18 264d
13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK VI [845-853] 233b 234a
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 32a-48d / *Lycurgus Numa* 63d 64a / *Solon* 64b d 77a c passim / *Marcus Cato* 284b 286b / *Lysander* 361b d / *Agesilaus* 480b d 481a
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 14 16 4c 5b par 19-30 5d 8d BK VI par 2 35a c par 11 13 38b-39c / *Christian Doctrine* BK III CH 12 13 662c 663c CH 18 22 664d 666c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 92 A 1 213c 214c A 2 REP 4 214d 215a c Q 95 A 1 226c 227c A 3 228c 229b Q 96 AA 2 3 231c 233a Q 98 A 6 ANS 244c 245b Q 100 A 9 261b 262b Q 105 A 4 ANS 318b 321a
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVI [52 105] 77b d
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 149b c 154a 156b PART IV 272c
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 42b 43c 46b 48b 60c 61d 63d 64b 131b 132a
27 SHAKESPEARE *Measure for Measure* ACT II SC I [225 270] 181a c ACT III SC II [91 125] 190c d
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 78d 80a

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead*, TR III CH I 3 10a
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18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 13 4b-c par 19-20 5d-6a par 23 6d 7a / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 6 638a d CH 36-37 653d 654b KIV 675a-698a c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PROLOGUE 1a b PART I Q I A 9, REP 5c-6a A 9 8d 9c Q 79, A I REP 3 423d-424d Q 84 A 3 RE 3 443d-444d Q 106, A I A 3 545d 546d Q III I A 3 568c 569b Q II A I 595d 597c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II-II Q I A R P 2 385c-387 Q 51 A 3, A and REP 2 618c-619b

23 H s *Leviathan*, PART I 55a

24 R ELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, BK I 18b-19a 26d 30c passim

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 57b-61c passim 63d-80b passim, esp 73b-74 446d-450a 453c-454d

28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 268c / *On Animal Generation*, 336d 33 a,c

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 16c 31a-d 39b-d 61d-62c 64b-c 65a-c 68b-69c

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART I 42b 42d-43a

32 MILTON *Areopagitica* 384a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 9-1 173b 0 177b-178a

35 LOCKE *Toleration* 3c-4 7a b 15c / *Human Understanding* K III CH X, ECT 34 299d 300a K IV CH II S CT II 340d 341a

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* P III 109b-110b

36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 417b-418a 421b-4 2b

37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 42a-c

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 339d-340a

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK 33 c-d

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 2d-4a,c / *Practical Reason* 335b-c

43 MILL *Liberty* 283c 288c esp 284b-d / *Representative Government* 331 424b-c

44 BOSWELL *Johnson*, 7d 8a 144c 191b-c 199d 200b 448a b 471d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III, par 175, 61 -d

47 GOETHE *Faust* PART [5—601] 15a 16b

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 48b-d

53 JAMES *Psychology* 290a 291a 692a b 711b-71 b

54 FREUD *General Introduction*, 449a-451b passim

5c The nature of learning: its several modes

7 PLATO *Laches* 29d 30b / *Euthydemus* 67b-68d *Cratylus* 111d 112d / *Phaedrus* 124a-126c esp 126a-c 139b-140b / *Meno* 179b-183a 185d 189a / *Phaedo* 228a 230c / *Republic* BK VI-VII, 383d-401d / *Theaetetus* 541d 543a / *Phaedrus* 610d-613a

8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK I CH I [6— I] 88c / *Posterior Analytics* BK I, CH 9"a-d K II, CH 19 136a-137a, / *Sophistical Refutations* CH 2 [6"35-b3] 227d 228a / *Physics*, K VII CH 3 [24"—5"6] 330b-d K III, CH 4 [-55"30-"23] 340a-c / *Metaphysics* BK I, CH I [980"-S-981 13] 499a-c CH 9 [99-"4-993"] 511a-c BK II CH 2 [994"5 30] 512 BK IX CH 6 [104" S 34] 5 4a-c CH 8 [1049"9-1050"3] 575c-d / *Soul* BK II CH 5 [41"2 -418 3] 647d-648c / *Sense and the Sensible* CH I [4"6 15-437"17] 673d-6 4a / *Memory and Reminiscence* CH 2 [451 19-"9] 692b-d [452 4-"] 693c

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VII CH 3 [114"18-23] 397b-c / *Poetics* CH 4 [1448"4 20] 68 c-d

10 HIPPOCRATES *The Law* par 2 3 144b-d

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [I 5] 44a b

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 6 131b-132b BK III CH 23 202d 203a

14 PLUTARCH *Cato the Younger* 620b-c

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III 10a 12b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 13 4b-c par 23 6d a K IV par 28-31 26a 2 a / *Christian Doctrine* BK I, CH 2 624d-625a BK II CH 36-37 653d 654b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* P RT I Q 76, A —, REP 5 388c-391 Q 84, A 3 REP 3 443d 444d Q II A I A and REP 4 595d 597c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* P RT II-II Q I A REP 2 385c 387a Q2, A 3 A 1 392d 393c P RT III, Q 9, A 4, REP I 766b 6 b Q 12 776c 779d

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 55d 56a 66c-d 68b

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, BK I 18b-19a 26d 30c

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 55d-62a passim 63d 75a esp 64c-66b 446a-450a 453c-454d

28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 268c / *On Animal Generation*, 332a 333c esp 334d-335c

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 16a 57d 58b 64b-c / *Novum Organum* P EF 105a 106d

31 DESCARTES *Rules* III-IV 3b-7d XII XIII 18b-27d esp XII, 23c, 24d 25a / *Discourse* PART 2, 61d-62c 63a-b / *Meditations* I 75a 77c / *Geometry* BK I, 297a b K I I 341b

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 6 173a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH I, S CT 15 98d-99a SECT 23 101b-102a CH III, SECT 25 120c-d

36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 221a 222a

37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 99d 100a

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 528c

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 14 15c 113b-114a 244c 245c / *Judgement* 526a 527b

43 MILL *Liberty* 283c 288c

44 BOSWELL *Johnson*, 121d 126d 2 7c

45 LAVOISIER *Elements of Chemistry* PRE 1c 2b

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 69, 30b-c

48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 245b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 15b-17 49b-52b esp 52a 71a-73b 83a b 110b 331b-336a passim 362b-364a 433a-438a 443a-444a 448b-450a 664b-665a 691a b 827 -835a

(4 *The formation of a good character virtue a right will 4d The effect upon character of poetry music and other arts the role of history and examples*)

42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 263a b 264b [fn 1] 266d [fn 2] / *Practical Reason* 325d 327d esp 327b d 356a 360d / *Judgement* 504a b 513d 514b 521b 523c 586d 587a
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 308b-d 347c d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART II 267a 268b 276a b PART IV 347b d
53 JAMES *Psychology* 826b 827a

5 The improvement of the mind by teaching and learning

5a The profession of teaching the relation of teacher and student

4 HOMER *Iliad* BK IX [430-605] 61c 63b
5 ARISTOPHANES *Clouds* 488a 506d
7 PLATO *Laches* 29d 31b / *Protagoras* 38a 47c esp 39d 41a 42a c / *Euthydemus* 65a 84a c / *Symposium* 169c 170a / *Meno* 174a 190a c esp 179b 183a / *Apology* 203a 204c 206b 208c / *Crito* 215a c / *Gorgias* 252a 259c 290b 291b / *Theaetetus* 515d 517b 544a c / *Sophist* 556b 559a / *Laws* BK VII 723c d / *Seventh Letter* 801c 802d 808b-c
8 ARISTOTLE *Sophistical Refutations* CH 1 [165ᵃ19 24] 227c CH 2 [165ᵃ38-ᵇ3] 227d 228a CH 11 [171ᵇ18-35] 236b d / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 1 [981ᵇ7-9] 499d CH 2 [982ᵃ13-14] 500b [982ᵃ28-30] 500c BK IV CH 2 [1004ᵇ18 27] 523d
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK IX CH 1 [1164ᵃ22 ᵇ6] 417a b BK X CH 9 [1180ᵇ28 1181ᵇ19] 435d 436a c
10 HIPPOCRATES *The Oath* xiiia
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [1-30] 30a b BK V [1-54] 61a d BK VI [1 42] 80a d
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK II CH 17 158d 161a esp 160b 161a CH 24 172d 174b BK III CH 2 177c 178d CH 9 185b d CH 21 23 193d 203b BK IV CH 8 235b 237d
14 PLUTARCH *Pericles* 122d 123d / *Alcibiades* 155b d 158b / *Alexander* 542d 544a / *Cato the Younger* 623a b / *Dion* 782c 788b
15 TACITUS *Annals* BK XIII 125d 126a BK XIV 153d 155a
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 22 6b-c BK IV par 2 19d BK V par 22 33b c BK VI par 11 38b-c / *Christian Doctrine* BK IV CH 4 676d 677a CH 27 696a c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PROLOGUE 1a b PART I Q 76 A 2 REP 5 388c 391a Q 106 545c-549a Q 107 A 3 ANS and REP 1 551a-c Q 111 A 1 568c 569b Q 117 AA 1-2 595d 598c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II II Q 1 A 7 REP 2 385c 387a Q 2 A 3 ANS 392d 393c Q 181 A 3 618c 619b Q 188 A 6 ANS 681b 682c PART III SUPPL, Q 96 A 7 1061b 1062a A 11 ANS and REP 1 5 1063d 1064d A 12 1064d 1065b
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL 1a 52d passim esp I II 1a-4a VII [64] IX [103] 10b 13b XV 21a 22c XXIV [1 78] 34d 35b PURGATORY 53a 105d passim esp X [1-21] 59a XVIII [1-96] 79d 80d XXVII 94c 96a XXX [2-81] 99c 100b PARADISE IV [115-14] 111d 112a
22 CHAUCER *Prologue* [85 308] 164a b
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 1b d 18b 25a passim BK II 101b 106a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 57b-60c 64c 79c passim esp 70c 72a
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 7d 11a 14c 15a 16c 29c 32c 68b 69b
31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART I 42b
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV APPENDIX IX 448a
32 MILTON *Areopagitica* 398a b
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 423b-424b
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 41a 43b 45d 46a 94d 95a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 326c d / *Political Economy* 376d 377a
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 57b 58b BK V 331b d 334c 338c 340b 354d 355d esp 355c d
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 669a 671b
43 MILL *Representative Government* 420b d 424b-c
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 23b c 191b c 199d 200b 300a c
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [6689-6818] 164a 166b
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 47b 48d BK VIII 306b
54 FREUD *New Introductory Lectures* 870b-c

5b The means and methods of teaching

5 ARISTOPHANES *Clouds* 488a 506d
7 PLATO *Protagoras* 50c 52d / *Cratylus* 85d 88a esp 87c d 112d 113d / *Phaedrus* 131b 141a c esp 139b 140b / *Meno* 179b 183a / *Apology* 206b d / *Republic* BK VII 388a 398c esp 389d 390b 399c / *Theaetetus* 515d 517b 549c 550a c / *Sophist* 551d 556b 559a / *Statesman* 590d 591c / *Philebus* 610d 613a / *Laws* BK II 656b-c BK IV 684c 685a / *Seventh Letter* 809a 811a esp 809a c
8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 1 [71ᵃ1 10] 97a / *Sophistical Refutations* CH 2 [165ᵃ38 ᵇ3] 227d 228a CH 10 [171ᵃ27 ᵇ2] 235d 236a CH 11 [172ᵃ15 21] 237a / *Heavens* BK I CH 10 [279ᵇ32 280ᵃ11] 371b c / *Metaphysics* BK II CH 3 513c d / *Sense and the Sensible* CH 1 [436ᵇ18 437ᵃ17] 673d 674a
9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH 1 [639ᵃ1-ᵇ12] 161a d / *Ethics* BK VI CH 3 [1139ᵇ18-34] 388b-c
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [921-950] 12b-c BK IV [1-25] 44a b
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK II CH 24 172d 173c BK III CH 9 185b CH 23 203a b

5f

43 H bes Le athan pa t i 52d 53b part ii 154a
24 Ra elais Gargantua and Pant gruel bk iii 190 191
25 M t i ne Essai 70d 74a 244d 246a
26 Sh kespeare Taming of the Shreu act i sc i [40] 202c 203a
28 H r ey On A mal Generation 331 332a
30 B con Ad a cement f Le rni g 79b-c
31 D sc r es Geometry bk i 297a b
31 S oza Ethics part iii prop 55 schol 413b-d th a f cts def 27 419a b
33 Pascal Geometrical Demonstrat o 440b 442a
35 Locke Human U dersta d ng bk i ch xxxiii sect 15 250c
37 Fieldi g Tom Jon s 7b-c
38 R usseau Inequality 326c-d 338c 339a
42 Kant J dgement 551d
44 Bo w ll J hnso 7d 8a 11b-d 14b 15a-c 130b 135b-136a 151d 199d 200b 273 309c-d 360d 423c 448a b
45 Lavoi er Element of Chemi try pr f 1d 2a
46 Hege Ph l ophy f Right part iii par 175 61c-d par 197 67a b
47 Go the F st a t i [354 736] 11a 19b
51 Tolstoy Wa and Peace bk i 47b-48d bk viii 306b
53 James Psychology 271b-275a esp 274b 275a 290 291a 433 -434a 448b-449b 524a 525 711b-712b

5f Learn ng ap rt from teachers and books the role of e pe ience

A ry h Ecclesia t ct s 25 3-6—(D) OT Eccl s ticu 5 5-8
4 Home Odyssey 183 322d
5 A chylus Agamemnon [60– 5/] 53d 54d
7 Plato Laches 29d 30b 37c-d / G rgias 253a / Republic bk ii 333b-d 337b d bk v 366a-c bk vi 377a 379c bk vii 401a / Theaetet 535d
8 Aristotle Pr o Analytics bk i ch 30 63d 64b / Posterior A lyt cs bk ch 97a d bk ii ch 19 136 137a / Physic bk i c 259a b / Gener tio nd Corrupt n k i c 2 [316ᵃ5 14] 411c d / M taphy ics bk i h 1 [980ᵃ22-981 3] 499 -c bk ix ch 8 [1050ᵇ10–5] 5 5d / So l bk ch [40 ᵇ 1 403ᵃ2] 631d-632a k iii h 8 [432 3-9] 664c
9 Aristotl Ethics k i ch 3 [094ᵇ 8 109 3] 340 ch 4 [1 95 30 ᵇ13] 340 d bk c i i [1 3 4 7] 348b bk vi ch 8 [1 42 12 19] 391b ch 11 [43ᵃ25 ᵇ13] 392d 393a k x ch 9 [18 ᵇ13 3] 435b-c [1 81 18 ᵇ6] 436a / P litics k i ch 6 [1287ᵃ32 33] 485d bk vi ch 6 546b 547b
10 Hippocra e Articul t s par 10 94d 95a / The Law par 3-4 144c-d
12 Luc etiu N tur f Th g bk v [925 145] 73b 80a c pas im p [448 1457] 79d 80 c
13 Vi il Aeneid bk iii [508–5 9] 272b-273a
14 Pluta c i Demosthenes 691b d-692b 692d 695d
18 Augustine Confess s bk i par 13 4b-c / Christian Doctrin bk iv ch 3 676a d
19 Aquinas Summa Theologica part i q 84 a 6 447c-449a q 85 a i 451c-453c q 8 a i 3 465a-468a pass m q 94 a 3 rep 3 504 505a q 117 a i a s and re 4 595d 597c
20 Aquinas Summa Theolog ca part iii q 9 a 4 re i 766b 767b q 12 a i r p i 776c 777b a 2 777b 778b a 3 rep 2 778b-779a
21 Dante Divine Comedy hell, xxvi [49-14] 38c 39c
23 Hob es Leviathan intro 47b d part i 60a 61a 66c 68b
24 R belais Gargantua and Pantagruel bk i 29d-30c
25 Montaigne Essays 24 -c 66b-69d 74d 75a 395b-398c 520d 522d
26 S akespear Love s Labour s Lost act iv c iii [296–365] 271c 272a / Henry I act i sc i [22-66] 533b-c / As You Like It act iv sc i [1 26] 617a b
28 Gilbe t Load tone pref 1a b
28 Harvey Motion f the Heart 268c / On Anim l Generation 331b-332a 333b-d 411c d
30 Bacon Ad ancement of Le ni g 16a 16c 30d 31a 82c d / Novum Org num bk i ap i 97-98 126c 127b
31 Descart s Rules ii 2d 3b xii 22c 23a / Discourse part i 43a 44a-c p rt i i 50b-51a part vi 61d-62c / Geometry bk i 297a b bk iii 341b
31 S noza Ethics part ii prop 4 schol i 2 387b-388b
33 Pascal Pensée 6 173a / Vacuum 355a 358b
35 Locke Human Understanding bk ii ch i xii 121a 148d passim ch xxiii sect 3 204c-d k iii ch iii sect 7-8 255d 256a bk iv ch xii sect 9-13 360d 362d
35 Berk ley Human Knowled e ct 30 31 418c-d
35 H me Human Understand g sect vii div 65 479d-480
37 Fielding Tom Jones 12d 99d 100 142 d 274 296b d 297c
38 Monte quieu Spirit of Laws bk iv 15c
38 Rouss au Inequ l ty 334c
39 Sm th W alth of N t ons k v 337c d
42 Kant Pure Reason 14a 15c 146a 149d esp 148b-c
43 M ll Liberty 287b-c 288a b 294c 295a / Represen e Government 341d 343a pass m 418b-d / Ut arianism 456 -d
44 Boswell John on 257c 378b-c
45 La o er Elements of Chemistry pr 1d 2b p rt iii 8 b-
46 H Ph l phy of Right p r i i par 197 67 b / Ph l sophy f History pa t 230c 231b
47 Goethe F st p t i [52 -601] 15 16b

(5 *The improvement of the mind by teaching and learning*)

5d The order of learning: the organization of the curriculum

7 PLATO *Protagoras* 46b-c / *Meno* 179b-183a / *Gorgias* 272b-273b / *Republic* BK II 320c-321a BK III 333b-334b BK VI 380d-381a BK VI-VII 383d-401d / *Timaeus* 465d-466a / *Sophist* 552b-c / *Philebus* 610d-613a / *Laws* BK II 653a-654a BK V 696b-d BK VII 728b-730c BK XII 798a-799a,c / *Seventh Letter* 809c-810d

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK I CH I 259a-b CH 7 [189b30-33] 265b-c / *Metaphysics* BK II CH 3 [995a12-14] 513c BK IV CH 3 [1005b2-5] 524c CH 4 [1006a5-12] 525a-b BK V CH I [1013a1-3] 533a BK VII CH 3 [1029b3-12] 552a BK IX CH 8 [1049b29-1050a3] 575c-d / *Soul* BK I CH I [402b15-403a2] 631d-632a BK II CH 2 [413a11-13] 643a

9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH I [639a1-b11] 161b-d / *Ethics* BK I CH 3 [1094b28-1095a3] 340a BK VI CH 3 [1139b25-29] 388c / *Politics* BK VII CH 15 [1334b20-28] 539c-d BK VIII CH 3 542d-543d

11 NICOMACHUS *Arithmetic* BK I 812b-813d

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 26 131b-132b BK II CH 25 174b-c

16 PTOLEMY *Almagest* BK I 5a-6b passim

16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 847b-848a

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III CH 1-4 10a-11c

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 13-31 4b-9a BK IV par 30 26b-c / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 8-42 639d-656d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PROLOGUE 1a-b PART I Q I A 9 8d-9c Q 2 AA 1-2 10d-12c Q 10 A I ANS and REP I 40d-41d A 2 REP I 41d-42c A 6 ANS 45c-46d Q 11 A 2 REP 4 47d-48d Q 14 A 6 REP 2 80a-81c Q 18 A 2 ANS 105c-106b Q 84 A 3 REP 3 443d-444d A 6 447c-449a Q 85 A I 451c-453c A 3 455b-457a A 8 460b-461b Q 117 A I ANS 595d-597c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 100 A 6 ANS and REP 2 257c-258c

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 56b 59b-c 71c-d 72a-d PART IV 268c-269b

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 18b-19d 25a-30c BK II 75c-77a 78b-80d 82c-83b

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 63d-80b passim, esp 69d-70c

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 332a-336a esp 334c-d, 335c-336a

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 4c-5b 14c-15a 30b-c 31a-d 44c 56b-66a 68c-69c 79c-80a 85a-c / *Novum Organum* PREF 105a-106d BK I APH 19-36 108b-109b APH 90 124d-125a

31 DESCARTES *Rules* IV-VI 5a-10a VIII-X 12a-17a XIII 25b-27d / *Discourse* PART I 42b-44a PART II 47a-b PART VI 61d-62c / *Geometry* BK I 297a-b 298b BK III 341b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH I SECT 15 98d-99a SECT 20 100c-d SECT 3 101b-102a CH III SECT 13 116a-b BK II CH I SECT 6-8 122b-123a SECT 22 127a CH XI SECT 8-9 145b-c BK III CH II SECT 7 254a-b CH III SECT 7-9 255d-256c CH V SECT 15 267c-d CH IX SECT 9 286d-287b BK IV CH VII SECT 9 338d-339b SECT 11 340a-342d passim, esp 340d-341a CH XII SECT 3 358d-359c

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART II 78b

36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 421b-422b

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK V 334c-337b 338c-d 342b

42 KANT *Practical Reason* 294a-b / *Judgement* 551a-552c 572a-b

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31 DESC RT S *G ometry* BK I 297a b

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38 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 376b 377a
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50 MARX *Capital* 176d 178a 195b 196d 237d 241d 245a d
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39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 56b 58b BK V 331b d 356d
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43 MILL *Liberty* 317d 319b passim / *Representative Government* 382c-383b
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7 PLATO *Republic* BK II III 320c 339a BK IV 344b d BK V 365d 366c BK X 427c-434c esp 432d 434c / *Statesman* 601c 602c / *Laws* BK II 654c 655b BK III 675c 676b BK VII 713c 731d BK VIII 732c d BK XI 782d 783b
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8d The training of the prince the statesman the citizen aristocratic and democratic theories of education

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(9 *Historical and biographical observations concerning the institutions and practices of education*)

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The discussion of freedom in the communication of knowledge and art *see* ART 10b KNOWLEDGE 9b LIBERTY 2a OPINION 5b POETRY 9b TRUTH 8d

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection
II Works by authors not represented in this collection

For the date place and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited consult the *Bibliography* of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

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J H NEWM N *The Idea of a Un versity*
— *U ersity Sketch s*
S NCER *Essays on Edt cat on and Kindred S bjects* P T I
M RE TH *Th Ordeal of Richard Fevere l*
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N TZSCI E *On the Fut re of Our Ed cational I sti t ns*
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CLIFFO Vircho on the Teaching of Science n VOL II *Lect res and Es ays*
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H A S *The Education of Henry Adams*
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K LSO *The D ct e of the English Gentleman in the S xteenth Cent ry*
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D WEY *The School d S ci ty*
— *I terest d Effort in Ed cat on*
— *Democr cy a d Educ t on*
— *Experien e and Ed cat on*
RI H D *I terpretat in T ch g*
LI I ON *On Ed cat*
MEIKLEJ N *Ed cat o B twee Two Wo lds*
HUT H S *The H gher Lea g America*
— *Ed cat n f r F eedom*
M IN *Ed tio at th Cross ds*
VAN DO EN *Liber l Ed cat o*
BA ZUN *Te cher Amer a*
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Chapter 21 ELEMENT

INTRODUCTION

THE words atom and element express basic notions in the analysis of matter To some extent their meaning seems to be the same Atoms or elements are usually under stood to be ultimate units the parts out of which other things are formed by combination But as soon as further questions are asked—about the divisibility or indivisibility of these units or about their number and variety—we are confronted with differing conceptions of *the atom and with a theory of the elements* which is opposed to the atomic analysis of matter

Even when the two notions are not opposed to one another they are not interchangeable Atom has a much narrower meaning It usually designates a small particle of matter whereas element signifies the least part into which anything at all can be divided It is this broader meaning of element which permits Euclid to call his collection of the theorems in terms of which all geometric problems can be solved the elements of geometry According to Aristotle this is true not only of geometrical proofs but also in general of the elements of demonstration for the primary demonstrations each of which is implied in many demonstrations he says are called elements of demonstration From this it follows that elements will be found in any subject matter or *science in which analysis occurs and not only* in physics

An element writes Nicomachus in his *Introduction to Arithmetic is the smallest thing* which enters into the composition of an object and the least thing into which it can be analyzed Letters for example *are called the elements* of literate speech for out of them all articulate speech is composed and into them finally it is resolved Sounds are the elements of all melody for they are the beginning of its composition and into them it is resolved The so called four elements of the universe in general are simple bodies fire water air and earth for out of them in the first instance we account for the constitution of the universe and into them finally we conceive of it as being resolved

This explains why books in so many different fields have the word element in their titles *There are the elements of grammar or logic the elements of language or music the elements of* psychology or economics Elements in one subject matter or science are analogous to elements *in another because in each sphere they stand to* everything else as the simple to the complex the pure to the mixed the parts to the whole Thus the factors of price may be said to function in economic analysis as do the parts of speech in grammatical analysis

Another illustration comes from the theory of the four bodily humors in ancient physiology In the traditional enumeration which goes back to Hippocrates they are blood phlegm yellow bile and black bile and they function analytically as do fire water air and earth in ancient physics They make up the nature of the body of man according to a *Hippocratic treatise on the nature of man* and through them he feels pain or enjoys health Perfect health is enjoyed by a man when these elements are duly proportioned to one another in respect of compounding power and bulk and when they are perfectly *mingled* Galen in an analysis of temperaments explains all varieties of temperament and all complexions of physique in terms of these *humors either by their mixture or by the predominance* of one or another Thus the sanguine phlegmatic choleric or melancholic *temperament is accounted for by the excess of* one and a deficiency of the other humors

Still another physiological application of the notion of element is to be found in the ancient division of tissue into flesh and bone, or in the more elaborate modern analysis of the types of cells which compose all living matter.

THESE ILLUSTRATIONS indicate that the irreducibility of elements to anything simpler than themselves does not necessarily mean that they are absolutely indivisible. Cells can be further divided into nucleus, protoplasm, and membrane without ceasing to be the elements of tissue. The parts of speech—nouns, verbs, adjectives—can be further divided into syllables and letters without ceasing to be the elements of significant utterance. Letters, treated as the elements of language, can be physically divided. The fact that terms are sometimes regarded as the logical elements out of which propositions and syllogisms are formed does not prevent a distinction from being made between simple and complex terms. Nicomachus calls the triangle elementary among all plane figures, for everything else is resolved into it, but it into nothing else; yet the triangle is divisible into the lines which compose it and these lines in turn are divisible into points.

When Nicomachus says that the triangle is the element of all other figures "and has itself no element," he does not mean that the triangle is absolutely indivisible, but only relatively so. Relative to the analysis of plane figures, there is no simpler figure out of which the triangle can be formed. Similarly, relative to the analysis of significant speech, there is no simpler part than the word. Relative to the analysis of melody, there is no simpler part than the tone. Musical tones may be physically, but they are not musically, complex.

THE DEFINITION OF element can also be approached by comparing its meaning with that of principle and cause. All three terms are brought together by Aristotle in the beginning of his *Physics* when he declares that we attain "scientific knowledge" through acquaintance "with the principles, causes, and elements" of things.

The word "principle" occurs almost as frequently as "element" in the titles of books which claim to be basic expositions or analyses. The two words are often used as synonyms. Lavoisier, for example, says that we can use "the term *elements*, or *principles of bodies*," to express our idea of the last point which analysis is capable of reaching."

To discover any difference in the meaning of "element" and "principle," it is necessary to specify their correlatives precisely. Out of elements, *compounds* or *mixtures* are formed. From principles, *consequences* are derived. In logic, for example, we say that terms are the elements of propositions (the proposition 'Socrates is a man' comprising the terms 'Socrates' and 'man'), but we say that axioms are the principles from which conclusions are derived. This does not prevent the same thing from being viewed in different connections as both element and principle—as an element because it is the simple part out of which a more complex whole is composed, and as a principle because it is the source from which something else is derived. The parts of speech in grammar are the elementary components of phrases and sentences; they are also the principles from which the rules of syntax are derived.

The third notion which belongs with element and principle is cause. Its correlative is effect. Again it can be said that that which is an element in one connection and a principle in another can be regarded as a cause from still a third point of view. In Aristotle's physical treatises, for example, matter is regarded in all three ways: it is an element of all bodies, for they are substances composed of matter and form; it is a principle of change, since from matter, form, and privation change is derived; it is a cause (*i.e.*, the material cause) of certain results.

But it must also be observed that everything which is any one of these three is not necessarily both of the others also. Since an element according to Aristotle is a "component immanent in a thing," anything that is an extrinsic principle or cause cannot be an element. Thus the action of one body upon another is a cause and a principle but not an element. Referring to these distinctions, Aquinas declares that "*principle* is a wider term than *cause*, just as *cause* is more common than *element*." The chapters on CAUSE and PRINCIPLE tend to substantiate this observation about the scope of these ideas in the tradition of western thought.

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tive indivisibility The atom is the least quantity of matter It cannot be broken into quantitative parts The elementary body is not atomic It is always capable of division into smaller units but all of these units must be of the same kind as the elementary body under going d ision

The element is indivis ble only in the sense that it cannot be decomposed into other kind of matter as a mixed body can be decomposed into its diverse elements The atom can not be divided in any way Only compound bod es can be divided into their constituent atoms all of which are alike in kind differing only quantitatively—in s ze shape or weight Different kinds of matter occur only on the level of compounds and as the result of diverse combinations of atoms

This last point indicates another contrast between atoms and elements in ancient physical theory The elements are defined as we have seen by their qualitative differences from one another or more strictly according to combinations of elementary sens ble qualities—hot and cold moist and dry By virtue of the qualities peculiar to them the four elements stand in a certa n order to one another Water and air accord ng to Plato are in the mean between fire and earth and have the same propo tion so far a poss ble as fire is to air so is a r to water and a air is to water so is water to earth The qual ty which two of the elements have in common pro des the mean. Thus fire and air are joined I y the common quality of hot a r nd water by moist and water and earth by cold

Wh n their analysis reached its greatest ref ment the ancients recogni ed that the earth a r fire and water of common experience do not actually have the purity requisit for element They are not s mple but blended Aristotle writes and while the elements are indeed milar in nature to them [they] are not identical with them The element corresponding to fire is uch-as fire not fire that which corresponds to a r is such as-air and so on with th rest of them. Thus the four elements are only analogous to for they are purer than ord nary earth ir fire and water yet thei names continued to be used as symbols for the true elements a connotation which is still retained when we speak of men struggling against or battling with the elements.

IT WILL NO DOUBT be a matter of surprise Lavoisier writes in the Preface to his *Elements of Chemistry* that in a treatise upon the elements of chemistry there should be no chapter on the constituent and elementary parts of matter but I shall take occasion in this place to remark that the fondness for reducing all the bodies in nature to three or four elements proceeds from a prejudice which has descended to us from the Greek philosophers. The notion of four elements which by the variety of their proportions compose all the known substances in nature is a mere hypothesis, assumed long before the first principles of experimental philosophy or of chemistry had any existence

This does not mean that Lavoisier entirely rejects the notion of elements in chemical analysis On the contrary he says that we must admit as elements all the substances into which we are capable by any means to reduce bodies by decomposition His quarrel with the ancients chiefly concerns two points The first is on the number of the elements which he thinks experiment has shown to be much greater than the four of classical theory The second is on the simpl city of the experimentally discovered elements They can be called atoms or simple bod es only if v e do not thereby imply that e kn w them to be absolutely indivisible—either qualitatively or quantitatively We are not entitled to affirm that these substances we consider as simple may not be compounded of two or even of a greater number of principles merely because we have not yet discovered the means of separating them

In modern physics and chemistry the distinction between element and atom seems to be abol shed The same unit of matter is at once both an atom and an element The table of atomic weights is also a chart of the elements The classification of atoms is both quantitative and qual tative—qualitative in the sense that the atoms of d fferent elementary kinds of matter d ffer in their active properties

According to the ancient meaning of the terms, the molecule would seem to be both a mixture and a compound—*m xed* in that it can

THE BASIC ISSUES concerning elements occur in the analysis of matter Before Plato and Aristotle the early Greek physicists had asked such questions as From what do all things come? Of what are all things made? A number of answers were given ranging from one kind of ultimate such as earth or fire through a small set of ultimate kinds to an infinite variety The classical theory of the four elements is the middle answer avoiding the extremes of unity and infinity

According to Galen it was Hippocrates who first took in hand to demonstrate that there are in all four mutually interacting qualities and who provided at least the beginnings of the proofs to which Aristotle later set his hand in developing the theory of the four elements Galen also indicates that it was a subject of controversy among the ancients whether the substances as well as the qualities of the four elements undergo this intimate mingling from which results the genesis and destruction of all things that come into and pass out of being

Aristotle in his treatise *On Generation and Corruption* enumerates the various senses in which the physicist considers elements We have to recognize three originative sources (or elements) he writes firstly that which is potentially perceptible body secondly the contrarieties (*e g* heat and cold) and thirdly Fire Water and the like The potentially perceptible body is identified with prime matter and since this has no separate existence but is always bound up with a contrariety it can be ruled out from the usual notion of element The elementary qualities the contrarieties named secondly are the hot and cold and dry and moist The so called elements Fire Air Water and Earth are left to the last and are mentioned only thirdly Aristotle says because they change into one another whereas the contrarieties do not change

The elementary qualities attach themselves by couples to the apparently simple bodies In consequence Aristotle writes Fire is hot and dry whereas Air is hot and moist and Water is cold and moist while Earth is cold and dry Each of them however is characterized *par excellence* by a single quality In terms of these simple bodies and the elementary qualities all other material things can be explained

In contrast to the elements stand the mixed or compound bodies in the constitution of which two or more elements combine There may be many kinds of mixed bodies but none is irreducible in kind as are the four elements any mixed body can be divided into the different kinds of elementary bodies which compose it whereas the elementary bodies cannot be divided into parts which are different in kind from themselves A living body for example may contain parts of earth and water but the parts of earth are earth the parts of water water

It is precisely the mode of divisibility that Aristotle declares is the fundamental question In answering this question he opposes the theory of the four elements to another Greek account of the constitution of matter—the atomic theory developed by Leucippus and Democritus and expounded for us in Lucretius poem *On the Nature of Things*

ACCORDING TO the Greek atomists matter is not infinitely divisible If nature had set no limit to the breaking of things Lucretius writes by this time the bodies of matter could have been so far reduced that nothing could within a fixed time be conceived out of them and reach its utmost growth of being There must then be a fixed limit to their breaking —a limit in physical division which ultimately reaches units of matter that are absolutely indivisible Lucretius calls them first beginnings of solid singleness not compounded out of a union of parts but rather strong in everlasting singleness —the seed of things or atoms The Greek word from which atom comes literally means *uncuttable*

From this it is evident that Aristotle can deny the existence of atoms while at the same time he affirms the existence of elementary bodies The elements unlike the atoms are not conceived as indivisible in quantity but only as incapable of division into diverse kinds of matter

In the Greek conception of atom and element the difference between them lies in this distinction between quantitative and qualita

stancy of nature and the indestructibility of matter depend on the absolute sol d ty and impenetrab lity of matter s ultimate parts The negati e arguments of Aristotle and Descartes proceed from the divisibility of whate er is continuous to the conclusion that any unit of matter must have parts

The ph losophical doctrine of atomism in the form in which Lucretius adopts it from Epicu rus insists upon void as the other basic princi ple of the universe Nature he writes is founded on two things there are bodies and there is void in which these bodies are placed and through which they mo e about Com pound bodies are divis ble because the atoms of wh ch they are composed are not absolutely co t nuous w th one another but are separated by oid or empty space That is why they are not solid or impenetrable as are the atomic particles which are composed of matter en tirely without oid In Newton s language hardness must be reckoned the property of all uncompounded matter for if compound bodies are so ery hard as we find some of them to be and yet are very porous, ho much harder must be s mple particles which are void of pores

Th opponents of atomism tend to deny the existence not nly of atoms but of the vo d as well Descartes for example denies that there can be any atoms or parts of matter which are nd is ble of their o n nature For how ever mall the parts are supposed to be yet because they are necessarily extended we are lways able n thought to d vide any one of them into two or more parts. For the same reason he mainta ns there cannot be a space in which there s no substance because the extens on of space or internal place is not dif ferent from that of body The physical world o thi iew is concei ed as what the ancients c lled a plenum continuously filled with mat te Th s contro ersy over void and plenum is labo ted in the chapter on SPACE.

Although he uses the language of the atom t Faraday seems to agree w th Descartes rath r than w th Newton He pictures matter a cont nuous throu hout with no distinc t on between its atoms and any intervening pace Atoms, he thinks, instead of being ab solutely hard are h ghly elastic and they are all mutually penetrable He compares the combination and separation of two atoms with the conjunction of two sea waves of different velocities into one their perfect union for a time and final separation into the constituent waves Such a view of the constitution of mat ter Faraday writes, leads to the conclusion that matter fills all space or at least all space to which gravitation extends

The very continuity—the voidlessness or lack of pores—which the opponents of atom ism insist is the source of matter s infinite divis ibility the atomists seem to give as the reason why the ultimate particles are without parts hence simple solid and indivisible

ON STILL OTHER POINTS there is disagreement among the atomists themselves Not all of them go to the extreme of denying existence or reality to anything immaterial nor do all insist that whatever exists is either an atom or made up of atoms and void In the tradition of the great books the extreme doctrine is found in Lucretius alone Though it is shared by Hobbes and is reflected in the *Leviathan* it is not ex pounded there It is developed in his treatise *Concerning Body*

For Lucretius the atoms are eternal as ell as indestructible The first beginnings of all other things are themselves without be ginnin, In time gone by Lu retius writes they moved in the same ay in which now they move and will ever hereafter be borne along in like manner through an endless suc cession of worlds each of which comes to be through a concourse of atoms each in turn perishin, as with decay that concourse is d s solved Newton writes in what seems to be a contrary vein It seems probable to me he says that God in the beginnin, formed mat ter in sol d massy hard impenetrable mova ble particles All material things, he contin ues, seem to have been composed of the hard and solid particles above mentioned variously associated n the first Creation by the counsel of an intelligent Agent

Nor does Newton appeal to the properties and motions of the ultimate pa t cles except to explain the characteristics and la s of the phys ical wo ld Unl ke Lucretius and Hobbes he does not—and there seems to be some ev dence

be broken up into other *kinds* of matter *compound* in that it can be divided into *smaller* units of matter But in modern theory the meanings of compound and mixture have also changed the molecule being classified as a compound rather than a mixture The combination of the elements to form molecular compounds is determined by the proportion of their weights or valences rather than by a fusion of their qualities

The most radical change in theory is not this however nor is it the increase in the number of the elements from four to more than ninety four nor the ordering of the elements by reference to their atomic weights rather than by the contrariety of their qualities It results from the discovery that an atom is not uncuttable and that new elements can be produced by atomic fission Faraday s experimental work in ionization and in electro chemical decomposition lies at the beginning of the physical researches which have penetrated the interior structure of the atom and isolated smaller units of matter Even before atoms were experimentally exploded analysis had pictured them as constituted by positive and negative charges

As the result of his researches Faraday for example conceives of atoms as mere centres of forces or powers not particles of matter in which the powers themselves reside The atom thus ceases to be a little unchangeable impenetrable piece of matter and consists of the powers it exercises What was ordinarily referred to under the term *shape* becomes the disposition and relative intensity of the forces that are observed

With Faraday it is evident that the meaning of atom has departed far from the sense in which Lucretius speaks of units of solid singleness or Newton of solid massy hard impenetrable movable particles incomparably harder than any porous bodies compounded of them, even so very hard as never to wear or break in pieces no ordinary power being able to divide what God himself made one in the first creation With the conception of the elements as different kinds of atoms then with the discovery of radio active elements undergoing slow disintegration finally with the production of isotopes and new elements through atomic change the meaning of ' element has moved equally far from its original sense

Do THESE ALTERED meanings change the basic issues in the philosophy of nature? Are these issues resolved or rendered meaningless by experimental science?

The central point in the theory of elements is an irreducible qualitative diversity in kinds of matter The elements of modern chemistry may no longer be *elementary* types of matter in the strict sense of the word but the kind of difference which would be strictly elemental may be found in the distinction of the positive the negative and the neutral with respect to the electrical charge of sub atomic particles

Similarly the central point in atomism as a philosophy of nature is the existence of absolutely indivisible units or quanta of matter in other words the denial that matter is infinitely divisible that any particle no matter how small is capable of being broken into smaller parts The strict conception of the atom is therefore not invalidated by the experimental discovery that the particles called atoms are not *atomic* that they are themselves complex structures of moving particles and that they can be physically divided

It makes no difference to the philosophical atomist whether the particles which constitute molecules or the particles—the electrons and protons the neutrons and mesons—which constitute atoms are *atomic* Even if further experimental work should succeed in dividing these sub atomic particles the question could still be asked Is matter infinitely divisible regardless of our actual power to continue making divisions *ad infinitum*? Since the question when thus formulated cannot be put to experimental test the issue concerning atoms would remain

That issue would not refer to any particle of matter defined at a certain stage of physical analysis or experimental discovery It would consist in the opposition of two views of the nature of matter and the constitution of the material universe the affirmation on the one hand that truly atomic particles must exist and the denial on the other that no particle of matter can be atomic The affirmative arguments of Lucretius and Newton make the con

stan v of nature and the indestructibility of matter depend on the absolute solid ty and impenetrabil ty of matter s ultimate parts. The negati e arguments of Aristotle and Descartes proceed from the divisibility of whatever is continuous to the conclusion that any unit of matter must have parts.

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in the *Optics* that he would not—reduce the soul of man to a flow of extremely mobile atoms or attempt to account for all psychological phenomena (thought as well as sensation and memory) *in terms of atom buffeting atom*

The atomic theory of the cause of sensation is not limited to the materialists Writers like Locke who conceive man as having a spiritual nature as well as a body adopt an atomistic view of the material world The different motions and figures bulk and number of such particles he writes affecting the several organs of our senses produce in us those different sensations which we have from the colours and smells of bodies Furthermore the distinction which is here implicit—between primary and secondary sense qualities—is not peculiar to atomism It can also be found in a critic of atomism like Descartes

The atomistic account of sensation is nevertheless of critical significance in the controversy concerning this type of materialism Critics of atomism have contended that the truth of atomism as a materialistic philosophy can be no greater than the measure of its success in explaining sensation—the source upon which the atomist himself relies for his knowledge of nature—in terms of the properties and motions of particles themselves imperceptible

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in **4** HOMER: *Iliad*, BK II [265-283] **12d**, the number **4** is the number of the volume in the set; the number **12d** indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in **53** JAMES: *Psychology*, **116a-119b**, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in **7** PLATO: *Symposium*, **163b-164c**, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., *Iliad*, BK II [265-283] **12d**.

BIBLE REFERENCES: These references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay is indicated by a (D) follows; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: *Nehemiah*, 7:45—(D) *II Esdras*, 7:46.

SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas*, consult the Preface.

1. The concept of element

7 PLATO: *Timaeus*, **455d-456** / *Theaetetus*, **544d-547** esp **544d-545**, **547a** / *Laws*, BK X, **761b-d**

8 ARISTOTLE: *Topics*, BK VI, CH 13 **204c-206a** passim [15 18-26] **205b-c** / *Physics*, BK I, CH 1 **259a-b** / *On the Heavens*, BK III, CH 3 [30]-CH 4 [3 2] **393c-394** / *Metaphysics*, BK I, CH 3 [983a24]-CH 5 [986 8] **501-504c**; CH 6 [987b 9]-CH 7 [988 3] **505d-506c**; CH 8 **506d-508c**; CH 9 [992 -9] **510b**; [992 18-993 1] **510b-511c** esp [99 b18-993 0] **511-c**; BK III, CH 1 [995b27 9] **514b-c**; CH 3 [998a20-b14] **517-b**; BK CH 3 **534c-d**; CH 4 [1014b 7 34] **535-b**; CH 2 [3 7 25] **545b-c**; BK VI, CH 7 **555-556b**; CH 10 **558a-559d**; CH 17 [1041b11-33] **565d-566a**; BK X, CH 1 [1 5 b8- 4] **579**; BK CH 4-5 **599d-601**; BK X, CH 2 [88 4 9] **620d-621a** / *Soul*, BK I, CH 5 [4 0a 23] **640a-b**

9 ARISTOTLE: *Politics*, BK I, CH 1 [125 18-24] **445b**

11 NICOMACHUS: *Arithmetic*, BK I, **829a-833b**

17 PLOTINUS: *Third Ennead*, TR I, CH 3 **79b-c**

18 AUGUSTINE: *City of God*, BK XIX, CH 6 **522**

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART Q 66 **345d-347b**; Q 91 1 s a d R 3 **484-485b**

20 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART II SUPPL, Q 74, A 1, REP 3 **925c-926c**; Q 91, A 5, A s and E 4 **1024-1025b**

31 DESCARTES: *Rules*, II **1** 14b-c; XII **22b-c**

42 KANT: *Pure Reason*, **100c-d**; **103a**; **105b-106a**; **137-140**

45 LAVOISIER: *Elements of Chemistry*, PREF, **3b-4a** esp **3d-4a**

53 JAMES: *Psychology*, **327-331b** passim

2. The comparison of element, principle, and cause

7 PLATO: *Timaeus*, **455d**

8 ARISTOTLE: *Physics*, BK I, CH 1 **259 b-c**; 4-9 **262-268d** passim / *Generation and Corruption*, BK II, CH 1 [329a24-b2] **429a-b** / *Metaphysics*, BK I, CH 6 [98 b19-23] **505d**; [988a7 6] **506a-b**; BK III, CH 3 [998a20-b13] **517-b**; BK V, CH 1-3 **533a-534d**; CH 24 **545-b**; BK VII, CH 16 [1 4 b16-23] **564d**; CH 17 [1041b 33] **565d-566a**; BK VI CH 3 [1043 4] **567d-568a**; BK X, CH 1 [105 b8-14] **579a**; BK XII, CH 1 **598a-c**; CH 4-5 **599d-601a** esp CH 4 [1070b 22-35] **600b**

17 PLOTINUS: *Third Ennead*, TR I, CH 3 **79c**

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART I, Q 33, A 1 **180d-181**

45 LAVOISIER: *Elements of Chemistry*, PREF, **3d-4a**

3 The theory of the elements in natural philosophy physics and chemistry

7 PLATO *Phaedo* 240d 242b / *Timaeus* 448b d 455c-462b / *Philebus* 618c 619a / *Laws* BK X 760a 761d
8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK I CH 1 [184 10]-CH 2 [184b-4] 259a-c CH 4-9 262a 268d / *Heavens* BK III IV 389b d-405a c / *Generation and Corruption* 409a-441a c esp BK II CH 1 3 428b d 431a / *Meteorology* 445a-494d
10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK I CH 2-3 167b 169a CH 6 169c 170c BK II CH 4 186d 187b
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [635-920] 8d 12b
17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR I CH I 35a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 49 A 4 ANS 5a 6a PART III SUPPL Q 74 925b-935a c passim Q 91 A 4 1022d 1023d A 5 ANS and REP 4 1024a 1025b
28 GILBERT *Loadstone* BK III 60c d
45 LAVOISIER *Elements of Chemistry* 1a 159d passim
45 FARADAY *Researches in Electricity* 383b-386c
53 JAMES *Psychology* 876a

3*a* Element and atom qualitative and quantitative indivisibility

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK I CH 2 [184b15 22] 259b c / *Heavens* BK III CH 4 [303 3]-CH 5 [304b23] 394b 396a CH 7 [305b27-306b2] 397a d BK IV CH 2 [308b29 310 13] 400b 401c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 4 [985b3-19] 503c d BK V CH 3 [1014b3-6] 534d CH 25 545b-c / *Soul* BK I CH 2 [403b-8 404 5] 633a b
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [599-920] 8b 12b esp [705-920] 9c 12b
17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR I CH 3 79b c
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK I APH 45 110b APH 66 114d 115a
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 161d 163a
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3*b* The enumeration of the elements their properties and order

7 PLATO *Cratylus* 98d / *Phaedo* 247b 248c / *Timaeus* 448b d 458b 460b / *Philebus* 618c 619a / *Laws* BK X 760a 761d
8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK III CH 5 [204b10-205 6] 282c 283a BK IV CH 1 [208b8 22] 287b / *Heavens* BK I CH 1-8 359a 369a CH 9 [278b 22-35] 370a BK II CH 3 377c 378a BK III CH 1 389b d 391c CH 3 5 393c 396a BK III CH 7 [306 1]-BK IV CH 6 [313b24] 397b-405a c esp BK IV CH 3-5 401c 404d / *Generation and Corruption* BK I CH 1 409a 410c BK II CH 1-3 428b d 431a / *Meteorology* BK I CH 2 3 445b-447d BK IV CH 1 [378b10 26] 482b d 483a / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 3 [983 24]-CH 5 [986b8] 501c 504c CH 7 [988 1,-31] 506b-c CH 8 506d 508c BK V CH 4 [1014b27-35] 535a b / *Soul* BK I CH 2 [404b,-31] 633d 634a CH 5 [409b18-411] 639c-641a BK III CH 1 [424b20 425 13] 656b d 657a / *Sense and the Sensible* CH 2-5 674a 683b passim
9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK II CH 1 [646 12 b20] 170a d CH 2 [648 20]-CH 3 [649b22] 172c 174b / *Generation of Animals* BK III CH 11 [761b7-24] 302c-d
10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK I CH 2 3 167d 169a CH 6 169c 170c BK II CH 4 186d 187a CH 8 193b d
11 NICOMACHUS *Arithmetic* BK II 829a
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [,05 ,15] 9d [763 ,88] 10b-c
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK III CH 13 188d 189a
13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK VI [7 4-731] 230b
17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR I CH 3 36b d CH 6-7 37d 39c / *Fourth Ennead* TR VII CH 2 192a b / *Sixth Ennead* TR III CH 9 285d 286a TR VII CH 11 326d 327d
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK VIII CH 2 265b 266a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 66 A 1 CONTRARY and REP to CONTRARY 343d 345c A 2 345d 347b Q 71 A 1 REP 2 367a 368b Q 91 A 1 ANS and REP 3 484a-485b Q 115 A 3 REP 2 588c 589c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL Q 74 925b 935a c passim esp A 5 929d 931b Q 79 A 1 REP 4 951b 953b Q 91 A 4 1022d 1023d
28 GILBERT *Loadstone* BK I 13b d BK III 60c d
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 491a b 496a c
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK I APH 45 110b APH 66 114d 115a BK II APH 40 171a 173a
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [708 721] 150b 151a
45 LAVOISIER *Elements of Chemistry* PREF 3b-4a PART I 29d 33b PART II 53a 55a 57c 65a,c
45 FARADAY *Researches in Electricity* 383b 386c
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK VI 248d 249a

3*c* The mutability of the elements their transmutation

7 PLATO *Timaeus* 456b-c 458d-460b
8 ARISTOTLE *Heavens* BK I CH 3 360d-362a BK III CH 1 [298a24 299 1] 389b d 390b CH 2 [301b33-302 9] 393b CH 6 [304b23]-CH 8 [306b29] 396a 398a / *Generation and Corruption* BK I CH 1 409a-410c CH 6 [322b1 21] 420b d BK II CH 4-6 431b-435a / *Meteorology* BK I CH 3 [339 36-b3] 445d / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 8 [989 18 29] 507b-c
10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK I CH 167d 168b BK II CH 3 185c d
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [635 8 9] 8d 11a BK V [235 305] 64a 65a [380 415] 66a c
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK II SECT 3 257a b BK IV SECT 46 267c BK V SECT 13 271b BK VII SECT 18 281a SECT 3 281b F T 25 281c SECT 50 283a BK X SECT 7 297b c

19 AQU S Summa Theologica PART I Q 66 A 2 A 534 d 347b
20 AQU S Summa Theologica PART I UPPL, Q 74 AA 1-6 925c 932b passim Q 91 A 5 ANS and R P 4 1024 102 b
21 DANTE Divine Comedy RAD SE, II [21 145] 116b-c
22 CH UCER Cano s Yeoman s Prologue 471b-474a / Cano s Yeoman s Tale 4 4b-487
30 B CO Advancement f Learning 14b-c
34 NEWTON O tics BK II 531a b
40 GIB O Decline and Fall 148a b
41 GI Decline and F l 299d 300a
44 BOSW LL J h son 262c
45 LA O S ER Element of Chemistry PART I 41b-c

3d Comb nations of the elements: compounds and mixtures

7 PL TO Timaeus 448b-d 449c-450a 452d 454a 460b-462c
8 A ISTOTLE Topics BK VI CH 13 [151ᵃ20-3] 206a / Physics BK I CH 5 [2 4ᵇ10-22] 282c-d BK II CH 3 [246ᵇ2 9] 329c 330a / H avens, K I CH [268 69ᵃ3] 360a-c CH 5 [2 ᵇ18 3] 362d 363a BK I, CH 3 [30ᵃ 0]-C I 4 [302ᵇ28] 393c 394 CI 8 [30ᵇ22 9] 398a BK IV CH 4 [311 3-ᵇ14] 402d-403a / G neratio and Corru tio BK I CH I [314 25 ᵇ2] 409c CH 2 [315ᵃ18-33] 410d CH I 426c 428d BK I CH 6-8 433d-436d / Meteorology K III H 6 [3 8 13]- K IV CH 2 [390ᵇ1] 482c-494d / Met physics K II, CH 17 [41ᵇ 2 33] 565d 566a So l BK I CI 2 [4 4ᵇ7 29] 633d 634 [405ᵇ8-31] 634d-635a CI 5 [409 8 41] 639c-641 K II CH 13 [435ᵃ 4] 668a-c / Sense and the Sensible H 3 674a-6 8b
9 AR TOTL Parts f Animals K I, CH I [64 5 8] 163a-b K I CH [646ᵃ12 ᵇ20] 170a-d
10 HI POCR S Ancient Medicine par 5 5e-d
10 G E Natural Faculties K I 2 3 167b-169a 6 169c 170c BK II CH 8 193b-d
12 I ETIUS Nat f Things BK I [635-9-] 8d 12b
12 E TETU Discourses BK II, H 3 189a
12 A REL S Med itations BK X CT 297b
16 K PLE Epit me K I 929b-930a
17 PL TI L Second Ennead TR I CH 6-8 37d 39d CH 62d 64b
18 A TI E City f God K XII CH 265b-266a
19 AQ Summa Theologica RT I Q 36 368b Q 6 A 4 E 4 393a 394c Q 484 485b
20 AQ Summa Theologica P RT I Q 710a 711c A I UPPL, Q 4 A 3 925c 926c 4 928d 929d A 5 929d-931b Q 9 I P 4 S 1b-933b Q 80, 3 3 938b-959c Q 8 A I A S 963a 9 0c Q 9 S 1024 1025b
21 D Divine Comedy RADISE, VII [121 4] 116b-c

28 G L ERT Loadstone BK I 13b-14d BK II 29c 30a
28 H R EY On Animal Generation 495c-496d
30 B CO Novum Organum, BK I APH 66 114d 115c BK II APH 7 139c 140a APH 40, 171a 173a APH 48 181a 184a
33 PASCAL Vacuum 367a b
35 BERKELEY H man Knowledge SECT 65 425d-426a
45 LAVO SIER Elements of Chemistry PART I, 22c 5-a,c P RT II 54b d 55d 57c 86a c PART III 87c-d 103b-c 10 d 117a 1 8c esp 117a 118a
45 FARAD Y Researches in Electricity 309a 312a 312c 313d 314a b 315a b 327a-422a c passim 541b,d 584a c passim
51 TOLSTOY W r d Peace BK VI 248d 249a
53 JAM S Psychology 104a 105a 876a

4 The discovery of elements in other arts and sciences

7 PLATO Cratylus 104c 110d esp 106a 107b / Rep lic BK III 333c-d / Theaetetus 544c 548c / Philebus 615c-617d 618d-619b 635b-639a,c
8 ARISTOTLE Categories CH 2 [I 9] 5b / Interpretation, CH 4 [6ᵇ 3] 26a / Prio Analytics K I CH 1 [24ᵇ – 2] 39c CH 3 [4 ᵇ1 –] 57b [4 4] 57d / Posterior Analytics BK I CH 4 [3ᵃ33 ᵇ2] 100b-c CH [5ᵃ38 ᵇ7] 103c CH 3 [84ᵇ19-85ᵃ1] 115c 116a CH 119b / Topics K CH 4-9 144b-117b esp CH 4 [1 11 5] 144b-c BK VI, C I [139 24] 192a CH 13 204c 206a / Met physics K I CH 5 [985ᵇ4-986ᵃ21] 503d 504b CH 6 [98 ᵇ 19 23] 505d [988ᵃ 6] 506a b CH 9 [992ᵇ 18-993ᵃ1] 511a-c BK III, CH 3 [998ᵇ20 ᵇ11] 517 b c 6 [100 ᵇ11 25] 521b-c BK CH 3 534c-d K XII, CH 4-5 599d-601a / Soul BK I CI 2 [404ᵇ 49] 633d-634a CH 5 [409ᵇ23 411 23] 639d-641b K I CH 5 [430ᵃ10-14] 662c
9 ARISTOTLE Parts of A imals BK II CH I [646ᵃ 0]-CH 2 [647ᵃ3] 1 0a 172a / Fourth BK 2, CH I [1 32 8-24] 445b BK III CH I [12 4ᵇ 31 12 5ᵃ2] 471b CH 3 [12-6ᵃ34 ᵇ1] 4 3b-c / Rhetoric K III CH 13 66 b-d / Poetics C I 6 684a-685a C 0 692b-693a
10 G Natural Faculties K I C 6 163c 1 0c K II CH 6 188c 191 BK III CH 15 213a b
11 EU LID Elements I 396b
11 NI O HUS Arithmetic K I 8-9b-d
12 LUCRETIU Nature of Things BK I [823-829] 11a K II [(88-699] 23d
16 K E R Harmonies of the W or d 1016b-1017a
18 AUGU TI City of God BK XIX CH 16 522a
19 AQU S Summa Theologica T I Q 1 9, I R P 3 604c-60 b
20 AQU S Summa Theologica PART I II Q I 9 2, R 2 607a-c PART III SUPPL, Q 80, A 3 958b 959c
24 RABELAIS Gargantua a d Pantagruel, BK I 138a-d

(5 *The theory of atomism critiques of atomism*)

5*b* The atomistic account of the origin and decay of the world its evolution and order

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [1008-1037] 13c d BK II [1023-1174] 28a 30a c BK V [55-508] 61d 67c

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK VI SECT 10 274b c

17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR I CH 3 79b-c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 47 A 1 ANS 256a 257b A 3 ANS 258c 259a

34 NEWTON *Optics* BK III 541b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 95b

CROSS REFERENCES

For The discussion of the ideas most closely associated with element *see* CAUSE PRINCIPLE

Matters relevant to the conception of elements or atoms as simple parts of a whole *see* ONE AND MANY 2b-2c and for another discussion of the distinction between elements or atoms and compounds or mixtures *see* CHANGE 9a MATTER 2

The problem of the transmutation of the elements *see* CHANGE 10a

The issue concerning the divisibility of matter and the existence of a void *see* INFINITY 4b ONE AND MANY 3a(3) SPACE 2b(1)-2b(3) and for the question of the number of the elements or of the atoms *see* INFINITY 5-5b QUANTITY 7

Other considerations of atomistic materialism *see* MATTER 3a 6 MECHANICS 4c MIND 2e SOUL 3d WORLD 1b 4c

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection

II Works by authors not represented in this collection

For the date place and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

I

AUGUSTINE *De Genesi ad Litteram*

AQUINAS *De Mixtione Elementorum*

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HOBBES *Concerning Body*

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II

EPICURUS *Letter to Herodotus*

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LEIBNITZ *New Essays Concerning Human Understanding* APPENDIX CH 3

—— *Monadology* par 1-9

VOLTAIRE Atoms in *A Philosophical Dictionary*

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PLANCK *The Origin and Development of the Quantum Theory*

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B RUSSELL *The Analysis of Matter* CH 3

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—— *On the Application of the Quantum Theory to Atomic Structure*

—— *Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature*

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C G DARWIN *The New Conceptions of Matter*

SODDY *The Interpretation of the Atom*

STRANATHAN *The Particles of Modern Physics*

SMYTH *Atomic Energy for Military Purposes*

GAMOW *Atomic Energy in Cosmic and Human Life*

ANDRADE *The Atom and Its Energy*

HECHT *Explaining the Atom*

G THOMSON *The Atom*

Chapter 22. EMOTION

INTRODUCTION

THE emotions claim our attention in two ways. We experience them sometimes in a manner which overwhelms us and we analyze them by defining and classifying the several passions and by studying their role in human life and society We seldom do both at once for analysis requires emotional detachment and moments of passion do not permit study or reflect on

With regard to the emotions the great books are similarly divided into two sorts—those which are theoretical discussions and those which concretely describe the passions of particular men exhibit their vigor and induce in us a vicarious experience Books of the first sort are scientific philosophical or theological treatises. Books of the second sort are the great epic and dramatic poems the novels and plays, the literature of biography and history

We customarily think of the *emotions* as belonging to the subject matter of psychology —proper to the science of animal and human behavior It is worth noting therefore that this is largely a recent development which appears in the works of Darwin James and Freud In earlier centuries, the analysis of the passions occurs in other contexts in treatments of rhetoric as in certain dialogues of Plato and in Aristotle s *Rhetoric* in the Greek discussions of virtue and vice in the moral theology of Aquinas and in Spinoza s *Ethics* and in books of political theory such as Machiavelli s *Prince* and Hobbes *Leviathan*.

Descartes treatise on *The Passions of the Soul* is probably one of the first discourses on the subject to be separated from the practical consider ations of oratory morals, and politics. Only subsequently do the emotions become an object of purely theoretic interest in psychology But even then the interest of the psychiatrist or psychoanalyst—to the extent that it is medical or therapeutic—has a strong practical bent

In the great works of poetry and history no similar shift takes place as one goes from Homer and Virgil to Tolstoy and Dostoevsky from Greek to Shakespearean tragedy from Plutarch and Tacitus to Gibbon What Words worth said of the lyric poem—that it is emotion recollected in tranquillity —may not apply to the narratives in an identical sense Yet they too re-enact the passions in all their vitality Their pages are filled with the emotions of men in conflict with one another or suffering conflict within themselves

This is no less true of historical narrative than of fiction The memorable actions of men on the stage of history did not occur in calm and quiet We would certainly not remember them as well if the historian failed to re-create for us the turbulence of crisis and catastrophe or the biographer the storm and stress which accompanies the inward resolution of heroic lives.

It is impossible of course to cite *all* the relevant passages of poetry and history In many instances, nothing less than a whole book would suffice The particular references given in this chapter which are far from exhaustive have been selected for their peculiar exemplary significance in relation to a particular topic but for the whole range of topics connected with emotion the reader should certainly seek further in the realms of history and poetry for the raw materials which the scientists and philosophers have tried to analyze and understand

To the student of the emotions Bacon recommends the poets and writers of histories as "the best doctors of this knowledge where we may find painted forth with great life how affections are kindled and incited and how pacified and refrained and how again contained from act and further degree how they

disclose themselves how they work how they vary how they gather and fortify how they are enwrapped one within another and how they do fight and encounter one with another and other like particularities

Four words— passion affection or affect and emotion —have been traditionally used to designate the same psychological fact Of these affection and affect have ceased to be generally current although we do find them in Freud and passion is now usually restricted to mean one of the emotions or the more violent aspect of any emotional experience But if we are to connect discussions collected from widely separated centuries we must be able to use all these words interchangeably

The psychological fact to which they all refer is one every human being has experienced in moments of great excitement especially during intense seizure by rage or fear In his treatise *On the Circulation of the Blood* Harvey calls attention to the fact that in almost every affection appetite hope or fear our body suffers the countenance changes and the blood appears to course hither and thither In anger the eyes are fiery and the pupils contracted in modesty the cheeks are suffused with blushes in fear and under a sense of infamy and of shame the face is pale and in lust how quickly is the member distended with blood and erected!

Emotional experience seems to involve an awareness of widespread bodily commotion which includes changes in the tension of the blood vessels and the muscles changes in heart beat and breathing changes in the condition of the skin and other tissues Though some degree of bodily disturbance would seem to be an essential ingredient in all emotional experience the intensity and extent of the physiological reverberation or bodily commotion is not the same or equal in all the emotions Some emotions are much more violent than others This leads William James to distinguish what he calls the coarser emotions in which every one recognizes a strong organic reverberation from the subtler emotions in which the organic reverberation is less obvious and strong

This fact is sometimes used to draw the line between what are truly emotions and what are only mild feelings of pleasure and pain or endure sentiments Nevertheless sentiments may be emotional residues—stable attitudes which pervade a life even during moments of emotional detachment and calm—and pleasure and pain may color all the emotions Pleasure and pain Locke suggests are the hinges on which our passions turn Even though they may not be passions in the strict sense they are obviously closely connected with them

That the emotions are organic disturbances upsetting the normal course of the body s functioning is sometimes thought to be a modern discovery connected with the James Lange theory that the emotional experience is nothing but the feeling of the bodily changes which follow directly the perception of the exciting fact On this view the explanation of emotion seems to be the very opposite of common sense which says we meet a bear are frightened and run According to James this order of sequence is incorrect and the more rational statement is that we feel afraid because we tremble In other words we do not run away because we are afraid but are afraid because we run away

This fact about the emotions was known to antiquity and the Middle Ages Aristotle for example holds that mere awareness of an object does not induce flight unless the heart is moved and Aquinas declares that passion is properly to be found where there is corporeal transmutation He describes at some length the bodily changes which take place in anger and fear Only very recently however have apparatus and techniques been devised for recording and in some cases measuring the physiological changes accompanying experimentally produced emotions—in both animals and men

Modern theory also tries to throw some light on these organic changes by pointing out their adaptive utility in the struggle for existence This type of explanation is advanced by Darwin in *The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals* and is adopted by other evolutionists 'The snarl or sneer the one sided uncovering of the upper teeth James writes is accounted for by Darwin as a survival from the time when our ancestors had large canines and unfleshed them (as dogs now do) for attack

The distention of the nostrils in anger is interpreted by Spencer as an echo of the way in which our ancestors had to breathe when during combat their mouth was filled up by a part of the antagonist's body that had been seized

The redding of the face and neck is called by Wundt a compensatory arrangement for relieving the brain of the blood pressure which the simultaneous excitement of the heart brings with it The effusion of tears is explained both by this author and by Darwin to be a blood withdrawing agency of a similar sort

Reviewing statements of this sort James is willing to concede that some movements of expression can be accounted for as *weakened repetitions of movements which formerly* (when they were stronger) *were of utility to the subject* but though we may thus see the reason for a few emotional reactions he thinks others remain for which no plausible reason can even be conceived The latter James suggests, may be reactions which are purely mechanical results of the way in which our nervous centres are framed reactions which although permanent in us now may be called accidental as far as their origin goes

Whether or not *all* the bodily changes which occur in such emotions as anger or fear serve the purpose of increasing the animal's efficiency in combat or flight—as for example the increase of sugar in the blood and the greater supply of blood to arms and legs seem to do—the basic emotions are generally thought to be connected with the instinctively determined pattern of behavior by which animals struggle to survive The actions we call instinctive James writes are expressions or manifestations of the emotions or as other writers suggest an emotion whether in outward expression or inner experience is the central phase of an instinct in operation

The observation of the close relation between instinct and emotion does not belong exclusively to modern or post Darwinian thought The ancients also recognize it though in different terms. Following Aristotle's analysis of the various interior senses Aquinas for example speaks of the estimative power by which animals seem to be innately prepared to react to things useful or harmful.

If an animal were moved by pleasing and disagreeable things only as affecting the sense —that is the exterior senses— there would be no need to suppose Aquinas writes that an animal has a power besides the apprehension of those forms which the senses perceive and in which the animal takes pleasure or from which it shrinks with horror But animals need to seek or avoid certain things on account of their advantages or disadvantages and such emotional reactions of approach or avoidance require in his opinion a sense of the useful and the dangerous which is innate rather than learned The estimative power thus seems to play a role which later writers assign to instinct The relation of instinct to the emotions and to fundamental biological needs is further considered from other points of view in the chapters on DESIRE and HABIT

LIKE DESIRE emotion is neither knowledge nor action but something intermediate between the one and the other The various passions are usually aroused by objects perceived imagined or remembered and once aroused they in turn originate impulses to act in certain ways For example fear arises with the perception of a threatening danger or with the imagination of some fancied peril The thing feared is somehow recognized as capable of inflicting injury with consequent pain The thing feared is also something from which one naturally *tends to flee* in order to avoid harm Once the danger is known and until it is avoided by flight or in some other way the characteristic feeling of fear pervades the whole experience It is partly a result of what is known and what is done and partly the cause of how things seem and how one behaves

Analytically isolated from its causes and effects the emotion itself seems to be the feeling rather than the knowing or the doing But it is not simply an awareness of a *certain bodily condition* It also involves the felt impulse to do something about the object of the passion

Those writers who like Aquinas identify emotion with the impulse by which the soul is drawn to a thing define the several passions as specifically different acts of appetite or desire—specific *tendencies to action* Aquinas for instance adopts the definition given by Damascene Passion is a movement of the sensi

tive appetite when we imagine good or evil

Other writers who like Spinoza find that the order of the actions and passions of our body is coincident in nature with the order of the actions and passions of the mind stress the cognitive rather than the impulsive aspect of emotion They accordingly define the passions in terms of the characteristic feelings pleasant and unpleasant which flow from the estimation of certain objects as beneficial or harmful Spinoza goes furthest in this direction when he says that an affect or passion of the mind *is a confused idea by which the mind affirms of its body or any part of it a greater or less power of existence than before*

There seems to be no serious issue here for writers of both sorts acknowledge though with different emphasis the two sides of an emotion —the cognitive and the impulsive that which faces toward the object and that which leads into action On either view the human passions are regarded as part of man s animal nature It is generally admitted that disembodied spirits if such exist cannot have emotions The angels Augustine writes feel no anger while they punish those whom the eternal law of God consigns to punishment no fellow feeling with misery while they relieve the miserable no fear while they aid those who are in danger When we do ascribe emotions to spirits it is Augustine claims because *though they have none of* our weakness their acts resemble the actions to which these emotions move us

In connection with the objects which arouse them the emotions necessarily depend upon the senses and the imagination and their perturbations and impulses require bodily organs for expression That is why as indicated in the chapter on Desire some writers separate the passions from acts of the will as belonging to the sensitive or animal appetite rather than to the rational or specifically human appetite Even those writers who do not place so high an estimate on the role of reason refer the emotions to the animal aspect of human behavior or to what is sometimes called man s lower nature When this phrase is used it usually signifies the passions as opposed to the reason not the purely vegetative functions which man shares with plants as well as animals

There seems to be no doubt that emotions are common to men and animals and that they are more closely related to instinct than to reason or intelligence Darwin presents many instances which he claims prove that the senses and intuitions the various emotions and faculties such as love memory attention curiosity imitation reason etc of which man boasts may be found in an incipient or even sometimes in a well developed condition in the lower animals Where Darwin remarks upon the fewness and the comparative simplicity of the instincts in the higher animals in contrast with those of the lower animals James takes the position that man is the animal *richest in instinctive impulses* However that issue is decided the emotions seem to be more elaborately developed in the higher animals and man s emotional life would seem to be the most complex and varied of all

The question then arises whether particular passions are identical—or are only analogous —when they occur in men and animals For example is human anger no matter how closely it resembles brute rage in its physiology and impulses nevertheless peculiarly human? Do men alone experience righteous indignation because of some admixture in them of reason and passion? When similar questions are asked about the sexual passions of men and animals, the answers will determine the view one takes of the characteristically human aspects of love and hate It may even be asked whether hate as men suffer it is ever experienced by brutes or whether certain passions such as hope and despair are known to brutes at all?

In the traditional theory of the emotions the chief problem after the definition of emotion is the classification or grouping of the passions and the ordering of particular passions. The vocabulary of common speech in all ages and cultures includes a large number of words for naming emotions and it has been the task of analysts to decide which of these words designate distinct affects or affections The precise character of the object and the direction of the impulse have been for the most part the criteria of definition As previously noted it is but recently that the experimental observation of bodily changes has contributed to the differentiation of emotions from one another

Spinoza offers the longest listing of the passions. For him the emotions, which are all "compounded of the three primary affects, desire joy and sorrow" develop into the following forms astonishment contempt love hatred inclination aversion devotion derision hope fear confidence despair gladness, remorse commiseration favor indignation, over estimation envy compassion self-satisfaction humility repentance pride despondency self exaltation shame regret emulation gratitude benevolence anger vengeance ferocity audacity consternation, courtesy ambition luxuriousness, drunkenness, avarice lust

Many of the foregoing are for Hobbes, derived from what he calls the simple passions, which include appetite desire love aversion hate joy and grief There are more emotions in Spinoza s list than either Aristotle or Locke or James mentions, but none which they include is omitted Some of the items in Spinoza s enumeration are treated by other writers as virtues and vices rather than as passions.

The passions have been classified by reference to various criteria. As we have seen James distinguishes emotions as coarse or subtle" in terms of the violence or mildness of the accompanying physiological changes and Spinoza distinguishes them according as the mind passes to a greater perfection or to a less perfection. Spinoza s division would also seem to imply a distinction between the beneficial and the harmful in the objects causing these two types of emotion, or at least to involve the opposite components of pleasure and pain for in his view the emotions which correspond to a greater or less power of existence than before are attended in the one case by "pleasurable excitement and in the other by pain.

Hobbes uses another principle of division. The passions differ basically according to the direction of their impulses—according as each is a motion or endeavor to or from the object moving Aquinas adds still another criterion— the difficulty or struggle in acquiring certain goods or in avoiding certain evils which in contrast to those we can easily acquire or avoid makes them, therefore "of an arduous or difficult nature In these terms, he divides all the passions into the "concupiscible which regard "good or evil simply (i.e love hate desire aversion joy sorrow) and the irascible" which regard good or evil as arduous through being difficult to obtain or avoid (i.e fear daring hope despair anger)

Within each of these groups, Aquinas pairs particular passions as opposites, such as joy and sorrow or hope and despair either according to the contrariety of object i.e., of good and evil or according to approach and withdrawal. Anger seems to be the only passion for which no opposite can be given other than that cessation from its movement which Aristotle calls calmness" and which Aquinas says is an opposite not by way of contrariety but of negation or privation "

Using these distinctions Aquinas also describes the order in which one passion leads to or generates another beginning with love and hate passing through hope desire and fear with their opposites, and after anger ending in joy or despair On one point all observers and theorists from Plato to Freud seem to agree namely that love and hate lie at the root of all the other passions and generate hope or despair fear and anger according as the aspirations of love prosper or fail. Nor is the insight that even hate derives from love peculiarly modern though Freud s theory of what he calls the "ambivalence of love and hate toward the same object seems to be part of his own special contribution to our understanding of the passions.

THE ROLE OF THE emotions or passions in human behavior has always raised two questions, one concerning the effect of conflict between diverse emotions, the other concerning the conflict between the passions and the reason or will. It is the latter question which has been of the greatest interest to moralists and statesmen

Even though human emotions may have instinctive origin and be innately determined man s emotional responses seem to be subject to voluntary control, so that men are able to form or change their emotional habits. If this were not so, there could be no moral problem of the regulation of the passions nor for that matter could there be a medical problem of therapy for emotional disorders. The psychoanalytic treatment of neuroses seems, more-

tive appetite when we imagine good or evil

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for express n, emotional drives in action the ego supported by the super-ego represses the emotional or instinctual impulses, that is prevents them from expressing themselves overtly

Freud s great insi ht is that emotions re pressed do not atrophy and disappear On the contrary their dammed up energies accumu late and like a sore they fester inwardly Together with related ideas memories and wishes the repressed emotions form what Freud calls a complex, which is not only the active nu cleus of emotional disorder but also the cause of neurot c symptoms and behavior—phobias and anxieties obsessions or compulsions and the various physical manifestations of hysteria such as a blindness or a paralysis that has no organ c basis

The l ne between the neurotic and the nor mal is shadowy for repressed emotional com plexes are accordin, to Freud also responsible for the hidden or latent psychological s gnifi cance of slips of speech forgetting the content of dreams, occupational or marital choices and a wide ariety of other phenomena usually regarded as accidental or as rationally deter m ned In fact Freud sometimes goes to the extreme of insisting that all apparently rational processes—both of thought and decis on—are themselves emotionally determined and that most or all reasoning is noth n but the ration alization of emotionally fixed prejudices or be l efs. The ego he writes is after all only a pa t of the id a part purposively modified by its proxim ty to the dangers of reality "

The anc ent distinct on between kno ledge and opin on seems to be in essential agreement w th the ins ght that emotions can control the course of thinking But at the same time it denies that all thinking is necessarily dominated by the pass ons The sort of thinking which is free from emot onal bias or domination may result in knowledge if reason itself is not defect e in its processes But the sort of th nk ng wh ch i directed and determined by the pas sions *must* result in opinion. The former is reasoning the latter what Freud calls ration al zation or sometimes wishful thinking

BE AL E THEY CAN be ordered when they get out of ord the emot ons raise problems for both medicine and morals. Whether or not there is a fundamental opposition between the medical and the moral approaches to the prob lem whether psychotherapy is needed only when morality has failed whether morality is itself partly responsible for the disorders which psychotherapy must cure the difference be tween the medical and the moral approaches is clear Medically emotional disorders call for diagnosis and therapy Morally they call for criticism and correction

Human bondage according to Spinoza con sists in the impotence of man to govern or restrain the affects for a man who is under their control is not his own master A free man he describes as one who lives according to the dictates of reason alone and he tries to sho how much reason itself can control the af fects to achieve what he calls freedom of mind or blessedness While moralists tend to agree on this point they do not all offer the same prescription for establishin, the right relation between man s higher and lower natures

The issue which arises here is also discussed in the chapters on DESIRE and DUTY It exists between those ho think that the passions are intrinsically evil the natural enemies of a good will las less elements always in rebell on against duty and those who think that the passions represent a natural desire for certain goods which belong to the happy life or a natural avers on for certain evils

Those who like the Stoics and Kant tend to adopt the former view recommend a policy of attrition toward the passions Their force must be attenuated in order to emancipate reason from their influence and to protect the will from their seductions Nothing is lost accord ing to this theory if the passions atrophy and d e But if according to the opposite doctrine the pass ons have a natural place in the moral life then the aim should be not to dispossess them entirely but to keep them in their place Aristotle therefore recommends a policy of moderation The pass ons can be made to serve reason s purposes by restraining them from ex cesses and by directing their ene g es to ends which reason approves

As Aristotle conceives them certain of the virtues—especially temperance and courage—are stable emotional attitudes, or *habits* of emo t onal response which conform to reason and

over to assume the possibility of a voluntary or even a rational resolution of emotional conflicts—not perhaps without the aid of therapeutic efforts to uncover the sources of conflict and to remove the barriers between repressed emotion and rational decision

The relation of the passions to the will especially their antagonism is relevant to the question whether the actions of men always conform to their judgments of good and evil or right and wrong As Socrates discusses the problem of knowledge and virtue it would seem to be his view that a man who knows what is good for him will act accordingly Men may desire things which they imagine to be good he says but which in reality are evil Hence their misconduct will be due to a mistaken judgment not to a discrepancy between action and thought Eliminating the case of erroneous judgment Socrates gets Meno to admit that no man wills or chooses anything evil

Aristotle criticizes the Socratic position which he summarizes in the statement that no one when he judges acts against what he judges best—people act badly only by reason of ignorance According to Aristotle this view plainly *contradicts the observed facts* Yet he admits that whatever a man does must at least *seem* good to him *at the moment* and to that extent the judgment that something is good or bad *would seem to determine action accordingly* In his analysis of incontinence Aristotle tries to explain how a man may act against what is his better judgment and yet at the moment of action seek *what he holds to be good*

Action may be caused either by a rational judgment concerning what is good or by an emotional estimate of the desirable If these two factors are *independent of one another*—more than that if they can tend in opposite directions—then a man may act under emotional persuasion at one moment in a manner contrary to his rational predilection at another That a man may act either emotionally or rationally Aristotle thinks explains how under strong emotional influences a man can do the very opposite of what *his reason would tell* him is right or good The point is that while the emotions dominate his mind and action he does not listen to reason

These matters are further discussed in the chapter on TEMPERANCE But it should be noted here that the passions and the reason or the lower and the higher natures of man, are not always in conflict Sometimes emotions or emotional attitudes serve reason by supporting voluntary decisions They reinforce and make effective moral resolutions which might otherwise be too difficult to execute

THE ANCIENTS DID not underestimate the force of the passions nor were they too confident of the strength of reason in its struggle to control them or to be free of them They were acquainted with the violence of emotional excess which they called madness or frenzy So too were the theologians of the Middle Ages and modern philosophers like Spinoza and Hobbes But not until Freud—and perhaps also William James though to a lesser extent—do we find in the tradition of the great books insight into the pathology of the passions, the origin of emotional disorders and the general theory of the neuroses and neurotic character as the consequence of emotional repression

For Freud the primary fact is not the conflict between reason and emotion or in his language between the *ego* and the *id* It is rather the repression which results from such conflict On the one side is the ego which stands for reason and circumspection and has *the task of representing the external* world or expressing what Freud calls the reality principle Associated with the ego is the super ego— the vehicle of the ego ideal by which *the ego measures itself towards which* it strives and whose demands for ever increasin perfection it is always striving to fulfill On the other side is the id which stands for the *untamed passions and is the source of* instinctual life

The ego according to Freud is constantly attempting *to mediate* between the id and reality *and to measure up to the ideal set by* the super ego so as to dethrone the pleasure-principle which exerts undisputed sway over the processes in the id and substitute for it the *reality principle* which promises greater security and greater success But sometimes it fails in this task Sometimes when no socially acceptable channels of behavior are available

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

1. The nature and causes of the emotions or passions
   - 1a. Emotion in relation to feelings of pleasure and pain
   - 1b. Bodily changes during emotional excitement
   - 1c. Instinctive emotional reactions in animals and men

2. The classification and enumeration of the emotions
   - 2a. Definitions of particular passions
   - 2b. The order and connection of the passions
   - 2c. The opposition of particular emotions to one another

3. The disorder or pathology of the passions
   - 3a. Madness or frenzy due to emotional excess: excessively emotional or emotionally over-determined behavior
   - 3b. Rationalization or the emotional determination of thought
   - 3c. Particular emotional disorders: psychoneuroses due to repression
     - (1) Hysterias
     - (2) Obsessions and compulsions
     - (3) Phobias and anxieties
     - (4) Traumas and traumatic neuroses
   - 3d. The alleviation and cure of emotional disorders

4. The moral consideration of the passions
   - 4a. The conflict between reason and emotion
     - (1) The force of the passions
     - (2) The strength of reason or will
   - 4b. The treatment of the emotions by or for the sake of reason
     - (1) Moderation of the passions by reason: virtue, continence, avoidance of sin
     - (2) Attenuation and atrophy of the passions: the liberation of reason
   - 4c. The moral significance of temperamental type or emotional disposition

5. The political consideration of the passions
   - 5a. The causes of political association: fear or need
   - 5b. The acquisition and retention of power: love or fear
   - 5c. The coercive force of law: fear of punishment
   - 5d. The devices of oratory: emotional persuasion
   - 5e. The regulation of art for the sake of training the passions

carry out its rule The moral virtues require more than a momentary control or moderation of the passions they require a discipline of them which has become habitual What Aristotle calls continence as opposed to virtue consists in reason s effort to check emotions which are still unruly because they have not yet become habituated to reason s rule

The fact of individual differences in tempera ment is of the utmost importance to the moral ist who is willing to recognize that universal moral rules apply to individuals differently ac cording to their temperaments Both psychol ogists and moralists have classified men into temperamental types by reference to the dom inance or deficiency of certain emotional pre dispositions in their inherited makeup These temperamental differences also have a medical or physiological aspect insofar as certain ele ments in human physique—the four bodily humors of the ancients or the hormones of modern endocrinology—seem to be correlated with types of personality

One of the great issues in political theory concerns the role of the passions in human asso ciation Have men banded together to form states because they feared the insecurity and the hazards of natural anarchy and universal war or because they sought the benefits which only political life could provide? In the polit ical community once it is formed do love and friendship or distrust and fear determine the relation of fellow citizens or of rulers and ruled? Should the prince or any other man who wishes to get and hold political power try to inspire love or to instill fear in those whom he seeks to dominate? Or are each of these emo tions useful for different political purposes and in the handling of different kinds of men?

Considering whether for the success of the prince it is better to be loved than feared or feared than loved Machiavelli says that one should wish to be both but because it is diffi cult to unite them in one person it is much safer to be feared than loved when of the two either must be dispensed with Neverthe less he continues a prince ought to inspire fear in such a way that if he does not win love he avoids hatred because he can endure very well being feared whilst he is not hated

According to Hobbes when men enter into a commonwealth so that they can live peacefully with one another they are moved partly by reason and partly by their passions. The pa sions that incline men to peace he writes are fear of death desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living and a hope by their industry to obtain them But once a commonwealth is formed the one passion which seems to be the mainspring of all political ac tivity is a perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceaseth only in death for a man cannot assure the power and means to live well which he has present without the acquisition of more

Not all political thinkers agree with the an swers which Machiavelli and Hobbes give on such matters nor do all make such questions the pivots of their political theory But there is general agreement that the passions are a force to be reckoned with in the government of men that the ruler whether he is despotic prince or constitutional officeholder must move men through their emotions as well as by appeals to reason

The two political instruments through which an influence over the emotions is exercised are oratory (now sometimes called propaganda) and law Both may work persuasively Laws like other discourses according to Plato may have preludes or preambles intended by the legislator to create good will in the persons whom he addresses in order that by reason of this good will they will more intelligently re ceive his command But the law also carries with it the threat of coercive force The threat of punishment for disobedience addresses itself entirely to fear whereas the devices of the ora tor—or even of the legislator in his preamble—are not so restricted The orator can play upon the whole scale of the emotions to obtain the actions or decisions at which he aims

Finally there is the problem of whether the statesman should exercise political control over other influences which affect the emotional life of a people especially the arts and public spec tacles The earliest and perhaps the classic statement of this problem is to be found in Plato s *Republic* and in his *Laws* Considerations relevant to the question he raises and the im plications of diverse solutions of the problem are discussed in the chapters on Art Liberty and Poetry

1a to 1b

sexus 432c-433d esp 433b / *General Introduction* 608d 6..3b-c / *Inhibitions Symptoms, and Anxiety* 720c 721b 736d 41 / *New Introductory Lectures* 837b-d

1a Emotion in relation to feelings of pleasure and pain

7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 120b-c / *Phaedo* 220b-221 / *Republic* BK IV 352d / *Timaeus* 463d 464b / *Philebus* 628d-630c / *Laws* BK IX, 748a

8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK IV CH 5 [125b28-34] 1 5a CH 6 [...b6-32] 177b / *Soul* BK I CH 2 [413b1-24] 643d

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK II CH 3 [1104b 9-1105a16] 350b-c CH 5 [1105b19-...] 351b BK ..., CH 6 [1149b... 4] 400b / *Politics* BK ... CH [13 ... 4 33] 515b / *Rhetoric* BK CH 11 CH [13...-13...] 613c-615c passim BK II, CH 1 [13...] CH 11 [1388b30] 623b-636a passim

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [...3 ...] 58a b

14 PLUTARCH *Coriolanus* 184 -c

17 PLOTINUS *Fourth Ennead*, TR IV CH 18- 0 166d 168b CH 28 172a 173b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK III, par 4 13c 14b BK VIII, par 7-8 54c 55a BK X par 39 81b-c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II Q ..., A 1 2, A 6, A 5 and REP 2 619d-620d Q ..., A ... 720d 721c Q 23 723c 727 QQ 3 39 52b-792d Q 48 A 82 d-823b

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I, 61 -62c

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III, PROP 4-5 398d 415b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II, CH XX 1 6b-178a passim, esp SECT 3 1 6d CH XXI, SECT 4 187d 188b

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 1 413a b

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 338c-d

42 KANT *Practical Reason*, 298d 300a 341 342a *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 385a-386b *Judgement* 4..7b-4..8a

53 JAMES *Psychology* 197 b 391b-392a ..39b-740a 7..4b-7..8a passim 808a-812b passim, esp 808b-809a

54 FREUD *Interpretation of Dreams* 3..8b-d / *Instincts* 418d-420b esp 420a / *Repression* 422a-42 ..c esp 421a d, 424d-42..c *General Introduction* 608d *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 639a-641 esp 640b-d 641d-643c / *Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety* 720a 721c 736d-737b ..39b-c 752.. 54a.c passim

1b Bodily changes during emotional excitement

7 PLATO *Ion* 145a b *Symposium*, 155c 157 / *Timaeus* 466c-d / *Philebus* 628c

8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 8 [9b9-34] 14c 15a *Soul*, BK I, CH 1 [4 3... b3] 632a-c CH 4 [4 ...34 b31] 638b-d BK III CH 9 [432b 6-433a1] 665c / *Memory and Reminiscence* CH [453a15 3] 695b-d / *Dreams* CH 2 [460a3-... 8] 704b-c

9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK IV CH 1 [5..] 19] 50c BK ... CH 18 [5..0a9-31] 77b BK ... CH 18 [5...5-...5] 9 d 98c BK IX, CH 3.. [6..1b-8-6..2a10] 147c / *Parts of Animals* BK II CH 4 [650b18-651 15] 175c 1 6a BK IV CH 5 [6..9 5 31] 209a-c CH 1 [69..22 ...] 224b-c / *Motion of Animals* CH .. [..01b3]-CH 8 [..0 21] 236d 23 c CH 11 239a-d / *Ethics* BK IV CH 9 [1128 10- 4] 375d 376a BK ... CH 3 [11..14 1] 39 b

10 HIPPOCRATES *Sacred Disease* 158a 159d 160a

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [103 10..] 57d

14 PLUTARCH *Demetrius* 7..0d 41a

17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR ... CH 3 108a b / *Fourth Ennead*, TR I CH 23 153d 154b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q ..5 A 3 REP 3 380c-381b PART I-II Q 1 A 7 REP 690d-692a Q ..2 720b d 723b passim esp A 2, REP 3 721 722 Q 35 A 8 ANS 779c 780c Q 3.. A .. ANS 784c ..85b A 4 785d 786d Q 4 A 1 ANS ..98b-d Q 44 A 1 807 808b A 3 809a-c Q 48 A 2 823b-824c 4 825b-826a.c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL, Q ..0 A .., REP ..5 896a-897d

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, BK I 15a b BK III 192b-193a

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 3..5b-c 40 b-d

28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 271a-b 288b 292d 293a 296d / *Circulation of the Blood* 322..-d / *On Animal Generation* 431d-432a

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 49b-c

31 DESCARTES *Meditations* VI 99d 100a

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III DEF 3-POSTUL TE 1 395d 396a PROP 2, DEMONST and SCHOL, 396d PART IV PROP 7-8 426a-c PART V PR 4 1a-452c P O 34 DEMONST 460c-d

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XX, SECT 17 177d

36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 234 b

37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 234 b 2..3d

42 KANT *Judgement* 509c-d

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 169d 1..0b

49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 274 5..6b

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I, 48c BK IV 1..8d 1..9a BK VI 247d 248a 2..6b-c 264c d BK VIII, 334 BK IX, 3..0d 354a passim, esp 3..1d 352a, 3..3b-d BK XII 56..d ..68c BK XV 616a-618b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 198a 327b-328a 694a 699a 738a 66a esp 738b-74 b, 7..4b-7 9a

54 FREUD *Hysteria* 59c / *Interpretation of Dreams* 323b / *Unconscious* 433d [fn] / *General Introduction*, 608d-609a / *Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety* 736d ..38a esp ..3 a-b

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad* BK II [265 283] 12d the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 1

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119 When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164

AUTHOR S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases e g *Iliad* BK II [265 283] 12d

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a *(D)* follows e g OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—*(D) II Esdras* 7 46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface

1 The nature and causes of the emotions or passions

7 PLATO *Republic* BK IV 350c 353d BK IX 416b c 421a b / *Timaeus* 466b d / *Philebus* 621c 622b 627c 628a 628d 630c / *Laws* BK IX 748a

8 ARISTOTLE *Soul* BK I CH I [403^{a}2–^{b}3] 632a-c CH 4 [408^{a}34–^{b}31] 638b d BK III CH 3 [427^{b}21–24] 660a CH 9 [432^{b}26–433^{a}2] 665c

9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK IV CH II [692^{a}22–27] 224b c / *Ethics* BK II CH 5 [1105^{b}19–1106^{a}6] 351b c / *Politics* BK VII CH 7 [1327^{b}40–1328^{a}18] 532a c / *Rhetoric* BK II CH I [1378^{a}20]–CH II [1388^{b}30] 623b 636a

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [136–160] 31d 32a [231–322] 33a 34b

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK VI [724 734] 230b

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR I CH I 1a b CH 5 2d 3c CH 9 II 4c 5c / *Third Ennead* TR VI CH 3 4 108a 109b / *Fourth Ennead* TR IV CH 18 166d 167b CH 20–21 167d 168c CH 28 172a 173b / *Sixth Ennead* TR I CH 19 22 262a 264c

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK IX CH 4 5 287a 289a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 81 AA 2 3 429c 431d PART I II QQ 22–48 720b d 826a c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL Q 82 A I ANS 968a 970c Q 86 A 3 ANS and REP 3 4 994d 996a c

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* INTRO 47c-d PART I 61a 65b esp 61a c 68b c 77b-c PART II 162c

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 55b c

31 DESCARTES *Meditations* III 82d 83a

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II AXIOM 3 373d PART III 395a 422a c esp 395a d, DEF I 3 395d 396a PROP I 396a c PROP 3 398b-c PROP 56 414a d THE AFFECTS 416b 422a c PART IV DEF 7 424b PROP I 4 424c-425d PROP 9–13 426d 428a APPENDIX I II 447a b PART V AXIOM 2 452c PROP 34 460c d

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XX 176b 178a esp SECT 3 176d CH XXXIII SECT 5 15 248d 250c

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 338c d

42 KANT *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 378b c / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 385a d 386b d / *Judgement* 483d 484b 508d [fn 1]

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 17 69c

53 JAMES *Psychology* 49b 50a 87b 209a b 327b 328a 738a 766a esp 738a b 742a 746a 758a 759a 761a 765b

54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psycho Analysis* 4d 5a / *Interpretation of Dreams* 363c d / *Repression* 424d 425b *Uncon*

(1 *The nature and causes of the emotions or passions*)

1c Instinctive emotional reactions in animals and men

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 111d 112c esp 112c BK VII 236c
7 PLATO *Symposium* 157b 159b esp 158a 159a 165b 166b / *Republic* BK II 320b c / *Laws* BK VI 712b
8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK II CH 27 [70b6-39] 92c 93a c
9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK IV CH 1 [524b17-19] 50c BK V CH 8 [542 17-b4] 68d 69a CH 18 [550a29-31] 77b BK VI CH 18-BK VII CH 2 97b 108c passim esp BK VI CH 18 97b 99c BK VII CH 1 106b d 108a BK IX CH 1 [608 21-b20] 133b d 134a CH 37 [621b28-622 10] 147c / *Parts of Animals* BK IV CH 5 [679a5-32] 209a c CH 11 [69 22 27] 224b c / *Generation of Animals* BK III CH 2 [753 6-17] 294a b / *Ethics* BK III CH 8 [1116b24 1117a3] 363a b BK VII CH 6 [1149b24 1150 8] 400b c
10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK I CH 12 173a c
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 3 128c d BK III CH 7 183c d
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK IX SECT 9 292b d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 78 A 4 ANS 411d 413d Q 82 AA 2-3 429c-431c Q 96 A 1 REP 2 510b 511b PART I II Q 17 A 2 REP 3 687d 688b Q 40 AA 2-3 793d 795a Q 41 A 1 REP 3 798b d Q 46 A 4 REP 2 815b d A 5 REP 1 815d 816d
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVIII [19 75] 80a c
22 CHAUCER *Nun's Priest's Tale* [15 282-287] 457b / *Manciple's Tale* [17 104 144] 490a b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 184a b
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 346a 347d 349a 350a 361b 362a 381b c 402a d 405c 406a 476c 477a
31 DESCARTES *Meditations* VI 99d 100a 102b 103a / *Objections and Replies* 156a d
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 57 SCHOL 415b
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VIII DIV 80 486c d
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 343d 346d
43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 469c d
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 124b 174b 347a c 386a
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 144a b
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 287d 291a esp 289a 291a 304b 313a esp 305c 309a 312b d [fn 27] 371c 372c
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XI 499c 500c
53 JAMES *Psychology* 49b 51a 198a 199a 204b 211a passim esp 206a 208a 209b 700a 738b esp 717a 731b 734b 735a 738a b
54 FREUD *General Introduction* 591d 592c 607d 609b esp 608d 609b 613a 615b 616c 623b-c / *Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety* 721a b 737c 739c 752a-c / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 782a b d [fn 1] 787a b 789b-791d esp 789c 790b / *New Introductory Lectures* 840a 853b esp 840b-c 846b 849b 851a c

2 The classification and enumeration of the emotions

7 PLATO *Philebus* 628d 630c
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK II CH 5 351b c / *Rhetoric* BK I CH II [1378 20-30] 623b
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 81 A 2 429c 430c PART I II Q 23 723c 727a Q 24 A 4 729c 730a Q 30 A 2 ANS and REP 1 749d 750d
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 62c-64a
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III THE AFFECTS 416b 422a c
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XX SECT 1-3 176b d SECT 18 178a
53 JAMES *Psychology* 127b 656a 742a 743a 745b 746a 766a

2a Definitions of particular passions

7 PLATO *Cratylus* 103b-d / *Phaedrus* 120a-c / *Symposium* 149a 173a c esp 161d 168a / *Euthyphro* 193d 194b / *Apology* 202a / *Philebus* 628d 630c / *Laws* BK I 650a 651a-c
8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK II CH 7 [113 33 b3] 158d 159a BK IV CH 5 [125b28 34] 175a CH 6 [127b26-32] 177b CH 13 [151 14 19] 205d 206a BK VIII CH 1 [156 26-b3] 212b c / *Soul* BK I CH 1 [403 25-33] 632b c
9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK IV CH 11 [692 22-27] 224b-c / *Ethics* BK III CH 6 [1115 7 14] 361a b CH 8 [1116b24 1117 3] 363a b BK IV CH 9 [1128b10-14] 375d 376a BK VIII CH 6 [1158 10-14] 409d 410a BK IX CH 10 [1171 11 13] 424d CH 12 [1171b29-33] 425d / *Politics* BK V CH 10 [1312b24 33] 515b / *Rhetoric* BK II CH 1 [1378 20]-CH 11 [1388b30] 623b 636a
17 PLOTINUS *Fourth Ennead* TR IV CH 28 172a 173b
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par 13 11d 12a BK III par 2 13c d BK IV par 7 14 20d 23a esp par 11 21d 22a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II QQ 26-48 733d 826a c
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 61a 65b esp 61a 62c
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 5a 6c 25c 26d 344a 347c 409d 434d passim esp 424d-425a
27 SHAKESPEARE *Othello* ACT III SC III [165 192] 223d 224a [322 357] 225c 226a SC IV [155 162] 229a
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 11-59 399d 416b THE AFFECTS 416b-422a c PART IV APPENDIX XXI XXV 449a-c
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 262 221a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XX SECT 3 18 176d 178a

3c(1) Hysterias

3c( ) Obsessions and compulsions

3c(3) Phobias and anxieties

3c(4) Traumas and traumatic neuroses

3d The alleviation and cure of emotional disorders

(3 *The disorder or pathology of the passions* 3a *Madness or frenzy due to emotional excess excessively emotional or emotionally over determined behavior*)

22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida* 1a 155a esp BK IV STANZA 32-49 92b 95a BK V STANZA 33-39 124b 125b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 63b 68b 71a
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK III 192b d
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 5a 6c 10b 11b 25c 26d 166a 167a 275c d 289b 290a 344a 347c 418c d 420d-421d
26 SHAKESPEARE *3rd Henry VI* ACT III SC II [104 195] 87b 88a ACT V SC VI [61-93] 103d 104a / *Richard III* 105a 148a c / *Romeo and Juliet* 285a 319a c esp ACT III SC III [1-115] 304d 306a / *Merchant of Venice* ACT IV SC I [40 62] 426a
27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* 29a 72a c esp ACT IV SC V 59c 62a / *Othello* 205a 243a c esp ACT IV SC I 229d 233a / *King Lear* 244a 283a c esp ACT I 244a 254c ACT II SC IV [274 289] 261c d ACT III SC IV 264a 266b ACT IV SC VI [80 207] 274b 275c / *Macbeth* ACT V SC I 306b 307a SC III [37-46] 308a / *Antony and Cleopatra* ACT II SC V 322a 323d / *Timon of Athens* ACT IV SC III ACT V SC IV 410c 420d
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 83a c 88c 89a
35 LOCKE *Toleration* 7d 8c / *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 12 180d 181a SECT 69 196d 197a
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 231c 232b 234a b
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 216a c 509d 510c esp 509d
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 481d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART IV 323a c
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [3374 3413] 82b 83a [4405-461] 110a 114b
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* esp 135a 136b 148b 150a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 51d BK III 119a 120 159b 162b esp 160d BK IV 178b 179a BK V 207b 208a 233b 234a BK VI 238a c 245d 246a 266c d 271b 273c BK VII 277a 278a 292b 296a BK VIII 305b 307d BK IX 350d 354a BK XI 505a 511b 531a 532a c BK XII 549d 551c BK XIII 567d 568c BK XV 616a 617a 642d 643b
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK I 4a d BK II 17b 21b 21d 22b 41c 45d BK III 46a 82a c esp 50c 62a BK VIII 200c 201c 206a 207d 228d 235d BK IX 259c 65a BK XII 395a 396a 397c 398d
53 JAMES *Psychology* 204b 653a b 716b 718a 719a 750a b 754a 797a b
54 FREUD *Hysteria* 27a-c / *Interpretation of Dreams* 210c d 328a b / *General Introduction* 547b 549d / *Group Psychology* 670d 671c 675b 676b / *Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety* 743b 744a / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 787a b

3*b* Rationalization or the emotional determination of thought

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK III 427d-428a BK IV 474a-c BK V 506b 507a-c
7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 118d
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK III CH 16 [1287a20-b3] 485c 486a / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 2 [1356a11 19] 595c BK II CH I [1377b28 1378 5] 622d 623a
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [1141 1191] 59a d
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 52d 53a 58a 68c 78a b PART II 154a
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK III 148d 150d 154a 156c 159d 163c 166a 168a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 210b 212a 273b 276a 447c-448c 490d 491d
28 HARVEY *Circulation of the Blood* 306a-c 309d
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 38d 39a 66c d / *Novum Organum* BK I APH 49 111a
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 39 SCHOL 408b d
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 8 -87 186b 189a 93-100 191a 192b / *Geometrical Demonstration* 439b-442a
35 LOCKE *Toleration* 2d 3a / *Civil Government* CH II SECT 13 28a b / *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXXIII SECT 1-9 248b 249d BK IV CH XX SECT 12 392c
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT I DIV 6 453c
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER I 29c 30b NUMBER 31 103c 104a NUMBER 50 162a b
43 MILL *Liberty* 270a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK II 82d 83a BK III 134a c BK IV 170d 171c BK V 233b 234a BK VI 238a b BK X 426b BK XI 497c-499c 505a 511b esp 509c 510d BK XIII 585b EPILOGUE II 686c 687a
53 JAMES *Psychology* 371b 374a 377a passim esp 376b 377a 439a 643a 646a 652a 657b
54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psycho Analysis* 13d 14a / *Interpretation of Dreams* 210c d 379a 380d / *General Introduction* 486b 488b esp 487d-488a / *Group Psychology* 682b c / *War and Death* 760d 761a / *New Introductory Lectures* 874a 879b esp 874a d 878b 879b

3*c* Particular emotional disorders psychoneuroses due to repression

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 347c d
53 JAMES *Psychology* 244b 253b esp 248a 645b-646a 746b 748a 749a 750b 753b 754b 759b 760a 799b 807a 838a 839b
54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psycho Analysis* 1a 20d esp 4d 5a 7a 9a 14b 19a /

49 D RWI Descent of Man 318d 319a
53 JAMES Psychology 799a-808a esp 799a b 807a b 816a 819a esp 816a 817a
54 FREUD Unconscious 433b-c / General Introduction, 501d 504b esp 503b-c 504b 589c 593b passim / Ego and Id 702c-d 704 c 708b-c 715a 716c / Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety 21d 722 / New Introd ctory Lecture 837b 839b esp 838a d 843d 846a esp 845b

4a(1) The force of the passions

OLD TESTAMENT Genesis 4 1 16 25:29-34 34 39— 20 / Exod s 32 15 2 / I Sam el 18 6-12 19 8-1 —(D) I Kings 18 6-1 9 8 / II Sam el 1 13—(D) II Kings 1 13 / Job 5:2 / Proverbs 15 13 27 4
NEW TESTAMENT Romans 1 18-32 / II Corinthians 8 16 / I Timothy 6 9-10 / I John 2 15 3 14 16
4 HOMER Odyssey BK XII [153 200] 251d 252b
5 EURIPIDES Medea [62 -63] 217c / Hippolytus 225a 236d
5 ARISTOPHANES Lysistrata 583a 599a c
6 HERODOTUS History BK I 100b-101b K 218c 222c-d
6 THUCYDIDES Peloponnesian War K II 438a b
7 PLATO Charmides 2b-c / Protagoras 59b-61 Phaedrus 120a 122a / Symposium 168a / Phaedo 232d 234c / Republic BK I 296b-c BK IX 416a-418c / Timaeus 474b-d / Laws BK VII 735a 738c passim
8 ARISTOTLE Memory and Reminiscence CH 2 [453 5 31] 695b-d / Dreams CH 2 [460a32 b18] 704b-c
9 ARISTOTLE History of Animals BK II CH 1 [581b 1 22] 107b / Ethics BK I CH 3 [1094b 29-1095a12] 340a b BK III CH 1 [1109b30-1110b15] 355b d 356b [1111a2 b3] 357 b K IV CH 9 [1128 15 2] 376a K CH 5 [1140b6 19] 389b-c BK CH 1 o 395a 403c passim K VIII H 3 [1156a3 b5] 408a BK X CH 8 [168b11 28] 422 b BK X CH 9 (9b4 1180a24] 434b-435a / Politics K 1 CH 2 [53 31 37] 446d BK I H 15 [286a 6-] 484b-c [286 33 37] 484d CH 16 [28-28 32] 485d BK CH D [131 b23 33] 515b c [1315a25 31] 518a b K VII C 1 [3 b40-1325 8] 532a-c / Rhetoric K c H 12 (389a3 b11] 636b-d
12 LUCRETIUS Nature of Things BK III [307 322] 34a b
12 AURELIUS Meditations BK II ECT 10 257d 258a K ECT 55 283b-e
13 VIRGIL Aeneid K IV 16 a 186b BK X (1-80] 354 356a [593-611] 3 0a
14 PLUTARCH Pericles 139a-c / Coriolanus 174b d 193a c / Lysander 362b-365a / Pompey 533a-c / Antony 748a 779d
15 TACITUS Annals BK III 58a K X 1 137b-c / Histories IV 26 d
18 AUGUSTINE Confessions BK IV par 9 14 21b 23a BK VI par 11 13 38b-39c BK VIII par 10-11 55c 56b / City of God BK IX C 1 3 190a-c BK XIX CH 1 5 1a-c
19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I Q 81 A 3 REP 1 2 430c-431d Q III A ANS 569c 5 0b ART 1 II Q 6 AA 6-7 649a-650d Q 9 A 2 658d 6 9c Q 10 A 3 664d-665c Q 24 A 2 A 5 727d 728c Q 37 783c 786d
20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I II Q 72 A 2 112b-113 Q 73 A 5 123a d Q 74 A 10 131d 137c Q 77 144d 152a Q 82 A 3 169c 170b Q 83 4 173c 174b
21 DANTE Divine Comedy HELL, V 7a-8b VII [97]- 111 [64] 10c 11c
22 CHAUCER Manciple's Tale [s 104 144] 490a b
23 HOBBES Leviathan PART I 65a 89a PART II 104d 10 138d 139 141a b
25 MONTAIGNE Essays 5a-6c 20d 22a 25c 26d 36c-41 passim esp 39b-40a 109a-c 159a 167a 184a d 200d 20 b esp 203c 205b 232b-238d passim 273b 276a 346b-347 350d 354b 402c-404b 418c-d 420d-421d 435b-d 491c-495a
26 SHAKESPEARE 3rd Henry VI ACT I SC III 73d 74b / Romeo and Juliet 285a 319a,c / Merchant of Venice ACT I 2 406a-430c
27 SHAKESPEARE Troilus and Cressida 103a 141a c / Othello 205a 243a c / Antony and Cleopatra 311a 350d
28 HARVEY On Animal Generation 347c-d
30 BACON Advancement of Learning 67a b 78a-d
31 SPINOZA Ethics PART IV PROP 18 424c 4 9d
32 MILTON Paradise Lost BK VIII [561-594] 244b-245a BK X [990-1066] 269a 270b BK XII [80-110] 321 b / Samson Agonistes [521 5 6] 351a 352a
33 PASCAL Pensées 360 235a
35 LOCKE Human Understanding K II CH XXI SECT 39 187c-d SECT 54 192b-c BK IV CH XX SECT 2 392
35 HUME Human Understanding SECT I DIV 3 451d
36 STERNE Tristram Shandy 239b 243
37 FIELDING Tom Jones 10c
38 ROUSSEAU Inequality 329b
42 KANT Intro Metaphysic of Morals 385c 386b / Judgement 586a 587a
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 1 29d 30a NUMBER 6 40a b NUMBER 50 162a b NUMBER 55 173a
44 BOSWELL Johnson 174b-c 176d 214b-c 341 d
46 HEGEL Philosophy of History INTRO 167c 168a PART III 300c d
47 GOETHE Faust PART I [1110-111] 27b 28a [32 7 3373] 79a 82a PART II [6,566-6569] 161a
48 MELVILLE Moby Dick 135a 136b 411 -412a
49 DARWIN Descent of Man 311d 312b
51 TOLSTOY War and Peace BK I 15b-16a K III 122b-c BK VI 251d 252d EPILOGUE I 655c-656b

4 The moral consideration of the passions

7 PLATO *Gorgias* 275d 277c / *Republic* BK IV 350c 353d BK X 433d
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK II CH I BK III CH I 348b d 357b passim BK III CH 6-BK IV CH 9 361a 376a c BK V CH 8 [1135b17-1136 9] 383c 384a BK VII 395a 406a c BK X CH 8 [1178 8 21] 432d / *Politics* BK VII CH 15 [1334b8-28] 539b d / *Rhetoric* BK II CH 12 14 636a 638a
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [88-322] 33d 34b
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* 105a 245a c passim esp BK I CH 3-5 108b 110c CH 22 127c 128c CH 25 129d 130a BK II CH 5 142c 143b CH 13 152c 153d CH 17 18 158d 162b BK III CH 15 190c d BK IV CH 4-6 225a 232c CH 9 237d 238d
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* 253a 310d passim
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK IX CH 4-6 287a 289b BK XIV CH 3-9 378a 385b / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 24 630c 631a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 24 727a 730a Q 34 768c 772b
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 56 A 4 32b 33c Q 58 A 2 ANS 42a 43a A 3 REP 2 43b 44a Q 59 45d 49d Q 60 A 5 50d 51b AA 4-5 52b 54d Q 62 A 2 REP I 3 60d 61b Q 63 A 4 ANS 65d 66c Q 64 A I 66d 67c Q 66 A 3 ANS and REP 2 77c 78b Q 67 A I 81c 82c
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 61d 62a 79a 80a 85d 95d 96b PART II 138d 139a PART IV 272c
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 26a 27c 78a d
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV APPENDIX I III 447a b XXXII 450c d PART V PROP I-4 452d 453d esp PROP 4 SCHOL 453b d
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 203 211a 262 221a 412 413 242a 423 243b 502 260b 261a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 330d 331a 343b 346d 362a d / *Political Economy* 375d 376b
42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 253a 279d esp 256a c 259b c 264d 65b 266d 267d 268d 271d 284d 285a / *Practical Reason* 297a 307d esp 298a 300a 304a 307d 321b 329a esp 321b 324b 341c 342a 356a 360d / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 385c 386d 389a b
43 MILL *Liberty* 295b 297b / *Utilitarianism* 457c-461c 464d 465c 469b 471b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 150 56c 57a / *Philosophy of History* PART I 251b c PART IV 321b d
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 310c 319a esp 311a d 313d 314b 318d 319a 592b 593b
53 JAMES *Psychology* 81b 83a 202a 203a 798b 808a esp 807a 808a 816a 818a
54 FREUD *Interpretation of Dreams* 386c 387a / *General Introduction* 501d 504b esp 503d 504b 624d 625b / *War and Death* 757d 761c

4a The conflict between reason and emotion

5 SOPHOCLES *Oedipus at Colonus* [655-663] 120b-c
7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 120b c 128a 129c / *Republic* BK IV 350c 355a BK IX 416a c
9 ARISTOTLE *Motion of Animals* CH 11 239a d / *Ethics* BK I CH 13 [1102b13 1103 10] 348a d BK III CH I [1111 35-b4] 357b BK VII 395a 406a c / *Politics* BK III CH 15 [1286 17 0] 484b c [1286 33-37] 484d
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [307 322] 34a b
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK II SECT 5 257b-c SECT 10 257d 258a SECT 16-17 259a d BK III SECT 4 260b 261a SECT I 262b c BK V SECT 8-9 269d 270c BK VII SECT 55 283b-c SECT 68-69 284c d BK VIII SECT 39 288c
13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK IV 167a 186b
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 81 A 3 ANS and REP 2 430c-431d Q 95 A 2 ANS and REP I 507c 508a Q III A ANS 569 570b PART I II Q 9 A 2 esp REP 3 658d 659c Q 10 A 3 ANS and REP 2 664d 665c Q 17 A 7 690d 692a Q 33 A 3 767a d Q 34 A I REP I 768c 769d Q 48 A 3 824c 825b
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 61 A 3 ANS 56b 57a Q 77 144d 152a esp A 2 145d 147c A 4 148b 149a A 7 150d 151c Q 80 A 2 160d 161c Q 91 A 6 212c 213c Q 93 A 6 219d 220d Q 94 A 6 ANS 225d 226b PART II II Q 186 A 4 ANS 655c 656b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 57d 58a 58c d PART II 105d 106a 141a b 151b c
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 20d 22a 159a 167a esp 161a c 165c 166a 184b d 200d 205b 273b 276a 486b-495a
27 SHAKESPEARE *Troilus and Cressida* ACT II SC II 113c 115d ACT III SC II [74-81] 121a / *Othello* ACT I SC III [306-337] 212b-c
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 55b d 66c d 67a b 78a d
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP I 18 424c 429d PROP 59 73 442b 447a APPENDIX I III 447a b XXXII 450c d PART V PROP I 0 452d-458a
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VIII [500-643] 243a 246a BK XII [80-110] 321a b
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 104 193a 412-413 242a 4 243b
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH II SECT 13 28a b / *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 54 192b c BK IV CH XX SECT 12 392c
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT I DIV 3 451d
42 KANT *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 385c 386b / *Judgement* 586a 587a
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 15 65b c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART III 312d 313a
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [321 33 3] 79a 82a esp [321 3 50] 79a b
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 411a 412a

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK II SECT 5 257b-c BK IV SECT 24 265c d BK III SECT 53 283b-c BK V 1 SECT 39 288c BK I SECT 7 292b

14 PLUTARCH *Dio* 98b-d

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par 2 4 9b d BK II par 1 13b-c BK I par 25 25c BK VI par 18 26 40d 43 BK I par 1 2 52c 53b par 10-11 55c 56b par 25 7 60a-c / *City of God* BK IV CH 3 190a c BK IX CH 5-6 288b 289b BK XIV CH 6-9 380b 385b BK XIX CH 15 521a-c / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 24 630c 631a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 95 A 2 3 507c 509b Q 98 A 2 esp REP 3 517d 519 PART I II Q 20 A 4 ANS 714c 715b Q 24 727a 730a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I I Q 56 A 4 32b-33c Q 59 45d-49d Q 6 A 4-Q 6 A 5 52b-59d Q 64 AA 1 2 66d 68b Q 65 A 1 70b-72 PART III Q 15 AA 4-9 790d 795b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURG TORY XVIII [19- 5] 80a-c

22 CHAUCER *Tale of Melibeus* par 4 7 401b-402b / *Parson's Tale* par 12 503b-504a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 93d-94 95d 96b

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK IV 234 240a

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 20d 22 89b 91b 159a 167a 184 -d 200d 205b 232b-238d 251a-c 346b-347c 353c 354b 402c-404b 431c-432d 486b 495a

26 SHAKESPEARE *Romeo and Juliet* ACT II SC 1 [1 15] 300c / *Henry V* ACT I SC 1 [24-69] 533b

27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT I SC III [5-51] 34c d ACT I SC II [68 9] 49 d

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 27b-c 67 b 71d 72b 78a d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 8 424c 429d esp PROP 8 SCHOL 429a d PR 9 3 442b-447a PROP END X 447 450d PART V 4 1a-463d esp PROP 20 452d-458a PROP 38-42 461d-463d

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VIII [500-6] 243a 245b BK X [334 369] 306b 307 [5- 551] 310b 311 / *Samson Agonistes* [4 - 6] 351b-352 / *Areopagitica* 390 391

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 1 4 193a 203 211a 4 3 242a 4 3 243b 502-5 3 260b 261

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 46-54 189d 192 esp SECT 54 192b-c SECT 69 196d 197a

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 32 b

42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 256b / *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 368d 369 *Judgement* 586d 587

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 9 b c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* ADDITIONS 105 133d 134 / *Philosophy of History* PART III 312d 313 PART I 365d 366a

49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 310c 319a esp 313d 314b 318d 319a 322c d 592b c 593a b

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK III 122b-c BK V 201a-c BK VI 245b-c 247d 250a EPILOGUE I 655c 656b

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI 164a 167a

53 JAMES *Psychology* 807a 808a 816a-819 esp 817a 818a

54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psycho Analysis* 9a 20a-c / *Hysteria* 110c / *Narcissism* 407b-408a / *Ego and Id* 02c 706d 707d 715a 716a / *War and Death* 757d 759c / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 773b-c / *New Introductory Lectures* 838c 839b 844b-c

4b(2) Attenuation and atrophy of the passions the liberation of reason

7 PLATO *Phaedo* 233c 234c / *Republic* BK I 295d 296c

9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK II CH 13 [1389b12-1390a24] 637a-c

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK V [1-54] 61 d

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 1 105a 106c CH 4 108d 110a BK II CH 2 140c 141c CH 17 18 158d 161b BK III CH 8 184b-c CH 22 195a 201a BK IV CH 4 225a 228a CH 12 242d 244a

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK II SECT 2 257a SECT 5 257b-c SECT 10 257d 258a SECT 16-17 259a-d BK III SECT 4 260b 261a SECT 6 261a-c SECT 1 262b-c BK IV SECT 39 26 a BK V SECT 8 269d 270b SECT 26 272c BK VI SECT 40-46 277d 278d BK VII SECT 55 283b c SECT 68-69 284c d BK IX SECT 7 29 b

17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR VI CH 4 5 108c 109d esp CH 5 109 d

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK IX CH 4-5 287 89 BK XIV CH 8 10 381c 385d / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 24 630c 631a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 24 A 2 727b-728c

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK III 152 d 188d 191c

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 89b-91b 99b 100a 107a 112d 165d 167a 200d 205b 232b 238d esp 235 36 251 -c 402c-404b 432b-d 486b-495 esp 491d-495a

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 26b c 71d 72b

32 MILTON *Comus* [414 475] 42b 44a [706-755] 49a 50a / *Areopagitica* 390 391a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 413 242a

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK V 19a

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 344d 345c

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 32 b

42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 256b / *Practical Reason* 346b d [fn 1] / *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 378d 379 / *Judgement* 586a 587a

(4a The conflict between reason and emotion.
4a(1) The force of the passions)

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK I 4a d BK II 39b-40a BK III 50c 62a BK VII 177c BK XII 397c 398d
53 JAMES *Psychology* 799a b
54 FREUD *Hysteria* 110c / *General Introduction* 502a 504b esp 503d 504a / *Group Psychology* 690a c / *Ego and Id* 701d 702d 715d 716a / *Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety* 745d 747b / *War and Death* 760d 761a / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 787b c / *New Introductory Lectures* 837b 839b esp 838c 839b

4a(2) The strength of reason or will

4 HOMER *Odyssey* BK IV [265-295] 201d 202a BK IX [82-104] 230a BK XIX [203-219] 291b
7 PLATO *Symposium* 168a 173a c / *Apology* 205d 206d / *Crito* 214d 215d / *Phaedo* 220b 221a 225b 226c 232b 234c 250b 251d / *Laws* BK I 649d 650b
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK IX CH 8 [1168^{b}28 1169^{a}11] 422b d / *Politics* BK I CH 5 [1254^{b}18-^{b}8] 447d 448a
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [307-322] 34a b
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 3 108b c BK II CH 23 170a 172d
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK VII SECT 55 283b c BK VIII SECT 39 288c BK IX SECT 7 292b BK XI SECT 18 304b 305b
14 PLUTARCH *Pericles* 139a 140d
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK VI par 11 13 38b 39c par 16 40a c BK VIII par 10-11 55c 56b par 19-27 58b 60c / *City of God* BK IX CH 4-5 287a 289a BK XIV CH 8-9 381c 385b
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 81 A 3 430c-431d Q 111 A 2 ANS 569c 570b PART I II Q 10 A 3 664d 665c Q 17 A 7 690d 692a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 141a b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 20d 22a 36c 41a esp 39b 40a 159a 167a 184a d 200d 205b 273b 276a
27 SHAKESPEARE *Othello* ACT I SC III [322 337] 212b c
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 27a c
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 15-17 428a d PROP 59 73 442b 447a APPENDIX I III 447a b XXXII 450c d PART V 451a 463d
32 MILTON *Comus* [414 475] 42b 44a / *Paradise Lost* BK VIII [500-617] 243a 245b
33 PASCAL *Pensees* 350 234a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 54 192b c
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 344d 345c
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 164a 165c 235c d / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 259a c 264d 265b 271c d 279b 282d 283d 284d 285a / *Practical Reason* 303b 304b 314a d 315b c 346b d [fn 1] / *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 365b-366a / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 386b d / *Judgement* 483d 484b 586a 587a 605d 606b [fn 2]
43 MILL *Representative Government* 332c d / *Utilitarianism* 463d 464c
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 312a c 313d 314a 318d 319a
53 JAMES *Psychology* 798b 800a 807a 808a
54 FREUD *Hysteria* 110c / *Interpretation of Dreams* 384c 385c 386d 387a / *Unconscious* 433b c / *Group Psychology* 690a c / *Ego and Id* 702c d 715c 716c / *Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety* 721d 722c 744a / *War and Death* 760d 761a / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 800d 801a / *New Introductory Lectures* 837d 839b 845b 880a

4b The treatment of the emotions by or for the sake of reason

4b(1) Moderation of the passions by reason virtue continence avoidance of sin

OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 20 14 17 23 4 5 / *Leviticus* 19 17 18 / *Numbers* 15 37 41 / *Deuteronomy* 5 18 21 / *Psalms* 32 8 10 37 1-8—(D) *Psalms* 31 8 10 36 1-8 / *Proverbs* 7 15 1 23 30 7-9 / *Ecclesiastes* 7 8-9—(D) *Ecclesiastes* 7 9 10
APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 18 30 33 31 38 16-23—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 18 30-33 31 38 16-24
NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 5 21 26 43 48 / *I Corinthians* 13 4-8 / *Ephesians* 4 31 32 / *Colossians* 3 5 15 / *I Thessalonians* 4 3-8 / *I Timothy* 6 3-1 / *Titus* 2 11 14 3 1 7 / *James* 4 1 7 / *I Peter* 2 11 12
5 ARISTOPHANES *Clouds* [866 1114] 499a 502b
7 PLATO *Charmides* 5a b / *Laches* 31d 37a / *Protagoras* 59b 64a / *Phaedrus* 120b c / *Symposium* 153b 157a 168a 173a c / *Phaedo* 225b 226c 233c 234c / *Republic* BK III 325b 326b BK IV 346a 356a BK IX 416a c BK X 431b 434a / *Timaeus* 466a 467a / *Laws* BK I 649d 650b BK VII 713c 716a esp 715d 716a BK VIII 735c 738c
8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK IV CH 5 [125^{b}20-28] 174d 175a
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 13 347b 348d BK II CH 1 BK III CH 1 348b d 357b BK III CH 6-BK IV CH 9 361a 376a c BK VII 395a 406a c BK IX CH 8 [1168^{b}28 1169 11] 422b d / *Politics* BK I CH 5 [1254 18 ^{b}8] 447d-448a / *Rhetoric* BK II CH 14 637d 638a
11 NICOMACHUS *Arithmetic* BK I 826d 827a
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK II [1-61] 15a d BK III [307 322] 34a b [1053 1094] 43c 44a c BK V [1-54] 61a d [1117 1135] 75d BK VI [1 42] 80a d
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 1 105a 106c CH 3 108b c BK II CH 2 140c 141c CH 11 151a b CH 18 161a 162b

43 FED R LIST NUMBER 1 29a 31 passim NUM BER 5-63 41c passim, esp NUM ER 6 40a b MBER 10 49c 53a esp 50a-d NUM ER 15, 65b-d NUM ER 1 69a 70d NUMBER 27 95c d NUM ER 31 103d 104 UM ER 34 110c d NUMBER 46 150b-152a NUMBER 49, 160b-161a NUM ER 50 162 b NUMBER 55 173a b NUM ER 63 192c 193a NUM ER 70 211d 212a NUM R 6 225d 226a

43 M LL Representative Government 329b-c 336c 337a 346c 348c

46 H GEL Philosophy of History INTRO, 166b-16 P RT I 241d 242a P RT III 300c-d P T I 323b-c

53 J MES Psychol gy 201a

54 FR UD Civilization a d Its Disco tents 780b-802a,c esp 780c d 781c, 783c 784b 785d 787c, 792 b, 800c-802a c

5a The causes of polit cal association, fear or need

6 HERODOTU History K 1 23b-d

6 THU CYDIDE Peloponnesian War BK 1 402b-404

7 PLATO Pro agoras 44 -45b / Rep blic BK II 311b-c 316c 319a

9 ARISTOTLE Politics BK III CH 6 [12 8^b15 30] 475d-476a CH 9 [280a32 128 a2] 477d-478c BK V CH 8 [1308a2, 3] 510b-c

12 LUCRETIUS Nature f Things BK [01 10] 74b-c

15 T CITUS Annals BK II 51b

18 A U TIN City of God BK I CH 30 147b-d

23 H BE Leviathan PART I 77a 77c 84c 87b esp 86b 90b-91b PART I 99a 101a 109b-c 116c-d

31 SPINOZ Ethics P RT IV PROP 3 SCHOL I 2 434d-436a

35 LOCKE T eratio 16a-c / Civil Government CH II, CT 13 15 28a-c C VI SECT 95 46c d CH X 53c 54d

38 MO T SQU U Spirit f La s BK I 2b-d

38 RO S U Ineq ity 354c 355a / Political Economy 3 0b 374 b / Soci l Contract BK I 393b-c

39 SMITH W alth f Nations BK V 309a-c 311b-c

40 G O Decl e and Fal 91b-c

4 K Science f Righ 435c-d

43 F ER LI T M R 1 50a-d UMBER 15 65b-d BER 17 69a 70d passim NUMB 27 95c d UM R 29 101a UMB R 46, 150b-152 N M E 51 163b-c

43 M L Representative Government 424c-425b / U ilitarianism 471 b

46 H EL Philoso hy of Right P RT III par 183 64a par 26 83c d / Philoso hy f H ory R II, 262a 283b-c T I, 289b-d PART 3 85-c

49 D WI Descent f Man 308a 310d 321b-c

52 DOSTOE KY Brothers Kar m ov BK V 133c d passim BK 158b 159a

54 F EUD Group Psychology 664a-696a c esp 665c, 672a-676b 687b-c / Civilization a d Its Discontents 781d 78 d 783b-c 785c 788d 796a b / New Introductory Lectures 884a

5b The acquisition and retention of power-lo e or fear

6 HERODOTUS History BK III 95d 96b 103d 104a 107c-d

6 THUCYDIDES Peloponnesian War BK I 368b-d BK II 402a-404a BK III 425d-426d BK VI 519a 520d 523c 524c BK VIII 580b-c

7 PL TO Rep blic BK II 311c 312b / Law BK III 671a-c 674c-d BK IV 682b / Seventh Letter 806d-807a

9 ARISTOTLE Politics BK V CH 2 [1302 16]-CH 3 [130 b34] 503b-504b CH 8 [1308a2, 34] 510b-c CH 10 512d 515d CH 11 [313 34 1315 11] 516a 518c

12 EPICTETU Discourses BK I CH 4 225a 26c CH 9 237d 238d

14 PLUTARCH Coriolanus, 180d 181b / Pyrrhus 314b d 332d esp 319b-321a / Lysander 362b-365a / Su la 384a-c / Crassus 438b d-455a c / Sertorius 462a-c 466d-467a / Agesilaus 482d 484a / Pompey 517d 518a 533a-c / Caesar 577d 583a / Cleomenes 6 9d-660a / Cicero 717a b / Demetriu 737b-d / Dion 784d 85a / Artaxerxes 856b-c

15 T CITUS Histories BK II 224d 225

23 MACHIA ELLI Prince CH V 9b-d CH VII 11b-c 12b-d CH X II 23d 24d CH XIX 26a 30a c XX 31b-c

23 HOB S Leviatha INTRO, 47b-d PART I 76d PART II 100d 109b-c 156c

24 R BELAIS Gargantua and Pantagruel BK III 132a-d

25 MO TAIGNE Essays, 51a 55d passim

26 S AKESPEARE Richard III ACT SC III [238-290] 146b-c / L Henry IV ACT III SC II [39-84] 453b-d

27 SH KESPE RE Macbeth ACT IV SC III [37 114] 303d 304c

29 CE TES D Quixote PART I 40d

30 BACON Advancement of Learnin 78a-d

38 M TESQUIEU Spirit f La BK III 12b-13c BK IV 15 -c K V 26d 7d BK VI 43c-d BK XII 93d 94a 94c-95a

38 ROUSSEAU I equality 364a b / Social Contract BK III 412d-413a

39 SMITH Wealth of Nations BK V 348a 349c

40 GI BO Decline and Fall, 263a b 436a b

41 GIBB N Decline and Fall 549a

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 6 39a b NUMBER 15 65b-d NUMBER 17 69a-d NUMBER 72 217a-c

43 M LL Representative Government 354b-355b / U ilitarianism 462d

46 H Philoso hy of History P RT III 287a-d PART IV 365d 366b

54 FRE Gro Psychol gy 669a-c 686c 689b esp 687 b

(4b *The treatment of the emotions by or for the sake of reason* 4b(2) *Attenuation and atrophy of the passions: the liberation of reason*.)

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XIII 577a 578b BK XIV 605b d BK XV 630c 631a
53 JAMES *Psychology* 751a 752a 753b 754b 760a b
54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psycho Analysis* 20b c / *Hysteria* 110c / *Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety* 745d 746c / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 773b c / *New Introductory Lectures* 839d 840a

4c The moral significance of temperamental type or emotional disposition

7 PLATO *Charmides* 3b d / *Republic* BK I 296b c BK II 319c 320c BK III 338a 339a / *Timaeus* 474b d / *Statesman* 607a 608d
8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 8 [9^b34–10^a6] 15a
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK IV CH 9 [1128^b10–20] 375d 376a BK VI CH 13 [1144^b1 17] 394b BK VII CH 4 [1148 18–22] 398c CH 5 399a d / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 10 [1369 5 29] 612b c BK II CH 12 14 636a 638a
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [288–32] 33d 34b
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 5 110b c BK II CH 15 155c 156b
17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III CH 1 3 10a 11a / *Fifth Ennead* TR IX CH 1 2 246c 247b
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 46 A 5 ANS and REP 1 815d 816d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 51 A 1 ANS 12b 13c Q 63 A 1 63a 64a Q 65 A 1 ANS 70b 72a
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XXX [100–145] 100b-d
22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida* BK III STANZA 129 71a b / *Wife of Bath's Prologue* [6191–6208] 266a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 68b-c 77c 78a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 200d 205b esp 203a 204a 434d-435d 491d-495a esp 494d 495a
26 SHAKESPEARE *Richard II* ACT III SC II 335b 337d / *1st Henry IV* ACT III SC I [146–189] 451c-452a / *2nd Henry IV* ACT IV SC V 494b-496d
27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT IV SC IV [32 66] 59a c
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 49b 50b 76d 77c
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XIV 102b d 108d
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 435b d
42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 256a 258b-c / *Practical Reason* 356a 360d
43 MILL *Liberty* 303d 304d / *Representative Government* 346c 348c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 150 56c 57a / *Philosophy of History* PART IV 323b c 357b-c
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 311c
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK VIII 321d 322d 336b 337d BK IX 362d 363a BK XI 514c d 519a-c 527b-528b EPILOGUE I 655c-656b
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK II 38a 40c BK III 48b 50b 53a 60a esp 54a b 57b c 69c 71c
53 JAMES *Psychology* 799b 808a passim esp 802b 803a 806b 807a

5 The political consideration of the passions

5 SOPHOCLES *Antigone* [162 210] 132c d
5 ARISTOPHANES *Lysistrata* 583a 599a c
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK III 436d 438b
7 PLATO *Republic* BK VIII IX 404a 418a passim esp BK VIII 404d-405c 407a 408a 409d 411a BK IX 416a 418a / *Laws* BK I II 643c 663d esp BK I 651a 652d BK III 665a c 668a 670c 671a 672c 674c-675c BK IV 681b d 682b BK V 686d 691b esp 689c 690c BK VI 707c 708a BK VII 718c 719d 726d 728b BK VIII 732d 738c esp 735c 736c, 738a-c BK IX 747d 748d
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK IV CH 1 [1121^b28–30] 368c / *Politics* BK II CH 9 [1271^a9 17] 467b BK III CH 15 [1286 17 21] 484b c [1286^a33 37] 484d CH 16 [1287 28 39] 485d BK V 502a 519d passim esp CH 2 3 503b 505b CH 10 11 512d 518c BK VII CH 7 [1327^b40–1328 18] 532a c
14 PLUTARCH *Cleomenes* 659d 660a / *Dion* 784d 785a
15 TACITUS *Histories* BK III 257c d
23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* 3a 37d passim
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* INTRO 47b d PART I 85c d 90b d 93d 94a 95d 96b PART II 104b d 105c 106b 113b 140c 142a 151b-c PART IV 272c CONCLUSION 279a c
27 SHAKESPEARE *Timon of Athens* ACT III SC V 406d 408a
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 20c d 78a d
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 46 410c PART IV PROP 35 SCHOL 433d 434a APPENDIX VIII XVII 447d-448d
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 291–338 225a 233a
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH XI SECT 136–137 56c 57b
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 28b 29a 37a b PART III 112a 114b 119b 121a
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK II 6a b BK III 9a 10a 10c 11a 12b d BK V 18d 19d BK VII 47c 48a BK VIII 96a BK XIX 135d 139c passim BK XXVIII 259b BK XXIX 269a c
38 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 368a b 375d 376b
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 4d 5a

CROSS REFERENCES

For The g neral theory of inst nct *see* HABIT 3-3e and for the cons deration of instinctual drives *see* DESIRE 2a 3a

The relation of pleasure and pain to the emotions *see* PLEASURE AND PAIN 4a

The conception of the emotions as forms of animal appetite or sensitive desire *see* DESIRE 3b(1) WILL 2b(2)

The analysis of the one emotion which is held to be the root of all the others *see* LOVE 2a-2a(3)

Other d scuss ons of the conflict bet een the pass ons and reason or between one emotion and another *see* DESIRE 3d 4a 6c DUTY 8 MIND 9b-9c OPPOSITION 4a-4b 4d

Other discuss ons of emotional d sorder from a psychological or medical point of view *see* DESIRE 4a-4d MEDICINE 6c(2) MIND 8b ONE AND MANY 3b(5) OPPOSITION 4c

The influence of the emotions upon ima ination or thou ht *see* DESIRE 5a-5b 6c MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 8c 8d(1) OPINION 2a TRUTH 3d(2)

The moral probl ms raised by the conflict between reason and emotion *see* DESIRE 6a-6b DUTY 4-4b LIBERTY 3a-3b MI D 9c-9d SIN 5 SLAVERY 7 TYRANNY 5d VIRTUE AND VICE 5a

The significance of the pass ons in relat on to la government and the state *see* LAW 5 6a PUNISHMENT 1c-1d STATE 3e-3f and for th problem of political censorsh p or regulation of the art because of their emot onal influence *see* ART 10b LIBERTY 2a POETRY 9b.

The consideration of emotion by the orator *see* RHETORIC 4b

Emotion in relation to artistic inspiration *or* expression *see* ART 8 POETRY 3

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Li ted below are wo ks not in luded n *Grea Books of the W estern W orld* but rele ant to the idea and top cs w th which thi chapte deals. These w rks a e di ided into two groups

I Works by a thors r presented in this collection.

II Works by authors n t rep esented i this collect on

Fo th dat plac and other f cts con ernin th publication of the wo ks cited, consult th B bliograph of Add tional Readings wh ch follow the la t chapter f *The G t Ideas*

I

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EPICTETUS *The M l*

AUGUSTINE *Of Continence*

AQ Quaestiones D *uta*, *D Veri* QQ 25 26

F BACON Of Anger *Essays*

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PASCAL *Discour ur le p s de l'am ur*

H *The Elemen f La Natural nd Po ic* 2

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II

CICERO *T scul n D ta o* I IV

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COLLINS *The Passions*

(5 *The political consideration of the passions*)

5c The coercive force of law fear of punishment

5 Aeschylus *Eumenides* [681-710] 88b c
5 Sophocles *Ajax* [1047-1090] 152a b
6 Herodotus *History* bk vii 233a d
6 Thucydides *Peloponnesian War* bk ii 396c d 400d 401a bk iii 426b 426d 427c 428d esp 427d 428a
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15 Tacitus *Annals* bk iii 57b 58d
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36 Swift *Gulliver* part i 28a b
38 Montesquieu *Spirit of Laws* bk vi 37d 38b 38d 39c bk xxv 212b c
38 Rousseau *Inequality* 345d 359d 360b / *Political Economy* 370d 373a / *Social Contract* bk ii 406c
39 Smith *Wealth of Nations* bk v 309a c
41 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 92a b
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46 Hegel *Philosophy of History* part iv 328b 329c
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52 Dostoevsky *Brothers Karamazov* bk ii 30d 31a
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Chapter 23 ETERNITY

INTRODUCTION

THE notion of eternity, like that of infinity, has two meanings. One meaning may refer to something positive, yet both seem to be formulated by the human mind in a negative way. We grasp one meaning of eternity by saying that there is *no* beginning or end to time's process. The other sense of eternity we conceive by *denying* time itself and with it change or mutability.

Considering eternity as infinite duration, Locke says that we form this notion "by the same means and from the same original that we come to have the idea of time ... viz. having got the idea of succession and duration ... we can in our thoughts add such lengths of duration to one another as often as we please, and apply them, so added, to durations past or to come. And this we can continue to do, without bounds or limits, and proceed *in infinitum*."

The unimaginability of the infinite is no different in the sphere of time than in that of space or number. The difficulty Locke points out is the same in all three cases. "The idea of *so much* is positive and clear. The idea of *greater* is also clear. But these do not yet give us the idea of the infinite. That only comes with the idea of *so much greater as cannot be comprehended*; and this is plainly negative, not positive." What lies beyond our positive idea *towards* infinity, Locke continues, "lies in obscurity, and has the indeterminate confusion of a negative idea, wherein I know I neither do nor can comprehend all I would, it being too large for a finite and narrow capacity."

In insisting that we can have no positive idea of infinity—whether of space, time, or number—Locke's point seems to be that it is beyond our finite capacity to form an image of an infinite object. But though our imaginations may be limited in this way, we do seem able to construct—in a negative manner—conceptions that go beyond experience and have some meaning even if they lack imaginative content. Locke indicates this other aspect of the matter when he criticizes those who assert dogmatically that the world is neither eternal nor infinite. It seems to him that the world's eternity or the world's infinity is at least as conceivable as the contrary.

It may not be inconsistent, therefore, to say that infinite time, while unimaginable, *remains* quite conceivable; for to say that eternity is conceivable is simply to say that endless time is neither more nor less possible than time with a beginning and an end. The first conception is as meaningful as the second. It is in fact formed from the second by negation—by substituting the word "without" for "with" with respect to a beginning and an end. But unlike our conceptions, our images cannot be formed by negation. When we imagine, as when we perceive, the object before us is positive and definite. We cannot imagine, as we cannot experience, a duration *or* a span of time without a beginning and an end.

WITH REGARD TO the other traditional meaning of eternity, Locke takes a different position. It too might be defended as a negative concept so far as human comprehension is concerned, since it involves the denial of time itself, *i.e.*, of a duration comprising a succession of moments. But here Locke says that there is "nothing more inconceivable to me than duration without succession." "If our weak apprehensions," he continues, "cannot separate succession from any duration whatsoever, our idea of eternity can be nothing but of an infinite succession of moments of duration wherein anything does exist."

Nevertheless, Locke affirms that "we can easily conceive in God infinite duration and

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Nevertheless Locke affirms that we can easily conceive in God infinite duration and

we cannot avoid doing so Whether he means by this that God s eternity involves temporal succession must be determined by an interpretation of the passage in which he maintains that God s infinite duration being accompanied with infinite knowledge and infinite power he sees all things past and to come and they are no more distant from his knowledge no farther removed from his sight than the present they all lie under the same view

If this passage means that time stands still for God in a single moment in which all things are co present then Locke may not be as resolute as Hobbes in rejecting the theologian s conception of God s eternity Criticizing the *Scholastics Hobbes says that for the meaning of Eternity* they will not have it be an endless succession of time Instead they will teach us that eternity is the standing still of the present time a *Nunc-stans* (as the Schools call it) This Hobbes thinks neither they nor anyone else understands no more than they would a *Hic-stans* for an infinite greatness of place

A theologian like Aquinas tries to avoid the difficulty which Hobbes finds in this conception by distinguishing between the *now* of eternity and the *now* of time The *now* of time is the same he writes as regards its subject in the whole course of time but it differs in aspect Furthermore the flow of the *now* as altering in aspect is time But eternity remains the same according to both subject and aspect and hence eternity is not the same as the *now* of time

The notion of the eternal as the timeless and the immutable does not belong exclusively to Christian theology In the tradition of the great books it is found for example in Plato and Plotinus Eternity according to Plotinus is a Life changelessly motionless and ever holding the Universal content in actual presence not this now and now that other but always all not existing now in one mode and now in another but a consummation without part or interval All its content is in immediate concentration as at one point nothing in it ever knows development all remains identical within itself knowing nothing of change for ever in a Now since nothing of it has passed away or will come into being but what it is now that it is ever

Eternity so conceived is perhaps even more unimaginable than the eternity which is infinite time We may feel that we have some sense of an infinite duration when we talk as Ivan does in the *Brothers Karamazov* about a billion years or a quadrillion of a quadrillion raised to the quadrillionth power Infinite time is *like* that *only longer* But because all our experience is temporal through and through it is more difficult to get any sense of that which is both absolutely timeless and endlessly enduring

Poets and sometimes philosophers turned poets have struggled to give this concept imaginative content by contrasting the white radiance of eternity with a many colored glass or by speaking of time itself as the moving image of eternity When Dimmler in *War and Peace* tells Natasha that it is hard for us to imagine eternity she replies that it does not seem hard to her—that eternity is now today and it will be tomorrow and always and was there yesterday and the day before

These and similar attempts may not succeed as much as the insight that if we could hold the present moment still or fix the fleeting instant we could draw an experience of the eternal from the heart of time The *now* that stands still Aquinas writes is said to make eternity according to our apprehension For just as the apprehension of time is caused in us by the fact that we apprehend the flow of the *now* so the apprehension of eternity is caused in us by our apprehending the *now* standing still

To UNDERSTAND the opposed views that constitute the major issues with regard to eternity it is necessary to hold quite separate the two meanings of the word which have run side by side in the tradition of western thought The first of these two senses signifying interminable time is the meaning of eternity which has greatest currency in popular speech This is the meaning which appears in the chapters on INFINITY and TIME It is also the sense in which philosophers and theologians debate the problem of the eternity of the world—whether the world ever began or will ever end

Since that which exists interminably is imperishable the word eternal is also applied to substances which are thought to be ever

lasting Thus Ptolemy and the ancients gen erallv think of the heavenly bodies as beings which are sensible and both moving and moved but eternal and impassible Aristotle calls the heavenly bod es eternal and incorrupt ble For Lucretius and the atomists the atoms and the atoms alone are eternal They are he says everlastin thou h all things else are dis sol ed Unless they were eternal all things before this would have utterl returned to nothing If the atomic particles were to wear away or break in pieces Newton argues the nature of things depending on them would be changed And therefore that nature may be lasting the changes of corporeal things are to be placed only in the various separations and new associations and motions of these perma *nent particles*

The hea enly bodies and the atom may be th ught e erlastir g but they are not immu table in all respects for local motion is of their very essence Imperishable in existence they are also endlessly in motion In Aristotle s view *local* motion can be perpetual or eternal *only* if t is circular Circular motion alone has neither beg nn ng nor end

The eternal circular motion of the heavens, acco ding to Aristotle in turn communicates an eternal cyclical movement to the rest of reality Since the sun revolves thus, the sea sons in consequence come-to-be in a cycle nd nce they come to-be cyclically so in their turn do the things whose coming to-be the seasons in tiate Such an eternal return it would seem, is also appl ed by Aristotle to hu*man things* for h writes that probably each a t and ea h sc enc ha often been developed as far as possible and has again perisl ed

SINCE THE HE ENS and tl e atoms are in mo- ti n e en though the r m t on is *everlasting* or t nal, they cannot be eternal in the second mea ng of eter ty wh ch is the *very oppo-* s te of the first not a ariation or extens on *of* it In this meaning the eternal is an ex stence bsolutely immutable—*a be ng wh ch* neither comes to be nor passes away *nor chan es* nor mo es in any respect whatsoever Aquinas uses the word n this sense when he says that the nature of etern ty con sts in the uniform ty of what is absolutely outsi*de* of movement

He also includes in this meaning of eter nity the notion of interminability for he writes as whatever is wholly immutable can have no succession so it has no beginning and no end Yet Aquinas preserves the sharp dis tinction between the two meanings when he differentiates the sense in which the world mi ht be called eternal and the sense in which he would attribute eternity to God alone Even supposing that the world always was it would not be equal to God in eternity he writes for the divine bein is all being simul taneously without succession but with the world it is otherwise

The conception of eternity as absolutely im mutable existence is found in the ancient pagan writers. Plotinus as we have already seen makes immutability the mark of eternity The un moved prime mover of Aristotle and the Pla tonic Ideas or Forms also possess this charac teristic. But it is the Jewish and Christian theologians who make eternity in this sense one of the *prime attributes of God*

Augustine for example invokes God as that everfixed Eternity in whom nothing passeth but the whole is present Since time is for him inconceivable apart *from change* or *motion* that which exists immutably does not *exist in* time Referring to God s *et rnity* he says Compare *it with* the times which are *ne er fixed* and see that it cannot be com pared Thy years *neither* come nor go whereas ours both come and go that they all may come Thy years are one day and Thy day is not daily but To-day Thy To-day is Eternity

Time an I eternity are here conceived as two distinct orders of reality *The temporal order is the ord r* of things in change or motion the *eternal* the realm of the fixed or *permanent* the immobile and immutable As eternity is *the* proper measure of being Aquinas writes so time is the proper measure of movement

The eternal and the temporal are similarly distinguished by *Pla o in terms of the realms* of being and becoming— the world of immu table being and the world of generation In the one we find the parts of time and the past and the future which do not apply to the other We unconsciously but wrongly transfer them Plato declares to the eternal essence

but the truth is that is alone is properly attributed to it and was and will be are only to be spoken of becoming in time for they are motions but that which is immovably the same cannot become older or younger by time nor is it subject at all to any of those states which affect moving and sensible things of which generation is the cause

For Spinoza the distinction consists in two ways of viewing the order of nature Things are conceived by us as actual in two ways he writes either in so far as we conceive them to exist with relation to a fixed time and place or in so far as we conceive them to be contained in God and to follow from the necessity of the divine nature Only in the second way do we conceive things under the form of eternity We can view things under the aspect of eternity only insofar as we know God and through knowing God are able to know all things according as their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God

The separation of time and eternity into distinct spheres of reality or even into distinct ways of conceiving the whole of being is challenged by thinkers who find the eternal within the process of time For both Jew and Christian the eternal God intervenes directly in the temporal order The most radical form which this fusion takes is perhaps exemplified in the doctrine of the Incarnation of Christ when the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us

Whitehead challenges the sharpness of the separation from another point of view He not only makes eternal objects ingredients in actual occasions or temporal events but since the events which constitute the process of change are themselves unchangeable they are for him eternal—even though they have their being within the sphere of change

A similar point seems to be made in Aristotle s theory of change When change is conceived as consisting in a transformation of matter it is the thing composed of matter and form which changes and neither the matter nor the form Matter *as* matter Aristotle writes does not cease to be in its own nature but is necessarily outside the sphere of becoming and ceasing to be The remark would seem to hold true as well of the form *as* form

As indicated in the chapter on CHANGE the Aristotelian analysis of motion finds in matter or the substratum of change and in the contrary forms *from which* and *to which* a motion takes place the elements of permanence underlying change When a green leaf turns red for instance green has not changed into red the leaf has changed from one color to another The changing leaf is not eternal but *red* and *green* are since they are incapable of change This is the sense of eternity in which the unchanging instant is eternal or the past is eternal even though both are somehow elements or aspects of time and the process of change

The past may be eternal but it no longer exists The passing moment may be eternal but it has no duration Lack of existence and lack of duration together distinguish that meaning of eternal in which it merely signifies the unchanging from the meaning in which it signifies that which exists or endures forever without changing It is only in the second of these two meanings that the eternal can be conceived as that which exists entirely outside the realm of time

AS WE HAVE ALREADY observed the basic philosophical and theological issues concerning eternity cannot be intelligibly stated unless these meanings of eternity and the eternal are kept distinct

The traditional problem of the eternity of the world asks for example not whether the order of nature is free from change or succession but whether the changing physical universe ever had a beginning or ever will end As indicated in the chapters on CHANGE TIME and WORLD it is a question of the infinity of time or in another formulation a question of the interminability of change or motion

Aristotle appears to answer these questions affirmatively especially in the last book of his *Physics* where he claims to demonstrate the impossibility of there having been a beginning to motion Aquinas on the other hand does not think that the eternity of the world can be demonstrated and of Aristotle s arguments he says that they are not absolutely demonstrative but only relatively so—that as against the arguments of some of the ancients who asserted that the world began to be in some actually

impossible ways." In support of this contention, he cites a remark made by Aristotle in the *Topics* that among dialectical problems which we cannot solve demonstratively " one is "*whether the world is eternal*."

For Kant the problem is typically dialectical. It occurs as part of the first antinomy in the Transcendental Dialectic the thesis of which asserts that "the world has a beginning in time" and the antithesis that "the world has no beginning, but is infinite in respect both to time and space" The fact that *apparently* cogent arguments can be marshalled for both of these contradictory propositions shows, in Kant's opinion that the reasoning on either side is not demonstrative, but only dialectical and as he says, "illusory "

The Jewish and Christian doctrine of the world's creation by God might seem to require the denial of the world's eternity But in fact the theologians find either alternative compatible with divine creation, which they conceive as the cause of the world's *being* not necessarily of its *beginning* Augustine for example examines the sense in which the world is held by some to be co-eternal with God even though made or created by God. "It is as if a foot, he interprets them to say had been always from eternity in the dust there would always have been a print underneath it and yet no one would doubt that this print was made by the pressure of the foot nor that, though the one was made by the other neither was prior to the other So, he goes on, it might also be said that the world has always existed and yet is always, throughout eternity created, *i.e. caused to exist* by God.

Commenting on this passage Aquinas adds the observation that if an action is instantaneous and not successive it is not necessary for the maker to be prior in duration to the thing made Hence it does not follow necessarily he writes, that if God is the active cause of the world He must be prior to the world in duration because creation, by which He produced the world, is not a successive change" —but an instantaneous act

Writing both as a philosopher and as a theologian, Maimonides—many centuries before Kant stated his antinomy —thinks he is able to show that the question of infinite time and endless motion cannot be decided by proof, neither in the affirmative nor in the negative Just as for Augustine and Aquinas, so for him it is indifferent—from a *philosophical* point of view—whether the created world and its Creator are co-eternal or whether as Genesis says, "in the beginning God created heaven and earth."

But both alternatives are not equally acceptable to the theologian. Since there is no proof on either side "sufficient to convince us, Maimonides writes, "we take the text of the Bible literally and say that it teaches us a truth which we cannot prove"—namely that the world had a beginning in time. Aquinas comes to the same conclusion. "That the world did not always exist" he writes, we hold by faith alone. It is not "an object of demonstration or science." For Christian and Jew alike the religious dogma that the world is not only created by God in the sense of depending for its existence upon God as cause but was also initiated by God or caused to begin to exist and move is based on the revealed word of God in Holy Writ.

Those who, on philosophical grounds, deny creation *ex nihilo* also deny the world's beginning Pursuant to his theory of the world as a necessary and perpetual emanation from the One, Plotinus, for example, declares that the Kosmos has had no beginning and this is warrant for its continued existence Why should there be in the future a change that has not yet occurred?" For Spinoza likewise "all things which follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must for ever exist and to this extent at least the world is eternal and uncreated

The man of faith, however believes in a God who is free to create or not to create, not one *from* whom the world emanates as a necessary effect *from* its source When, therefore he affirms that God freely chose to produce the world out of nothing he seems to meet the question, "What was God doing before He made heaven and earth?" To the questioner Augustine does not wish to give "the jesting answer—said to have been given by one who sought to evade the force of the question—'He was getting Hell ready for people who pry too deep '"

Instead he points out that the question itself

is illicit for it assumes a time before time began If before heaven and earth were made he writes there was no time then what is meant by the question What were You doing *then?* If there was not any time there was not any then' In the phrase before creation the word before has no temporal significance It signifies a different kind of priority—the sense in which eternity precedes time the sense in which Augustine says of God that it is not in time that You are before all time You are before all the past by the eminence of Your ever present eternity

TURNING FROM eternity in the sense of infinite time to the eternal in the sense of the timeless and unchanging the great question is whether anything eternal exists The atoms of Lucretius are not eternal in this sense nor are the supposedly imperishable heavenly bodies Nor is it sufficient to point out that change itself involves aspects or elements of permanence for the question *strictly interpreted asks whether* anything exists in and of itself which having no beginning or end also has no past present or future—no temporal phases in its continued endurance Only such a thing would be utterly non temporal or changeless

Since nothing made of matter is exempt from motion it is generally supposed that no material thing is eternal in this sense Not even God is eternal unless God is absolutely immutable as well as spiritual The angels are spiritual beings yet according to Christian theology they cannot be called eternal because in the first place they are creatures and had an origin and in the second place they are subject to spiritual *change even if they are not* involved in the sorts of motion to which bodies are susceptible The theologians therefore use the word aeviternal to signify the mode of angelic existence in that it is a mean between eternity and time Aeviternity Aquinas explains has a beginning but no end while eternity has neither beginning nor end and time both beginning and end

THE QUESTION ABOUT the eternal as timeless and immutable existence has two parts Does an immutable God exist? Does anything else exist which is immutable?

To the first question it does not suffice to reply by affirming the existence of God Some modern theologians deny God s absolute immutability and so deny the eternality of His being in the precise sense under consideration

With regard to the second question we must observe that in the tradition of the great books eternality has been claimed for two things other than God namely for truth and ideas Whatever is produced by reasoning aright Hobbes says is general eternal and immutable truth On somewhat different grounds James declares there is no denying the fact that the mind is filled with necessary and eternal relations which it finds between certain of its ideal conceptions and which form a determinate system independent of the order of frequency in which experience may have associated the conception s originals in time and space He quotes Locke to the effect that truths belonging to the essences of things are eternal and are to be found out only by the *contemplation of those essences*

The common phrase— the eternal verities —which James uses testifies to the prevalence of the notion that truth itself cannot change and that when men speak of a new truth or the growth of truth the change they refer to is only a change of mind with respect to what men think is true or false not a change in the truth itself Whatever is true now always was true and always will be Time and change make no difference to the truth of *two plus two equals four*

But even so it can still be asked how the truth exists for the attribution of eternity to anything also requires us to consider its mode *of being If for example the truth exists only* in the mind then it exists unchangingly only in the mind of an absolutely infallible knower a mind which neither learns nor forgets nor changes in any respect with regard to what it knows If God is such a knower eternal truth can have existence in God s mind

The theologians sometimes go further and identify absolute truth as they identify absolute goodness with God Aquinas writes for example that if we speak of truth as it is in things then all things are true by one primary truth to which each one is assimilated according to its entity and thus although the es

sences or forms of things are many yet the truth of the divine intellect is one in conformity to which all things are said to be true. On this view it would appear that there are not two eternal beings but only one.

William James finds immutability not only in the truth but also in the concepts of the human mind. "Each conception," he writes, "eternally remains what it is, and never can become another. The mind may change its states and its meanings at different times; may drop one conception and take up another; but the dropped conception can in no intelligible sense be said to *change into* its successor." Thus amid the flux of opinions and of physical things, the world of conceptions, or things intended to be thought about, stands stiff and immutable like Plato's Realm of Ideas.

In the case of ideas, however, the problem is complicated by the question whether ideas exist in and by themselves outside the mind of God or man. If, according to a doctrine attributed to Plato and the Platonists, the Ideas or Forms exist separately, then they constitute a realm of eternal beings, for their immutability is unquestionable. If, from an opposite point of view, the realm of unchanging ideas is identical with the divine intellect, then no eternal being or beings exist apart from God.

THE PROPOSITION that God is the only eternal being, the only uncreated and immutable existence, is inextricably connected with the proposition that God is the only actually infinite being—the *ens realissimum* having all perfection. "Eternity is the very essence of God," Spinoza writes, "in so far as that essence involves necessary existence." In saying this he appeals to his definition of eternity, by which "we are to understand existence itself, so far as it is conceived necessarily to follow from the definition alone of the eternal thing." For Spinoza, as well as for Aquinas, the same fact which makes God eternal—namely, the identity of his essence and existence—also constitutes his infinity and uniqueness. It is impossible, Spinoza argues, for there to be two infinite substances. For the same reason, there cannot be two eternal beings.

As indicated in the chapter on INFINITY, when the word "infinite" is applied to God, the theologians give it a positive rather than a negative significance. They mean by it the actual infinity of perfect being and absolute power, in sharp distinction from the potential infinity by which the mathematicians signify the *lack* of a limit in addition or division.

These two meanings of "infinity" seem to parallel the two meanings of "eternity" which we have dealt with throughout this chapter—one, the negative sense in which it means the *lack* of a beginning or an end to time; the other, the positive sense in which God's eternity consists in that fullness of being which can exist apart from time and change. Because our intellects are finite, we may apprehend eternal being in a negative manner by calling it "timeless," or by conceiving it as infinite duration; but Spinoza cautions us against supposing that it can be "explained by duration or time, even if the duration be conceived without beginning or end."

One other theological discussion raises issues which involve in a unique way the two meanings of eternity. It deals with the revealed doctrine of perdition and salvation as eternal death and eternal life. Is the eternality of Hell and Heaven equivalent to a period of *endless* duration, or does it mean—more fundamentally—the *unchanging state of souls* after the Last Judgment?

According to Augustine and Aquinas, the eternity of Heaven and Hell means the moral immutability of the immortal soul as well as the interminability of the beatitude it enjoys or the punishment it suffers. Only in Purgatory does a change of moral state occur, but the process of purification which takes place there is always limited in period. Purgatory is therefore not eternal in either sense.

As Kant sees it, however, the after life must not only be interminable or of infinite duration, but it must also permit a progressive moral development without end. Man is justified, according to Kant, "in hoping for an endless duration of his existence" only on the ground that "the holiness which the Christian law requires ... leaves the creature nothing but a progress *in infinitum*." From still another point of view, Dr. Johnson questions the traditional Christian dogma that the souls of the blessed are secure in a perpetual state of rectitude—in this respect

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like the good angels who are confirmed in their goodness from the first instant of creation

Boswell had ventured to ask him whether, although the words of some texts of Scripture seemed strong in support of the dreadful doctrine of an eternity of punishment we might not hope that the denunciation was figurative and would not be literally executed To this Dr Johnson replied Sir you are to consider the intention of punishment in a future state We have no reason to be sure that we shall then be no longer able to offend against God We do not know that even the angels are quite in a state of security It may therefore perhaps be necessary in order to preserve both men and angels in a state of rectitude that they should have continually before them the punishment of those who have deviated from it

On Dr Johnson s theory the moral condition of the damned seems to be immutable It is irremediable even by the punishments which according to him may exercise some deterrent effect upon the blessed who he seems to think are not as unalterably set in the path of righteousness as the wicked are in their iniquity

On any of these conceptions of Heaven and Hell and of the state of the soul in the after life the meaning of eternity is somewhat altered for eternal life or eternal death is conceived as having a beginning if not an end for the individual soul As in the case of all fundamental religious dogmas the truth asserted remains obscure and mysterious It is not only beyond imagination but also beyond any adequate rational conception analysis or demonstration

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

REFERENCES

To find the passa es cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example in **4** HOMER *Iliad* BK II [265 283] **12d**, the number **4** is the number of the volume in the set the number **12d** indicates that the pas sa is in secti n d of pa e 12

P CE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters **a** and **b** refer to the upper and lo er hal es of the page For ex mple in **53** JAMES *Psych log*) **116a 119b** the passage beg ns in the upper half of page 116 and nds in the lower half of page 119 When the text is pr nted in two columns, the letters **a** and **b** refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hands de f the page the letters **c** and **d** to the upp r and lower hal es of the right hand side of the pag For xample in **7** PLATO *Sympost m* **163b-164c** the passage beg ns in the lower half f the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of pa e 164

AUTH R S DIVIS ONS One or more f the main divis ons of a work (such as P RT BK CH S CT) are somet mes inclu led in th reference l ne numbers, in brackets, are given in cer tain cases e g *Iliad* BK II [265 283] **12d**.

BIBLE REFER NC S The refe ences are to book chapter and verse, When the Kin James and Douay vers ons differ in t tl of books or in the number ng of chapters or ve ses, the King J mes vers on is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (*D*) follows e g OLD TESTA MENT *Nehem ah* 7 45—(*D*) *II Esdras* 7 46

SYM OLS The abbr viat on esp calls the reader s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a wh l reference pass m signifies that the topic is discu sed intermit tently rath r th n cont n ou ly in the o k or passage cited

For additional nf rmat o c ncern ng the style of the references, see the Explanation of R fe ence Style for g ne al guid nce in the use of *The G eat Ideas* consult the Preface

1 Ete n ty s timelessne s and immutab l ty or as ndless and nfin te time the dist nc t on between ete nity a d time

APOC Y HA *Eccle ast cus* 18 10—(*D*) OT *Ec l n t c* 18 8

7 PLATO *T maeu* **450b-451d**

8 ARI TOTLE *I terpretati n* 1 13 [23 18-26] **35b-c** / *Physics* BK I CH I [221 19]-CH 3 [2 2 9] **301 302c** BK VI H 2 [233 13 b 6] **315 -c** H 7 [237 23 238 19] **321 c** CH 10 [24 1 2] **325d** K V II CH 1 2 **334a 337b** H 6 **344b-346b** H 8 **348b 352** / *Hea ens* 1 **372d 375d** esp [28 b22 283a2] **373d 374c**, [283b7 2] **375 d** BK I CH 3 [86 8 13] **377c** / *Generati and Corrupti on* K I 1 9 [335 33 b] **436d-437a** / *Meta phy* K H 5 [01 b9- 6] **536a** BK IX 8 [1 50 6 20] **576b-c** BK XI C 1 10 [106 33 38] **596** K XI H 6 [07 2 11] **601b** 7 [1 72 8 3] **602 b** [73 3 1] **603 b** K V H 2 [1 88b14 8] **620d 621**

12 A LI *M ditat s* BK VI S CT 15 **275 b**

17 PLOTI U F st *Ennead* TR V CH 7 **20a-c** / *Th d En ad* R V I **119b 129a** / *Fourth D ne d* 6-8 **161b 162d** H 15 6 **165 166b**

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessi ns* BK VII par 21 **49d 50a** K XI **89b 99b** esp par 8 17 **91b 93c** par 39-41 **98c 99b** BK XII par 13 0 **102a 103d** par 40 **109b 110a** BK XIII par 44 **122d** / *City of God* BK XI CH 5-6 **324d 325d** CH 21 **333 d** BK XII CH 12 9 **349b 355a**

19 AQUIN S *Summa Theologica* P RT I Q 10 A 1-5 **40d-45c** esp A 4 **43b 44b** Q 14 A 9 A 5 **83b-d** A 13 4 5 and REP 3 **86d 88c** Q 42 A 2 RE 2 4 **225d 227a** Q 46 A 2 REP 5 **253a 255a** Q 79 A 8 REP 2 **421c-422b**

21 DA TE *D vine Com dy* PURG TORY XI [106-1 8] **69d** PARADISE XXIX [10-45] **150b-c**

23 HO BE *Lei ath* PART IV **271b**

25 M NTAIGNE *Essays* **292d 294a**

29 CE V NTE *Don Qu xote* PART II **366d 367a**

30 BACO *Novum Organum* BK I APH 48 **110d**

31 DE C RTES *Objections a d Repl es* **216d 217c**

31 S NOZA *Ethics* PART I DEF 8 **355c** PR P 20 CO L 2 **364a** P RT II PRO 44 COROL 2 and D O T **390a** PART V PROP 23 **458b d** PR 29 DEM ON T **459c** PROP 34 SCHOL **460d**

32 M TON *On Time* **12a b** / *Par dise Lost* BK XI [553-556] **331a**

33 P AL *Pen é s* 121 **195a 205** 6 **211a**

35 LOCKE *H m n U dersi ding* BK II CH X V S CT 26-27 **160c 161a** S CT 30-31 **161c 162a** CH XV SECT 3-8 **162d 164b** S CT 11 1 **165a-c**

(1 *Eternity as timelessness and immutability or as endless and infinite time the distinction between eternity and time*)

CH XVII 167d 174a passim esp SECT 5 168d 169a SECT 10 170b-c SECT 16 172a b CH XXIX SECT 15 237a
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 26d 130b 133c 135a 137a c 152c 160b 161d 185a b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 206c
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XII 295b-c EPILOGUE II 681a

1a The priority of eternity to time

7 PLATO *Timaeus* 450c-451a
8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK IX CH 8 [1050b 2-28] 576b d
17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR VII CH I 119b c CH 6 122c d CH II 126a CH 13 128c / *Fourth Ennead* TR IV CH 15-16 165c 166b
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XII par 21 49d 50a BK XI par 12-16 92b 93a BK XII par 40 109b 110a / *City of God* BK XI CH 4-6 324a 325d BK XII CH 12 349b 350a CH 15-17 351b 354a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 22 A I REP 2 127d 128d Q 46 250a 255d Q 61 A 2 315c 316a
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE XXIX [10-45] 150b c
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK V [577-599] 187b-188a BK VII [70-108] 218b 219b
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 135a 137a c 160b 161d esp 161d

1b Aeviternity as intermediate between eternity and time

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XII par 9 101b c par 12-15 101d 102c par 18-22 103b 104a / *City of God* BK XII CH 15 351b-352d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 10 A 2 REP 1-2 41d-42c A 3 ANS 42c-43b A 4 5-6 44b 46d

2 The issue concerning the infinity of time and the eternity of the world or of motion

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 1 1 2 / *Nehemiah* 9 6 —(D) *II Esdras* 9 6 / *Job* 38 1-13 / *Psalms* 90.2 93 4-5 102 25-26 104 5-6 119 90-91 136 5-9 148 1-6—(D) *Psalms* 89.2 94 4-5 101.26-7 103 5-6 118 90-91 135 5-9 148 1-6 / *Proverbs* 3 19 8.22-29 / *Isaiah* 45 12 18 48 13 65 17 25—(D) *Isaias* 45 12 18 48 13 65 17-25 / *Jeremiah* 51 15—(D) *Jeremias* 51 15
APOCRYPHA *Wisdom of Solomon* 7 17-18—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 7 17-18 / *Ecclesiasticus* 23 19-20 24 9—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 23.28 29 24 14 / *II Maccabees* 7.23—(D) OT *II Machabees* 7 23
NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 13.24-30 36-43 49-50 24 3-35 / *Mark* 13 3-33 / *Luke* 21 5-33 / *John* 1 1-3 / *Colossians* 1 16-17 / *Hebrews* 1 10-12 / *II Peter* 3 3 13 / *Revelation* 10 5-6—(D) *Apocalypse* 10 5-6
7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 124b-c / *Timaeus* 447b-c 450b-451a
8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK I CH II [104b13 18] 148a b / *Physics* BK IV CH 13 [222 9-b8] 302b BK VIII CH I 2 334a 337b CH 6 344b-346b CH 8 348b 352a / *Heavens* BK I CH 2 [269b2-10] 360c d CH 3 [270b1-26] 361c 362a CH 9 [279a 12]-CH 12 [283b22] 370b-375d / *Generation and Corruption* BK II CH 10-11 437d-441a c / *Meteorology* BK I CH 14 [352a 16-353a27] 458b 459a c BK II CH 3 [356b2 357a4] 462b c / *Metaphysics* BK IX CH 8 [1050b20-28] 576c d BK XI CH 6 [1063 13 16] 591b CH 10 [1067a33-38] 596a BK XII CH 6-8 601b 605a esp CH 7 [1072 19-b14] 602b-d [1073 5-11] 603b
9 ARISTOTLE *Motion of Animals* CH 4 [699b14 700a6] 234d 235a CH 6 [700b9-701a7] 236a b
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [146-264] 2d-4b [483-634] 7a 8d [951-1051] 12d 14a BK II [89-141] 16a d [294-307] 18d 19a [569-580] 22b [1048-1063] 28b-c [1105 1174] 29a 30a c BK V [1-431] 61a 66d esp [55 70] 61d 62a [235 246] 64a b [351-379] 65c 66a BK VI [535-607] 87c 88b
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK V SECT 13 271b BK VI SECT 15 275a b BK IX SECT 28 293d 294a
16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 847b 848b
17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR I 35a 39d esp CH I 5 35a 37c
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XI 89b 99b esp par 12-17 92b 93b par 40 98d 99a / *City of God* BK XI CH 4-6 324a 325d BK XII CH 10-20 348b 357a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 14 A 12 ANS 85d 86d Q 46 250a 255d esp A 1 250a 252d Q 61 A 2 315c 316a Q 66 A 4 348d 349d Q 75 A I REP I 378b 379c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL Q 91 A 2 1017c 1020c
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 50a PART II 162b
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK I APH 48 110d
31 DESCARTES *Rules* XIII 27b-c / *Objections and Replies* 228a b
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I [6-10] 93b BK II [850-1009] 129b 133a esp [890-969] 130b 132a BK V [577-599] 187b 188a BK VII [70-108] 218b 219b
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 121 195a
34 NEWTON *Optics* BK III 540a 541b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XIV SECT 26 160c d
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 20a 26d 130b 133c esp 130b 131c 132d 133a 135a 137a c 152a d 160b 161d 239b c / *Practical Reason* 334b-335c esp 335a b
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE II 693c 694a passim

3 The eternity of God

OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 15 18 / *Deuteronomy* 32:39-40 / *Psalms* 9 5-8 9 10-11 33 10-11 48 esp 48:8 48 14 90 esp 90 1-6 93 1 2:12 25 1 3:24 8 136 145 10-13 146:5 10—(D) *Psalms* 9:6-9 5 10 32:10-11 47 esp 4 79 4 75 89 esp 89 1-6 92 101:13 20 102:24 25 35 144:10-13 145:5-10 / *Isaiah* 40:28-9 43 10- 3 57 15—(D) *Isaias* 40:28-9 43 10- 3 57:15 / *Jeremiah* 10:10—(D) *Jeremias* 10 10 / *Lamentations* 5:19 / *Daniel*, 6:26 —/ *Malachi*, 3:6—(D) *Malachias* 3:6

APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 39:20 42:21—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 39:20 42:21 —

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 24:35 / *Colossians* 1:16-17 / *I Timothy* 1:17 / *Hebrews* 1 10-12 13-8 / *Revelation* 1:17-18 10:6—(D) *Apoc* above 1:17-18 10 6

5 SOPHOCLES *Oedipus at Colonus* [607-615] 120a

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK VIII CH 6 [258b10-259b3] 344b-345d / *Heavens* BK II CH 3 [286a3 3] 377 / *Metaphysics* BK CH 5 [1015b9- 6] 536a BK IX CH 8 [1050b6 0] 576b-c BK XII, CH [1069a30-b2] 598b-c 6- 601b-603b CH 9 605a-d esp [1075a5] 605c-d BK XIV CH 2 [1088b14 28] 620d 621 *Soul*, BK II CH 4 [415a22-b8] 645c-d

16 KEPLER *Harmonies of the World* 1071b

17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR VII CH 5 121c 122a / *Sixth Ennead*, TR VIII, CH 1 348b-c

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK 1 par 4 43b-4-c par 6 44d-45a par 16-18 48c-49b par 1 49d 50a par 23 24 50b-51a BK XI par 2 6 91b-93a BK XII par 101c-d par 103a-c par 4 109b-110a BK XIII par 44 122d *City of God* BK XI CH 2 333a-d BK XI CH 14 17 350d 354a / *Christian Doctrine* BK I, 5-6 624d-625b CH 22 629b-630a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART 1 Q 10 40d-46d Q 4, 9 A 5 83b-d A 3 AN and RE 3 86d-88c Q 18 A 3 106b-10 c Q 22, REP 2 127d 128d Q 4 2 22d 2 Q 43 2 230d 231c Q 61 2, ANS 315c 316a

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE, [64 —] 115d XIII [5 -60] 126a XXIX [130-14] 144 XXIX [0-45] 150b-c XXXIII 156b-1 7d esp [24 4] 1 7 d

22 CHAUCER *Knight's Tale* [3004] 209a 210a

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 293d 294a

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 52b-c *Meditations* 1 84 -87a esp 86a 9a 93a esp 93a *Objections and Replies* 228a b

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART EF 355a D F 3,6 355b DE 8 355c o 6-8 356b-35 d PROP 0-1 358a 359b ROP 9- 3 3c 35a ROP 33 SCHOL 2, 367d 3 8, PAR II ROP 44, CO PRO 4 390a 391

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* II [2] 135b 3 143b

34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III GENERAL SCHOL, 370a 371a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XV SECT 3 4 162d 163b CH XVII SECT 16-17 172a-c SECT 20 172d 173c BK IV CH X 349c 354c passim, esp SECT 3-5 349d 350b SECT 8-11 351a 352a

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 81b-c

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 175d 176c 190c 201b-c / *Practical Reason* 334b-335c 344b-c / *Judgement* 592a-c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO, 156d 15 b 206c

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XV 631a-c

4 The things which partake of eternity

4a. The imperishability of angels spiritual substances, souls

7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 124b-c / *Meno* 179d 183a esp 180a / *Phaedo* 223c 246c esp 226c 228b, 230c 232c, 245d 246c / *Republic* BK X 434d 436a / *Timaeus* 452c-d

8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation*, CH 13 [23a18] 35b-c / *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 3 [1070a24] 599c CH 8 603b-605a / *Soul*, BK II, CH 2 [413b24 9] 643d-644a BK III CH 5 [430a] 662d

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [417-869] 35c-41a

16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 890b-891a

17 PLOTINUS *Fourth Ennead* TR IV CH 6 161b c TR VII 191 200c esp CH 8 195d 196a, CH 9 15 198b-200c

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XII, par 9 101b-c par 12 101d 102a par 15 16 102b-103a par 18-22, 103b-104a par 3 10 c / *City of God* BK X, CH 31 319b-d BK XI CH 15 351b-352d BK XI CH 1 360a-b CH 16-1 367a 368d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 1 A , REP 2 41d-42c A 3, ANS and REP 1 42c-43b AA 5-6 44b-46d Q 50 A 5 2 4b-2 a Q 61 A 2 315c 316a Q 5, A 6 383c 384c Q 104, A 1 ANS and REP 1 3 534c 536c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE, VII [64-5] 115d 116a [1 1 145] 116b-c XI 1 [5- 72] 126a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan*, ART III, 192c 193c PART IV 250c 251b 253b-254a

31 DESCARTES *Meditations* 73b-c / *Objections and Replies* 127c-d 216d 217a 228b

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 11 3 7b-c PART V PROP 23 458b-d PROP 25 458d-4 9a PROP 9-33 459b-460c PROP 38-40 461d 462d

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I [116-159] 96a 97a BK II [31 105] 113a b BK V [859-89] 194b BK VI [296-353] 202b-204a [430-436] 207b [573-835] 215a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 194 195, 206b-210b

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 141 441a b

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 186a b

(4 The things which partake of eternity 4a. The imperishability of angels, spiritual substances, souls)

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 121a 128b esp 124d 126c 203d 204c / *Practical Reason* 348d
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK V 216d 218b BK VII 295b c BK XIV 608a b

4b The imperishable in the physical order matter atoms celestial bodies

7 PLATO *Timaeus* 450c-451a 457a b
8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK II CH 1 [193 9-28] 269b-c / *Heavens* BK I CH 3 360d 362a BK I CH 9 [279 12] BK II CH 1 [284b6] 370b 376a BK II CH 6 379c 380c BK III CH 6 396a c / *Generation and Corruption* BK II CH 10 11 437d-441a c esp CH 10 [336b25-34] 438d / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 3 [983b7-984 17] 501d 502b BK III CH 2 [997a34-b12] 516a b CH 4 [999b1-16] 518b c [1000 5 1001 3] 518d 519d BK IX CH 8 [1050b16-28] 576c d BK XI CH 2 [1060 3-36] 588a c CH 6 [1063 10-16] 591b BK XII CH 3 599a d CH 6-8 601b 605a / *Soul* BK II CH 4 [415 23-b8] 645c d
9 ARISTOTLE *Motion of Animals* CH 4 [699b14-700 6] 234d 235a
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [146 264] 2d-4b [483-634] 7a 8d BK II [294-307] 18d 19a BK V [110-145] 62c 63a
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK III CH 13 188d 189a
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK II SECT 3 257a b BK IV SECT 46 267c BK VI SECT 15 275a b BK VII SECT 18 281a SECT 23 281b SECT 25 281c SECT 50 283a BK X SECT 7 297b c
16 PTOLEMY *Almagest* BK I 5a 6a BK XIII 429a b
16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 888b 889b 929b 930b
17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR I 35a 39d / *Fourth Ennead* TR IV CH 7-8 161d 162d
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XII par 8-9 101a-c par 14 16 102b 103a par 22 104a b par 28 105c par 40 109b 110a / *City of God* BK XIII CH 17 367d 368b
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 10 A 2 REP 2 41d 42c A 3 ANS 42c 43b A 4 ANS 43b 44b A 5 ANS 44b 45c Q 46 A 1 REP 2 3 250a 252d Q 58 A 3 ANS 301d 302d Q 63 A 1 REP 2 325c 326c Q 65 A 1 REP 1 339b 340b Q 66 A 2 345d 347b Q 75 A 6 ANS 383c 384c Q 84 A 1 REP 3 440d-442a Q 104 A 1 REP 1 3 534c 536c Q 113 A 1 ANS 576a d Q 115 A 3 ANS 588c 589c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL Q 77 A 2 ANS and REP 1 945a 946b Q 91 1016a 1025b
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE I [64-81] 106d 107a
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 390b d
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 48 186b d
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 15 SCHOL 360b-361d
33 PASCAL *Vacuum* 358a
34 NEWTON *Optics* BK III 541b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH X SECT 10 19 351b 354c passim
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 346d
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 226b
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 18d 19a 74b- 6c
45 LAVOISIER *Elements of Chemistry* PART I 41b c

4c The immutability of truth and ideas

OLD TESTAMENT *Psalms* 100 5 117 2 119 160 146 5-6—(D) *Psalms* 99 5 116 2 118 160 145 5-6 / *Proverbs* 8 22-30
APOCRYPHA *Wisdom of Solomon* 24 6—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 7:24 6 / *Ecclesiasticus* 24 9—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 24 14
NEW TESTAMENT *II John* 1 2
7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 125a b / *Symposium* 167b d / *Meno* 184d / *Phaedo* 231b 232b / *Timaeus* 447b d 457b 458b
8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 8 104a b / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 6 [987a 9-b18] 505b d BK II CH 1 [993b19 31] 512a b BK III CH 2 [997a34 b12] 516a b BK IX CH 10 [1051b33 1052a12] 578a c
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 6 [1096 9 35] 341c d BK VI CH 3 [1139b18 4] 388b c
11 NICOMACHUS *Arithmetic* BK I 811a 812a 813d 814a
17 PLOTINUS *Fifth Ennead* TR IX CH 5-8 2 8a 250a
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 9 3a / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 8 10 626c 627b BK II CH 38 39 654b d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 10, A 3 REP 3 42c-43b Q 14 A 13 ANS and REP 3 86d 88c A 15 89b 90b Q 16 AA 7 8 99a 100d Q 18 A 4 107d 108c Q 22 A 1 REP 2 12 d 128d Q 44 A 3 240b 241a Q 84 A 1 REP 3 440d-442a A 2 ANS and REP 3 442b-443c A 5 446c 447c Q 86 A 3 463b d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 91 A 1 208b d Q 93 215b d 220d Q 94 A 4 ANS 223d 224d AA 5-6 224d 226b PART II II Q 1 A 1 CONTRARY 380b 381a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART IV 267b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 276b 285c passim esp 279b 282a
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK I APH 56 112a
31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 216d 217c 228a b 229c-d
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I DEF 8 355c PROP 8 SCHOL 2 356d 357d PROP 17 SCHOL 362c 363c PROP 19 SCHOL 363d PROP 20 C ROL 1 364a PROP 33 SCHOL 367d 369a PART II PROP 44 COROL 2 PROP 47 390a 391a

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK II [142 151] 114b
33 PASCAL *Vacuum* 358b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH III SECT 31 323c d CH XI SECT 14 358b-c
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 113c 118a esp 113c 114b 117b-118a 173b-174
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PREF 6a 7a PART III par 270 85c / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 156d 157b 168b d PART III 310d
53 JAMES *Psychology* 301a 879b 882a

4d The eternity of Heaven and Hell everlasting life and death

OLD TESTAMENT *Psalms* 16 esp 16 10-11 73 esp 73 24 28 145 10-13—(D) *Psalms* 15 esp 15 10- ,72 esp 72 24 28 144 10-13 / *Daniel* 7 13 8 esp 18
APOCRYPHA *Wisdom of Solomon* 1-5 esp 3-5—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 1-5 esp 3-5
NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 6 19-21 18 8-9 25 31 46 / *Mark* 9 43-50 10 17 31—(D) *Mark* 9 42 49 1 17 31 / *Luke* 10 37 / *John* 6 37 40 8 51 10 24 3 11 23 2 17 1 3 / *Romans* 6 esp 6 23 / *I Corinthians* 15 34 58 / *II Corinthians* 3 4 12 10 / *Galatians* 6 8 / *I Peter* 1 3 22 25 / *I John* 2 16-17 5 11 12 / *Jude* 5-8 / *Revelation* 2 7 1 3 20-22 esp 0 10-15 1 4-6 2 -5—(D) *Apocalypse* 2 7 11 3 5 20-22 esp 2 9-15 21 4-6 22 1 5
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XII par 50-53 124c 125a,c / *City of God* BK XIII CH 2 360b-361 c 1 365d 367a CH 14 2 366b-371a BK XIII c 2 BK XV CH 1 371c 377a BK XIV c 1 15 388d 390a BK XV H 1 3 397b d 399 CH 6 400c-401b BK XIX CH 4 511a 513c CH 10-11 516c 517b c 27 28 529 530a BK XXI XX 1 560a 618d / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 4 625b-c CH 21 629b CH 24 630d H 38 39 635c 636a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* ART 1 Q 0 3 A 5 d P 42c-43b Q 18 2 REP 2 105 106b Q 3 A 3 and RE 3 132 133b Q 66 3 347b 348d Q 75 7 E 384d 385 PART 1 II Q 4 A 7 R P 3 635b-636a Q 5 4 639 640b
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* P T 1 II Q 67 81b 87 Q 68 A 6 93c 94c Q 87 A 3-5 187b-189c RT 1 Q 8 2 3 462d 464c Q 19 472d 473d Q 6 A 13 519d 5 0d
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* [1 2 129] 2b-[8] 4a b [82 1 9] 5a b IV [3 45] 5 d 1 [1-57] 8b 9 VI [6-59] 9d 10 esp [5 -59] 10 [49-5] 16d 17a XIV [28 42] 19d 20a X [2 42] 21b-c PARADISE III [34 90] 109d 110b 1 [64 8] 115d 116a [121 48] 116b-c X V [-66] 126d 127c X [2] 128b c XXX XXXI 151d 157d esp XXXI [31 93] 153c 154
22 CHAUCER *Second Nun's Tale* [15 787-800] 467a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART III 191b 198a PART IV 250c 251b 253b-255b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 265b c
26 SHAKESPEARE *Richard III* ACT I SC IV [42 (3] 115a b
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 366d 367a
31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 228b
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I [84 191] 95b 97b [242 330] 98b-100b BK II [85-9] 113a [142 183] 114b 115a BK III [74 333] 141b 143a BK X [782-844] 291b-292b BK XII [537-556] 331a
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 194 195 206b 210b 233 214b 215a
35 LOCKE *Toleration* 5b-c 15d 16a / *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 38 187b c SECT 62 194c d
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 233d 234d
42 KANT *Practical Reason* 346b 347c
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 363 b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 315d
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 347a

5 The knowledge and imagery of eternity

7 PLATO *Apology* 211b-c / *Timaeus* 450b-451a
8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK I CH 11 [104b13 18] 148a b / *Memory and Reminiscence* CH 1 [449 30-450a10] 690c d
16 KEPLER *Harmonies of the World* 1048a
17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR V CH 7 20a c / *Third Ennead* TR 1 C1 3 120a d
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XI par 13 17 92b 93c BK XII par 4 109b-110a BK XIII par 44 122d / *City of God* BK XI CH 5-6 324d 325d C 1 21 333a-d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART 1 Q 10 A 1 40d-41d A 2 REP 1 41d-42c Q 13 A 1 REP 3 62c 63c Q 42 A 2 REP 1,4 225d 227a Q 46 A 1 ANS 250a 252d A 253a 255 Q 79 A 9 ANS and REP 3 422b-423d
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY [100-1 8] 69d PARADISE XXX XXXIII 151d 157d esp XXXI [31-93] 153c 154a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART 1 271b
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK 1 APH 48 110d 111
32 MILTON *On Time* 12a b / *At a Solemn Musick* 13 b / *Sonnets* XI 66a / *Paradise Lost* BK XII [537-556] 331a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XIV SECT 26-27 160 161a SECT 30-31 161c 162a CH XV SECT 3-5 162d 163c SECT 11 1 165a-c CH X II 167d 174a passim esp SECT 5 168d 169a, SECT 0 170b-c SECT 16 172a b CH XXIX SECT 15 237a SECT 16 237d 238a
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 185a b
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 154c
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK III 156d BK V 216d 218b esp 217 -c X V 1 295b-c BK IX 355d 356a

CROSS REFERENCES

For Other discussions of the distinction between eternity as infinite time and eternity as timelessness *see* TIME 2 and for the relation of eternity to time *see* TIME 2c
Another consideration of infinite time *see* INFINITY 3e
The controversy concerning the infinity of time and the eternity of the world or motion *see* ASTRONOMY 8c(1) 8d CHANGE 13 TIME 2b WORLD 4a and for the relation of creation to eternity and time *see* GOD 7a TIME 2c WORLD 4e(2)
The notion of permanent elements or principles of change *see* CHANGE 2
Other discussions of the eternity of God *see* CHANGE 15c GOD 4d
The conception of the angels as aeviternal *see* ANGEL 3c TIME 2a
The discussion of imperishable or incorruptible bodies *see* ASTRONOMY 8a BEING 7b(3) CHANGE 10c ELEMENT 5a
The consideration of the eternality of truth and of ideas *see* CHANGE 15a FORM 2b IDEA 1e IMMORTALITY 6c TRUTH 5
The conception of the eternity of Heaven and Hell or of eternal salvation and damnation *see* HAPPINESS 7c IMMORTALITY 5e–5f PUNISHMENT 5e(1) SIN 6d
The problem of the knowability of the infinite *see* INFINITY 6b KNOWLEDGE 5a(4)

ADDITIONAL READINGS

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I

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AQUINAS *Summa Contra Gentiles* BK II CH 32–38
—— *On the Power of God* Q 8
—— *De Aeternitate Mundi*
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LEIBNITZ *New Essays Concerning Human Understanding* BK II CH 14
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—— *The Ignorant Philosopher* CH 14 16 20
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—— *Philosophical Fragments*
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BERGSON *The Creative Mind* CH 1 5
A E TAYLOR *The Faith of a Moralist* SERIES I (3 6)
DEWEY *The Quest for Certainty* CH 2
WHITEHEAD *Process and Reality* PART I CH 2 PART II CH 1 PART IV CH 1 (5–6) PART V CH 2
—— *Adventures of Ideas* CH 11–15

Chapter 24. EVOLUTION

INTRODUCTION

THIS chapter belongs to Darwin Not that his writings which are cited under almost all headings, stand alone in the various places they appear The point is rather that many of the topics are dictated by and draw their meaning from his thought and that he figures in all the major issues connected with the origin of species the theory of evolution and the place of man in the order of nature With respect to the matters under consideration in this chapter the other writers in the tradition of the great books cannot escape from being classified as coming before or after Darwin, or as being with or against him

Darwin s influence on later writers may be variously estimated but it is plainly marked by the r use of his language and their reference to his fundamental notions James *Principles of Psychology* especially in its chapters on instinct and emotion, views the behavior of men and animals and the phenomena of intelligence or mind in evolutionary terms The writings of Freud are similarly dominated by the genetic approach and by an appeal to man s animal ancestry in order to explain the inherited constitution of his psyche in conformity with the doctrine of evolution

Outside psychology the concept of evolution is reflected in theories of progress or of a dialectical development in history as, for example in the dialectical or historical materialism of Marx and Engels which is set forth in the latter *Dialectic of Nature* An even more general re-orientation of philosophy which stems from an evolutionary way of thinking is to be found in the writings of Bergson and Dewey such as *Creative Evolution* and *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy* These along with many of the specifically biological works cited in the list of Additional Readings give some measure of the influence of Darwin not only on philosophical thought but also on the direction of research in all the biological sciences.

With regard to Darwin s predecessors the question is not so much one of their influence upon him as of their anticipation in one way or another of his discoveries his conceptions, and his theory

The observation made in antiquity concerning a hillside deposit of marine fossils is sometimes taken as implying an early recognition of the evolution of terrestrial life More apposite perhaps is the statement by Lucretius that the new earth first put forth grass and bushes, and next gave birth to the races of mortal creatures springing up many in number in many ways after divers fashions." Lucretius also speaks of strange monsters which nature did not permit to survive Nature set a ban on their increase and they could not reach the coveted flower of age nor find food nor be united in marriage And many races of living things must then have died out and been unable to beget and continue their breed Those which survived he adds, had qualities which "protected and preserved each particular race

Apparently susceptible to similar interpretation are Aristotle s statements that nature proceeds little by little from things lifeless to animal life that there is observed in plants a continuous scale of ascent toward the animal and that throughout the entire animal scale there is a graduated differentiation in amount of vitality and in capacity for motion Augustine s commentary on the first chapter of Genesis seems even more explicitly to contemplate the successive appearance of the various forms of life Plants and animals did not actually exist when the world began Though their causes were created by God and existed from the beginning the actual production of plants

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For Other discussions of the distinction between eternity as infinite time and eternity as timelessness *see* TIME 2 and for the relation of eternity to time *see* TIME 2c

Another consideration of infinite time *see* INFINITY 3e

The controversy concerning the infinity of time and the eternity of the world or motion *see* ASTRONOMY 8c(1) 8d CHANGE 13 TIME 2b WORLD 4a and for the relation of creation to eternity and time *see* GOD 7a TIME 2c WORLD 4e(2)

The notion of permanent elements or principles of change *see* CHANGE 2

Other discussions of the eternity of God *see* CHANGE 15c GOD 4d

The conception of the angels as aeviternal *see* ANGEL 3c TIME 2a

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The consideration of the eternality of truth and of ideas *see* CHANGE 15a FORM 2b IDEA 1e IMMORTALITY 6c TRUTH 5

The conception of the eternity of Heaven and Hell or of eternal salvation and damnation *see* HAPPINESS 7c IMMORTALITY 5e–5f PUNISHMENT 5e(1) SIN 6d

The problem of the knowability of the infinite *see* INFINITY 6b KNOWLEDGE 5a(4)

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WHITEHEAD *Process and Reality* PART I CH 2 PART II CH 1 PART IV CH 1 (5–6) PART V CH 2

—— *Adventures of Ideas* [illegible] 15

cerned. He is concerned with establishing the fact that new species do originate in the course of time against those who suppose the species of living things to be fixed in number and immutable in type throughout the ages. He is concerned with describing the circumstances under which new species arise and other forms cease to have the status of species or become extinct. He is concerned with formulating the various factors in the differentiation of species, and with showing against those who think a new species requires a special act of creation that the origin of species, like their extinction, is entirely a natural process which requires no factors other than those at work every day in the life, death, and breeding of plants and animals. Only as a consequence of these primary considerations does he engage in speculations about the moving panorama of life on earth from its beginnings to its present and its future.

Darwin looks upon the term "species" as arbitrarily given, and for that reason does not attempt any strict definition of it. He uses it, moreover, like his predecessors in systematic biological classification, to signify "a set of individuals closely resembling each other"—a class of plants or animals having certain common characteristics. Darwin would probably agree with Locke's criticism of those who suppose that our definitions of species grasp the real essences or relate to the substantial forms inherent in things. As indicated in the chapter on DEFINITION, Locke insists that our notion of a species expresses only what he calls the "nominal essence"—a set of characteristics we attach to the name we give things of a sort when we group them and separate them in our classifications. "The boundaries of species, whereby men sorts [things] are made by men," he writes; "the essences of the species, distinguished by different names, are ... of man's making."

Species is not the only term of classification. A *genus*, for example, is a more inclusive group than a *species*. Groups which differ specifically belong to the same genus if their difference is accompanied by the possession of common traits. As species differ from one another within a generic group, so genera are in turn subclasses of more inclusive groupings, such as phyla, families, and orders. But there are also smaller groupings within a species. There are races or varieties and sub-varieties, the members of which share the characteristics of the species but differ from one another in other respects. Ultimately, of course, within the smallest class the systematist bothers to define, each individual differs from every other in the same group with whom, at the same time, it shares certain characteristics of the race, the species, the genus, and all the larger classes to which they belong.

This general plan of botanical or zoological classification does not seem to give *species* peculiar status in the hierarchy of classes or groupings or to distinguish it from other classes except as these are more *or less inclusive* than itself. Why, then, should attention be focused on the origin of species rather than of *varieties* or of genera?

One part of the answer comes from the facts of generation or reproduction. Offspring tend to differ from their parents, as well as from each other, but they also tend *to resemble* one another. "A given germ," Aristotle writes, "does not give rise to any chance living being, nor spring from any chance one; but each germ springs from a definite parent and gives rise to a definite progeny." This is an early formulation of the insight that in the process of reproduction the law of like generating like always holds for those characteristics which identify the species of ancestors and progeny.

In other words, a species always breeds true; *its members* always generate organisms which can be classified as belonging to the *same* species, however much they vary among themselves as individuals within the group. Furthermore, the sub-groups—the races or varieties—of a species are able to breed with one another, but diverse species cannot interbreed. Organisms different in species either cannot mate productively at all or, if crossbred like the horse and the ass, they produce a sterile hybrid like the mule.

In the hierarchy of classes, then, species would seem to be distinguished from all smaller groupings by their *stability* from generation to generation. If species are thus self-perpetuating, they in turn give stability to all the larger

and animals in their various kinds is as Aquinas tells us while summarizing Augustine s view the work of propagation —not of creation

Like Aristotle both Aquinas and Locke represent the world of living organisms as a graduated scale ascending from less to more perfect forms of life But where Aquinas tends to conceive that graduated scale as a hierarchy involving essential differences Locke sees an almost perfect continuity involving only differences in degree In all the visible world he writes we see no chasms or gaps To illustrate this he points out that there are fishes that have wings and are not strangers to the airy region and there are some birds that are inhabitants of the water whose blood is cold as fishes There are animals so near of kin to both birds and beasts that they are in the middle between both amphibious animals link the terrestrial and aquatic together and the animal and *vegetable kingdoms are so nearly joined that* if you will take the lowest of one and the highest of the other there will scarce be perceived any great difference between them and so on till we come to the lowest and the most inorganical parts of matter we shall find everywhere that the several species are linked together and differ but in almost insensible degrees

But for the theory of evolution the observation of a hierarchy in nature or even of a continuity in which the species differ by almost insensible degrees constitutes only background What the theory of evolution brings to the fore is the notion of a developmental or genetic relation among the various forms of life Because it seems to contain this insight the anticipation of Darwin to be found in Kant s *Critique of Judgement* is perhaps the most remarkable even though in a closely related passage in which Kant discusses epigenesis he uses the word evolution in a sense quite contrary to Darwin s conception

It is praiseworthy Kant writes to employ a comparative anatomy and go through the vast creation of organized beings in order to see if there *is not* discoverable in it some trace of a system and indeed of a system following a genetic principle When we consider the agreement of so many genera of animal in a certain common schema which apparently underlies not only the structure of their bones but also the disposition of their remaining part and when we find here the wonderful simplicity of the original plan which has been able to produce such an immense variety of species by the shortening of one member and the lengthening of another by the involution of this part and the evolution of that there gleams upon the mind a ray of hope however faint that the principle of the mechanism of nature apart from which there can be no natural science at all may yet enable us to arrive at some explanation in the case of organic life This analogy of forms which in all their differences seem to be produced in accordance with a common type strengthens the suspicion that they have an actual kinship due to descent from a common parent This we might trace in the gradual approximation of one animal species to another from that in which the principle of ends seems best authenticated namely from man back to the polyp and from this back even to mosses and lichens and finally to the lowest perceivable stage of nature

FINDING ANTICIPATIONS of Darwin involves judgments much more subject to controversy than tracing his influences It is questionable for example whether the suggestive passages in Lucretius and Locke bear more than a superficial resemblance to Darwin s thought Th matter is further complicated by Darwin s own sense of his divergence from and disagreement with his predecessors—both immediate precursors like Buffon and Linnaeus and earlier phi losophers and theologians

Darwin tells us himself of his quarrel wi the theologians His followers elaborate on th opposition between his conception of speci and that of Aristotle an opposition which Da win intimates by the great stress he lays on th difference between a static taxonomy and dynamic or genealogical classification of livin things

We must therefore try to locate the centr points of Darwin s theory in order to jud comparable views for their agreement or di agreement

As the title of his major work indicates it i not evolution as a grand scheme of biologica or cosmic history but the origin of species wit which Darwin seems to be principally con

common language will come into accordance In short we shall have to treat species in the same manner as those naturalists treat genera who admit that genera are merely artificial combinations made for convenience Our classifications will come to be as far as they can be so made genealogies

The *origin of species* thus seems to be identical with the *extinction of intermediate varieties* combined with the survival of one or more of the extreme varieties These seem to be simply two ways of looking at the same thing Still another way of seeing the point may be achieved by supposing contrary to fact the survival of all the varieties ever produced through the breeding of organisms

If my theory be true Darwin writes numberless intermediate varieties, linking closely together all the species of the same group must assuredly have existed but the very process of natural selection constantly tends as has been so often remarked to exterminate the parent forms and the intermediate links If one were to suppose the *simultaneous* co-existence of *all* intermediate varieties in the present day the groups now called species would be continuously connected by slight differences among their members and would not therefore be divided into distinct species as they now are because *certain* links are missing

In the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant states the principle of continuity in the following manner 'This principle he writes indicates that all differences of species limit each other and do not admit of transition from one to another by a *saltus* but only through *smaller* degrees of the difference between the one species and the other In one word there are no species or sub-species which are the nearest possible to each other intermediate species or sub-species being always possible the difference of which from each of the former is always smaller than the difference existing between these But Kant adds it is plain that this continuity of forms is a *mere idea* to which no adequate object can be discovered in experience partly because "the species in nature are really divided and if the gradual progression through their *affinity* were continuous the intermediate members lying between two given species must be infinite in number which is impossible

The Russian geneticist Theodore Dobzhansky gives an interpretation of continuity in nature which differs from Kant's in that it follows and applies Darwin's conception of species and their origin According to him if we suppose the extreme case of all possible genetic variations being alive on earth together the result would be not an infinite number of species but no species and genera at all The array of plants and animals would approach a perfectly continuous series in which there would only be individual differences. There would be no specific or generic groupings of the sort now made in our classification of the forms of life

On Darwin's conception of the origin of species its causes divide *into two sets of factors* first those which determine the extinction or survival of organisms and with their survival their opportunities for mating and reproduction second those which *determine* the *transmission* of characteristics from one *generation* to another and the variation of *offspring* from *their ancestors* and from each other Without genetic variation there would be *no range* of *differences within* a group on which the factors of selection could *operate* Without the inheritance of ancestral traits there would be no *perpetuation* of *group characteristics* in the *organisms* which manage to survive and reproduce

For Darwin the operation of the first set of factors constitutes the process of natural selection This may take place in many ways through geological catastrophes which make certain areas of the earth's surface *uninhabitable* for *all* organisms or for those types which cannot adapt themselves to the radically changed *environment* through the competition among organisms for the limited food supply available in their habitat through the struggle for existence in which organisms not only compete for food but also prey upon one another through the sexual selection which operates within a group when some organisms are prevented by others from mating and reproducing and through all the obstacles which isolate groups from interbreeding in

groupings—the genera phyla families—which remain as fixed from generation to generation as the species which constitute them Hence the question of origin applies peculiarly to species rather than to varieties or to genera

On the supposition stated no origin of species would seem to be possible except by a special act of creation Either all the existing species of organisms have always existed from the beginning of life on earth or if in the course of ages new species have arisen their appearance cannot be accounted for by natural generation By the law of natural generation offspring will always be of the same species as the parent organisms

Spontaneous generation of course remains a possibility A new species of organism might come to be without being generated by other living organisms But apart from the question of fact (*i e* whether spontaneous generation ever does occur) such origin of a form of life seems to lie outside the operation of natural causes and to imply the intervention of super natural power

The possibility of spontaneous generation was entertained in antiquity and the Middle Ages and was even thought to be supported by observation such as that of maggots emerging from putrefying matter But modern science tends to affirm the biogenetic law that living organisms are generated only by living organisms To Kant the notion that life could have sprung up from the nature of what is void of life seems not only contrary to fact but absurd or unreasonable Yet while affirming the principle that like produces like by insisting upon the generation of something organic from something else that is also organic Kant does not carry that principle to the point where it would make the generation of a *new* species impossible Within the class of organic beings he writes it is possible for one organism to generate another differing specifically from it

Against the background of these various suppositions Darwin is moved to a new insight by the conjunction of certain types of fact the results of breeding under domestication which exhibit the great range of variation within a species and the tendency of *inbred* varieties to breed true his own observations of the geographical distribution of species of flora and fauna especially those separated from one another by impassable barriers the facts of comparative anatomy and embryology which reveal affinities in organic structure and development between organisms distinct in species and the geological record which indicates the great antiquity of life upon the earth which gives evidence of the cataclysmic changes in the earth s surface (with consequences for the survival of life) and which above all contains the fossil remains of forms of life now extinct but not dissimilar from species alive in the present age

Briefly stated Darwin s insight is that new species arise when among the varieties of an existing species certain intermediate forms become extinct and the other circumstances are such that the surviving varieties now become more sharply separated from one another in type are able to reproduce their kind and in the course of many generations of inbreeding also tend to breed true They thus perpetuate their type until each in turn ceases to be a species and becomes a genus when its own extreme varieties separated by the extinction of intermediates become new species as they themselves did at an earlier stage of history For the very same reason that Darwin says a well marked variety may be called an incipient species a species may be called an incipient genus

The point is misunderstood if it is supposed that when new species originate from old both the new and the old continue to survive as species On the contrary when in the course of thousands of generations some of the varieties of a species achieve the status of species the species from which they originated by variation ceases to be a species and becomes a genus

The only distinction between species and well marked varieties Darwin writes is that the latter are known or believed to be connected at the present day with intermediate gradations whereas species were formerly thus connected It is quite possible that forms now generally acknowledged to be merely varieties may hereafter be thought worthy of specific names and in this case scientific and

pothesis of the origin of pecies by the extinc- t on of intermediate varieties

In comparing Darwin with certain of his predecessors notably Aristotle and Aquinas it seems necessary to apply another kind of test. Here th problem is not so much one of dis covering affinities or d sa reements as one of determining whether they are talking about the same thing and therefore when they appear to disagree whether the issue between them is genuine They do not seem to conceive a species in the same way Certainly they use the word differently This affects the way in which the whole problem of orig ns is under stood The controversies concernin the fixity or mutability of species, concerning evolution and creation and concerning the origin of man involve genuine issues only if those who seem to disagree do not use the word species in widely different senses.

It is *possible* that certain forms of life do not originate by descent from a common ancestor and do not derive their status as quite distinct types from the mere absence of intermediate variet es—varieties wh ch once must have ex isted but are now extinct If such forms were to be called species the word would have a different meaning from the meaning it has when applied to types of pigeons, beetles, or rats

The first of these two meanings may express the philosophical conc ption of a l ving species as a class of organisms having the same essential nature according to which conception there ne r c uld have been intermediate varieties The second meaning may be that of the scien t fic t xo omist in botany o zoology who con structs a sy tem of classificat on genealo cal o otherwise On this meaning one million and a half would be a conservati e estimate of th number of plant and animal types classi fied by the systemat st as species. In contrast the number of species in the philosophical sense of distinct essences would be extremely small

Darwin for example says I cannot doubt that the theory of descent w th modification embraces all the members of the same great class or kingdom I belie e that animals are descended from at most only four or five progenitors, and plants from an equal or lesser number Analogy would lead me one step farther namely to the belief that all animals and plants are descended from some one prototype But analogy may be a deceitful guide " It is immaterial to the theory of evolution he adds whether this inference chiefly grounded on analogy be accepted

The issue bet een Darwin and the theologians may or may not be genuine according to the interpretation of this passage and according to the possibility of a double use of the word species —for both the small number of pro enitors from which all the extant types of plants and an mals have evolved *and* for a very large number of those extant types. If the theologians use the word species in the first sense and Darwin in the second they need not be in disagreement The view of life which Darwin attributes to certain eminent authori ties he himself does not flatly reject namely that life with its several po ers [has] been originally breathed by the Creator into a few forms or into one.

Is there common ground here in the ad mitted possibility that life may have been originally created in a small number of distinct forms and that these are to be regarded as species in one conception though not in another? If so the affirmation of a certain fixity to species would apply only to a few primordial forms Concerning forms which have appeared with the passage of time two questions would have to be answered First are they species in the ph losopher s sense of distinct and immutable essences or species in the scheme of systematic biological classifica tion? Second is their first appearance at an historical moment due to a special act o creation to spontaneous generation or t evolution from already existing organic form by descent with modification ?

To join issue with Darwin it would seem t be necessary for the person answering thes questions to use the word species in th b ologist s sense and at the same time to a count for the historical origin of the new speci by special creation or spontaneous generatio But in the tradition of the great books, the logians like Augustine and Aquinas do n attribute to God any special acts of creati after the original production of the wor

cluding geographical and physiological in accessibility

The struggle for existence is not only a struggle to survive but also a struggle to re produce Natural selection operates with respect to reproduction as well as survival Whether the survival is of the fittest alone or *whether the multiplication of inferior organ isms* also gives evolution another direction has been disputed since Darwin s day but ac cording to his theory natural selection works solely by and for the good of each being all corporeal and mental endowments will tend to progress toward perfection Thus from the war of nature from famine and death the production of the higher animals directly fol lows

With respect to the factors of heredity and variation tremendous advances since Darwin in the experimental science of genetics require revisions in this part of his theory of evolution This is particularly true of the researches of Mendel Bateson and Morgan concerning the ways in which genetic factors operate But on one major point in the theory of heredity *Darwin holds a view which later investigations* have tended to confirm Antedating Weismann he nevertheless opposes *Lamarck s theory* of the inheritance of acquired characteristics As William James expresses it where Lamarck sup *poses that environmental influences cause* changes in the structure or functioning of the organism which then become hereditary Dar win regards the environment merely as a selec tive agency acting upon variations produced entirely by causes operating in the breeding process James thinks the evidence for Mr Darwin s view [was] quite convincing even before it received the support of Weis *mann s* theory according to which it is *a priori* impossible that any peculiarity acquired during the lifetime by the parent should be transmitted to the germ

The situation is not the same with regard to Darwin s views on the mechanism of heredity Writing before Mendel s classic experiments in hybridization Darwin seems to suppose a blending of hereditary factors whereas ac cording to Mendel inheritance is particulate Distinct genetic factors *combine to produce a* certain somatic result without losing their separate identities They can therefore be re assorted and enter into new genetic combina tions in the next generation Most important of all Darwin thinks that new forms of life arise gradually as the result of a continuous accumu lation of slight and imperceptible variations The opposite view is now taken The discovery of abrupt mutations in a single generation dis countenances Darwin s maxim *natura non f cit saltum*— nature does nothing by jumps

These advances in genetics since Darwin s day do not alter the main outlines of his theory The mechanisms of heredity may be much more complicated than Darwin knew and involve much of which he was ignorant such as mutation rates or the various types, causes, *and effects of hybridization But that merely* leads to a more elaborate or different explana tion of genetic variation in offspring and the transmission of ancestral traits No matter how these are explained their occurrence is all that is needed to permit new species to originat through natural processes of heredity and selection If Darwin were alive today Julian Huxley writes the title of his book would *have to be not the origin but the Origins* *Species For perhaps the most salient singl fact that has emerged from recent studies that species may arise in a number of quit* distinct ways

THE READER MUST judge for himself to wha extent Darwin s theory of evolution was an ticipated by those who like Augustine affirm the appearance of new species of life on earth a various stages in its history or even by a writ like Kant who seems to possess the germ of it insight

The critical test in every case is whethe those who affirm the occurrence of *new* specie by natural processes rather than by specia creation think of them as simply *added* to th organic forms already in existence without an change in the status as species of the pre-exist *ing forms Those who think in this way do no have Darwin s idea of the origin of species fo* in conceiving an increase in the number o species as merely a matter of addition they necessarily attribute stability to each specie *new* as well as old By this *test not even Kan* seems to be near the center of Darwin s hy

cording to the doctrine of man's creation by God or even on the hypothesis of emergent evolution, there need not be—strictly speaking there cannot be—a missing link between ape and man for the emergent species is a whole step upward in the scale of life. Man is thus not one of several organic types which have become species through the extinction of intermediate varieties, and hence he differs from other animals not in an accidental but rather in an essential manner—that is, he differs in kind rather than degree.

This issue concerning human nature is discussed from other points of view in the chapters on ANIMAL and MAN. Here the issue stated in terms of man's origin seems to involve three possibilities: special creation, evolution by descent from a common ancestor, and emergent evolution. But these three possibilities apply not only to man, but to the origin of every species which did not exist at the first moment of life on earth.

The hypothesis of special creation does not seem to be held by the theologians, at least not in the tradition of the great books. The hypothesis of emergent evolution raises questions concerning the factors—natural or supernatural—which must be operative to cause the emergence of higher from lower forms of organic matter. Whether or not Aristotle and Aquinas can supply an answer to these questions in terms of their theory of matter's potentiality for a variety of forms, Darwin's theory of descent with modification seems to be definitely opposed to the hypothesis of emergent evolution. Speaking as a Darwinian, James says that "the point which as evolutionists we are bound to hold fast to is that all the new forms of being that make their appearance are really nothing more than results of the redistribution of the original and unchanging materials. ... No new natures, no factors not present at the beginning, are introduced at any later stage."

In this dispute between two theories of evolution, does not the solution depend in every case upon a prior question concerning the relation of the species under consideration—whether or not it is possible for them to be or to have been developmentally connected by intermediate varieties? If, for example, the evidence were to prove that man and ape, as they now exist in the world, are essentially distinct—different in kind—then no intermediate varieties could ever have existed to account for their descent from a common ancestor. If, on the other hand, the evidence were to prove that they differ only in degree, then no difficulty stands in the way of the Darwinian hypothesis. The ultimate issue concerning the origin of species would thus seem to reduce to the problem of which meaning of "species" applies to the organic types in question.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

except to explain the origin of individual human souls

"Nothing entirely new was afterwards made by God," Aquinas writes, "but all things subsequently made had in a sense been made before in the work of the six days. Some existed not only in matter, but also in their causes, as those individual creatures that are now generated existed in the first of their kind. Species also that are new, if any such appear, existed beforehand in various active powers; so that animals, and perhaps even new species of animals, are produced by putrefaction by the power which the stars and elements received at the beginning. Again, animals of new kinds arise occasionally from the connection of individuals belonging to different species, as the mule is the offspring of an ass and a mare; but even these existed previously in their causes, in the work of the six days."

Whether or not the theologian's conception of an historical development of the forms of life conforms to the evolutionist's hypothesis, even though it does not offer the same type of explanation, is a matter which the reader of the texts must decide. But one issue, which still remains to be discussed, can leave little doubt of a basic controversy between Darwin and some of his predecessors, especially the theologians.

It concerns the origin and nature of man. It can be stated in terms of two views of human nature. One is that man is a species in the philosophical sense, essentially and abruptly distinct from brute animals; the other, that man is a species in the biologist's sense and differs from other animals only by continuous variation.

On the first view, *either* man would have to be created in body as well as soul, *or* if the human species has an origin which in part or whole involves the operation of natural causes, it must be conceived as *emerging* from a lower form of life. The rational soul, Aquinas maintains, "can not come to be except by creation." But it is not only man's soul which, according to Aquinas, "cannot be produced save immediately by God." He also insists that "the first formation of the human body could not be by the instrumentality of any created power, but was immediately from God." He does not reject the suggestion of Augustine that the human body may have preexisted in other creatures "*as an effect preexists in its causes.*" But he adds the qualification that it preexists in its causes only "in the manner of a passive potentiality," so that "it can be produced out of pre-existing matter only by God." A Christian theologian like Aquinas might entertain the hypothesis of emergent evolution as applied to the human organism, but only with the qualification that natural causes by themselves do not suffice for the production of man.

On the second view, which is Darwin's, man and the anthropoid apes have descended from a common ancestral form which is now extinct, as are also many of the intermediate varieties in the chain of development—unless, as it is sometimes thought, certain fossil remains supply some of the missing links. "The great break in the organic chain between man and his nearest allies, which cannot be bridged over by any extinct or living species, has often been advanced," Darwin admits, "as a grave objection to the belief that man is descended from some lower form; but this objection," he continues, "will not appear of much weight to those who, from general reasons, believe in the general principle of evolution. Breaks often occur in all parts of the series, some being wide, sharp and defined, others less so in various degrees; as between the orang and its nearest allies—between the Tarsius and the other Lemuridae—between the elephant, and in a more striking manner between the Ornithorhynchus or Echidna, and all other mammals." Furthermore, Darwin insists, "no one who has read Lyell's *Antiquity of Man*" will lay much stress "on the absence of fossil remains," for Lyell "has shown" that in all the vertebrate classes the discovery of fossil remains has been a very slow and fortuitous process. Nor should it be forgotten that those regions which are the most likely to afford remains connecting man with some extinct ape-like creature, have not as yet been searched by geologists."

On either of these two conflicting views, the organic affinities between man and the most highly developed mammals would be equally intelligible, though they would be differently interpreted by Aquinas and Darwin. But ac-

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to For example, in 4 HOMER *Iliad* BK II [265 283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119 When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example, in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases e g *Iliad* BK II [265 283] 12d.

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book, chapter and verse When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e g OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—(D) *II Esdras* 7 46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface

1 The classification of animals

1a Comparison of genealogical classification with other types of taxonomy the phylogenetic series

8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK V CH 28 546b-c
9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK I CH 1 [486^{a}15]-CH 6 [491^{a}5] 7b-12 esp CH 1 [486^{a}15-487^{a}1] 7b-d BK V CH 1 [539^{a}4 15] 65b BK VIII CH 1 [588^{b}4]-CH 2 [590 9] 114d 116c / *Parts of Animals* BK CH 2 4 165d 168c / *Generation of Animals* BK II CH [732^{a}3 733^{b}17] 272c 274a BK III CH 1 [-6 ^{b}14 24] 302 -d
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 2 158b-c
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH VI SECT 23 274b-c
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 31d 63d-64d 207a 229 ,c esp 207 212c, 215b-217b 228c 229a 2 5b-239a / *Descent of Man* 331 341d esp 332b-c, 337a 338c 340d 341d

1b The criteria for distinguishing races or varieties species genera and all higher taxonomic groupings

8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 13 [14^{b}32 5^{a}9] 20c-d / *Topics* BK CH 6 [144^{a}2, 145^{a}2] 197d 198c passim / *Metaphysics* BK CH 28

9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK I CH 1 [486^{a}15]-CH 6 [491^{a}5] 7b-12 esp CH 1 [486^{a}15-487^{a}1] 7b-d BK II CH 1 [497^{b}4 18] 19b d 20a BK IV CH 1 [523^{a}30-^{b}20] 48b d / *Parts of Animals* BK I CH 4 [644 12 ^{b}15] 167d 168a CH 5 [645^b 0- 8] 169c-d / *Politics* BK IV CH 4 [1290^{b}25 36] 489d-490a
11 NICOMACHUS *Arithmetic* BK I 813a b
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 50 A 4 RE 1 2 3b-274b Q 76 A 5 REP 3 394c 396a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH VI 268b-283a passim, esp SECT 7 270b, SECT 36-37 279a b CH X SECT 21 297a b CH XI SECT 19-20 304b-d
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 193a 200c esp 195d 200c / *Judgement* 579b-c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO, 183c-d
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 12 13a 24a b 25d 29a 30d 31d 55c 60a passim 64a 136b-137a 145c 151a passim esp 146c d 147b-149a, 150c-d 159c 160a 207d 229 c passim, esp 207d 210b 234d 241d 242a / *Descent of Man* 331b-333a passim 34 a 350b passim, esp 342a b 346d 347d

2 Genetic variation in the course of generations

7 PLATO *Republic* BK III 403b-d
9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK I CH 15 [139 ^{b} 4 31] 638a b

3b The inheritance and variability of instincts

3c Interbreeding and crossbreeding hybridism and sterility

3d Atavisms and reversions to ancestral type

3e Marked and abrupt mutations in a single generation as opposed to th continuous accumulation of slight and imperceptible variations

4 The problem of evolution the origin of plant and animal species

4a The question of ultimate origins the creation of primordial life in one or many forms the original generation of life from inorganic matter

4b The fixity or the mutability of species

4c The origin of new forms of life special creation spontaneous generation or descent with modification from older forms

4d The direction of evolution progress and recession

5 The theory of evolution the origin of new species from a common ancestry

5a The struggle for existence its causes and consequences

(1) Natural selection the survival of the fittest

(2) The extinction of intermediate varieties

(3) Difficulties with the theory of natural selection its limitations

5b Competition in mating sexual selection

5c The geographical and physiological factors in breeding accessibility fertility and sterility

6 The facts of evolution evidences bearing on the history of life on earth

6a The geological record the significance of fossil remains

6b The geographical distribution of the forms of life in relation to the genealogy of existing species

6c Comparative anatomy and embryology the meaning of rudimentary or vestigial organs and functions

7 The origin and development of man

7a The doctrine of man s special creation in body in soul

7b The theory of the evolutionary origin of man from lower forms of animal life descent from an ancestor common to man and the anthropoids

(1) Anatomical physiological and embryological evidences of an organic affinity between man and other mammalian forms of life

(2) Paleontological evidences the missing link in man s ancestry

(3) Psychological evidences the human mind in relation to animal intelligence

7c Biological evolution in the course of human generation from prehistoric to historic man

3d Atavisms and reversions to ancestral type

9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals*, BK VII, CH 6 [585b32-34] 112a / *Generation of Animals*, BK I, CH 18 [722a5-11] 52a BK IV, CH 3 [768a9-b4] 309c 310a

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things*, BK IV [1218-1222] 60a

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 12a-c 16a-d 73b-c 7 b-78c 149d 150c 236b / *Descent of Man* 271 275c 325c 331b 3 5c-d 55 a-c 58 a 590b-c

3e Marked and abrupt mutations in a single generation as opposed to the continuous accumulation of slight and imperceptible variations

30 BACON *Novum Organum*, BK II, APH 29 159b-c

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 3a b 10c 4b-c 92 -d 11 118d 235b-c 240d 241a / *Descent of Man* 442a b 48 a-488a passim 538b-539a 590d 591 passim

4 The problem of evolution: the origin of plant and animal species

4a. The question of ultimate origins: the creation of primordial life in one or many forms; the original generation of life from inorganic matter

OLD TESTAMENT: *Genesis*, 1:11 1:20- S -4 9:19- 3

APOCRYPHA: *Wisdom of Solomon*, 1:14—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom*, 1:14

9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals*, BK V, CH 1 [539a16- 3,65b-66a CH 1 [543 15-19] 0b CH 15 [546b1 55] 73c CH 15 [547a12]-CH 16 [548] 74b-7 b CH 19 [550b3 55 3] 7 d 78a [5 1b 9] 78c 79c CH 31 [556b-]-CH 3- [14] 83c-84b BK VI, CH 15 16 95a 96a / *Generation of Animals*, BK I, CH 1 [715a S- 6] 2 5b-256a CH 16 [721 3 11] 260d 261a BK II, CH 1 [732b8-14] 272d 273a CH 3 [3-] 277d BK III, CH 9 299b-300a CH 11 [76 - 63 19] 303d 304b

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things*, BK V [53-8 6] 71b-72a

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions*, BK XIII, par 45 123a / *City of God*, BK XII, CH 1 348b-c CH 1 349a b CH 357a b BK 3 27 357d 360a,c BK XIII, CH 24 373d 3 6a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I, Q 69, 351 362 Q 1 — 36 369d

28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences*, 10sa b

28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 299b / *On Animal Generation* 338c-d 400d-401a 412 413a 428c-d 449a b 454d-455a 468b-469c

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost*, BK VII [31-64] 220a-231

34 NEWTON *Optics*, BK 1 541b

36 SWIFT *Gulliver*, PART IV 167b

42 KANT *Judgement* 578d 580a esp 579b-580a 581b-c

47 GOETHE *Faust*, PART II [831 864] 191b

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 2d-4a passim esp 3c-d 240c 241d 243d

53 JAMES *Psychology* 95b-98a esp 95b 98a

54 FREUD *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 652d

4b The fixity or the mutability of species

OLD TESTAMENT: *Genesis*, 1:11 1:20- S -4- 9:19- 3

9 ARISTOTLE *Generation of Animals*, BK I, CH 1 [15b-] 255c-d BK II, CH 1 [731b24 3 11] 2a b

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things*, BK I [5 - 50] 8a b BK II [700-710] 23d 24a BK V [916-924] 73a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I, Q 3 A ANS 138d 140a Q 9 A 1 ANS 516d 51

30 BACON *Novum Organum*, BK II, APH 9-30 159b-d

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding*, BK III, CH III, SECT 17 258d 259b CH VI SECT 23 17 272d 273a SECT 3 2 4b-2 6a passim BK I CH IV SECT 13 16 326d 328d passim

42 KANT *Judgement* 579b-580b 581b-58

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 1a 5d passim, esp 1a 2a, 2d 3b, 5a b 7d 160d 180d passim, esp 160d, 165d, 167a-c 239d 240b

4c The origin of new forms of life: special creation, spontaneous generation, or descent with modification from older forms

OLD TESTAMENT: *Genesis*, 1:11 1:20- S -4 9:19- 3

9 ARISTOTLE *Generation of Animals*, BK III, CH 11 [76 b-S-763a19] 303d 304b

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things*, BK V [83-8 6] 71b-72a

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God*, BK XII, CH 13 350b-c BK X T CH—S 42 a-428c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I, Q 69, A AN 361c-362c Q A 1 A S and R P 1 36 a 368b Q 2, A 1 ANS and REP 5 358b-369d Q 73 A 1 REP 3 370a 371 Q 4 A A 3 373d 375a Q 115 A 2 587 588 Q 18 A 3 REP 1 603b-604b

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation*, 338d

30 BACON *Novum Organum*, BK II, APH 9 159b-c

36 SWIFT *Gulliver*, PART IV 167b

42 KANT *Judgement* 5 8d 580a esp 579b-580a

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 1 5d passim, esp 1a-d 3a, 5c-d 6d 7d esp 7d 31d 60d 61 64a 74a b 78a-c 85b-c 92d 18 a 184d esp 183b-184b 198b-204d esp 198b-c, 204d 217d 219a 228, 229a,c esp 228c, 229c 234d 243d esp 239b-240d, 42d 243d / *Descent of Man*, 253a-c

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace*, EPILOGUE II 689c-690a esp 690d

(2 *Genetic variation in the course of generations*)

30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 29 159b c
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART II 79b
42 KANT *Judgement* 579b c
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 6d 7a 9a 31d esp 9a 12a 23c d 29a 31d 53b 59d passim 65a 79d 99a 103c esp 100d 149b 150c 182d 183a 234a c / *Descent of Man* 266a 271a esp 266a 268a 275c d 284c 285d esp 285b c 347d 348c
53 JAMES *Psychology* 857b 858a

2*a* Comparison of variation under conditions of natural and artificial breeding

30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 29 159b c / *New Atlantis* 211c 212a
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 7a b 9a 31d esp 9a b 12a c 24a c 40a-42d 53b 55a 65a 66a 117a c 149b d 233b d / *Descent of Man* 377a 486d

2*b* Characteristics which are more and less variable genetically their bearing on the distinction of races species and genera

9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK I CH 4 167d 168c
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH VI SECT 14-17 272d 273a SECT 23-27 274b 276a passim
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 24c 25b 71d 75b 78c 79d 236b d / *Descent of Man* 342a 372d 375a 486d 488b

3 The process of heredity

9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK VII CH 6 [585^{b}29 586 14] 111d 112b / *Parts of Animals* BK I CH I [640 15 28] 162c d [641^{b}27-42] 164d 165a / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH 17 [721^{b}6]-CH 18 [724 13] 261b 264b BK IV CH 3 [767 36]-CH 4 [770^{b}27] 308d 312c
10 HIPPOCRATES *Airs Waters Places* par 14 15a b / *Sacred Disease* 155d 156a
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [159 191] 3a c [592-598] 8b BK IV [1209-1233] 60a b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 367b 368a
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 386d 387b 391c 393b 395a 396a 425b d 446b-c 455d 456a
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 191b 192b
42 KANT *Judgement* 578d 580a esp 579b c
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 10d 12c esp 11a b 11d 12a 69c 71a passim 222a 224b / *Descent of Man* 375a 383a 413d [fn 61] 429d-430c 500a 525a esp 500a 502a 511a b 529d 531a c 590c d
54 FREUD *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 653b-c

3*a* The inheritance of acquired characteristics the use and disuse of parts

7 PLATO *Laws* BK VI 708d 709a
9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animal* BK VII CH 6 [585^b 9-37] 111d 112a / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH 17 [721^{b}18 7 2 1] 261c d CH 18 [724 3-7] 264a
10 HIPPOCRATES *Airs Waters Places* par 14 15a b
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 81 A 2 164d 165c
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 367c
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 455d-456a
42 KANT *Judgement* 580a
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 1c 10d 12c 66a 69c esp 66a c 69c 82d 85c 103c 116d passim, esp 115d 119c 120a 223c 227c 228b / *Descent of Man* 258d 259a 269b 271a 283a 284b 299a c 318a c 319a 320b 321b 358d 359a 587d 588a
53 JAMES *Psychology* 52a 691a b 890b 891a
54 FREUD *General Introduction* 594d 595a / *Ego and Id* 707d 708b

3*b* The inheritance and variability of instincts

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [741 53] 39c d
42 KANT *Judgement* 580a
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 111a 119a 135a c esp 121b 122d 131c 134d 236d 237a / *Descent of Man* 288a d 292c d 304b d [fn 5] 318a 319a passim 506d 507a
53 JAMES *Psychology* 691a b 718a 720b esp 718b 722b 725a passim 851b 890b 897a
54 FREUD *General Introduction* 591d 592b 594d 595b 613a / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 651d 654a / *Ego and Id* 707c 708b esp 708b / *War and Death* 758a d esp 758d

3*c* Interbreeding and crossbreeding hybridism and sterility

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 121d 122a
8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK VII CH 8 [1033^b 29-1034 1] 557a
9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animal* BK VI CH 11 [566 26-30] 92c CH 23 [577^{b}5]-CH 24 [577^b 9] 103a c BK VIII CH 28 [606^{b}20-607^{a}9] 132b-c BK IX CH I [608 31-34] 133d CH 32 [619^{a}7 11] 144c / *Parts of Animals* BK I CH I [641^{b}27 30] 164d 165a / *Generation of Animals* BK II CH 4 [738^{b}26-35] 279c d CH 7 [746 29-^{b}20] 287c-288a CH 8 288c 290a c
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK II [700-710] 23d 24a [920-924] 26d BK V [878-924] 72c-73a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 73 A I REP 3 370a 371a
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 386d 387b 392b c 395b d 425c
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 30 159c d / *New Atlantis* 211c 212a
42 KANT *Judgement* 581d 582a
43 MILL *Representative Government* 426d-427a
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 14a c 16b d 23c d 47c 50c 136a 151d 230b 231b / *Descent of Man* 342a b 344b 345c esp 345b d [fn 14] 356a b 482b 483b

(4 *The problem of evolution the origin of plant and animal species*)

4d The direction of evolution progress and recession

36 Swift *Gulliver* part ii 79a 80a part iii 121a b
46 Hegel *Philosophy of History* intro 178a d
49 Darwin *Origin of Species* 1c 41c 42a 60b 62a 63b 64d 96b 103c esp 96b 98a 99a c 102d 103c 176b 178a 243b d / *Descent of Man* 340d 341d
51 Tolstoy *War and Peace* bk v 217c
53 James *Psychology* 95b
54 Freud *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 651d 654c esp 653d 654a / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 768d 769a

5 The theory of evolution the origin of new species from a common ancestry

49 Darwin *Origin of Species* 6a 243d esp 6d 7d 23c d 32a c 116d 118d 228c 243d
53 James *Psychology* 95b 98a esp 95b 98a

5a The struggle for existence its causes and consequences

6 Herodotus *History* bk iii 112d 113a
9 Aristotle *History of Animals* bk ix ch 1 [608b19]-ch 2 [610b20] 134a 136b
36 Swift *Gulliver* part ii 58a b 79b
38 Rousseau *Inequality* 334b d-337d passim 348d 349d
39 Smith *Wealth of Nations* bk i 33c 34a
49 Darwin *Origin of Species* 7b 32a 64d esp 33a b 38b 39a c 63b 64d 182d 183a 243 d / *Descent of Man* 275d 277c 320a 328c passim esp 320a 321b 328b c 350d 351a
54 Freud *General Introduction* 573c 592a b / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 791c d

5a(1) Natural selection the survival of the fittest

8 Aristotle *Physics* bk ii ch 8 [198b16 33] 275d 276a
12 Lucretius *Nature of Things* bk v [855-877] 72b c
38 Rousseau *Inequality* 335a b
44 Boswell *Johnson* 510a c
49 Darwin *Origin of Species* 2a b 7b d 32a c 40a 64d esp 40a c 44d-47c 63b 64d 95d 97a 134d 135a c 214b d 233d 239c esp 233d 234a 234c 235b / *Descent of Man* 277c 286d passim esp 277c 278a 284c 285c 320a 328d esp 327c 328c 424a-425d passim 430d-432c 442d-443b 525b 527c 554d 555b
53 James *Psychology* 90b 93a esp 93a b 94a b 208a 209b esp 209b

5a(2) The extinction of intermediate varieties

12 Lucretius *Nature of Things* bk v [837-877] 72a c
49 Darwin *Origin of Species* 5a 52c 53a 58b 60a esp 58b 59a 63d 64d 80b 82d 84a b 91a b 152a 153a 168d 171a 231d 232d / *Descent of Man* 341a 350b 356a
54 Freud *Civilization and Its Discontents* 768d 769a

5a(3) Difficulties with the theory of natural selection its limitations

49 Darwin *Origin of Species* 80a 118d esp 80a b 131c 134c 152a 153a 160d 166a c passim esp 165d 166a c 230a 233b / *Descent of Man* 284d 285c

5b Competition in mating sexual selection

7 Plato *Republic* bk v 361b 363b
28 Harvey *On Animal Generation* 434a-c 477b
36 Swift *Gulliver* part iv 166a b
38 Rousseau *Inequality* 346b c
49 Darwin *Origin of Species* 43d 44c / *Descent of Man* 359c d 364a 589d esp 364a 365b 373b-375a 381d 383a 432c-434d 486a c 529a 530c, 561a d 582d 585d 588d 589d 593d 596a 598a 600a c
53 James *Psychology* 14b

5c The geographical and physiological factors in breeding accessibility fertility and sterility

12 Lucretius *Nature of Things* bk ii [700-729] 23d 24b bk v [837-854] 72a b
42 Kant *Pure Reason* 209d
49 Darwin *Origin of Species* 10a c 47c 52b 68d 69c 136a 151d esp 136a b 141b 142c 143b 145c 150d 151d 230b 231c / *Descent of Man* 344b 345c 351c 355d 365b-c

6 The facts of evolution evidences bearing on the history of life on earth

6a The geological record the significance of fossil remains

36 Swift *Gulliver* part ii 79a b
42 Kant *Judgement* 583d 584c
49 Darwin *Origin of Species* 80c-81a 152a 180d esp 179b 180d 231d 233a 237a c 242c 243a

6b The geographical distribution of the forms of life in relation to the genealogy of existing species

49 Darwin *Origin of Species* 51a 52b passim 80c 82d 181a 206a c esp 204d 206a c 231b-c 237c 238b / *Descent of Man* 343c 344a

6c Comparative anatomy and embryology the meaning of rudimentary or vestigial organs and functions

9 Aristotle *History of Animals* bk i ch 9 [491b26-35] 13c bk iv ch 8 [532b34-533a14] 59d 60a bk vii ch 7 112b c
28 Harvey *On Animal Generation* 375b c 451c-453a passim
30 Bacon *Novum Organum* bk i aph 7 139c
38 Rousseau *Inequality* 334b d

Th origin and de elopment of man

a The doctrine of man s special cre t on. in body in soul

7b The theory of the e olut onary or g n of m n from lower forms of animal life descent from an ancestor common to man and the anthropoids

7b(1) Anatomical phys ological and em bryological evidences of an organic affinity between man and other mam mal an forms of l fe

7b(2) Paleontological ev dences the missing li k in man s ancestry

7b(3) Psycholog cal e idences the human mind in relat on to animal intelligence

7c Biological evolution in the course of h man generation from prehistor c to histor c man

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For Other discussions of the classification of animals *see* ANIMAL 2a–2c LIFE AND DEATH 3–3b and for the distinction between species and genera in relation to definition and classification *see* DEFINITION 1a 2b 2d RELATION 5a(4) SAME AND OTHER 3a(1)

Other considerations of the problem of heredity *see* ANIMAL 10 FAMILY 6b HABIT 3e

Matters relevant to the origin of life and of the major forms of life *see* ANIMAL 1b 8a–8b LIFE AND DEATH 2 3a

Another treatment of the conflict of organisms in the struggle for existence *see* OPPOSITION 3e

Matters relevant to the origin of man and to his affinity with other animals *see* ANIMAL 1c–1c(2) MAN 1a–1c 4b–4c 8–8c MIND 3a–3b SOUL 2c(2)–2c(3)

Evolution in relation to the idea of progress *see* PROGRESS and for matters bearing on social and mental evolution in human history *see* HISTORY 4b MAN 9c MIND 3c PROGRESS 1b, 6 TIME 8a

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection

II Works by authors not represented in this collection

For the date place and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

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Chapter 25 EXPERIENCE

INTRODUCTION

EXPERIENCE is regarded as a source of knowledge It is also spoken of as containing what is known

Sometimes it is identified with sense perception sometimes it involves more—memory and the activity of the imagination Sometimes it includes thoughts feelings and desires as well all the contents of consciousness every phase of mental or psychic life The temporal flow of experience is then identified with the stream of consciousness

Experience may connote something which is private or public subjective or objective—something which no man can share with another or something which is common to all men who live in the same world and who are acquainted with the same objects

There are still other divisions of experience intuitive or aesthetic experience religious experience and mystical experience

Experience is said to be that which makes a man expert in an art or in a sphere of practical activity A man is better able to do or make that which he has much experience in doing or making He is also better able to judge what should be undertaken or what has been accomplished by others as well as by himself In this connection experience is called practical both because it is the result of practice and because it is a means to be used in directing action But it is also praised for the opposite reason—as something to be enjoyed for its own sake serving no end beyond itself unless it be the enrichment of life by the widest variety of experiences

THESE ARE SOME of the myriad meanings of experience —not all but those which occur with major emphasis in the tradition of the great books No author uses the word in all these senses Some of these senses are contradictory According to the context of the discussion or the subject matter under consideration the same author will shift from one meaning to another

For example in his account of the origin of science Aristotle says that out of sense-perception comes to be what we call memory and out of frequently repeated memories of the same thing develops experience for a number of memories constitute a single experience The further product of experience— the universal stabilized in its entirety within the soul —is obtained by abstraction and the related act of induction or generalization Art or science arises Aristotle writes when from many notions gained by experience one universal judgment about a class of objects is produced Hence it can be said he thinks that from experience originate the skill of the craftsman the knowledge of the man of science skill in the sphere of coming to be and science in the sphere of being

In the study of nature experience according to Aristotle is essential for taking a comprehensive view of the admitted facts which can come only from dwelling in intimate association with nature and its phenomena In the context of ethical or political problems he treats experience as the basis for a prudent judgment which is not concerned with universals only but must also recognize the particulars This fact Aristotle writes explains why some who do not know but who have experience are more practical than others who know In the field of poetry as in moral matters it is the man of experience according to Aristotle who can best judge what is good or bad he can judge rightly the works produced and understand by what means or how they are achieved and what harmonizes with what whereas the inexperienced must

e content if they do not fa l to see whether the ork has been well or ill made

Hobbes and William James also use the word for the possession of expertness or sound judg ment in practical affairs as well as in connection with the origin or nature of knowledge Hobbes like Aristotle says that much memory or memory of many thin s is called *Experience* He connects it with prudence It is that knowl edge he writes wh ch is not attained by rea soning but found as well in brute beasts as in man and is but a memory of successions of e ents in times past wherein the omission of e ery little circumstance altering the effect frustrates the expectation of the most prudent

For James however experience is usually identified with the stream of consciousness Experience moulds us every hour he writes and makes of our minds a mirror of the time-and-space-connections between the things in the world He distinguishes it from concep tion reasoning or thought and associates it with sensation and feeling The way of experi ence proper is the front door he writes the door of the five senses

For the most part experience is a term in psychological analysis with impl cations for the development of theoretic knowledge or prac tical wisdom. That is the way it is chiefly used by Aquinas Bacon Descartes Spinoza Locke and Hume as well as the authors already men t oned It is still a term in the d mension of psychology when it is used by Plotinus and by the theologians to discuss the mystical union of the soul with God

But w th Hume experience also is reality or in his phrase the realm of matters of fact and ex stence as opposed to relations of ideas He tends to identify the order of nature with the success on of events in experience though he also seems to conce ve a pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas Nature he goes on to say has implanted n us an instinct which carries forward the thought n a correspondent course to that which she has established amo g e ternal objects

Hume s difficulty or indecision with regard to th obje t ty of experience does not appear in Kant for whom experience ceases to be psy chological n any subjective sense f that word

The order of nature—the object of the theoretic sciences—*is* the order of experience In Kant s technical sense of *mogliche erfahrung* nature is the realm of all possible experience His distinction between judgments of per ception and judgments of experience differentiates what for other writers is subjective sense-experience from knowledge of reality or of objects shared by many minds

Experience is the domain of such public objects precisely because its sense-materials are formed and ordered by the structure of the mind itself—by the forms of intuition and the categories of the understanding in a synthesis which Kant calls the transcendental unity of apperception Without this synthesis experi ence would be merely a rhapsody of perceptions never fitting together into any connected text according to rules of a thoroughly united (possible) consciousness and therefore never subjected to the transcendental and necessary unity of apperception

Though it may not seem possible William James goes further than Kant in the conception of experience as a realm of being Kant does not think that *all possible experience* circumscribes reality That which is not phenomenon he writes cannot be an object of experience it can never overstep the limits of sensibility within which alone objects are presented to us In contrast to this phenomenal reality with wh ch he identifies experience Kant posits a noumenal world—a world of intelligible or supra-sensible beings. To this realm Kant writes belong those possible things which are not objects of our senses but are cogitated by the understanding alone Since the things Kant calls *d ng-an-sich* are unconditioned that is not subject as they are in themselves to the forms of intuition or the categories of the un derstanding they cannot have an empirical or sensible reality but only an intelligible exist ence

William James goes further in his *Essays in Rad cal Empiricism* when he takes experience as equivalent to the whole of reality including the actual and the possible or imaginary the concrete and the abstract the objective and the subjective All differentiations must be made within experience and experience itself is neutral with respect to all distinctions—re-

ceptive of all There can be no meaningful distinction between experience and some other realm of existence It is in this all inclusive sense that experience is said to be the central term in the philosophy of John Dewey when it functions as *mind* does for Hegel *substance* for Spinoza or *being* for Aquinas and Aristotle

WE HAVE GONE from one extreme to another in passing from a purely psychological to something like a metaphysical conception of experience These are opposite in a way which suggests the contrast between the practical and the aesthetic values of experience—the actively useful and the intrinsically enjoyable At least the metaphysical identification of experience with all existence seems analogous to the aesthetic ideal of a life which embraces every variety of experience

There is some intimation of this ideal in the lust for adventure which motivates Odysseus and his men Dante in fact finds the secret of his character in the ardor of Odysseus to become experienced of the world and of the vices of men and of their virtue which leads him to pursue virtue and knowledge even to the point of his mad flight

There is some suggestion of this ideal of experience in the unbounded vitality of Gargantua and Pantagruel and in the enterprise of the Wife of Bath in Chaucer s tale But the great poetic expression of this ideal is written in *Faust*—in the worlds of experience Mephistopheles opens to the man who has wagered his soul for one ultimately satisfying moment

Whatever to all mankind is assured
I in my inmost being will enjoy and know
Seize with my soul the highest and most deep
Men s weal and woe upon my bosom heap
And thus this self of mine to all their selves expanded
Like them I too at last be stranded

THE BASIC ISSUE concerning the role of experience in the origin of knowledge especially the organized knowledge of the arts and sciences turns on whether it is *the* source or only *a* source It is rarely if ever supposed that nothing can be learned from experience or that everything worth learning can come to be known entirely apart from experience During the early centuries of Christianity devoutly religious men preached that God has revealed to man all he needs to know in order to live well and be saved But this extreme position rejects the constructions of reason as well as the materials of experience

Among philosophers and scientists concerned with what man can learn by the exercise of his own powers the controversy over experience usually involves a distinction between the senses and the reason or intellect As indicated in the chapters on IDEA MIND and SENSE whether this distinction can be validly made is itself a major issue in the tradition of the great books Those who make it however tend to regard experience as something which results from the activity of the senses For them the problem is whether our ideas—the general notions or concepts that enter into our scientific judgments and reasoning—come from sense-experience which either is or originates from the perception of particulars The contrast between the particular and the universal between percept sense impression or concrete image on the one hand and concept or abstract idea on the other lies at the heart of the problem

One possibility is that the mind by processes of abstraction or induction somehow draws all its concepts and generalizations from experience Aquinas is representative of this view He adopts Aristotle s notion that the intellect is like a tablet on which nothing is written This *tabula rasa* depends upon the senses and the imagination for the material out of which concepts are formed For the intellect to understand actually Aquinas writes not only when it acquires new knowledge but also when it uses knowledge already acquired there is need for the act of the imagination and of the other powers

Without experience the mind would remain empty but experience itself does not fill the intellect with ideas The activity of the sensitive faculty is not by itself the cause of knowledge The perceptions and images furnished by sense experience Aquinas writes need to be made actually intelligible and this requires the activity of the intellect not merely its passivity in receiving impressions from experience For this reason he concludes it cannot be said that sensitive knowledge is the total and perfect cause of intellectual knowledge but

rather that it is in a way the material cause—Although experience is the indispensable source of the materials on which the intellect actively works knowledge worthy of the name of science or of art does not come from experience alone

Thus we see that those who like Aquinas affirm that there is nothing in the intellect which was not previously in the senses do not mean to imply that the materials of sense-experience reach the intellect untransformed On the contrary the primary contribution of the intellect is the translation of experienced particulars into universal notions Nor do those who like Bacon affirm that the principles of knowledge are obtained by induction from experience necessarily imply that all knowledge is *directly* drawn from experience To the extent that deductive reasoning is a way of learning new truths the truths thus learned derive from experience only indirectly Their direct source is truths already known which must in turn have come from experience by induction

Harvey criticizes those who misconceive the part which reason should play in relation to the senses. In the field of his own inquiries some weak and inexperienced persons he writes vainly seek by dialectics and far fetched arguments either to upset or establish things that are only to be founded on anatomical demonstration and believed on the evidence of the senses

How difficult it is he continues to teach those who have no experience the things of which they have not any knowledge by their senses[1]

As in geometry so in all the sciences according to Harvey it is the business of reason from things sensible to make rational demonstration of things that are not sensible to render credible or certain things abstruse and beyond sense from things more manifest and better known Science depends upon both reason and sense but sense not reason is the ultimate arbiter of what can be accepted as true To test whether anything has been well or ill advanced to ascertain whether some falsehood does not lurk under a proposition it is imperative on us Harvey declares to bring it to the proof of sense and to admit or reject it on the decision of sense

THE FOREGOING views are not a necessary consequence of the distinction between the faculties of sense and reason The theory of innate ideas presents another possibility As expressed by Descartes for example this theory holds that there are purely intellectual [ideas] which our understanding apprehends by means of a certain inborn light Hence it would seem that experience can be dispensed with except for its value in dealing with particulars But for most of the writers who take this view experience in addition to providing acquaintance with particulars, acts as the stimulus or the occasion for the development of the seeds of knowledge implanted in the mind at birth Although he rests his metaphysics on the innate ideas of self and God Descartes also appeals to experimental knowledge in the sphere of natural science To answer such a question as what is the nature of the magnet the inquirer must first collect all the observations with which experience can supply him about this stone and from these he will next try to deduce its character

The extreme position which denies any role to experience can be taken only by those who think that the growth of actual knowledge from innate ideas requires no outside impetus and perhaps also by those who make ideas the objects of the mind's intuitive apprehension It is questionable whether anyone goes to this extreme without the qualification that for particulars at least sense-experience is knowledge

The other extreme—that experience is the *only* source of *knowledge*—is approached by those who deny the distinction in faculties and substitute for the duality of sense and reason each with its characteristic contribution to human knowledge a distinction between the function of perceiving and that of reworking the received materials. Though in different ways Hobbes Locke Berkeley and Hume all appear to take this position

They represent according to James the empirical school in psychology He tries to summarize their view by saying that if *all* the connections among ideas in the mind could be interpreted as *so many* combinations of sense data wrought into fixity then experience in the common and legitimate sense of the word would be the sole fashioner of the mind If

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even more emphatic than Aristotle or Aquinas in his insistence on the empirical origin of knowledge goes as far as they do in affirming man s knowledg of God and the soul

Hume in contrast holds that knowledge may go beyond experience only if it is knowledge of the relation of our ideas, as exemplified in the science of mathematics. Precisely because mathematics is not knowledge of matters of fact or real existence its propositions are according to Hume discoverable by the mere operation of thought without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe. But with regard to matters of fact Hume thinks that "experience is our only guide

Any science which claims to be knowledge of reality or existence rather than of the relations between ideas, is thus limited to the realm of experienceable objects. According as the objects of a science fall within experience so also must its conclusions be verified by reference to experience Experience is the ultimate test of what truth there is in th propositions of natural science Only the propositions of mathematics can have a validity which does not require empirical verification.

By these criteria Hume challenges the validity of metaphysics or natural theology Such disciplines claim to be knowledge of real existences, but their objects are not experienceable and their conclusions cannot be empirically verified The exist nce of God and the immortality of the soul may be objects of faith but they are not verifiable conclus ons of science nor for that matter can metaphysics give us scientific knowledge of the ult mate constitution of the phys cal world if that involves knowledge of substances and causes which lie behind the ph nomena and out de of experience. "All the ph losophy in the world Hume writes, "and all the religion will never be able to carry us be ond the usual course of experi nce

Kant lik Hume limits theoretic knowledge to mathematics and the stud of nature A met physics which pretends to know objects outside the phenomenal order cannot be de f ied "Th understanding has no power to d de he writes, "whether other perceptions bes des those which belong to the total of our possible experience [exist], and consequently whether some other sphere of matter exists. What transcends all possible experience in other words cannot be known at least not in the manner of the speculative sciences only the moral sciences, proceeding in a d fferent fashion have access to the realm of the supra-sensible

Kant s position seems to resemble Hume s But it involves a quite d fferent conception of mathematics and natural science especially the latter which Kant divides into pure and empirical physics. Kant identifies pure physic with the metaphysic of nature in distinction from the metaphysic of morals" the one a theoretic, the other a practical science For Kant the principles of both mathematics and pure physics are *a priori* rather than *a posteriori* the objects of both are objects of actual or possible experience

IN THE CLASSIFICATION of sciences the natural sciences are usually set apart from mathematics, as well as from metaphysics, by being called *empirical or experimental* These names signify not merely the inductive method by which the knowledge is obtained from experience they also imply that hypotheses however formulated and conclusions, however reached must be verified by the facts of experience Newton states it as a rule of reasoning in experimental philosophy [that] we are to look upon propos tions inferred by general ind tion from phenomena as accurately or very nearly true notwithstanding any contrary hypotheses hat may be imagined till such time as other phenomena occur by which they may either be made more accurate or liable to exceptions." In similar tenor La oisier says that we ought in every instance to submit our reasoning to the test of experiment and never to search for truth but by the natural road of experiment and observation.

The two words "empirical and experimental should not however be used interchangeably No science can be experimental without being empirical but as the chapter on ASTRONOMY indicates th converse does not appear to be true

There seem to be three different types of experience from which knowledge can be de ri ed (1) the ordinary everyday experiences which men a cumulate without mal...

in other words all that is done with the sensations impressions or ideas—whatever term is used for the original data of experience—consists in their reproduction by memory and imagination and their comparison combination and connection in various ways to produce complex ideas judgments and trains of reasoning then the entire content of human knowledge can be reduced to elements derived exclusively from experience

Whether this position is taken *with* or *without* qualification depends on the disposition that is made of the problem of universals or abstractions which is more fully discussed in the chapters on IDEA SENSE and UNIVERSAL. Locke s treatment of abstract ideas and the special consideration given by Hume to the concepts of mathematics suggest that there are kinds or aspects of knowledge which cannot be accounted for by reduction to experience Both men introduce a certain qualification upon their empiricism However slight that may be it does not appear in Hobbes and Berkeley for they completely deny the existence of abstract or universal notions in the mind If abstract universal or general applies to names alone then the mind or understanding adds nothing to and does not radically transform the materials of experience

THE CONTROVERSY concerning experience and knowledge can also be stated in terms of the opposition between the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* These terms are sometimes used to signify what is possessed before and what comes after or from experience and sometimes they are used to indicate without reference to the time order what is independent of and what is dependent upon experience

The distinction between the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* is not made in the same way with respect to propositions or judgments and with respect to reasoning or inference The distinction and its significance for science and philosophy are discussed in the chapters on JUDGMENT and REASONING It is sufficient here to point out that an *a priori* judgment is not determined by experience nor does it need empirical verification

It might at first be supposed that those who agree in thinking that experience is just one—not the only—source of knowledge would also agree that some judgments especially the basic propositions of science are *a priori* But this does not appear to be the case Bacon for example like Aristotle holds that the principles of the various sciences are derived by induction from experience There are and can exist he writes but two ways of investigating and discovering truth The one hurries on rapidly from the senses and particulars to the most general axioms and from them as principles and their supposed indisputable truth derives and discovers the intermediate axioms The other constructs its axioms from the senses and particulars by ascending continually and gradually till it finally arrives at the most general axioms All axioms on this view are *a posteriori* propositions

Descartes and Kant while differing in the terms of their analysis think as we have seen that the mind itself provides the ground for certain judgments which are therefore *a priori*. It does not even seem to be the case that those who make experience the only source of knowledge regard all propositions as *a posteriori* Hume s treatment of mathematical propositions and James treatment of axioms or necessary truths seem to be the exceptions here

There is still another way in which the issue can be stated The question is whether human knowledge extends to objects beyond experience to things or beings which are not sensible and which transcend all possible experience

Again it might be supposed that those who take an *a posteriori* view of the origin of knowledge would also limit apprehension to things experienceable But Aristotle and Aquinas seem to say that the origin of knowledge from experience does not restrict the knowable to things capable of being experienced Aquinas cites Aristotle s work on the heavens to show that we may have a scientific knowledge of things we cannot experience by way of negation and by their relation to material things He would hold what is true of astronomy to be even more the case in metaphysics and theology Even though all our concepts are abstracted from experience we can by means of them reach beyond the sensible world to purely intelligible realities—to immaterial and non sensible beings or aspects of being Locke who may be thought

of discovery rather than of induction or verification. Hypotheses may result from such explorations, but in the first instance the experimentation may be undertaken without the guidance of hypotheses. This employment of experimental technique is illustrated by Faraday's remark that "the science of electricity is in that state in which every part of it requires experimental investigation not merely for the discovery of new effects, but what is just now of far more importance the development of the means by which the old effects are produced

Experimental exploration apart from the direction of hypotheses, seems to be a procedure of trial and error. Experimentation in this sense reflects what Hippocrates had in mind when he spoke of the experiment perilous. In the work of Hippocrates at the very beginning of empirical science recourse to experiment far from being the most prized technique signified a lack of scientific knowledge. Only the physician who could not cure the patient by art based on science took the risk of experimenting—of proceeding by trial and error

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special effort to investigate explore or test (2) the special data of experience which men collect by undertaking methodical research and making systematic observations with or without apparatus and (3) experiences artificially produced by men who exercise control over the phenomena and with respect to which the observer himself determines the conditions of his experience Those experiences which are used to prove a scientific truth James writes are for the most part artificial experiences of the laboratory gained after the truth itself has been conjectured

Of these three only the last is an experimental experience The first type of experience may be employed by the scientist but it is seldom sufficient or reliable enough for his purposes The distinction between the empirical sciences which are and those which are not experimental turns on the difference between the second and third types

It is not always possible for the scientist to perform experiments as for example in astronomy where the phenomena can be methodically observed and exactly recorded but cannot be manipulated or controlled Among the great books of natural science the biological writings of Hippocrates Aristotle Galen and Darwin the astronomical works of Ptolemy Copernicus Kepler and Newton and the clinical studies of Freud are examples of scientific works which are more or less empirical but not experimental In contrast Galileo s *Two New Sciences* Newton s *Optics* Harvey s *Motion of the Heart and Blood* Lavoisier s *Elements of Chemistry* and Faraday s *Experimental Researches in Electricity* represent empirical science which has recourse to experimentation at crucial points

On the side of their production experiments are like inventions They do not happen by chance or without the intervention of art They are usually performed under carefully controlled conditions and by means of apparatus artfully contrived This explains the interplay between technology and experimental science Progress in each occasions progress in the other

On the side of their utility experiments seem to serve three different though related purposes in scientific work In those branches of physics which are both mathematical and experimental, the experiment enables the scientist to make exact measurements of the phenomena and so to determine whether one or another mathematical formulation fits the observable facts of nature Investigating accelerated motion Galileo seeks not only to demonstrate its definition and its properties but also to show that experimental results agree with and exactly *correspond* with those properties which have been one after another demonstrated by us

The experiment of the inclined plane yields measurements which exemplify those ratios between space and time that are determined by *one rather than by another mathematical definition* of the acceleration of a freely falling body The experiment is thus used to decide between two competing mathematical theories choosing that one best fitting natural phenomena In those sciences Galileo writes in which mathematical demonstrations are applied to natural phenomena the principles once established by *well chosen experiments become the foundation* of the entire super structure

Concerned with the phenomena of heat Fourier makes the same point concerning the relation of mathematics and experiments Mathematical analysis he says can deduce from general and simple phenomena the expression of the laws of nature but the special *application of these laws to very complex effects* demands a long series of exact observations for which experiments are needed

In addition to testing hypotheses and providing measurements whereby mathematical formulations can be applied to nature experiments function as the source of inductions A crucial experiment constitutes a single clear case from which a generalization can be drawn that is applicable to all cases Newton s optical experiments are of this sort He calls this use of experiments the *method of analysis* It consists in making experiments and observations and in drawing general conclusions from them by induction And although the arguing from experiments and observations by induction be no demonstration of general conclusions yet it is the best way of arguing which the nature of things admits of

A third use for experiments is in the exploration of new fields of phenomena for purposes

of discovery rather than of induction or verification. Hypotheses may result from such explorations, but in the first instance the experimentation may be undertaken without the guidance of hypotheses. This employment of experimental technique is illustrated by Faraday's remark that "the science of electricity is in that state in which every part of it requires experimental investigation, not merely for the discovery of new effects, but what is just now of far more importance, the development of the means by which the old effects are produced."

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REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad* BK II [265-283] 12d the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119 When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164

AUTHOR S DIVISIONS *One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as* PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases *e g Iliad* BK II [265-283] 12d

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a *(D)* follows *e g* OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—*(D) II Esdras* 7 46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermit*tently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited*

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface

1 Various conceptions of experience

8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation* CH 1 [16 3-8] 25a / *Posterior Analytics* BK II CH 19 [99b34 100 9] 136b-c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH I [980b25-981b9] 499b d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 54 A 5 288a d Q 58 A 3 REP 3 301d 302d Q 64 A 1 REP 5 334a 335c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 112 A 5 ANS and REP 1 5 359c 360c

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 50d PART II 128c PART IV 267b

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 516b 524a

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 334a 335a

31 DESCARTES *Rules* XII 22c / *Discourse* PART 1 44a c

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II AXIOM 5 373d

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH I SECT 1-8 121a 123a esp SECT 2 121b c

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 30 418c

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT IV DIV 20 SECT VIII DIV 74 458a-484c passim esp SECT IV DIV 28 SECT V DIV 38 460d 466c SECT VII DIV 58-61 476a-478a

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 14a 15c 45d-46a 47d 48a 53b 54b 56d 57b 58c 59b 65d 66d 72c 73a 176d 177a 225c 226b / *Practical Reason* 308a b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 185b 187b 232b 238b esp 235a 236a 260a 261a 317b 318a 852b 858b

2 Experience in relation to the acts of the mind

7 PLATO *Meno* 179d 183a / *Phaedo* 224a 225a 228a 230c / *Republic* BK VII 392c 393c / *Theaetetus* 534d 536b

8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK II CH 19 136a 137a c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 1 499a 500b

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18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X par 12 36 74b 80d esp par 14 74d 75a par 26 78a b par 31 79c d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 54 A 5 288a-d Q 58 A 3 REP 3 301d 302d Q 64 A 1 REP 5 334a 335c Q 84 AA 5-8 446c-451b PART I II Q 40 A 5 795d 796c A 6 ANS and REP 3 796c 797a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 112 A 5 ANS and REP 1 5 359c 360c

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 332a 335c esp 334c d

31 DESCARTES *Rules* XII 22c 23a / *Discourse* PART III 50b d / *Meditations* II 75a 77c esp 75d 76c / *Objections and Replies* 229d 230d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 40-42 387a 388c

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH I SECT 2-5 121b-122b s CT 20-25 126d 127d

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 1a-4a c 14 -c 22a,c 23a 24a 34a-c 39a-c 2a 45d-46a 47c-48a 53b-54b 58a 59b 61a-64a 66a-d 72c-85d esp 72c 74b 89c 91d 93d 94b 98c 109d 110a 115b-c 153a-c 199b-c / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals*, 253a b 282b-c / *Practical Reason* 308a b 329b-c / *Judgement*, 461a-462d 472c-d 482d-483d 492c-d 516b 551a 552c 562d 553b 570b-572b 603d 604b-c

53 JAMES *Psychology* 2b-3a 149b-152b esp 152 b 299b-300a 314a 317b-319a 325a 369a 76 b- 68a 851a-89 b esp 851a b, 897 b

2a Memory and imagination as factors in or products of experience

7 PLATO *Phaedo* 228a 230c / *Theaetetus* 523d 524b / *Philebus* 621 -c

8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK II CH 19 [99b34 100a6] 136b-c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH I [980a28-981] 499a b

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28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 332a 335c esp 334c-d

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 59a b

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 4 CHOL I 387b-388a

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35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT I 413a b

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54 FREUD *Interpretation of Dreams* 363c 364b

2b The empirical source of induction, abstraction, generalization

8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK I CH 3 [46 5 8] 64 K II CH 23 [68 5 29] 90b-c / *Posterior Analytics* BK CH I [71a1-8] 97a II 8 111b-c CH 3 120a-c K II, CH 2 [90a24 30] 123b-c II [9- 34 b1] 126b CH 9 136a 13 a,c / *Topics* BK CH 12 148d CH 18 [5 1] 153d BK II CH [3 3 31] 158d BK V I, CH [55 35 6] 211d 212a [156b 10- 5] 212 -d / *Physics* K I, CH I 259a-b BK I I CH [2a19-b] 335d 336b / *Heavens* BK III CH 7 [306a6-18] 397b-c / *Generation and Corruption* BK I CH [316a5 14] 411c d / *Metaphysics* BK I CH I [980b25-981a12] 499b-c / *Soul* BK I CH I [4 b11 403a] 631d 632a

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 4 [1095a30-b8] 340c BK VI CH 8 [1142 1 19] 391b CH 11 [1143a34 b6] 392d 393a / *Rhetoric* BK II CH 20 [1393a25 b3] 641a

18 AUGUSTINE *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 27 650a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 0 AA 3 4 416a-418c Q 84 A 6 447c-449a Q 85 A I 451c-453c A 3 A 5 455b-457a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q 9 A 4 766b-767b Q 12 776c 779d passim

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 331a 335c esp 334c-d

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 43d-44c 57b-d 59c / *Novum Organum* BK I APH 19-26 108b-d APH 51 111c APH 69- 0 116a 117a APH 100-106 127c 128c BK II, APH 10-15 140c 149a

31 DESCARTES *Rules* II 2d 3a VII 10c 11c XII 24a b XI 28a b / *Discourse* PART VI 61d 62c / *Objections and Replies* 167c d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 40 CHOL I 2 38 b-388b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* K I C I 1, SECT 15 98d 99a BK II, CH XI, SECT 8-9 145b-c CH XXXII SECT 6 244b-c BK III CH II SECT 6-8 255c 256a

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 107 433d-434a

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT III DIV 19 458a

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 341b-342b

42 KANT *Pure Reason*, 14 b 45b-46a / *Judgement* 562d 563b

45 FARADAY *Researches in Electricity* 659a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO, 182d 183c PART IV 361a b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 303a 329a 331b 6 4a 67 a passim 858a-865b esp 860b-862a, 864 865a

54 FREUD *Instincts* 412a

2c The transcendental or innate structure of the mind as condition of experience

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 14a 108a, esp 14a 15c 23a 33d, 41c-42b 48d 51d, 53b-55a, 56d 59b 66d-93c, 99a 101b 112d 113a 115d 128c-d 166c 171 173b 176d 177a 192a b 199b-c 207 -d 213d 215a / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 281b-c 283b / *Practical Reason*, 308a b 309d 310a 350b-c / *Judgement* 471b-c 482d 492c-d 515d 516b 520a 552b-c 562d 563b 570b-572d esp 5 0c-d 572b-c 5 3a-c 603d 604b-c 612 -d

53 JAMES *Psychology* 3 b-238b esp 232b-233b, 235a b 260a 261a 62 -635a passim, esp 629a-631a 851 -890a esp 851b-862a, 865a-868a, 881b [fn 3], 889a

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: *Iliad*, BK II [265–283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES: *Psychology*, 116a–119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: *Symposium*, 163b–164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., *Iliad*, BK II [265–283] 12d.

BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (*D*), follows; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: *Nehemiah*, 7:45—(*D*) *II Esdras*, 7:46.

SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas*, consult the Preface.

1. Various conceptions of experience

8 ARISTOTLE: *Interpretation*, CH 1 [16ª3–8] 25a / *Posterior Analytics*, BK II, CH 19 [99ᵇ34–100ª9] 136b–c / *Metaphysics*, BK I, CH 1 [980ᵇ25–981ᵇ9] 499b–d

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART I, Q 54, A 5 288a–d; Q 58, A 3, REP 3 301d–302d; Q 64, A 1, REP 5 334a–335c

20 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART I–II, Q 112, A 5, ANS and REP 1, 5 359c–360c

23 HOBBES: *Leviathan*, PART I, 50d; PART II, 128c; PART IV, 267b

25 MONTAIGNE: *Essays*, 516b–524a

28 HARVEY: *On Animal Generation*, 334a–335a

31 DESCARTES: *Rules*, XII, 22c / *Discourse*, PART I, 44a–c

31 SPINOZA: *Ethics*, PART II, AXIOM 5 373d

35 LOCKE: *Human Understanding*, BK II, CH I, SECT 1–8 121a–123a esp SECT 2 121b–c

35 BERKELEY: *Human Knowledge*, SECT 30 418c

35 HUME: *Human Understanding*, SECT IV, DIV 20–SECT VIII, DIV 74 458a–484c passim, esp SECT IV, DIV 28–SECT V, DIV 38 460d–466c; SECT VII, DIV 58–61 476a–478a

42 KANT: *Pure Reason*, 14a–15c; 45d–46a; 47d–48a; 53b–54b; 56d–57b; 58c–59b; 65d–66d; 72c–73a; 176d–177a; 225c–226b / *Practical Reason*, 308a–b

53 JAMES: *Psychology*, 185b–187b; 232b–238b esp 235a–236a; 260a–261a; 317b–318a; 852b–858b

2. Experience in relation to the acts of the mind

7 PLATO: *Meno*, 179d–183a / *Phaedo*, 224a–225a; 228a–230c / *Republic*, BK VII, 392c–393c / *Theaetetus*, 534d–536b

8 ARISTOTLE: *Posterior Analytics*, BK II, CH 19 136a–137a,c / *Metaphysics*, BK I, CH 1 499a–500b

12 LUCRETIUS: *Nature of Things*, BK IV [379–521] 49a–51a esp [469–521] 50b–51a

18 AUGUSTINE: *Confessions*, BK X, par 12–36 74b–80d esp par 14 74d–75a, par 26 78a–b, par 31 79c–d

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART I, Q 54, A 5 288a–d; Q 58, A 3, REP 3 301d–302d; Q 64, A 1, REP 5 334a–335c; Q 84, AA 5–8 446c–451b; PART I–II, Q 40, A 5 795d–796c; A 6, ANS and REP 3 796c–797a

20 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART I–II, Q 112, A 5, ANS and REP 1, 5 359c–360c

28 HARVEY: *On Animal Generation*, 332a–335c esp 334c–d

31 DESCARTES: *Rules*, XII, 22c–23a / *Discourse*, PART III, 50b–d / *Meditations*, I, 75a–77c esp 75d–76c / *Objections and Replies*, 229d–230d

31 SPINOZA: *Ethics*, PART II, PROP 40, SCHOL 2 387a–388c

(2 *Experience in relation to the acts of the mind*)

2d The *a priori* and *a posteriori* in judgment and reasoning

8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 3 [72b25-33] 99c BK II CH 19 136a 137a c / *Physics* BK I CH I 259a b / *Metaphysics* BK I CH I 499a 500b BK VII CH 3 [1029 33-b12] 552a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2 A I REP 2 10d 11d A 2 11d 12c Q 3 A 5 ANS 17c 18b
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 112 A 5 ANS and REP I 5 359c 360c
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 332a 335c
31 DESCARTES *Rules* II 2d 3a / *Meditations* III 81d 89a esp 88c d / *Objections and Replies* PROP I II 132b c 215b c 224b d
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP II 358b 359b PART II PROP 40 SCHOL 2 388a b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH I SECT 15-16 98d 99c SECT 23 101b 10?a BK IV CH IX SECT I 349a CH XI SECT 13-14 357d 358c
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT IV DIV 20-SECT V DIV 38 458a 466c esp SECT IV DIV 30 462a SECT X DIV 89 490b-c SECT XI 497b 503c passim SECT XII DIV 131-132 508d 509d passim
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 14a 108a c esp 14a 20c 23a 24a 25b 26b 27b 28b 29d 33d 35b 36a 41c 42b 46a 48d 57d 59b 64b 66d 108b d 110a 113b 115d 120c 123d 124b 134c d 141d 142c [antithesis] 146a 170d 171a 172c 173a 174a 177d 179c 182b 190c 191a 192a b 199a 209b d 211c 218d 2 4a 227a 228b d 230c 231c .36d 237a 244d 245a / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Moral* 253a 254d esp 253b 254c d 268b d 283b / *Practical Reason* 307d 308b 309b d 329d 330c / *Science of Right* 405b d / *Judgement* 461a 475d esp 465c 467d 474b 475d 570b 572b 600d 603d esp 603a b
43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 445d 447a passim 475b d [fn 1]
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 182d 183c
53 JAMES *Psychology* 851a 890a esp 851a b 859a 861b 889a 890a

3 Experience in relation to organized knowledge art and science

7 PLATO *Gorgias* 253a
8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK I CH 30 [46 18 28] 64a / *Posterior Analytics* BK II CH 19 136a 137a c / *Heavens* BK III CH 7 [306 6-18] 397b-c / *Generation and Corruption* BK I CH 2 [316 5 14] 411c d / *Metaphysics* BK I CH I 499a 500b
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK X CH 9 [1180b13 1181b 12] 435b-436a c
10 HIPPOCRATES *Ancient Medicine* par 1-8 1a 3b / *Aphorisms* SECT I par I 131a
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE II [46 105] 108b d
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 60c 61a PART II 128d 129b
28 HARVEY *Circulation of the Blood* 322d 323d 324c d / *On Animal Generation* 331b 335c esp 334c d
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 16a / *Novum Organum* BK I APH 98 126d 127b
31 DESCARTES *Rules* II 2d 3a / *Discourse* PART I 44a c PART VI 61b d / *Meditations* I 75a 77c esp 75d 76c
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 40 SCH L 2 388a b
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 396 240b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH I SECT 1-8 121a 123a esp SECT 2 121b-c CH I SECT 15 146d 147a
35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 30-32 418c-419a SECT 43 420d
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT IV DIV 20 SECT V DIV 38 458a-466c passim esp SECT V DIV 36 465a d [fn 1] 465c SECT VII DIV 60 477a c SECT VIII DIV 65 479b-480a
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 14a 15c 72c 85d esp 72c 74b 82a b / *Judgement* 562d 563b
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 281b c
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [522 601] 15a 16b
54 FREUD *General Introduction* 449 451b

3a Particular experiences and general rules as conditions of expertness or skill the contrast between the empiric and the artist

7 PLATO *Charmides* 6d 7b / *Phaedrus* 136b c / *Gorgias* 253a 261a 262a 280d 282b 287d 288b / *Republic* BK I 303a 304a / *Theaetetus* 516a / *Philebus* 633a c / *Laws* BK IV 684c 685a BK IX 745a b
8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK I CH 30 [46 18-28] 64a / *Posterior Analytics* BK II CH 19 [100 3-9] 136c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH I [980b25-982 1] 499b 500b
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 13 [1102 15 26] 347c BK II CH I 348b d 349b passim BK III CH 8 [1116b3 15] 362d 363a BK VI CH I [1138b25 34] 387b BK X CH 9 [1180b13 1181b12] 435b 436a c / *Politics* BK III CH II [1281b40 128.b6] 479d
10 HIPPOCRATES *Ancient Medicine* par 1-8 1a 3b par 20 7b d / *Epidemics* BK III SECT III par 16 59b c / *Surgery* par 1 70b / *Articulations* par 10 94d / *The Law* 144a d
10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK II CH 9 195c 196a
18 AUGUSTINE *Christian Doctrine* BK IV CH 3 676a d
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 60c d
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 66a b 368a 377d passim esp 377a d 450d-451a 523c 524a

30 B ON *Adva cement of Learni g* 5b-6a 48d 49 53a b 56c 57b 74b-d 82c d / *Novum Organum* K I PH 64 114b BK I APH 44-52 175d 195d
31 DE C RT *D scourse* P R T 61b-c
35 H ME *H m Understa ding* SECT V DI 36 465a d [fn 1] 465c S CT II D V 65 479d 480
37 FI LD G *Tom J nes* 296b d 297c
51 TOLS OY *War a d P e* K IX 361d 365c
53 JAM S *Psych l gy* 666b-667a 673 674b 689b-690
54 F U *Psy h A alytic Therapy* 125a

3b The ss e concerning the role of e perience n scie ce

7 PL TO *Phaed* 224 225 228a 230c / *Re p bl* BK 383d 388a BK 391b-398c / *T ma s* 455a-c / *Theaetet s* 534d 536b / *Seven h Let er* 809c 810d
8 ARI OTL *Pri Analytics* K CH 3 [46 18-28] 64 / *Poster o A lytic* BK I H 13 [8 3 , 9a16] 108b-c CH 18 111b-c CH 31 120 -c K I CH 9 136a 137a / *Phys s* K I CH I 259 b CH 8 [19 a24 34] 267 b / *H aven* BK III CH 7 [306a6- 8] 397b- / *Generat o and Corrupt* BK I CH 2 [316a5 14] 411c-d / *Metaphy ics* BK I CH [98 25 982 1] 499b-500b K X CH 7 [1064 4-9] 592b / *S l,* K I H I [4 2b1 4 3 2] 631d 632a
9 A STOTLE *H t ry of A m l* BK III CH 2 [511b 0-25] 35a b / *P ts f A m l* K I H 4 [666a7 1] 193d / *Genera of A im ls* BK I H 0 [760 27 3] 301d 302a / *Eth cs* K X H 9 [180 13 8 1] 435b-436a c
10 H POCRA S *Ancient Medicine* par 1-8 1a 3b / *Aphorism* SECT par 1 131
19 AQ I S *S mma Theologic* I Q 84 6-8 447 -451b Q 96 A R P 3 510b-511b
20 AQ *S mma Theol gica* P T III Q 9 4 766b 767b Q 776c 779d passim
23 HO B *Lev ath* A 60 d PART II 129 267 b
25 M N *Essay* 260c 261c 285 288a 291b 292d
28 G BE *Loadstone* E 1a b BK I 6 7 B II 27b-c
28 G LILEO *T o New Scienc* T D 131a 138b pa im
28 H R Y *M t f the H art* 267b d 268d 280c / *Circulat f the Blood* 322d 323d 324c d / *O A im l Gener t o* 331b 335c 411 d
30 B *Ad ncement f Le g* 5b-c 16a 44c 57b-d / *Novum Organ m* 105a 195d esp BK H 64 114b PH 95 1 3 126b-128a
31 D *Rule II* 2d 3 VI 10c 12a 24 b / *D sco se* T T 61b-62c
31 S OZ *Eth cs* P I PRO 4 S OL I 2 387b-388b
34 NEWTO *Principles* BK III RULE III IV 270b-271b / *Opt cs* BK III 543a b
34 HUYGE S *Light* CH I 553a
35 LOCKE *Human U derst nd g* BK II CH XXIII SECT 3 204c d S CT 6-7 205b 206a SECT 28 29 211b 212a SECT 32 37 212c 214b BK III CH XI SECT 21 23 304d 305b BK IV CH II SECT 14 316b-d SECT 16 317a-c SECT 25 29 321a 323a p ssim CH VI SECT 13 335c d CH XII SECT 9-13 360d 362d CH XVI SECT 12 370b-371
35 BERKELEY *H man Kno led e* SECT 30 418c S CT 58-59 424a b SECT 104 433a b SECT 107 433d-434
35 H E *Human U derstand g* SECT I DIV 20-S CT V D V 38 458a-466c passim SECT VII D V 48 471b-c DIV 60 477 -c SECT VII DIV 65 479b-c S CT XI DIV III 113 501b-502d esp D V II 501c 502
42 KA T *Pure Rea o* 5a 13d 14a-c 15c 16c 31b-d 46a b 58a b 66d-67b 68a 69c 85a b 86d 87b 94b-95a 211c 218d / *Fund Prin Metaphy ic of Morals* 253 254d esp 253b 254b-c 263b-c 273 b / *Practical Reaso* 295b-d 312c-d 329d 330c 331a 332d / *In tro Met physic f Morals* 387a b / *J dgement* 562d 563b
43 M LL *Utilit rian sm* 445b-447a passim 475b d [fn 1]
45 LAVOI R *Elements of Chemistry* PREF 1c 2b 6d 7 c PART I I 87b-c
45 F RA Y *Rese ches in Elect icity* 774d
46 HE L *Ph los phy of Right* INTRO P r 3 10 11 / *Ph l sophy of History* INTRO 156c 190b
51 T LSTOY *War a d Pe ce* EP LOG E II 684
53 JAMES *Psychology* 385a b 677b 86 a 884b esp 862a 865a 867 884b
54 FR UD *Narcissism* 400d-401 / *Inst ncts* 412 b / *General Introd ct on* 54 b d / *New Introductory Lectu es* 815a

4 Experience as measuring the scope of human knowledge

4a The knowab lity of that which is out d e pe en the supra sens bl the nou menal or transc d nt

7 PLATO *Cratyl s* 94a 113b-114 c / *Rep bl c* K V 383d 388a / *Timaeus* 447b-d / *Critia* 478b d / *P rmenid s* 489d-490d / *Theaetetus* 534c 536b
8 ARISTOTLE *H a ens* K CH I [295b 5 4] 390a b / *Memory d Rem iscence* CH [449b30-450a] 690c-d
9 ARISTOTL *Parts f A imals* K CH 5 [644b 21-645a5] 168c d
12 LUC *Nature f Th g* BK I [65 3 8] 4b-5a BK [308-332] 19a b
18 A STINE *City of G d* K XI CH 2 4 323a 324a / *Christian Doctrin* BK C 7 626b-c

(4 *Experience as measuring the scope of human knowledge 4a The knowability of that which is outside experience the supra sensible the noumenal or transcendent*)

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2 AA 1 2 10d 12c QQ 12-13 50b 75b Q 32 175d 180d Q 77 A 1 REI 7 399c 401b Q 84 A 5 446c 447c A 6 REP 3 447c 449a QQ 87-88 464d 473a Q 89 A 2 475a d Q 94 AA 1 2 501d 504a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 112 A 5 359c 360c PART III SUPPL Q 75 A 3 REP 2 938a 939c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE IV [28 48] 111a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 54b c 78d 79a PART II 163a b

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 291b 294b

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 39d 40a 41b d 96d 97b

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 53b 54b / *Objections and Replies* 215b c

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK XII [552 587] 331a 332a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH I SECT 2-10 121b 123d SECT 19 24 126a 127c CH XII SECT 1 2 147b d CH XXIII SECT 2 3 204b d SECT 6-7 205b 206a SECT 29 211d 212a SECT 3 -37 212c 214b BK III CH VI 268b 283a passim esp SECT 9 11 270d 271d BK IV CH III SECT 14 316b d SECT 16 317a c SECT 25-29 321a 323a passim CH XII SECT 9-1 360d 362c passim CH XVI SECT 12 370b 371a

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 27 418a b SECT 135 14 440a-441c

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT II 455b 457b SECT IV DIV 20 SECT V DIV 38 458a 466c passim SECT VIII DIV 81 487a SECT XI 497b 503c passim SECT XII DIV 119 505a b DIV 127 507b c

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 308c d

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 1a 4a c 15c 16c 19a 19d 20c esp 20a 25b 26b 27b 33d 49c 59b esp 53b 54b 80c 88c 89c 91d 93c 99a 101b 108a c 112b d 113c 115a 117b 118a 119a 209d esp 121a 128b 130b 145c 153a c 164a 165c 173b 192d 200c 209d 218d 223d 227a 235a esp 231c 232b 247a b / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 260d 261b 281c 282d 283d 287d / *Practical Reason* 291a 293b esp 292a c 296a d 307d 314d esp 307d 308b 309b 310d 311d 320c 321b 327d 329a 335c 337a c 337a c 349b 353d / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 383c d 383b d 384a c / *Judgement* 461a c 465a c 474b 475d 500c d 506d 507a 510b c 543a 543d 541a 547b d 551a 552c 560c 562a 564c 570b 572b esp 570c 571c 574b 577a 579a 581a b 584c d 588d 589c 594d [fn 1] 599d 600d 603a 604b 606d 607c 609b 610a 611c 613a c

4*b* Verification by experience experience as the ultimate test of truth

7 PLATO *Republic* BK VII 395c 396d BK IX, 421a-422b

8 ARISTOTLE *Heavens* BK I CH 3 [270b1 13] 361c d BK III CH 7 [306a6 18] 397b c / *Soul* BK I CH I [402b15-403 2] 631d 632a

9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK III CH 4 [666a7 10] 193d / *Motion of Animals* CH I [698 10-15] 233a / *Generation of Animals* BK III CH 10 [760b27 33] 301d 302a / *Ethics* BK II CH 7 [1107a27-32] 352d 353a BK X CH I [1172 34 b7] 426b CH 8 [1179 17 22] 433d 434a / *Politics* BK II CH 5 [1264 1 11] 459a b BK VII CH I [1323 33 b7] 527b

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [418 426] 6b [693 701] 9c BK IV [469-521] 50b 51a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART III 165a

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 260c 261c 285c 288a 291b 292d

28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences* THIRD DAY 200a b

28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 268d / *Circulation of the Blood* 322d 323d 324c d / *On Animal Generation* 331b 332a 357b

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 43d 44c / *Novum Organum* 105a 195d esp BK II 137a 195d

31 DESCARTES *Rules* II 2d 3a XII 22c 23a / *Discourse* PART VI 66a b / *Meditations* I 75a 77c / *Objections and Replies* 229d 230d

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 9 173b

34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III RULE III 270b-271a

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT II DIV 14 456b SECT X 488d 497b passim esp DIV 86-91 488d 491c SECT XI DIV 110 501a b

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 36a 37a esp 36b-c 77b d 85b d 86b 87c 91d 95b 114d 115a 146a 149d 153a c 231b c

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 6 40a b NUMBER 20 78a b

43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 450b c 461c-462a 463c d

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 129a

45 FARADAY *Researches in Electricity* 774d

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE II 684a

53 JAMES *Psychology* 647b 648b 863a 865a 879b 880b [fn 2] 881a b

54 FREUD *New Introductory Lectures* 819d 820a 879c

5 The theory of experimentation in scientific method

10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK III CH 2 199d 200a

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 377a d

28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 267b d 268d / *On Animal Generation* 331b 337a c

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 34b 42a-c / *Novum Organum* 105a 195d / *New Atlantis* 210d 214d

6 The man of experience in practical affairs

6a Experience as indispensable to sound judgment and prudence

APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 25 3-6 34 9 11—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 25 5-8 34 9 1
4 HOMER *Iliad* BK IX [430-605] 61c 63b
5 SOPHOCLES *Philoctetes* [50-12] 182d 183b
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK VII 238b c
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK I 383d 384a BK VII 555b
7 PLATO *Republic* BK III 337b 338a BK V 366a c BK VII 400d 401c BK IX 421a-422b / *Laws* BK I 645b 652d
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 3 [1094b29 1095 12] 340a b CH 4 [1095 30-b12] 340c d BK III CH 8 [1116b3 15] 362d 363a BK VI CH 7 [1141b14-23] 390c d CH 8 [1142 12 19] 391b CH 11 392c 393b passim BK X CH 9 [1180b 13-1181b12] 435b 436a c / *Rhetoric* BK II CH 12 [1389 3]-CH 14 [1390b11] 636b 638a passim
10 HIPPOCRATES *Articulations* par 10 94d
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 8 114a b
14 PLUTARCH *Fabius Pericles* 154a d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 95 A I REP 2 226c 227c
22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida* BK I STANZA 90-93 12b 13a / *Knight's Tale* [2438 452] 200a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 53c 54a 60c d 66d 67b 67d 68a
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6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK I 354b c BK IV 451a b
7 PLATO *Gorgias* 288b 289b / *Republic* BK VII 400d-401b
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7 Mystical or religious experience experience of the supernatural

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8 Variety of experience as an ideal of human life

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For The discussion of the faculties or the acts of the mind which are related to experience *see* IDEA 1c 2b 2e–2g INDUCTION 1a 2 JUDGMENT 8c KNOWLEDGE 6b(1) 6c(4) MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 1a 3c 5a–5b 6c(1)–6c(2) MIND 1a(1)–1a(2) 1e(1) REASONING 1c 4c 5b(3) SENSE 1a 1c–1d 3c(5) 4b 5a UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 4c

The consideration of the empirical foundations or sources of science and art *see* ART 5 DIALECTIC 2a(1) MEDICINE 2a METAPHYSICS 2c PHILOSOPHY 3a PHYSICS 2 SCIENCE 1b 1c 5a SENSE 5b–5c

The discussion of experience in relation to the conditions or limits of human knowledge *see* INDUCTION 2 KNOWLEDGE 5a–5a(6) MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 6d METAPHYSICS 4b MIND 5b

Other treatments of the empirical verification of hypotheses or theories *see* HYPOTHESIS 4d PHYSICS 4c SCIENCE 5e SENSE 5c TRUTH 1a

Other discussions of the role of experimentation in scientific inquiry *see* INDUCTION 5 LOGIC 4b MECHANICS 2a PHYSICS 4–4d SCIENCE 5a

Experience as a factor in education *see* EDUCATION 5f

The treatment of religious or mystical experience or of related matters *see* GOD 6c(3) PROPHECY 1b RELIGION 1b(2)–1b(3) SIGN AND SYMBOL 5b

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection
II Works by authors not represented in this collection

For the date place and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

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—— *Erkenntnis und Irrtum*
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Chapter 26 FAMILY

INTRODUCTION

THE human family according to Rousseau is the most ancient of all societies and the only one that is natural On the naturalness of the family there seems to be general agreement in the great books although not all would claim like Rousseau that it is the *only* natural society The state is sometimes also regarded as a natural community but its naturalness is not as obvious and has often been disputed

The word natural applied to a community or association of men can mean either that men *instinctively associate with one another as do bees* and buffaloes or that the association in question while voluntary and to that extent conventional is also *necessary* for human welfare It is in this sense of necessity or need that Rousseau speaks of family ties as natural The children remain attached to the father only so long as they need him for their preservation he writes As soon as this need ceases the natural bond is dissolved If after that they remain united they continue so no longer naturally but voluntarily and the family itself is then maintained only by convention

Locke appears to attribute the existence of the human family to the same sort of instinctive determination which establishes familial ties among other animals though he recognizes that the protracted infancy of human offspring make the conjugal bonds more firm and lasting in man than the other species of animals Since with other animals as well as in the human species the end of conjunction between male and female [is] not barely procreation but the continuation of the species it ought to last in Locke s opinion even after procreation so long as is necessary to the nourishment and support of the young ones who are to be sustained by those who got them till they are able to shift and support for themselves This rule he adds which the infinite wise Maker hath set to the works of His hands, we find the inferior creatures steadily obey

Yet Locke does not reduce the association of father mother and children entirely to a divinely implanted instinct for the perpetuation of the species Conjugal society he writes, is made by a voluntary compact between man and woman and though it consists chiefly in such a communion and right in one anothers bodies as is necessary to its chief end procreation yet it draws with it mutual support and assistance and a communion of interests too

If the human family were *entirely* an instinctively formed society we should expect to find the pattern or structure of the domestic community the same at all times and everywhere But since the time of Herodotus historians and later anthropologists have observed the great diversity in the institutions of the family in different tribes or cultures or even at different times in the same culture From his own travels among different peoples Herodotus reports a wide variety of customs with respect to marriage and the family From the travels of other men Montaigne culls a similar collection of stories about the diversity of the mores with respect to sex especially in relation to the rules or customs which hedge the community of man and wife

Such facts raise the question whether the pattern of monogamy pictured by Locke represents anything more than one type of human family—the type which predominates in western civilization or even more narrowly in Christendom Marx for instance holds that the structure of the family depends on the character of its economical foundation and insists that it is of course just as absurd to hold the Teutonic Christian form of the family to be absolute and final as it would be to apply that character to the ancient Roman the ancient

Greek or the Eastern forms which moreover taken together form a series in historic development

Though the observation of the various forms which the human family takes has led some writers to deny the naturalness of the family—at least so far as its naturalness would mean a purely instinctive formation—it has seldom been disputed that the family fulfills a natural human need Conventional in structure the family remains natural as a means indispensable to an end which all men naturally desire There must be a union of those who cannot exist without each other Aristotle writes namely of male and female that the race may continue and he goes on to say that this union is formed not of deliberate purpose but because in common with other animals and with plants mankind have a natural desire to leave behind them an image of themselves

The human infant as Locke observes, requires years of care in order to survive If the family did not exist as a relatively stable organization to serve this purpose some other social agency would have to provide sustained care for children But wherever we find any other social units, such as tribes or cities there we also find some form of the family in existence not only performing the function of rearing children but also being the primitive social group out of which all larger groupings seem to grow or to be formed Aristotle for example describes the village or tribe as growing out of an association of families just as later the city or state comes from a union of villages

We have seen that the naturalness of the family—as answering a natural need—is not incompatible with its also being a product of custom or convention. The facts reported by Herodotus Montaigne and Darwin which show the variability of families in size and membership in form and government do not exclude but on the contrary emphasize the further fact that wherever men live together at all they also live in families

Whether or not the political community is also a natural society and if so whether it is natural in the same way as the family are questions reserved for the chapter on STATE. But it should be noted here that for some writers, for Aristotle particularly and to a lesser extent for Locke the naturalness of the family not only points to a natural development of the state but also helps to explain how in the transition from the family to the state paternal government gives rise to royal rule or absolute monarchy Even Rousseau who thinks that the family is the *only* natural society finds in the correspondence between a political ruler and a father reason for saying that the family may be called the first model of political societies

IN WESTERN CIVILIZATION a family normally consists of a husband and wife and their offspring If the procreation and rearing of offspring is *the* function or even *a function* which the family naturally exists to perform then a childless family cannot be considered normal. Hegel suggests another reason for offspring He sees in children the bond of union which makes the family a community

The relation of love between husband and wife he writes is in itself not objective because even if their feeling is their substantial unity still this unity has no objectivity Such an objectivity parents first acquire in their children in whom they can see objectified the entirety of their union In the child a mother loves its father and he its mother Both have their love objectified for them in the child While in their goods their unity is embodied only in an external thing in their children it is embodied in a spiritual one in which the parents are loved and which they love

Until recent times when it has been affected by urban industrial conditions, the family tended to be a much larger unit not only with regard to the number of children but also with respect to other members and relationships The household included servants if not slaves it included blood relatives in various degrees of consanguinity its range extended over three or even four generations Sancho Panza's wife for instance pictures the ideal marriage for her daughter as one in which we shall have her always under our eyes and be all one family parents and children, grandchildren and sons in law and the peace and blessing of God will dwell among us Even though they belong to the nineteenth century the families in *War and Peace* indicate how different is the domestic

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establishment under agrarian and semi feudal conditions

But even when it comprised a larger and more varied membership the family differed from other social units such as tribe or state in both size and function Its membership determined by consanguinity was usually more restricted than that of other groups although *blood relationships* often more remote may also operate to limit the membership of the tribe or the state Its function according to Aristotle at least in origin was to supply men s everyday wants, whereas the state went beyond this in aiming at other conditions of a good life

In an agricultural society of the sort we find among the ancients the household rather than the city is occupied with the problems of wealth In addition to the breeding and rear ing of children and probably because of this in part the family as a unit seems to have been concerned with the means of subsistence on the side of both production and consumption Its members shared in a division of labor and in a division of the fruits thereof

Apart from those industries manned solely by slave labor in the service of the state the production of goods largely depended on the industry of the family In modern times this system of production came to be called the domestic as opposed to the factory system It seems to persist even after the industrial revolution But according to Marx this mod ern so called domestic industry has nothing except the name in common with the old fashioned domestic industry the existence of which presupposes independent urban handi crafts independent peasant farming and above all a dwelling house for the laborer and his family

In effect the industrial revolution produced an economy in which not only agriculture but the family ceased to be central The problem shifts from the wealth of families to the wealth of nations even as production shifts from the family to the factory Modern industry ac cording to Marx by assigning an important part in the process of production outside the domestic sphere to women to young persons and to children of both sexes creates a new economical foundation

The family was for centuries what the fa tory and the storehouse have only recently be come in an era of industrialism For the an cients the problems of wealth—its acquisition, accumulation and use—were domestic not political The so called art of getting wealth Aristotle writes is according to some identical with household management accord ing to others a principal part of it In his own judgment property is a part of the house hold and the art of acquiring property is a part of the art of managing the household — but a *part only* because the household includes human beings as well as property and is co cerned with the government of persons as well as the management of things

The foregoing throws light on the extrao dinary shift in the meaning of the word eco nomics from ancient to modern times In the significance of their Greek roots the word polity signifies a state the word economy a family and as politics referred to the art of governing the political community so eco nomics referred to the art of governing the domestic community *Only in part* was it con cerned with the art of getting wealth As the chapter on WEALTH indicates Rousseau tries to preserve the broader meaning when he uses the phrase political economy for the general problems of government but for the most part in modern usage economics refers to a s ence or art concerned with wealth and it is politi cal in the sense that the management of wealth and of men with respect to wealth has become the problem of the state rather th n the family Not only has the industrial economy become more and more a political affair but the character of the family as a social institution has also changed with its altered economic status and function

THE CHIEF QUESTION about the family in rela tion to the state has been in ancient as well as in modern times whether the family has natu ral rights which the state cannot justly invade or transgress

The proposal in Plato s *Republic*— that the wives of our guardians are to be common and their children are to be common and no parent is to know his own child nor any child his parent —was as *radical in* the fifth century

a c s its counterpart would be today When Socrates proposes this, Glaucon suggests that the poss bil ty as well as the utility of such a law may be subject to a good many doubts. But Socrates does not think that there can be any dispute about the very great utility of hav in wives and children in common the possi bility he adds, is quite another matter and will be very much disputed

Aristotle questions both the desirability and poss b l ty Th premise from which the argu ment of Socrates proceeds he says is the greater the unity of the state the better He denies this premise Is it not obvious he asks, that a state may at length attain such a degree of unity as to be no longer a state?— ince the nature of a state is to be a plurality and in tendin to a greater unity from being a state it becomes a family and from being a family an ind vidual Hence we ought not to attain this greatest unity even if we could for it ould be the destruction of the state In ddition the scheme taken literally is im practicable

It is si nificant that Aristotle s main argu ment *against* Plato s communism (which in cludes the community of property as well as the community of women and children) is based upon the nature of the state *rather than* on the ri hts of the family It seems to have been a pre alent view in antiquity at least among philosophers that the ch ldren should be re garded a belon ing to the *state rather* than to th r parents. Antigone s example shows how ever that this v ew was by *no means* without e ception Her defiance of Creon based on the unwritten and unfailing statutes of heaven, is also und rtaken for the majesty of k ndred blood In this sense it const tutes an affirmation of th rights and duties of the fam ily

In the Christian trad t on the rights of the family as against the state are also defended by reference to d ine la The point is not that the state is less a natural community than the fa nily in the eyes of a theologian l ke Aquinas but in add tion to havin *a certa n* priority in the order of nature the family more d rectly than the state is of di ine origin. Not only is it founded on th sacrament of matrimony but the xpress commandments of God d ctate the duties of care and obedience which bind its m mbers together For the state to interfere in those relationships between parents and chil dren or betw en husband and wife which fall under the regulation of di ine law would be to exceed its authority and hence to act without right and in violation of rights founded upon a higher authority

In the Christian tradition philosophers like Hobbes and Kant state the rights of the family in terms of natural law or defend them as natu ral rights. Because the first instruction of chil dren writes Hobbes, depends on the care of their parents it is necessary that they should be obedient to them while they are under their tuition Originally the father of every man was also his sovereign lord with power over him of life and death When the fathers of families relinquished such absolute power in order to form a commonwealth or state they did not lose nor did they have to give up ac cordin to Hobbes, all control of their children Nor would there be any reason he goes on why any man should desire to have children, or take the care to nourish and instruct them if they were afterwards to have no other benefit from them than from other men And this he says accords with the Fifth Commandment

In the section of his *Science of Ri ht* devoted to the rights of the family as a domestic so ciety Kant argues that from the fact of pro creation there follows the duty of preservin and rearing children From this duty he de rives the ri ht of parents to the management and training of the child so long as it is *itself incapable* of making proper use of its body as an organism and of its mind as an understanding This includes its nourishment and the care of its education It also includes in general the function of forming and developing it practi cally, that it may be able in the future to main tain and a vance itself and also its moral cul ture and development the guilt of neglecting it falling upon the parents.

As is evident from Hobbes and Kant the rights of the family can be vindicated without denying that the family like the individual owes obed ence to the state In modern terms, at least the problem is partly stated by the question To what extent can parents justly cla m exemption from political interference in

the control of their own children? But this is only part of the problem It must also be asked whether in addition to regulating the family for the general welfare of the whole community the state is also entitled to interfere in the affairs of the household in order to protect children from parental mismanagement or neglect Both questions call for a consideration of the form and principles of domestic government

THE KINDS OF RULE and the relation between ruler and ruled in the domestic community have a profound bearing on the theory of government in the larger community of the state Many of the chapters on the forms of government—especially CONSTITUTION MONARCHY and TYRANNY—indicate that the great books of political theory from Plato and Aristotle to Locke and Rousseau derive critical points from the comparison of domestic and political government

We shall pass over the master slave relationship both because that is considered in the chapter on SLAVERY and because not all households include human chattel. Omitting this two fundamental relationships which domestic government involves remain to be examined the relation of husband and wife and of parents and children

With regard to the first there are questions of equality and administrative supremacy Even when the wife is regarded as the complete equal of her husband the administrative question remains for there must either be a division of authority or unanimity must prevail or one —either the husband or the wife—must have the last word when disagreement must be overcome to get any practical matter decided So far as husband and wife are concerned should the family be an absolute monarchy or a kind of constitutional government?

Both an ancient and a modern writer appear to answer this question in the same way A husband and father Aristotle says rules over wife and children both free but the rule differs the rule over his children being a royal over his wife a constitutional rule Yet the relation between husband and wife in Aristotle s view is not perfectly constitutional In the state the citizens rule and are ruled in turn on the supposition that their natures are equal and do not differ at all In the family however Aristotle thinks that although there may be exceptions to the order of nature th male is by nature fitter for command than the female

According to Locke the husband and wife though they have but one common concern yet having different understandings will unavoidably sometimes have different wills too It therefore being necessary that the last determination (*i e* the rule) should be placed somewhere it naturally falls to the man s share as the abler and the stronger But this Locke thinks leaves the wife in the full and true possession of what by contract is her peculiar right and at least gives the husband no more power over her than she has over his life the power of the husband being so far from that of an absolute monarch that the wife has in many cases a liberty to separate from him where natural right or their contract allows it

In the so called Marriage Group of the *Canterbury Tales* Chaucer gives voice to all of the possible positions that have ever been tak n concerning the relation of husband and wife The Wife of Bath for example argues for the rule of the wife She claims that nothing will satisfy women until they have the sovereignty as well upon their husband as their love and to have mastery their man above The Clerk of Oxford in his tale of patient Griselda presents the wife who freely admits to her husband When first I came to you just so left I my will and all my liberty The Franklin in his tale allows the mastery to neither wife nor husband save that the name and show of sovereignty would belong to the latter He dares to say

> That friends each one the other must obey
> If they d be friends and long keep company
> Love will not be constrained by mastery
> Women by nature love their liberty
> And not to be constrained like any thrall
> And so do men if say the truth I shall
> Thus did she take her servant and her lord
> Servant in love and lord in their marriage
> So was he both in lordship and bondage

WHILE THERE MAY be disagreement regarding the relation between husband and wife there is none regarding the inequality between parents and children during the offspring s imma

e nre Althou h every man may enjoy "equal ri ht to his natural freedom, without bein subjected to the will or authority of any other man," children, according to Locke are not born in this full state of equality thou h they are born to it."

Paternal power even absolute rule, over children arises from this fact. So long as the child "is in an esta e wherein he has no under standin of his own to direct his will," Locke thinks h "is not to have any will of his own to follow H that understands for him must will for him too he must prescribe to his will, and regulat his actions." But Locke adds the important qualification that when the son "comes to the estat which mad his father a free man, the son is a free man too."

Because children are truly inferior in competence there would seem to be no injust ce in their being ruled by their parents or in the rul bei absolut in th sense that children are precluded from exercisin a decisi e voice in the cond ct of thei own or their family s af fa rs. Those who think that kings cannot cla m the absolut author ty of parental rul frequently use the word despotic" to signify unjustified paternalism—a transference to the sta of a type of dominion which can be justified only in the family

The nature of despotism as absolute rule is discussed in the chapters on MONARCHY and TYRANNY but its relevance here makes it worth repeat that the Greek wo d from hich "despot comes, lik its Latin equivalent *paterfamilias*, signifies the rul r of a household and carries the connotation of absolut rule—the compl t mastery of the father over the children and the servants, if not over the wife. A cord gly th re would seem to be nothing u zious in refe rin to domestic overnment as despoti at least not to the exten tha in the case of the children, absolute rul is justified by thei mmaturity The problem arises only w h respect to despotism in the state when one man rules ano h r matur man as absolutely a a parent rules child

The great defender of the doctrine that the sovereign must be bsolute "o e ise there is no sov reignty at al sees no difference between the ri hts f th ruler of a state—the "sovereign by insti ution —and those of a father as th natural master of his family "The ri hts and consequences of both paternal and despotical dominion Hobbes maintains, are the very same with those of a sovereign by institution." On the other hand Rousseau an equally staunch opponent of absolute rule, uses the word despotism only in an invid ous sense for what he regards as illegitimate government —absolute monarchy "Even if there were as close an analogy as many authors maintain between the State and the family he writes, "it would not follow that the rules of conduct proper for one of these soci ties would be also proper for the other"

Rousseau even goes so far as to deny that parental rule is despotic in his sense of that term. With regard to paternal authority from which some writers have derived absolute government he remarks that "nothing can be further from the f rocious pirit of despotism than the mildness of that authority which looks more to the advantage of him who obeys than to that of him who commands. He agrees with Locke in the observation that unlik the political despot, the father is the child s master no longer than his help is necessary" When both are equal, the son is perfectly independent of the fath r and owes him "only respect and not obedience"

Misrule in the family then would seem to occur when these conditions or limits are violated. Parents may try to continue their absolute control past th point at which the children have become mature and are competent to take care of their own affairs. A parent who does not relinquish his absolutism at this point can be called "despotic" in the derogatory sense of that word.

Applying a distinction made by some politi cal wr ters, the parent is tyrannical rather than despotic when he uses the children for his own good treats them as property to exploit even at a time when his absolute direction of their affairs would be justified if it were fo the children s welfare The ex tence of parental tyrann raises in ts sharpest form the question of the sta e s ri ht to intervene in the family for the good of its members.

THE CENTRAL ELEMENT in the domestic establishment is, of course the institution of mar-

riage The discussion of marriage in the great books deals with most of the moral and psychological if not all of the sociological and economic aspects of the institution The most profound question perhaps is whether marriage is merely a human institution to be regulated solely by custom and civil law or a contract under the sanctions of natural law or a religious sacrament signifying and imparting God s grace The last two of these alternatives may not exclude one another but those who insist upon the first usually reject the other two

Some like the Parson in the *Canterbury Tales* consider marriage not only a natural but also a divine institution—a sacrament ordained by God Himself in Paradise and confirmed by Jesus Christ as witness St Matthew in the gospel For this cause shall a man leave father and mother and shall cleave to his wife and they twain shall be one flesh which betokens the knitting together of Christ and of Holy Church

Others like Kant seem to stress the character of marriage as an institution sanctioned by natural law The natural union of the sexes he writes proceeds either according to the mere animal nature (*vaga libido venus vulgivaga fornicatio*) or according to law The latter is marriage (*matrimonium*) which is the union of two persons of different sex for life long reciprocal possession of their sexual faculties Kant considers offspring as a natural end of marriage but not the exclusive end for then the marriage would be dissolved of itself when the production of children ceased Even assuming he declares that enjoyment in the reciprocal use of the sexual endowments is an end of marriage yet the contract of marriage is not on that account a matter of arbitrary will but is a contract necessary in its nature by the Law of Humanity In other words if a man and a woman have the will to enter on reciprocal enjoyment in accordance with their sexual natures they *must* necessarily marry each other

Still others see marriage primarily as a civil contract Freud for example considers the view that sexual relations are permitted only on the basis of a final indissoluble bond between a man and woman as purely a convention of present day civilization Marriage as a set of taboos restricting the sexual life varies from culture to culture but in Freud s opinion the high water mark in this type of development has been reached in our Western European civilization

The conception of marriage—whether it is merely a civil or a natural and even a divine institution—obviously affects the position to be taken on monogamy on divorce on chastity and adultery and on the comparative merits of the married and the celibate condition The pagans for the most part regard celibacy as a misfortune especially for women as witness the tragedy of the unwedded Electra Christianity on the other hand celebrates the heroism of virginity and encourages the formation of monastic communities for celibates Within the Judaeo Christian tradition there are striking differences Not only were the patriarchs of the Old Testament polygamous but orthodox Judaism and orthodox Christianity also differ on divorce

Augustine explains how a Christian should interpret those passages in the Old Testament which describe the polygamous practices of the patriarchs The saints of ancient times he writes were under the form of an earthly kingdom foreshadowing and foretelling the kingdom of heaven And on account of the necessity for a numerous offspring the custom of one man having several wives was at that time blameless and for the same reason it was not proper for one woman to have several husbands because a woman does not in that way become more fruitful In regard to matters of this sort he concludes whatever the holy men of those times did without lust Scripture passes over without blame although they did things which could not be done at the present time except through lust

On similar grounds Aquinas holds that it was allowable to give a bill of divorce under the law of the Old Testament but it is not allowable under the Christian dispensation because divorce is contrary to the nature of a sacrament The greatest familiarity between man and wife requires the staunchest fidelity which is impossible if the marriage bond can be sundered Within the Christian tradition Locke takes an opposite view of divorce He can see good reason why the society of man and wife should be more lasting than that of

mal and female amongst other creatures, but he does not see why this compa t where p o- creation and education are secured and inher tance taken care for may not be made deter minable either by consent or at a certain time or upon certain conditions, as well as any other voluntary compact there being no necessity in the natur of the thing that it should always be for life Against Locke Dr Johnson would argue that to the contract of marria e be- s des the man and wife there is a third party—Society and if it be considered as a vow—God and therefore it cannot be dissolved by their consent alone

Laws and customs, however represent only the external or social aspect of marria e The discussion of these externals cannot give any impress on of the inwardness and depth of the problem which marriage is for the individual person. Only the great poems, the great novels and plays the great books of history and biog raphy can adequately present the psychological and emotional aspects of marriage in the life of indi iduals. Heightened in narration they give more eloquent testimony than the case histories of Freud to support the *proposition that mar riage* is at all times—in every culture and under the widest var ety of circumstances—one of the supreme tests of human chara ter

The relation between men and women in and out of marriage the relation of husband and wife before and after marriage the relation of parents and children—these create crises and tensions, conflicts between love and duty be- tween reason and the pass ons from which no individual can entirely escape Marriage is *not* only a typically human problem but *it s the* one p oblem which both psychologically and morally touches e ery man woman, and child Som times the *resolution* is trag sometimes the outcome seems to be happy almost blessed but whether a human life is bu lt on th s foun dation o broken against these rocks it is vio len y shaken in the process and forever shaped

To some degree ea h reader of the great books has, in imagination if not in action par ic pated in the trials of Odysseus Penelope and Telema hus in the affections of Hector and Andromache Alcestis and Admetus, Tom Jones nd Sophia Natasha and P erre Bezukhov in the jeal usy of Othello the anguish of Lear th decision of Aeneas or the indecision of Hamlet and certainly in the reasoning of Panur about whether to marry or not In each of these cases everyone finds some aspect of love in relation to marriage some phase of parenthood or childhood which has colored his own life or that of his family and he can find somewhere in his own experience the grounds for sympathetic und rstanding of the extraordinary relation between Electra and her mother Clytemnestra between Augustine and Monica his mother between Oedipus and Jo- casta Prince Hamlet and Queen Gertrude Pierre Bezukhov and his wife or what is per haps the most extraordinary case of all—Adam and Eve in *Parad se Lost*

On one point the universality of the problem of marriage and family lif seems to require qualifica ion The conflict between *conjugal* and illicit love exists in all ages. *The entangle- ment of the bond* between man and wife with the ties—of both *love and blood*—which unite parents and children is equally universal But the *difficulties* which arise in marriage as a re- sult of the ideals or the illusions of romantic love seem to constitute a peculiarly modern problem. The *ancients* distinguished between sexual love and the love of friend hip and they understood the necessity for both in the con jugal relationship if marriage is to prosper But *not* until the later Middle Ages did men think *of* matrimony as a way to perpetuate through out all the years the ardor of that moment in a romantic attachment when the lovers find each *other* without flaw and beyond reproach

Matters relevant to th s modern problem are discussed in the chapter on LOVE. As is there indicated *romantic* love thou h it seems to be of Christian ori in may also be a distort on—*even an heretical* perversion—of the kind of Christian love which *is pledged* in the recipro- cal vows *of holy matrimony*

WE HAVE ALREADY considered some of the problems of the family wh ch relate to children and youth—the immature members of the hu man race—such as whether the *child belongs* to the family or the state and whether the family is solely responsible for the care and training of children or a share of this responsibil ty falls to the state or the church

There are other problems Why do men and women want offspring and what satisfactions do they get from rearing children? For the most part in Christendom and certainly in antiquity the lot of the childless is looked upon as a grievous frustration To be childless is not *merely contrary to nature but for pagan as well* as Christian it constitutes the deprivation of a blessing which should grace the declining years of married life The opposite view so rarely taken is voiced by the chorus of women in the *Medea* of Euripides

Those who are wholly without experience and have never had children far surpass in hap*piness those who are parents* the *women chant* in response to Medea s tragic leave taking from her own babes The childless because they *have never proved whether children grow up* to be a blessing or a curse to men are removed from all share in many troubles whilst those who have a sweet race of children growing up in their houses do wear away their whole life through first with the thought how they may train them up in virtue next how they shall leave their sons the means to live and after all this tis far from clear *whether on good* or bad children they bestow their toil

Still other questions arise concerning children quite apart from the attitude of parents toward having and rearing them What is the economic position of the child both with respect to ownership of property and with respect to a part in the division of labor? How has the economic status of children been affected by industrialism? What are the mental and moral characteristics of the immature which exclude them *from participation in political life and* which require adult regulation of their affairs? What are the criteria—emotional and mental as well as chronological—*which determine the* classification of individuals as children or adults and how is the transition from childhood to manhood effected economically politically and above all emotionally?

The authors of the great books discuss most of these questions but among them only Freud sees in the relation of children to their parents the basic emotional determination of human life The fundamental triangle of love and hate devotion and rivalry consists of father mother and child For Freud all the intricacies and perversions of love the qualitative distinctions of romantic conjugal and illicit love the factors which determine the choice of a mate and success or failure in marriage and the conditions which determine the emergence from emotional infantilism—all these can be understood *only by reference to the emotional life of* the child in the vortex of the family

The child s great task according to Freud is that of freeing himself from the parents for only after this detachment is accomplished can he cease to be a child and so become a member of the social community These tasks are laid down for every man but Freud *writes it is noteworthy how seldom they are* carried through ideally that is how seldom they are solved in a manner psychologically as well as socially satisfactory In neurotics however he adds this detachment from the parents is not accomplished at all

In one sense it is never fully accomplished by anyone What Freud calls the ego-ideal — which represents our higher nature and which in the name of the reality principle resists instinctual compliance with the pleasure principle—*is said to have its origin in the identi*fication with the father which takes place in the prehistory of every person Even after an individual has achieved detachment from the family this ego ideal acts as a substitute for the longing for a father and in the form of conscience it continues to exercise the censorship of morals

One other group of questions which involve the family—at least as background—concerns *the position or role of women* We have already considered their relation to their husbands in the government of the family itself The way in which that relation is conceived affects the status and activity of women in the larger community of the state in relation to citizenship and the opportunities for education to the possession of property and the production of wealth (for example the role of female labor in an industrial economy)

Again it is Euripides who gives voice to the plight of women in a man s world in two of his great tragedies the *Trojan Women* and *Medea* In the one they cry out under the brunt of the suffering which men leave them to bear in the

backwash of war In the other Medea passionately berates the ignominy and bondage which women must accept in being wives Of all things that have life and sense she says we women are the most hapless creatures first must we buy a husband at great price and then o er ourselves a tyrant set which is an evil worse than the first

The ancient world contains another feminist who goes further than Euripides in speaking for the right of women to be educated like men to share in property with them and to enjoy the privileges as well as to discharge the tasks of citizenship In the tradition of the great books the striking fact is that after Plato the next great declaration of the rights of women should be written by one who is as far removed from him in time and temper as John Stuart Mill

In Plato s *Republic* Socrates argues that if the difference between men and women consists only in women bearing and men begetting children this does not amount to proof that a woman differs from a man in respect to the sort of education she should receive For the same reason he says the guardians and their wives ought to have the same pursuits Since he thinks that the gifts of nature are alike diffused in both Socrates insists that there is no special faculty of administration in a state which a woman has because she is a woman or which a man has by virtue of his sex All the pursuits of men are the pursuits of women also Yet he adds that in all of them a woman is inferior to a man Therefore when he proposes to let women share in the toils of war and the defence of their country Socrates suggests that in the distribution of labors the lighter are to be assigned to the women who are the weaker natures

Mill s tract on *The Subjection of Women* is his fullest statement of the case for social economic and political equality between the sexes In *Representative Government* his defense of women s rights deals primarily with the question of extending the franchise to them Difference of sex he contends is as entirely irrelevant to political rights as difference in height or in the color of the hair All human beings have the same interest in good government Mankind have long since abandoned the only premises which will support the conclusion that women ought not to have votes No one now holds that women should be in personal servitude that they should have no thought wish or occupation but to be the domestic drudges of husbands fathers or brothers It is allowed to unmarried and wants but little of being conceded to married women to hold property and have pecuniary and business interests in the same manner as men It is considered suitable and proper that women should think and write and be teachers As soon as these things are admitted Mill concludes the political disqualification has no principle to rest on

Though no other of the great books speaks so directly for the emancipation of women from domestic and political subjection many of them do consider the differences between men and women in relation to war and love pleasure and pain virtue and vice duty and honor Some are concerned explicitly with the pivotal question—whether men and women are more alike than different whether they are essentially equal in their humanity or unequal Since these are matters pertinent to human nature itself as it is affected by gender the relevant passages are collected in the chapter on MAN

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

REFERENCES

T find th passa es c ted, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passa es eferred to. For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad* K II [65 283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of th olum in the set the numbe 12d indicates that th passage is in section d of pa e 12

P GE S CTIONS When the text is printed in on column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower hal es of the page. For exampl in 53 JAMES *Psych* ogy 116a 119b the passage begins in th upper half of page 6 and ends in th lower half of pa e 1 9. When the text is printed in two columns, the lett rs a and b ef r to th upper and lower hal es of the left hand sid of th pa e th letters c and d to the upper and lower hal es of the r ght hand side of the pa e. Fo exampl in 7 PLATO *Sym* o 163b-164c the passa e begi in the lower half of th left hand side of page 6 and ends in th upper half of the ri ht hand side of page 164

AUTHO D I O S O or more of the main division of a work (such as P RT BK, CH, ECT) are sometimes included in th reference line numbers, in brackets, are gi en in cer tain cases e g *Iliad* K I [26 83] 12d.

B E RE R CE The re erences are to book, chapter and erse When the Kin James and Douay ersions diff r in titl of books or in th numbering of chapters or erses, the Kin James version is cited first nd the Douay indicated by a (D) foll ws e g OLD TEST M NT N *hemiah* 4 —(D) *II Esd* 46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation "esp" calls th reader ttention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole referen e passim" signifies that th topic is discussed intermit tently rath than continuously n the work or passage cited.

For additional information concernin the st le of the references, see the Explanation of R fere e St le f en ral guidance in th use of *Th Great Bo* consult th Preface.

1 The nat re and necess ty of the family

OLD T STAM T *Genesis* 2 18-25

7 PL TO *Re ubl* K 351b-365d / *La s* BK IV 685a-c 1 70 c 709a

9 ARI TOTL *Pol cs* BK I 445 -455a,c BK I H 4 4 b d-458a pass m

12 LU RETI *Nature f T g* K [10 1 1] 74b-c

12 E CTET *Discourse* BK I H 2 198c 199c

14 PL TA CH *Lycurgus* 30a-41 / *L curg* 62d-64

18 A GU TI *City f God* K X X CH 14 I 520a 523a

19 AQ N *Summa Theol* \\R Q 9 2 483d-490c Q 98 516d 19a

20 AQ S *Summa Theologic* P T Q 94 A 3 221d 223a Q 105 318b-321

23 H S *Leviathan* P T 121

31 SPI OZ *Ethics* P RT I E DIX XX 449a

3 M TON *Paradise Lost* BK [5 45] 240a-242a

35 LOCK *Civil Government* CH CT 56-63 36d 38c CH T ECT 54 b-44

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* I 2 b-30a

36 S *Tristram Shand* 410a-411

38 MONT QUIEU *Spirit of Laws* K XXIII 187d 188a

38 ROUSSE U *I equality* 350a-c / *Social Con tract* K 38 d 388a

42 KANT *Science f Right* 418 -422d 433c 434a

46 HE EL *Philosophy f Right* P R I I par 158-81 58a-63d AD ITIO 4 124 b / *P iloso phy f History* TRO, 172b-d PART IV 303a b

50 MARX *Capital* 241 -d

50 MARX E ELS *Communist M nif sto* 4 7b-c

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* E ILOGUE I 659d 662a

53 J M *Psycho ogy* 189a

54 F EUD *Gro Psych ogy* 685c-687d esp 68 d / *Civilizatio d Its Discont nts* 78 d 82 788a b

2 The family and the state

2a Comparison of the domestic and polit cal community n origin, structure and func tion

7 PL TO *Crito* 216d 217d / *Republic* K 356b-365d / *Laws* BK 641 -642b BK II 664a-666c

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VIII CH 12 [16 6-18] 414c / *P litics* K I, CH I 445a-446d K I CH 455d-456c CH 5 [63b30-35] 4 9a

20 AQU s *Summ Theologica* P RT I Q 90 A 3 REP 3 20 a-c Q 95 A 1 226c 22 c Q 1 4 A 4 A 5 306d 307c
23 H B ES *Lev than* PART II 121a 155b
25 MO TAIG *Essays* 3-4a-c
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VI 36a-42a CH VII SECT 83 43b-c CH X 64c-65d CH XVI SECT 180- 83 67b-68b SECT 1 3 19- 69a d
36 SW FT *Gu ver* PART I 29b-31a P T IV 166b-167a
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I 13b K V 22d 23a BK XII 95c-d K XIX 140a-c BK XXI 189b-c 190b 192d 199b BK XXVI 216b-217b
38 ROUSS U *Ine a y* 337 -d / *Pol l Econ omy* 3 6b-377a 377d 378a / *Social Co ract* BK I 439b d [fn 2]
39 SMITH *We h of Nations* BK V 338 339b 341c 342a
40 GIBBO *Decline and F ll* 66d-67b 1 c-d
41 G o *Decline and F* 73 82b-83c 86b-d 88d 89a 92c
4 KANT *Science of Righ* 40-d 421a b
43 M LL *Liberty* 31 319d
44 BO WELL *Joh so* 280c 281 304 b
46 HE EL *Philoso hy of Righ* P I par 166 59d-60a par 80 62c-63c par 3- 4 176c 77 par 5 6 79d-80a D TIO S 146- 47 140b-c / *Ph so hy of H tory* TRO 172b-d P T I 246d 247a II 277c T III 283c 289b
50 M RX *Capital* 193a 196d 241 -d 24 a-d
50 M RX E GELS *Communist Manif o* 427b-428a
54 F EUD *Civilization and I Disco ents* 783b-784d esp 783d 784b / *New Introductory Lec ture* 868d 871 passim

3 Th econom cs of th famil

3*a* The wealth of families: the maintenance of the domestic eco omy

OLD TESTAME T *Numbers* 27 11 / *Deuterono my* 21 5
N W T T ME T *I Timothy* 5 8
7 PLATO *Re ubc* K 3 0c 35 d / *Laws* BK 1 664 -666a K VI 709a 710a BK XI 775d 8b
9 AR TOTL P tics K I CH 3 446d- 3d esp H 3 [1253b 2 14] 447a, H 4 447b-c CH 8- 449d-453d K II CH 5 [1 64] 4 9d 1 H 4 [5-] 474d
14 PL T R H *Solon* 72b-c / *Pericle* 130b-d / *P o lus* 233a b / *Mar s Ca* 278b- 79c 286b-28 d *Aristides Marcu Cato* 291b-292b / *Cr ssu* 439a-c / *Cr ssus Nicia* 45 b d / *Agis* 650d-651b
15 T T *Annals* K I 3 b-d
18 A T *City of God,* BK XIX, CH 4 5 0a d
20 AQU S *S m Theo ogica* R I-II Q 9 4 3d RE 1 4 318b-321
25 MO T IGNE *Essay* 122b-124c 18 a 191c 58 -46 472a-473a
29 CERV TES *D Qu o e* PART I 148b-149a
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH T SECT 2 73 40d-41a CH VII SECT 0-80 42c-43a CH XVI SECT 18 183 67c-68b SECT 190-192 69b-d
36 STER E *Tristram Sha y* 376b-379a
38 MONTE QUI U *Spirit of La s* BK II 50a b BK XVIII 129d 132b BK XXIII 190a b BK XX 216a b BK XX I 225a 230d
38 ROU SEAU *I equa y* 3 0a b / *Po ical Econ omy* 367 368c
39 SMITH *Wealth of N ons* I TRO 1b-c BK III 16 b-167a BK 383d 384d
40 GIBBO *Decline and F ll* 16c 17d 66d-67b 498b-501b passim
41 GI ON *Decline and Fa* 83a 86d-89d
43 M LL *Liberty* 319b-d
44 BO WELL *J hnson* 147c 148b [fn 3] 274b-2 8a 280c 281a 282 b 289c-d
46 HE EL *Philosophy of Ri h* RT III par 69- 60c-61a par 1 8- 80 62a-63c AD I TIONS 109 134c 114 13 b-c / *P oso hy of History* P T III, 289a b
49 D WIN *D scent of M* 3 4a-c
50 MARX *Capital* 34c d 171d 172a
51 TOLSTOY *War a d Peace* BK V 211a 213a K II 2 5a 302d passim, esp 27 a 2 8a 291a 292b 301b-30 d BK XV 633a d EPILOGU I 650d-6 2a 654a-6 5c

3*b* The effects of political economy: the *family* in the industrial sy t m

38 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 367a 368c
39 SMITH *W h f Nat s* BK I 27b-3 b esp 8d 29a 29d 30d, 34b-c BK IV 243b d BK 383d 384d
43 MILL *Liberty* 319b-d
44 BO WELL *J hnson* 197d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy f Righ* PART III par 53 79a-c
50 MARX *Ca t l* 117 1 4 passim 192 196d 22 d 248c esp 241a-d 318a 319a 375c 3 6c
50 M RX E G LS *Comm nist M n festo* 420d 423a 424c 427b-d

4 The nstitution of marriage: ts nature and purpose

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NEW TESTAM NT *M thew* 19 3 12 / *Mark* 1 1 / *Luke* 16 18 / *I Corinthians* / *E hesians* 5:22 33 / *Colos ans* 3 18- 9 / *I Peter* 3 1-7
7 PL TO *Re ub ic* BK V 361b-365d / *States man* 60 a-c / *Laws* BK IV 685a-c K VI 0 c 09a
9 A TOTLE *Politics* BK I CH [1252a-] 9] 44 b-d BK II CH 16 539d 541
12 EPICTET *D courses* K III CH 7 183b-d CH 2 198c 199c

(2 *The family and the state* 2a *Comparison of the domestic and political community in origin structure and function*)

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK V [35 103] 188a 190a BK VI [679 70] 229a b [756-789] 231a 232a BK VIII [66-80] 260b 261a BK X [1-117] 302a 305a
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 36a b
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIX CH 12 517c d CH 13 17 519a 523a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 90 A 3 REP 3 207a c
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 99b c 111a b
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 34a
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VI VII 36a 46c CH XV 64c 65d
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 214b 217b esp 216b 410a 411a
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK IV 13b
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 359b c / *Political Economy* 367a 368c / *Social Contract* BK I 387d 388a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 75 31d 32b PART III par 157 57d par 181 63c d par 203 68a c par 255 256 79d 80a par 303 101c 102a par 349 111d 112a ADDITIONS 47 124a b 115 116 135c d 157 142b c / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 172b d 180c 182c PART I 211a 212c 246d 247a PART III 288c 289d
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 308b d 310a c 579b 581c esp 581a b
54 FREUD *Group Psychology* 664b d 685b 687d esp 686c 687d 692a b / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 781d 783d esp 781d 782d 796b c

2b Comparison of the domestic and political community in manner of government

OLD TESTAMENT *Isaiah* 2 20 22—(D) *Isaias* 22 20 22
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 35c d
7 PLATO *Statesman* 581a b / *Laws* BK I 641a 642b BK III 664a 666c esp 666b c
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK V CH 6 [1134ᵇ8 17] 382b c CH 11 [1138ᵇ5-14] 387a c BK VI CH 5 [1140ᵇ7 10] 389b CH 8 [1141ᵇ28-1142 11] 390d 391a BK VIII CH 10-11 412c 413d BK X CH 9 [1180ᵇ3 7] 435b / *Politics* BK I CH 1 2 445a 446d CH 5 447d 448c CH 7 [1255ᵇ15 20] 449b CH 12 453d 454a CH 13 [1259ᵇ30-1260 33] 454b 455a BK III CH 6 [1278ᵇ30-1279] 476a b CH 14 [1285ᵇ29 33] 481a
13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK V [35 103] 188a 190a BK VI [756-789] 231a 232a BK VIII [66-80] 260b 261a BK X [1-117] 302a 305a
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIX CH 12 517c d CH 13 17 519a 523a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 92 A 1 REP 2 488d 489d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 90 A 3 REP 3 207a c Q 105 A 4 REP 5 318b 321a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 67d 68a 86a PART II 109b 111b 121a 155b PART III 228b c
30 BACON *New Atlantis* 207b 209d
32 MILTON *Samson Agonistes* [1010 1060] 361b-362b
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH I SECT 1 2 25a c CH VI VII 36a 46c esp CH VI SECT 66-?? 39b 42a CH VIII SECT 105 112 48c 51b CH XIV SECT 162 63a CH XV 64c 65d
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 214b 217b esp 216b 410a 411a
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 21a 22d 120c 121a c
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I 3b BK IV 13b BK V 28b 29a BK XVI 118b-c BK XIX 140a c
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 357a b / *Political Economy* 367a 368c / *Social Contract* BK I 387d 388a BK III 411c d 414c
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 412c-413b
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 82b 83c
42 KANT *Science of Right* 421c 422d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* ADDITIONS 47 124a b 111 134d 135a 157 142b c / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 172b d PART I 211a 213a
54 FREUD *Group Psychology* 687a d 688d 689a

2c The place and rights of the family in the state the control and education of children

OLD TESTAMENT *Deuteronomy* 0 5 / 24 ?
5 AESCHYLUS *Seven Against Thebes* 27a 39a c esp [1011-1084] 38b 39a c
5 SOPHOCLES *Antigone* 131a 142d
5 EURIPIDES *Iphigenia at Aulis* 425a-439d esp [1255 1275] 436c [1368 1401] 437c d
5 ARISTOPHANES *Ecclesiazusae* [611 650] 622a c
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK IV 139a b BK VII 223c d
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 398c d
7 PLATO *Crito* 216d 217d / *Republic* BK V 360d 365d / *Statesman* 606d 608d / *Laws* BK III 665d 666c BK VI 707b 708a BK VII 721d 723d BK XI 775d 780c
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK X CH 9 [1179ᵇ31 1180ᵇ13] 434c 435b / *Politics* BK I CH 13 [1260ᵇ8 19] 455c BK II CH 2 3 455d-457a CH 6 [1265 38 ᵇ17] 460d 461a CH 9 [1269ᵇ13 1270ᵇ6] 465d 466c BK III CH 9 [1280ᵇ30-1281 2] 478c BK IV CH 15 [1300 4-8] 500d BK VI CH 8 [1322ᵇ38 13 36] 526d BK VII CH 16 [1334ᵇ28] BK VIII CH 1 [1337ᵃ34] 539d 542b
14 PLUTARCH *Romulus* 21a 26b / *Lycurgus* 36a 45c / *Numa Pompilius* 58d / *Lycurgus Numa* 62d 64a / *Cato the Younger* 629a c
15 TACITUS *Annals* BK II 32b d BK III 51a 51d 52a BK XV 162b c / *Histories* BK III 248c d
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIX CH 16 522a

20 AQUIN *Summa Theol* gi a p rt i ii q 90 a 3 rep 3 207a-c q 9 a 1 ans 226c 22 c q 1 4 a 4 ans 306d 307
23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part ii 121a 155b
25 Montaign *Essays* 344a-c
35 Locke *Civil Government* ch vi 35a-42a ch vii sect 83 43b-c ch xv 64c 65d ch x v sect 180-183 67b-68b sect 1 S 19 69 d
36 Swift *Gulliver* part i 29b-31a part iv 166b-167a
38 Montesquieu *Spirit of Laws* bk i 13b bk 22d 23a bk xii 95c-d bk xix 140 -c bk xxi 189b-c 190b 192d 199b bk xxvi 216b-217b
38 Rousseau *Inequality* 327c-d / *Political Economy* 376b-377 377d 378a / *Social Contract* bk i 439b d [fn 2]
39 Smith *Wealth of Nations* bk 338c 339b 341 342a
40 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 66d 67b 175c d
41 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 73 8 b 83c 86b-d 88d-89a 92c
42 Kant *Science of Right* 404d 421a b
43 Mill *Liberty* 317c 319d
44 Boswell *Johnson* 280c 281a 304 b
46 Hegel *Philosophy of Right* part i par 166 59d 60a par 18 62 -63 par 35- 41 76c 77a par 55 256 79d 80 additions 146-147 140b-c / *Philosophy of History* intro 172b-d part 246d 247a part 277c part 288c 289b
50 Marx *Capital* 193a 196d 241a-d 245 d
50 Marx Engels *Communist Manifesto* 427b 428a
54 Freud *Civilization and Its Discontents* 783b-784d esp 783d 784b / *New Introductory Lectures* 868d 871 passim

3 The economics of the family

3 The wealth of families: the maintenance of the domestic economy

OLD TESTAMENT *Numbers* 7 1 1 / *Deuteronomy* 1 1 17

New Testament *I Timothy* 5 8

PLATO *Republic* bk v 360c 365d / *Laws* bk 664 666a bk 709 710 bk x 775d 778b

9 Aristotle *Politics* bk ch 3 s 446d-453d esp ch 3 [253[b] 2 14] 447a ch 4 447b-c, ch 8- 449d-453d bk ii ch 5 [64[b] 3] 459d bk i ch 4 [1 7[b] o 23] 474d

14 Plutarch *Solon* 72b-c / *Pericles* 130b-d / *Pelopidas* 233a b *Marcus Cato* 278b-279c 286b-287d / *Aristides Marcus Cato* 291b-292b / *Crassus* 439 -c / *Crassus Nicias* 455b d / *Agis* 650d 651b

15 Tacitus *Annals* bk i 3 b-d

18 Augustine *City of God* bk xix ch 4 520 -d

20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i-ii q 5 4 a 3 and rep 1 4 318b-321

5 Montaigne *Essays* 122b 124c 184a 191c 458c-462a 472a-4 3

29 Cervantes *Don Quixote* part ii 148b 149a

35 Locke *Civil Government* ch vi sect 2 73 40d-41a ch ii sect 9 80 42c-43 ch xvi sect 18 183 67c 68b sect 190-192 69b-d

36 Sterne *Tristram Shandy* 376b 379a

38 Montesquieu *Spirit of Laws* bk vii 50a b bk xviii 129d 132b bk xxiii 190a b bk xxvi 216a b bk xx 11 225a 230d

38 Rousseau *Inequality* 350a b / *Political Economy* 367a 368c

39 Smith *Wealth of Nations* intro 1b-c bk iii 165b-167a bk v 383d 384d

40 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 16c 17d 66d 67b 498b 501b passim

41 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 83a 86d 89d

43 Mill *Liberty* 319b-d

44 Boswell *Johnson* 14 c 148b [fn 3] 74b-2 8a 280c 81a 28 a b 289c d

46 Hegel *Philosophy of Right* part iii par 169-1 2 60c-61a par 1 8 18 62 63c additions 109 134c 114 135b-c / *Philosophy of History* part iii 289a b

49 Darwin *Descent of Man* 324a-c

50 Marx *Capital* 34c-d 171d 172

51 Tolstoy *War and Peace* bk 211 213a bk ii 275a 302d passim, esp 275a 278a, 291 292b 301b-302d bk xv 633a d epilogue i 650d-652a 654a-6 5c

3b The effects of political economy: the family in the industrial system

38 Rousseau *Political Economy* 367a 368c

39 Smith *Wealth of Nations* bk i 27b-37b esp 28d 29a 29d 30d, 34b-c bk iv 243b d bk v 383d 384d

43 Mill *Liberty* 319b-d

44 Boswell *Johnson* 197d

46 Hegel *Philosophy of Right* part iii par 233 79a-c

50 Marx *Capital* 117c 144 passim 192c 196d 227d 248c esp 241a d 318a 319a 375 376c

50 Marx Engels *Communist Manifesto* 420d 423 424c 427b d

4 The institution of marriage: its nature and purpose

Old Testament *Genesis* 1:27 28 18 5 30 24 / *Proverbs* 18:22

New Testament *Matthew* 9 3 12 / *Mark* 0 2 / *Luke* 16 18 / *I Corinthians* 7 / *Ephesians* 5:24 33 / *Colossians* 3 8 19 / *I Peter* 3

7 Plato *Republic* bk v 361b 365d / *Statesman* 60 a-c / *Laws* bk iv 685 -c bk vi 707c 709

9 Aristotle *Politics* bk i ch 2 [25 5 [b] 9] 445b-d bk vii ch 16 539d 541

12 Epictetus *Discourses* bk iii ch 7 183b-d ch 22 198c 199c

(2 *The family and the state 2a Comparison of the domestic and political community in origin structure and function*)

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK V [35 103] 188a 190a BK VI [679 702] 229a b [756-789] 231a 232a BK VIII [66 80] 260b 261a BK X [1-117] 302a 305a
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 36a b
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIX CH 1 517c d CH 13 17 519a 523a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 90 A 3 REP 3 207a c
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 99b c 111a b
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 34a
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VI VII 36a 46c CH XV 64c 65d
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 214b 217b esp 216b 410a 411a
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK IV 13b
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 359b c / *Political Economy* 367a 368c / *Social Contract* BK I 387d 388a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 75 31d 32b PART III par 157 57d par 181 63c d par 203 68a c par 255 256 79d 80a par 303 101c 102a par 349 111d 112a ADDITIONS 47 124a b 115 116 135c d 157 142b c / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 172b d 180c 182c PART I 211a 212c 216d 247a PART III 288c 289d
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 308b d 310a c 579b 581c esp 581a b
54 FREUD *Group Psychology* 664b d 685b 687d esp 686c 687d 692a b / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 781d 783d esp 781d 782d 796b c

2*b* Comparison of the domestic and political community in manner of government

OLD TESTAMENT *Isaiah* 22 20-22—(D) *Isaias* 22 20-2
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 35c d
7 PLATO *Statesman* 581a b / *Laws* BK I 641a 642b BK III 664a 666c esp 666b c
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK V CH 6 [1134^{b}8 17] 382b c CH 11 [1138^{b}5-14] 387a c BK VI CH 5 [1140^{b}7 10] 389b CH 8 [1141^{b}28 1142 11] 390d 391a BK VIII CH 10-11 412c 413d BK X CH 9 [1180^{b}3 7] 435b / *Politics* BK I CH 1-2 445a 446d CH 5 447d 448c CH 7 [1255^{b}15 20] 449b CH 12 453d 454a CH 13 [1259^{b}30-1260 33] 454b 455a BK III CH 6 [1278^{b}30-1279 2] 476a b CH 14 [1285^{b}29-33] 484a
13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK V [35 103] 188a 190a BK VI [756-789] 231a 232a BK VIII [66-80] 260b 261a BK X [1-117] 302a 305a
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIX CH 12 517c d CH 13 17 519a 523a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 92 A 1 REP 2 488d 489d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 90 A 3 REP 3 207a c Q 105 A 4 REP 5 318b 321a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 67d 68a 86a PART II 109b 111b 121a 155b PART III 228b c
30 BACON *New Atlantis* 207b 209d
32 MILTON *Samson Agonistes* [1010-1060] 361b-362b
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH I SECT 1 2 25a c CH VI VII 36a 46c esp CH VI SECT 66-75 39b 42a CH VIII SECT 105 112 48c 51b CH XIV SECT 162 63a CH XV 64c 65d
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 214b 217b esp 216b 410a 411a
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 21a 22d 120c 121a c
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I 3b BK IV 13b BK V 28b 29a BK XVI 118b-c BK XIX 140a c
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 357a b / *Political Economy* 367a 368c / *Social Contract* BK I 387d 388a BK III 411c d 414c
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 412c-413b
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 82b 83c
42 KANT *Science of Right* 421c-422d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* ADDITIONS 47 124a b 111 134d 135a 157 142b c / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 172b d PART I 211a 213a
54 FREUD *Group Psychology* 687a d 688d 689a

2*c* The place and rights of the family in the state the control and education of children

OLD TESTAMENT *Deuteronomy* 20 5 / 24 5
5 AESCHYLUS *Seven Against Thebes* 27a 39a c esp [1011 1084] 38b 39a c
5 SOPHOCLES *Antigone* 131a 142d
5 EURIPIDES *Iphigenia at Aulis* 425a 439d esp [1255 1275] 436c [1368 1401] 437c d
5 ARISTOPHANES *Ecclesiazusae* [1 11 630] 622a c
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK IV 139a b BK VII 223c d
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 398c d
7 PLATO *Crito* 216d 217d / *Republic* BK V 360d 365d / *Statesman* 606d 608d / *Laws* BK III 665d 666c BK VI 707b 708a BK VII 721d 723d BK XI 775d 780c
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK X CH 9 [1179^{b}31-1180^{b}13] 434c 435b / *Politics* BK I CH 13 [1260^{b}8 19] 455c BK II CH 2 3 455d 457a CH 6 [1265 38 ^{b}17] 460d 461a CH 9 [1269^{b}13-1270^{b}6] 465d 466c BK III CH 9 [1280^{b}30-1281 2] 478c BK I CH 15 [13 0 4 8] 500d BK VI CH 8 [1322^{b}38 1323 6] 526d BK VII CH 16 [1334^{b}28] BK VIII CH [1337 34] 539d 542b
14 PLUTARCH *Romulus* 21a 26b / *Lycurgus* 36a 45c / *Numa Pompilius* 58d / *Lycurgus Numa* 62d 64a / *Cato the Younger* 629a c
15 TACITUS *Annals* BK II 32b d BK III 51a 51d 52a BK XV 162b c / *Histories* BK III 248c d
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIX CH 16 521d 522a

38 MO TESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XXVI 217c 218a 219b-d
38 ROUSS U *S c l C nt act* K IV 439b d [fn 2]
40 C BB *Decl ne and Fall* 193 b
41 GIB O *Decl e a d Fall* 83d 85c 177d 178b
44 PO WELL *Joh so* 304a b
46 H GEL *Pl lo phy of H st ry* P RT III 288c 289b 294 d PART I 333 353a b
51 TOLSTOY *W ar and P ace* BK I 50c BK XI 476c 479d passim

4c Matrimo y and celibacy

NEW TEST ME T *Ma theu* 19 10 I / *I Corin-th* s 7
7 PLATO *Laws* K IV 685 -c
12 E ICTETUS *Discourses* K I CH 2 198c 199c
14 P UTARC I *N ma Pompili s* 54c 55a
15 TACITUS *Annals* BK II 44c BK III 51
18 AU UST *C fess ns* BK II p r 3 9b c K VI par 21 25 41c-42d BK VII par 26-27 60b-c
20 AQU S *Summa Th ologic* P RT II I Q 186 A 4 655 656b P RT II I Q 65 A 4 NS and RE 3 883d 884 c A III SU L, Q 96 A 3-5 1053 1058a II 12 1063d 1065b
22 CHAUC R *Wife of B th s Prologue* [5633 573] 257a 258b / *Seco d Nun s T l* 463b-471b esp [5 588-7 6] 463b-465b
23 H ES *Levi athan* PA T IV 272d 273 276b 278c
24 R ELA *Gargantua and P tagr l* BK I 60 -66b K III 219b-221b
27 S KE E E *Hamlet* CT III C I [120-157] 48b-c
32 M TO *Pa adise Lost* BK IV [736-749] 168b
36 STER E *Trist m Sh dy* 522 523b
38 M QUI U *Spirit of Laus* BK XXIII 189d 197 -c K XX 210 b
40 GI BON *Decl ne a d Fall* 82 193a c 533c d
41 GI ON *Decl e a d Fall* 86 177d 178a 422
43 M LL *Liberty* 308c
46 H E *Philosophy f H tory* RT IV 333 353a b
49 D RWIN *D scent f M n* 315 d 327d
50 MARX *Cap t l* 305b [fn 2]
54 FR U *G p Psychol gy* 695a b

4d Th l ws and customs regulating marr ag dultery ncest

O D T T MENT *Genesis* 19 30-38 24 29 35 22 38 39 7 2 49 3 4 / *E d* 2 14 7 22 6-17 34 5 16 / *Le t c s* 18 19.29 2 9 2 / *Number* 5 2 31 36 / *Deuter n my* 5 8,21 7 4 21 0-14 22 13 3 4 5 5 7.20- 3 / *Ruth* 3 4 / *II S m l* 11 3 16 20- 3—(D) *II Ki g* 13 6-0- 3 / *Ezr* —(D) *I Esdr s* I / *Esther* 2 14 / *J b* 24 5 5 / *Proverbs* 5 6-0-7.27 / *Jerem ah* 5 7-9—(D) *Jeremias* 5 7-9

APOCRYPH *Tobit* 4 12 13—(D) OT *T bias* 4 13 / *Ecclesiasticus* 9 1-9 23 I 28—(D) OT *Eccles ast cus* 9 1 13 23 24 38 / *Si sa na* —(D) OT *D n el* 13
NEW TEST MENT *Mattheu* 5.27 32 14 3 4 19 3-9 / *Ma k* I I 12 / *Luke* 16 18 / *John* 4 16-18 8 I 11 / *Romans* I 3 / *I Corinthi a s* 5 7 / *Hebrews* 13 4
4 HO IER *Odyssey* BK II 188a 192d BK XI [385 461] 247a-c BK XVIII [250-312] 286d 287b
5 AESCHYLUS *Seve Against Thebes* [731-757] 35b-c / *Agamem on* 52a 69d / *Choephoroe* 70a 80d / *Eumenides* 81a 91d
5 SO HOCLES *Oed pus the Ki g* 99a 113a c / *Oedipus at Col s* [939-999] 123a-c
5 EU IPIDES *Med a* 212a 224a c / *Andromache* 315 326 esp [147 244] 316c 317b / *Elect a* [1008 1123] 336b-337b / *Phoenician Ma dens* [1-87] 378a 379a / *Cycl ps* [175 187] 441d-442a
5 A ISTO HANE *Clouds* [1 60-1104] 501c 502a / *Ecclesi usa* 615a 628d
6 HE DOTUS *H st ry* BK I 2d 3d 32a 34a b 39b-c 44c d 48c BK III 96a b 104d 105a BK IV 144b BK V 160d 161a
7 PLATO *Crito* 217a / *Rep bl c* BK V 360d 365d BK VIII 403b d / *Timaeus* 442d-443a / *Statesm n* 605d-608d esp 608 c / *La s* BK I 685a-c BK I 707b 709a 710d 711a 712b 713c BK VI I 735b-738c BK XI 777b-778a 780 -c
9 A STOTLE *Politics* BK II CH I 4 455b d 458a esp C I 4 457b-458a CH 9 [1269b13 12 b-] 465d-466c BK V CH 4 [1303b40-1304 17] 505c d C I 6 [1306a33 b3] 508b BK VI CH 16 539d 541a
12 EPICTETUS *Disco rses* BK I CH 18 124b c BK I C I 4 142 -c CH 10 149c 150a
14 PLU CH *Rom l s* 21a 22a 26a b / *Lycur gus* 39 -40c / *Lycurg s Numa* 62d 63d / *S l* 71d 72a 72d 73 / *Cato the You ger* 629 -c / *A ta erx s* 855b-c
15 TACITUS *An als* BK III 51a 53 d BK XI 107b-110a BK XII 111a c 121d 122 BK XIV 141c d
18 A GUSTINE *City f God* BK XV CH 16 410b 411d / *Christ n Doctrine* K III C I 12 666a-c CH 18-22 664d 666c esp CH 21 665d 666b
19 AQUI S *S mma Theol gica* P RT I Q 92 A 3 489d-490c
20 AQUINAS *S mm Theolog ca* PART I II Q 72 A 2 REP 4 112b 113 Q 94 A 2 S 221d 223a Q 105 A 4 ANS D RE 6-9 318b 321a R III UP L, Q 95 1042c 1049d passim
21 D NTE *D ne Com dy* HELL XXX [37 45] 44d-45 PU G ORY XXV [109 139] 92 d
22 C UCE *M ller s Prol gue* [3150-3 66] 212 / *M ller s T l* 212b 223b esp [3 I 3 32] 213 / *Re e s Tale* [4136-4291] 228b 231b / *Me cha t s Tale* 319 338a / *Fra kl n s T l* [I 667-854] 361b 365a / *P so s Tal* p r 75-6 536 540a

(4 *The institution of marriage its nature and purpose*)

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK IV [1-172] 167a 171b BK VII [81-106] 238a 239a [248 434] 242b 248a BK XI [336-375] 337a 338a

14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 39a 40c / *Lycurgus Numa* 62d 64a / *Solon* 71d 72a

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par 3 9b c BK IV par 2 19d BK VI par 22 25 41d 42d / *City of God* BK XIV CH 21-26 392b 396c BK XV CH 16 410b 411d / *Christian Doctrine* BK III CH 12 663a c CH 18 20 664d 665d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 92 AA 1-2 488d 490c Q 98 516d 519a

22 CHAUCER *Wife of Bath s Prologue* [5583 6410] 256a 269b / *Merchant s Tale* [9121-9562] 319a 326a / *Franklin s Tale* 351b 366a esp [11 041 117] 351b 352b / *Parson s Tale* par 77-80 540b 542a

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 410d 413a

26 SHAKESPEARE *As You Like It* ACT V SC IV [114-156] 625a b

29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 261c 262a

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV APPENDIX XX 449a

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VIII [357-451] 240a 242a BK IX [952-959] 268a

35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VII SECT 77-83 42b-43c

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 29b

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XXIII 187d 188a

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 364d 365b

42 KANT *Science of Right* 418c 420b 433d 434a

43 MILL *Liberty* 316d 317c

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 194a 89d 290a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 75 31d 32b PART III par 161-169 58b 60c ADDITIONS 47 124a b 103 108 133c 134c

49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 579b 581c

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 14b 15a 55c 59d BK III 111a 128d BK VI 245d 274a c BK VII 301b 302d EPILOGUE I 659d 662a

54 FREUD *Civilization and Its Discontents* 784c / *New Introductory Lectures* 862d 863b

4a Monogamy and polygamy

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 16 29 1 30 24 / *Deuteronomy* 17 16 17 21 15-17 / *I Samuel* 25 39 44—(D) *I Kings* 25 39 44 / *II Samuel* 3 1 5 11-12—(D) *II Kings* 3 1 5 11-12 / *I Kings* 11 1 13—(D) *III Kings* 11 1 13

NEW TESTAMENT *I Timothy* 3 2 12

5 SOPHOCLES *Trachiniae* [307 489] 172d 174b

5 EURIPIDES *Andromache* 315a-326a c esp [147-244] 316c 317b / *Electra* [1030 1 40] 336c

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 32a 48 BK I 155c 156a BK V 160d

14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 39d 40c / *Demetrius* 731a b / *Antony Demetrius* 780d

18 AUGUSTINE *Christian Doctrine* BK III CH 12 663a c CH 18 2 664d 666c

22 CHAUCER *Wife of Bath s Prologue* [5583 5641] 256a 257a

30 BACON *New Atlantis* 209b d

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART IV 162b 166b esp 162b, 166a b

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK X 28d BK XV 112a b BK XVI 116a 120a BK XVIII 188c d BK XXVI 218d

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 92c

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 86a 245b 246c

42 KANT *Science of Right* 419c-420a

43 MILL *Liberty* 311a 312a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 16 168 60b c ADDITIONS 105 133d 134a / *Philosophy of History* PART III 294c d

49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 579b 583a esp 581b c

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE I 660d 661b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 735a b

54 FREUD *Civilization and Its Discontents* 784b c

4b The religious view of marriage the sacrament of matrimony

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 2 3 24 / *Proverbs* 18 22

APOCRYPHA *Tobit* passim esp 6 10-17 8 1 17 9 6 10 1 12—(D) OT *Tobias* passim esp 6 10 2 8 1 19 9 12 10 1 13

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 19 3 12 / *Mark* 10 1 12 / *John* 2 1-12 / *I Corinthians* 7 / *Ephesians* 5 22 33 / *I Timothy* 4 1-5 / *Hebrews* 13 4

5 AESCHYLUS *Eumenides* [210 224] 83b

5 EURIPIDES *Hippolytus* 225a 236d

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK VII [81 106] 238a 239a [248 434] 242b 248a

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par 3 9b c BK IV par 2 19d / *City of God* BK XIV CH 2 392d 393b / *Christian Doctrine* BK III CH 18-22 664d 666c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 92 AA 2-3 489d 491b Q 98 516d 519a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 102 A 5 REP 3 283c 292c Q 105 A 4 ANS and REP 6-9 318b 321a PART III Q 65 A 1 ANS and REP 5 879c 881d A 2 ANS and REP 1 881d 882c A 3 ANS and REP 1 4 882d 883d A 4 ANS and REP 3 883d 884a c PART III SUPPL Q 95 1042c 1049d passim

22 CHAUCER *Wife of Bath s Prologue* [5583 5748] 256a 258b / *Merchant s Tale* [9173 9210] 320a b / *Parson s Tale* par 75 536a par 77-80 540b 542a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART IV 250c 272d 273a 276a b

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK III 219b 222b

29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 124b c

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VIII [39-560] 240b 244a

4e Divorce

27 SHAKESPEARE Troilus and Cressida ACT II s 1 [163-66] 115b-c / Coriolanus ACT V sc III 387 359b
35 LOCKE Civil Government CH X 1 5 CT 182 1836 c-68b
39 SMITH Wealth of Nations BK V 301b-c
40 GIBBON Decline and Fall 93a b 509d 510b
41 GIBBON Decline and Fall 437b-c 551d 552c
49 DARWIN Descent of Man 565a b
51 TOLSTOY War and Peace BK I 1a 14b 55c 59d BK I 6a b 90c 91 K 227d 223a K IX 36 c 369a BK X 372a b 39 398 410c-421 BK X 483a-488c 51 b-c 528b-531d BK XII 538a 539c BK X II 580c-d

6. Parents and children: fatherhood, motherhood

OLD TESTAMENT: Exodus 0:5-6, 2 / Proverbs, 20 / Jeremiah 3 29-30—(D) Jeremias 3 29-30 / Ezekiel, 18—(D) Ezechiel 18
APOCRYPHA Tobit—(D) OT Tobias / Ecclesiasticus, 3 1 16—(D) OT Ecclesiasticus, 3 1 16
4 HOMER Iliad K XXII [429-5 5] 1 9d 160d / Odyssey BK II 188a 192d K XI [45-54] 247c 245b BK X X II 266a 2 0d
5 EURIPIDES Medea [105 1 15] 1b-c
6 HERODOTUS History BK VI 212c 213a
6 THUCYDIDES Peloponnesian War K II, 398c-d
7 PLATO Laches 29b / Symposium 165b-167a / Crito 214c
9 ARISTOTLE Ethics BK VIII CH 12 [1161b16-3] 414a b / Politics K CH 2 453d-45 BK II CH 3 [1262a14 24] 457a BK II CH 16-7 539d 542a,c / Rhetoric BK I CH 5 [1 60b9-136 1] 601a-c
10 GALEN Natural Faculties K I CH 173b-c
12 EPICTETUS Discourses K I CH 2, 198c 199c
13 VIRGIL Aeneid BK II [6-9-69] 2 9a b K I [505-5 9] 272b-273a K IX [—4 313] 283a 87a
18 AUGUSTINE Confessions K V par 3 31a-c
19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica R 1, 154c 15 b Q 4 S and BK 5 160c-161d Q 3 and BK 1 168a 169b Q 1 A 1 b-173c Q 32 S and BK 1 8a 179b 4 S and B 4 177b-180b Q 33 180d 18a Q 39, A 5 210a 213a QQ 40-42 13a 230a passim Q 4 A 4 2 c 233a Q 93 6 E 496b-498a Q A BK 2 60 b-608d
20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I-II Q 81 162d 16 d passim
25 MONTAIGNE Essays 184a b 191c 192d
26 SHAKESPEARE 1st Henry VI CT IV II 23d 26a 3rd Henry VI CT I, SC V [3 2] 82b-d
27 SHAKESPEARE King Lear ACT I SC I [1 2] 4 d 248a
30 BACON New Atlantis 20 c 208d
32 MILTON Paradise Lost BK [353-4 3] 183b-184 K X [5 96] 278b

35 LOCKE Civil Government CH VI 36a-42a
36 SWIFT Gulliver PART I 29b-31a PART IV 165b-167
36 STERNE Tristram Shandy 191b-192a 210b-213a 35 a 353b 400a-402a
37 FIELDING Tom Jones 4 b-d 305b
38 ROUSSEAU Inequality 354d 365b / Political Economy 36 a-368 / Social Contract BK I 38 d 388a
42 KANT Science of Right 420b-421c
44 BOSWELL Johnson 510b-c
46 HEGEL Philosophy of Right PART III part 1 3 61 b
49 DARWIN Descent of Man 579d 580a
51 TOLSTOY War and Peace
52 DOSTOEVSKY Brothers Karamazov BK XII 395a 398d
53 JAMES Psychology 189a 1 b
54 FREUD Narcissism 406b-c / New Introductory Lectures 853a-c 876a-d

6a The desire for offspring

OLD TESTAMENT: Genesis 15:1-6 30:30-35 / I Samuel, 1 1 -11—(D) I Kings 1 1
APOCRYPHA Tobit 8:4-8—(D) OT Tobias 8:4-10
NEW TESTAMENT Luke 1:5-25
5 EURIPIDES Medea [105 1115] 221b-c / Ion 282 29 a c / Andromache 315a 3 6a,c esp [409-420] 318a d
6 HERODOTUS History BK I, 3 a b
7 PLATO Symposium, 165b-16 a / Laws BK IV 685a-c K I, 708a b
9 ARISTOTLE Politics, BK I CH 2 [1 252a 3] 445c
12 EPICTETUS Discourses BK III CH 2, 198 199c
13 VIRGIL Aeneid K I [65] 121a 123a BK IV [295-33] 117a 1 6a
14 PLUTARCH Cato the Younger 629a-c
15 TACITUS Annals BK III 51 K XV 162b-c
18 AUGUSTINE Confessions K I par 6 10a b BK IV par 19d / City of God, BK XIV CH 22 39 b-333b / Christian Doctrine K I I CH I 663a-c
19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I Q 98, A 51 d 519a
20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART II Q 84 A 4 A 3 1 6d 178a PART II Q 65, A 1 879c 881d
23 HOBBES Leviathan, PART II 155b
25 MONTAIGNE Essays 4 4c
27 SHAKESPEARE S nets X 1 555a 588d
30 BACON Advancement of Learning 72 73a
31 SPINOZA Ethics, PART IV APPEND X, XX 449a
32 MILTON Paradise Lost BK IV [—] 168a 169a BK X [966-1 33] 29 b-297a
36 SWIFT Gulliver PART IV 165b-166b
36 STERNE Tristram Shandy 5 a 5 3a 549a
37 FIELDING Tom Jones 21 -d
38 ROUSSEAU Inequality 364d 367b

(5 *The position of women* 5a *The role of women in the family the relation of husband and wife in domestic government*)

52 Dostoevsky *Brothers Karamazov* bk iii 46a-48b bk v 112a 113b

54 Freud *Group Psychology* 692b / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 783d 784a

5b The status of women in the state the right to citizenship property education

Old Testament *Numbers* 27 1-11

4 Homer *Odyssey* bk xi [385-461] 247a c

5 Aeschylus *Seven Against Thebes* [181 202] 29a b

5 Euripides *Medea* [410-445] 215d

5 Aristophanes *Thesmophoriazusae* 600a 614d / *Ecclesiazusae* 615a 628d

6 Herodotus *History* bk i 39b-c bk ii 56c bk iv 128c d 143b 144b 154b

7 Plato *Republic* bk v 356b 365d bk vii 401b-c / *Timaeus* 442d / *Laws* bk vi 710d 711d bk vii 716b 717a 721d 722c

9 Aristotle *Politics* bk ii ch 1-4 455b d 458a ch 9 [1269^{b}13-1270 33] 465d-466c bk iv ch 15 [1300 4-8] 500d bk v ch 11 [1313^{b}33-42] 516c bk vi ch 4 [1319^{b}26-33] 523b ch 8 [1322^{b}38-1323^{a}6] 526d bk vii ch 16 539d 541a / *Rhetoric* bk i ch 5 [1361^{a}6-12] 601c

13 Virgil *Aeneid* bk v [604-699] 202b 205b

14 Plutarch *Lycurgus* 39a 41a / *Numa Pompilius* 54a 55a / *Lycurgus-Numa* 62d 63c / *Solon* 72c / *Pericles* 133a d / *Coriolanus* 189d 191c / *Agis* 650d 651b / *Marcus Brutus* 811c d

15 Tacitus *Annals* bk ii 44b-c bk iii 53a d bk xii 117d / *Histories* bk iv 285d 286a

20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i ii q 105 a 2 rep 2 309d 316a

23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part ii 109c 110b

24 Rabelais *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk i 60c 66b

25 Montaigne *Essays* 59d 60a 399c d

27 Shakespeare *Coriolanus* act v sc iii 387a 389b

32 Milton *Samson Agonistes* [871-902] 358b 359a

35 Locke *Civil Government* ch vii sect 82 43b ch xvi sect 183 67d 68b

36 Swift *Gulliver* part iii 98b 99a part iv 166b

36 Sterne *Tristram Shandy* 210b 213a

37 Fielding *Tom Jones* 7b c 283b-c

38 Montesquieu *Spirit of Laws* bk vii 47c 50d bk xii 90c d bk xiv 107d 108c bk xvi 116a 122a c bk xix 137a 137c 138c 145c bk xxvi 215b 216a

38 Rousseau *Inequality* 327c d

39 Smith *Wealth of Nations* bk iii 165b 166a bk v 340b-c

40 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 61b-c 122c 123b esp 122c 533b 535d esp 533b 534a 557c-d 649c 652a

41 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 14d 16a 84a b 87d 88c passim 89c 164a b 170b-171c 174b-c 182a 183b

42 Kant *Science of Right* 419c-420a 436d-43 c

43 Constitution of the U S amendments, xix 19d

43 Mill *Liberty* 317c d / *Representative Government* 387d 389b

44 Boswell *Johnson* 257d 259d 260a 274d 277d 289c 312a 391c 392a

46 Hegel *Philosophy of Right* part iii par 166 59d 60a additions 107 134a b

50 Marx Engels *Communist Manifesto* 423a 427c-428a

5c Women in relation to war

Old Testament *Deuteronomy* 21 10-14 / *Judges* 4-5

Apocrypha *Judith* 8-16—(D) OT *Judith* 8 16

4 Homer *Iliad* bk ii [155 16] 11c bk iii [146 160] 20c bk xxii [405 515] 159c 160d bk xxiv [707-804] 178d 179d / *Odyssey* bk ii 188a 192d

5 Aeschylus *Persians* [1-139] 15a 16d / *Seven Against Thebes* [79- 63] 28a 30a / *Agamemnon* [399-455] 56b 57a [855-922] 61b d

5 Euripides *Medea* [247 268] 214b / *Trojan Women* 270a 281a c / *Helen* 298a 314a c / *Andromache* [91-116] 316a b / *Iphigenia at Aulis* 425a-439d

5 Aristophanes *Lysistrata* 583a 599a c

6 Herodotus *History* bk i 2a bk iii 121c d 123c bk iv 143b 144b 153a b bk vii 232b

7 Plato *Republic* bk v 356b 368c / *Critias* 479c-480a / *Laws* bk vi 713b-c bk vii 721d 722c 726a-c bk viii 734a 735a

9 Aristotle *Politics* bk ii ch 9 [1269^{b}13 1270 14] 465d 466b

10 Hippocrates *Airs Waters Places* par 17 16a b

13 Virgil *Aeneid* bk i [490-493] 116b bk ii [567-623] 140a 141b bk v [605-699] 202b-205b bk xi [486-915] 341b 353a

14 Plutarch *Theseus* 10b 11c / *Romulus* 21a 24d / *Coriolanus* 189d 191c / *Pyrrhus* 328c 330a / *Antony* 756c 779c esp 760c d 767c 774a / *Marcus Brutus* 811c d

15 Tacitus *Annals* bk i 12b d 20b-c bk ii 26b c bk iii 53a d bk xiv 150a b / *Histories* bk iv 271c d

22 Chaucer *Knight's Tale* [859-1004] 174a 176b

24 Rabelais *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk iii 140c 141c 144b c

26 Shakespeare *King John* act iii sc i [205 338] 389b c / *1st Henry VI* act ii sc iii [77-120] 444a b / *2nd Henry VI* act ii sc iv 477d-478c

The care nd go ernment of ch ldren the rights nd d ties of the child pare tal despotism and tyran y

(*6 Parents and children fatherhood mother hood 6a The desire for offspring*)

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 29d 30d
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 293d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 161 58b
54 FREUD *Instincts* 415a b / *New Introductory Lectures* 860d 861a 863a b

6b Eugenics control of breeding birth control

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK IV 143b c
7 PLATO *Republic* BK V 361c 363b BK VIII 403a d / *Timaeus* 443a / *Statesman* 605d 608d esp 608a c / *Laws* BK V 693a c BK VI 707b 709a 712b 713c
9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK VII CH 3 [583 14-25] 108d / *Politics* BK II CH 6 [1265 38-b18] 460d 461a CH 9 [1270 39-b6] 466c CH 10 [1272 23-24] 468c BK VII CH 16 539d 541a
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 39a-40c / *Solon* 71d 72a / *Cato the Younger* 629a c
15 TACITUS *Annals* BK III 51a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 99 A 2 REP 2 520a d
22 CHAUCER *Parson's Tale* par 35 520b
30 BACON *New Atlantis* 207b 209d
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART IV 166a b 168a b
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 193b 194b 271b
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XXIII 187d 190a b 191c d 192a b 192d 199b
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 335a b 364d 365a
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 175c
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 83c
43 MILL *Liberty* 319b d / *Representative Government* 426d 427a
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 267b c 275d 277c esp 276d 277a 323b 328a 391d-394a,c 578a 579a 581c d 583a 596b d

6c The condition of immaturity

NEW TESTAMENT *I Corinthians* 13 10-11
7 PLATO *Lysis* 16c 17c / *Protagoras* 46b d / *Euthydemus* 67a / *Republic* BK II 320c 321d BK IV 353b d BK V 366a c BK VII 399c 401a / *Philebus* 611c d / *Laws* BK II 653a c BK VII 723c d
8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK VII CH 3 [247b13 248 6] 330c d
9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK VIII CH 1 [588a25-b3] 114b d / *Parts of Animals* BK IV CH 10 [686b5-30] 218a-c / *Ethics* BK I CH 3 [1094b-7 1095 11] 340a CH 9 [1099b32 1100 9] 345b c BK III CH 1 [1119 35-b19] 366a c BK IV CH 9 [1128b15 20] 376a BK V CH 6 [1134b8 17] 382b c BK VI CH 8 [1142 12 19] 391b BK VII CH 13 [1153 27 35] 404c d BK VIII CH 3 [1156 a2 b5] 407d 408a BK X CH 3 [1174 1 4] 428b / *Politics* BK I CH 12 453d 454a BK III CH 5 [1278 3 6] 475a b BK VII CH 9 [1329a2 17] 533b c CH 14 [1332b36 41] 537c d CH 15 [1334b8 8] 539b d CH 17 541a 542a c / *Rhetoric* BK II CH 12 636a-d
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK V [234] 64a
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK III CH 6 182b
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK I SECT 17 255d 256d
14 PLUTARCH *Alexander* 540b d 549c
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 7 31 2c 9a BK II par 3-9 9b 11a / *City of God* BK XXI CH 16 573b 574a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I QQ 100-101 520d 523d PART I II Q 34 A 1 REP 768c 769d Q 40 A 6 796c 797a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 94 A 1 REP to CONTRARY 221a d Q 95 A 1 226c 227c
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVI [85 96] 77d
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 60b 78b PART II 132b c
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 9c 11d 14c 18b 24a 30c BK II 74b 75c
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 43a c 63d 79c passim, esp 72b 75a 414a d
27 SHAKESPEARE *Troilus and Cressida* ACT II SC II [163 173] 115b
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VI SECT 54) 36c 42a passim CH VII SECT 79-81 42 -43a CH XV SECT 170 64d 65a / *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXXIII SECT 8 10 249c d
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 36a 54c esp 36a 38b 53b 54c
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XXIII 180b
38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK I 387d 388a 389c
43 MILL *Liberty* 271d 272a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 159 58a par 173 175 61a d ADDITIONS 68 126d 127a 111 112 134d 135a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 20c 26a 35b-37d BK III 132b c BK IV 192d 193c BK VI 252d 254c 269c 270a BK IX 381b-c 382a 384b BK XII 559d BK XIV 592d 604b
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK IV 90b 92b 100c 109a c BK X 272a 297d EPILOGUE 408a 412d
53 JAMES *Psychology* 206b 207a
54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psycho Analysis* 15a 18a / *Sexual Enlightenment of Children* 119a 122a c / *Interpretation of Dreams* 191b 193a 238c 239a 241b 243c / *Narcissism* 400a / *General Introduction* 495a-496b passim 526d 532a esp 526d 527c 530d 532a 572d 576d 579b 584d esp 579b 580d 591a d 592c 594d 599b 612d 614b / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 641d 643c 644d 645a 651b c / *Group Psychology* 685b d 693a-c / *Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety* 724a 727c 737c 740c 741b 743a d 746c 747a 751d 753c / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 768b c / *New Introductory Lectures* 855b 861c passim 868d 870c

7b The co ntinuity of the fam ly the veneration of a cestors f m ly pr de feuds curses

(6 Parents and children: fatherhood, motherhood 6d The care and government of children: the rights and duties of the child; parental despotism and tyranny)

50 MARX *Capital* 193a 194b 241a d
50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 427c
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 2c 3a 22b 23a 34d 35b 47b 48d BK III 119a 128d BK IV 192b 193d BK V 207b 208a 210b 211a BK VI 252d 254c 271c 274a c BK VII 291a 292b BK VIII 305b 307d 324b 325c 335d 336a BK IX 356b 358b 381b c 382a 384b BK X 406c 410c EPILOGUE I 659d 674a c passim
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK I 2d 11a BK XII 370b d 395a 398d
54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psycho Analysis* 17d 18a / *Sexual Enlightenment of Children* 119a 122a c passim / *Interpretation of Dreams* 244a c / *Narcissism* 406b c / *General Introduction* 573b d / *Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety* 751d / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 794c 795a esp 795b [fn 1] / *New Introductory Lectures* 832b c 834b c 868d 871a esp 869b c 870a c 876c

6e The initiation of children into adult life

NEW TESTAMENT *Luke* 2 41-52
4 HOMER *Odyssey* BK I II 183a 192d BK XI [487-540] 247d 248b
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK IV 125c 126a 155c 156a
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK III CH 12 [1119 33-b18] 366a c
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK I 253a 256d
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 41b 42b
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par 3 8 9b 10d
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 63d 79c passim esp 72b 75a 156d 158a c 184a 191c esp 187a c
26 SHAKESPEARE *Two Gentlemen of Verona* ACT I SC III [1 42] 232c d / *2nd Henry IV* ACT V SC II 497d 499b
27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT I SC III [52 136] 34d 35d / *Cymbeline* ACT IV SC IV 478b d
30 BACON *New Atlantis* 207b 209a
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VI SECT 59 69 37b 40b passim
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XVIII 133a b
38 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 376b d / *Social Contract* BK I 387d 388a
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 82a 91b
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 86b c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 159 58a par 174 61b par 177 62a ADDITIONS 111 112 134d 135a
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 387b
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 36d 37a BK III 128d 131c esp 130d 131b BK IV 192d 193c BK VI 254c 260a 267c 270a BK IX 381b c 82a 384b BK XIV 592d 604b
54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psycho Analysis* 17d 18a / *Sexual Enlightenment of Children* 119a 122a c passim / *General Introduction* 512a 583c d 584b c / *Group Psychology* 682a b / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 783d

7 The life of the family

7a Marriage and love: romantic, conjugal, and illicit love

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 2 23 4 24 6, 29 16-30 / *Ruth* / *I Samuel* 1 1-8—(D) *I Kings* 1 1-8 / *II Samuel* 11 13 1-20—(D) *II Kings* 11 13 1-20 / *Proverbs* 5 6 20-7 27 / *Ecclesiastes* 9 9 / *Song of Solomon*—(D) *Canticle of Canticles*
APOCRYPHA *Tobit* 6 10-17—(D) OT *Tobias* 6 11-22 / *Ecclesiasticus* 7 26 25 1 40 23—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 7 28 25 1 2 40 23
NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 19 4-6 / *Mark* 10 6-9 / *I Corinthians* 7 1 15 32 34 / *Ephesians* 5 22-33 / *Colossians* 3 18 19 / *I Peter* 3 1-7
4 HOMER *Iliad* BK IX [334 347] 60c d BK XIV [29-360] 100c 101d / *Odyssey* BK XXIII [153 365] 313d 316a BK XXIV [191 202] 319a
5 AESCHYLUS *Agamemnon* [681-781] 59b 60b / *Choephoroe* [585-651] 75d 76b [892-930] 78d 79b
5 SOPHOCLES *Trachiniae* 170a 181a c
5 EURIPIDES *Medea* 212a 224a c esp [446-66] 215d 217c / *Hippolytus* 225a 236d esp [373 481] 228b 229b / *Alcestis* 237a 247a c esp [152 198] 238c 239a [3 9-368] 240a b / *Suppliants* [990-1071] 267a c / *Trojan Women* [634 683] 275c d / *Helen* 298a 314a c / *Andromache* 315a 326a c esp [147-244] 316c 317b / *Electra* [988 1122] 336a 337b
5 ARISTOPHANES *Lysistrata* 583a 599a c / *Thesmophoriazusae* 600a 614d esp [383-532] 604d 606a
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK VI 197a-c BK IX 311b 312d
7 PLATO *Symposium* 152d 153a / *Republic* BK V 361b 363b
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VIII CH 12 [1162 15 33] 414c d
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [1149-1287] 59d 61a c
13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK II [730-794] 144b 146b BK IV [1-361] 167a 177a
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 39d-40b / *Lycurgus Numa* 62d 63c / *Solon* 71d 72a / *Demetrius* 731a b / *Antony* 756c 779d / *Marcus Brutus* 807b d 811c d
15 TACITUS *Annals* BK IV 64b c BK XI 107b-110a BK XII 121c
17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR V CH 1 100c 101c
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par 2-8 9b-10d BK IV par 2 19d BK VI par 21 25 41c

7b The continuity of the family the veneration of ancestors family pride feuds curses

330a [139-181] 331b-333a BK XI [409-440] 36 a b

14 PLUT c I Lycurg s Numa 62d 63c / Solo 66b-d 71d 72a / Pericl s 139a 140a / Coriola n s 174b d 193a c esp 175d 176b 189d 191d / T m leon 196b-198b / Marcus Cato 286b-287b / Alexander 542a 545b / Cato the Young er 623 -624 / Agis 654c 655 / Demetrius 727a b 740d 741 / Marcus Brutus 807b-d 811 d

15 T CITU Annals BK I 10c d BK XI 107b-110a K XII 115a-c 118d 119b BK XIII 128a 131b BK XIV 141b-143d BK XVI 183a-c / Historie K IV 282b d

18 AUGU TI E Co fessions BK III par 19-21 18b-19b BK V par 15 31 -c BK I par 17 37 65a 71b / City of G d K XIX CH 14 520 -d

19 AQUI S mma Theologica P RT I Q 60 4 s 312c 313b Q 96 A 3 REP 2 512 -c

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21 D NTE D in Comedy HELL, XXX I [124]-XXX I [90] 43a 50c P R. DI XV XVI 128b-133c pass m

22 CH UCE W f f Bath s Prologue [5893-5914] 261 b / Clerk s Tale 296a 318a

23 MACHIA ELLI Prince CH X I 24b-c

23 HO s Leviathan, PART II 155b

24 RABELAIS Garg nt a d Pan. gruel, BK I 8c-d K I 81 83b K I 144b-c 196b-d K I 242c 244d 248d 250a

25 MO TAI Es ys 66c-67a 83a 84b 184 192d esp 184 d 358b-362 409d-434d esp 410a-422b 472 -473a

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27 S E EAR H mlet ACT I SC III [5-51] 34c d [54 36] 3 b-d ACT I S V [, 2 6] 60d-62a / K g Lea 244a 283a c / Coriola c 355b-356b CT II I [0-2.0] 362a 363b CT V S 387 389b

30 B CO Advancement f Lear g 84b-c

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36 S FT G Liver R IV 165b-166a

37 FI LDIN Tom Jone 11d 19a c 22d 23a 44b-d 65b-c 126c 127b 23 b-238d 304a-c 405a,c

38 M E Q I U Spirit of Laws K X 117c K XIX 1,0 -c

38 R U Ineq auty 326c-d 327 -d 350b 364d 365b / P Litc l Eco omy 368b-c / Soci l Contract K 387d 388a

40 GI Decl nd F ll 92d 93

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44 BOSW LL J h 57a 57d 58a 90c 30 b 424d-425a 510b-c

46 H GEL Phi sophy of Right PART III par 158 58a par 173 61a b DDITIONS 110 134d 112 135a / Philosophy of History INTRO 172b-d PART I 211d 212c P RT III 288d 289b

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48 MELVILLE Moby Dick 387a 388b

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52 DOSTOE SKY Brothers Karamazov BK IV 90b-92b 100c 109a c BK V 117c 121d 137a c BK VI 148d 150d BK X 285a 297d EPI LOGUE 408a-412d

53 J E Psychology 189 190a 717b 735b-736b

54 FREU I erpreta on of Dreams 241b-246b / Narcissism 406b-c / Gener l Introd ction 528d 529d 583a-c / Group Psychology 685c / Civ zatio a d Its Discontents 783b-c / New Introductory Lectures 856d-859a 862d 863c

7d The emot onal mp ct of f mily l fe upon the child the domestic tri ngle the symbolic roles of father and mother

4 HOMER Ody sey BK II 188a 192d BK XV X I 266a 276d

5 SO OCLE Oed us the King 99a 113a,c esp [9-5-983] 108b / Electra 156a 169a c esp [34 3 9] 158a b [516-633] 160a 161a

5 EURI E H polytus 225a 236d / Electra 327a 339 c esp [1008-1123] 336b-337b

6 H R DOTU H story BK III 89d 100b-101b K IV 151a b

9 A ISTOTLE Ethics K VII CH 6 [1149b4 13] 400 BK VIII H 10 [1160b23 33] 413 CH 12 413d-414d passim / Politics K I CH 12 [1259b 10- 6] 454

14 PLUT CH Artaxerxes 855b-c

6 SH K E RE 3 d Henry VI ACT S 1 [11 63] 72b-d

27 S K SPEARE Hamlet 29a 72a c

31 S I OZA Ethics PART IV APP XD X XIII 448b-c

36 SWIFT Gull er ART IV 165b-166a

37 FIELD NG Tom J e 126c 127c

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51 TOLS O War d Peace K I 271c 273c K I 30 b-307d BK IX 356b-358b EP OGU I 658a 659d 662a 664b 667b-d 669a 669c-d 673d-674

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6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 13b-c BK III 96c d BK IV 146a b 149b c BK V 167b 168a
7 PLATO *Charmides* 3c d / *Laws* BK IX 683b-c BK IX 752d 753a
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VII CH 6 [1149b4 13] 400a BK VIII CH 11 [1161 15-21] 413b c / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 5 [1360b19-38] 601a b
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK I 253a 256d
13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK II [671-804] 143a 146b BK V [42-103] 188a 190a BK VI [679-702] 229a b [756-901] 231a 235a BK VIII [609-731] 275a 278b BK X [276-286] 309b 310a
14 PLUTARCH *Aratus* 826a c
15 TACITUS *Histories* BK II 227b-c
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par 6 10a b
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XI [46-72] 69b-c PARADISE XV-XVI 128b 132a
22 CHAUCER *Tale of Wife of Bath* [6691-6788] 274b 276a / *Parson's Tale* par 27 514b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 121d
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK III 140c d
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 411a d
26 SHAKESPEARE *1st Henry VI* ACT IV SC V-VII 23d 26a / *Romeo and Juliet* 285a 319a c / *Julius Caesar* ACT I SC II [13 161] 570d 571a
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33 PASCAL *Pensees* 626 286b
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 225b 227b 307b-310a
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 15c 17d 106b c 125b 275a 362c 364d
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XIX 140a BK XXIII 188b c 189b c
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 242a b 412c 413a passim 497a 498a
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44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 274b 278a 280c 281a 282a b 289c d 293d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 173 61a b par 180 62c 63c / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 197c d PART I 211d 212c PART IV 320c
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK X 399d-401d
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK II 41a b

7c Patterns of friendship in the family man and wife parents and children brothers and sisters

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NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 10.21 35 3 ... 50 19 29 / *Mark* 3 31 35 13 12 / *Luke* ... 51-53 14 26 15 11 3 18 29-30
4 HOMER *Iliad* BK XXII [1-98] 155a 156a [... 515] 159c 160d BK XXIV [159-804] 172d ... / *Odyssey* BK II 188a 192d BK XI [... 247c 248b BK XIV XV 260a 271d BK ... [16 ... 5] 273d 274b BK XVII [31-60] ... BK XXIII [1-245] 312a 314d BK XXIV [... 361] 320a d
5 AESCHYLUS *Seven Against Thebes* [95 ... 37d 39a c / *Choephoroe* 70a 80d esp [... 72b-73a [89 -930] 78d 79b
5 SOPHOCLES *Oedipus at Colonus* 114a 130a esp [3 4-460] 117a 118b [1150-1446] 1... 127b / *Antigone* 131a 142d / *Ajax* [1290-1... 154a b / *Electra* 156a 169a c / *Trachiniae* 17... 181a c
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7 PLATO *Republic* BK I 296d 297a BK V 360... 365d / *Laws* BK IV 683b c
9 ARISTOTLE *Generation of Animals* BK IV CH 2 [753 7 15] 294a b / *Ethics* BK VII CH 4 [1148 26-b4] 398d BK VIII CH 1 [1155a16-...] 406b d CH 7 [1158b1 24] 410c d CH ... [1159 24 33] 411b-c CH 9 [1159b ... 1160a...] 411d-412b CH 10 [1160b23]-CH 11 [1161b...] 413a-c CH 1 413d-414d CH 14 [1163b13 ...] 416c d BK IX CH 2 417c-418b CH 4 [1166a 1-9] 419a b CH 7 [1168 21 7] 421d / *Politics* BK I CH 12-13 453d-455a c BK II CH 3 4 456c-458a
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK V [1011 1018] 74b
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 23 128c d
13 VIRGIL *Eclogues* IV [60-64] 15b / *Aeneid* BK III [69 -715] 166a b BK V [42 103] 188a 190a BK VI [679-702] 229a b BK VIII [554-5...] 273b 274b BK IX [280-302] 286b 287a BK X [822-828] 324b 325a BK XI [29 71] 329b

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14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus Numa* 62d-63c / *Solon* 66b-d 71d 72a / *Pericles*, 139a 140a / *Coriolanus* 174b,d 193a c esp 175d 176b, 189d 191d / *Timoleon*, 196b-198b / *Marcus Cato* 286b-287b / *Lysander* 542 545b / *Cato the Younger* 623c-624 / *Agis* 654c-655a / *Demetrius* 72 a b 740d 741c / *Marcus Brutus* 807b-d 811c-d

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21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL, XXXII [124]-XXXIII [90] 49a 50c PARADISE XV XVI 128b-133c passim

22 CHAUCER *Wife of Bath's Prologue* [5893-5914] 251 b / *Clerk's Tale* 296a 318a

23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* CH XVI 24b-c

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25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 66c-6 a 83a-84b 184 197d esp 184 -d 358b-36_a 409d-434d esp 410a-422b 472a-473a

26 SHAKESPEARE *1st Henry IV* ACT IV SC V II 23d 26a / *3d Henry VI* ACT II, SC 5 [55 3] 87b-d / *Richard II* ACT SC II [1 4] 322d 323a *Henry VI* ACT I SC 4 7d-4 8c ACT IV SC IV 492d-496d / *Julius Caesar* ACT 1 34 309] 577a-c

27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT I SC III [5-5] 34c-d [5 6] 35b-d ACT IV SC [11 216] 60d-6_a *King Lear* 244a 283a,c / *Coriolanus* ACT II 3 5b-356b ACT II SC [10-] 36_a 363b ACT V III 387a 389b

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 84b-c

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I [779-] 168a 1 9a *Samson Agonistes* [14-6- 50] 371b-377b

35 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART IV 165b-166a

37 FIELDING *Tom Jones*, 17d 19a,c 22d 2aa 44b-d 6ab-c 126c 127b 235b-238d 304a-c -05a,c

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws*, BK X II, 117c BK XIX, 1-0a-c

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 326c-d 32 c-d 350b 364d 3-5b / *Political Economy* 368b-c / *Social Contract* BK I 38 d 388a

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 9 d 9aa

41 KANT *Science of Right* 419a-420b

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 5 5 d 5aa 90c 305b 424d-425a 5 0b-c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 158 58a par 1 3 61a b ADDITIONS 110 134d 112 135a / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 172b-d PART 211d 212c PART II 288d 289b

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51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 2c 3a 7d 8d 13a 14b 25a 31a 37d-47b 55c 59d BK III 119a 131c BK IV 165a 168d 179b-180d 183d 184b 192b-193d BK V 203a-d 210b-211a BK VI 24 a 248a 251a b 252d 254c 2 0b-274a,c BK VII 2 6b-27 a 290b-291 BK VIII 30 b-310d 314a 316a 326b-329c BK IX, 356b-358b BK X 406c-410c 412d 414b 416c-417b BK XI 483a-d BK XII 553c-d BK X 614a-618b EPILOGUE I 650d 67 a,c

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53 JAMES *Psychology* 189a 190a 717b 735b-735b

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7d The emotional impact of family life upon the child the domestic triangle the symbolic roles of father and mother

4 HOMER *Odyssey* BK II 188a 192d BK XV XVI 256a 2 6d

5 SOPHOCLES *Oedipus the King* 99a 113a,c esp [9-953] 108b / *Electra* 156a 169a,c esp [254 309] 158a b, [5 6-633] 160a 161

5 EURIPIDES *Hippolytus* 225a 236d / *Electra* 32 a 339a,c esp [1008-11 3] 336b-337b

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 89d 100b-101b BK IV 151 b

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VIII CH 6 [1149b4 13] 400a BK VIII CH 10 [1160b23 33] 413a CH 1 413d-414d passim / *Politics*, BK I CH 1 [1259 10- 6] 454a

14 PLUTARCH *Artaxerxes* 85 b-e

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27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* 29a 72a c

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV APPENDIX, XX 4-8b-c

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART IV 165b-166a

37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 1 6c 127c

38 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 377a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* ADDITIONS 110 134d 111 135a

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK VI, 271 273c BK 1 30 b-30 d BK IX, 356b-358b EPILOGUE I 658a-659d 662a-664b 667b-d 669a 669c-d 673d-674a,c

(7 *The life of the family 7d The emotional impact of family life upon the child the domestic triangle the symbolic roles of father and mother*)

52 Dostoevsky *Brothers Karamazov* bk ii 34b 36c 38b 39b bk iii 59d 62a 69d 70c bk iv 104b 109a c bk viii 207a d bk ix 244b 245b bk xii 365a b 395a 398d

54 Freud *Origin and Development of Psycho Analysis* 14b 19a esp 17b 18a / *Interpretation of Dreams* 240d 249a / *General Introduction* 528d 531d 573d 574d 580d 585a 591a d 594d 599b passim / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 644d 645a / *Group Psychology* 678d 681b 685b 687d 692a 694b esp 693a b / *Ego and Id* 703c 708c esp 704d 707d / *Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety* 724a 727c 738d 742a 743a b 751d 752c 753c / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 792b 796c esp 794c 795a / *New Introductory Lectures* 832b 834d 855a 863b esp 856b 860a 876a d

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9 Aristotle *Politics* bk ii ch 9 [1269^b13-1270^b7] 465d 466c

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14 Plutarch *Romulus* 26a b / *Lycurgus* 39a 41a / *Numa Pompilius* 54a 55a 58d / *Lycurgus Numa* 62d 64a / *Solon* 72b 73a / *Themistocles* 99a b / *Alcibiades* 158b d / *Lysander* 368a c / *Cato the Younger* 629a-c / *Agis* 650d 651b / *Antony Demetrius* 780d

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38 Rousseau *Inequality* 340b c 348b d 350a-c 364d 365b

39 Smith *Wealth of Nations* bk i 29d 30d bk iii 165b 166a bk v 338c d

40 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 92 93a

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44 Boswell *Johnson* 197d 289c d 301d 302a

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50 Marx *Capital* 241a d

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54 Freud *Group Psychology* 686c 687 69 a b 694d 695a / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 781d 782c

CROSS REFERENCES

For The general problem of the naturalness of human association in the family or in the state *see* Nature 2b Necessity and Contingency 5b State 1a 3b–3d

The political significance of the domestic community and for comparisons of government in the family and in the state *see* Education 8a Government 1b Monarchy 4a 4e(1) Slavery 6b State 1b 5b Tyranny 4b

The economic aspects of the family *see* Labor 5a 5c Slavery 4a Wealth 2 3d

Religious considerations relevant to matrimony and celibacy *see* Religion 2c 3d Virtue and Vice 8f–8g

Other discussions of women in relation to men and of the difference between the sexes *see* Happiness 4a Man 6b War and Peace 5a

Other discussions of childhood as a stage of human life *see* Life and Death 6c Man 6c and for the problem of the care and training of the young *see* Duty 9 Education 4b 8a Religion 5c

A more general consideration of the problems of heredity *see* Evolution 2–3c

The distinction of the several kinds of love and friendship which may enter into marriage *see* Love 2–2d and for matters relevant to the emotional pattern of family relationships *see* Desire 4a–4d Emotion 3c–3c(4) Love 2b(4) 2d

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World*, but relevant to the ideas and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:

I. Works by authors represented in this collection.
II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

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FLÜGEL *The Psycho Analytic Study of the Family*
HARTLAND *Primitive Society the Beginnings of the Family and the Reckoning of Descent*
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GORKY *Decadence*
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—— *Strange Interlude*
—— *Mourning Becomes Electra*
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Chapter 27 FATE

INTRODUCTION

FATE—sometimes personified, sometimes abstractly conceived—is the antagonist of freedom in the drama of human life and history. So at least it seems to the poets of antiquity. In many of the Greek tragedies, fate sets the stage. Some curse must be fulfilled. A doom impends and is inexorable. But the actors on the stage are far from puppets. Within the framework of the inevitable, the tragic hero works out his own destiny, making the choices from which his personal catastrophe ensues. Oedipus, doomed to kill his father and marry his mother, is not fated to inquire into his past and to discover the sins which, when he sees, he wills to see no more. The curse on the house of Atreus does not require Agamemnon to bring Cassandra back from Troy or to step on the purple carpet. The furies which pursue Orestes he has himself awakened by murdering his mother Clytemnestra, a deed not fated but freely undertaken to avenge his father's death.

The ancients did not doubt that men could choose and through choice exercise some control over the disposition of their lives. Tacitus, for example, while admitting that "most men ... cannot part with the belief that each person's future is fixed from his very birth," claims that "the wisest of the ancients ... leave us the capacity of choosing our life." At the same time he recognizes an order of events beyond man's power to control, although he finds no agreement regarding its cause—whether it depends "on wandering stars" or "primary elements, and on a combination of natural causes." For his own part Tacitus declares, "I suspend my judgment on the question whether it is fate and unchangeable necessity or chance which governs the revolutions of human affairs." In so doing, he grants the possibility that not everything which lies beyond man's control is fated. Some of the things which happen without man's willing them may happen by chance or fortune.

It is sometimes supposed that "fate" and "fortune" are synonyms, or that one has a tragic and the other a happy connotation. It is as if fortune were always good and fate always malevolent. But either may be good or evil from the point of view of man's desires. Although fate and fortune are hardly the same, there is some reason for associating them. Each imposes a limitation on man's freedom. A man cannot compel fortune to smile upon him any more than he can avoid his fate. Though alike in this respect, fate and fortune are also opposed to one another. Fate represents the inexorable march of events. There *is no* room for fortune unless some things are exempt from necessity. Only that which can happen by chance is in the lap of fortune.

It would seem that fate stands to fortune as the necessary to the contingent. If everything were necessitated, fate alone would reign. Contingency would be excluded from nature. Chance or the fortuitous in the order of nature and freedom in human life would be reduced to illusions men cherish only through ignorance of the inevitable.

In a sense fortune is the ally of freedom in the struggle against fate. Good fortune seems to aid and abet human desires. But even misfortune signifies the element of chance which is more congenial than fate, if no more amenable, to man's conceit that he can freely plan his life.

THE TERMS *necessity* and *contingency* cannot be substituted for *fate* and *fortune* without loss of significance. As the chapter on NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY indicates, they are terms in the philosophical analysis of the order of nature and causality. They may have, but they need not have, theological implications. Necessity

and contingency can be explained without any reference to the supernatural as is evident from the discussion of these matters in the chapter on CHANCE But fate and fortune in their origin at least are theological terms

In ancient poetry and mythology both inevitability and chance were personified as deities or supernatural forces There were the goddess of Fortune and the three Fates as well as *their three evil sisters or counterparts the* Furies The Latin word from which fate comes means an oracle and so signifies what is divinely ordained What happens by fate is *fated*—something destined and decreed in the councils of the gods on Olympus or it may be the decision of Zeus to whose rule all the other divinities are subject or as we shall see presently it may be a supernatural destiny which even Zeus cannot set aside

In any case the notion of fate implies a supernatural will even as destiny implies predestination by *an intelligence able not only to plan* the future but also to carry out that plan The inevitability of fate and destiny is thus distinguished from that of merely natural necessity which determines the future only insofar as it may *be the inevitable consequence of causes* working naturally

But the ancients do not seem to be fatalists in the extreme sense of the term To the extent that men can propitiate the gods or provoke divine jealousy *and anger the attitude and* deeds of men seem to be a determining factor in the actions of the gods To the extent that the gods align themselves on opposite sides of a human conflict (as in the *Iliad*) or oppose each other (as in the *Odyssey*) *it may be thought* that what happens on earth merely reflects the shifting balance of power among the gods

But human planning and willing do not seem to be excluded by the divine will and plan which are *forged out of the quarrels of the* gods On the contrary polytheism seems to make fortune itself contingent on the outcome of the Olympian conflict and so permits men a certain latitude of self determination Men can struggle *against* the gods precisely because the gods may be with them as well as against them

The ultimate power of *Zeus to decide the* issue may however place the accent on fate rather than on freedom This is certainly so if Zeus is not the master of even his own fate much less the omnipotent ruler among the gods or the arbiter of human destiny In *Prometheus Bound* the Chorus asks Who is the pilot of Necessity? Prometheus answers, The Fates triform and the unforgetting Furies The Chorus then asks Is Zeus of lesser might than these? To which Prometheus replies *He shall not shun the lot apportioned* When they ask what this doom is, Prometheus tells them to inquire *no more for* they verge on mysteries Later Zeus himself sends Hermes *to wrest from Prometheus the* secret of what has been ordained *for him by* all consummating Fate or Fate s resistless law *Prometheus refuses saying that none* shall bend my will or force me to disclose by whom tis fated he shall fall from power

The question Aeschylus leaves unanswered is whether *Zeus would be able to escape his doom if he could foresee what Fate holds in store for him* The suggestion seems to be that without omniscience the omnipotence of Zeus cannot break the chains of Fate

IN THE TRADITION of Judaeo Christian theology the problem of fate is in part verbal and in part real The verbal aspect of the problem concerns the *meaning* of the word fate in relation to the divine will providence and predestination *With the verbal matter settled there remains* the real problem of God s will and human freedom The strictly monotheistic conception of an *omnipotent and omniscient* God deepens the mystery and makes it *more difficult than the problem of fate and freedom in pagan* thought

If anyone calls the will or the power of God itself by the *name of fate* Augustine says, let *him keep his opinion* but correct his language *For when men hear that word according to the ordinary use of language* they simply understand by it the virtue of that particular *position of the* stars which may exist at the time when anyone is born or conceived which some separate *altogether from* the will of God whilst others affirm that this also is *dependent on that will* But those who are of *the opinion that apart from the will of God* the stars *determine* what we shall do or what

good things we shall possess or what evils we shall suffer must be refused a hearing by all not only by those who hold the true religion but *by those who wish to be the worshippers of any gods whatsoever even false gods* For what does this opinion really amount to but this that no god whatsoever is to be worshipped or prayed to?

Since the word fate has been used *for those* things which are determined apart from the will of God or man Augustine thinks it would be better for Christians not to use it but to substitute providence or predestination when they wish to refer to what *God* wills Aquinas however retains the word fate but restricts its meaning to the ordering of mediate causes by which God wills the production of certain effects

According to the definition given by Boethius which Aquinas quotes Fate is a disposition inherent to changeable things by which providence connects each one with its proper order Thus fate is not identified with providence but made subordinate to it The distinction Aquinas explains depends on the way we consider the ordering of effects by God As being in God Himself the ordering of th effects is called Providence But as being in the mediate causes ordered by God *it is called* fate While admitting that the divine power or will can be called fate as being the cause of fate he declares that essentially fate is the very disposition or *series* i e order of second cause

The position Lucretius takes seems to be exactly opposite to that of Augustine and Aquinas Lucretius condemns the fatalism of those who believe that the gods control the order of nature and who therefore attribute whatever befalls them to divine ordination For him nature free at once and rid of her haughty lords is seen to do all things *spontaneously* of herself without the meddling of the gods He tries to teach men that everything happens according to the laws of nature *other than which there is no fate* The decrees of fate lie in the laws by which all motion *is* ever linked together and a new motion ever springs *from* another in a fixed order If man by his power of free action can make some commencement of motion to break through the decrees of fate in order that cause follow not cause from everlasting it is because in the atoms of his makeup there is another cause of motions caused by a minute swerving of first beginnings at no fixed part of space and no fixed time

Nevertheless according to Augustine Lucretius is a fatalist who disbelieves in providence *other than which there is no fate* Each of them uses the word fate the one to deny the other to affirm the power of God

But even if a Christian avoids the superstitions of astrology or some similar belief in a natural necessity *which does not* depend on God he may *still commit the sin of* fatalism which follows from the denial of man s free will Understanding fate as *identical with* providence the Christian is a fatalist if in the belief that every human act *is foreordained by God* he resigns himself to his fate making *no* moral effort and taking no moral responsibility *for his soul s welfare* To do that is to argue like Chaucer s Troilus

I am here d but do e for so to say
For all that comes comes by necessity
Th s to be done for is my destiny
I must believe and cannot ther choose
That Providence in its divine for sight
H th known that Cressida I once must lose
Since God s es everythin from heaven s he ght
And plans things as he thinks both best and right
As wa arranged for by *predestination*

Troilus sees no way of avoiding the conclusion that free choice *is an idle dream*

THE THEOLOGIANS recognize the difficulty of reconciling providence and free will The truth must lie *somewhere* between two heresies If *it is heresy to deny God s omnipotence and* omniscience then nothing remains outside the all encompassing scope of divine providence *nothing happens contrary to the divine will* no future contingency is or can be unforeseen *by God If* on the other hand to deny that man sins freely *means* that God must be responsible for the evil that man does then *it is a* heresy to deny free will, for that imputes evil to God

This is the problem with which Milton deals in *Paradise Lost* announcing that he will try to justify the ways of God to man In a conversation in heaven the Father tells the

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In any case the notion of fate implies a supernatural will even as destiny implies predestination by an intelligence able not only to plan the future but also to carry out that plan The inevitability of fate and destiny is thus distinguished from that of merely natural necessity which determines the future only insofar as it may be the inevitable consequence of causes working naturally

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But human planning and willing do not seem to be excluded by the divine will and plan which are forged out of the quarrels of the gods On the contrary polytheism seems to make fortune itself contingent on the outcome of the Olympian conflict and so permits men a certain latitude of self determination Men can struggle against the gods precisely because the gods may be with them as well as against them

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Son that though He knows Adam will disobey his rule Adam remains quite free to sin or not to sin and the fault is his own just as the rebellious angels acted on their own free will The angels God says

So were created nor can justly accuse
Thir maker or thir making or thir Fate
As if Predestination over rul d
Thir will dispos d by absolute Decree
Or high foreknowledge they themselves decreed
Thir own revolt not I if I foreknev
Foreknowledge had no influence on their fault
Which had no less prov d certain unforeknown
So without least impulse or shadow of Fate
Or aught by me immutablie foreseen
They trespass Authors to themselves in all
Both what they judge and what they choose for so
I formed them free and free they must remain
Till they enthrall themselves I else must change
Thir nature and revoke the high Decree
Unchangeable Eternal which ordain d
Thir freedom they themselves ordain d their fall

A solution of the problem is sometimes developed from the distinction between God s foreknowledge and God s foreordination God foreordained the freedom of man but only foreknew his fall man ordained that himself *Strictly speaking however the word fore knowledge* would seem to carry a false connotation since nothing is future to God Everything that has ever happened or ever will is simultaneously together in the eternal present of the divine vision

During his ascent through Paradise Dante wishing to learn about his immediate future asks his ancestor Cacciaguida to foretell his fortune for he gazing upon the Point to which all times are present can see contingent things ere in themselves they are Cacciaguida prefaces his prediction of Dante s exile from Florence by telling him that the contingency of material things is all depicted in the Eternal *Vision* yet thence it does not take *necessity* more than does a ship which is going down the stream from the eye in which it is mirrored The difference between time and eternity is conceived as permitting *the temporal future* to be contingent even though God knows its content with certitude

But it may still be asked does not God s knowledge imply the absolute predestination of future events by providence since what God knows with certitude cannot happen otherwise than as He knows it? In a discussion of divine grace and man s free will Dr Johnson remarks, I can judge with great probability how a man will act in any case without his *being restrained* by my judging God may have this probability increased to certainty To which Boswell replies that when it is increased to *certainty* freedom ceases because that cannot be certainly foreknown which is not certain at the time but if it be certain at the time it is a contradiction to maintain that there can be afterwards any contingency dependent upon the exercise of will or anything else

Against such difficulties Aquinas insists that *divine providence is compatible not only with* natural necessity but also with contingency in nature and free will in human acts *Providence he writes* has prepared for some things necessary causes so that they happen of necessity for others contingent causes that they may happen by contingency Human liberty does not imply that the will s acts are not caused by God who being the first cause moves causes both natural and voluntary Just as by moving natural causes He does not prevent their acts *being natural so by moving* voluntary causes He does not deprive their actions of being voluntary God causes man to choose freely and freely to execute his choice

THE UNCOMPROMISING conception of fate is that which leaves no place for chance or freedom anywhere in the universe neither in the acts of God nor in the order of nature nor in the course of history The doctrine of absolute determinism whether in theology science or history is thus fatalism unqualified

The ancient historians are not fatalists in this sense Herodotus for example finds much that can be explained by the contingencies of fortune or by the choices of men The crucial decision for example in the defense of Athens is presented as an act of man s choice Upon receiving the prophecy that safe shall the *wooden wall continue for thee and thy children* the Athenians exercise their freedom by disagreeing about its meaning Certain of the old men Herodotus writes were of the *opinion that the god meant to tell them the* citadel would escape for this was anciently defended by a palisade Others maintained

that the fleet was what the god pointed at and their advice was that nothing should be thought of except the ships. The eloquence of Themistocles carried the latter view. To stress its importance the historian observes that the salvation of Greece lay in the decision that led Athens to "become a maritime power."

In presenting a comparable decision by the Persians, Herodotus seems to be contrasting their fatalism with the freedom of the Greeks. At first Xerxes accepts the council of Artabanus not to go to war against the Greeks. But after a series of visions, which appear to both the king and his councillor, that decision is reversed for according to the dream the war "is fated to happen."

The conception of fate and freedom in the *Aeneid* seems closer to the Greek than to the Persian view. Even though the consummation of his story which will come with the founding of the Roman empire is projected as a divinely appointed destiny, the hero who brings that great event to pass acts as if he were free to accept or evade his responsibilities.

The Christian understanding of historical destiny in terms of providence permits—more than that requires—men to exercise free choice at every turn. "The cause of the greatness of the Roman empire," writes Augustine, "is neither fortuitous nor fatal according to the judgment or opinion of those who call those things *fortuitous* which either have *no causes or such causes* as do not proceed from some intelligible order and those things *fatal* which happen independently of the will of God and man by the necessity of a certain *order*. Human kingdoms are established by divine providence." The fatalism which Augustine here condemns involves independence not only of the will of God but of man's will also.

It is only in modern times, with Hegel and Marx, that necessity reigns supreme in the philosophy of history. Hegel spurns the notion that history is "a superficial play of casual so-called merely human strivings and passions." He also condemns those who "speak of Providence and the plan of Providence" in a way that is "empty" of ideas since "for them the plan of Providence is inscrutable and incomprehensible." For Hegel history is the necessary development out of the concept of the mind's freedom alone. But this development and this freedom are entirely matters of necessity as far as individuals and their works are concerned. They are all the time the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind at work within them.

For Marx history seems likewise to have the same necessity. He deals with individuals, he writes in the preface to *Capital*, "only in so far as they are the personifications of economic categories, embodiments of particular class relations and class interests. My stand point," he says, is one from which "the evolution of the economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history" and within which "the individual cannot be responsible for relations whose creature he socially *remains*, however much he may subjectively raise himself above them." Here it is a question only "of these laws themselves, of these tendencies working with iron necessity towards inevitable results."

According to the historical determinism of Hegel and Marx, which is further considered in the chapter on HISTORY, men play a part which is already written for them in the scroll of history. Human liberty apparently depends on man's knowledge of and acquiescence in the unfolding necessities.

HISTORICAL DETERMINISM is merely a part of the doctrine of a causal necessity which governs all things. Causality seems to be understood by moderns like Spinoza, Hume, and Freud as excluding the possibility of chance or free will. Among the ancients, Plotinus alone seems to go as far as Spinoza in affirming the universal reign of natural necessity. What Spinoza says of God or Nature, Plotinus says of the All One, namely, that for the first principle which is the cause of everything else, freedom consists in being *causa sui* or cause of itself—self-determined rather than determined by external causes.

"God does not act from freedom of the will," Spinoza writes. Yet "God alone is a free cause," for "God alone exists ... and acts from the necessity of his own nature." As for everything else in the universe, Spinoza maintains that "there is nothing contingent, but all things are determined from the necessity of the divine

nature to exist and act in a certain manner This applies to man who according to Spinoza, does everything by the will of God alone

From quite different premises Hume seems to reach much the same conclusion concerning chance and liberty Chance he writes when strictly examined is a mere negative word and means not any real power which has anywhere a being in nature But he also thinks that liberty when opposed to necessity not to constraint is the same thing with chance

Hume embraces the consequences of such a position If voluntary action be subjected to the same laws of necessity with the operations of matter there is a continued chain of necessary causes pre ordained and pre determined reaching from the original cause of all to every single volition of every human creature No contingency anywhere in the universe no indifference no liberty

When confronted with the objection that it then becomes impossible to explain distinctly how the Deity can be the mediate cause of all the actions of men without being the author *of sin and moral turpitude* Hume replies that these are mysteries which natural and unassisted reason is very unfit to handle To defend absolute decrees and yet free the Deity *from being the author of sin has been found* hitherto to exceed all the power of philosophy

Unlike Spinoza and Hume Freud does not deal with the theological implications or presuppositions of determinism For him determinism is an essential postulate of science and even to some extent a scientifically discoverable fact The deeply rooted belief in psychic freedom and choice he writes, is quite unscientific and *it must give ground before the claims* of a determinism which governs even mental life He thinks it can be shown on the basis of clinical experience that every psychic association *will be strictly determined by important* inner attitudes of mind which are unknown to us at the moment when they operate just as much unknown as are the disturbing tendencies which cause errors and those tendencies which bring about so called chance actions

The fatalism of what is often called scientific determinism is that of blind necessity It not only eliminates liberty and chance but also purpose and the operation of final causes. Every future event in nature history or human behavior is completely predetermined by efficient causes—predetermined but not predestined for there is no guiding intelligence at work no purpose to be fulfilled The system of *fatality* of which Spinoza is the accredited author Kant writes is one which eliminates all *trace of design* and leaves the original ground of the things of nature divested of all intelligence

Whether such complete fatalism is the only doctrine compatible with the principles and findings of natural science has been questioned by *philosophers like William James* It is certainly not the only doctrine compatible with the view that nothing happens without a cause As the chapters on CHANCE and WILL show ancient and mediaeval thinkers who affirm contingency in nature or freedom in human acts do so without denying the universal reign of causation

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

REFERENCES

To fi d the passages cited u e the numb rs in heavy type wh ch are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to For example in 4 Ho ier *Iliad* BK II [265 283] 12d the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the n mber 12d indicates that the passa e is in secti n d of page 12

P GE SECTIO S When the text s printed in one column the letter a and b refer to the uppe a d l wer hal es of the pag For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lo er half of page 119 When the te t is printed in two col mns the letters a nd b refer to the upper and lower hal es of the left hand d of the page the letters c and d to th upper and lo er hal es of the right hand side of the pa e F re ampl in 7 PLATO *Sympos um* 163b 164 the passage be ns n the l er half of the l ft hand s de of page 163 and end in the upper half of the r ght hand de of page 164

AUTHO S DI ISI NS One or more of the ma n d vis ons of a work (uch as P RT BK CH S CT) are somet mes i cl ded in the reference line numbers, in brackets are ven in certain cases *e g* *Iliad* K II [265 283] 12d.

B LE R FE ENCE The refe ences are to book, chapter and erse When the Kin James and Douay versi s diffe in title of books or in th numbering of chapters or verses, the Kin James versio is cited first and the D uay i dicated by a (*D*) follows *e g* OLD TEST E T *Nehemiah* 7 45—(*D*) *II Esdr s* 7 46

SYM OLS The abbre i tion esp calls th reader s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of whole ref rence passim sig ifies that the topic is d scussed intermittently rath r th n c ntinuo ly in the work r passage cited

For add tional i formati co cerning the style of the ref rences, see the Explanat on of Reference Styl fo general guidance in the use of *The G eat Ideas* c nsult the Preface

1 Th decrees of fat and the decis ons of the god

4 H M R *Il ad* BK I [5 3–531] 8b-c K VI I [66–77] 51d K XI [631–632] 94d K XIV [52–53] 98c X [431 461] 117a b [657 658] 119b [843–861] 121c K X II [97 126] 131 -c K XIX [74–94] 137d 138 BK XXI [8 -84] 149 BK XXII [131 223] 156c 157c / *Odyssey* BK I [225 239] 195b-c BK XX [75] 296d

5 A HY S *S ppl a t Ma dens* [032 1073] 14 / *Prometheus B d* 40 51d esp [507 5] 45a b / *Ag mem o* [1 8– 034] 63

5 E DES *Alc t s* 237 247 esp [1 76] 237a 238a, [2 3 243] 239 b [96 -99] 245c / *Her cles Mad* [3 3 1357] 376c d / *Iph gen a Amo g the T uri* [435 1499] 424a d

6 HE DOTU *History* K I 20 22a

12 E I TU *Discourse* K I H 12 118d 120b

12 AUR U *Medit t o* BK II CT 3 257 b 258a b BK III S CT 11 262a b BK CT 8 269d 270b

13 V *Aeneid* K [1 33] 103 104 [26 62] 110 K [4 8–433] 136a BK I I [1 1] 147 K [44] 179a [651] 185a BK II [56–3] 243b-245 BK X [0–11] 304b-305a K X [8 119] 331 K X [725–84] 373b-376b

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32 MILTON *A c des* [54–83] 26b 27a

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47 GOETH *F st* PART II [5305–5344] 131b 132a

2 The fated or ine table in human life

4 HOMER *Il ad* 3a 179d esp BK XV [47 7] 104c d K XVI [843–861] 121c K XVI [52 137] 130c 131c K XXII [355 366] 159 BK XXIV [522–53] 176d 177a / *Odyssey* BK XVIII [124 150] 285b- BK XXII [41] 310

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5 SOPHOCLES *Oed pus the Ki g* 99 113 c / *O d p s at C l* 114a 130 c esp [939–999] 123 -c / *Ant g* [944–987] 139a c / *Ajax* [736– 83] 149b d [9 5–935] 151a / *Electra* 156 169 c / *Philoctetes* [3 6–1347] 193 d 194a

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3 The antitheses of fate fortune freedom natural necessity chance or contingency

6 The historian's recognition of fate: the destiny of cities, nations, empires

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For The basic opposites of fate, *see* CHANCE 1a-1b, 2a; HISTORY 4a(1); WILL 5-5a(4), 5c; and for other terms in which the opposition between fate and chance is expressed, *see* NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 3.

The problem of human liberty in relation to fate, *see* LIBERTY 4b; NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 5a(3); WILL 5c.

The implications of fate in theology, or for the relation of human liberty to divine providence, *see* CAUSE 7c; GOD 1c, 7b; HISTORY 5a; LIBERTY 5a-5c; WILL 7c.

The foretelling of fate or providence, *see* PROPHECY 1a-1b; and for the condemnation of astrology and divination, *see* PROPHECY 5.

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The same doctrine in the philosophy of history, *see* HISTORY 4a(1)-4a(4); NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 5f; WILL 7b.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World*, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:

I. Works by authors represented in this collection.
II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*.

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Chapter 28 FORM

INTRODUCTION

THE great philosophical issues concerning form and matter have never been resolved But the terms in which these issues were stated from their first formulation in antiquity to the 17th or 18th centuries have disappeared or at least do not have general currency in contemporary discourse Kant is perhaps the last great philosopher to include these terms in his basic vocabulary The conceptions of matter and form he writes lie at the foundation of all other reflection so inseparably are they connected with every mode of exercising the understanding The former denotes the determinable in general the second its determination

The word form is no longer a pivotal term in the analysis of change or motion nor in the distinction between being and becoming nor in the consideration of the modes of being and the conditions of knowledge The word matter is now used without reference to form where earlier in the tradition all of its principal meanings involved form as a correlative or an opposite Other words such as participation and imitation have also fallen into disuse or lost the meanings which derived from their relation to form and matter

The problems which these words were used to state and discuss remain active in contemporary thought There is for instance the problem of the universal and the particular the problem of the immutable and the mutable the problem of the one and the many or of sameness and diversity These problems appear in the writings of William James and Bergson Dewey and Santayana Whitehead and Russell Sometimes there is even a verbal approximation to the traditional formulation as in Whitehead s doctrine of eternal objects or in Santayana s consideration of the realm of essence and the realm of matter Whatever expressions they use these thinkers find themselves opposed on issues which represent part if not the whole of the great traditional controversy between Plato and Aristotle concerning form

THERE IS A TENDENCY AMONG the historians of thought to use the names of Plato and Aristotle to symbolize a basic opposition in philosophical perspectives and methods or even in what William James calls intellectual temperaments Later writers are called Platonists or Aristotelians and doctrines or theories are classified as Platonic or Aristotelian It almost seems to be assumed at times that these names exhaust the typical possibilities that minds or theories must be one or the other or some sort of mixture or confusion of the two

If this tendency is ever justified it seems to be warranted with regard to the problems of form Here if anywhere there may be poetic truth in Whitehead s remark that the history of western thought can be read as a series of footnotes to Plato though perhaps the observation should be added that Aristotle the first to comment on Plato wrote many of the principal footnotes In Plotinus the two strains seem to be intermingled The issue between Plato and Aristotle concerning form dominates the great metaphysical and theological controversies of the later Middle Ages and with some alterations in language and thought it appears in the writings of Hobbes Bacon Descartes Spinoza and Locke where it is partly a continuation of and partly a reaction against the mediaeval versions of Platonic and Aristotelian doctrine

The most extreme reaction is of course to be found in those who completely reject the term *form* or its equivalents as being without significance for the problems of motion existence or knowledge Bacon retains the term but radically changes its meaning None should

suppose from the great part assigned by us to forms, Bacon writes, "that we mean such forms as the meditations and thoughts of men have hitherto been accustomed to He does not mean either the concrete forms or any abstract forms of ideas but rather the laws and regulations of simple action The form of heat or form of light therefore means no more than the law of heat or the law of light But Hobbes and Locke tend to reject the term itself—especially when it occurs in the notion of substantial form—as meaningless or misleading

"We are told" says Hobbes, there be in the world certain essences, separated from bodies which they call *abstract essences and substantial forms* Being once fallen into this error of *separated essences* [men] are thereby necessarily involved in many other absurdities that follow it. For seeing they will have these forms to be real, they are obliged to assign them *some place* which they cannot succeed in doing according to Hobbes, because they hold them incorporeal, without all dimension of quantity and all men know that place is dimension and not to be filled but by that which is corporeal.

With regard to *substantial form* Locke declares, I confess I have no idea at all but only of the sound form. Those who have been taught that it was those *forms* which made the distinction of substances into the true species and genera were led yet further out of the way by having their minds set upon fruitless inquiries after substantial forms —a subject which Locke regards as wholly unintelligible. The general skepticism about this notion (or the distrust of its hollowness) in the 17th and 18th centuries is reflected in a bantering remark by Tristram Shandy s father In a discussion of infant prodigies, he refers to some boy wonders who left off their substantial forms at *nine years old* or sooner and went on reasoning without them.

Since form and matter are supposed to be correlative the denial to form of meaning or reality lead to materialism as in the case of Hobbes—the affirmation of matter alone as a principle or cause Materialists of one sort or another are the opponents of both Plato and Aristotle and of Platonists and Aristotelians That part of the controversy is discussed in the chapter on MATTER Here we are concerned with the issues arising from different views of form and its relation to matter

THE POPULAR meaning of form affords an approach to the subtleties of the subject As ordinarily used form connotes figure or shape That connotation expresses one aspect of the technical significance of form. A great variety of things, differing materially and in other respects can have the *same* figure or shape The same form can be embodied in an indefinite number of otherwise different individuals But figures or shapes are sensible forms forms perceptible to vision and touch To identify form with figure or shape would put an improper limitation on the meaning of form This is popularly recognized in the consideration of the form of a work of art—the structure of an epic poem or a symphony—which seems to be more a matter of understanding than of direct sense-perception.

Bertrand Russell s definition of the form of a proposition effectively illustrates the point involved The form of a proposition, he says, is that which remains the same in a statement when everything else is changed For example these two statements have the same grammatical and logical form (1) *John followed James* and ( ) *Paul accompanied Peter* What might be called the matter or subject matter of the two statements is completely different but both have the same form, as may an indefinite number of other statements.

This illustration helps us to grasp the meaning of form and the distinction between form and matter or the formal and the material aspects of anything It is thus that we understand the phrase formal logic to signify a study of the forms of thought or discourse separated from the subject matter being thought about or discussed. Similarly abstractionism or surrealism is a kind of formalism in painting which tries to separate visible patterns or structures from their representative significance or their reference to familiar objects

Kant s doctrine of space and time as transcendental forms of intuition exemplifies the meaning of form as pure order or structure divorced from sensuous content "That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation

Chapter 28 FORM

INTRODUCTION

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we regard the idea we have (that is, our understanding of the thing) as an approximation of the Idea. The Ideas are outside the human mind even as the Forms are separate from their sensible material imitations. When we apprehend things by reason we know the Forms they imitate; when we apprehend them by our senses we know them as imitations or as images of the Ideas.

THE PLATONIC THEORY changes the ordinary meaning of the word 'imitation.' We ordinarily think of imitation as involving a relation of resemblance between two sensible things, both of which we are able to perceive; for example, we say that a child imitates his father's manner or that a portrait resembles the person who posed for it. The painter, according to Socrates in the *Republic*, is not the only "creator of appearances." He compares the painter who pictures a bed with the carpenter who makes one.

Like the bed in the painting, the bed made by the carpenter is not the real bed. It is not, says Socrates, the Idea "which, according to our view, is the essence of the bed." The carpenter "cannot make true existence, but only some semblance of existence." As the bed in the picture is an imitation of the *particular* bed made by the carpenter, so the latter is an imitation of the Idea—the essential *bed-ness* which is the model or archetype of all particular beds.

Shifting to another example, we can say that a statue which resembles a particular *man*, is the imitation of an imitation, for the primary imitation lies in the resemblance between the particular man portrayed and the Form or Idea *Man*. Just as the statue derives its distinctive character from the particular man it imitates, so that particular man, or any other, derives his manhood or humanity from *Man*. *Just as* the particular man imitates Man, so our *idea* of Man is also an imitation of that Idea. Knowledge, according to Plato, consists in the imitation of Ideas, even as sensible material things have whatever being they have by imitation of the true beings, the Forms.

Another name for the primary type of imitation is 'participation.' To participate in is to partake of. In the dialogue in which Plato has the young Socrates inquiring into the relation between sensible particulars and the Ideas or Forms, Parmenides tells him that "there are certain ideas of which all other things partake, and from which they derive their names; that similars, for example, become similar because they partake of similarity; and great things become great because they partake of greatness; and that just and beautiful things become just and beautiful because they partake of justice and beauty." The Forms or Ideas are, Parmenides suggests, "patterns fixed in nature, and other things are like them and resemblances of them—what is meant by the participation of other things in the ideas, is really assimilation to them."

The fact of particularity and multiplicity seems to be inseparable from the fact of participation. That in which the many particulars participate must, on the other hand, have universality and unity. The *Forms or Ideas* are universals in the sense that each is a one which is somehow capable of being in a many—by resemblance or participation. Parmenides asks Socrates whether he thinks that "the whole idea is one, and yet, being *one*, is in each one of the many." When Socrates unhesitatingly says Yes, Parmenides points out to him that we then confront the difficulty that "one and the same thing will exist as a whole at the same time in many separate individuals, and that ... the ideas themselves will be divisible, and things which participate in them will have a part of them only and not the whole idea existing in each of them." "Nor can we say," Socrates is made to realize, that "the one idea is really divisible and yet remains one."

THIS DIFFICULTY concerning the relation of particulars to the Ideas they participate in, is discussed in the chapter on UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR. It is not the only difficulty which Plato himself finds in the theory of Ideas. Another concerns the individuality of each of the indefinite number of particulars which copy a single model or archetype. What makes the various copies of the same model different from one another?

Plato meets this problem by adding a third principle. To the intelligible patterns or archetypes and their sensible imitations, he adds, in the *Timaeus*, the principle which is variously

I term its *matter* he writes, that which effects that the content of the phenomenon can be arranged under certain relations I call its *form* Sometimes the consideration of form emphasizes not its s paration from but its union with matter The form dwells in the thing constituting its nature The sensible or intelligible characteristics of a thing result from the various ways in which its matter has been formed

It is impossible to say more about the mean ing of *form* without facing at once the great controversy between Plato and Aristotle and the difficulties which their theories onfront

PLATO DOES NOT deny that things—the sensi ble material changing things of experience—have something like form Nor does he deny that the ideas by which we understand the na tures of things are lil e forms Rather he asks us to consider that which they are *like*

In th *Phaedo*—only one of the many dia logues in which the doctrine of forms is dis cussed—Socrates argues that there is such a thing as equality not of one piece of wood or stone with another but that, over and above this there is absolute equality Socrates gets Simmias to admit that we know the nature of this absolute essence and then asks Whence did we obtain our knowledge? It could not have been obtained from the pieces of wood or stone Socrates tries to show because they ap pear at one time equal and at another time unequal whereas the idea of equality is never the same as that of inequality Hence he thinks we must have known equality p eviously to the time when we first saw the material equals Before we began to see or hear or perceive in any way we must have had a knowledge of absolute equality or we could not have referred to that s andard the equals which are derived from the senses The equal ity which supplies the standard by which *material* equals are measured is the Form or Idea of equality

What is true in this one ca e Socrates thinks is true in every other Whether we consider the essence of equality beauty or anything else Socrates holds the Id as or essences which in the dialectical process we define as true existences are each of them always what they are having the same simple self existent and unchanging forms not admitting of variation at all or in any way or at any time Apart from the perishable things of the sensible world and apart from the ideas which are in volved in our process of learning and thinking there exist the Forms or the Ideas themselves—the immutable objects of our highest knowl edge

Because the same Engli h words are em ployed in these quite distinct senses it is useful to follow the convention of translators who capitalize the initial letter when Form or Idea refers to that which is separate from the characteristics of material things and from the ideas in our mind The words Form and Idea are interchangeable but the words Idea and idea are not The latter refers to a notion in the human mind by which it knows whereas Idea —as Plato uses the word—signifies the object of knowledge *i e* that which is known Th se differences are further discussed in the chapter on IDEA

By imitating the Forms sensible things ac cording to Plato have the characteristics we apprehend in them The ideas we have when we apprehend the resemblance between sensi ble things and their Forms (which sensible things exhibit) would seem to be indirect ap prehensions of the Forms themselves When in the *Republic* Socrates discusses knowledge and opinion he distinguishes them from one an other according to a division of their objects—the realm of intelligible being on the one hand and the realm of sensible becoming on th other The latter stands to the former as image or copy to reality and Socrates finds this rela tionship repeating itself when he further di vides each of the two parts The realm of be coming divides into images or shadows and into that of which this is only the resemblance namely the animals which we see and every thing that gro s or is made The realm of in telligible being he also subdivides into two parts of which the first is as an image or reflec tion of the second namely the hypotheses we form in our minds and the Ideas or Forms them selves

From this it appears th t just as we should regard the form of the thing as an imitation of or participation in the separate Form so should

ual physical things—familiar sensible substances, such as this stone, this tree, or this man—are not, in his opinion, imitations of or participations in universal models which exist apart from these things. He leaves it an open question whether there are self-subsistent Forms or Ideas—that is, purely intelligible substances—which do not function as the models for sensible things to imitate.

Stated positively, the Aristotelian theory consists in two affirmations. The first is that the characteristics of things are determined by "indwelling forms," which have their being, not apart from but in the things themselves. To interpret his meaning he turns to the realm of art. When we make a brass sphere, he writes, "we bring the form," which is a sphere, "into this particular matter," the brass, and "the result is a brazen sphere." There is no "sphere apart from the individual spheres," and no brass apart from the particular lumps of metal that are brass. "The form means the 'such,' and is not a 'this'—a definite thing," such as the individual brazen sphere.

Aristotle analyzes natural things in the same manner. It is from "the indwelling form and the matter," he says, that "the concrete substance is derived." Men such as Callias or Socrates, for example, consist of "such and such a form in this flesh and in these bones," and they are different in virtue of their matter (for that is different) but the same in form." The flesh and bones of Callias are not the flesh and bones of Socrates, but though different as individual men, they are the same as men because they have the same form.

The second point is that our understanding of things involves the forms of things, but now somehow in the intellect rather than in the things themselves. In order to know things, Aristotle says, we must have within us "either the things themselves or their forms. The former alternative is of course impossible; it is not the stone which is present in the soul," he maintains, "but its form."

The form in the thing is as individual as the thing itself. But in the mind, as the result of the intellect's power to abstract the forms from its matter, the form becomes a universal. It is then called by Aristotle an "idea," "abstraction," or "concept." Forms are universal in the mind alone. If there were a form existing apart from both matter and mind, it would be neither an individual form nor an abstract universal.

The indwelling forms, according to Aristotle, are not universals. Except for the possibility of Forms which dwell apart and bear no resemblance at all to sensible things, all forms are either in matter or abstracted from matter in the human mind. These are often called "material forms" because they are the forms which matter takes on, can take, and which the mind abstracts from matter. Their being consists in informing or determining matter, just as the being of matter consists in the capacity to receive these forms and to be determined by them.

THE FOREGOING helps to explain Aristotle's use of the word "composite" as a synonym for "substance" when he is considering particular sensible things. The independently existing individual physical things which Aristotle calls "substances" are all composites of form and matter. He sometimes also calls form and matter "substances," but when he uses the word "substance" strictly and in its primary sense, he applies it only to the concrete individual. Form and matter are only principles or constituents of the concrete thing—the composite substance.

The union of form and matter to constitute physical substances also explains the Aristotelian identification of form with actuality and of matter with potentiality, and their union of form and matter to a third term in the analysis of change, namely, privation. As a physical thing changes, its matter gives up one form to take on another. Its matter thus represents its capacity or potentiality for form. Matter is the *formable* aspect of changing things. What things are actually at any moment is due to the forms they possess. But they may have the potentiality for acquiring other forms, with respect to which they are in privation.

"The mutability of mutable things," Augustine writes, "is simply their capacity for all the forms into which mutable things can be changed." Change consists in a transformation of matter, which is another way of saying that it consists in the *actualization* of a thing's *potentialities*. The Aristotelian theory of form and matter is a theory of becoming as well as an

named sometimes the receptacle sometimes space sometimes matter However named it is the absolutely formless for that which is to receive all Forms should have no form The mother and receptacle of all visible and in any way sensible things is an invisible and formless being which receives all things and in some mysterious way partakes of the intelligible and is most incomprehensible

It is this material or receiving principle which somehow accounts for the numerical plurality and the particularization of the many copies of the one absolute model When a number of replicas of the same pattern are produced by impressing a die on a sheet of plastic material at different places it is the difference in the material at the several places which accounts for the plurality and particularity of the replicas Yet the one die is responsible for the character common to them all

The sensible things of any one sort are not only *particular* because the Form they imitate is somehow received in matter they are also *perishable* because of that fact The receptacle is the principle of generation or of change It is Timaeus says the natural recipient of all impressions which is stirred and informed by them and appears different from time to time by reason of them but the forms which enter into and go out of her are the likenesses of real existences modelled after their patterns in a wonderful and inexplicable manner

Matter as Plato here suggests is the mother of changing things things which between coming to be and passing away are what they are because of the unchanging Forms The Form which is received in matter for a time makes the changing thing an *imitation* as the matter in which the Form is received makes the changing thing a *participation*

The admittedly mysterious partaking of the Forms by the formless receptacle constitutes the realm of becoming in which being and non being are mixed But the Forms or Ideas themselves existing apart from their sensible imitations are uncreated and indestructible never receiving anything from without nor going out to any other but invisible and imperceptible by any sense They constitute the realm of pure being They are the intelligible reality

The criticism of the Forms or Ideas which we find in the writings of Aristotle is primarily directed against their separate existence Plato was not far wrong Aristotle says when he said that there are as many Forms as there are kinds of natural object but he immediately adds the qualification if there *are* Forms distinct from the things of this earth It is precisely that supposition which Aristotle challenges

Aristotle s criticism of Plato stems from his own notion of substance and especially from his conception of sensible substances as composed of matter and form He uses the word substance to signify that which exists in and of itself or in other words that which exists separately from other things Hence when he says that in addition to sensible substances Plato posited two kinds of substances—the Forms and the objects of mathematics he is translating the affirmation that the Forms have being separately from the sensible world of changing things into an assertion that they are substances

Socrates did not make the universals or the definitions exist apart Aristotle writes but referring to the Platonists he says they however gave them separate existence and this was the kind of thing they called Ideas What proof is there he repeatedly asks for the separate existence of the Forms or universals or the objects of mathematics? Of the various ways in which it is proved that the Form exist he declares none is convincing Furthermore he objects to the statement that all other things come from the Forms for to say that they are patterns and the other things share in them is to use empty words and poetical metaphors There is the additional difficulty he thinks that there will be several patterns of the same thing and therefore several Forms e g animal and two footed and also man himself will be Forms of man

Aristotle s denial of separate existence or substantiality to the Ideas or universals stand side by side with his affirmation of the place of forms in the being of substances and the role of universals in the order of knowledge Furthermore he limits his denial of the substantiality of Ideas to those Forms which seem to be the archetypes or models of sensible things Par

its own determinate idea which is always one and the same he will have nothing on which his mind can rest; and so he will utterly destroy the power of reasoning."

The Aristotelian theory has difficulties of its own with respect to the ultimate character of matter apart from all forms. Completely formless matter would be pure potentiality and would therefore have no actual being. It would be completely unintelligible, since form is the principle of anything's intelligibility. Nevertheless, something like formless matter seems to be involved in substantial change, in contrast to the substantially formed matter which is the substratum of accidental change.

The problem of prime matter is related in Aristotelian speculations to the problem of the number and order of the various forms which matter can take. The question is whether matter must have a substantial form before it can have any accidental form, and whether it can have a second substantial form in addition to a first, or is limited to having a single substantial form, all subsequent forms necessarily being accidental.

Aquinas plainly argues in favor of the unity of substantial form. "Nothing is absolutely one," he maintains, "except by one form, by which a thing has being; because a thing has both being and unity from the same source; and therefore things which are denominated by various forms are not absolutely one, as, for instance, a white man. If therefore," Aquinas continues, "man were living by one form, the vegetative soul, and *animal* by another form, the sensitive soul, and *man* by another form, the intellectual soul, it would follow that man is not absolutely one.... We must therefore conclude," he says, "that the intellectual soul, the sensitive soul, and the nutritive soul are in man numerically one and the same soul." In other words, "of one thing there is but one substantial form." It is not only "impossible that there be in man another substantial form besides the intellectual soul," but there is also no need of any other, because "the intellectual soul contains virtually whatever belongs to the sensitive soul of brute animals and the nutritive soul of plants."

The Aristotelian theory also has difficulties with respect to substantial forms as objects of knowledge and definition. The definition which the mind formulates attempts to state the essence of the thing defined. The formulable essence of a thing would seem to be identical with its form. But Aristotle raises the question and his followers debate at length whether the essence of a composite substance is identical with its substantial form or includes its matter as well.

Among his followers Aquinas maintains that in defining the essence or species of a composite substance, the genus is used to signify the matter and the differentia the form. "Some held," he writes, "that the *form alone* belongs to the species, while the matter is part of the individual, and not of the species. This cannot be true, for to the nature of the species belongs what the definition signifies, and *in natural* things the definition does not signify the form only, but the form and the matter. Hence in natural things the matter is part of the species; not, indeed, signate matter, which is the principle of individuation, but common matter." He explains in another place that "matter is twofold, common and *signate* or individual; common, such as flesh and bone; individual, such as this flesh and these bones." In forming the universal concept *man*, for example, the intellect abstracts the notion of the species "from *this flesh and these bones*, which do not belong to the species as such, but to the individual.... But the species of *man* cannot be abstracted by the intellect from *flesh and bones*."

As will be seen in the chapters on ONE AND MANY and UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR, the Platonic and the Aristotelian theories of form are equally involved in the great problem of the universal and the individual. Even though they seem to be diametrically opposed on the existence of universals—whether apart from or only in minds—both Plato and Aristotle face the necessity of explaining individuality. What makes the particular that imitates a universal Form the unique individual it is? What makes the indwelling form of a composite substance an individual form, as unique as the individual substance of which it is the form?

We have already noted that both Platonists and Aristotelians appeal to matter as somehow responsible for individuation or individuality, but that only raises further questions. The

analysis of the being of changing things Illustrative applications of this theory will be found in the chapters on ART CAUSE and CHANGE

Some forms are sensible Some are shapes some are qualities some are quantities But not all forms are perceptible by the senses as for example the form which matter takes when a plant or animal is generated and which gives the generated thing its specific nature This type of form came to be called a substantial form because it determines the kind of substance which the thing is In contrast the forms which determine the properties or attributes of a thing are called its accidents or accidental forms For example size and shape color and weight are accidental forms of a man whereas that by virtue of which this thing (*having* a certain size shape and color) is a *man* is its substantial form

Aristotle s distinction between substantial and accidental form affects his analysis of change and his conception of matter Generation and corruption are for him substantial change change in which matter undergoes transformation with respect to its substantial form The various types of motion—alteration increase or decrease and local motion—are changes which take place in enduring substances and with respect to their accidental forms

The substratum of accidental change is not formless matter but matter having a certain substantial form whereas in the coming to be or passing away of substances the substratum would seem to be a primary sort of matter devoid of all form As indicated in the chapter on MATTER this according to Aristotle is the primary substratum of each thing from which it comes to be without qualification and which persists in the result He tries to help us grasp prime matter by using an analogy As the bronze is to the statue the wood to the bed he writes so is the underlying nature to substance —matter absolutely formless to substantial form

Aristotle sometimes speaks of the substantial form as a first act or actuality and of accidental forms as second actualities Accordingly he also distinguishes between a primary and secondary kind of matter—the one absolutely potential and underlying substantial change the other partly actualized and partly potential and involved in accidental change Primary matter Aquinas explains has substantial being through its form But when once it exists under one form it is in potentiality to others.

Perhaps one more distinction should be mentioned because of its significance for later discussions of form Regarding living and non living things as essentially distinct Aristotle differentiates between the forms constituting these two kinds of substances As appears in the chapter on SOUL he uses the word soul to name the substantial form of plants animals and men

BOTH THE PLATONIC theory of the separate Forms and the Aristotelian theory of the composition of form and matter raise difficulties which their authors consider and which become the subject of intense controversy among Platonists and Aristotelians in the Hellenistic and mediaeval periods

The Platonic theory faces a question which arises from supposing the existence of an eternal and immutable Form for every appearance in the sensible world of becoming If the Idea and the individual are alike then some further idea of likeness will always be coming to light Parmenides says to Socrates and if that be like anything else then another and new ideas will be always arising if the idea resembles that which partakes of it Because of this difficulty with the doctrine of participation Parmenides suggests that it may be necessary to conclude that the Idea cannot be like the individual or the individual like the Idea In addition the relationships of the Forms to one another presents a difficulty Is the relation of one Form to another Parmenides asks determined by the essence of each Form or by the relationships among the sensible particulars that imitate the Forms in question? Either solution seems to be unsatisfactory because of the further difficulties which both raise

Yet after propounding questions of this sort and multiplying difficulties Parmenides concludes by telling Socrates why the theory of Ideas cannot be given up If a man fixing his attention on these and like difficulties he says does away with the Forms of things and will not admit that every individual thing has

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which God in the beginning created was unformed and void Aquinas argues that if formless matter preceded in duration it already existed for this is implied by duration To say then, that matter preceded but without form, is to say that being existed actually yet without actuality which is a contradiction in terms. Hence we must assert that primary matter was not created altogether formless But neither according to Aquinas can the form of any material thing be created apart from its matter Forms and other non-subsisting things, which are said to co-exist rather than to exist he declares ought to be called *concreated* rather than *created* things.

Aristotle's theory of physical substances as composite of form and matter raises certain special difficulties for Christian theology Those who like Aquinas adopt his theory must also adapt it to supernatural conditions when they deal with the problems of substance involved in the mystery of the Incarnation of the second person of the Trinity and the mystery of transubstantiation in the Eucharist

Furthermore Aristotle's identification of soul with the substantial form of a living thing makes it difficult to conceive the separate existence of the individual human soul Again an adaptation is required As indicated in the chapters on IMMORTALITY and SOUL, the Christian doctrine of personal survival is given an Aristotelian rendering by regarding the human soul as a form which is not completely material. Hence it is conceived as capable of self-subsistence when with death and the dissolution of the composite nature it is separated from the body

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

Platonists conceive matter as the receptacle of all Forms and so in itself absolutely formless How then can it cause the particularizations which must be accounted for? Since prime matter like the receptacle is formless the Aristotelians resort to what they call signate matter or individual matter to explain the individuality of forms and substances but it has been argued that this only begs the question rather than solves it

THE CORRELATIVE terms *form* and *matter* seem to occur in modern thought under the guise of certain equivalents as for example the distinct substances which Descartes calls thought and extension —*res cogitans* and *res extensa*—or the infinite attributes of substance which Spinoza calls mind and body They appear more explicitly in Kant s analysis of knowledge related as the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* elements of experience But it is in the great theological speculations of the Middle Ages that the most explicit and extended use of these terms is made often with new interpretations placed on ancient theories

The doctrine of spiritual substances for example has a bearing on the theory of self subsistent Forms The angels are sometimes called separate forms by the theologians They are conceived as immaterial substances and hence as simple rather than composite But though Plotinus identifies the order of purely intelligible beings with the pure intelligences the Christian theologian does not identify the Platonic Ideas with the angels He regards the angels as intelligences They exist as pure forms and therefore are intelligible as well as intellectual substances But they are in no sense the archetypes or models which sensible things resemble

Nevertheless Christian theology does include that aspect of the Platonic theory which looks upon the Ideas as the eternal models or patterns But as Aquinas points out the separately existing Forms are replaced by what Augustine calls the exemplars existing in the divine mind

Aquinas remarks on the fact that whenever Augustine who was imbued with the doctrines of the Platonists found in their teaching anything consistent with faith he adopted it and those things which he found contrary to faith he amended He then goes on to say that Augustine could not adopt but had to amend the teaching of the Platonists that the forms of things subsist of themselves apart from matter He did this not by denying the ideas, according to which all things are formed but by denying that they could exist outside the divine mind The divine ideas are the eternal exemplars and the eternal types—*types* Aquinas explains insofar as they are the likenesses of things and so the principles of God s knowledge *exemplars* insofar as they are the principles of the making of things in God s act of creation

The profound mystery of the creative act which projects the divine ideas into substantial or material being replaces the older problem of how physical things derive their natures by participation in the Forms According to the Aristotelian theory both natural generation and artistic production involve the transformation of a pre existent matter According to the Platonic myth of the world s origin only changing things are created neither the receptacle nor the Ideas But the Christian dogma of creation excludes everything from eternity except God

Ideas are eternal only as inseparable from the divine mind Being spiritual *creatures* the angel or self subsistent forms are not eternal And in the world of corporeal creatures matter as well as its forms must begin to be with the creation of things Since matter and its forms cannot exist in separation from one another the theologians hold that God cannot create them separately God cannot be supposed Augustine says first to have made formless matter and after an interval of time formed what He had first made formless but he goes on as intelligible sounds are made by a speaker wherein the sound issues not formless at first and afterwards receives a form but is uttered already formed so must God be understood to have made the world of formless matter but contemporaneously to have created the world God concreates form and matter Augustine holds giving form to matter s formlessness without any interval of time

Defending Augustine s interpretation of the passage in Genesis which says that the earth

1c The transcendental or *a priori* form as constitutive of order in experience

1d The realization of form in the sensible order

1d(1) Imitation or participation: the role of the receptacle

1d(2) Creation, generation, production: embodiment in matter or substratum

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad* BK II [265 283] 12d the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119 When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164

AUTHOR S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases *e g* *Iliad* BK II [265-283] 12d

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of book or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a *(D)* follows *e g* OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—*(D) II Esdras* 7 46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface

1 Form in relation to becoming or change

1a Forms as immutable models or archetypes the exemplar ideas

7 PLATO *Cratylus* 88a 89a 113c 114a c / *Phaedrus* 125a b / *Symposium* 167b d / *Phaedo* 231b 232b 247c 248c / *Republic* BK III 333b 334b BK V 368c 369c BK VI 382a c BK VI-VII 386c 389 BK IX-X 426d-429b / *Timaeus* 447a-458b passim esp 447b 448b / *Parmenides* 487c 491a / *Philebus* 610d 613a / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810b

8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK II CH 7 [113 24 33] 158d BK VI CH 8 [147 5 11] 201a / *Generation and Corruption* BK II CH 9 [335b8-24] 437a b / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 6 [987 29 b13] 505b c CH 7 [988 34 b5] 506c CH 9 [991 19 32] 509c BK VII CH 8 [1033b19-1034 7] 556d 557b BK XIII CH 4-5 610a 611d

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 6 [1096b3 1097a 14] 342b c

11 NICOMACHUS *Arithmetic* BK I 811a d

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK V [181 194] 63b-c

17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR III CH II 46b c TR III CH 17 TR IV CH 5 49b 51d TR IX CH 15 56c 57a / *Third Ennead* TR IX CH I 136a d / *Fourth Ennead* TR II CH I 139c 140c TR IX 205a 207a c / *Fifth Ennead* TR II CH I 214c 215a TR V CH 4 TR IX CH 14 230b 251d / *Sixth Ennead* TR II CH 20 22 278d 280d TR VII CH 4 17 323c 331a

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 9 3a BK XII par 38 108d 109a / *City of God* BK VIII CH 3 266a b CH 6 269b c BK IX CH 22 296d 297a BK XI CH 7 326a c CH 10 328c d CH 29 339a b / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 9-10 627a b BK II CH 38 654b c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 15 91b 94a passim Q 18 A 4 REP 107d 108c Q 44 A 3 240b 241a Q 47 A 1 REP 2 256a 257b Q 50 A 3 ANS 272a 273b Q 65 A 4 ANS 342b 343c Q 108 A 1 ANS and REP 2 552c 553c

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 43d-44c

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH III SECT 17 258d 259b SECT 19 259c 260a

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 113b 115a 173b 174a / *Practical Reason* 352c 353a / *Judgement* 551a 552c

1b Forms as indwelling causes or principles

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK I 259a 268d BK II CH I [193 30 b19] 269c 270a CH [194 12 b15] 270c 271a BK III CH 2 [202 9-11] 279c / *Heavens* BK I CH 8 [7a12 27] 368b-c BK IV CH 4 [312 3-22] 403c d / *Generation and Corruption* BK I CH 3 [318b13- 8] 415b c / *Meta*

2b to 2c(3)

99a-d Q 18 A 4 REP 3 10 d 108c Q 44 A 3 ... 41a Q 4 A 1 REP ... 256a 257b Q 57 ... 293a-d Q 58 ... 304c 306b ... A 4 34 b-343c ... 344b-445 ... 444d-446b A 5 446c-44 c ... A 3 465a-456c ... A 1 5 6 51 d ... 55 553

30 AQUINAS Summa Theologica ... PART III ... Q 9 ... 1032b

31 DESCARTES Meditations 93b-d / Objections and Replies 216d 21 c

31 SPINOZA Ethics PART I, PROP 1 SCHOL 362c ... 354a 355a

42 KANT Pure Reason 113c 115a 173b-1 4 / Judgement 501 502c

46 HEGEL Philosophy of History INTRO 156d 157b

2c. Form in the composite being of the individual thing

2c(1) The union of matter and form: potentiality and actuality

8 ARISTOTLE Physics BK II, CH 1 [193a9-b19] 269b-270a ... BK II CH 4 ... CH 6 ... 533a-b ... CH 8 535b-c ... 545a ... BK VII ... 566a-566a,c ... BK IX, CH 6-9 ... BK XII CH 4-5 599d-601 ... 606d / Soul, BK II, CH 1 642a-644c

9 ARISTOTLE Parts of Animals BK I ... 162b-165a / Generation of Animals ... 270a ... 270c ... 278a ... 275b-c

12 AURELIUS Meditations, BK V SECT 13 271b

16 KEPLER Harmonies of the World, 1078a b

17 PLOTINUS First Ennead TR VIII CH 8 30d 31 ... 32a 33d Second Ennead, TR IV CH 6 51d 52a ... 53b TR ... 5 d 60c / Third Ennead, TR VI, CH 19 111 119a / Sixth Ennead, TR ... CH 8 30 d 308c

18 AUGUSTINE Confessions BK XI, par 7 90d 91a ... BK XII, par 3-6 99d 100c par 8 101b par 9, 101c par ... 10 b-103a par ... 6 104c 105b par ... 10 ... par ... 108d 110a BK XIII, par 45 124a

19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 3 A 2 ... 16a A 8 19d ... 31a-d ... 31d 32 Q 9 A ... REP 3 39c-40d Q ... 6 ... REP 1 3 70d 77d Q 1 ... 3 10 d 108 Q 9 A ... 4 162a 163b ... 163b-164b Q 50 A ... 270a 272a ... 2 4b-2 ... Q 53 ... 289d ... 290 Q 6 ... 1 32 d 3 3b Q 66 A 1 343d 345c ... 345d 347b Q ... A 3 ... 3 393b-35 ... 385c-399b Q 86 A 3 ... 443b-d Q ... 1 A 1 533c 535c PART I-II Q 50, A ... REP ... 662d-663d

20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica, PART I-II Q 49, A 4 ... and ... 5a 6a PART III Q ... 11 ... 495b-499c PART III Q 2, A 1 ... and ... 10a 11c A 2, ANS 11d 12d ... 958a 9 0c ... Q 92, A 1 A ... 1025c 103 b

21 DANTE Divine Comedy PARADISE I [1 ... 1] 10 c-d I [46-1] 108b 107b ... [131 14] 11 b-c XIII [52-84] 1 6a b XXIX [13 3] 150b-c

28 GILBERT Loadstone BK II 30b

33 PASCAL Pensées 512 25a

42 KANT Pure Reason, 23b 34a b 36b-c 43d 45a 48d-49a 100d 101b 185b-18 a 188d 189a

2c(2) The distinction between substantial and accidental forms

19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I Q 7 A ... ANS 31d 32c Q 8 A ... REP 3 35c 3 b Q 9, A 2, ANS and REP 4-5 163b-164b Q 45 A 4 ... 244d 245 Q 54 A 1 3 ... 85a 25 b Q 66 A 1 ... REP 3 343d 345c Q 67 A 3 351b-35 a Q 76, A 4 393a 394c A 6 395a d Q ... A 1 399c-401b A 6, ANS 404c-405c PART I-II Q A 4 REP 3 654b 655a

20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I-II Q 49, A ... 2b-4 A 4 A ... and REP ... 5a 6a Q 5 A 1 ... 8a Q 5, A 1 A 1 15d 18a Q ... A 1 ... 4 1 8b-19b PART ... Q ... 10a 11c A 2 ANS 11d 12d ... 893d-895d Q 79, A 1 ... 4 ... 933b

31 DESCARTES Discourse PART ..., 41d

35 LOCKE Human Understanding BK II CH XII SECT 3-6 13 d 148 CH XXIII, SECT 3 204c-d CH XXXI SECT 6-13 ... 0d 243b CH XXXII SECT ... 24 c-d BK ... 1 CH III, SECT 15 19 258b-260a CH VI 2 ... 8b-283a passim, esp SECT ... 268b-271b, SECT ... 3c, SECT ... 2 4c CH IX, SECT 12 13 ... d 288d CH X SECT ... 90d ...

42 KANT Pure Reason, 131c-d / Judgement 550c-d

2c(3) The unity of substantial form: prime matter in relation to substantial form

8 ARISTOTLE Physics, BK I, CH 9 [19... 3 33] 268a-c / Generation and Corruption, BK I CH 3 [317b...] 416b-c / Metaphysics BK ... CH ... 493d-49 a / Metaphysics BK V CH ... BK I CH 9 [991b6-...] 509c BK II C 2 [994 ...] 51 b BK V ... 4 [1015 ... 11] 535b BK ... CH 3 [1 ... 6] 551c-d CH 6 [1 ... 5] 556c CH 13 [1 ... 3] 562d 563a ... 16 [1 ...] 564c [...] 56 a BK VIII CH 4 [1044 ...] 568d 569a BK IX, CH 7 [1049 ... 1] 5 ... BK XII, CH 3 [1070 ...] 599a b [1070 ... 1] 599b BK XIII CH 5 [1079 ... 34] 611c

17 PLOTINUS Second Ennead, TR IV CH ... 9 5 a 53b TR ... 5 d-60c / Third Ennead, TR 1 CH ... 9 110d 119a / Fourth Ennead, TR IX 205a-... 0 a,c

(*1d The realization of forms in the sensible order* *1d(2) Creation generation production embodiment in matter or substratum*)

343c Q 66 A 1 ANS 343d 345c Q 84 A 3 REP 2 443d 444d Q 90 A 2 481d 482c Q 104 A 1 ANS and REP 1-2 534c 536c Q 105 A 1 538d 539c Q 110 A 2 565d 566d PART I II Q 20 A 1 REP 3 712a d

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 52 A 1 ANS 15d 18a PART II II Q 24 A 11 ANS 498b 499c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE II [46-148] 108b 109b VII [121-148] 116b c XIII [52-84] 126a b

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 100d 101b 186b d / *Judgement* 556d 558a 559b d 561c 562a 565b d 566d 567a 575c 576a 577c d

2 The being of forms

2a The existence of forms separately in matter in mind

7 PLATO *Cratylus* 113c 114a c / *Symposium* 167a d / *Republic* BK V 368c 373c BK VI 385c 386c BK IX-X 426d-429b / *Timaeus* 457b 458a / *Parmenides* 487c-491a / *Sophist* 570a 574c / *Philebus* 610d 613a / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810b

8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 11 [77 5-9] 105d 106a CH 13 [79 6-10] 108c CH 18 [81 40-^{b}5] 111b c CH 22 [83 23-35] 113c d CH 24 [85^{b}17-22] 117a / *Topics* BK II CH 7 [113 24 33] 158d BK VI CH 6 [143^{b}11-33] 197b c CH 10 [148 13 22] 202b / *Physics* BK II CH 1 [193^{b}2-5] 269d CH 2 [193^{b}23 194 6] 270a b BK IV CH 1 [208^{b}19 24] 287b c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 6 505b 506b CH 9 508c 511c BK III CH 2 [997 34-998 19] 516a d CH 4 [999 24 ^{b} 4] 518a c CH 4 [1001 4]-CH 6 [1002^{b}31] 519d 521d BK VII CH 2 [1028^{b}18 28] 551a b CH 8 [1033^{b}19-1034 8] 556d 557b CH 13 14 562a 563c CH 15 [1040 8 ^{b}4] 564a c CH 16 [1040^{b}28 1041 4] 564d 565a BK VIII CH 6 [1045 14-19] 569d 570a BK IX CH 8 [1050^{b}35-1051 2] 576d 577a BK X CH 10 586c d BK XI CH 1 [1059 39 ^{b}21] 587b c CH 2 588a 589a CH 3 [1061 29 ^{b}4] 589c BK XII CH 1 [1069 27-37] 598b CH 3 [1070 4-30] 599b d CH 6 [1071^{b}12-23] 601b c CH 10 [1075^b 5 33] 606c d BK XIII XIV 607a 626d / *Soul* BK III CH 4 [429 10-29] 661b c CH 7 [431^{b}13 19] 664b

11 NICOMACHUS *Arithmetic* BK I 811a d

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR VII CH 1-2 26a d TR VIII CH 2-3 27c 28c / *Third Ennead* TR VIII CH 8-10 132d 136a / *Fourth Ennead* TR III CH 4 5 143d 144c CH 17 150d 151b / *Fifth Ennead* TR IX 226d 228b TR VII CH 1 TR VIII CH 3 38a 241a TR IX CH 4 14 247d 251d / *Sixth Ennead* TR II CH 20- 2 278d 280d TR V CH 8 307d 308c TR VI 310d 3 1b esp CH 4-10 312b 315d CH 15-17 318b 320c TR VII CH 8 17 325b 331a

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 9 3a BK X par 19 76a b BK XI par 7 90d / *City of God* BK VIII CH 6 269b c BK XI CH 27 337d 338a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 4 ANS 16d 17c Q 4 A 1 REP 3 20d 21b Q 5 A 3 REP 4 25a d Q 9 A 2 REP 3 39c-40d Q 13 A 1 REP 2 62c 63c Q 14 A 1 ANS 75d 76c A 2 ANS 76d 77d Q 15 A 1 ANS and REP 1 91b 92a Q 18 A 4 REP 3 107d 108c Q 44 A 1 REP 3 238b 239a A 3 240b 241a Q 65 A 4 342b 343c Q 84 AA 1-4 440d-446b Q 85 A 1 REP 2 451c-453c Q 110 A 2 ANS 565d 566d Q 115 A 1 ANS 585d 587c A 3 REP 2 588c 589c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 52 A 1 ANS 15d 18a PART III Q 4 A 4 ANS and REP 2 733a 734a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART IV 269d 271b

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 43d-44a

31 DESCARTES *Meditations* V 93b-c

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH III SECT 11-20 257a 260a CH V VI 263d 283a passim esp CH V SECT 9 266a b SECT 12 266d 267a CH VI SECT 2 3 268c d BK IV CH IV SECT 6 325a b CH VI SECT 4 331d 332b CH IX SECT 1 349a

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT I 415b-c

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 23b d 34a b 36b-c 45d 46a 48d-49a 100d 101b 176d 177a 186b 187a 211c 213a / *Judgement* 461a c 551a 553c 556d 558a 559b d 575c 576a 577c d 580b d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 156d 157b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 881b

2b The eternity of forms the perpetuity of species the divine ideas

7 PLATO *Cratylus* 113a 114a c / *Phaedrus* 125a b / *Symposium* 167b d / *Phaedo* 231c 232b / *Timaeus* 447a d 457c d / *Laws* BK IV 685b c

8 ARISTOTLE *Generation and Corruption* BK II CH 10 [336^{b}25 34] 438d / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 6 [987 9 ^{b}18] 505b d BK III CH 2 [997 34 ^{b}12] 516a b BK VI CH 1 [1026^{a}7 18] 548a b BK VII CH 8 [1033^{b}19-1034 8] 556d 557b BK XI CH 2 588a 589a BK XII CH 6 [1071^{b}12 23] 601b c BK XIII CH 4 [10 8^{b}7 1079 4] 610a-c / *Soul* BK II CH 4 [415 23 ^{b}8] 645c d

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 6 [1096 33 ^{b}5] 341c d

11 NICOMACHUS *Arithmetic* BK I 841a d

17 PLOTINUS *Sixth Ennead* TR VII CH 17 322b 331a

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 9 3a BK XII par 38 108d 109a / *City of God* BK VIII CH 3 266a b CH 6 269b c BK IX CH 22 296d 297a BK XI CH 7 326a c CH 10 328c d CH 29 339a b / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 38 654b c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 14 A 8 82c 83b Q 15 91b 94a Q 16 A ~ REP 2

99a-d Q 18 A 4 RE 3 107d 108c Q 44 3
2 0b-241 Q 4 REP 2 256a 257b Q 5
A1 AA 295a d Q 58 A 6-7 304c 306b Q 65
A 4 342b-343c Q 84 A 2 ANS and R P 3 442b-
443c 4 REP 1 444d-446b A 5 446c-447c Q
8 1 A S 465 -466c Q 98 A 1 516d 517d
Q1 8 A 1 A S and REP 2 552c 553c
20 AQ S S mma Theol g ca P RT III SUPPL
Q 9 A 3 A S 1025c 1032b
31 DE C R E Me' A TS V 93b d / Objec tions and Repl. s 216d 21 c
31 SPINOZ Eth cs P T1 PRO 1 SC SOL 362c 363c R P21 23 364 365a
42 KANT Pure Reason 113c 115a 173b 174a / J dgement 551a 552c
46 H EL Ph losophy of H st ry INTRO 156d 15 b

2c F rm i the compos te be ng of the in di idual thi g

2c(1) The union of m tter and form. poten- tiality nd actuality

8 ARISTOTLE Physics K 1 CH 1 [193a9-b19] 269b-270a / Metaphysics BK C 14 [10 4b26- 10 5 1] 535a b CH 6 [1 16 1 18] 537 b CH 8 535b-c CH 24 [1 3 32 b1] 545a BK 12 CH 17 565a 566a,c BK 1 CH 6 569d 5 0d BK IX CH 6-9 573 577c BK XI CH 4-5 599d-601a CH [75b34 3] 606d / Soul, K II CH 1 2 642a 644c
9 ARISTOTLE Parts f A imals K 1 CH 1 [640a 12-641b39] 162b-165a / Generat o of Animals BK 1 CH 20 [729a9]-CH 21 [9 21] 269b-270a II [30a23]-CH 22 [730b32] 270 271 BK II CH 3 [3a6-2] 277d 278a CH 4 [738 1 8] 279b-c
12 A LI S M ditations BK V SECT 13 2 1b
16 K PL R Harmo es of th World 1078a b
17 PLOTI US First Ennead TR VIII H 8 30d 31c CH 10-1 32a 33d / Second Enne d TR V CH 6 51d 52 CH 8-9 52 53b TR V 57d-60c / Third Ennead TR VI CH 8 19 111c 119a / Sixth Enne d R II 8 307d 308c
18 AU US I E Co f ssio BK XI par 7 90d 91a K I par 3-6 99d 100c pa 8 101b par 9, 101 par 4 16 102b-103 pa 4 26 104c 105b par 8 3 105 107 par 35 40 108d 110a K XI I par 48 124
19 AQ I S Summ Theol g c A T I Q 3 A nd R P 3 15c 16a A 8 19d 20c Q A 1 a d 31a d A A S and R 3 31d 32 Q 9 A R 3 39c-40d Q 14 A 1 75d 76c A 2 REP 3 6d 77d Q 18 4 R 3 107d 108c Q 29 1 R 4 162a 163b A S and P 4-5 163b 164b Q 50 A 2 270 2 2 5 A S 274b-275a Q 55 A 1 289d 290d Q 62 A EP 322d 323b Q 66 1 343d 345c A 345d 347b Q 0 3 E 365b-367a Q 6 385c 399b Q 86 A 3 463b-d Q 1 4 A 1 A S 534c 536c P RT I Q 1 R P 2 662d-663d
20 AQ IN S Summa Theologica PART I II Q 4 A 4 ANS and REP 1 5a 6a PART II II Q 23 11 ANS 498b-499c P RT III Q 2 A 1 ANS and REP 2 710a 711c A 2 ANS 711d 12d P T III SUPPL Q 9 A 1 REP 2 968a 9 0c Q 92 1 ANS 1025c 1032b
21 D TE Divine Comedy PARA ISE I [12 142] 10 c-d II [46-148] 108b 109b VII [121 148] 116b-c XIII [52-84] 126a b XXIX [13 36] 150b-c
8 GILBERT Loadstone BK II 30b
33 P SCAL Pensées 512 262a
42 K NT Pu e Reason 23b 34 b 36b-c 45d 46a 48d-49a 100d 101b 186b 187a 188d 189

2c(2) The distinction between sul stantial and accide tal forms

19 AQ I AS Summa Theologica PA T I Q 7 2 ANS 31d 32c Q 8 2 REP 3 35c 36b Q 29 A 2 A S and REP 4-5 163b-164b Q 45 A 4 A S 244d 245c Q 54 AA 1 3 285a 287b Q 66 A 1 REP 3 343d 345c Q 6 A 3 351b-352a Q 6 A 4 393a 394c A 6 396a d Q 7 A 1 399c-401b A 6 S 404c-405c PART I II Q A 4 REP 3 654b 655a
20 AQUINAS S mma Theol gica P RT I II Q 49 A 2 A S 2b 4a A 4 ANS and REP 1 5a 6a Q 5 2 7c 8a Q 52 A 1 A S 15d 18a Q 85 A 1 REP 4 178b-179b P T III Q 2 A 1 3 710a 711c A 2 AN 711d 712d P RT III SUP L Q 70 A 1 ANS 893d 895d Q 79 A 1 REP 4 951b-953b
31 DESCARTES Disco se PART I 41d
35 LOCKE H man U derst ndi g BK II CH XII SECT 3-6 147d 148c C I XXIII SECT 3 204c d CH XXXI SECT 6-13 240d 243b CH XXXII SECT 24 247c d BK III C I III SECT 15 19 258b-260a CH VI 268b-283a passim esp SECT 1 10 268b 271b SECT 21 2 3c SECT 24 274c CH IX 1 CT 12 13 287d 288d C I X SECT 20 296d 297a
4 KA T P re Reason 131c d / J dgement 580c d

2c(3) The unity of substant al form: pr me m tter n rel tion to substant al form

8 AR TOTLE Phy cs BK I CH 9 [19 3 33] 268a-c / Generat o and Corrupt n BK I CH 3 [319a29 b4] 416b-c / Meteo logy BK IV C 1 12 [38 b22 390a7] 493d-494a / Metaphysics K I H 9 [991a26-3] 509c BK II II 2 [994 1-6] 512b BK V C 14 [1 15 5 11] 535b BK I CH 3 [10 9a11 6] 551c d CH 8 [033b1-5] 556c CH 13 [039a2 3] 562d 563a CH 16 [104 b5 16] 564c [1 4 5] 565 BK VI CH 4 [1 44 15 32] 568d 569a BK IX CH 7 [1049a 24 b] 575 BK XI CH 3 [1069b35 1070a 4] 599a b [107 9-11] 599b BK XIII CH 5 [0a9b31 34] 611c
17 PLO N S co d Ennead TR IV CH -9 52a 53b TR 57d-60c / Third Ennead TR VI C 7 9 110d 119a / F urth Ennead TR IX 205a 207a,c

(2c Form in the composite being of the individual thing 2c(3) The unity of substantial form prime matter in relation to substantial form)

10 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 8 REP 3 19d 20c Q 5 A 3 REP 3 25a d Q 7 A 2 ANS and REP 3 31d 32c Q 8 A 4 REP I 37c 38c Q 14 A 2 REP 3 76d 77d Q 15 A 3 REP 3 93b 94a Q 16 A 7 REP 2 99a d Q 47 A I ANS 256a 257b Q 66 AA 1-2 343d 347b Q 76 AA 3-4 391a 394c Q 77 A I REP 2 399c 401b A 2 REP 3 401b d Q 84 A 3 REP 2 443d 444d Q 115 A I REP 1-2 4 585d 587c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL Q 79 A I REP 4 951b 953b
35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT II 415a b

2d Angels and human souls as self subsistent forms the substantiality of thought or mind in separation from extension or body

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR VIII CH 2 27c d / *Fourth Ennead* TR I CH I 139b TR III CH 9-12 146d 149b CH 18 151b c TR IX 205a 207a c / *Sixth Ennead* TR IX CH 5 356d 357a
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XXII CH I 586b d 587b
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 7 A 2 ANS and REP 2 31d 32c Q 8 A 2 REP 2-3 35c 36b Q 50 269a 275a esp A 2 270a 272a Q 75 378a 385c esp A 5 382a 383b
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE XII [121-148] 116b c XXIX [13 36] 150b c
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 80a b PART III 174b 176d PART IV 250c 251c 258b 261a 270c 271b
31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 51d 52a PART V 60b c / *Meditations* II 77d 81d VI 96b 103d / *Objections and Replies* DEF X 130d PROP IV 133c 152b d 156a 224d 225b 225d 226a 231a 232d
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 10 358a b PROP 14 COROL 2 360a PART II PROP 1-2 373d 374a PROP 7 375a-c PROP 13 377d 378c PART III PROP 2 396c 398b
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I [423-431] 102b BK V [388-443] 183b 185a [469-505] 185b 186a BK VI [320-353] 203a 204a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXIII SECT 5 205a b SECT 15-37 208c 214b passim
35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 2 413b SECT 26-27 418a b SECT 89 430b c SECT 135 142 440a 441c
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 186b
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 136b
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 121a 128b 201b c 203d 204c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 257c 258a PART IV 360c d
53 JAMES *Psychology* 221a 226a

3 Form in relation to knowledge

7 PLATO *Cratylus* 113c 114a c / *Phaedrus* 125a-c / *Republic* BK V 368c 373c BK VI 385c 388a / *Timaeus* 457b-458a
8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH II [77a5-9] 105d 106a CH 22 [83a23 35] 113c d / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 6 505b 506b CH 9 [990a33-991a18] 508c 509c BK XIII CH 4 [1078b] -CH 5 [1079b24] 610a 611c / *Soul* BK III CH 4 [429a13 28] 661b c
11 NICOMACHUS *Arithmetic* BK I 811a d
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XI CH 7 326a-c CH 29 339a b
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 7 A 2 REP 2 31d 32c Q 13 A I REP 2 62c 63 Q 14 A I ANS 75d 76c A 2 76d 77d Q 15 A I ANS and REP I 3 91b 92a Q 19 A I ANS 108d 109c Q 34 A I REP 3 185b 18 b Q 86 A 3 463b d
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVIII [49 60] 80b c
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXXI SECT 6-13 240d 243b BK III CH VI 268b 283a passim CH IX SECT 12 287d 288a BK IV CH IV SECT 5-8 324d 325c
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 14a 108a c 173b / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 282b c / *Practical Reason* 308a b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PREF 7a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE II 693d 694c
53 JAMES *Psychology* 859a 860b

3a Sensible forms intelligible forms the forms of intuition and understanding

7 PLATO *Cratylus* 113c 114a c / *Phaedrus* 125a 126c / *Symposium* 167a d / *Phaedo* 228a 23 b / *Republic* BK III 333b 334b BK V 370d 373c BK VI 383d 388a / *Timaeus* 447a d 455c-458a / *Theaetetus* 534c 536a
8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 13 [79a6 10] 108c / *Topics* BK II CH 7 [113a 3 31] 158d / *Soul* BK III CH 2 [425b17 6] 657d 658a CH 4 661b 662c CH 8 664b d / *Memory and Reminiscence* CH I [450a26-451a19] 691a 692b
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X par 19 76a b BK XII par 5 100a b / *City of God* BK VIII CH 6 269b c BK XI CH 27 337d 338a BK XII CH 7 346c d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 7 A 2 REP 31d 32c Q 13 A I ANS 71b 72c Q 14 A I ANS 75d 76c A 8 ANS 82 83b Q 15 A I ANS and REP I 3 91b 92a Q I A 3 N 102d 103c Q 18 A 3 ANS 106b 107c Q 19 A I ANS 108d 109 Q 34 A I R 185b 18 b Q 50 A 2 REP 2 270a 272a Q 84 440b 451b Q 85 AA 1 2 451c 455b A 5 457d 158d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 62 A 3 REP I 61c 62b PART III SUPPL Q 92 A I ANS 1025c 1032b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 49d
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH VI SECT 9 10 270d 271b

CROSS REFERENCES

For Other discussions of the Forms or Ideas as immutable models or archetypes *see* CHANGE 15a ETERNITY 4c IDEA 1a 6b

Other discussions of forms as indwelling causes or principles in mutable things *see* CAUSE 1a CHANGE 2a MATTER 1a and for the consideration of form and matter as co principles of composite substances *see* BEING 7b(2)

Discussions of matter or the receptacle in relation to form *see* CHANGE 2–2b MATTER 1–1b SPACE 1a WORLD 4b and for the consideration of matter apart from form *see* MATTER 2 3a

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II

DUNS SCOTUS *Opus Oxoniense* BK I DIST 7 (24)
CRESCAS *Or Adonai* PROPOSITIONS 10–11 16
BRUNO *De la causa p incipio e i no*
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JOHN OF SAINT THOMAS *Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus Philosophia Naturalis* PART I QQ 3 4 6 9 11
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LOTZE *Metaphysics*
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A E TAYLOR *Philosophical Studies* CH 3
KONINCK *Le problème de l indeterminisme*
BLANSHARD *The Nature of Thought*

Chapter 29 GOD

INTRODUCTION

WITH the exception of certain mathematicians and physicists all the authors of the great books are represented in this chapter In sheer quantity of references, as well as in variety it is the largest chapter The reason is obvious More consequences for thought and action follow from the affirmation or denial of God than from answering any other basic question They follow for those who regard the question as answerable only by faith or only by reason and even for those who insist upon suspending judgment entirely

In addition to the primary question of God s existence there are all the problems of the divine nature and of the relation of the world and man to the gods or God The solutions of these problems cannot help influencing man s conception of the world in which he lives the position that he occupies in it and the life to which he is called

The whole tenor of human life is certainly affected by whether men regard themselves as the supreme being in the universe or acknowledge a superior—a superhuman being whom they conceive as an object of fear or love a force to be defied or a Lord to be obeyed Among those who acknowledge a divinity it matters greatly whether the divine is represented merely by the concept of *God—the* object of philosophical speculation—or by the living God whom men worship in all the acts of piety which comprise the rituals of religion.

The most radical differences in man s conception of his own nature follow from the exclusion of divinity as its source or model on the one hand and from the various ways in which man is seen as participating in divinity on the other Many fundamental themes and issues are therefore common to this chapter and to the chapter on MAN

SOME OF THE TOPICS IN this chapter are primarily philosophical They belong to the subject matter of rational speculation or poetic imagination in all the great epochs of our culture regardless of differences in religious belief Other topics however are peculiarly restricted to matters of faith or religion With respect to such matters, dogmatic *differences* or differences in articles of faith must be explicitly recognized

The materials here assembled must therefore in some instances be divided according to their origin in from pagan or from Jewish and Christian sources Though no great books from the Mohammedan tradition are included in this set the fact that Gibbon discusses the *Moslem* faith and compares its teachings with those of Judaism and Christianity explains the inclusion of Mohammedanism in one group of topics That is the group which deals with the doctrines common *to these three religions* as distinguished from the tenets on which Judaism *and Christianity* differ dogmatically The ex*istence of* certain common beliefs in the western tradition enables us to begin as it seems advisable *to do with* the conception of God that is shared by the living religions of western culture today

In our civilization what is denied by an atheist who says there is no God? Not idols or *images* which men may seek to placate Not *philosophical* constructions or mythological figures Certainly not the universe itself either as *an infinite* and everlasting whole or as finite and *temporal* but equally mysterious in its ultimate incomprehensibility to the human *mind* In our civilization the atheist denies the existence of a supernatural being the object of *religious* belief and worship among Jews Christians *and* Mohammedans He denies the single personal God Who created the world out of

CROSS REFERENCES

For Other discussions of the Forms or Ideas as immutable models or archetypes *see* CHANGE 15a ETERNITY 4c IDEA 1a 6b

Other discussions of forms as indwelling causes or principles in mutable things *see* CAUSE 1a CHANGE 2a MATTER 1a and for the consideration of form and matter as co principles of composite substances *see* BEING 7b(2)

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of divine and human mating These deities exercise superhuman powers but none is completely omnipotent or omniscient not even Kronos or Zeus who cannot escape the decrees of Fate Moreover with the exception perhaps of that of Zeus the power of one divinity is often challenged and thwarted by another This aspect of polytheism and its bearing on the intervention of the gods in the affairs of men are discussed in the chapter on FATE

The extent to which we think of the pagans as idolatrous because they made graven images of their gods in human form or regard the pagan conceptions of the gods as anthropomorphic depends on our interpretation of religious symbolism. Plato for one thinks that many of the poets descriptions of the gods and their activities should be dismissed as *unworthy* precisely because they debase the gods *to the* human level

According to Gibbon a Greek or Roman philosopher who considered the system of polytheism as a composition of *human fraud and error* could disguise a smile of contempt under the mask of devotion without apprehending that either the mockery or the compliance would expose him to the resentment of any invisible or as he conceived them imaginary powers But the early Christians he points out saw the many gods of antiquity in a much more odious and formidable light and held them to be the authors the *patrons and* the objects of idolatry

Those who take symbols with flat literalism might also attack Christianity as anthropomorphic and idolatrous in fact they have The defense of Christianity against this charge does not avail in the case of Roman emperor worship which consisted *not in* the human zation of the divine for the sake of symbolic representation but in the deification of the merely human for political purposes

Although there are radical differences there are also certain fundamental agreements between paganism and Judaeo-Christianity regarding the nature of the divine As we have already noted the deities are conceived personally not in terms of impersonal brute forces Conceived as beings with intelligence and will the gods concern themselves with earthly society they aid or oppose man s plans and efforts they reward men for fidelity and virtue or punish them for impiety and sin

Despite all other differences between paganism and Christianity these agreements are substantial enough to provide many common threads of theological speculation throughout our tradition especially with regard to the abiding practical *problems of how man shall* view himself and his destiny in relation to the divine or the supernatural We have therefore attempted to place passages *from the great* books of pagan antiquity under every heading except those which are specifically *restricted to* the dogmas of Judaism and Christianity—*even under headings which* are worded monotheistically since even here there *is continuity of* thought and expression *from* Homer and Virgil *to* Dante and Milton from Plato, Aristotle *and* Plotinus to Augustine Aquinas, Descartes and Kant from Lucretius to Newton and Darwin

THE DOCTRINES known as deism and pantheism like *unqualified* atheism are as much opposed to the religious beliefs of polytheism as to the faith of Judaism and Christianity

Of these two pantheism is much nearer atheism for it denies the existence of a *transcendent* supernatural being or beings. *God is* Nature God is *immanent* in the world and in the extreme form of pantheism not transcendent in any way Certain historic doctrines which are often regarded as *forms* or kinds of pantheism seem to be less extreme than this *for they* do not conceive the *physical* universe as exhausting the *infinite* being of *God* The world *for all its* vastness and variety may only represent an *aspect* of the divine nature

According to Spinoza the attributes of extension and thought in terms of which we understand the world *or* nature as being of the divine substance are merely those aspects of God which are *known* to us for the divine substance consists of infinite attributes each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence In the conception of Plotinus the whole world represents only a p l m n on from the div ne sou e Y t tl nk l ke Plo nu nd Spinoza so con e v l la on of l w l l o God that— s n th t ct st p nthe m—the r lig ous doct ine of e tion provid nce and

nothing Who transcends this created universe and sustains it by His immanent power Who has made laws for the government of all things and cares for each particular by His providence and Who created man in His own image revealed Himself and His will to men and metes out eternal rewards and punishments to the children of Adam whom He also helps by His grace

In this religious conception of God one term must be saved from misinterpretation The word personal should not be read with anthropomorphic imagery though its meaning does entitle man as well as God to be called a person rather than a thing Although the term *person* is not found applied to God in Scripture either in the Old or New Testament Aquinas writes nevertheless what the term signifies is found to be affirmed of God in many places of Scripture as that He is the supreme self subsisting being and the most perfectly intelligent being

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We shall use this idea of a personal God the reality of which the contemporary atheist denies in order to distinguish divergent conceptions in other doctrines Then we shall examine more closely what is involved in this idea itself

In the western tradition the various pagan religions—reflected especially in the poems and histories of Greek and Roman antiquity—were all polytheistic The number of their gods Montaigne estimates amounts to six-and thirty thousand Augustine offers one explanation of why there were so many The ancients he writes being deceived either by their own conjectures or by demons supposed that many gods must be invited to take an interest in human affairs and assigned to each a separate function and a separate department—to one the body to another the soul and in the body itself to one the head to another the neck and each of the other members to one of the gods and in like manner in the soul to one god the natural capacity was assigned to another education to another anger to another lust and so the various affairs of life were assigned—cattle to one corn to another wine to another oil to another the woods to another money to another navigation to another wars and victories to another marriages to another births and fecundity to another and other things to other gods

That polytheism no less than monotheism conceives the divine as personal appears in Plato s *Apology* When Socrates is accused of atheism he asks whether the indictment means that he does not acknowledge the gods which the state acknowledges but some other new divinities or spiritual agencies in their stead" Meletus answers that he thinks Socrates is a complete atheist who recognizes no gods at all To this Socrates replies by suggesting that his enemies must be confusing him with Anaxagoras who had blasphemed against Apollo by calling the sun a red hot stone As for himself he offers evidence to show that he believes in divine or spiritual agencies new or old no matter and if I believe in divine beings he asks how can I help believing in spirits or demigods?

Like the one God of Judaism and Christianity the many gods of pagan antiquity have immortal life but they are not without origin Zeus is the son of Kronos and he has many offspring both gods and demigods who perform different functions and are not of equal station in the Olympian hierarchy The realm of the divine includes such figures as the Titans and the Cyclops who are neither gods nor men and demigods like Heracles who are offspring

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Of these two, pantheism is much nearer atheism, for it denies the existence of a transcendent supernatural being or beings. God is Nature. God is immanent in the world and in the extreme form of pantheism, not transcendent in any way. Certain historic doctrines which are often regarded as forms or kinds of pantheism seem to be less extreme than this, for they do not conceive the physical universe as exhausting the infinite being of God. The world, for all its vastness and variety, may only represent an aspect of the divine nature.

According to Spinoza the attributes of extension and thought, in terms of which we understand the world or nature as being of the divine substance, are merely those aspects of God which are known to us, for the divine substance consists "of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence." In the conception of Plotinus, the whole world represents only a partial emanation from the divine source. Yet thinkers like Plotinus and Spinoza so conceive the relation of the world to God that—as in the strictest pantheism—the religious doctrines of creation, providence and

salvation are either rejected or profoundly altered

In the ancient world the teaching of the Stoic philosophers expresses a kind of pantheism "There is one universe made up of all things" Marcus Aurelius writes "and one God who pervades all things and one substance and one law one common reason in all intelligent animals and one truth" He speaks of the "common nature" which is apparently divine and of which "every particular nature is a part as the nature of the leaf is a part of the nature of the plant" But although he stresses the oneness and divinity of all things Aurelius also at times uses language which seems to refer to a god who dwells apart from as well as in the world as for example when he debates whether the gods have any concern with human affairs

Another type of ancient pantheism appears in the thought of Plotinus for whom all things have being only insofar as they participate in even as they emanate from the power of The One or Primal Source "God is sovranly present through all" he writes "We cannot think of something of God here and something else there nor of all of God gathered at some one spot there is an instantaneous presence everywhere nothing containing and nothing left void everything therefore fully held by the divine" The relation between The One and every other thing is compared to the number series "Just as there is primarily or secondarily some form or idea from the monad in each of the successive numbers—the latter still participating though unequally in the unit—so the series of beings following upon The First bear each some form or idea derived from that source In Number the participation establishes Quantity in the realm of Being the trace of The One establishes reality existence is a trace of The One"

But although The One is in all things and all things depend upon it for their very existence The One itself has no need of them It is in this sense that Plotinus says that "The One is all things and no one of them" "Holding all—though itself nowhere held—it is omnipresent for where its presence failed something would elude its hold At the same time in the sense that it is nowhere held it is not present thus it is both present and not present not present as not being circumscribed by anything yet as being utterly unattached not inhibited from presence at any point" Thus all things partake of The One in absolute dependence But The One considered in itself is absolutely transcendent Plotinus even denies it the name of God or Good or Being saying it is beyond these

Whether or not Spinoza is a pantheist has long been debated by his commentators An explicit even an extreme form of pantheism would seem to be expressed in the proposition that "whatever is is in God and nothing can be or be conceived without God" But while the one and only substance which exists is at once nature and God Spinoza identifies God only with the nature he calls *natura naturans* God is not reduced to the nature that falls within man's limited experience or understanding—the nature he calls *natura naturata*

"By *natura naturans*" he explains "we are to understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself or those attributes of substance which express eternal and infinite essence that is to say God in so far as He is considered as a free cause But by *natura naturata* I understand everything which follows from the necessity of the nature of God or of any one of God's attributes that is to say all the modes of God's attributes in so far as they are considered as things which are in God and which without God can neither be nor can be conceived"

God is the infinite and eternal substance of all finite existences an absolute and unchanging *one* underlying the finite modes in which it variably manifests itself Though God for Spinoza is transcendent in the sense of vastly exceeding the world known to man in no sense does God exist apart from the whole of nature Spinoza's view thus sharply departs from that of an orthodox Jewish or Christian theologian When the latter says that God is transcendent he means that God exists apart infinitely removed from the whole created universe When the latter speaks of God as being immanent in that universe he carefully specifies that it is not by His substance but by the power of His action and knowledge But Spinoza calls God "the immanent and not the transitive cause of

all things," for the reason that ou sid God ther can be no substance that is to say out of Him nothing can exist which is in itself.

These divergent conceptions of God's immanence and transcendence—so relevant to the question of who is or is not a pantheist—are further discussed in the chapters on NATURE and WORLD.

UNLIKE PANTHEISM, deism affirms gods or a God, personal intelligences existing apart from this world but as in the teaching of Lucretius, deism sometimes goes to the extreme of believing in absentee gods who neither intervene in the order of nature nor concern themselves with human affairs.

"The nature of the gods," Lucretius writes, "must ever in itself of necessity enjoy immortality together with supreme repose far removed and withdrawn from our concerns since exempt from every pain exempt from all dangers, strong in its own resources, not wanting aught of us, it is neither gained by favors nor moved by anger."

Such gods neither create the world nor govern it above all they do not reward or punish man, and so they do not have to be feared or propitiated "To say that for the sake of men they have willed to set in order the glorious nature of the world and therefore it is meet to praise the work of the gods immortal, and that it is an unholy thing ever to shake by any force from its fixed seats that which by the forethought of the gods in ancient days has been established on everlasting foundations for mankind, or to assail it by speech and utterly overturn it from top to bottom and to invent and add other figments of the kind is all sheer folly For what advantage can our gratitude bestow on immortal and blessed beings that for our sakes they should take in hand to administer aught?"

Divinity seems to have moral significance to Lucretius only insofar as the gods exemplify the happy life and religion is immoral because its superstitions concerning divine motives and meddling make men servile and miserable

When the deism of Lucretius is contrasted with the more familiar modern forms of that doctrine the influence of Christianity is seen The modern deist affirms the supremacy of one God the infinite and eternal Creator of this world Whose laws are the laws of nature which are laid down from the beginning, and which govern all created things. Rousseau speaks of this as "the religion of man" and even identifies it with Christianity—"not the Christianity of today but that of the Gospel which is entirely different He describes this religion as that which has neither temples, nor altars, nor rites, and is confined to the purely internal cult of the supreme God and the eternal obligations of morality"

Not all deists, certainly not those of the 17th and early 18th centuries, go to the Lucretian extreme of picturing an uninterested and morally neutral God Many of them believe in an after life But modern deism did tend toward this extreme By Kant's time it had even ceased to look upon God as a personal intelligence Kant therefore takes great pains to distinguish deism from theism.

The deist according to Kant "admits that we can cognize by pure reason alone the existence of a supreme being but at the same time maintains that our conception of this being is purely transcendental, and that all we can say of it is, that it possesses all reality without being able to define it more closely" The theist on the other hand "asserts that reason is capable of presenting us, from the analogy with nature with a more definite conception of this being, and that its operations, as the cause of all things, are the results of intelligence and free will."

Kant even maintains that we might in strict rigor deny to the deist any belief in God at all, and regard him merely as a maintainer of the existence of a primal being, or thing—the supreme cause of all other things. In any case deism seems to be an essentially un-Jewish and un-Christian or anti-Jewish and anti-Christian doctrine So it denies God's supernatural revelation of Himself it denies miracles and every other manifestation of supernatural agency in the course of nature or the life of man it denies the efficacy of prayer and sacrament. In short it rejects the institutions and practices, as well as the faith and hope of any religion which claims supernatural foundation and supernatural warrant for its dogmas and rituals. Deism, which consists simply in the worship

of a God considered as great powerful and eternal is in Pascal s opinion almost as far removed from the Christian religion as atheism which is its exact opposite

What Pascal and Kant call deism and Rousseau the religion of man others like Hume call natural religion His *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* provide a classic statement of rationalism which is the same as naturalism in religion though as the chapter on RELIGION indicates it may be questioned whether the word religion can be meaningfully used for a doctrine which claims no knowledge beyond that of the philosopher and no guidance for human life beyond the precepts of the moralist

THE SYSTEMATIC exposition of man s knowledge of God is the science of theology In addition to considering all things—the whole world and human life—in relation to God theology treats especially of God s existence essence and attributes Throughout the range of its subject matter and problems theology may be of two sorts it may be either natural knowledge obtained by ordinary processes of observation and reasoning or knowledge which is supernatural in the sense of being based on divine revelation This is the traditional distinction between natural and sacred or as it is sometimes called dogmatic theology The one belongs to the domain of reason it is the work of the philosopher The other belongs to the domain of faith and is the work of the theologian who seeks to understand his faith

These distinctions are discussed in the chapters on THEOLOGY METAPHYSICS and WISDOM Here we are concerned with different attitudes toward the problem of man s knowledge of God The deist as we have seen rejects supernatural revelation and faith theology like religion is held to be entirely natural a work of reason The agnostic makes the opposite denial He denies that anything supernatural can be known by reason It cannot be proved or for that matter disproved The evidences of nature and the light of reason do not permit valid inferences or arguments concerning God or creation providence or immortality

It is usually with respect to God s existence that the agnostic most emphatically declares reason s incompetence to demonstrate He often accompanies the declaration with elaborate criticisms of the arguments which may be offered by others This is not always the case however For example the great Jewish theologian Moses Maimonides thinks that God s existence can be proved by reason entirely apart from faith but with regard to the essence or attributes of God his position seems to be one which might be called agnostic

When men ascribe essential attributes to God Maimonides declares these so-called essential attributes should not have any similarity to the attributes of other things just as there is no similarity between the essence of God and that of other beings Since the meaning of such positive attributes as *good* or *wise* is derived from our knowledge of things they do not provide us with any knowledge of God s essence for no comparison obtains between things and God Hence Maimonides asserts that the negative attributes of God are the true attributes They tell us not what God is but what God is not

Even though Maimonides holds that existence and essence are perfectly identical in God he also insists that we comprehend only the fact that He exists not His essence All we understand he goes on to say in addition to the fact that He exists is the fact that He is a Being to whom none of his creatures is similar This fact is confirmed in all the negative attributes such as eternal (meaning non temporal) infinite or incorporeal even as it is falsified by all the positive attributes expressed by such names as good or living or knowing insofar as they imply a comparison between God and creatures When they cannot be interpreted negatively they can be tolerated as metaphors but they must not be taken as expressing an understanding of the true essence of God concerning which Maimonides maintains there is no possibility of obtaining a knowledge

Aquinas takes issue with such agnosticism about the divine nature in his discussion of the names of God Although he says that we cannot know what God is but rather what He is not Aquinas disagrees with Maimonides that all names which express some knowledge of God s essence must be interpreted negatively

or treated as metaphors. He denies that "when we say God lives, we mean merely that God is not like an inanimate thing," as "was taught by Rabbi Moses." On the contrary he holds that "these names signify the divine substance ... although they fall short of representing Him. ... For these names express God, so far as our intellects know Him. Now since our intellect knows God from creatures, it knows Him as far as creatures represent Him." Therefore Aquinas concludes, "when we say *God is good*, the meaning is not *God is the cause of goodness*, or *God is not evil*; but the meaning is, *Whatever good we attribute to creatures pre-exists in God*, and in a higher way."

If MAIMONIDES were right that the names which are said positively of both God and creatures are "applied ... in a purely equivocal sense" (*e.g.*, having literal meaning when said of creatures but being only metaphorical when said of God) then, according to Aquinas, it would follow that "from creatures nothing at all could be known or demonstrated about God." Those who say on the other hand that "the things attributed to God and creatures are univocal" (*i.e.*, are said in exactly the same sense) claim to comprehend more than man can know of the divine essence. "When the term *wise* is applied to God," Aquinas writes, "it leaves the thing signified as uncomprehended and as exceeding the signification of the name. Hence it is evident that this term *wise* is not applied in the same way to God and to man. The same applies to other terms. Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and creatures" but rather all positive names "are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense."

A further discussion of the names of God will be found in the chapter on SIGN AND SYMBOL, and the consideration of the analogical, the univocal, and the equivocal will also be found there as well as in the chapter on SAME AND OTHER. We have dealt with these matters here only for the sake of describing that degree of agnosticism according to which Maimonides, by contrast with Aquinas, is an agnostic. But agnosticism usually goes further and denies that man can have any natural knowledge of God—either of His existence or of His essence.

So understood, agnosticism need not be incompatible with religion, unless a given religion holds, as an article of faith itself, that the existence of God can be *proved by reason*. In fact, the agnostic may be a religious man who accepts divine revelation and regards faith as divinely inspired.

Montaigne's *Apology for Raymond de Sebonde* illustrates this position. Sebond had written a treatise on natural theology which to Montaigne seems "hardy and bold" for he undertakes, "by human and natural reasons to establish and make good against the atheists all the articles of the Christian religion." Though Montaigne says of his work "I do not think it possible to do better upon that subject," and though he entertains the conjecture that it may have been "drawn from St. Thomas Aquinas, for in truth that mind full of infinite learning and admirable subtlety was alone capable of such imaginations," nevertheless, Montaigne does "not believe that means purely human are in any sort capable of doing it."

According to Montaigne, "it is faith alone that vividly and certainly comprehends the deep mysteries of our religion." In his view reason by itself is incapable of proving *anything*, much less *anything about God*. "Our human reasons," he writes, "are but sterile and undigested matter; the grace of God is its form; it is that which gives it fashion and value. ... The light and value in Sebonde's arguments come from the fact that faith supervenes "to tint and illustrate" them, and "renders them firm and solid."

Such arguments, Montaigne says, may serve as "direction and first guide to a learner," and may even "render him capable of the grace of God"; but for himself, skeptical of all arguments, the way of faith alone can provide "a certain constancy of opinion. ... Thus have I, by the grace of God, preserved myself entire without anxiety or trouble of conscience in the ancient belief of our religion, amidst so many sects and divisions as our age has produced."

Far from being religious as Montaigne was, the agnostic *may* be a skeptic about faith as well as reason. He may look upon faith either as superstition or as the exercise of the will to believe with regard to the unknowable and the

unintelligible—almost wishful thinking He may even go so far as to treat religion as if it were pathological

Freud for example regards religion as an illusion to be explained in terms of man s need to create gods in his own image—to find a surrogate for the father on whom his infantile dependence can be projected Freud finds confirmation for this in the fact that in the religions of the west God is openly called Father Psychoanalysis he goes on concludes that he really is the father clothed in the grandeur in which he once appeared to the small child

Though the grown man has long ago realized *that his father is a being with strictly limited* powers and by no means endowed with every desirable attribute Freud thinks that *he nevertheless looks back to the memory* image of the overrated father of his childhood exalts it into a Deity and brings it into the present and into reality The emotional strength of this memory image and the lasting nature of his need for protection —for as Freud explains in relation to the external world he is *still a child* — are the two supports of his belief in God

At the other extreme from agnosticism is as the name implies gnosticism Like deism it dispenses with faith but it exceeds traditional deism in the claims it makes for reason s power to penetrate the divine mysteries Between exclusive reliance on faith and an exaltation of *reason to the point where there is no need for God to reveal anything a middle ground is held* by those who acknowledge the contributions of both faith and reason Those who try to harmonize the two usually distinguish between the spheres proper to each and formulate some principle according to which they are related to each other in an orderly fashion

Whatever is *purely a matter of faith* Aquinas says is assented to solely because it is revealed by God The articles of Christian faith are typified by the Trinity of Persons in Almighty God the mystery of Christ s Incarnation and the like With regard to such matters which Aquinas thinks belong primarily to faith some auxiliary use can be made of reason not indeed to prove faith he explains but to make clear the things that follow from it Certain matters such as God s existence and attributes, he classifies as belonging to the preambles to faith because they fall in his view within reason s power to demonstrate unaided by faith Yet even here he does not assign the affirmation of the truth to reason alone

Just as it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which *exceed human* reason should be made known to him by divine revelation so even with regard to those truths about God which human reason can investigate Aquinas thinks it was also necessary that man be taught by a divine revelation For the truth about God such as reason can know it *would only be known by a few* and that after a long time and with the admixture of many errors Because human reason *is very deficient in things concerning God* — a sign of which is that philosophers have fallen into many errors and have disagreed among themselves —men would have no knowledge of God free from doubt and uncertainty unless all divine truths were delivered to them by the way of faith being told to them as it were by God Himself Who can not lie

In different ways faith supports reason and reason helps faith On matters which belong to both reason and faith faith provides a greater certitude On matters strictly of faith reason provides some understanding however remote and inadequate of the mysteries of religion.

The use of human reason in religion Bacon writes *is of two sorts the former* in the con*ception and apprehension of the mysteries* of God to us revealed the other in the inferring and deriving of doctrine and direction thereupon In the former we see God vouchsafeth to descend to our capacity in the expressing of his mysteries in sort as may be sensible unto us and doth grift his revelations and *holy doctrine upon the notions of our reason* and applieth his inspiration to open our understanding as the form of the key to the ward of the lock For the latter there is allowed us an use of reason and argument secondary and respective although not original and absolute For after the articles and principles of religion *are placed and exempted from examination* of reason it is then permitted unto us to make derivations and inferences from and ac

cording to the analogy of them for our better direction"

In addition to all discursive knowledge of God, whether it be by faith or by reason there is the totally incommunicable and intimate acquaintance with the supernatural which the mystic claims for his vision in moments of religious ecstasy or which is promised to the blessed as their heavenly beatitude When at the culmination of *Paradise* Dante sees God my vision he declares, was greater than our speech.

Knowing that his speech will fall more short than that of an infant who still bathes his tongue at the breast he tries nevertheless to communicate in words one single spark of Thy glory for the folk to come. In the presence of God he writes, his mind wholly rapt was gazing fixed motionless, and intent and ever with gazing grew enkindled. In that Light one becomes such that it is impossible he should ever consent to turn himself from it for other sight because the Good which is the object of the will is all collected in it and outside of it that is defective which is perfect there

THE ARGUMENTS FOR the existence of the gods or of one God constitute one of the greatest attempts of the human mind to go beyond the sensible or phenomenal world of experience. The attempt has been made in every age and by minds of quite different persuasions in religious belief or philosophical outlook. It is possible nevertheless, to classify the arguments into two or three main types.

Within the domain of pure or speculative reason there seem to be two ways of approach in the problem of God s existence.

One is in terms of the conception of God as an infinite perfect and necessary being whose non-existence is therefore inconceivable According to Anselm God cannot be conceived in any other way than as a being than which nothing greater can be conceived But since the fool hath said in his heart there is no God how shall he be made to know that the God which exists in his understanding at the moment when he denies His real existence, also really exists outside his understanding? For it is one thing for an object to be in the understanding and another to understand that the object exists. Hence Anselm considers the consequence of supposing that God exists in the understanding alone

If that than which nothing greater can be conceived he argues, exists in the understanding alone the very being than which nothing greater can be conceived is one than which a greater can be conceived —for to exist in reality as well as in the understanding is to have *more* being But this leads to an irreconcilable contradiction since if that than which nothing greater can be conceived can be conceived not to exist it is not that than which nothing greater can be conceived Therefore Anselm concludes that a being than which nothing greater can be conceived must exist both in the understanding and reality"

Anselm summarizes his argument by saying that no one who understands what God is can conceive that God does not exist Since the non-existence of God is inconceivable God must exist Descartes gives the same argument a slightly different statement in terms of the inseparability of God s essence from God s existence

Being accustomed he writes, in all other things to make a distinction between existence and essence I easily persuade myself that the existence can be separated from the essence of God and that we can thus conceive God as not actually existing But nevertheless, when I think of it with more attention I clearly see that existence can no more be separated from the essence of God than can its having its three angles equal to two right angles be separated from the essence of a rectilinear triangle or the idea of a mountain from the idea of a valley and so there is not any less repugnance to our conceiving a God (that is, a Being supremely perfect) to whom existence is lacking (that is to say to whom a certain perfection is lacking) than to conceive of a mountain which has no valley

Spinoza defines a "cause of itself" as that whose essence involves existence or that whose nature cannot be conceived unless existing Since in his conception of substance substance is necessarily infinite it is also cause of itself. Hence he concludes that God or substance necessarily exists for if this be denied conceive if it be possible that God does not

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Without labelling it a proof of God's existence Augustine in his *Confessions* presents a similar argument—from the visible creation Behold, he says, the heavens and the earth are they proclaim that they were created for they change and vary They procla m also that they made not themselves therefore we are because we have been made we were not therefore before we were so as to make our selves Thou therefore Lord madest them

This second approach to the existence of God by reasoning from the facts of experience or the evidences of nature is called the *a posteriori* proof In the tradition of the great books it has been formulated in many different ways What is common to all of them is the principle of causality in terms of which the known existence of certain effects is made the basis for inferring the existence of a unique cause—a first cause a h hest cause an uncaused cause

Aristotle for example in the last book of his *Physics* argues from the fact of motion or change to the existence of an unmoved mover He sums up his elaborate reasoning on this point in the following statement We established the fact that everything that is in motion is moved by something and that the mo ent is e ther unmoved or in motion and that if it is in motion it is moved either by itself or by something else and so on throughout the series and so we proceeded to the position that the first principle that directly causes things that are in motion to be moved is that which moves itself and the first principle of the whole series is the unmoved

Aristotle's argument unlike that of Augustine or Locke does not p esuppose the creat on of the world at least not in the sense of the world's hav ng a be inning On the contrary he holds the world and ts motions to be as eternal as their unmoved mover It is im poss ble he writes in the *Metaphysics* that movement should either ha e come into being or cease to be Precisely because he thinks the wo ld's motions are eternal Aristotle holds that the prime mover in addition to be ng eve la t g must be mmutable This for him means a principl whose very essence is actuality Only substance without any poten cy only o e wh ch *p r ly ctual* can be an absolut ly immutable et rnal be ng

Whatever has any potentiality in its nature is capable of not existing If everything were of this sort nothing that no v is need be for it is possible for all things to be capable of existing but not yet to exist Hence in still another way Aristotle seems to reach the conclusion that a purely actual being must exist and furthermore he seems to identify this being with a living and thinking God Life also belongs to God he writes for the actuality of thought is life and God is that actuality and God's self dependent actuality is life most good and eternal

Where Aristotle argues from motion and potentiality to a prime mover and a pure actuality Newton gives the *a posteriori* proof another statement by arguing from the design of the universe to God as its designer or architect The most wise and excellent contrivances of things and final causes seem to him the best way of kno ing God Blind metaphysical necessity which is certainly the same al ays and everywhere could produce no variety in thin s All that diversity of natural things which we find suited to different times and places could arise from nothing but the ideas and will of a Being necessarily existing

In similar fashion Berkeley maintains that if we attentively consider the constant regularity order and concatenation of natural things the surprising ma nificence beauty and perfection of the larger and th exqui ite contrivance of the smaller parts of the creation together with the exact harmony and correspondence of the whole but above all the never enou h admired laws of pain and pleasure and the instincts or natural inclinations appetites and pass ons of animals I say if e consider all these things and at the same time attend to the meaning and import of the attributes one eternal infinitely wise good and perfect we shall clearly perceive that they belong to the Spirit who works all in all and by whom all things consi t This seems to him so certain that he adds we may even assert that the existence of God is far more ev dently perc ved than tl e existence of men

But accord ng to Berkeley all the vis ble th ngs of nature exist only as ideas in our minds id as h h unlike our own memories or imaginations e do not oursel es produce Every

exist Then it follows that His essence does not involve existence But this is absurd Therefore God necessarily exists

This mode of argument which takes still other forms is traditionally called the ontological argument or the *a priori* proof of God s existence Its critics sometimes deny that it is an argument or proof in any sense at all Aquinas for example interprets Anselm not as proving God s existence but rather as asserting that God s existence is self evident Those who say that the proposition God does not exist is self contradictory are saying that the opposite proposition God exists must be self evident

Aquinas does not deny that the proposition God exists is intrinsically self evident On this point he goes further than Anselm Descartes and Spinoza Where they say God s essence *involves* His existence Aquinas asserts that in God essence and existence are *identical* When Moses asks God If they should say to me What is His name? what shall I say to them? the Lord says unto Moses I AM THAT I AM and adds Say to the children of Israel HE WHO IS hath sent me to you This name—HE WHO IS—Aquinas holds to be the most proper name of God because it signifies that the being of God is His very essence

For this reason he thinks that the proposition God exists is self evident in itself Its subject and predicate are immediately related Nevertheless Aquinas holds that the proposition is not self evident to us because we do not know the essence of God Even supposing he writes that everyone understands this name *God* as signifying something than which nothing greater can be thought nevertheless it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the name signifies exists actually but only that it exists mentally Nor can it be argued that it actually exists unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist

The writer of the First Set of Objections to Descartes *Meditations* maintains that the criticism advanced by Aquinas applies to Descartes as well as to Anselm Whether stated in terms of the conception of an absolutely perfect being or in terms of essence and existence th argument is invalid he thinks which asserts that God actually exists because His non-existence is inconceivable Kant s later criticism of the ontological argument takes a similar course A proposition may be logically necessary without being true in fact

The conception of an absolutely necessary being he writes is a mere idea the object of reality of which is far from being established by the mere fact that it is a need of reason The unconditioned necessity of a judgment does not form the absolute necessity of a thing From the fact that existence belongs necessarily to the object of the conception we cannot conclude that the existence of th thing is therefore absolutely necessary—merely Kant says because its existence has been cogitated in the conception What ever be the content of our conception of an object it is necessary to go beyond it if we wish to predicate existence of the object The celebrated ontological or Cartesian argument for the existence of a supreme being is therefore insufficient

THE SECOND MAIN approach to the problem of God s existence lies in the sort of proof which Locke thinks our own existence and the sensible parts of the universe offer so clearly and cogently to our thoughts He refrains from criticizing the argument from the *idea of a most perfect being* but he does insist that we should not take some men s having that idea of God in their minds for the only proof of a Deity He for one prefers to follow the counsel of St Paul that the invisible things of God are clearly seen from the creation of the world being understood by the things that are made even his eternal power and Godhead

We have according to Locke an intuitive knowledge of our own existence We know he says that nonentity cannot produce any real being and so from the consideration of ourselves and what we infallibly find in our constitution our reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident truth—*That there is an eternal most powerful and most knowing Being*

ent Aquinas himself says that in speculative matters the med um of demonstration which demonstrates the conclusion perfectly is only *one* whereas probable means of proof are many Since he considers th argument for God s existence to be a certain not a probable proof it would seem to follow that in strict logic only one principle can be involved in that proof.

As already suggested the principle—common to all the various ways in which such *a posteriori* reasoning is expressed—seems to be the principal of causality This appears in the argument from the existence of contingent beings, which cannot cause their own being to the existence of a being which needs no cause of its being because its very essence is to exist This may be the one argument for God s existence or if one among many it may be the core of all the others It has the distinction at least of conceiving God as the cause of being rather than of motion or of hierarchy and order in the world

According to the statement of Aquinas that being is the proper effect of God it establishes God as the *unique* and *direct* cause of the being possessed by every finite thing This formulation of the proof is more fully examined in the chapter on NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY and its relation to the quest on of whether the world had a beginning or is eternal *and if* eternal whether it is created or uncreated will be seen in the chapters on CAUSE, ETERNITY and WORLD

THE VALIDITY OF the *a posteriori* argument for God s existence—in *one form* or another—is questioned by those who think that the causal principle cannot be applied beyond experience or who think that our knowledge of cause and effect is not sufficient to warrant such inferences.

The existence of any being can only be proved by arguments from its cause or its effect Hume writes and these arguments are founded entirely on experience It is only experience which teaches us the nature and bound of cause *and effect* and enables us to infer th exist nce of *one object* from that of another But Hume doubts whether it be pos ble fo a cause to be known only by its effect or to be of so singular and particular a nature as to have no parallel and no similarity with any other cause or object that has ever fallen under our observation If experience and observation and analogy be indeed the only guides which we can reasonably follow in inferences of this nature as Hume thinks is the case then it follows that both the effect and the cause must bear a similarity and resemblance to other effects and causes which we know

I leave it to your own reflection he adds to pursue the consequences of this principle One seems obvious enough namely that God —a unique and unparalleled cause—cannot be proved by reasoning from our experience of effects and their causes Hume himself draws this conclusion when he declares that theology insofar as it is concerned with the existence of a Deity has its best and most solid *foundation* not in reason or experience *but in faith* and d vine *revelation* "

Like Hume Kant thinks that our notions of cause and effect cannot be applied outside experience or to anything beyond the realm of sensible nature But he offers an *additional* reason for denying val dity to all *a posteriori* reasoning concerning God s *existence* It imposes upon us, he says, an old argument in a new dress, and appeals to the agreement of two *witnesses*, the one with the credentials of pure reason *and th* other with those of empiricism while in fact it is only the former who has changed his dress and voice

The principle of the argument from the contingency of the world or its parts Kant states as follows If *something* exists an absolutely necessary being must likewise exist One premise *in* the argument namely that *contingent things* exist has its foundation in experience and therefore Kant admits *that* the reasoning is not completely *a priori* or ontological But in order to complete the proof he *thinks* it must be shown that an *ens realissimum or most* perfect being is th same as an absolutely ne essary being in order for the obtained conclus on *(a necessary bein exists)* to be translated into the conclusion desired *(God exists)*

That an *ens realissimum* must possess the additional attr bute of absolute necessity —or in other words that a perfect being is identical

thing we see hear feel or anywise perceive by sense he writes must have some other cause than our own will and is therefore a sign or effect of the power of God To the unthinking herd who claim that they cannot see God Berkeley replies that God is intimately present to our minds producing in them all that variety of ideas or sensations which continually affect us

The existence of any idea in us is for Berkeley ground for asserting God s existence and power as its cause But for Descartes *one* idea alone becomes the basis of such an inference He supplements his *a priori* or ontological argument with what he calls an *a posteriori* demonstration of God s existence from the mere *fact that the idea of God exists in us*

That he is himself imperfect Descartes knows from the fact that he doubts Even when doubting leads to knowledge his knowledge is imperfect an infallible token of which he *says* *is* the fact that my knowledge increases little by little But the idea which he has of God he declares is that of an absolutely perfect being in whom there is nothing merely potential but in whom all is present really and actually On the principle that there cannot be more reality or perfection in the effect than in the cause Descartes concludes that his own imperfect mind cannot be the cause of the idea of a perfect being The idea that I possess of a being more perfect than I he writes must necessarily have been placed in me by a being which is really more perfect

The radical imperfection of man and indeed of all creation offers Augustine still another proof for God s existence which he attributes to the Platonists They have seen he writes that whatever is changeable is not the most high God and therefore they have transcended every soul and all changeable spirits in seeking the supreme They have seen also that in every changeable thing the form which makes it that which it is whatever be its mode or nature can only *be* through Him who truly *is* because He is unchangeable And therefore whether we consider the whole body of the world its figure qualities and orderly movement and also all the bodies which are in it or whether we consider all life either that which nourishes and maintains as the life of trees or that which besides this has also sensation as the life of beasts or that which adds to all these intelligence as the life of man or that which does not need the support of nutriment but only maintains feels understands, as the life of angels—all can only *be* through Him who absolutely *is* For to Him it is not one thing *to be* and another to live as though He could *be* not living nor is it to Him one thing to live and another to understand as though He could live not understanding nor is it to Him one thing to understand another to be blessed as though He could understand and not be blessed But to Him to live to understand to be blessed are to *be* They have *understood from this unchangeableness and this simplicity* that all things must have been made by Him and that He could Himself have been made by none

The variety of arguments we have so far examined seems to fit the five ways in which according to Aquinas the existence of God can be proved *a posteriori* The first and most manifest way is the argument from motion which Aquinas attributes to Aristotle The second way is from the nature of an efficient cause" Berkeley s argument or Locke s would seem in some respects to offer a version of this mode of reasoning The third way is taken from possibility and necessity and seems to develop the argument from potentiality in Aristotle s *Metaphysics* and to contain the inference from mutability and contingency which is implicit in the argument attributed to the Platonists by Augustine The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things Proceeding from the existence of the imperfect to absolute perfection it resembles in principle the reasoning of Descartes concerning the perfection in the cause relative to the perfection in the effect The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world —from the fact that everything acts for an end—and so is like the argument which Newton offers from final causes and the existence of order in the universe

These five ways may or may not be regarded as an exhaustive list of the *a posteriori* proofs It may even be questioned whether the five ways are logically distinct and independ

cause of all nature distinct from nature itself and containing the principle of this connexion namely of the exact harmony of happiness with morality." That is why Kant explains, "it is morally necessary to assume the existence of God."

IN THE TRADITION of the great books, the common ground shared by reason and faith is marked by the convergence of the contributions made by pagan, Jew, and Christian—and by poets, philosophers, and theologians—to the problem of God's existence and the understanding of the divine nature: the essence of God and His attributes.

Certain attributes of God, such as simplicity, *immateriality, eternity,* infinity, perfection, and glory, are usually regarded as so many different ways in which the human understanding apprehends the divine nature in itself. Other attributes, such as the divine causality, omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience, love, justice, and mercy, are usually taken as ways of considering God's nature *in relation to the* world or to creatures. But to divide the attributes in this way, as is done in the Outline of Topics, is to make a division which cannot be fully justified except in terms of *convenience* for our understanding. God's will, for example, no less than God's intellect, can be considered in relation to Himself. God's intellect, *no less* than God's will, can have the world *for its* object. So, too, the divine goodness can be considered with reference to things, even as God's love can be considered with reference to Himself.

The difficulties we meet in classifying or ordering the attributes of God confirm the opinion of almost all theologians, *that our* understanding is inadequate to comprehend the essence of God. The fact that we employ a multiplicity of attributes to represent to ourselves what in itself is an absolute unity is another indication of the same point. The one attribute of *simplicity* would seem to deny us the right to name others, unless we take the plurality of attributes to signify something about man's understanding of God rather than a real complexity in the divine nature.

"He that will attribute to God," Hobbes writes, "nothing but what is warranted by natural reason, must either use such negative attributes, as *infinite, eternal, incomprehensible;* or superlatives, as *most high, most great,* and the like; or indefinite, as *good, just, holy, creator;* and in such sense, as if he meant not to declare what He is (for that were to circumscribe Him within the limits of our fancy), but how much we admire Him, and how ready we would be to obey Him; which is a sign of humility, and of a will to honor Him as much as we can. For there is but one name to signify our conception of His nature, and that is, I AM; and but one name of His relation to us, and that is GOD; in which is contained Father, King, and Lord."

Even when they are discussed by the philosophers and reflected on by the poets, certain matters belong especially to theology because they constitute the dogmas of religion—*articles* of religious faith based solely *on divine revelation,* not discovered by human inquiry or speculation. That God created the world *out* of nothing and of His free will, that the world had a beginning and will have an end, are, for example, dogmas of traditional Judaism and Christianity. Philosophers may argue about the freedom or necessity of the creative act, or about the possibility of a beginning or an end *to time and the world;* but Jewish and Christian theologians find in Sacred Scripture the warrant for believing that which may not be thoroughly intelligible to reason, much less demonstrable by it. What is true of creation applies generally to the religious belief in divine providence and the positive commandments of God, to the gift of grace which God bestows *upon* men, and to the performance of *miracles.*

Judaism and Christianity share certain dogmas, though the degree to which Jewish *and Christian* theologians commonly understand what is *apparently* the same dogma varies from great similarity of interpretation (as in the case of creation and providence) to differences so great (as, for example, with regard to grace) that there may be some doubt whether the dogma in question is really the same. The line of demarcation between these faiths would seem to be more easily determined than their common ground; yet even here such matters as the resurrection of the body—even when we take differences of interpretation into account—may be regarded as a dogma shared by both

with one which necessarily exists—is according to Kant exactly what was maintained in the ontological argument Hence he maintains that the argument from contingency is invalid because it cannot avoid including what is for Kant the invalid premise of the ontological argument as the real ground of its disguised and illusory reasoning

THE CONTROVERSY concerning the proof of God s existence raises issues in logic in meta physics and physics and in the theory of knowl edge Philosophers are opposed on the ques tion whether a valid demonstration is possible Those who think it possible differ from one another on the way in which the proof should be constructed Those who think it impossi ble do not always go to the opposite extreme of making the affirmation of God s existence a matter of faith or of denying with the skep tic that we can have any light on the ques tion at all Pascal and Kant for example reject the theoretic arguments as inconclusive or untenable but they do not think the problem is totally insoluble They offer instead *practical* grounds or reasons for accepting God s exist ence

The metaphysical proofs of God are so re mote from the reasoning of men Pascal as serts and so complicated that they make little impression He will not undertake he tells us in his *Pensées* to prove by natural reasons the existence of God In his view there are only three kinds of persons those who serve God having found Him others who are occupied in seeking Him not having found Him while the remainder live without seeking Him and without having found Him Since he regards the first as reasonable and happy the last as foolish and unhappy he addresses himself to the middle group whom he regards as unhappy and reasonable

He asks them to consider whether God is or is not Reason can decide nothing here he says If a choice is to be made by reason it must be in the form of a wager Which will you choose then? Let us see Since you must choose let us see which interests you least You have two things to lose the true and the good and two things to stake your reason and your will your knowledge and your happiness and your nature has two things to shun error and misery Your reason is no more shocked in choosing one rather than another since you must of necessity choose This is one point settled But your happiness? Let us weigh the gain and the loss in wagering that God is Let us estimate these two chances If you gain you gain all if you lose you lose nothing Wager then without hesitation that He is

We are incapable of knowing either that God is or what God is according to Pascal be cause if there is a God He is infinitely incom prehensible and has no affinity to us Never theless proceeding on the practical level of the wager reason may lead to Christian faith yet not in such a way as to give adequate reasons for that belief since Christians profess a re ligion for which they cannot give a reason

Kant also makes the affirmation of God a matter of faith but for him it is a purely rational faith since pure reason is the sole source from which it springs He defines a *matter of faith* as any object which cannot be known through the speculative use of reason but which must be thought *a priori* either as consequences or as grounds if pure practical reason is to be used as duty commands Such is the *summum bonum* he says which has to be realized in the world through free dom This effect which is commanded *together with the only conditions on which its possibility is conceivable by us* namely the exist ence of God and the immortality of the soul are *matters of faith* and are of all objects the only ones that can be so called

For Kant then the existence of God is a postulate of pure practical reason as the necessary condition of the possibility of the *summum bonum* The moral law commands us to seek the highest good with perfect happi ness as its concomitant but Kant thinks that there is not the slightest ground in the moral law for a necessary connexion between morality and proportionate happiness in a being that belongs to the world as a part of it Since man is a part of the world or nature and dependent on it he cannot by his will be a cause of this nature nor by his own power make it thorough ly harmonize as far as his happiness is con cerned with his practical principles The only possible solution lies in the existence of a

The basic differences between Jewish and Christian theology center of course on the issue between a unitarian and a trinitarian conception of the Godhead with immediate consequences for disbelief or belief in Christ as the incarnate second person of the Trinity—the Word become flesh This in turn has consequences for doctrines of salvation and of the nature and mission of the church its rituals and its sacraments Even within Christianity however there have been and still are serious doctrinal differences on all these matters The most fundamental heresies and schisms of early Christianity concerned the understanding of the Trinity and the Incarnation The great modern schism which divided Christendom arose from issues about the sacraments the organization and practices of the church and the conditions of salvation

It would seem to be just as easy to say what beliefs are common to religious Jews and Christians as to articulate the faith common to all sects of Christianity If all varieties of Protestant doctrine are included little remains in common except belief in the God of Abraham Isaac and Jacob—creator and provider governor and judge dispenser of rewards and punishments

ONE BOOK STANDS OUT from all the rest because in our tradition it is—as the use of Bible for its proper name implies—*the* book about God and man For those who have faith Holy Writ or Sacred Scripture is the revealed Word of God Its division into Old and New Testaments represents the historic relation of the Jewish and Christian religions

Without prejudice to the issue between belief and unbelief or between Jewish and Christian faith we have attempted to organize the references to specifically religious doctrines concerning God and His creatures according to their origin and foundation in either the Old or in the New Testament or in both On certain points as we have already seen the line of distinction can be clearly drawn For example the doctrines of God s covenant with Israel of the Chosen People of the Temple and the Torah are indisputably drawn from the Old Testament and from the New Testament come such dogmas as those concerning Christ s divinity and humanity the Virgin Birth the Church as the mystical body of Christ and the seven sacraments

Under all these topics we have assembled passages from the Bible interpretations of them by the theologians and materials from the great books of poetry and history philosophy and science Since the criterion of relevance here is the reflection of sacred or religious doctrine in secular literature the writings of pagan antiquity are necessarily excluded though they are included in the more philosophical topics of theology such as the existence and nature of one God

Despite its length this chapter by no means exhausts the discussion of God in the great books The long list of Cross References which follows the seventy three topics comprising the Reference section of this chapter indicates the various ways in which the idea of God occurs in the topics of other chapters The reader will find that list useful not only as an indication of the topics in other chapters which elaborate on or extend the discussion of matters treated here but also as a guide to other Introductions in which he is likely to find the conception of God a relevant part of the examination of some other great idea

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

REFERENCES

To find the passa es ci ed use the numbers n heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passa es ref rred to. For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad* BK II [65 83] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the olume in the set the number 12d ind cates that the passage is in section d of page 12

P GE SECTI S When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lowe hal es of the page. For example, in 53 J MES *Psychol gy* 116a 119b the passa e begins in th upper half of pag 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119 When the text is printed in tw columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower hal es of the left hand side of th page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower hal es of the r ght hand side of the pa e. For exampl in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b-164c, the passage be n in the lower half of th l ft hand side of page 163 and ends in the pper half of the ri ht hand side of pa e 164

AUTH S DIVI IO S One or more of the ma n d isions of a work (such a P RT K, CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference l e n mbers, n brackets, are gi en in cer tain cases g *Iliad* BK I [65 283] 12d.

B LE REFE E CE The references are to book chapter and verse When th King James and Douay ersion differ in t tle f books o in the numbering of chapters or erses, the King James ersion is cited first and the Douay ind cated by a (*D*) follows *e.g* OLD TESTA ME *Nehem h* 7 45—(*D*) *II Esdr s* 7 46

S MBOL The abb iation esp calls th reader s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whol refe ence passim si nifies that the topic is discussed intermit tently rather than continuou ly in the work or passage cited

For additional information conc rnin the style of th references, see the E planat on of Reference Styl for general guidance in th use of *The Great Ide s* consult the Preface

1 The po ytheistic conception of the super natural ord

1a. Th nature and existence of the gods

4 HOM *I d s* [330-35] 33c d [814 909] 38b-39a,c / *O yssey* BK I [266-366] 22d 225d

5 AESCHYLUS *Prometheus Bo d* 40a 51d / *Agamemnon* [58 83] 53d 54

5 SO OCLE *Oed s at Co on* [607-614] 120a *Antigone* [80- 92] 138a

5 E RIP *H len* [37 1 5] 309a / *B cch* *ae* 340a 352 c esp [72 32] 342b-c / *Heracles Mad* [5-874] 371d 372 [302 1353] 376c-d *I h genia Among the T uri* [354 39] 414a b [5 0-5] 416a

5 ARI TO H *Cl ds* 408 506d esp [63 4 8] 491a-493d, [8 3-833] 498c-d, [46 4] 506c *Bird* 542a 563d esp [834 3] 551b-552a, [492 1 65] 560c 563d / *P u* [8 -03] 630a

6 H RODOTUS *History* BK 10a 11d 31 b 48c 1 58b-60d 75 b 79d-80c 85c 95a-c BK 134 140c-d

7 PLATO *Crat l s* 91 -d / *Phaedru* 124c 125b / *Symposium* 152b 153b-c 159d 161 163a 164c / *Euthyphr* 193 -c / *Apology* 204c 205c 209a b / *Republic* K I 313d 314d

BK II-III 320c 328a / *Timaeus* 451d-452b 465d / *Statesman* 587a 589c / *La s* BK VII 730a-d BK X 757d 769d BK XII 87d 788a

8 ARISTOTLE *Heavens* K I CH 3 [2 0 1] 361 62a K II CH 1 375b d 376a / *Met physics* BK III CH 4 [1000 8-1] 518d 519a BK XI CH 8 [1074 1 14] 604d-605a

9 ARI TOTLE *Ethics* BK X CH 8 [11 5 8-23] 433b-c / *Rhetoric* BK II C 23 [139 12 14] 645d [139 15 17] 646c [139 27 25] 647b [139 5-8] 648a b BK I I CH 18 [1419 6-13] 673d-674a

12 L TI S *Nature f Thing* BK II [646-651] 23b [1090- 1 4] 29a K III [4 4] 30b BK V [46-1 3] 63a b [306-310] 65a [1161 1193] 76b-c K I [56- 8] 81a b

12 EPICTETUS *Disco ses* BK I CH 3 108b-c C 12 118d 119b K CH 13 188b-189a K IV CH 4 227d 228a CH 11 240d 241a

12 A RELIUS *Med ti s* BK II CT II 258a b

14 PLUT CH *Pericles* 1 0d / *Cori l n s* 191d 192b / *P lopida* 239d 240c

15 T CIT *Ann l* BK II 59d-60a

17 PLOTI US *Third Ennead* TR V CH 2 3 101c 102c CH 6 103b-104 CH 8-10 105a 106b / *F f h Enne d* TR I CH 7 212b-c TR I CH 3 241 CH 10 244c 245a / *S th Enne d*, TR III CH 1 342d 343c CH 3 344a b

[1-55] 225a-c [5 0-568] 229c-d, [120 1366] 234d 236d / *Alcestis* 237a 247a c esp [1 -6] 23 a 238a [1159-1163] 247c / *Heracleidae* [750-1055] 254d 2 7a,c / *Suppliants* 258a 269a, esp [113 53] 259a 260d, [1183 1234] 68c 269a,c / *Trojan Women* 270a 281a c esp [1-97] 270a 271a [914 1032] 277d 278d / *Ion* 282a 297d esp [1-81] 282a-d, [429-451] 286b-c [470-1622] 296a 297d / *Helen* 298a 314a c esp [1-6] 298a-d, [711 13] 304d 305a [1644 1692] 313d 314 c / *Andromache* [1-25 1255] 325c 326a c / *Electr* 327a 339a c esp [1233 359] 338b-339a c / *Baccha es* 340a 3 2a c / *Hecuba* [488-500] 357a / *Heracles Mad* 365a 3 7d esp [60-1390] 376a 377b / *Phoenician Women* 378a 393d esp [1-8] 378a 379a [930-959] 386c, [1758- 63] 393d / *Orestes* 394a-410d esp [317 35] 39 a b [16 5 1693] 410b-d / *Iphigenia Among the Taur* 411a-424d esp [1 4] 411a b [939-986] 419b-d, [1435 499] 424a-d / *Iphigenia at Aulis* 425a-439d esp[185 1 94] 435d-436a [1576-16 9] 439a-d

5 ARISTOPHANES *Peace* 526a 541d esp [195 2] 528b-c / *Thesmophoriazusae* [655-68] 607c 608a / *Plutus* 629a 642d esp [86-9] 630a [459-498] 634c-d, [653 747] 637 d

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 7b-10a esp 9d 10a 20b 22 BK I 54d 55a 77a b 78d 79c BK II 98b-c BK I 124d 125a 144c-d 140b-d 151b-153d 155b-c 158d 159d esp 159d BK 1 190c-d 198b-d 199d 00a 200c 201a 201d 202 205c-d 211b-d BK II 216d 217c esp 217 218b-220a 224d 225a 226d 227 239c 240d 246b-247 250a d BK VIII 262b-c 266a-d 269c 270a 270c 271a 274b-c 276b-d 279d 280a 283d 284d 285a BK IX 302 308a-c 309d 310a

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK I 355b-c 378a b BK I 407a b 415d-416c BK 506b-c BK II 559d 560a

7 PLATO *Protagoras* 44 -45a / *Symposium* 152d 153b / *Apology* 211d / *Republic* BK II 313b-314d 322a 324c BK 1 378a b BK X 436c-437a 437 -438c / *Critias* 478a-485d / *Statesman* 587 589c / *Laws* BK I 679 b 681b-683b BK X 757a BK X 765d 768d BK XII 787d 788a

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 9 [1 99b9-18] 345a BK X, CH 8 [1 9 23 3] 434a *Rhetoric* BK CH 5 [1383 3-8] 629d CH 7 [1391 30-b3] 638d

10 HIPPOCRATES *Sacred Disease* 154a 15 d

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK II [1090-4] 29 BK V [1194 1240] 76d 77b BK VI [43-79] 80d 81b [3 9-4 2] 85b-d

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 2 118d 120b 22 128a b BK II H 8 146a 147

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK CT 17 2 5d 2 5d BK I SECT 3 2 7a b BK III SECT 262a b BK V S CT 8 269d 270b BK VI CT 40-46 2 7d 278d BK X, SEC 5 296d BK XII SECT 5 307d 308a

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* 103a 379a esp BK I [23 417] 109a 114b [65 2] 121 123a BK II [162 00] 128b-129b [588-633] 140b 142a BK III [84 120] 149b-150b BK I [00-128] 169b 170b [173 8] 171b 174b BK V [604-699] 202b-205b [79-8 1] 207b-210a BK 1 [42 101] 212a 213b BK II [86-600] 243b 252b BK VIII [360-453] 269a 271a [608- 31] 275a 278b BK IX [1 4] 279a b [7 1 2] 281a 282a [638-663] 296a 297a BK X [1 11] 302a 305a [606-688] 318b-321a BK XI [532-596] 342b-344b [6 -867] 349a 351b BK XII [134 160] 357b-358a [405 440] 365a b [66-886] 374b-377b

14 PLUTARCH *Romulus* 27d 29c / *Numa Pompilius* 50d 51c 57b-58a / *Solon* 68a / *Camillus* 104b-d 107b-d / *Fabius* 142d 143b / *Coriolanus* 185b-186a 188d 191b / *Aristides* 268a 273c / *Lysander* 365a 366a / *Sulla* 3 0c 371b / *Lucullus* 404d-405a / *Alexander* 553b 554b / *Caesar* 602c-604d esp 604b-d / *Phocion* 615b-d / *Cato the Younger* 639d / *Demosthenes* 698a 699a / *Dion* 781d 782a

15 TACITUS *Annals* BK III 53d-60a BK VI 91b-d BK X 1 179d 183d / *Histories* BK I 189d 190 BK II 235a-c BK IV 284b 292c 294a

17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR IX C 1 9 71a / *Third Ennead* TR II-III 82c 97b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 22 A 3 ANS 130d 131c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL, XIV [43] 20a b PARADISE IV [49-63] 111b VIII [1 12] 116d

22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida* BK I ST ZA 30-35 5a b BK III ST NZ 89 66a / *Knight's Tale* 174a 211a esp [13 3 1333] 181b-182 [663 2699] 203b-204a [3099-3108] 211a / *Merchant's Tale* [10 093 30] 335a 337a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 81b-c

27 SHAKESPEARE *King Lear* ACT IV SC I [33 39] 269d [69-74] 270b SC II [38-50] 2 0d 271a C VI [35 40] 273d ACT SC III [166-1 4] 81 / *Antony and Cleopatra* ACT II SC I [1-8] 317d / *Cymbeline* ACT V SC IV [1 151] 481a 482 SC V [425 485] 488b-d

38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK I 435a-436a

47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [8598 -8590] 209a [8610-8637] 209b-210a

2 The existence of one God

2a The revelation of one God

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 1 1 14 / *Exodus* 3 esp 3 6 3 14 16 6 1-8 19 9-20 6 esp 20 1-6 20 8-22 / *Deuteronomy* 4 39 5 1 10 6 esp 6 4-5 32 1 47 esp 32 36-43 / *I Kings* 8 2-62 esp 8 23 8 60—(D) *III Kings* 8 2-62 esp 8 23 8 60 / *I Chronicles* 16 7 36—(D) *I Paralipomenon* 6 7 36 / *Psalms* 18 esp 18 30-3 —(D) *Psalms* 7 esp 31-33 / *Isaiah* 37 5 20 43 45 passim esp 43 3 43 10- 3 44 6

(2 *The existence of one God* 2a *The revelation of one God*)

44 9 44 4 45 5-7 45 18 45 1-22 48 12 —(D) *Isaias* 37 15 20 43-45 passim esp 43 3 43 10 13 44 6 44 8 44 24 45 5 7 45 18 45 21 — 48 12 / *Jeremiah* 10 esp 10 6 10 10—(D) *Jeremias* 10 esp 10 6 10 10 / *Daniel* 6 esp 6 20 6 26-27 / *Hosea* 13 4—(D) *Osee* 13 4 / *Joel* 2 27 / *Zechariah* 14 9 —(D) *Zacharias* 14 9 / *Malachi* 2 10—(D) *Malachias* 2 10

APOCRYPHA *Wisdom of Solomon* 12 13—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 12 13 / *Ecclesiasticus* 1 8—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 1 8 / *II Maccabees* 1 24 29—(D) OT *II Machabees* 1 24-29

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 23 9 / *Mark* 12 28-34 / *John* 1 1-2 10 30 17 3 / *Acts* 17 22 29 / *Romans* 1 14-32 / *I Corinthians* 8 4-6 12 4-6 / *Ephesians* 4 5-6 / *I Timothy* 2 5-6 4 10 6 14 16 / *I John* 5 5-9

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XII par 16 48c 49a / *City of God* BK VIII CH 11 272c / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 12 627c d CH 32 633c d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2 A 2 REP 1 11d 12c Q 11 A 3 CONTRARY and REP 1 49a c Q 13 A 11 CONTRARY 73c 74b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 74 A 10 REP 3 136c 137c Q 102 A 5 REP 1 283c 292c PART II II Q 1 A 5 REP 3 383b 384b A 8 ANS and REP 1 387a 388c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE XXIV [115 147] 143d 144a

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 38a 41b d

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VIII [267-318] 238a 239a, BK XII [106-151] 321b 322b [223 248] 324a b / *Samson Agonistes* [47 478] 350a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 242-290 217b 225a 428 244b 557 272b

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 245d 247b passim

2b The evidences and proofs of God s existence

NEW TESTAMENT *Romans* 1 14-32 esp 1 18 21

7 PLATO *Laws* BK X 758b 765c

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK VII CH 1 326a 327b BK VIII CH 1-6 334a 346b CH 10 [267a 21 b 7] 354d 355d / *Metaphysics* BK II CH 2 512b 513b BK IX CH 8 575b 577a BK XII CH 6 7 601b 603b CH 8 [1074a 33-b 1] 604d CH 10 [1075b 35-1076 5] 606d

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 6 110 112b CH 12 118d 120b CH 16 121d 122d

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 10 3b-c BK V par 1 27a b BK VII par 16-23 48c 50c BK X par 8-38 73b 81a BK XI par 6 90c d / *City of God* BK VIII CH 6 268d 269c BK X CH 14 307c 308a / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 8 626c 627a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2 10c 14a esp A 3 12c 14a Q 3 A 4 REP 2 16d 17c Q 8 34c 38c Q 11 A 3 49a-c Q 19 A 5 REP 3 112d 113c Q 44 A 1 REP 1 238b 239a Q 65 339a 343c esp A 1 REP 3 339b-340b Q 75 A 1 REP 1 378b 379c Q 79 A 4 ANS 414a 418c Q 104 AA 1 2 534c 537b PART I-II Q 1 A 2 610b 611b

22 CHAUCER *Knight s Tale* [3003 3016] 209a b

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 78d 79a 79d 80a

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 38a 41b-d

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 51b 54b / *Meditations* 71d 72a III 81d 89a V 93a 96a / *Objections and Replies* 108a 115a c passim 120c 123a 126b 127c DEF VIII 130d POSTULATE V 131b c AXIOM I 131d AXIOM IX X 132b PROP I III 132b 133a 137d 138a 158b-162a 168d 169a 211c 212a 213a d 21 d 218a

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I DEF I 355a DEF 3 6 355b PROP 7 356c PROP 11 358b 359b PROP 14 DEMONST and COROL 1 359d 360a PROP 20 DEMONST and COROL 1 363d 364a

32 MILTON *Psalm 136* 8a 10a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 242 244 217b 218a 463 256a 557 272b

34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III GENERAL SCHOL 369b 370a / *Optics* BK III 528b 529a 542a 543a passim

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXIII SECT 1 172b c SECT 20 173a BK IV CH X SECT 1 11 349c 352a

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* PREF 404a SECT 6 , 414b c SECT 25 33 417d-419a esp SECT 29 3 418c-419a SECT 146-156 442a 444d passim

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT XI 49 b-503c passim

37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 187d 188a

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 143a b [thesis] 177b 192d 236b 240b esp 239a 240b / *Practical Reason* 353a 354d / *Judgement* 593c d 607d 609b

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 401a b

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 8 94d 95a

47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [3431 3468] 84a b

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK V 196b d 217c d

2c Criticisms of the proofs of God s existence agnosticism

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2 1 REP 2 10d 11d A 2 11d 12c

31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 110a 111a 112d 114c 137d 138a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 42 217b 218a 428 244b 543 266a 547-549 266b 267a

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT XI 497b-503c passim esp DIV 115 503b c

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 33a d 143a 145c 152a 153c 177b 192d esp 177b 179c 190a 192d

3d Obed ence to God or the gods

(3 *Man's relation to God or the gods* 3b *The reproach or defiance of God or the gods*)

1 18 3 4- / *Ezekiel* 2 3 5 5-8 12 15 17 20 22 23 28—(D) *Ezechiel* 2 3 5 5-8 12 15 17 20 22-23 28 / *Hosea*—(D) *Osee* / *Jonah*—(D) *Jonas*

APOCRYPHA *Judith* 5 7 20-8 27—(D) OT *Judith* 5 7 11-8 27 / *Wisdom of Solomon* 12 12—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 1 12

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 27 46 / *Mark* 15 34 / *Acts* 9 1-6 11 17 / *Romans* 8 7 9 19-21 / *James* 4 4

4 HOMER *Iliad* BK I [1-120] 3a 4b [428-487] 7c 8a BK V [431-549] 34c 35d BK XXI [114-148] 149b c [200 382] 150b 152a / *Odyssey* BK IX [475-535] 234a d

5 AESCHYLUS *Suppliant Maidens* [151-175] 2d 3a [882-894] 12b / *Persians* [679-842] 22a 24b / *Agamemnon* [901-954] 61c 62b [1200-1222] 64d 65a

5 SOPHOCLES *Oedipus the King* [864-910] 107b c / *Antigone* [988 1090] 139c 140b / *Ajax* 143a 155a c esp [1-133] 143a 144c [430-459] 146d 147a [748-783] 149c d / *Electra* [516 576] 160a c / *Trachiniae* [1264-1278] 181c / *Philoctetes* [446-452] 186a

5 EURIPIDES *Hippolytus* 225a 236d esp [1-55] 225a c / *Heracleidae* 248a 257a c / *Suppliants* 258a 269a c esp [113-283] 259b 260d / *Trojan Women* [1-98] 270a 271a / *Ion* 282a 297d esp [429-451] 286b c / *Helen* [255-305] 300c d / *Andromache* [994-1045] 323c 324a / *Bacchantes* 340a 352a c / *Heracles Mad* 365a 377d esp [339-347] 368a [750-760] 371c [1258-1347] 376a d / *Iphigenia Among the Tauri* [570-575] 416a

5 ARISTOPHANES *Clouds* [263-428] 491a 493d [813-833] 498c d [1462-1477] 506c / *Birds* 542a 563d / *Thesmophoriazusae* [655 687] 607c 608a

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 20d 22a 39a b BK II 77a b BK III 95a c BK IV 140c d 151b 154a BK VII 222c d 226d 227a BK VIII 283d

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 400d 401a

7 PLATO *Laws* BK IX 757a

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 6 110c 112b CH 12 118d 120b CH 27 132c 133a BK III CH 22 195c d 198a b

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK I [1 11] 103a BK XII [500-509] 367b

14 PLUTARCH *Agesilaus* 483a b / *Dion* 801b c

15 TACITUS *Histories* BK IV 292c 294a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 78 A 1 CONTRARY 152b 153b Q 84 A 2 ANS and REP 2 175b 176a PART II II QQ 13 14 444b 452a PART III Q 64 A 6 ANS 874d 875d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL III [100-136] 5a b XI [16-90] 15b 16a XIV [1-72] 19c 20b XXV [1 15] 36b c XXXI [82-96] 46d-47a

22 CHAUCER *Knight's Tale* [1303 1333] 181b-182a / *Monk's Tale* [14 149-188] 437a b

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 10b 11b

27 SHAKESPEARE *King Lear* ACT IV SC I [30-37] 269d

32 MILTON *Samson Agonistes* [667 709] 354a 355a

48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 30a 34a 123a b 370b 371b 380a 381a

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK V 121d 127b passim

3c The love of God or the gods

OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 20 5 6 / *Deuteronomy* 6 4-9 7 9 11 10 12 11 1 11 13 25 13 13 19 9 30 6 15 20 / *Joshua* 22 5 23 11—(D) *Josue* 22 5 23 11 / *Psalms* 5 11 12 18 1 2 31 23 42 1-2 63 97 10 116 1 119 132 122 6 145 20—(D) *Psalms* 5 12 13 17 2 3 30 24 41 2-3 62 96 10 114 1 118 132 121 6 144 20 / *Isaiah* 26 8-9 56 6-7—(D) *Isaias* 26 8-9 56 6 7 / *Jeremiah* 2 1 3—(D) *Jeremias* 2 1-3

APOCRYPHA *Tobit* 13 12-18—(D) OT *Tobias* 13 14 -3 / *Ecclesiasticus* 2 15 16 13 14 25 11 12—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 2 18 19 13 18 -5 14 16

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 10 37 38 22 35 38 / *Mark* 12 28 33 / *Luke* 7 37 47 10 25 -11 42 / *John* 5 40-4 8 42 14 15 21 16 26-27 17 23 26 21 15 17 / *Acts* 20 2 24 217 15 / *Romans* 5 5 8 28 39 / *I Corinthians* 2 9 8 1-3 13 1-14 1 16 14 22 / *II Corinthians* 5 14-15 / *Ephesians* 1 3-6 3 14 21 6 24 / *II Thessalonians* 3 5 / *I Timothy* 1 5 / *II Timothy* 1 13 14 3 1 5 / *James* 1 12 2 5 / *I Peter* 1 7-8 / *I John* 2 5 15 17 3 17 4 7-5 3 / *II John* 6 / *Jude* 20-21

4 HOMER *Odyssey* BK XIII [217 351] 257b-258c

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK II CH 16 158b d CH 22 168d BK IV CH 1 219a b

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK II SECT 13 2 8c

16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* BK I 510a b

16 KEPLER *Harmonies of the World* 1050b 1080a b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 5-6 2b-c par 28 7d 8a BK II par 15 12b c BK III par 13 17a b BK IV par 15 19 23a 24b BK V par 1 2 27a c BK VII par 6 44d-45a par 23 50b c BK VIII par 9 55a c BK IX par 3 62a b BK X par 8-40 73b 81c BK XI par 1 4 89b 90b BK XII par 10 101c par 23 104b c / *City of God* BK X CH 1 298b d 299d CH 3 300b 301a BK XIV CH 28 397a d / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 3-5 625b 626a CH 10 627b CH 15 628b c CH 22-23 629b 630c CH 26-27 631b d CH 29-30 632a 633b CH 33 633d 634b CH 35 634c d CH 37-40 635b 636a c BK II CH 7 638d 639c CH 38 654c CH 41 656a c BK III CH 10-24 661c 666d passim

A L s *Summa Theol g ca* P RT I Q 3 A I R P 5 14b 15b Q 8 3 ANS a d RE 4 36b-37c Q 60 A 5 313b-314c Q 82 A 3 A s and E 3 433c-434c Q 95 A 4 ANS 509b-510a PA T I I Q A 8 615 C Q 2 A I REP 3 615d 616c Q 6 A 3 R P 4 735 736b Q 28 A 2 CO TR Y 741 742 A 4 A 5 742d 743c Q 35 A 5 P I 775d 777a

0 AQ I s *S mma Theol g ca* RT I II Q 65 A 5 and REP I 74c 75a Q 66 A 6 80c 81b Q 68 2 A s 89c 90c 8 RE 2 95c 96c Q 69 A 4 s 100c 101c Q A 3 103b-104d Q 73 4 RE 3 122b 123a A 5 A s 123 d Q 77 A 4 CONTRA a d R P I 148b-149a Q 78 2 R P I 153b 154 Q 84 A I RE I 174b-175 Q 88 2 RE I 194b-19 b A 6 REP 2 198a d Q 89 A I RE 3 199 -c 2 A s 199 200d Q 99 I P 245c 246b Q 100 6 R P I 257c 258c A I 262b-263b A II REP I 263c 264d Q I A I REP I 270c 271b Q 9 A 3 340c 341b PA T II I Q I I RE 3 380b-381 3 R I 381d 382c Q 3 R P I 401 d Q 7 A 2 416b-d Q 9 A 4 REP 3 467 -468b I2 s 473d-474d Q 22 A s 481d-482c QQ 23 27 482c 527b Q 180 A I A and RE 607d-608c A 2 R P I 608c 609 A 7 A 614d 616a Q 182 A 2 s 621d-623 A 4 P I 623d 624d Q 184 2 s 629d-630d A 3 and R P 3 630d 632 7 REP 2 636a-637 Q 185 A 2 EP I 641c-643 A 4 644a 645c Q 186 2 RE 2 651d-652d A 7 REP 2 658d 660a Q 87 A 2 A s 665a-666a Q 188 2 s 675d-677a

21 D TE *Dwin Com dy* PURGAT Y XV [40-81] 75d 76a XVII [91]-X I [5] 79b-80 P R I [94 I4] 107b-d III 109b-110c [I] II2 b VI [2 26] 114d 115 X [94 138] 137d 138a XXI [52 I 2] 138d 139b XX I [-8] 145d 146c XX [39]-XXXIII [145] 156 157d

2 C C R *Tro l s d C s da* K V ST NZA 263 267 154b-155a / *Second N s T le* 463b-471b / *P o T le* par 6 497 p 21 509a b pa 31 517b-518b

23 Ho BES *Le th* RT III 240d

25 M NT G *E say* 210d 211

27 SHAK E *Henry VIII* CT III SC II [435 457] 573 d

30 B *Advancement f Le rning* 80b-81a

31 D C TES *M dit* I 88d 89 / *Obj c t ons and Replie* 227b 228a

31 S OZ *Eth cs* P PR P 4 6 456b-c PR 18-20 456d-458a O 32 34 460b d P 36-37 461 -c

32 M LTO *P dise Lo t* BK [561-566] 331b

33 P C *Prov ci l Letter* 78b-80b / *Pen* 43 249a 247b 463 255 468 255b-256a 471 256a b 4 6 256b-257 479 257b 48 483 258a b 485 258b 487 489 258b-259 49 259 544 266a 82 331b 332

35 LO K *H m Understa d g* BK II H VII s CT 5-6 132 -d

42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 278b-279d / *Practical Reason* 321b-329a esp 326b-327a

43 MILL *Utilitaria sm* 458a b

47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [1178 1185] 29b

48 MEL ILLE *Moby Dick* 318b

51 TOLSTOY *W ar and Pe ce* BK XV 631a-c

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Bro hers Ka ama ov* BK III 54 b BK *127b-137c passim* BK VI 164d 165a BK XI 313c 314d

3d Obed ence to God or the gods

O D TESTAMENT *Genesis* 2 15 17 3 22 I 18 esp 22 18 26 4-5 / *Exodus* 3-4 4 17 24 I-8 / *Deutero omy* 4 II pass m 27 30 passim / *Josh a* 22 24 I 28—(D) *Josue* 22 24 I 28 / *I Samuel* 12 14 5 15 esp 15 22 23—(D) *I Ki g* 12 14 15 15 esp 15:22 23 / *I K s* 8 54-62—(D) *III Kings* 8 54-62 / *I Chro icles* 28 9—(D) *I Pa alipomen n* 28 9 / *Ezra* 7 23 —(D) *I Esd as* 7 23 / *Job* / *Ecclesiastes* 5 I 12 13—(D) *Ecclesiastes* 4 17 12 13 / *Isaiah* I 19- —(D) *Isaias* I 19-20 / *Jeremiah* pa sim esp 3 7 II 35 42 44—(D) *Jeremias* pass m esp 3 7 II 35 42 44 / *Da iel* 7 27 / *M cah* 6 8—(D) *Micheas* 6 8

N w T ST NT *M tthew* 6 10 7 21 12 46-50 26 36-39 / *M k* 14 32 36 / *Luke* 22 40-45 / *Joh* 5 3 18 10-11 / *Acts* 5 29-32 21 8 15 / *R mans* 5 19 / *II Corinth a* 10 5-6 / *Philip p ans* 2 I 18 esp 2 7-8 / *II Thessalonia s* I 7-9 / *H brews* 5 8-9 II 8

4 HOM R *Il ad* BK I [88 222] 5a b

5 AESCHYLUS *Suppl ant Ma dens* [410-434] 6a b / *Choeph roe* [269-301] 72d 73 [885 10,6] 78d 80d / *Eumenides* [490-565] 86b-87a

5 SO OCLES *Oed pus the K g* [863-910] 107b-c / *Ant go e* 131 142d esp [374 378] 134b [443 465] 134d 135 [1351 1353] 142d / *Ajax* [666-676] 148d / *Electra* 156a 169a c esp [23 37] 156b

5 EUR I S *Suppl a ts* [513-563] 262d 263b / *Helen* [644 1692] 313d 314a c / *Iph genia Amo g the Tau i* [67 122] 411d-412b

6 H RODOTUS *History* BK I 39c d BK II 55a BK I 124d 125 126d 127 150b-d 151b-152 K V 201d 202c BK VII 218c 220 BK IX 308a-c

6 THUCY E *P l p sian W ar* BK I 355b-c 382 d

7 PLATO *Apology* 206b d / *Laws* BK IV 681b-683b

12 E TETUS *D scourses* BK II CH 16-17 158a 161 BK I CH 24 204c d 208d 210a BK IV CH I 213 223d p ss m esp 218b 219a CH 3 224b-d CH 7 234b CH I 242d 243

12 AU L S *M d t tio s* BK I I S CT 3 262c K V SECT 27 272d K V CT 10 274b c BK IX CT I 291 -c

13 V R IL *Aen id* K III [84 120] 149b-150b BK V [259-282] 174a b [356-36] 176b-177a

15 T ITU *Histories* K V 292c 294a

(3 *Man's relation to God or the gods* 3d *Obedience to God or the gods*)

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK III par 15 17a b / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 15 628b c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 19 A 5 REP 2 705d 707a A 6 ANS and REP 2 707a 708a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 88 A I REP 2 193a 194b Q 96 A 4 233a d Q 97 A 3 REP I 237b-238b PART II II Q 2 A 9 ANS 398c 399b Q 4 A 7 REP 3 407d 409a Q 33 A 7 REP 5 556a 557d Q 186 A 7 REP 3 658d 660a PART III Q 7 A 3 REP 2 747b 748a
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE III [1] V [87] 109b 113a VII [19-120] 115b 116b
22 CHAUCER *Tale of Man of Law* [5240-5253] 249b / *Clerk's Tale* 296a 318a esp [9018-9038] 316b 317a / *Tale of Melibeus* par 17 407b-408a / *Parson's Tale* par 24 511a b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 82b d PART II 137b 138b 154b-155c 159d 160a 162a PART III 199b 204a 240a 241a 244d 246a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 213a 215a 233a 234a 238c 239c
26 SHAKESPEARE *Richard III* ACT II SC II [77-95] 120b c
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* 93a 333a esp BK IV [411-439] 161b 162a [720-749] 168a b BK V [506-543] 186a 187a BK VI [164-188] 199b-200a BK VII [449-518] 227a 228b BK VIII [311-333] 239a b [630-643] 246a BK IX [366-375] 255b [647-654] 261b BK X [1013]-BK XI [44] 296b 300a BK XI [133-161] 302a b BK XII [386-410] 327b 328a [561-566] 331b / *Samson Agonistes* [373-419] 347b 348b / *Areopagitica* 394b 395b
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 460 254b 476 256b 257a 482 258a 489 491 259a 531 264b 539 265b
35 LOCKE *Toleration* 15d 16a 16c / *Civil Government* CH II SECT 6 26b c / *Human Understanding* BK I CH II SECT 5-6 105a c
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I 2a b BK XII 85d 86a
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 259b 260a
42 KANT *Practical Reason* 321b 329a 345c d / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 383b d 384a c / *Judgement* 504b 505a 509a c 593a d 611a c
43 MILL *Liberty* 296b d
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 394a
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 30a 36b
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK III 64c 67a BK V 127b 137c passim BK VII 177b 180a
54 FREUD *General Introduction* 582a / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 776b

3e The worship of God or the gods prayer propitiation sacrifice

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 4 3-7 15 7-21 22 1-18 / *Exodus* passim esp 12 13 11 16 15 1 21 23 18 19 / *Leviticus* passim esp 2 4-7 16-17 22 1-4 9 27 1-34 / *Numbers* 5-8 15 18-19 28-30 / *Deuteronomy* 10-1 14:22 17 1 / *Joshua* 22 10-34—(D) *Josue* 22 10-34 / I *Samuel* 15 esp 15 22-23—(D) I *Kings* 15 esp 15 22-23 / I *Kings* 8 18 21 39—(D) III *Kings* 8 18 21-39 / II *Chronicles* 5-8 29 31—(D) II *Paralipomenon* 5-8 29-31 / *Nehemiah* 10 29-39—(D) II *Esdras* 10 29-39 / *Psalms* / *Proverbs* 15 8 21 3 / *Isaiah* 1 11 20 58—(D) *Isaias* 1 11 20 58 / *Lamentations* 5 / *Ezekiel* 43 18-27 45 13-46:24—(D) *Ezechiel* 43 18-27 45 13-46:24 / *Hosea* 6 esp 6 6 8—(D) *Osee* 6 esp 6 6 8 / *Joel* 2 12 18 / *Amos* 4 / *Micah* 6 6-8—(D) *Micheas* 6 6-8 / *Malachi* 1 6-14—(D) *Malachias* 1 6-14
APOCRYPHA *Tobit* 13—(D) OT *Tobias* 13 / *Rest of Esther* 13 12 14—(D) OT *Esther* 13 12-14 / *Ecclesiasticus* 18 22 23 35—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 18:22-23 35
NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 6 1 18 9 9-13 26 36-44 / *Mark* 9 14 29 esp 9 29 12 3 33—(D) *Mark* 9 13 28 esp 9 28 12 3 33 / *Luke* 11 1-13 18 1-14 / *John* 17 / *Colossians* 4 2-4 / I *Thessalonians* 5 17 / *Hebrews* 10 1 22 13 15 16 / *Revelation* 5—(D) *Apocalypse* 5
4 HOMER *Iliad* BK I [428-487] 7c 8a BK II [394-431] 14a b BK IX [485-526] 62a b / *Odyssey* BK III [1-68] 193a d
5 AESCHYLUS *Suppliant Maidens* [1 175] 1a 3a [525-600] 7c 8d [1018-1073] 13d 14a c / *Seven Against Thebes* [80-320] 28a 30d
5 SOPHOCLES *Oedipus the King* [151 215] 100c 101a [863 910] 107b c / *Oedipus at Colonus* [465-509] 118b d / *Electra* [516-576] 160a c / *Philoctetes* [1440-1444] 195a c
5 EURIPIDES *Trojan Women* [1277 1283] 280d / *Bacchantes* 340a 352a c esp [200-209] 341c [337-433] 342c 343b / *Iphigenia at Aulis* 425a 439d
5 ARISTOPHANES *Peace* [173 195] 528a [922 1126] 536c 539a / *Birds* 542a 563d
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 6a 10a 11d 20d 22a 31a-c 40d-41b 48c BK II 57b-60a 79a c 86c BK III 95a c BK IV 126d 127a 134a 140c d 142b c 155c 156a 156d 157a BK V 175d 176a BK VI 196d 197a 199d 200a 200d 205c d BK VII 226c 235a 248b c 250b d BK VIII 267a 270b c 282b c
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 407a b BK VI 517d 518a
7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 127c 128a / *Symposium* 156d 157a / *Euthyphro* 197d 198c / *Phaedo* 251d / *Republic* BK I 295a d 297a b BK II 313d 314d BK IV 345d 346a / *Timaeus* 447a / *Laws* BK IV 683a b BK VII 721a c BK VIII 731d 732d BK X 768d 769c BK XII 791d 792a
8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK I CH II [105ᵃ2-6] 148c / *Heavens* BK I CH I [268 12 15] 359a b
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 12 347a b BK IV CH 2 [1122ᵇ18 23] 369c BK VIII CH 9 [1160 19-29] 412b c / *Politics* BK VII CH 9 [1329 26-34] 533d

3f The imitation of God or the gods: the divine element in human nature; the deification of men; man as the image of God

(3 *Man's relation to God or the gods 3f The imitation of God or the gods the divine element in human nature the deification of men man as the image of God*)

- 23 13 15—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 2 23 13 15 / *Ecclesiasticus* 17 1-3—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 17 1-3

NEW TESTAMENT *John* 10 34-35 / *Acts* 1 21-23 14 7 18 17 27-29 28 3-6 / *Romans* 1 14-32 / *I Corinthians* 11 7 15 49 / *II Corinthians* 3 18 / *Colossians* 3 8 10 / *II Thessalonians* 2 3-4 / *James* 3 9 / *I Peter* 1 15-16 / *II Peter* 1 3-4

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 7a b 12d 13b 14a d BK II 79d 80a BK IV 140c 141a BK V 168d 169a 183d 184a BK VII 217c 235b c

7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 127c 128a / *Ion* 144b 145c / *Republic* BK II III 320c 328a / *Timaeus* 452c d 466a b 476a b / *Theaetetus* 530b 531a / *Laws* BK IV 681b 683b BK V 686d 687c

8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK I CH 2 [982b28 983 11] 501a b BK XII CH 7 [1072b14 29] 602d 603a CH 9 605a d / *Soul* BK II CH 4 [415 2 -b8] 645c d

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 9 [1099b9-18] 345a CH 12 347a b BK VII CH 1 [1145 15-33] 395a b BK X CH 8 [1178b8 27] 433b-c

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK V [1-54] 61a d

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 3 108b c CH 6 110c 112b CH 9 114c 116b CH 13-14 120b-121c CH 17 122d 124a esp 123d BK II CH 7-8 145b 147c CH 14 153d 154c BK III CH 13 188b d BK IV CH 11 240d 241a

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK II SECT 1 256b d SECT 13 258c BK III SECT 12 13 262b c BK V SECT 27 272d BK XII SECT 2-3 307b d

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK I [283 290] 110b 111a [586-593] 119a b

14 PLUTARCH *Romulus* 27d 29c / *Numa Pompilius* 50d 51c 52b 53c / *Alexander* 541a 542a 553b 554b / *Dion* 784d 785a

15 TACITUS *Annals* BK I 4c d BK IV 73b d 80c d / *Histories* BK IV 285d 286a 287b

16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 849a b / *Harmonies of the World* 1038a 1048a

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR II 6b 10a / *Second Ennead* TR IX CH 15 74d 75b / *Fourth Ennead* TR III CH 12 148d

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par 14 12a b BK IV par 26 25c d par 31 26c 27a BK VI par 4 36a b BK XIII par 32 119a b / *City of God* BK VIII CH 8 270a d BK XI CH 26 28 336d 338d BK XII CH 23 357d 358a / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 22 629b 630a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 1 REP 2 14b 15b Q 14 A 2 REP 3 76d 77d Q 26 A 4 151c 152a c Q 27 A 1 ANS 153b 154b Q 59 A 1 CONTRARY 306c 307b Q 72 A 1 REP 3 368b 369d Q 77 A 2 ANS and REP 1 401b d Q 88 A 3 REP 3 472c 473a Q 91 A 4 REP 1 2 487d 488c Q 92 A 2 ANS 489d 490c Q 93 492a 501c Q 106 A 1 REP 3 545d 546d PART I II Q 1 A 8 615a c Q 2 A 4 REP 1 618a d Q 3 A 5 REP 1 626b 627a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 55 A 2 REP 3 27a d Q 87 A 8 REP 2 191d 192d Q 93 A 3 217b 218a A 6 ANS 219d 220d Q 110 A 4 ANS 350d 351d PART II II Q A 9 REP 3 398c 399b Q 10 A 11 ANS 435d 436b Q 19 A 3 REP 1 466d 467c Q 31 A 3 REP 2 538b 539c PART III Q 4 A 1 REP 2 730d 731d PART III SUPPL Q 71 A 12 CONTRARY 914c 915c Q 75 A 1 REP 4 935b 937a Q 91 A 2 CONTRARY 1017c 1020c Q 92 A 3 REP 9 1034b 1037c Q 93 A 1 REP 1 1037d 1039a

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVI [83 90] 77d XXV [58 78] 92a PARADISE V [19-24] 112b VII [64-84] 115d 116a XIII [52 ?] 126a b

22 CHAUCER *Franklin's Tale* [11 189-19] 353b-354a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 82b c PART II 263a d

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 215a 233b 234a 248a c 256c d 294a b 541d 543a c

27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT II SC II [314 322] 43d ACT IV SC IV [33-66] 59a c

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 428b-c

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 41b d 80b-81a

31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 214a d

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK II [345 353] 118b-119a BK VII [150 173] 220b 221a [519-529] 228b BK XI [466-52] 309b 310b / *Areopagitica* 384a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 430 431 245a 247b 434 435 248a 251a 485 258b 537 265b 555 270a

35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH II SECT 6 26b-c

37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 187d 188a

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 12b-c 28b d, 547a-c

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 136b 379b d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* ADDITIONS 90 130d / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 16 b d PART I 224a 228a 234d 235c 245a PART II 266d 267a 268b 271c esp 270c 271c PART III 306a d 308a b PART IV 339b d 349c 350c

47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [614-736] 17a 19b [1566-1569] 38a

48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 84b 85a

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XI 525c 526b

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK V 121d 122c BK XI 313c 314d 345a c

54 FREUD *Group Psychology* 692a 693a esp 693a / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 778d 779a 790d

4 The divine nature in itself the divine attributes

7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 126a / *Symposium* 167b-d

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK X CH 8 [1178b8 23] 433b c

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses*, BK II, CH 8 146a; BK III, CH 13 188b-c

17 PLOTINUS *Fifth Ennead*, TR I 208a-23 d passim / *Sixth Ennead*, TR VII-IX 321b-360d passim

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions*, BK I, par 4 2a; BK IV, par 9 6b; BK VII, par 1-8 43b-45d / *City of God*, BK XIII, CH 6 258d-269c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I, Q 3 II 14a-50b; Q 84, A [illegible] ANS 44[illegible]b-443c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy*, PARADISE, XXXIII [76-145] 15[illegible]-d

23 HOBBES *Leviathan*, PART II 162a 163b; PART IV 2[illegible] 1b-c

31 DESCARTES *Discourse*, PART IV 52b-d / *Meditations*, III 81d-89a / *Objections and Replies*, PROP III 132d 133a 211c 212a 232b

31 SPINOZA *Ethics*, PART I 355a-372d esp DEF 4 6 355b, PROP 5 356b, PROP 8-13 356d-359d, PROP 14, COROL 2 PROP 15 360a-361d, PROP 9-[illegible] 363c-36[illegible]a; PART II, PROP 1 373d 374a

34 NEWTON *Principles*, BK III, GENERAL SCHOL, 369b-371a / *Optics*, BK III 542a 543a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding*, BK I, CH III, SECT 1 116c-d; BK II, CH XIII, SECT 16 d 168a; CH XXIII, SECT 33 35 212d 213c; BK II, CH [illegible], SECT 12 271b-2[illegible]2b

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge*, SECT 146 442a-b

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 229c 230b

42 KANT *Pure Reason*, 18[illegible] 190c 23[illegible]b-[illegible]0b [illegible] 239a-c / *Practical Reason*, 303b-304a 3[illegible]5d 3[illegible]6a 344b-c 345a-c 347d 348b 3[illegible]c 351a 3[illegible]2-c / *Judgement*, 592a-c 608c 611d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right*, ADDITIONS, 6[illegible] 143a-b

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace*, BK V 196b-d

4c The identity of essence and existence in God: the necessity of a being whose essence involves its existence

OLD TESTAMENT: *Exodus*, 3:13-14

8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics*, BK XII, CH 7 [1072b] 602[illegible]-d

17 PLOTINUS *Sixth Ennead*, TR VIII, CH 14 349d 350c; CH 15-21 351d 353d

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions*, BK VII, par 3 50c / *City of God*, BK VIII, CH 1 271c / *Christian Doctrine*, BK I, CH 32 633c-d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I, Q 2, A 3 [illegible] 12 14; Q 3 [illegible] 16d [illegible] c A [illegible] ANS and REP 19a-c; Q 4, A 1, REP 3 20d 21b; A [illegible] S and REP 3 21b-22b; A 3, REP 3 22b-23b; Q 6, A 3 29c 30b; Q 8 A [illegible] 34d 35c; Q [illegible] [illegible] and REP 3 41d-[illegible]; Q [illegible] A 4 [illegible] 49d 50b; Q 3 A [illegible] ANS [illegible] 7 b; Q 4 A 3 REP 85d-88c; Q 9, A 3 [illegible] 6 110b-111c; Q 44, 1 A 3 238b-239a; Q 5 A [illegible] REP 3 2[illegible]0a 2[illegible]2a; Q 54 [illegible] A [illegible] 28[illegible]a-d A 3 REP [illegible] 85c 28[illegible]b; Q [illegible] [illegible] REP 4 382a 383b; PART I-II, Q 3 A [illegible] 6 8a-d

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART III, Q 3 [illegible] REP 3 724 c

46 The unity and simplicity of the divine nature

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics*, BK VIII, CH 10 353b-355d / *Metaphysics*, BK XII, CH 7 [1072b [illegible] 11] 603a-b; CH 8 [1074a 39] 604d; CH 9 [1075a 11] 605c-d

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics*, BK VII, CH 14 [1154b20-31] 406c

17 PLOTINUS *Sixth Ennead*, TR IX 353d 360d

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions*, BK I, par 10 3b-c; par 12 4a; BK IV, par 24 25b-c; par 9 26b; BK VII, par [illegible] 43c-44; par 16 48c-49a; par 1 49d 50a; BK XIII, par 4 111c; par 19 115c-d / *City of God*, BK VI, CH 6 268d 269c; CH 11 2[illegible]2c; BK XI, CH 10 327d 328d / *Christian Doctrine*, BK I, CH 5 624d-6[illegible]6a; CH 3[illegible] 633c-d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I, Q 3 14 20c; Q 4, A [illegible], REP 1 2 21b-22b; A 3 22b-23b; Q 6, A 3 29c 30b; Q [illegible] A 2 31d 32c; Q 9 A [illegible] REP 2 3 35c 36b; A 4 3[illegible]c 38c; Q 11 46d 50b; Q 13 A 1 REP 2 3 6[illegible]c-63c; A 4, REP 3 65c-66b; Q 14 A 1 [illegible] [illegible]5d 6c [illegible]4 8b-[illegible]9a; Q [illegible]6 A 1 REP 1 150b-c; Q [illegible] A 1 REP 2 153b-154b; Q [illegible]5 A [illegible], REP 1 158d 160a; Q 30, A 1 REP 3 4 16[illegible]a 165a; A 3 169b-1[illegible]0c; Q 40 A [illegible] REP 1 213b-214b; Q 44 A 1 A [illegible]5 238b-239a; Q 47 A 3 256a 257b; Q 50 A [illegible] REP 3 2[illegible]0a 272a; A 3 REP 2 2 2[illegible]2a 273b; Q 54 A 1 ANS 28[illegible]a-d; A 3 REP [illegible] 286c 8 b; Q 5 A 1 ANS 29[illegible]a-d; Q 84 A 2, ANS and REP 3 442b-443c; Q 85 A [illegible] REP 4 471c-472c; PART I-II, Q 18 A 1 ANS 69[illegible]-d

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I-II, Q 49, A 4 A 3 5a-6a; Q 50, A 6, ANS 11a 12a; Q [illegible]3 A [illegible] REP 3 119c 120c; PART III Q [illegible] A [illegible] ANS and REP 1 711d 712d; Q 3 A [illegible] REP 3 72[illegible] -c; A 3 724c 7[illegible] b; Q 6, A 5 REP 2 7[illegible]4a-d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy*, PARADISE, XIII [52 66] 126a; XXIV [13[illegible] 154] 143d 144b; XXIX [1[illegible]-1[illegible]5] 151c-d; XXXIII [76-145] 15[illegible] a-d

23 HOBBES *Leviathan*, PART II 151d

31 DESCARTES *Discourse*, PART IV 52a-d / *Meditations*, I [illegible] 86a-88b esp 88b / *Objections and Replies*, 112b-c 232b

31 DESCARTES *Meditations*, III 81d-89a; [illegible] 93a 96a / *Objections and Replies*, 110a 112a 112d 114c 126b-127c; POSTULATE [illegible] 131b-c; AXIOM I 131d; AXIOM X 132b; PROP I 132b-c 158b-162a 217d 218a

31 SPINOZA *Ethics*, PART I, DEF 1 3 5a; DEF 6-8 35[illegible] b-c; PROP 6-8 356b-35[illegible] d; PROP 11 358b-3[illegible] 9b; PROP 20 363d 364; PROP 24 365a; PROP 3[illegible] 369a

33 PASCAL *Pensées*, 469 256a

42 KANT *Pure Reason*, 143a 145c 153a 177b-192d esp 177b-179c, 18[illegible] a-c, 192 -d [illegible]a-b 239a-c / *Practical Reason*, 344c 355d esp 353a 35[illegible]d / *Judgement*, 570b-571c 606d 603b esp 608b-609a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right*, PART III, par 3[illegible] 9[illegible]a / *Philosophy of History*, PART III 305c 306c

23 Ho es *Leviathan* PART I 9d 80a P RT III 173a
25 Mo T *Essays* 293d 294a
28 Har ey *On A imal Generation* 428
31 Des R es *Discourse* P RT IV 52b-c / *Med tat o s* III 84 b 86 V 94d 95a
31 Spi oz *Eth s* PART I DEF 6 355b D P 8 55c P O 6 356b c PROP 11 13 358b 359d O 17 362b 363c P OP 19- 0 363c 364a RO 33 SCHOL 2 367d 368c esp 368b-c PART II PR P 44 CO OL 2 PROP 47 390a 391a P T V PROP 17 456c d
3 M LTO *Parad se Lost* BK III [1 12] 135b [372 38]143b
33 P sc L *Pensées* 469 256a
34 NEWTON *Principles* BK I GENERAL SCHOL, 3 0a 371a
35 Lo KE *Hum n Understa di g* BK II CH XV S CT 3 4 162d 163b CH XVII SECT 16-17 172a c SECT 20 172d 173c H XXI I T 21 209c BK I CH X 349 354c esp SECT 3-5 349d 350b S c 8 11 351a 352a
35 B R LE *Hum Knowled e* SECT 117 436a
42 KA T *Pur Re n* 176b-c 190c 192 -d / *Practic l Re so* 334b 335b 344b-c 352a b / *J dgement* 592 -c
46 H EL *Philo phy of H story* INTRO 156d 157b I T I I 306a
51 T LSTOY *W ar d Peace* BK XIV 608a b EP LOG II 684 d

4e The finity of God the freedom of an infinite being

8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysi s* BK X I CH 7 [1073 3 10] 603a b
18 AUGUSTIN *Co f sio* K V par 19- 32b-33 K VII par 7 45 -d par 20-21 49d 50 BK XIII pa 12 113b-d
19 AQUI S *Summa Th l gic* ART I Q A 3 EP 1 12c 14 Q 7 31 34c Q 4 A 1 ANS 75d 76c A 3 77d 78b Q 5 s and REP 1 144c 145b Q 54 2 ANS 285d 286c Q 75 A 5 RE 1 4 382 383b Q 79 A ANS 414d 416a Q 86 R 1 462a-463a P T I Q 1 A 4 REP 1 612a 613a
20 AQUIN *S mma The l g a* PART I II Q 64 4 P 3 69b-70a Q 87 A 4 RE 2 188b d T II II Q 20 A REP 2 475d-476c Q 24 A 8 495b-496a PART I Q 1 A 2 REP 2 703a 704d Q 2 NS 710a 711c Q 3 A 1 REP 723b-724 R L Q 92 A 1 R 6 12 1025c 1032b
23 H s *Let athan* PAR II 162b-c
31 D CA s *M d tat* 3 86a 88d / *Ob ject s a d Replie* 112a d 123c d O III 132d 133
31 S I OZ *Et ics* P R D F 2 455 D F 6-7 355b R 8 14 356d 360 D 15 C O P O 7 360b-363 P O 21 DEMONST 364a PR 29 366b- PRO 3 35 367 369 A T 1 R 4 373d 74c
32 M TO *P ad se Lost* R [1 1] 211a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 231 233 213b 216a 469 256a
34 NEWTON *Principl s* BK III GENERAL SCHOL, 370
35 LOCKE *Huma Understa d ng* BK II CH XV SECT 2 4 162 163b SECT 12 165b c CH XVII SECT 1 167d 168a SECT 16 17 172a-c ECT 20 172d 173c C I XXIII SECT 33 36 212d 213d BK III CH VI SECT 11 271b-d
35 B RKELEY *Human Kno ledge* SECT 117 436a
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 188c 192c d 201b c 05a b / *Pract cal Reason* 325d 326a 344b-c / *Judgement* 590b d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 237d 238a 246b-c

4f The perfect on or goodness of God

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 5:48 / *Luke* 18 19
7 PLATO *Republic* BK II 321d 323a / *Timaeus* 447d 448a / *Theaetetus* 530b 531a
8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 7 602a 603b
9 ARI TOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 12 347a b
12 EPI TETUS *Discourses* BK II CH 8 146a 147c
16 KEPLER *Harmo ies of the W o ld* 1009a
18 AU STIN *Co f ssions* BK I par 13 4a BK III par 12 16b BK IV par 24 25b-c BK V par 19-2 32b-33a BK VII par 1-7 43b-45d esp par 4 44b-45d par 16-23 48c 50c BK X par 38 81 BK XI par 6 90c d BK XII par 15 103b BK XIII par 1-5 110d 111d par 53 124d 125a c / *City of God* BK XI CH 10 327d 328d K XII CH 1 3 342b d 344b I 8-9 346d 348b / *Chr st an D ctrine* BK I CH 5 7 625d 626c C 3 3 633b d
19 AQUIN S *S mma Theol g ca* PART I Q 2 A 1 REP 2 10d 11d A 3 AN and RE 1 12c 14a Q 3 A 1 ANS 14b-15b A 2 A S 15c 16a 7 REP 2 19a-c Q 4 20c 23b Q 6 28b 30d Q 3 A 2 S 63 64d A 11 REP 2 73c 74b Q 18 A 3 106b-107 Q 19 A 1 RE 1 3 108d 109c Q 2 A 1 REP 4 124b-125b Q 51 A 1 RE 3 275b 276b Q 61 A 3 REP 2 316a d Q 62 A 8 NS and REP 1 2 323c 324a Q 66 A 1 CONTR RY 343d 345c Q 84 A A S a d REP 3 442b-443c Q 91 A 1 A 484a-485b Q 100 A NS 521c 522b Q 103 528a 534b pass m Q 104 A 3 EP 2 537b d A 4 ANS 538a-c Q 105 4 ANS 541 542 A 5 ANS 542a 543b P T II Q 1 A 4 EP 1 612 613a Q 2 4 RE 1 618a d Q 9 A 6 662 -d Q 18 A 1 ANS 694a d Q 19 A 4 705b-c Q 22 A REP 1 721c 722c Q 24 A 3 REP 2 728c 729c
20 AQUINAS *St mma Theologica* PART I I Q 61 A 5 S 58b-59d Q 64 A 4 N and R P 3 69b 70 RT II II Q 9 A 4 R P 425d-426c Q 13 A 1 N 444b-445a Q 17 A 1 ANS 45 -d Q 3 A 4 ANS 485d-486b Q 34 A 1 AN 559a-c Q 39 A 2 REP 3 575b 576b Q 184 A 2 ANS 629d 630d PA T II Q 1 A 1 AN 701d 703 Q 23 A 1 AN 833a d RT III SUPPL Q 91 A REP 4 10 1017 1020c Q 99 A 2 RE 3 1081a d

(4 *The divine nature in itself the divine attributes 4f The perfection or goodness of God*)

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XXVIII [91-93] 97a PARADISE VII [64-66] 115d XIX [40-90] 135c 136a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 300c d
31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 52a d 53d / *Meditations* I 76d 77c III-IV 86a 93a / *Objections and Replies* 123d 124c DEF VIII 130d 142c
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 33 SCHOL 2 367d 369a PART V PROP 17 DEMONST 456c d
33 PASCAL *Pensees* 580 276b
34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III GENERAL SCHOL 370a 371a passim
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH VI SECT 11-12 271b 272b
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VIII DIV 78 81 485c 487a SECT XI DIV 106-107 499b-500b passim DIV 113 502a b
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 81b c
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 205a b / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 263a b / *Practical Reason* 307a d 325d 326a 342c 345a c 351b-352c / *Judgement* 592a c

4g The intellect of God

8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 7 [1072b 14-29] 602d 603a CH 9 605a d
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK X CH 8 [1178b8 23] 433b c
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 14 120d 121c BK II CH 8 146a
17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR IX CH 1 65d 66d / *Fifth Ennead* 208a 251d esp TR V-VI 228b 237d TR IX 246c 251d
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK VIII CH 6 268d 269c BK XI CH 21 333a d BK XII CH 17 353a 354a BK XXII CH 29 614b / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 13 627d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 1 REP 2-3 14b 15b Q 14 AA 1-4 75d 79a Q 18 A 3 106b 107c Q 19 A 1 ANS 108d 109c A REP 4 109c 110b A 3 REP 6 110b 111c A 4 ANS and REP 4 111c 112c Q 26 A 2 150c 151a Q 7 A 3 REP 3 155c 156a Q 46 A 2 REP 3 253a 255a Q 50 A 1 ANS 269b 270a Q 54 A 2 ANS 285d 286c Q 55 A 1 ANS and REP 3 289a d A 3 ANS 291a d Q 57 A 1 ANS 295a d A 2 ANS 295d 297a Q 59 A 2 ANS 307c 308b Q 79 A 1 ANS 414a d A 2 ANS 414d 416a A 4 ANS 417a 418c A 10 REP 2 423d 424d Q 84 A 2 ANS 442b-443c Q 85 A 5 ANS 457d 458d Q 87 A 1 ANS 465a 466c A 3 ANS 467b 468a Q 89 A 1 ANS 473b-475a Q 105 A 1 REP 2 538d 539c A 3 ANS 540c 541b Q 116 A 1 ANS 592d 593d PART I-II Q 1 A 4 REP 1 612a 613a Q 19 A 4 ANS and REP 3 705b c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 51 A 1 REP 2 12b 13c Q 61 A 5 ANS 58b-59d Q 93 A 1 215b d 216c PART III Q 6 A 2 A 1 741c 742a
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 15 149a
31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 228a-c
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 17 SCHOL 362 363c PROP 21 364a c PROP 32 COROL 2 367b PROP 33 SCHOL 2 368b c PART II PROP 1 373d 374a PROP 3-6 374a 375a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH I, SECT 10 123b CH X SECT 9 143a c
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 33a d 52c 53b / *Practical Reason* 303b 304a 344b c 350c 351b / *Judgement* 590b d 592a c 600d 601c 610b-613a c

4h The happiness and glory of God

OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 15 1-21 33 13 23 / *I Chronicles* 16 23 27 29 11 13—(D) *I Paralipomenon* 16 23 27 29 11 13 / *Psalms* 8 19 24 57 5-11 96 3-6 104 1 113 4 138 5 145 11-12—(D) *Psalms* 8 18 23 56 5 11 95 3-6 103 1 112 4 137 5 144 11 12 / *Isaiah* 6 1-4 42 8—(D) *Isaias* 6 1 4 42 8
APOCRYPHA *Judith* 16 13—(D) OT *Judith* 16 16 / *Rest of Esther* 13 12-14—(D) OT *Esther* 13 12-14 / *Song of Three Children* 28 31—(D) OT *Daniel* 3 51 53
NEW TESTAMENT *Mark* 8 38 / *John* 5 44 8 54 / *Hebrews* 2 10 / *I Peter* 4 7 11 / *II Peter* 1 16-18 / *Revelation* 5 9-14 7 9-12 21—(D) *Apocalypse* 5 9-14 7 9-12 21
8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 7 [1072b 13-29] 602d 603a
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VII CH 14 [1154b20-31] 406c BK X CH 8 [1178b8 23] 433b c
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XIII par 4 111c / *City of God* BK V CH 14 220a d BK VIII CH 6 268d 269c BK XII CH 17 353a 354a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 26 150a 152a c Q 62 A 3 REP 3 319c 320b A 4 ANS 320b 321b Q 63 A 3 327b 328b Q 65 A 2 ANS 340b 341b Q 70 A 2 ANS 364b 365a Q 73 A 2 REP 3 371b d PART I II Q 2 A 2 REP 2 616d 617b A 3 ANS and REP 1 617b 618a Q 3 A 1 REP 1 622c 623a A 2 REP 1-4 623a 624b A 8 REP 628d 629c Q 5 A 3 REP 638b 639a A 7 ANS 642a d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q 8 A 4 ANS 759b d Q 16 A 4 REP 2 799b 800b Q 6 A 1 REP 845b 846a PART III SUPPL Q 71 A 8 REP 1 909d 910d Q 92 A 1 REP 5 1025c 1032b
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE I [1-9] 106a XXXIII [46-145] 156c 157d
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART V PROP 17 456c d PROP 35-36 460d-461c
32 MILTON *Upon the Circumcision* 12b 13a / *Paradise Lost* BK III [56-415] 136b 144b
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 233 216a

4 KANT *Practical Reason* 347d 348b / *Judgement* 594d [fn 1]

5 The divine nature in relation to the world or creatures

7 PLATO *Republic* BK II 321d 322d / *Timaeus* 447b-458b 465d-466a

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK VII CH 1 326a-327b BK VIII CH 1-6 334a 346b

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VII CH 14 [1154b 0-31] 406c BK X CH 8 [1178b3 27] 433b c

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 22 195 b BK I CH 11 240d 241a

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK II SECT 4 257b BK V SECT 8 269d 270b BK VI SECT 40-46 277d 2 8d

16 KEPLER *Harmonies of the World* 1017b-1018a 1071b

17 PLOTINUS *Fourth Ennead* TR III CH 13 149b d

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 4 2a par 1 3b c BK I par 25 25c BK IV par 31 BK V par 1 26c 27b BK VII par 1-8 43b-45d par 16-23 48c 50c BK X par 38 81a BK XI par 6 90c d BK XI par 19 115c d / *City of God* BK VII CH 29-3 261a 262a BK VIII CH I 10 264b d 271d BK X CH 1 2 298b d 300a BK XI CH 24 335c 336a / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 9- 0 627a b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I QQ 14 25 75 150a Q 84 A 2 ANS 442b 443c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE I [1 3] 106a [97 142] 107b-d II [112 148] 109 b X [1 27] 120b c III [52-87] 126a b XIX [40-90] 135c 136a XX [1 0-120] 148b c XXVIII 148d 150b XXIII [76- 45] 157a d

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 428c d

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 38a

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART 1 52a d / *Objections and Replies* 123 d 214a d 229c d

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VII [1 2 436] 241 b

34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III GENERAL SCHOL, 369b 371 / *Optics* BK III 542a 543a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XVII 167d 168a BK CH V SECT 1 12 271b 272b

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 57 423d 424a

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT XI DIV 0 499b-c 3 502a d

37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 186c-d 187d 188a

38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK IV 439a

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 81b-c 183 307b-c 346b-347a

42 KANT *Practical Reason* 303b-304a 321b c 32 d 326a 327d 328b 342 344b-c 345 c 347d 348b 350c 351 35 a-c / *Judgement* 592

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK V 120d 121c

5a God as first and as exemplar cause the relation of divine to natural causation

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 1 2 7 4 / *Nehemiah* 9 6—(D) *II Esdras* 9 6 / *Job* 9 1-9 12 26 7 14 28 24 27 36 24 42 2 / *Psalms* 8 3 33 6-9 65 5 13 74 16-17 89 11 12 95 4-5 96 5 102 25 27 104 107 23 30 115 3 119 73 121 2 136 5-9 146 5-6 14 148—(D) *Psalms* 8 4 32 6-9 64 6-14 3 16-17 88 12 13 94 4-5 95 5 101 26-28 103 106 23 30 113 3 118 73 1 02 135 5-9 145 5-6 146-148 / *Proverbs* 3 19 / *Isaiah* 40 26-28 42 5 44 24 45 7 12 18 48 13 51 13 65 17—(D) *Isaias* 40 26-28 42 5 44 24 45 7 12 18 48 13 51 13 65 17 / *Jeremiah* 1 12 27 5 31 35 51 15 16—(D) *Jeremias* 1 12 27 5 31 35 51 15 16 / *Amos* 5 8 / *Zechariah* 12 1—(D) *Zacharias* 12 1 / *Malachi* 2 10—(D) *Malachias* 2 10

APOCRYPHA *Judith* 16 14—(D) OT *Judith* 16 17 / *Rest of Esther* 13 10—(D) OT *Esther* 13 10 / *Wisdom of Solomon* 1 14 2 23 9 1 2 11 17—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 1 14 2 23 9 1 2 11 18 / *Ecclesiasticus* 18 1 24 8-9 33 10-13 39 16-35 43—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 18 1 4 12 14 33 10-14 39 21-41 43 / *Bel and Dragon* 5—(D) OT *Daniel* 14 4 / *II Maccabees* 7 23 28—(D) OT *II Machabees* 7 23 28

NEW TESTAMENT *John* 1 1 3 / *Acts* 4 9-50 14 14 17 17 22 28 / *Colossians* 1 16-17 / *Hebrews* 1 10-12 2 10 3 4 11 3 / *II Peter* 3 5 / *Revelation* 4 11 10 6 14 7—(D) *Apocalypse* 4 11 1 6 14 7

7 PLATO *Republic* BK X 427c 429c / *Timaeus* 447a-448b / *Sophist* 577d 578b / *Statesman* 58 a 589c / *Laws* BK X 758b 765c esp 762b 765c

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK VIII CH 1-6 334a 346b / *Generation and Corruption* BK II CH 10 [336b25 34] 438d [337a15 23] 439a b / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 2 [983a7-9] 501b BK XII CH 4 [1070b22 35] 600b CH 5 [10 1 30 36] 601a

9 ARISTOTLE *Motion of Animals* CH 3 [699 11]-4 [700 5] 234 235

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK V [146-194] 63 -c

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 14 120d 121c

16 PTOLEMY *Almagest* BK I 5a b

16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK I 853b 854a / *Harmonies of the World* 1017b-1018a 1025a b 1049b-1050 1061a

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 10 3b-c par 12 4a BK VII par 16-23 48c 50c BK XI par 4 11 90a 92b BK XII par -9 99c 101c par 14 40 102b 110 esp par 38 108d 109a BK XIII 5 6-48 112a 124 / *City of God* BK VII CH 9-31 261a 262a BK VIII CH 1 264b d 265b CH 4-6 66d 269c CH 9 270d 271 BK XI CH 4 24 324a 336a BK XII 342b d 360a c BK XIX CH 13 519a 520 BK XXI CH 4 562a

(4 *The divine nature in itself: the divine attributes. 4f The perfection or goodness of God.*)

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XXVIII [91-93] 97a PARADISE VII [64-66] 115d XIX [40-90] 135c 136a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 300c d
31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 52a d 53d / *Meditations* I 76d 77c III-IV 86a 93a / *Objections and Replies* 123d 124c DEF VIII 130d 142c
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 33 SCHOL 2 367d 369a PART V PROP 17 DEMONST 456c d
33 PASCAL *Pensees* 580 276b
34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III GENERAL SCHOL 370a 371a passim
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH VI SECT II 12 271b 272b
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VIII DIV 78 81 485c 487a SECT XI DIV 106-107 499b-500b passim DIV 113 502a b
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 81b c
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 205a b / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 263a b / *Practical Reason* 307a d 325d 326a 342c 345a c 351b-352c / *Judgement* 592a c

4g The intellect of God

8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 7 [1072b 14-29] 602d 603a CH 9 605a d
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK X CH 8 [1178b8 23] 433b c
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 14 120d 121c BK II CH 8 146a
17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR IX CH I 65d 66d / *Fifth Ennead* 208a 251d esp TR V VI 228b 237d TR IX 246c 251d
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK VIII CH 6 268d 269c BK XI CH 21 333a d BK XII CH 17 353a 354a BK XXII CH 29 614b / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 13 627d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A I REP 2-3 14b 15b Q 14 AA 1-4 75d 79a Q 18 A 3 106b 107c Q 19 A I ANS 108d 109c A 2 REP 4 109c 110b A 3 REP 6 110b 111c A 4 ANS and REP 4 111c 112c Q 26 A 2 150c 151a Q 27 A 3 REP 3 155c 156a Q 46 A 2 REP 3 253a 255a Q 50 A I ANS 269b 270a Q 54 A 2 ANS 285d 286c Q 55 A I ANS and REP 3 289a d A 3 ANS 291a d Q 57 A I ANS 295a d A 2 ANS 295d 297a Q 59 A 2 ANS 307c 308b Q 79 A I ANS 414a d A 2 ANS 414d-416a A 4 ANS 417a 418c A 10 REP 2 423d 424d Q 84 A 2 ANS 442b-443c Q 85 A 5 ANS 457d 458d Q 87 A I ANS 465a 466c A 3 ANS 467b 468a Q 89 A I ANS 473b-475a Q 105 A I REP 2 538d 539c A 3 ANS 540c 541b Q 116 A I ANS 592d 593d PART I II Q I A 4 REP I 612a 613a Q 19 A 4 ANS and REP 3 705b c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 51 A I REP 2 12b 13c Q 61 A 5 ANS 58b 59d Q 93 A I 215b d 216c PART III Q 6 A 2 ANS 741c 742a
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 15 149a
31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 228a c
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 17 SCHOL 362c 363c PROP 21 364a c PROP 32 COROL 2 36 b PROP 33 SCHOL 2 368b-c PART II PROP I 373d 374a PROP 3-6 374a 375a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH I SECT 10 123b CH X SECT 9 143a c
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 33a d 52c 53b / *Practical Reason* 303b 304a 344b-c 350c 351b / *Judgement* 590b d 592a c 600d 601c 610b-613a c

4h The happiness and glory of God

OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 15 1 21 33 13 23 / *I Chronicles* 16 3 27 29 11 13—(D) *I Paralipomenon* 16 23 -7 29 11 13 / *Psalms* 8 19 24 57 5-11 96 3-6 104 1 113 4 138 5 145 11-12—(D) *Psalms* 8 18 23 56 5-11 95 3-6 103 1 112 4 137 5 144 11 12 / *Isaiah* 6 1-4 42 8—(D) *Isaias* 6 1 4 42 8
APOCRYPHA *Judith* 16 13—(D) OT *Judith* 16 16 / *Rest of Esther* 13 12-14—(D) OT *Esther* 13 12-14 / *Song of Three Children* 28-31—(D) OT *Daniel* 3 51-53
NEW TESTAMENT *Mark* 8 38 / *John* 5 44 8 54 / *Hebrews* 2 10 / *I Peter* 4 7 11 / *II Peter* 1 16-18 / *Revelation* 5 9-14 7 9-12 21—(D) *Apocalypse* 5 9-14 7 9-1 21
8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 7 [1072b 13-29] 602d 603a
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VII CH 14 [1154b 0-31] 406c BK X CH 8 [1178b8 23] 433b c
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XIII par 4 111c / *City of God* BK V CH 14 220a d BK VIII CH 6 268d 269c BK XII CH 17 353a 354a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 26 150a 152a c Q 62 A 3 REP 3 319c 320b A 4 ANS 320b 321b Q 63 A 3 327b 328b Q 65 A 2 ANS 340b 341b Q 70 A 2 ANS 364b 365a Q 73 A 2 REP 3 371b d PART I II Q 2 A 2 REP 616d 617b A 3 ANS and REP 1 617b 618a Q 3 A I REP 1 622c 623a A 2 REP 1 4 623a 624b A 8 REP 628d 629c Q 5 A 3 REP 2 638b 639a A 7 ANS 642a d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q 8 A 4 ANS 759b d Q 16 A 4 REP 2 799b 800b Q 26 A I REP 845b 846a PART III SUPPL Q 71 A 8 REP 1 909d 910d Q 92 A I REP 5 1025c 1032b
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE I [1-9] 106a XXXIII [46 145] 156c 157d
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART V PROP 17 456c d PROP 35-36 460d 461c
32 MILTON *Upon the Circumcision* 12b 13a / *Paradise Lost* BK III [56-415] 136b 144b
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 233 216a

5 The power of God: the divine omnipotence

(5 *The divine nature in relation to the world or creatures 5a God as first and as exemplar cause the relation of divine to natural causation*)

563c CH 7-8 565d 568d BK XXII CH 2 587b 588a / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 32 633c d CH 34 634b c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2 A 3 ANS and REP 2 12c 14a Q 3 A 1 ANS 14b 15b A 2 ANS 15c 16a A 4 ANS 16d 17c A 5 REP 2 17c 18b A 6 ANS 18c 19a A 7 ANS and REP 1 19a c A 8 ANS and REP 1 2 19d 20c Q 4 20c 23b esp A 3 22b 23b Q 18 AA 3 4 106b 108c Q 26 A 4 151c 152a c Q 51 A 1 REP 3 275b 276b Q 52 A 2 279b 280a Q 56 A 2 ANS 292d 294a Q 60 A 1 REP 2-3 310b 311a Q 65 339a 343c Q 74 A 3 REP 1 375a 377a c Q 75 A 1 REP 1 378b 379c Q 76 A 5 REP 1 394c 396a Q 83 A 1 REP 3 436d 438a Q 84 A 2 ANS and REP 3 442b-443c A 4 REP 1 444d 446b Q 88 A 3 REP 2 472c 473a Q 89 A 1 REP 3 473b 475a Q 92 A 1 REP 1 488d 489d A 2 REP 2 489d-490c A 4 ANS 491b d Q 93 492a 501c Q 94 A 3 ANS 504a 505a QQ 103 105 528a 545b Q 116 592d 595c PART I II Q 1 A 2 610b 611b Q 2 A 3 ANS 617b 618a Q 6 A 1 REP 3 644d 646a Q 9 A 6 662a d Q 10 A 4 665d 666a c Q 12 A 5 ANS 672a c Q 17 A 8 REP 2 692a c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 65 A 3 ANS 72d 73d Q 66 A 1 REP 3 75b 76b Q 68 A 1 ANS 87c 89c Q 79 A 1 REP 3 156b 157b A 2 ANS and REP 1 157b 158a Q 80 A 1 ANS and REP 2 3 159d 160c Q 85 A 6 182d 184a Q 93 A 1 215b d 216c Q 100 A 6 REP 2 257c 258c Q 102 A 3 ANS 272b 276c Q 109 A 1 ANS 338b 339c Q 110 A 1 REP 2 347d 349a Q 111 A 2 ANS 352d 353d PART II II Q 18 A 4 ANS 464c-465a PART III Q 2 A 5 REP 3 715a 716b Q 5 A 3 REP 2 737d 739a Q 13 A 3 CONTRARY 782b 783b PART III SUPPL Q 74 A 2 REP 3 926c 927c Q 75 A 3 938a 939d Q 88 A 1 ANS 1000d 1001d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE I [103 108] 107b II [112 148] 109a b XXVII [100-1 0] 148b c XXIX [10-36] 150b c

22 CHAUCER *Knight's Tale* [2987-3040] 209a 210a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 78d 79a 79d 80a PART II 113b-c 149d PART III 185d 241c 242a PART IV 272b c

28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences* FOURTH DAY 245b c

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 390d 391a 406b-407b 415b-417a esp 416b c 426a 429b 443a c 490d 493a

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 2c d 4b c

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART V 55d 56a / *Meditations* III 81d 89a esp 84b 85a 87b 88c / *Objections and Replies* 110b 112a 158b 161d 213b 214d 229c d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 16 18 362a 363c PROP 24 29 365a 366c PROP 33 SCHOL 2 367d 369a PART II PROP 7 375a c PROP 10 SCHOL 376d 377a

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [80-134] 137a 138a [630-735] 149a 151b BK V [468 474] 185b BK VII 217a 231a esp [162 169] 220b [601-640] 230a 231a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 77 186a

34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III GENERAL SCHOL 369b 370a / *Optics* BK III 528b-529a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 2 178c CH XXIII SECT 28 211b d BK IV CH III SECT 28-29 322a 323a

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 25 33 417d-419a esp SECT 3 418d-419a SECT 36 419c d SECT 51-53 422d-423a SECT 57 423d 424a SECT 60-75 424b-427d SECT 105 109 433b-434b SECT 141 441a b SECT 146 153 442a-444a esp SECT 150 442d-443b

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VII DIV 54-57 474b-475d

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 140b d 145c 177b 179b 187a 191d 205a 209a 236b 240b esp 239a-c / *Practical Reason* 332d 337a c esp 334b 335c / *Judgement* 569a 570a 581b-582c 592c 596c 597d 599d 600d 601c 608b 609a 610b 613a c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 156d 157b PART I 245d 246c PART IV 368d 369a c

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 239d 243c d

5b God as final cause the motion of all things toward God

OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 33 13 23 / *Deuteronomy* 4 29 / *I Chronicles* 28 9—(D) *I Paralipomenon* 28 9 / *II Chronicles* 15 2 4 12 15—(D) *II Paralipomenon* 15 2-4 12 15 / *Psalms* 24 6 27 4-9 42 63 70 4 73 25 28 84 119 10—(D) *Psalms* 23 6 26 4-9 41 62 69 5 72 25 28 83 118 10 / *Proverbs* 16 4 / *Isaiah* 26 8 9 43 7 58 2—(D) *Isaias* 26 8-9 43 7 58 2

APOCRYPHA *Wisdom of Solomon* 1 1 13 1 7—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 1 1 13 1 7

NEW TESTAMENT *Romans* 3 10-11 / *Colossians* 1 16-17 / *Hebrews* 2 10 / *Revelation* 4 11—(D) *Apocalypse* 4 11

8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 7 [1072a 23 b4] 602b c

17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR II CH 2 41a-c / *Fifth Ennead* TR VIII CH 7 243b c

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 1 1a par 5 2b BK IV par 15 19 23a 24b BK V par 1 2 27a c BK X par 29-33 78d 80b BK XIII par 3 111b c / *City of God* BK VIII CH 4 266d 267c CH 8-9 270a 271a BK X CH 1-3 298b d 301a BK XII CH 1 342b d 343c BK XIX CH 13 519a 520a / *Christian Doctrine* BK I 62 a 636a c esp CH 3 5 625b 626a CH 9 11 627a c CH 22 23 629b 630c CH 34 634b c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 1 A 1 ANS 5a b Q 2 A 1 REP 1 10d 11d A 3 A 5

2f

13 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 3 1b-2a BK III par 10 15c-d BK VII par 4 36a b BK VII par 1 49a BK X, par 8-10 73b-74 / *City of God* BK VII CH 30 261b-d BK XII CH 17 353a 35

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 1 REP 1 15b-1 b 8 19d 20c Q 8 A 1 ANS and REP 1 3 34d 35c Q 18 A 4 10 d 108c Q 51 A 3, EP 3 2 a 2 8c Q 61 A REP 316a-d Q 90, A 1 A 3 480d-481d Q 103 A 2 529a 530a PART I-II Q A 8 REP 692a-c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE II [12 148] 109a b XII [55-66] 125a XIX [40-66] 135c-d XXVIII 148d 150b XXIX [127 145] 1 1c-d

31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 110b-112a 113c-d 158b-159a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH VI CT 11 2 271b-272b

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VII DIV 57 47a b

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 192c-d / *Practical Reason*, 334b-335b 342 / *Judgement* 566c-d 580c-d

f God's knowledge: the divine omniscience: the divine ideas

OLD TESTAMENT: *Deuteronomy* 31:19-21 / *I Samuel* 3 16—(D) *I Kings* 3 16 7 / *I Chronicles*, 8:9—(D) *I Paralipomenon*, 8:9 / *Job* 12:1 3 12 22 14 24:1 8:3 20-8 34:21 2, 4:2 3 / *Psalms* 33 3 1 44:20- 69:5 3 11 94:7 1 113:4-6 9 147:4-5, 5 18—(D) *Psalms* 32 3 13 43:2 2 68:6 1 93 1 4-6 38 46:4-5 4 4, 18 / *Proverbs*, 3:19- 0 5:21 3 34 16:2 4 2 / *Isaiah*, 29 1, 6 40 13 14:2 8 46:9-10 4 10-11—(D) *Isaias* 9 5 6 40 3 14-7 8 46:9- 4 0- / *Jeremiah* 1:5 16 4 1 1:9- 0 1 23:23 24—(D) *Jeremias* 1:5 6:4 7 17:9- 20 2 3:23-24

APOCRYPHA *Rest of Esther* 3:2 14 15 19—(D) OT *Esther* 3:7 4 14 19 / *Wisdom of Solomon* 6:1 —(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 1:6- / *Ecclesiasticus*, 1 8 9 16 19 1 3 8- 39:19-20 4:18-2 — (D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 9-20 16 6-0 17 3 23:2 9 39:24 4 18- / *Susanna* 42 44—(D) OT *Daniel*, 13:42 44

NEW TESTAMENT *John* 1:1 3 6:64-70-71 4:6 / *Romans* 8:2 33 36 / *I Corinthians* 1:2 6-16 3:18- / *Colossians* 2:2 3 / *Hebrews* 4 13 / *I John* 3:18-20

7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 140d / *Timaeus*, 465d / *Parmenides* 489d-490d / *Laws*, BK X 766d 6

8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK I CH 2 [98 8-983] | 501a b BK XII CH 7 [4 9] 603d-603 CH 9 605a-d CH 1 [107 9-4] 606c

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 14 120d 121 12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK I SECT 44 2 8b

17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR IX 136a 138a,c / *Fifth Ennead* TR I CH 4 209d 210c CH 6-7 211a 212 TR I I CH 8-13 219d 224b TR IV 1 2 TR IX CH 14 22 b-251d

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XII par 18 103a b BK XIII par 19 115c-d / *City of God*, BK V CH 9-10 213b-216c BK VII CH 30 261b-d BK XI CH 10 327d 328d CH 21 333a-d BK XII CH 17 18 353a 354d BK XX CH 15 543d 544b BK XXII CH 58 b-588a / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 9-10 62 a b C 1 13 627d CH 34 634b-c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 1 REP 1 14b-15b A 6 REP 1 18c 19a Q 4 A 2 REP 3 21b-22b QQ 14 15 75c 94a Q 18 A 4 107d 108c Q 19, A 3 REP 6 110b-111c Q 34 A 3 A 3 and R P 3 4 188b-189a Q 44 A 3 240b-241a Q 55 A 1 ANS and REP 3 289a d A 2 A and REP 1 289d 290d A 3 ANS and REP 1 291a-d Q 56 A 2, ANS 292d 294a Q 5 1 ANS 295a-d A ANS 295d 297a A 3 ANS 297b-298a A 4 ANS 298a 299a Q 62 A 9, ANS 324a 325b Q 63 A REP 331c 332b Q 9, A 10 REP 423d-424d Q 84 A A 5 442b-443c A 4 R P 1 444d-446b A 5 446c-447c Q 85 A 4 ANS 457a-d Q 86, A 4 A 5 463d 464d Q 8 A 1 ANS 465a-466c A 3 ANS 467b-468a Q 89, A 1 ANS 473b-4 5a Q 93 A 4 ANS 494c-49 b A 8 ANS 499b-500c Q 105 A 3 540c 541b Q 10 AA 3 550b-551c P T I-II Q 1 A 4, REP 1 612a-613a Q A 3 A 5 617b-618a Q 3 A 5 RE 1 626b-62 Q 14 A 1 REP 2 677b-678a Q 40 A 3 REP 1 94c 795a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 51 A 1 REP 2 12b-13c Q 61 A 5, ANS 58b-59d Q 9, A 1 A 156b-157b Q 91 A 3 REP 1 209d 210c Q 93 A 1 215b,d 216c Q 100 A 9, ANS 261b-262b Q 102 A 1 ANS 270c 271b Q 11 A REP 2 349a d PART II II Q 2, A 6 R 3 393b-396a Q 9, A 1 REP 1 423c-424b Q A 4 R P 1 441b-442b Q 33 A REP 1 556a 5 7d PT III, Q 3 8 ANS 729b-730b Q 5 A 4 ANS 739a 740b Q A 12 AN 754c 755c Q 13 A 1 R 2 780a 781b Q 18 4 REP 1 813a-d Q 2 A 1 RE 823d 824d Q 60 A 4 ANS 849c-850b P RT III SUPPL, Q A ANS and R P 5 917 919a A 2 REP 4 919a 920c Q 84 A 2, ANS 984c 985d Q 88 A 3 A 5 1002d 1004b Q 91 A 3 A 5 1020d 1022c Q 9 A 1 EP 2 1025c 1032b Q 94 A 1 REP 2 1040d 1041b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE VIII [94 11] 118a XV [49-63] 128d 129a XVII [1 45] 132b-c XX 2 [1 3 108] 136d 14

22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida* BK IV STANZA 135- 54 106b-108b / *Nun's Priest's Tale* [15 36-56] 456b-45 a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan*, PART II 162

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 17b-c / *Novum Organum* BK APH 23 108c APH 24 133c-d BK II APH 15 1 9a

(5 *The divine nature in relation to the world or creatures 5c The power of God the divine omnipotence*)

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 160c 161a 162c
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 428c
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 17c 81a
31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 110b 112a 158b 159a 229a d
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 17 362b 363c PROP 33 SCHOL 2 PROP 35 367d 369a
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK II [106-225] 113b 116a BK III [372-415] 143b 144b BK VII [139-173] 220a 221a
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 654 292b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XV SECT 12 165b c CH XXI SECT 2 178c CH XXIII SECT 28 211b d BK III CH VI SECT 11-12 271b 272b BK IV CH X SECT 4 350a
35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 33 419a SECT 36 419c d SECT 152 443c d
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VII DIV 56 475a b
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 334a b
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 186c d
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 180b c 181b 192c d / *Practical Reason* 351b 352c / *Judgement* 504b d 592a c 594d [fn 1] 600d 601c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 156d 157b
54 FREUD *Civilization and Its Discontents* 790d

5*d* The immanence of God the divine omnipresence

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 28 15 / *Exodus* 20 24 -5,8 29 45-46 / *Leviticus* 26 11 12 / *Numbers* 5 1-3 / *Joshua* 3 10-11—(*D*) *Josue* 3 10-11 / *II Samuel* 7 1-13—(*D*) *II Kings* 7 1-13 / *I Kings* 6 11-13 8 12 13 26-30—(*D*) *III Kings* 6 11-13 8 12 13,26-30 / *I Chronicles* 17 1 12—(*D*) *I Paralipomenon* 17 1-12 / *Psalms* 68 7-8 16-18 119 151 139 esp 139 7-12 145 18-19—(*D*) *Psalms* 67 8-9 17 19 118 151 138 esp 138 7-12 144 18-19 / *Proverbs* 15 3 / *Isaiah* 50 7-9—(*D*) *Isaias* 50 7-9 / *Jeremiah* 23 24—(*D*) *Jeremias* 23 24 / *Amos* 9 1-4 / *Zechariah* 8 3—(*D*) *Zacharias* 8 3
APOCRYPHA *Wisdom of Solomon* 1 7 1 1—(*D*) OT *Book of Wisdom* 1 7 1-1
NEW TESTAMENT *John* 1 10 / *Acts* 7 49 17 2-29 / *Romans* 11 36 / *I Corinthians* 6 15 20 / *II Corinthians* 6 14-18 / *Ephesians* 4 6 / *Colossians* 1 16-19 2 8-13 / *II Timothy* 1 14 / *Hebrews* 13 5 / *I John* 4 4 16
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 14 120d 121c
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK II SECT 1 256b d BK VII SECT 9 280b c
17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR IX CH 16 75c d / *Fifth Ennead* TR VIII CH 7 242d 243c
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 2-3 1b 2a BK III par 10 15b d par 18 18b BK IV par 26 25c d par 31 26c 27a BK VI par 4 36a b BK VII par 1-2 43b 44a par 7 45a d par 21 49d 50a BK X par 8 10 73b 74a BK XII par 7 100d 101a par 21 103d 104a / *City of God* BK VII CH 6 248a CH 30 261b d BK X CH 14 307c 308a BK XII CH 5 358b 359a / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 1 627c d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 8 34c 38c Q 51 A 3 REP 3 277a 278 Q 52 A 1 279b 280a Q 90 A 1 480d 481d PART I-II Q 17 A 8 REP 2 692a c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II II Q 6 A 2 REP 3 511a d PART III SUPPL, Q 84 A 2 REP 1 984c 985d
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE XXXIII [76-93] 157a
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 428c d
31 DESCARTES *Meditations* VI 99c
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I 355a 372d esp DEF 3-5 355b AXIOM 1-2 355c d PROP 2-8 355d 357d PROP 10 SCHOL 358a b PROP 13 COROL PROP 18 359d 363c PROP 22 23 364d 365a PROP 25 365b PROP 28-31 365c 367a PROP 33 367b-369a PART II PROP 1-11 373d 377c
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK XI [334 346] 306b
34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III GENERAL SCHOL, 370a 371a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XIII SECT 18 152a c CH XV SECT 2 4 162c 163b
35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 149 150 442d 443b SECT 155 444b c
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 192c d / *Practical Reason* 334b 335b 351b 352c / *Judgement* 580c d 592a c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 156d 157b PART I 224a b 227d 228a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK V 217c 218a BK XIV 608a b BK XV 631a c
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI 153b d

5*e* The transcendence of God the divine aseity

OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 15 11 / *I Samuel* 2:2—(*D*) *I Kings* 2 2 / *I Chronicles* 17 20—(*D*) *I Paralipomenon* 17 20 / *Job* 11 7-9 33 12 35 6 7 36 2 -42 3 / *Psalms* 89 6-8 97 9 99 2 113 4 5—(*D*) *Psalms* 88 7-9 96 9 98 2 112 4-5 / *Isaiah* 29 16 40 12 26 45 7 46 5 9 55 8-9—(*D*) *Isaias* 29 16 40 12 26 45 9 46 5 9 55 8-9 / *Daniel* 4 35—(*D*) *Daniel* 4 32
APOCRYPHA *Wisdom of Solomon* 11 22 12 12—(*D*) OT *Book of Wisdom* 11 23 12 12 / *Ecclesiasticus* 16 20-21 18 4 7—(*D*) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 16 20 21 18 2-6
NEW TESTAMENT *John* 3 31 / *Acts* 7 47-50 / *Romans* 9 19 21 / *Ephesians* 1 19 23 4 6 / *I Timothy* 6 15 16
8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 10 [1075a 12 16] 605d
9 ARISTOTLE *Motion of Animals* CH 3 [699a 11]-CH 4 [700a 5] 234a 235a

3 16– 1 1 3 3› 14:21 15 9–16 17:21 26 / *Romans* 2 4 5 › 8 28 39 / *II Corinthia s* 13 11 / *Gala.ians* 2 20 / *Ephesians* 3 11 21 5 1 2 / *I Tim thy* 1 14 / *Titus* 3 3 7 / *He br s* 12 6 / *I Joh* 3 4 / *Revelation* 3 19–21 —(D) *Apocalypse* 3 19–21

7 PL TO *Rep blic* BK II 321d 322d / *Timaeus* 447c-448a

8 ARISTOTLE *Ge er t on and Corruption* BK II CH 10 [336b25 34] 438d

12 EPI TETUS *Discours s* BK II CH 8 146 147c

14 PLUT RC I *Numa Pomp li s* 50d 51c

16 KEPLER *Harmo es of the World* 1049b-1050b 1071b

17 PLOTI US *Si th Enne d* TR IX CH 9 358d 359c

18 AUG STINE *C nf ssions* K I par 7 2c d par 31 8d 9a BK V par 2 27b-c BK VII par 16–23 48c 50c BK XI par 6 90c d BK XII par 18 103 b K III pa 1–5 110d 111d / *City of G d* BK VI CH 3 261d 262 K XI CH 21 24 333 336a K XII H 1 343b-c CH 9 347b-348b BK XI CH 13 519a 520 K XXI CH 15 6 572c 574a BK XXI CH 1 586b d 587b CH 24 609 612a / *Christ an Doctrine* BK I CH 31 3 633b-d

19 AQUI AS *S mma The l gica* RT I Q 2 A 3 REP 1 12c 14 Q 3 A 1 E 1 14b-15b Q 6 A 4 30b-d Q 13 2 ANS 63 64d Q 9 A 2 NS and E 2–4 109c 110b A 4 ANS and EP 1 111c 112c Q 20 119d 124a Q 21 A 3 ANS 126a-c Q 27 A 3 4 155c 156d Q 37 197c 200c Q 44 A 4 ANS 2 d R P 1 241a d Q 49 264d 268a c Q 50 A 1 NS 269b-270a A 3 A 3 272a 273b Q 51 A 1 R P 3 275b-276b Q 59, 306c 307b A 2 ANS 307c 308b Q 60 5 313b-314c Q 74 A 3 RE 3 4 375a 377a Q 5 5 RE 1 382 383b Q 82 5 RE 1 435c-436c Q 89 A 1 R P 3 473b-475a Q 9 1 AN 484a-485b Q 93 A 4 ANS 494c 495b 8 A 499b-500c Q 103 528a 534b passim Q 4 A 3 E 537b-d A 4 ANS 538a-c Q 105 A 4 S 541c 542a Q 106 A 4 S 548b-549a RT I Q 1 A 4 P 1 612 613a Q 2 A 4 REP 1 618a d 5 RE 3 618d 619c Q 3 REP 3 7 2d 723b Q 8 3 C NTRAR 742 -d

20 AQUI S *S mma Theologica* P RT 1 Q 64 4 S 69b-70a Q 65 A 5 NS and R P 3 74 75 Q 73 A 10 S 128a d Q 5 3 N 139b-d Q 9 156b-157b A 3 P 158a d 4 158d 159c Q 90 PREAM L 205 Q 9 A 1 213 214c Q 93 6 1 219d 220d Q 96 A 5 R 2 233d 234d Q 10 A 1 347d 349a A 4 N 350d 351d Q 11 A 3 REP 1 353d 354b 11 Q 6 A RE 2 414c-415 Q 9 1 R 3 465a d A 5 P 3 468b-469a Q 23 2 RE 1 2 483d-484d Q 4 A 490b d 3 ANS 491a d 8 S 495b-496a A 11 R 1 498b-499c 1 499c 500d Q 6 3 NS 511d 512c Q 3 1 534b-535 Q 189 A 10 REP 1 699a 00d P RT III Q 1 A 3 REP 3 704d 706a Q 4 A 5 REP 2 734b-d Q 23 A 1 REP 2 833 d Q 62 A 2 CONTRARY 859d 860c PA T III SUPPL Q 71 A 3 REP 1 903c 904d Q 89 A 3 REP 3 958b-959c

21 DANTE *D vine Comedy* HELL, I [37 40] 1b-c PURG TORY III [103 145] 57a-c XI [1 30] 68d 69a XV [40–81] 75d 76a XX III [91–96] 97a PARADISE II [112 148] 109a b VII [64 75] 115d 116a X [1 7] 120b-c XIII [52–87] 126a b XIX [86–90] 135d 136a XXVI [1–81] 145d 146c XXVII [97 120] 148b-c XXIX [13 36] 150b-c [127 145] 151c d XXXII [139]–XXXIII [145] 156 157d

22 CH UC R *Tro lus and Cress da* BK III STA ZA 1–7 54b-55b STANZ 250–253 87a b K V STA ZA 263 67 154b-155a

30 B CON *Ad a cement f Lear in* 80b 81a

31 DESCARTES *Objections and Repl es* 229c

31 SP NOZA *Ethics* P RT V PROP 17 COROL 456d PROP 19 457 PROP 35 36 460d-461c

32 M LTON *Parad se Lost* BK III [80–343] 137a 143a esp [135 166] 138b 139a BK IV [311 439] 161b-162 BK VII [499–518] 228a b

35 LOCKE *Human Understand g* BK I CH III SECT 12 115b 116a

35 BE KEL Y *Huma Kno ledge* INTRO SECT 3 405b-c SECT 154 444a b

37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 186c d

42 KANT *Practical Reaso* 345a c / *Judgement* 592 -c

44 BOS ELL *Johnson* 539d 540a

48 MELVILLE *Moby D ck*, 318b

51 TOLSTOY *War and P ce* BK VI 272a b

52 DO TOE SKY *Brothers Ka ama ov* BK II 24 -c BK V 120d 137c BK VI 153a d BK II 189a 191a c BK XI 313c 314d

5f Di ne just ce and mercy d ne rewards and p nishments

O D TESTAM ENT *Genesis* 3 1 4 16 6–9 11 1–9 18 17 19:29 22 1 19 esp 22 15 18 / *E odus* 12 20 3 7 32 esp 32:9–14 33 19 34 5 10 / *Levi cus* 26 / *N mbers* 11 14 16 21 5–9 25 / *Deuteronomy* 1 1 passim 8–32 pass m / *I Samu l* 15—(D) *I K ngs* 15 / *II Samuel* 6 6 8 24—(D) *II K gs* 6 6–8 24 / *I K ngs* 8 13 14:2 16—(D) *III Kings* 8 13 14.2 16 / *II K gs* 9 1 10 11—(D) *IV Kings* 9 1 10 11 / *I Chron les* 10 13 14 21—(D) *I Pa al pome no* 1 13 14 21 / *II Chro icles* 6 12 19:6–7 1 12 20 26 16–21—(D) *II Paral pomenon* 6 12 19 6–7 21 12 20 26 16– 1 / *Nehemiah* 9 5 38—(D) *II Esdras* 9 5 38 / *Job* / *Psalms* / *Proverbs* 11 20–21 2 22 22.2 23 / *Eccl si ast s* 1 14 / *Isaiah* passim esp 1 3 4 10 13 27 30 34 35 4 42 47 52–53 59 65–66—(D) *I a s* pa im esp 1 3 4 10 13 27 30 34 35 4 42 47 52–53 59 65–66 / *Jerem ah* pass m esp 3–8 15 19 21 5 29–3 33 46–52 —(D) *Jerem as* passum esp 3–8 15 19 24 25 29–31 33 46–52 / *Lament t o s* / *E ekiel*

(5 *The divine nature in relation to the world or creatures* 5f *God's knowledge the divine omniscience the divine ideas*)

31 DESCARTES *Meditations* III 86a / *Objections and Replies* 122a b

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 17 362b 363c PROP 21 DEMONST 364a c PROP 33 SCHOL 2 367d 369a PART II PROP 1 373d 374a PROP 3-4 374a c PROP 7 SCHOL PROP 8 375b 376a PROP 32 385c

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK II [188-193] 115b BK III [56-134] 136b 138a BK X [1 16] 274b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH X SECT 9 143a c CH XV SECT 12 165b c BK III CH VI SECT 3 268d SECT 11 271b d BK IV CH X SECT 5 6 350a c

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VIII DIV 78 485d 486a

42 KANT *Practical Reason* 344a c 351b 352c / *Judgement* 592a-c

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 173c 392d 393a

5g God's will divine choice

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 1 2 / *Psalms* 135 6—(D) *Psalms* 134 6 / *Isaiah* 14 24 27 46 9-11 —(D) *Isaias* 14 24 27 46 9-11 / *Jeremiah* 4 28 51 29—(D) *Jeremias* 4 28 51 29

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 18 14 20 1-16 / *John* 5 21 6 38-40 / *Romans* 8 27- 9 9 11-19 12 1-2 / *I Corinthians* 12 / *Ephesians* 1 8-12 3 10-11 / *I Thessalonians* 4 3-6 5 18 / *II Timothy* 1 8-10 / *James* 1 18

5 AESCHYLUS *Suppliant Maidens* [86-103] 2a b

5 EURIPIDES *Bacchantes* [1388-1391] 352a c

7 PLATO *Timaeus* 452c

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK IV CH 3 224d CH 7 232d 233a

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK III SECT 11 262a b

17 PLOTINUS *Sixth Ennead* TR VIII 342d 353d

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK VII par 6-7 44d 45d BK XI par 12 92b BK XII par 18 103a b BK XIII par 5 111d par 19 115c d / *City of God* BK V CH 9-10 213b 216c BK X CH 7 302d 303a BK XII CH 14 350d 351b CH 17 353a 354a BK XXI CH 7-8 565d 568d BK XXII CH 2 587b-588a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 14 A 8 ANS 82c 83b Q 19 108d 119d Q 20 A 1 REP 3 120a 121b A 4 ANS 122c 124a Q 23 A 4 135a d Q 25 A 5 ANS and REP 1 147d 149a Q 26 A 2 REP 2 150c 151a Q 50 A 1 ANS 269b 270a Q 54 A 2 ANS 285d 286c Q 57 A 5 ANS 299b 300b Q 59 A 2 ANS 307c 308b Q 60 A 1 REP 2 310b 311a Q 61 A 2 REP 1 3 315c 316a Q 62 A 6 REP 1 322a d Q 63 A 1 ANS 325c 326c Q 104 AA 3 4 537b-538c Q 105 A 1 REP 2 538d 539c PART I II Q 1 A 2 REP 3 610b 611b Q 10 A 1 REP 2 662d 663d Q 19 AA 9-10 709d 711d Q 39 A 2 REP 3 790d 791b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 93 A 4 REP 1 218b d Q 97 A 3 REP 1 237b 238b PART III Q 18 A 1 REP 1 4 810a 811c Q 21 A 1 ANS 823d 824d A 4 ANS 826b-827c Q 61 A 4 REP 3 857c 858b Q 64 A 7 ANS 875d 876c PART III SUPPL Q 72 A 3 ANS and REP 5 920c 922b Q 74 A 4 ANS 928d 929d Q 91 A 1 REP 2 1016b 1017c A 2 ANS 1017c-1020c Q 92 A 3 REP 6 1034b-1037c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE III [64-90] 110a b XIX [85-90] 135d 136a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 113b c 162c PART IV 271b

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK IV 265b

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 38a

31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 228a c 229c

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 17 362b 363c PROP 32 367a b PROP 33 SCHOL 2 367d 369a APPENDIX 370c 371a

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [80-134] 13 a 138a BK VII [139 173] 220a 221a / *Samson Agonistes* [300-3 9] 346a b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 50-51 191b-c

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 29 33 417d-419a esp SECT 29 30 418c

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 150c 151b

42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 265b c esp 265b d [fn 1] 276b 277a 2 8b c / *Practical Reason* 303b 304a 321b-c 324b-325a 325d 326a 328b / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 393c d

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK VI 272a b BK XII 553b BK XIII 563a b BK XV 631c EPILOGUE II 675a 677b 680b-c 684b-d

5h God's love the diffusion of the divine goodness

OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 33 19 34 6 / *Deuteronomy* 4 37 38 7 7-8 10 15 18 3 4 / *I Chronicles* 16 7 34—(D) *I Paralipomenon* 16 7-34 / *Job* passim esp 2 10 / *Psalms* / *Proverbs* 3 12 / *Song of Solomon*—(D) *Canticle of Canticles* / *Isaiah* 43 45 7 63 7-9—(D) *Isaias* 43 45 7 63 7-9 / *Jeremiah* 31 1-6 32 17-44 33 1-16—(D) *Jeremias* 31 1-6 32 17-44 33 1-16 / *Lamentations* 3 25 38 / *Ezekiel* 16 1 15—(D) *Ezechiel* 16 1 15 / *Hosea* 1 3 11—(D) *Osee* 1 3 11 / *Joel* 2 12 3 21 / *Micah* 1 12—(D) *Micheas* 1 12 / *Zechariah* 9 17—(D) *Zacharias* 9 17 / *Malachi* 1 1 3—(D) *Malachias* 1 1 3

APOCRYPHA *Tobit* 13 10—(D) OT *Tobias* 13 12 / *Wisdom of Solomon* 7 28 11 22 26 12 13 16 16 20-29—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 7 28 11 23 27 12 13 16 16 20 29 / *Ecclesiasticus* 4 14 11 14 17 16 29-30 17 8-18 29 33 10-15 39 16 25 34—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 4 15 11 14 17 16 30 31 17 8 18 28 33 10 15 39 21 30 40

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 6 5 34 7 7 11 10 29-31 / *Luke* 11 1 13 12 6 7 16 33 / *John*

6. Man's knowledge of God

(5 *The divine nature in relation to the world or creatures 5i Divine justice and mercy divine rewards and punishments*)

passim esp 4-9 11 14-18 25-33 35-39—(D) *Ezechiel* passim esp 4-9 11 14 18 25-33 35-39 / *Daniel* 4 4-5 31—(D) *Daniel* 4-5 / *Joel* / *Amos* / *Obadiah*—(D) *Abdias* / *Jonah*—(D) *Jonas* / *Micah*—(D) *Micheas* / *Nahum* / *Habakkuk*—(D) *Habacuc* / *Zephaniah*—(D) *Sophonias* / *Zechariah*—(D) *Zacharias* / *Malachi*—(D) *Malachias*

Apocrypha *Tobit* 2-3 13—(D) OT *Tobias* 2-3 13 / *Judith* 5—(D) OT *Judith* 5 / *Wisdom of Solomon* 1-5 11:23 12—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 1-5 11 24 12 / *Ecclesiasticus* 16 17 19-29 18 1-14 23 18-21 35 39 25-31—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 16 17 16- 8 18 1-14 -3 25-31 35 39 30-37 / *Susanna*—(D) OT *Daniel* 13 / *Bel and Dragon* 3-42—(D) OT *Daniel* 14 22-42 / *II Maccabees* 6 12 17—(D) OT *II Machabees* 6 12-17

New Testament *Matthew* 5 1-22 29-30 45 9 9 13 11 0-24 12 36-37 13 4-30 36-43 18 7-14 19 16-30 16 23 / *Mark* 9 37-47 10 17-31 16 16 / *Luke* 1 46-55 6 36-38 7 36-50 10 25-28 14 7-14 15 16 19-31 18 1-8 19 1-10 23 34 39-43 / *John* 5 30 8 1-11 / *Acts* 12 18-23 13 1-12 / *Romans* 1 16-2 16 6 23 9 14-18 / *II Corinthians* 4 / *Galatians* 6 7-8 / *Ephesians* 2 / *II Thessalonians* 1 3 10 2 10 12 / *II Timothy* 4 8 / *Titus* 3 4-6 / *Hebrews* 10 26-31 / *I Peter* 3 18 / *II Peter* / *I John* 1 5-10 / *Jude* / *Revelation* passim esp 17-20—(D) *Apocalypse* passim esp 17-20

5 Aeschylus *Suppliant Maidens* [1-175] 1a 3a / *Agamemnon* [636-781] 58d 60b [1560-1566] 68c / *Eumenides* 81a 91d

5 Sophocles *Oedipus the King* 99a 113a c esp [1-275] 99a 101c [703-738] 105d 106a [863-910] 107b-c [1187-1285] 110b 111a / *Antigone* [279-289] 133c / *Oedipus at Colonus* 114a 130a c esp [521-545] 119a b [939-1014] 123a d [1254-1396] 125d 126d / *Ajax* 143a 155a c esp [430-459] 146d 147a [748-783] 149c d / *Electra* [173-1,9] 157c / *Trachiniae* [1 64 1278] 181c / *Philoctetes* [446-452] 186a

5 Euripides *Suppliants* [598-617] 263c d / *Hecuba* [1023-1033] 361c d / *Heracles Mad* [772-780] 371c d

6 Herodotus *History* bk i 20b 22a bk ii 77a b bk iv 158d 159d esp 159d bk vi 199c d 201d 202c 203a b bk viii 278d 279a 283d bk ix 308a c

6 Thucydides *Peloponnesian War* bk v 506b-c bk vii 560a

7 Plato *Republic* bk x 437c 441a c / *Laws* bk iv 682d 683a bk ix 757a bk x 765d 769d esp 767c 768c / *Seventh Letter* 806a

12 Lucretius *Nature of Things* bk iii [978-1023] 42d-43b bk vi [43 79] 80d 81b [379 4] 85b d

14 Plutarch *Romulus* 26b 27a / *Camillus* 107b d / *Aristides* 265c d / *Cato the Younger* 639d

15 Tacitus *Histories* bk i 189d 190a

18 Augustine *Confessions* bk ii par 15 12b-c bk v par 2 27b c bk vii par 5 44c-d bk ix, par 34-36 70c 71a / *City of God* bk v ch 10-11 215c 216d ch 14 6 220a 230a c bk ix ch 10 291a bk xi ch 23 334c 335c bk xiii ch 1-8 360a 363c ch 12 16 365d 3?d bk xiii ch 21-bk xiv ch 28 3?1a 397d esp bk xiv ch 15 388d 390a ch 26 395d 396c bk xv ch 4 5 418d-419b bk xvi ch 4 425b-426a bk xix ch 10-13 516c 520a ch 15 521a-c bk xx 530a 560a c bk xxi 560a 586a c esp ch 11 12 570b 571c ch 18 574c 575b ch 24 577b 579d bk xxii 586b d-619d / *Christian Doctrine* bk i ch 15 628b-c ch 32 633c d bk ii ch 23 648a-c

19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 19, a 6 113c 114d a 9 ans 116d 117d q 21 124b-127c q 23 a 5 135d 137d q 62 317c 325b q 63 a 8 ans 332c 333b q 64 a 2 rep 2 335d 336d q 65 a 2 rep 3 340b 341b q 66, a 3 ans 347b-348d q 95 a 4 509b-510a q 96 a 3 rep 3 512a c q 103 a 5 rep 531b-532b q 105 a 6 rep 2 543b 544a q 113 a, ans 580b 581a q 114 a 1 rep 1 581d 582c part i ii q 5 a 1 636d 637c a 4 ans 639a 640b a 7 642a d q 17 a 9 rep 3 692d 693d q 21 a 4 719d 720a c q 39 a 2 rep 3 790d 791b q 47 a 1 rep 1 819c 820b

20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i-ii q 61 a 5 ans 58b 59d q 62 a 1 60a d q 63 a 3 65a d q 68 a 2 89c 90c q 72 a 5 115a 116b q 73 a 9 rep 3 126d 128a a 10 rep 2 128a d q 79 aa 3-4 158a 159c q 81 a 2 rep 1 164d 165c q 85 a 5 ans 181d 182d a 6 182d 184a qq 87-88 185c 198d q 91 a 6 212c 213c q 94 a 5 rep 2 224d 225d q 98 a rep 3 240c 241b a 4 242b 243c q 100 a 7 rep 3 258c 259c a 8 rep 2 3 259d 261a a 12 264d 265d q 103 a 2 299b 300d q 106 a 2 322b-323a q 112 a 4 rep 1 358d 359c qq 113 114 360d 378a c part ii ii q 13 a 4 ans 446c-447a q 14 a 2 ans 448d-449d q 18 a 4 rep 2 464c-465a q 19 a 1 rep 2 465a d q 20 a 1 ans 474d-475d q 1 a 2 ans 479a-c q 24 a 10 ans 496d-498a q 8 a 3 528d 529c q 182 a 2 621d 623a q 184 a 4 ans and rep 632c 633c part iii q 2 a 11 721c 722b q 9 a 2 764c 765a q 64 870b 879c part iii suppl, q 69 a 886c 887d q 70 a 3 897d 900d q 71 900d 917b passim q 72 a 3 rep 4 920c 922b qq 73 74 922b-935a c passim q 75 a 1 935b 937a q 78 a 1 ans 947d 949b a 3 rep 3 950b 951a qq 82-99 968a 1085a c

21 Dante *Divine Comedy* esp hell iii [1 18] 4a b xi 15a 16b purgatory iii [103 145] 57a c vi [25-48] 61a b xix [97-1 6] 82c d paradise iii [1]-v [87] 109b 113a vii [19-1 0]

7 PLATO *Timaeus* 465d-466a / *Laws* BK VII 728b-730c BK X 758b 759a
8 ARISTOTLE *Heavens* BK II CH 1 3 5b d 376a / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 2 [982b28-983 11] 501 b BK VI CH 547b d 548c esp [1026a23 33] 548b-c BK XI CH [1064 6-13] 592d 593a
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 6 110c 112b CH 9, 114c 115 CH 6- 7 121d 124a
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK XII SECT 28 310
14 PLUTARCH *Pericles* 123c 124a / *Coriolanus* 191d 192b / *Nicias* 435b-d
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 1 27a b BK VI par 8 37b-c BK VII par 16-23 48c 50c BK X par 8-1 73b-74 BK XI par 6 90c-d / *City of God* BK VIII CH 3 266a-d BK X CH 14 307c 308a / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 4 625b-c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q AA 2 10d 12 Q 3 A 1 REP 1— 14b-15b A 3 REP 1 16a-d A 4 E 2 16d 17c A 6 REP 1 18c 19 Q 1 A 4 53b-54c A 12 13 60d 62b Q 3 1 175d 178a Q 50 A 2 A 270a 272a Q 6, A 1 RE 3 339b-340b Q 79 A 9 A S 422b-423d Q 86 A 2 R P 1 462 -463a Q 88 2 R 4 471c-472 A 3 472c-473a Q 94 A 1 501d 503a Q 1 3 A 1 ANS 528b-529a P RT I-II Q 5 5 A S 640b-641a Q 14 A 1 R P 677b-678a Q 17 8 R P 69'a-c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 61 A 5 A S 58b-59d Q 66 A 5 79b-80c Q 68 A 1 A S and REP 2 87c 89c Q 90 A 4 REP 1 207d 208b Q 93 A 2 216c 217b Q 94 A 2 221d 223a Q 99 A 3 R P 3 247a 248a Q 100 A 1 251b-252a Q 109, A 1 EP 1 338b-339c PART II-II Q 1 5 REP 4 383b-384b Q 4 A 7 ANS 407d-409a Q 1 A 12 R 4 436b-43 d Q 2 3 E 522c 523b A 4 RE 3 523c 524 A 6 RE 3 524c 52_c ART III Q 3 A 3 724c 725b Q 1 A 3, R 2 778b-779a ART III SUP L, Q 9 A 1 ANS 1016b-1017c
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY III [34 45] 56b PARADISE I [8- 8] 111 X [27] 120b-c
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 54b-c 66a-c 78d 79 79d 80b 83 b PART II 137b-c 149c-d 160b 163a b PART III 165a 167b 172d 173a 183d 184 241a 242a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 98b-99a 209a d 212 -d 238c 239c 246a-d 251 252b 267 268a
28 HARVEY *On Anim l Generati* 421d 429b
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 2c-4c 17b-20a 38a 39d-40a 41b-d 55b-c 96c 97 esp 96d-97 / *New Atlantis* 203a b
31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART I, 43c PART I 52a-d / *Meditations* 69 71a passim 71d 76 III IV 81d-89b 93a 96a / *Objections and Replies* 110c 114c 120c 122b 1 7 -c P -III 132b-133a 140b 1_8b-161d 168d 169 211 212a 21 c 213 213d 214 215b- 237b 283d 2_4 284d
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* R D 1 373 PROP 45 47 390a 391a R 1 P 28 431c P O 36-37 D MONST 434a d APPENDIX IV 447b c PART V PRO 1 42 458a-463d esp PROP 24 25 458d-459a PROP 30-33 459d-460c PROP 36 461a-c
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VII [109-130] 219b-220a BK VIII [114 130] 234b-235a
33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 163a 164b / *Pensees* 29 213 b 242 253 217b-220a 65 290 221b-225a 557-567 272b-273b
34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III GENER L SCHOL, 371a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH II SECT 12 107c-d CH III SECT 7 18 113d 117c BK II CH VII SECT 6 132d CH XVII SECT 1 167d 168a SECT 17 172b-c SECT 0 173a CH XXIII SECT 33 3 212d 214b BK II CH I SECT 11 271b-d BK IV CH X 349c 354c
35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 29 33 418c-419a SECT 146-156 442a-4-4d
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT II DIV 14 456b SECT XI 497b-503c passim SECT XII IV 132 509c
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 186c-d
38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK IV 437a
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 12d 13 00d 308b-309c
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 33a-d 173b-192d / *Practical Reason* 320c 321b 346b-34 a 349b-352c 354d 355d / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 384a,c / *Judgement* 547b-d 598b-599b 602b-603a 603b-d 607d-609b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 159b-160a PART III 304d 305b
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [343 3468] 84a b
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK V 217c d BK XI 248d 249a
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK V 120d 121c

6c Supernatural knowledge

6 (1) God as teacher: inspiration and revelation

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 2 5 7 3 8-24 9 1-1 17 1 26—4 35 11 46:2 3 / *Exodus* 3-4-6 13 5 4 10-12 6:2 8 0 1 7 24 12 29 45 46 33 11 34 8 / *Leviticus* 1 44 45 18 1-2 / *Numbers* 1 1-8 15 41 / *Deuteronomy* 4 -5 0-13 32 36 5 4 11 18 8 2 29:29 / *I Kings* 3 5 15 8 35 36—(D) *III Kings* 3 5-15 8 35 36 / *Job* 33 34 31 32 35 10-11 38-42 / *Psalms* 25 3-5 8-12 32 8-9 94 10- 5 1 9 143 esp 43 8-10—(D) *Psalms* 4-4-5 8-12 3 8-9 93 0- 3 118 42 esp 142 8 10 / 31 8-9 93 10-13 118 142 esp 142 8-1 / *Proverbs* 5-6 6:23 / *Isaiah* 6 1-9 11 3 28 9-13 48 3-8—(D) *Isaias* 6 1-9 11 1 3 8 9-13 48 3 8 / D el 2 4—(D) *Daniel* 2 3 08-4 34 / *Joel* 2:28-29
APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 17 5 14—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 17 5 12

(6 *Man's knowledge of God*)

390a 391a PART IV PROP 28 431c PROP 36-37 434a 436a APPENDIX IV 447b c PART V PROP 24-32 458d 460b

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VIII [114 130] 234b 235a [412-416] 241a

33 PASCAL *Pensees* 194 205d 206a 2 9-230 213a b 233 214a b 242-290 217b 225a 566-567 273b 586 277a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH III SECT 7 18 113d 117c BK II CH XVII SECT I 167d 168a SECT 17 172b c CH XXIII SECT 33-35 212d 213c BK III CH VI SECT II 271b d BK IV CH XVIII-XIX 380d 388d

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 146-149 442a d

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 200c 201a 308b 309d

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 1a b 173b 248d esp 177b 192d 218d 223d 234c 240b 241d 242c / *Practical Reason* 292a c 320c 321b 349b 352c esp 350c 351a 354d 355d / *Judgement* 575b 577a 589b 590b 598b 599b 600d 601c 603a d 606d 608c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 159b 160a

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK V 196a 197c

6a The names of God the metaphorical and symbolic representations of God the anthropomorphic conception of God

OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 3 13 15 6 2 3 15 3 20 7 33 20-23 34 5-7 14 / *Leviticus* 19 12 21 6 22 32 / *Deuteronomy* 5 11 28 58 / *II Samuel* 22—(D) *II Kings* 22 / *Psalms* passim esp 18 23 28 7 29 1 11 31 2 3 61 1-8 68 4 71 3 78 35 78 65 83 18 95 1 11—(D) *Psalms* passim esp 17 22 27 7 28 2-10 30 3-4 60 2-9 67 5 70 3 77 35 77 65 82 19 94 1-11 / *Proverbs* 18 10 30 4 / *Isaiah* 17 10 30 27-30 40 11 41 4 42 8 44 6 47 4 48 2 12 51 15 54 5 55 13 63 16—(D) *Isaias* 17 10 30 27-30 40 11 41 4 42 8 44 6 47 4 48 2 12 51 15 54 5 55 13 63 16 / *Jeremiah* 10 16 16 21 23 6 31 35 32 18 33 2 50 34 51 19—(D) *Jeremias* 10 16 16 21 23 6 31 35 32 18 33 2 50 34 51 19 / *Daniel* 7 9 13 / *Amos* 4 13 5 8 9 6

APOCRYPHA *Wisdom of Solomon* 14 12 21—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 14 12 21

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 6 9 / *Luke* 11 2 / *John* 10 1-18 / *I Corinthians* 10 4 / *Revelation* 1 8 21 6 22 13—(D) *Apocalypse* 1 8 21 6 22 13

5 AESCHYLUS *Agamemnon* [160-175] 53d 54a

5 EURIPIDES *Iphigenia Among the Tauri* [376-391] 414b

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK II 49d 50a 60a d 80a c

7 PLATO *Cratylus* 91c 92b 93d 97d / *Philebus* 609d 610a / *Laws* BK X 759d 760c

8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 8 [1074b1-7] 604d 605a

9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK I CH 2 [1252b19-27] 446a

16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 853b 854a 860a

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK IV CH 11 194c 195b CH 24-25 201c 202a BK VII CH 10-11 250b 251c / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 6-7 626a-c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q I A 9-10 8d 10c Q 3 A 1 REP 1-5 14b-15b A 2 REP 1-2 15c 16a A 3 REP 1 16a d Q 4 A 1 REP 1 20d 21b Q 13 62b 75b Q 14 A 1 REP 1-2 75d 76c QQ 27 43 153a 237a c passim Q 102 A 1 REP 4 523d 525a Q 113 A 7 REP 1 580b 581a PART I-II Q 47 A 1 REP 1 819c 820b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 99 A 3 REP 3 247a 248a Q 10 A 2 ANS 271b-272a PART III Q 2 A 5 ANS 715a 716b Q 16 A 3 ANS 798c 799b PART III SUPPL Q 96 A 2 ANS 1052a 1053b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE IV [28 48] 111a XXVI [124 138] 147a b XXX [34-99] 152a d

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 54b 79d 80a PART II 162c d PART III 172d 173a 181a 182c 183d 184a PART IV 271c 272b-c

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 238d 239b 256c d

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 428c d 443c

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 60c 61b

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 17 SCHOL 362 363c PART II PROP 3 SCHOL 374b c

34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III GENERAL SCHOL 370a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH III SECT 17 117a c BK II CH XIII SECT 18 152a-c

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 176a b 192c d / *Judgement* 547b d 593c d 598b 599b 599d 600a

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK VI 248d

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK XI 345a c

54 FREUD *Civilization and Its Discontents* 771a b / *New Introductory Lectures* 875d 876b

6b Natural knowledge the use of analogies the evidences of nature the light of reason

OLD TESTAMENT *Job* 12 7-9 26 7 14 36 24 42 2 / *Psalms* 8 19 1-6 65 75 1 95 1-6 104 107 147 12 20—(D) *Psalms* 8 18 1 64 74 2 94 1-6 103 106 147 / *Ecclesiastes* 3 11 8 17 11 5 / *Isaiah* 45 5-8—(D) *Isaias* 45 5-8

APOCRYPHA *Wisdom of Solomon* 13 1-5—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 13 1-5 / *Ecclesiasticus* 16 26 30 18 4 7 4 15 43 33—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 16 26-31 18 2-6 4 15 43 37 / *II Maccabees* 7 28—(D) OT *II Machabees* 7 28

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 6 26-30 / *Luke* 12 24 28 / *Romans* 1 18 4

31 DESCARTES *Rules*, III 4d 5a / *Discourse* PART I, 43c / *Meditations* 69a 71 c passim III, 83d-89a / *Objections and Replies* 125c 125b 1 & 169a 232b

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost*, BK XII [552-573] 331a 332a

33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 147b 163a 164b / *Pensées*, 229 213a b 242-290 217b-225a 425 243b-244b 523 256a 560-564 272b-273b 794-796 327b 880-881 34 b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK IV CH XVI SECT 14 371b-c CH XVII SECT 24 380c d CH XVIII XIX 380d 388d passim

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT X DIV 101 497a-b SECT XII DIV 132 509c

37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 379c 380a

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 190c 191a 399a-c

42 KANT *Pure Reason*, 242a 243a / *Practical Reason* 320c 321b 345c-d 353a 354d / *Judgement* 590d-600a 604d-609b esp 606a-d

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 395a b

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART III 306b-307b PART IV 34 b-350a

47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [0 11 1] 246b-247a

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK V 196a 198b BK X 631 c

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK I, 11a b BK II, 25b-27d BK III 64c 6 BK V 12 b-127 passim BK VII, 177b-180a BK XI, 33 a b

6c(3) Mystical experience

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 15 15 22 9-18 26 1-6 4 28 10-22 31 11 3 3-23 32 46 1 4 / *Exodus* 3 1 4 9 0 4 / *Numbers* 1 21 35 24 12 4 / *Joshua* 3-8 5 23-15—(D) *Josue* 3-8 5 13 16 / *Judges* 6 11 6 13 / *I Samuel*, 3—(D) *I Kings* 3 / *I Kings* 3 5 15 9 1-9 19—(D) *III Kings*, 3 5-15 9 1-9 19 / *I Chronicles* 1 15—(D) *I Paralipomenon* 1-15 / *Job* 4 12 33 14 1 5 1 4-5 / *Isaiah* 6—(D) *Isaias* 6 / *Jeremiah*, (D) *Jeremias* 1 / *Ezekiel* esp 1-4 8-12, 40-48—(D) *Ezechiel* esp 4 8-2 40-48 / *Daniel*, 1 / *Amos* 7-8 / *Zechariah*, 6—(D) *Zacharias*, 6

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 17 1-9 3 16-17 1 8 5 / *Luke* 12 35 20-15 3 9 28 36 4 / *Acts* 2 11 7 9 1 20 esp 19-20 5 1 15 9-11 2 1 1 23-11 3 5 / *II Corinthians* 1 12-9 / *II Peter* 1 5 / *Revelation*—(D) *Apocalypse*

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK VII par 16 48-49a BK VIII, par 25 30 60a-61 BK IX, par 23 5 83a-c BK X, par 65 87d-88a / *City of God*, BK X, CH 16 294 295a BK XI, CH 6 425c-427a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I, Q 1 1 259d-60d Q 84 A 5 446c-44 c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I-II Q 98 3 241c 242b PART I-II Q 80, A 5, 611d-613a

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE I [1-81] 106a-10 a XXI 138b-139c passim XXIII [1-69] 141b-142a XXX [34-99] 152a-d XXXII [139]-XXXIII [45] 156a 157d

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 52a b 68d-69b PART II 137b-138a 149c-d 160b PART III 165d 166a 1 4b-1 6d 183d 15c CONCLUSION 281d 282

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 2 255 222b-224b

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 81a

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 4 6b-477a

42 KANT *Practical Reason* 320d 321b

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VII 189a 191a c

6c(4) The beatific vision

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 28 10-22 3 24 30 / *Exodus* 4 esp 19-11 33 11 23 34 5 / *Numbers* 12 6-8 / *Deuteronomy* 34 10 / *Job* 9 26 42 5

APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 43 30-31—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 43 32 35

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 5 8 / *John* 1 8 / *Acts* 7 55-57 / *I Corinthians*, 13 1 / *II Corinthians* 5 6 1 1-4 / *I Timothy* 6 13 16 / *I John* 3 2 3

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK IX, par 23 68 / *City of God* BK XII CH 20, 355b BK XXII CH 9 614b-616d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 12 50b-62b Q 6 A 3 151a-c Q 60 A 5 REP 5 313b-314c Q 6 A 1 ANS 31 d 318 A 5 318d 319c Q 84, A 5 446c-44 c Q 89, A REP 3 4 0a-d Q 93 A 8 REP 4 499b-500c Q 94, A 1 501d 503a Q 100, A 2, ANS 521c 522b PART I-II Q 3 A 8 628d-629c Q 4 AA 2 3 630b-631d

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 67 A 3 CONTRARY 83b-84d A 4 84d 85d A 6 REP 3 8 a-c Q 69, A 2 REP 3 97b-98c A 4 ANS and REP 3 100c 101 Q 98 A 3 REP 2 241c 242b PART II-II Q 1 A 8 ANS 387a 88c Q 8 A A 5 421d-422 Q 9, A 4 RE 3 425d 426c Q 150 A 5 611d-613a PART III Q 1 A 3 REP 1 04d 06a Q 9, A 2, ANS and REP 3 64c 76 a PART III SUPPL, Q 2, A 1 ANS and REP 917c-919a Q 8 3 REP 4 971a-972d Q 84 A 2, ANS and REP 4 98 c-983d Q 87 A 3 ANS 999d 1000c Q 90 A 3 101 d 1016a Q 92 1025b-1037c Q 98 A 5 AN 1075b-d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE I [1 12] 106a II [37 45] 108a V [ ] 112a b I [10-2] 113d XIV [8-51] 127b X [8-8] 128 129b XXI [10] 138d 139b XX I [03 108] 146d 14 XXVIII [06 4] 150a XXXII [39]-XXXIII [45] 156a 157d

22 CHAUCER *Parson's Tale* par 10 499b-500a par 3 549b-550a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan*, PART I, 65a b

31 DESCARTES *Meditations* III 88d-89a

32 MILTON *On Time* [9-] 12a b / *Paradise Lost* BK III [2 -6] 141a

6c(2) The light of faith

10 ^

passim—(D) III Kings, 11 13 - passim / II Kings passim—(D) IV Kings passim / I Chronicles 13 15—(D) I Paralipomenon 17— 15 / II Chronicles, 11 36 passim—(D) II Paralipomenon, 11 36 passim / Esther esp 4 13-14—(D) Esther 1 1 1 3 esp 4 13 4 / J esp 1—24 38-41 / Psalms passim, esp 3 4 9-11 13, 1 18 65 — 104—(D) Psalms passim, esp 3-4, 9-10 1... 16-1 64 6 03 / Proverbs, 16:33 / Ecclesiastes, 3 7-13-15 8-9 11 12 / Isaiah, 36-37 46 51—(D) Isaias 36-37 46 51 / Jeremiah, 1 —8 18 19 31 45—(D) Jeremias 1 5-8 18-19 31 4 / Daniel passim, esp 3:4 4 6:1 5—(D) Daniel 1:1 3:23 passim, esp 3 1— 3 3:91 1 1 passim, esp 3:91 100 6 1 5 / Jonah esp 1 4—(D) Jonas esp 4 / Malachi 1:2 3—(D) Malachias 1:2 3

APOCRYPHA T —(D) OT T bias / Judith esp 5-6, 8-16—(D) OT Judith esp 5-6, 8-16 / Rest of Esther—(D) OT Esther 1 4 16:24 / Wisdom of Solomon, 14:1 3—(D) OT Book of Wisdom, 14:1 3 / Ecclesiasticus, 5:11 9—(D) OT Ecclesiasticus 15:11 22 / Song of Three Children—(D) OT Daniel, 3:24-90 / Susanna—(D) OT Daniel 13:1-64 / Bel and Dragon—(D) OT Daniel, 13:65 14:42 / I Maccabees 3:13-76—(D) OT I Machabees 3:13 6 / II Maccabees 6 1 16—(D) OT II Machabees, 6:1 6

NEW TESTAMENT Matthew 6:25 34 —7 11 10 esp 1 10, 0:29-33 25:37 / Luke 11:1 13 1 1 34 2 12 9 / John, 6:1 1 esp 6:40 6:44 45 6:64-65—(D) John, 6:22-72 esp 6:40, 6:44 45, 6:65-66 / Acts, 1:13, 6 6 8-40 13:48—(D) Acts, 1:15 6 6:8-7:59 3:48 / Romans 8:28-11:36 3:1 2 / Ephesians 1:4 10 4:1-7 / Philippians, 2:12 3 / II Timothy 1:9 / Hebrews 1:1 3 3:5-6 / I Peter 1:2-5

18 AUGUSTINE Confessions x IX, par 1 61c-d / City of God, BK I CH 8-9 133a 135a x CH 33 206c-d BK CH 207d 208c CH 8 212 216d CH 9 224b-225b CH 1 2 2 6a-277 x x CH 14-1 30 310b x XI CH 2 333d 334c BK XII, CH 27 359c 360a BK XIX CH 396c 39 x XX CH 1 586b d 58 b / Christian Doctrine x II CH 27 650a

19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART Q 3 1 ART 1 14b-15b Q 8, A 3 AN 36b-37 Q 13 8 A and 70d 71b Q 19, A 3 RE 4 93b 94 Q 2 12 c 143c Q 96 1 ANS and RE 2 510b-511b ART 1-II Q 9, A 6 R 3 66a-d

20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica AR 1 II Q 93 5 REP 3 219a-d PART II II Q — A 5 35c 8 Q A REP 3 508d 509c RT III, Q 61 A 855a-d PART III SUPPL, Q 69, 3 887d-889c Q 5 A 905c-908b Q — A 943a 944d Q A 3 950b-951a

21 DANTE Divine Comedy H LL, 7 [61-96] 1 b-c RAD x [34 142] 107b-d [11]

113c 114d III [55 148] 117c 118c XI XII 12a 125a esp XI [5 39] 122b XII [37-45] 124a XX [31 138] 137a 138a

22 CHAUCER Troilus and Criseyde BK IV STANZA 135-154 106b-108b / Knight's Tale [1 51 12] 180b [66, 16-2] 187b / Tale of Man of Law 236b 35b esp [4 69-49-4] 42b-243b [5-4-52:3] 249b / Friar's Tale [7064 7085] 281 b / Franklin's Tale [11 1— 06] 353b 354a / Monk's Tale [3 021-05] 434b-435a [14 149-52] 437a-438b

23 HOBBES Leviathan, PART 1 53d PART II 113b-c 160a 162b PART I 254b 271b

25 MONTAIGNE Essays 98b-99a

26 SHAKESPEARE Richard III ACT II SC II [— 95] 120b-c

27 SHAKESPEARE Hamlet ACT C II [I 11] 6 d-68a [3] 68b-c [230- 35] 70a

29 CERVANTES Don Quixote PART II, 408c

30 BACON Advancement of Learning 19d 38a / Novum Organum BK I, APH 93 125d 126a

32 MILTON Sonnets XVI 66b-6 a / Paradise Lost BK II [50- 34] 137a 138a / Samson Agonistes [10- 14] 344a [373-380] 347b-348a [66 —709] 354a 355a / Areopagitica 394b-395b

33 PASCAL Pensées 619-641 284b-290a

35 BERKELEY Human Knowledge INTRO, SECT 3 405b-c SECT 60-66 424b-426a SECT 9 -94 431b-c SECT 10 10 433b-434a CT 46-155 442a-444c

35 HUME Human Understanding SECT VII DIV 54-57 4 4b-475d S CT XI DIV 105 500b-d

37 FIELDING Tom Jones 5c-d 377c 378a

38 ROUSSEAU Inequality 331c-d / Social Contract BK III 414d BK IV 437d-438b

40 GIBBON Decline and Fall 292d 294a

41 GIBBON Decline and Fall 542a b

44 BOSWELL Johnson 95c-d

45 HEGEL Philosophy of History INTRO, 158c 160b 168d 170b PART IV 321b-c 368d 369a c

48 MELVILLE Moby Dick 85a 23 a 396b-397a

51 TOLSTOY War and Peace BK 2 2a b BK IX, 342a 344b 357b-358b x X, 447c—48a 465c—67c passim BK X 553b x XIII 563a b x XV 619d-620a 631a-c EPILOGUE 1 650b-c EPILOGUE II, 675a-677b 680b-c 684b-d

52 DOSTOEVSKY Brothers Karamazov BK V 127b-13 c passim x XI, 343b-c

54 FREUD Civilization and Its Discontents 7 1 b

7c Divine government and law

OLD TESTAMENT Genesis 9:1-7 / Exodus 12 1 15 18 19-31 esp 20:1 1 34 35 / Leviticus passim / Numbers passim, esp 5 10, 15 18-19, 2 —0, 35 36 / Deuteronomy passim, esp 5:6—1 / I Chronicles 29:11 1—(D) I Paralipomenon, 29:11 2 / J b 9:1 13 34 12 18 3 —41 / Psalms, 1 10:16 19 4 3 30-31 40:8 4 59 13 66— 75 8 1-8 89:30-3 93

Doctrines common to the Jewish Mohammedan and Christian conceptions of God and His relation to the world and man

7a Creation

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 1-2 5 1-2 / *Exodus* 20 11 / *I Samuel* 2 8—(D) *I Kings* 2 8 / *Nehemiah* 9 6—(D) *II Esdras* 9 6 / *Job* 9 1-13 10 8-13 12 7-10 26 7-14 28 24-27 37 14-38 41 esp 38 4-11 / *Psalms* 8 esp 8 5 19 1-6 24 1-2 33 74 16-17 89 11-12 90 2 95 1-7 96 5 102 25-28 104 119 73 90 121 2 136 5-9 139 14-16 146 5-6 148—(D) *Psalms* 8 esp 8 6-7 18 1-7 23 1-2 32 73 16-17 88 12-13 89 2 94 1-7 95 5 101 26-29 103 118 73 90 120 2 135 5-9 138 14-16 145 5-6 148 / *Proverbs* 3 19-20 8 22-31 / *Ecclesiastes* 3 11 / *Isaiah* 40 26 28 4 5-8 44 24-28 45 5-13 48 12-16 51 12-16 64 8 65 17—(D) *Isaias* 40 26-28 4 5-8 44 24-28 45 5-13 48 12-16 51 12-16 64 8 65 17 / *Jeremiah* 10 11-13 27 5 31 35 51 15-16—(D) *Jeremias* 10 11-13 27 5 31 35 51 15 16 / *Amos* 4 13 5 8 / *Jonah* 1 9—(D) *Jonas* 1 9 / *Zechariah* 12 1—(D) *Zacharias* 12 1

APOCRYPHA *Judith* 16 14—(D) OT *Judith* 16 17 / *Rest of Esther* 13 10—(D) OT *Esther* 13 10 / *Wisdom of Solomon* 1 14 2 23 6 7 9 1 9 11 17 24—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 1 14 2 23 6 8 9 1 9 11 18 25 / *Ecclesiasticus* 17 1-9 18 1-5 23 19-20 24 8-9 33 9-13 39 16-35 42 15-43 33—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 17 1-8 18 1-5 23 27-29 24 12-14 33 10-14 39 21-41 42 15-43 37 / *Song of Three Children* 34-60—(D) OT *Daniel* 3 56-82 / *Bel and Dragon* 5—(D) OT *Daniel* 14 4 / *II Maccabees* 7 23 28—(D) OT *II Machabees* 7 23 28

NEW TESTAMENT *John* 1 1 10 / *Acts* 14 14-15 17 23-27 / *Romans* 1 19-20 / *Colossians* 1 12-17 / *Hebrews* 1 10 3 4 11 3 / *II Peter* 3 5 / *Revelation* 4 11 10 6 14 7—(D) *Apocalypse* 4 11 10 6 14 7

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK VII par 7 45a d BK XI par 5-11 90b 92b BK XII-XIII 99b 125a c / *City of God* BK VII CH 29 261a b BK VIII CH 9-12 270d 273a BK X CH 31 319b d BK XI CH 4-34 324a 342a c BK XII 342b d 360a c esp CH 1-2 342b d 343d CH 4-5 344b 345b CH 9-27 347b-360a c BK XIII CH 24 373d 376a c BK XXII CH 1 586b d 587b CH 24 609c 610a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 7 A 2 REP 3 31d 32c Q 8 A 1 34d 35c A 2 ANS 35c 36b A 3 ANS and REP 1 36b 37c Q 9 A 2 ANS 39c 40d Q 21 A 4 ANS and REP 4 126c 127c QQ 44-46 238a 255d Q 50 A 1 ANS 269b 270a A 3 ANS 272a 273b Q 56 A 2 ANS and REP 4 292d 294a Q 57 A 2 ANS and REP 2 295d 297a Q 61 314d 317c QQ 65-74 339a 377a c Q 75 A 6 REP 1 2 383c 384c Q 84 A 3 REP 2 443d-444d QQ 90-93 480c 501c Q 94 A 3 ANS 504a 505a Q 104 A 1 esp REP 4 534c 536c AA 3 4 537b 538c Q 118 AA 2 3 601c 604b Q 119 A 1 ANS 604c 607b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II II Q 4 A 5 ANS 492b-493d PART III Q 2 A 7 718b-d Q 3 A 8 REP 2 729b 730b Q 6 A 3 REP 2 742a 743a

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XXI [58-78] 92a XXVIII [91-96] 97a PARADISE VII [64-75] 115d 116a [121-148] 116b-c X [1 , 120b c XIII [52-87] 126a b XIX [40-51] 135c XXIX [1-48] 150b-d

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 162b PART III 188d

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 17b-d / *Novum Organum* BK II APH 15 149a

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART V 54d 56a / *Meditations* III-IV 87a 90b / *Objections and Replies* PROP III 132d 133a 137d 138a 140b-c 214a c 229c-d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 17 SCHOL 362c 363c APPENDIX 370c 372d passim PART IV PROP 68 SCHOL 445a b

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I [6-10] 93b [650-659] 107b BK II [345 353] 118b 119a BK III [56-134] 136b 138a [708-735] 150b-151b BK IV [720-735] 168a b BK V [468-505] 185b 186a [577-599] 187b 188a [800-863] 192b-194a BK VII [59-640] 218b 231a esp [139-161 220a b [216-550] 221b 229a BK VIII [452-499] 242a 243a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 482 258a

35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VI SECT 56-57 36d 37b / *Human Understanding* BK II CH XV SECT 1 165c BK IV CH X SECT 15 352d 353a SECT 18-19 353c 354c

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 46 421b c

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT XII DIV 132 509d [fn 1]

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I 1a b

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 228a

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 81d-82a / *Judgement* 594d [fn 1]

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 245d 246a PART IV 361a

47 GOETHE *Faust* PROLOGUE [243-270] 7a b

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 239c 243d

54 FREUD *New Introductory Lectures* 875d 876a

7b Providence

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 1 1-3 6-9 esp 8 21 22 12 13 esp 12 1 3 12 7 13 14 18 15 esp 15 13 21 17 18 21 22 esp 22 15 18 26 1-6,22 25 28 10-22 35 9-15 37-50 esp 45 7-8 / *Exodus* 3 12 13 21 17 7 19-20 40 34 38—(D) *Exodus* 3 12 13 21 17 7 19-20 40 32 36 / *Numbers* 9 15-23 12 22 24 / *Deuteronomy* 4 1-40 6-11 29-33 / *Joshua* 1 11 23-24—(D) *Josue* 1-11 23-24 / *Judges* 1 16 / *I Samuel* 8 10 15 16—(D) *I Kings* 8-10 15 16 / *II Samuel* 7—(D) *II Kings* 7 / *I Kings* 11 13 2

passum—(D) III Kings 11 13 2 passum / II Kings pass m—(D) IV Kings passim / I Chro icle 17 3 15—(D) I Paralipomenon 17-3 15 / II Chron cles 11 36 passim—(D) II Paral pomenon 11 36 passim / Esther esp 4 13 14—(D) Esther 1 1 1 3 esp 4 13 14 / Job esp 1 2 24 2 38-41 / Psalms passum esp 3 4 9-11 13 17 18 65 , 103—(D) Psalms pas sim esp 3 4 9-1 12 16-17 64 ,6 103 / Proverbs 16 33 / Ecclesiast s 3 7 13 15 8-9 11 12 / Isa ah 36-37 46 51—(D) Isa as 36-37 46 51 / Jerem ah 17 5-8 18 19 3 45—(D) Jeremias 7 5-8 18-19 31 45 / Da iel passim, esp 3 4 3 6 1 28—(D) Da iel 1 1 3-23 passim, esp 3 1 23 3-91 2 3 passim, esp 3-91 100 6 1 28 / Jonah esp 1 4—(D) Jo as esp 4 / Malachi 1 2 3—(D) Malachias 1 2 3

APOCRYPHA Tobit—(D) OT Tob as / J dith esp 5-6 8-16—(D) OT J dith esp 5-6 8 16 / Rest of Esther—(D) OT Esther 1 4 16 24 / Wisdom of S lom 14 1 3—(D) OT B ok f Wisdom 14 1 3 / Ecclesiasticu 15 1 20—(D) OT Ecclesiasticus 15 11 22 / So g of Three Children—(D) OT Da iel 3-24-90 / S sanna —(D) OT Daniel 13 1-64 / Bel a d Dra n —(D) OT D iel 13-65 14-42 / I M ccabees 3 3 26—(D) OT I Mach bees 3 13 26 / II M ccabee 6 1 16—(D) OT II Machabees 6 1 6

N w TEST MENT M tthew 6:25 34 7 7 11 10 esp 0 1 10:29-33 23 37 / Luke 11 1 13 12 1 34 21 1 19 / Joh 6:22-71 esp 6.40 6.44 45 6.64-65—(D) Joh 6:22-72 esp 6.4 6.44 45 6.65-66 / Acts 1 5 26 6 8 7.60 13-48—(D) Act 15 26 6.8-7.59 13 48 / Romans 8..8 1 36 3 1 / Ephe sia 1 4 2 0 4 -7 / Ph l ppians 2 12 3 / II Tim thy 1 9 / Hebrews 1 1 3 13-5-6 / I Peter 1-5

18 AU USTI E Co f ssio s K IX par 1 61 -d / City f G d BK I CH 8-9 133a 135a BK I CH 33 206c d BK V CH 1 207d 208 CH 8- 1 12c 216d CH 19 224b-225b H 21 2 226a 2 a X X CH 14 17 307 310b BK XI CH 2 333d 334c BK X CH 27 359 360a c K XIV CH 2 396c 39 a BK XX 1 CH 1 586b d 587b / Chr stian Doctrine BK I CH 7 650a

19 AQU N Summa Theologica 1 Q 3 1 REP 14b-15b Q 8 3 NS 36b-37 O 3 8 and R 1 70d 71b Q 5 A 3 RE 4 93b-94 QQ 22 4 1 7c 143c Q 96 A 1 NS and EP 2 510b-511b P RT 1 II Q 9 6 R 3 662a d

20 AQUIN Summa Theologic RT 1 II Q 93 5 3 219a d P RT II II Q 1 A 7 AN 385c 387 Q 25 R P 3 508d 509c P T Q 6 1 855a-d P T 1 PPL, Q 69 3 887d-889c Q 71 A 5 N 90 c-908b Q 77 1 943a 944d Q 7b 3 950b-951a

21 D NTE Divine Comedy 11 1 [6 -96] 10b RAD S 1 [94 42] 107b-d 11 [2]

113c 114d VIII [85 148] 117c 118c XI XII 122a 125a esp XI [25 39] 122b XII [37 45] 124a XX [31 138] 137a 138a

22 CH UCER Troilus and Cresnda BK IV STA ZA 138 154 106b 108b / Kn ght s Tale [12,1 12(7] 180b [1663 16,2] 187b / Tale of Man of Law 236b-255b esp [4869-49 4] 242b 243b [5247 5253] 249b / Friar s Tale [of 4 08,] 281a b / Frankl s Tale [11 177 206] 353b 354a / Monk s Tale [14 021-052] 434b-435a [14 149-252] 437a-438b

23 HOBBES Levi than PA T 1 53d PA T II 113b-c 160 162b PART IV 254b 271b

25 MONTAIGNE Essays 98b 99a

26 SH KESPEARE Ri h rd III ACT II SC II [7,-95] 120b-c

27 S KESP RE Hamlet ACT V SC II [1 11] 67d-68a [4, -53] 68b-c [230- 35] 70a

29 CERVANTES Don Quixote P RT II 408c

30 BACON Advancement of Learn g 19d 38a / Novum Org um BK I APH 93 125d 126a

32 MILTON Sonnets XVI 66b-67a / Paradise Lost BK III [80-134] 137a 138a / Samson Agon es [210-214] 344a [373 380] 347b-348a [66,-709] 354a 355a / A eopagitica 394b-395b

33 PA CAL Pensées 619-641 284b-290a

35 BERKELEY Human Knowl dge INTRO SECT 3 405b-c SECT 60-66 424b-426a SECT 93-94 431b-c SECT 105 107 433b-434a SECT 146-155 442a-444c

35 HUME Human Understand g SECT VII DIV 54-57 474b-4 5d SECT XI DIV 108 500b-d

37 FIEL G Tom J nes 75 -d 377c 378a

38 ROU SE U I eq ality 331c d / Social Con tract K II 414d K IV 437d-438b

40 GI ON Decline and Fall 292d 294a

41 GI BON Decline a d Fall 542a b

44 BOSWELL Johnson 95c d

46 HEGEL Ph losophy of History INTRO 158c 160b 168d 170b P RT IV 321b-c 368d 369a c

48 M LVILLE Moby Dick 85a 237a 3 6b 397a

51 TOLSTOY War and Peace BK 1 2 2a b BK IX 342 344b 35 b-358b BK X 447c-448a 465c-467 passim BK XII 553b BK XI 1 563 b BK XV 619d 620 631a-c EP LOGUE 1 650b-c EPILOGUE II 675a 677b 680b-c 684b-d

52 DO O VSKY Brothers Karam ov BK V 127b-137c pass m BK XI 343b-c

54 FR Civ li,ation and I s Disconte.ents 771a b

7c Di ne go ernment and law

OLD T ST MENT Genesis 9 1 7 / Exodus 12 1 5 18 19-3 esp 20 1 7 34 35 / Levit cus passim / Numbers pass m esp 5 10 15 18 19 27 30-35 36 / Deuteronomy pass m esp 5 6-2 / I Ch o icles 29 1 —(D) I Paralipomeno 9 1 / Job 9 1 13 34 12 18 37 4 / Psalm 1 1 16 9 7-14 37 30-31 4 8 47 59 3 66- 72 8 8 1 8 89 30-32 93

7d Grace

39 b,d 399c BK XVI CH 26— 438c-439d BK XXI, CH 15 16 572c 574a BK XXII CH —2 606d-608b esp 608a b / *Christian Doctrine* BK I, CH 1 624b,d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q A 2 RE 1 11d 12 Q 8 A 3 ANS and REP 4 36b-37c Q 1— A 2 AN 51c 52c A 4 AN 53b-54c A 5 A 3 54c 55b A 13 61c-62b Q 38 200c 202b Q 43 230a 237a,c Q 62 317 325b Q 89, A 1 RE 3 473b-475a A 2 REP 3 475a-d Q 9- 506b-510a Q 104 A 4 ANS 5—8a-c Q 108 A 8 A and REP 1 2 561a 562a Q 113 A REP 576a-d ART I-II, Q 5 AA 5 7 640b-642d esp REP 3 642a-d

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 50 2 7c-8a Q 5 4 15a-d Q 5— A 4 A S and REP 6 28c 29d Q 58 A 3 REP 3 43b-44a Q 62 59d-63a Q 63 A 2 ANS and R P 2 64b-65a A 3 4 65a-66c Q 6— AA 2-5 72a 75a Q 66 A 2 EP 1 6c 77c Q 68 8 c-96c Q —6 A 2 RE 2 141d 142c Q —9, AA 3 4 158a 159c Q 8 3, REP 3 165d 166b Q 83 A 1 R P 4-—5 171 172b A REP 2 172b-173a Q 8— 4 6 A 3 182d 184a Q 9— A 1 ANS 226c 227c Q 98 A 1 239b-240c Q 100 A 5 EP 2 255a 257 A 10 RE 3 26 b-263b A 2 A S 264d 265d Q 106 A and REP 1 3 321a 322a QQ 109- 14 338a 3 8a,c PART II-II Q 2 AA 9-1 398c 400b Q —4 A 3 REP 1 491a d A AN 493b-4—9c PART III Q 6 A 3, REP 3 742a-743a QQ 7 8 745c 763b Q 1 A 4 RE 3 771b-772 Q 1— 4 REP 2 786d 787c Q — A 2 A S 789a-d Q — 1 ANS and RE 3 827 -828c Q 3 1 RE 1 833a-d 4 REP 835b-836a Q 6 A 2 REP 846b-d Q 6 A1 RE 2 855a-d Q 6 858b-864c PART III SUPPL, Q —— A — REP 5 937 938a

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL, —II 1 —42 PUR C TORY VI [40-60] 62d-63a [112 123] 63d 64 IX [13-69] 66a-c XI [1 24] 68d-69a XIII [10-] 72a P RADI E [16-1 0] 115b-116b XX [31 135] 137a 138a XXI 142d 144b esp [58-60] 143b, [18 3] 143d 144 XXIX [58-66] 150d 151a XXX [34-99] 152 -d XXXII [40-84] 155a-c XXXII [39]-XXX 1 [143] 156a 1 7d

22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida* BK STA ZA 144 19b-20a / *Second Nun Tale* [15 58-8—] 467 b

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 88c-89a PART II 137c-d 149c-d ART III 176d 177c 186a b 191b-193c esp 193a 241 242a PART IV 250c 251b 253b-254b 255b 264a

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 209a-d 212a-d 238c 239c —5 268a 273a b 294a b

31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 125d 126a

3— MILTON *Paradise Lost* K II [1024 033] 133b K [56-4 5] 136b-144b esp [30-134] 138a, [6— 8—] 139a b, [— 35] 140b K XI [31] 299a b [62] 304b-305a / *Samson Agonistes* [3 5-3—2] 347b [652-666] 353b 354

33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 1a 14a 19a 26b 29b 154b-159a / *Pensées* 202 211a 430-435 245 2 1a 505 261a b 507-511 261b 513-517 262a 263b 520-5 4 263b-264a 643 290b-291a 881 345b

37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 38d

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 238b

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* P RT III 310d 311a P T IV 354 c

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK 127b-137c passim

7e Miracles

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 17 18-18 16 19 9-11,24 26 21 1-8 / *Exodus* 3-4 7 12 14 17 / *Numbers* 9 5 3 1 2 16-17 20 1 13 2 5-9 22 2 34 6-9-10 / *Joshua* 3 4 6 1 20 0 12 14 4 6-7—(D) *Josue* 3 4 6 1 20 10 2 14 24 6-7 / *Judges* 6 36-40 / *I Samuel*, 12 16-19—(D) *I Kings* 12 16-19 / *I Kings* 17 18 30-39—(D) *III Kings* 1 18 30-39 / *II Kings* 1-6 13 20-21 20 1 11 —(D) *IV King* 1-6 13 20-21 20 1 1 / *Nehemiah* 9 9 21—(D) *II Esdras* 9 9- 1 / *Psalms* 8 105 106 7 11 114—(D) *Psalms* 77 104 105— 11 113 1-8 / *Isaiah* 38 1-9—(D) *Isaias* 38 1-9 / *Daniel* 3 1 4 3 5-6—(D) *Daniel* 3 1 23 91 100 5-6 / *Joel* 2 30-31 / *Jonah*—(D) *Jonas*

APOCRYPHA *Song of Three Children* 1 2—(D) OT *Daniel*, 3 24-50 / *Bel and Dragon* 28 42 —(D) OT *Daniel* 14 2 42 / *II Maccabees* 18 22 20—(D) OT *II Machabees* 1 18-— 2 10

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 1 18-25 8-9 12 9-13,22 9 14,13 36 15 22 39 17 0 29-34 / *Mark* 1 29-34,40-44 2 3 12 3 1-5 4 34-40 5 6 34 56 7 24-8 26 9 1 10 16- 9 10 46-52 3 24 26 / *Luke* 1 5-66 4 31-5 26 6 6-10 7 8 22-56 9 12 17,—8-43 11 14 6 13 11 17 14 1-6 1 11 9 18 35-43 / *John* 2 1 11 3 2 4 46-54 5 1 16 6 5-26 7 31 9 1 33 11 45 12 37 8 1 11 / *Acts* 1 2 3 2 11 5 12 6 8 6 9 36-43 14 7-1 5 7 19 1 12 20— 1 8 1 1 / *I Corinthians* 12 8-1 / *Galatians* 3 5-7 / *Hebrews* 2 3 4

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK X CH 8-13 303a 307c CH 6-18 308b-310d BK XXI CH 5-8 563d 568d BK XXII CH 5 10 589a 599b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 89, A 8 REP 2 479c-480c Q 9— A 4 AN 491b-d Q 104 A 4 A 3 538a-c Q 105 AA 6-8 543b-545b Q 106 A 3 A 547c 548b Q 110 A 4 567c 568b Q 114 A 4 584 585a P RT I II Q 10 A 4 REP 2 665d-666a,c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 63 A 4 RE 3 65d-66c Q 8 A 4 AN 166b-16 a Q 113 A 1 369c 3 0b PART III SUPPL, Q —5 3 ANS 938a-939d Q 83 A 3 978c 980d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE XX V [88-111] 143 d

(7 *Doctrines common to the Jewish Mohammedan and Christian conceptions of God and His relation to the world and man 7e Miracles*)

22 CHAUCER *Tale of Man of Law* 236b 255b esp [4869-49 4] 242b 243b / *Prioress s Tale* [13 418 6 0] 392a 395b / *Second Nun s Tale* [16 001-021] 471a b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 83c PART II 137b c 160b PART III 166a 167b 188a 191a PART IV 249b 250a
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 19b c 33c d 41b d / *New Atlantis* 201d 203c esp 203a b
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK XII [173-242] 323a 324a
33 PASCAL *Pensees* 643-644 290b 291b 803-856 328b 341b 856 345a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK IV CH XVI SECT 13 371a b
35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 62-63 425a c SECT 84 429b c
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VII DIV 54 474b c SECT X 488d 497b
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 180b c 189b 191a 206b d 295c 296b 465d 466c 605b d
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 227d 228a 232a c 398b 399b
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 126b c 359a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 247a PART III 307a b PART IV 338b c 348d 349a
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [762-770] 20a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK V 219b 220a
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK I 11a b BK II 21d 22b BK V 127b 137c passim BK VII 171a 177b 189d 190a

7f The Book of Life

OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 32 31-33 33 19 / *Psalms* 69 8—(D) *Psalms* 68 29 / *Isaiah* 4 3—(D) *Isaias* 4 3
APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 33 10 13—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 33 10-14
NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 20 1 16 22 1 14 / *Luke* 10 20 / *John* 5 21 6 44 10 26 29 / *Acts* 13 48 / *Romans* 8 28-9 23 / *Ephesians* 1-3 / *II Thessalonians* 2 12 14 / *II Timothy* 1 8 9 2 19 20 / *Hebrews* 12 22 23 / *I Peter* 1 1-5 2 1-9 / *II Peter* 1 10 / *Revelation* 3 4 5 13 4 8 17 7-8 20 11-21 27 esp 20 15 21 27 22 18 19—(D) *Apocalypse* 3 4 5 13 4-8 17 7-8 20 11-21 27 esp 0 15 21 27 22 18 19
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XV CH I 397b d 398c BK XX CH 8 536d 538c CH 14-16 542d 544d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 24 141b 143c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q 63 A I REP I 864c 865b PART III SUPPL Q 87 A I 997b 998c
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE XIX [103-148] 136a c XX [94 138] 137d 138a XXI [52 102] 138d 139b XXXII [40-84] 155a c
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I [356-363] 101a
33 PASCAL *Pensees* 884 346a
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 238c 334b c

7g The resurrection of the body

OLD TESTAMENT *Job* 14 13 15 19 25 27 / *Isaiah* 26 19 66 14—(D) *Isaias* 26 19 66 14 / *Ezekiel* 37 1 14—(D) *Ezechiel* 37 1 14 / *Daniel* 12 1 3
APOCRYPHA *II Maccabees* 12 41 45—(D) OT *II Machabees* 12 43 46
NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 22 23 33 27 52-53 28 / *Mark* 12 18 27 16 1-9 / *Luke* 20 27 38 24 1 12 / *John* 2 18 22 / *Acts* 23 1 10 24 15 26 8 / *Romans* 4 17 6 3 11 8 10 11 / *I Corinthians* 6 14 15 / *II Corinthians* 1 9-10 4 14 / *I Thessalonians* 4 13 17 / *Hebrews* 6 1 2
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK X CH 29 317b-318a BK XIII CH 1-2 360a 361a CH 16 20 367a 371a CH 22 24 371c-376a c BK XX CH 6 7 534a 536d CH 9-10 538 541a CH 12 17 541c 545c CH 20-23 547c 552c CH 26 555d 556a BK XX CH 30-BK XXI CH 10 559d 570b BK XXII 586b d 618d esp CH 4 5 588b-590a CH 7 591c d CH 11 21 599c-606d CH 25-30 612a 618d / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 19-21 629a b CH 23 24 630a 631a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL QQ 75-86 935a 996a c Q 93 A I 1037d 1039a
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL VI [94 111] 9b-c X [1 15] 13d XIII [85 108] 18d 19a PARADISE VII [121-148] 116b c XIV [1-66] 126d 127c XXV [64 1 9] 145a c
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART III 191b 193 195b d PART IV 253b 255b 259b c
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 248c 249c 311a
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [22, 343] 140b-143a esp [294-3 9] 141b 142b BK XII [386-445] 327b 329a esp [411 429] 328a b
35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 95 431c
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XXIV 205d 206a
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 233d 234d
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 472a b

7h The Last Judgment and the end of the world

OLD TESTAMENT *Job* 19 25 27 21 27 34 / *Psalms* 50 96 10-13—(D) *Psalms* 49 95 10-13 / *Ecclesiastes* 3 16 17 11 9 10 12 14 / *Isaiah* 2 4 11 11 16 13 6 22 24 6 27 30 34 35 65 17 25 66—(D) *Isaias* 2 4 11 11 16 13 6-22 24 26 27 30 34 35 6 17 25 66 / *Daniel* 7 21 27 12 / *Joel* / *Micah* 4—(D) *Micheas* 4 / *Zephaniah*—(D) *Sophonias* / *Zechariah* 14—(D) *Zacharias* 14 / *Malachi* 3 4—(D) *Malachias* 3 4
APOCRYPHA *Judith* 16 17—(D) OT *Judith* 16 20 21 / *Rest of Esther* 10 4 11 12—(D) OT *Esther* 10 4 11 12

NEW TESTAMENT: *Matthew* [illegible] 1 3 13:36-43 -50 / *Mark* 13:4-37 / *Luke* 1 / *Acts* 31 / *Romans* 5:11 / *I Corinthians*, 15:23 / *I Thessalonians* 4:10 / *II Thessalonians*, 1 / *II Timothy* 3:1 / *Hebrews*, 9:26 / *James*, 5:7-9 / *I Peter* 4:5-6 / *II Peter* 3:7-13 / *I John*, 2:18-29 / *Jude* / *Revelation* passim, esp 4:3 16:21 [illegible]—(D) *Apocalypse* passim, esp 14:15

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God*, BK X, CH 33 [illegible] BK XX [illegible] BK XXI, CH 1 [illegible] *Christian Doctrine* BK III, CH 37 [illegible]

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART III SUPPL, QQ 74 922a-935a,c Q 77 A 2 945a-946b [illegible] 1085a,c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy*, HELL, [illegible] PAR. DISE XIX [100-145] 136a-c

22 CHAUCER *Parson's Tale* par 10 495b-502a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan*, PART III, 230a 244b-c

32 MILTON *Christs Nativity* [133-1..] 4b-5b / *Paradise Lost* BK III [274-343] 141b-143a esp [325-341] 14.. b BK XI [..39-..3] 2..a-..a BK XI [..5-..3] 300a-301 BK XII [451-465] 329a [537-551] 331a / *Areopagitica* 410a b

35 LOCKE *Toleration*, 1 a-b

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 187c 189a

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 233c 234d

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK V, 127b-13.. c passim, esp 134d 13..a BK XI, 33.. a 3..a passim

8. Specifically Jewish doctrines concerning God and His people

8a. The Chosen People: Jew and gentile

OLD TESTAMENT: *Genesis* [illegible] / *Exodus*, [illegible] 33:12-34:18 / *Leviticus* / *Deuteronomy* 4:12 passim, esp [illegible] / *Joshua* [illegible] / *I Samuel* —(D) *I Kings* 12 / *II Kings*, [illegible]—(D) *III Kings* 8:5 / *II Kings*, [illegible]—(D) *IV Kings* / *I Chronicles*, [illegible] (D) *I Paralipomenon*, [illegible] / *Nehemiah* 9—(D) *II Esdras* 9 / *Psalms* passim, esp 33 [illegible] 106:48, [illegible] 135:4 [illegible]—(D) *Psalms* passim, esp [illegible] / *Isaiah* passim, esp 4 [illegible] 42:1-6, 43:1 [illegible] 45:3-4 49:1-6, 63:7-8—(D) *Isaias* passim, esp [illegible] 43:1 [illegible] 49:1 [illegible] / *Jeremiah* passim, esp [illegible] 30:22, 31:1 33

[illegible]—(D) *Jeremias* passim, esp [illegible] / *Ezekiel*, [illegible] 31 33 3 5 [illegible] 36:3—(D) *Ezechiel* 11:15 [illegible] 34 [illegible] / *Amos* 3:1-2 / *Obadiah*—(D) *Abdias* / *Micah* [illegible]—(D) *Micheas* 5:7 11 / *Zechariah*, 2:12 2:13 8:10 esp 8:23—(D) *Zacharias*, [illegible] 8:10 esp 8:23 / *Malachi* 1 3—(D) *Malachias* 1:2 3

APOCRYPHA: *Rest of Esther* 14:5—(D) OT *Esther* 14:5 / *Wisdom of Solomon* 16:20 [illegible]—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom*, 16:20 [illegible] / *Ecclesiasticus*, [illegible]—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* [illegible] 5

NEW TESTAMENT: *Matthew* 10:5-6 / [illegible] / *Romans* [illegible] 9-11 / *I Corinthians* 1 13 / *Galatians* 2:6-16 3:13 [illegible] / *Ephesians* 2:1 3:5 / *Colossians* 3:9-11

15 TACITUS *Histories* BK V 295d

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK IV [illegible] 206d [illegible] BK X, CH 16 433a-434a CH 15 434c [illegible] 435a-440b [illegible] 441c-442c BK XVII, CH [illegible] 458c-459d BK XIX CH 22 525b-c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I Q 1 A 4 REP 125c 127c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I-II, [illegible] 2 2b 44b [illegible] 270b-321a passim, esp [illegible] 29 [illegible] 298a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan*, PART I 82d-83a PART I 160b-c PART III, 177 180d

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK XII [10 [illegible]] 321b-32..a / *Samson Agonistes* 339a [illegible] [illegible] 344a 345a, [illegible] 348b-349a, [illegible] 358a 359a, [illegible] 364b-36..a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 603 279b 610-611 [illegible] [illegible]b 619-64.. 284b-290a [illegible] 301b-305b

38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK I [illegible]b-c

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 179d 183a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I, 245d 247b PART III 30.. b-c PAR[illegible] 322a b

8b. God's Covenant with Israel: circumcision as sign of the Covenant

OLD TESTAMENT: *Genesis*, 12:1-3 [illegible] / *Exodus*, [illegible] 6:1-9 19:3-8 24:1-8 31:16-1.. / *Leviticus* [illegible] / *Deuteronomy* [illegible] passim, esp [illegible] / *Joshua* 5:2-9 [illegible] 23:16-24:25—(D) *Josue* 5:1-9 [illegible] / *Judges* 2:1-3 / *I Kings* 8:56 19:9-18—(D) *III Kings* 8:56 19:9-18 / *II Kings*, [illegible]—(D) *IV Kings* [illegible] / *I Chronicles*, 16:13-22—(D) *I Paralipomenon*, 16:13 [illegible] / *II Chronicles*, 6:14 [illegible]—(D) *II Paralipomenon* 6:14-15 / *Nehemiah*, 1:5 9—(D) *II Esdras* 1:5 9 / *Psalms* [illegible] esp [illegible]—(D) *Psalms* [illegible] 43:18

(8 *Specifically Jewish doctrines concerning God and His people* 8b *God's Covenant with Israel circumcision as sign of the Covenant*)

73 19-20 77 104 esp 104 7-8 110 / *Isaiah* 24 1-5 33 1-8 54 esp 54 10 56 esp 56 4-6 59 20-21 61 esp 61 8—(D) *Isaias* 24 1-5 33 1-8 54 esp 54 10 56 esp 56 4-6 59 20-21 61 esp 61 8 / *Jeremiah* 4 4 11 14 19 22 22 5-9 31-33 esp 31 31-33 32 40 33 20-26 34 13 20 50 4-5—(D) *Jeremias* 4 4 11 14 19-22 22 5-9 31-33 esp 31 31 33 32 40 33 20-26 34 13-20 50 4-5 / *Ezekiel* 16-17 20 33-38 37 21-28 44 6-9—(D) *Ezechiel* 16-17 20 33-38 37 21-28 44 6-9 / *Hosea* 2 16-20 6 esp 6 7 8—(D) *Osee* 2 16-20 6 esp 6 7 8 / *Haggai* 2 4-5—(D) *Aggeus* 2 5 6

Apocrypha *Ecclesiasticus* 44 19-45 5—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 44 20-45 6 / *I Maccabees* 1 44 63 2 19-6 8 esp 4 7-14—(D) OT *I Machabees* 1 46-66 2 19-6 8 esp 4 7-14

New Testament *Luke* 1 70-75 2:21 / *John* 7 22-23 / *Acts* 3.25 7 1-8 51-53 15 1-29 21 20 21 / *Romans* 2 25 4 16 11 25-27 / *I Corinthians* 7 18 19 / *Galatians* 3 13-5 11 6 12 15 / *Ephesians* 2 11 13 / *Colossians* 2 10-14 3 9-11 / *Hebrews* 8 6-10 17

18 Augustine *City of God* BK XVI CH 16 433c 434a CH 18 434c CH 21 28 435a-440b CH 32 441c-442c CH 36-38 443d 446a BK XIX CH 22 525b c

20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 98 AA 4-6 242b 245b

23 Hobbes *Leviathan* PART I 82d 83a PART III 177c 180a 199b 201b 206c

32 Milton *Upon the Circumcision* 12b 13a

33 Pascal *Pensees* 610-612 280b 282b 637-639 289b 290a 675 296b 297a

46 Hegel *Philosophy of History* PART IV 322a b

8c The Law its observance as a condition of righteousness and blessedness

Old Testament *Genesis* 26 4-5 / *Exodus* 12 13 19 30 esp 20 1-17 / *Leviticus* passim esp 26 / *Numbers* passim / *Deuteronomy* passim esp 4 1-15 5 6-21 6 1-9 6 17-25 7 9-26 10 12 13 11 1-3 12 3 28 1-68 30 11 20 / *Joshua* 1 7-8 8 30-35 22 1-6—(D) *Josue* 1 7-8 8 30-35 22 1 6 / *I Kings* 8 54 62—(D) *III Kings* 8 54-62 / *II Kings* 17 21 8—(D) *IV Kings* 17 21 8 / *I Chronicles* 22 12 13—(D) *I Paralipomenon* 22 12 13 / *II Chronicles* 31 33 8 35 1-19—(D) *II Paralipomenon* 31 33 8 35 1-19 / *Ezra* 9-10—(D) *I Esdras* 9 10 / *Nehemiah* 1 5-9 9 16-38—(D) *II Esdras* 1 5-9 9 16-38 / *Psalms* 1 19 7-14 37 30-31 40 8 78 89 20-36 esp 89 30-32 94 12 105 43-45 119—(D) *Psalms* 1 18 8 15 36 30-31 39 9 77 88 21-37 esp 88 31 33 93 12 104 43-45 118 / *Proverbs* passim esp 6 20-23 28 7 29 18 / *Isaiah* passim esp 5 24-25 30 9 42:21 25 51 7-8—(D) *Isaias* passim esp 5 24-25 30 9 42.21 25 51 7-8 / *Jeremiah* passim esp 2 5-8 6 19 9 13 16, 16 10-13 26 4 6 31 33 44 10-14 44 23—(D) *Jeremias* passim esp 2 5-8 6 19 9 13 16, 16 10-13 26 4-6 31 33 44 10-14 44 23 / *Ezekiel* 5 5-9 11 17-20 18 22 26 36 25 27 43-48—(D) *Ezechiel* 5 5-9 11 17 20 18 22-26 36 25 27 43 48 / *Daniel* 9 1 15 / *Hosea* 4 6 8 1—(D) *Osee* 4 6 8 1 / *Amos* 2 4 6 / *Zephaniah* 3 1 7—(D) *Sophonias* 3 1-7 / *Zechariah* 7 12 14—(D) *Zacharias* 7 12 14 / *Malachi* 2 1 10 3 7 4 4—(D) *Malachias* 2 1-10 3 7 4 4

Apocrypha *Tobit* 14 8-9—(D) OT *Tobias* 14 10 11 / *Ecclesiasticus* passim, esp 2 16 9 15 10 19 11 15 17 11 14 19 17 20 19 24 24 23 32 15 33 2 34 8 39 1 11 41 8 4 1 2 45 1-5—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* passim esp 2 19 9 22 23 10 23 11 15 17 9 1 19 17-18 19 21 24 32-33 32 19 33 2 34 8 39 1-15 41 11 42 1 2 45 1-6 / *Baruch*—(D) OT *Baruch* / *I Maccabees* 1 38-63 2 19-68—(D) OT *I Machabees* 1 40-66 2 19 68 / *II Maccabees* 2 2 3 6-7 11 22 26—(D) OT *II Machabees* 2 2 3 6-7 11 22 6

New Testament *Matthew* 5 17 20 1 1 13 15 1 20 19 3-9 / *Mark* 7 1 23 10 2 12 / *Luke* 6 1-9 11 37-41 14 2-5 16 16 17 / *John* 1 17 5 1 18 45-47 7 19-23 / *Acts* 10 9-15 25 28 13 38-39 15 1 10 21 20 21 / *Romans* passim / *Galatians* passim / *Ephesians* 2 14-15 / *I Timothy* 1 5 11 / *Hebrews* 7 10

18 Augustine *City of God* BK X CH 15 309c 310b BK XX CH 28 556c 557a

20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 91 AA 4 5 210c 212c QQ 98 105 239b 321a

21 Dante *Divine Comedy* PARADISE V [13-84] 112b 113a passim

23 Hobbes *Leviathan* PART III 177d 178a 180a d 206c 207a 216b 218a 223a c PART IV 269a

30 Bacon *Advancement of Learning* 18b c

32 Milton *Paradise Lost* BK XII [223 260] 324a 325a [285 314] 325b 326a

33 Pascal *Pensees* 610 280b 282a 619 620 284b 286a 628-634 287a 289a 678 297a b 680 298a

35 Locke *Toleration* 14b 15a

40 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 179d 182c esp 181a 182a 208a-c

46 Hegel *Philosophy of History* PART I 246c d

8d The Temple the Ark of the Torah

Old Testament *Exodus* 25 27 30 1-6 35 10-38 31 39 32 40 36 / *Leviticus* 26 11 / *Numbers* 9 15 22 / *Deuteronomy* 10 1-5 12 5-6 16 5-6 31 24 26 / *Joshua* 3 4 6 1 16—(D) *Josue* 3 4 6 1 16 / *I Samuel* 4 3-7 2—(D) *I Kings* 4 3-7 2 / *II Samuel* 6 1 17 7 1 13—(D) *II Kings* 6 1 17 7 1 13 / *I Kings* 5-8—(D) *III Kings* 5-8 / *II Kings* 12 4 16

9 1 —(D) II Kings 4 16 25 1 17 / I Chronicles 13 15 1 1 1 —1 9 0—(D) I Paralipomenon, 13 15 1 1 1 —1 9 10 / II Chronicles 2 7 esp 12 16 8 11 / II Chronicles 36—(D) II Paralipomenon 44 4 9 34 36—(D) II Paralipomenon esp 16 8 11 24-4 4 9 4 36 / Ezra 3-6—(D) I Esdras 3-6 / Psalms 5— 11 4 4-6 65-4 68-29 138 2—(D) Psalms 55 1 5 25 4-6 64 5 6-30 3 2 / Isaiah 3 56-6—(D) Isaias 56-6 / Jeremiah 71 4-9-3 26 1 —(D) Jeremias 71 4-9-30 6 1 7 / Ezekiel, 40-4—(D) Ezechiel, 40-4 / Jonah 4—(D) Jonas 5 / Micah, 4 1 —(D) Micheas, 4 1 2 / Habakkuk 2 20—(D) II Habacuc 2 / II ggai—(D) Aggeus / Zechariah, 8 9—(D) Zacharias 8 9 / M Lchi, 3 1—(D) Malachias 3 1 APOCRYPHA T 14 4 —(D) OT Tobias 14 6-9 / Wisdom of Solomon 9 8—(D) OT Book f Wisdom 9 8 / Baruch, 2 26—(D) OT Baruch 26

NEW TESTAMENT John 13 7 / Hebrews 9 1 9

15 TACITUS Histories BK V 296a 297d 298a

18 AUGUSTINE City of God BK X CH 1 309c 3 0b

20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I-II Q 1 4 ANS and REP 1,4 259a 270b Q 10 A 4 2 6d 283c

23 HOBBES Leviathan PART III 178c 180a-c 18 c 198a b

32 MILTON Paradise Lost BK XII [-44 256] 324b [8 4 3] 325b-32 a esp [331 343] 326b

40 GIBBON Decline and Fall 180a 180d 181a 352c 354d esp 354a b

8e The messianic hope

OLD TESTAMENT Genesis 49 10 / Numbers, 4 / Deuteronomy 32 / Psalms 2 3 44 46-48 60 67-69 passim 4 1 76 0-48 1 6 3 14 1 —(D) Psalms 2 8-3 43 45 4 59 66-68 passim 3 1 05-40-48 125 131 46 / Isaiah, 2 4 7 10- 6 9 1 1 1 25 30 5-33 3 40-46 esp 41 25 42-4 49 5 -56 esp 5- 3-53 12 59 20-62 12 65 1 66 24—(D) Isaias 2 4 0-16 9 1 12 27 30 5-33 3 40-46 esp 4 2 4-4 9 5 56 esp 5- 3-53 1 59 20-6 65 -66 24 / Jeremiah, 33-6 0-33—(D) Jeremias 23 3-6 30-33 / Ezekiel, 1 2 34 36-37—(D) Ezechiel, 34 36-37 Daniel, 9 20 / Hosea, 1 10-1 2 6-3 3 35 13 14—(D) Osee 0-11 2 5-4 3 35 3 4 / Joel 2 3 / Amos 9 9 —(D) Amos 9 9-14 / Micah 2 1 3 4-5 —(D) Micheas 4 13 4-5 Zechariah 3—(D) So 3 / Zechariah 8 4—(D) Zacharias 2 8 2 4 Malachi, 3 4—(D) Malachias 3 4

NEW TESTAMENT Matthew 1 esp 1 20-23 3 1 3-3 24 1 16 13 16 1 3 6 63 64 / Mark 8 2 9 9 2 13 14 61-6 / Luke 1 0-35 3 1-6 15 16 24 8 0 18-0 28 36 2 66-70 / John 1 15 41 esp 1 41 44 50 4 6 26 10-4 5

20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART III Q 1 A 6 08c 709c

23 HOBBES Leviathan PART III 229c

32 MILTON Paradise Lost BK XII [35 -44] 324b [-84 330] 325b-326b

33 PASCAL Pensées 607 280a 609 280b 613 282b-283a 616-619 283b-285a 642 290b 66 293b 673 296a 675 296b-297a 692 300b-301 719 308b-309a 2 315b-316b 9 30 316b-317a

40 GIBBON Decline and Fall 181b 207d 208a 308a

41 GIBBON Decline and Fall 134b-135a

9 Specifically Christian dogmas concerning the divine nature and human destiny

9a The Trinity

OLD TESTAMENT Genesis 1 26

NEW TESTAMENT Matthew 1 18 2 3 11 16-10 19-2 1 3 3 8 19 / Mark 1 8-12 3 28 13 11 / Luke 1 15-6-35 3 6 1 22 11 13 1 0-1 / John, 1 1-8 14 18 3 34 3 esp 3 16-17 3 35 36 14 16 2 2 23 / Acts 1 2 5-8 2 1 4 esp 32 39 4 23 3 5 3 8 1 9 31 10 38 44 48 1 5 1 13 4 15 9 19 6 0 28 5 7 / Romans 5 esp 5 5 10 8 1-9 1 14 1 15 13 6 / I Corinthians 9-14 3 16-23 6 19 12 13 / II Corinthians 1 8 4 4 13 4—(D) II Corinthians 1 8 4 4 13 13 / Ephesians 1 3 passim / Colossians 1 13 15 / I Thessalonians 1 5-6 / II Timothy 1 14 / Titus 3 4 / Hebrews 1 3 6 4-6 1 14 / I Peter 1 1 2 / II Peter 21 / I John 4 esp 4 9-1 4 14 15, 5 1 5 5 5 0-12 / Jude 1

18 AUGUSTINE Confessions BK XIII par 6-1 112a-113d par 3 119b / City of God BK X CH 3 4 312c 313c BK XI CH 0 3 7d 3 8d CH 3 9 334c 339b CH 3 3 0b-d BK X CH 24 373d 376a,c BK XVI CH 6 426c / Christian Doctrine BK I, CH 5 62 d-626a CH 34 634b-c BK III CH 2, 657b-658a

19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I, QQ 27 43 153a 23 a,c Q 59, 1 CONTRARY 306c 307b Q 6 A 2, A 3 315c 316a Q 8 A 3 REP 3 72 473a Q 9 A 4, REP 2 487d-488c Q 93 A 1 REP 492a-d AA 5-8 49 b-500c Q 108 A 1 A 532 533c

20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I-II Q 93 REP 2 215b,d 216c Q 106, A 4 REP 3 3 4a 32c PART II-II Q A 8 REP 3 38 a 388c Q 2, 8 39 d 398b PART III, Q 2, A 3 REP 3 713a 714c Q 8 A 1 REP 756d-7 c Q 16, 1 REP 796b- 9 d A 2 REP 797d 798b REP 800c-801b Q 1 A REP 5 80 a-808d 2

(9 *Specifically Christian dogmas concerning the divine nature and human destiny 9a The Trinity*)

REP 3 808d 809d Q 19 A 1 REP 1 816a 818b QQ 20–24 821a 839c Q 25 A 1 ANS and REP 1 3 839d 840d Q 26 A 2 ANS and REP 2 846b d Q 63 A 3 REP 1 866c 867c A 4 CONTRARY 867d 868b PART III SUPPL Q 95 A 1 REP 2 1042c 1044c A 3 ANS 1045b 1046d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY III [34–45] 56b PARADISE X [1–6] 120b XIV [28–33] 127b XXIV [124–147] 144a XXXIII [76–145] 157a d

22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida* BK V STANZA 267 155a / *Second Nun's Tale* [15,794–808] 467a b

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 97c PART III 182a c 207b 207d 208c 227b PART IV 259d

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 100c

31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 159a 232b

32 MILTON *Christs Nativity* [1–14] 1a b / *Paradise Lost* BK III [56–415] 136b 144b esp [167 172] 139a [372 389] 143b 144a BK V [600–615] 188b BK VI [719 733] 212a BK XII [469–551] 329b 331a

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 307a 314a esp 310b 311a 438b 441d esp 438b c 441a b 605a b 607a

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 422a c 520b 521c esp 521c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART III 303d 304a 306a c

9b The Incarnation the God man

NEW TESTAMENT *John* 1 1 14

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK V par 20 32d 33a BK VII par 13 14 47c-48b par 24–25 50d 51c BK X par 67–70 88b 89a BK XI par 4 90a b / *City of God* BK IX CH 15 293a 294a CH 17 295a c CH 21 296b d BK X CH 20 311b c CH 22 312a b CH 24 312d 313c CH 27–29 315b 318b BK XI CH 2 323a c BK XXI CH 15 16 572c 574a / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 11 14 627b 628b CH 34 634b-c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 62 A 9 REP 3 324a 325b Q 64 A 1 REP 4 334a 335c Q 73 A 1 REP 1 370a 371a Q 93 A 1 REP 1 506b 507c PART I II Q 5 A 7 REP 2 642a d

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III QQ 1 6 701b d 846d esp Q 26 A 1 REP 3 845b 846a PART III SUPPL Q 76 A 1 939d 941a Q 95 A 3 ANS 1045b 1046d A 4 1046d 1047d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XXIX [106–120] 98d 99a XXXI [76–126] 101c 102a XXXII [19–63] 102c 103a PARADISE II [31 45] 108a VI [10 21] 113d VII [16 120] 115b 116b XIII [37–87] 125d 126b XXXIII [139] XXXIII [145] 156a 157d

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART III 182a-c

32 MILTON *Christs Nativity* 1a 7b / *The Passion* 10b 12a / *Upon the Circumcision* 12b 13a / *Paradise Lost* BK III [56–415] 136b 144b esp [315–341] 142a b [383 389] 143b 144a BK XII [307–385] 326a 327b

33 PASCAL *Pensees* 512 262a 763 765 322a 785 325b 862 342b 343a

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 307d 308b

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 134a 161a c esp 134a 138a 150c 151b 230d 231a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART III 306b c 308a b

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK V 127b 137c

9b(1) The divinity of Christ

OLD TESTAMENT *Isaiah* 9 6–7—(D) *Isaias* 9 6 7

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* passim esp 1 18–25 3 16 4 11 7 21 8:29–32 10 32 33 11 25 30 14 22 33 16 13 20 17 1–8 26 63–68 27 38–54 / *Mark* passim esp 1 1 1 10 11 1 21 3 23 12 3 11 12 5 2 7 9 1–8 14 60–65 15 39 16 19 / *Luke* passim esp 2 49 4 41 9 28 36 10 22 22:29 24 49 / *John* passim esp 1 1 14 1 49 5 17 27 8 16 10 30 10 38 11 27 14 10–11 14 20 14 28 17 1–3 20 17 / *Acts* 8 37 / *Romans* 1 3 4 8 3 29–33 / *I Corinthians* 1–4 15 28 / *II Corinthians* 1 19 5 18 21 / *Philippians* 2 5–6 / *Colossians* 1 15 17 2 8–9 / *I Timothy* 3 16 / *Hebrews* 1 1–8 4 14 5 5 8 13 8 / *I John* 2 22 24 3 8 4 9–10 13 15 5 1 13 20 / *II John* 7–11 / *Jude*

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK VII par 25 51a c / *City of God* BK IX CH 15 293a 294a CH 17 295a c BK X CH 20 311b c CH 312a b CH 24 312d 313c CH 27 29 315b 318b BK XI CH 2 323a c BK XXI CH 15 16 572c 574a BK XXII CH 6 590a 591c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q 3 723a 730b QQ 16 24 796a 839c Q 25 A 1 839d 840d PART III SUPPL Q 95 A 3 ANS 1045b 1046d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE VII [16–120] 115b 116b

22 CHAUCER *Prioress's Tale* 391a 395b

32 MILTON *Christs Nativity* 1a 7b / *The Passion* 10b 12a / *Upon the Circumcision* 12b 13a / *Paradise Lost* BK III [56–415] 136b 144b esp [135 142] 138b [167–172] 139a [281 314] 141b-142a [383 389] 143b 144a BK V [600–615] 188b BK VI [719–733] 212a BK XII [30 385] 326a 327b

33 PASCAL *Pensees* 734 317a 763 765 322a 785 325b 841–842 336a 337a

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 308a b

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 134b 138a esp 135b-136b

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART II 270d 271c PART III 306d 307b

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK V 127b-137c passim BK VII 189 190

(9 *Specifically Christian dogmas concerning the divine nature and human destiny 9c Christ the Saviour and Redeemer the doctrines of original sin and salvation.*)

242b 243c A 6 REP 2 244c 245b Q 100 A 12 264d 265d Q 101 A 3 ANS and REP 1 268a 269a Q 102 A 2 ANS 271b 272a A 4 REP 2 5-6 esp REP 6 276d 283c A 5 REP 5 283c 292c Q 103 A 1 ANS 298b 299b A 2 299b 300d A 3 REP 2 300d 302a Q 104 A 3 ANS 305d 306d QQ 106-108 321a 337d PART II II Q 1 A 7 REP 1 4 385c 387a A 8 REP 4 387a 388c Q 2 A 7 396a 397c Q 14 A 2 REP 3 448d 449d PART III Q 1 701b d 709c Q 26 845a 846d Q 60 A 3 ANS 848d 849c A 5 REP 3 850b 851b Q 61 A 1 REP 3 855a d A 3 856c 857c Q 62 A 5 REP 2 862b 863a A 6 ANS and REP 1 2 863a 864c PART III SUPPL Q 69 A 4 889c 890c Q 71 A 14 REP 2 916c 917b Q 75 A 2 REP 3-4 937a-938a Q 76 A 1 939d 941a Q 78 A 1 REP 3 947d 949b Q 89 A 2 ANS and REP 4 1006b 1007c A 5 ANS 1009b d Q 90 1012a 1016a Q 95 1042c 1049d Q 99 A 3 REP 1 1081d 1083a

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52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK III 67d 68c BK V 120d 121a BK X 293a
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Man's duty and piety toward God or the gods and for man's worship of God or the gods, *see* DUTY 5 11 JUSTICE 11b RELIGION 2–2g

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Matters relevant to proving God's existence and to other ways of affirming God's existence *see* BEING 7a 8f CHANGE 14 METAPHYSICS 2d NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY [illegible]–[illegible]b REASONING 5b(3) 5b(5) THEOLOGY 4c

The problem of God's immanence and transcendence and for the doctrine of pantheism, *see* NATURE 1b ONE AND MANY 1b WORLD 3–3b

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The consideration of God's perfection and goodness *see* GOOD AND EVIL 2–2a and for the discussion of God in relation to Satan and to the problem of evil *see* ANGEL 7–7b GOOD AND EVIL 1d 2b OPPOSITION 2d

The consideration of God's intellect his knowledge and wisdom the divine ideas and the divine truth *see* IDEA 1c INFINITY 7d KNOWLEDGE 7a MIND 10e–10f TRUTH 2d WISDOM 1d

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The consideration of God's beauty happiness and glory *see* BEAUTY 7a HAPPINESS 7d HONOR 6–6b

The consideration of the divine independence and God's free will *see* LIBERTY 5d WILL 4b.

The consideration of divine causality in relation to nature the origin of the universe by creation or emanation and the eternity of the world *see* ART 2c CAUSE 7–7a CHANGE 14 MATTER 3d NATURE 3c(4) TIME 2c WORLD 4–4e(3) and for the special problem of the creation of life and of man *see* EVOLUTION 4a 7a MAN 8b SOUL 4c

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The consideration of divine causality as expressed in divine law and in the government of the universe *see* ASTRONOMY 6 CAUSE 7c LAW 3–3b(2) MONARCHY 2b SIN 1 VIRTUE AND VICE 8c WORLD 1c

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The consideration of God's justice and mercy and of divine rewards and punishments, *see* HAPPINESS 7c–7c(3) IMMORTALITY 5e–5f JUSTICE 11–11a PUNISHMENT 5e SIN 6c–6e

Other discussions of the doctrine of the Messiah the Trinity the Incarnation and the second coming of Christ *see* MAN 11c ONE AND MANY 6b–6c PROPHECY 4c–4d RELATION 2

Other discussions of the doctrine of original sin and man's redemption and salvation *see* HAPPINESS 7a SIN 3–3e 7 VIRTUE AND VICE 8a WILL 7e(1)

Other discussions of the Last Judgment and the end of the world *see* IMMORTALITY 5c PROPHECY 4d WORLD 8

For Other discussions of the church as the Mystical Body of Christ and of the theory of the sacraments, *see* RELIGION 2c 3a–3b SIGN AND SYMBOL 5c

The general theory of the relation of reason and faith in man's knowledge of God *see* KNOWLEDGE 6c(5) LOGIC 4f METAPHYSICS 3a RELIGION 1b–1b(3) THEOLOGY 2 4b–4c VIRTUE AND VICE 8d(1) WISDOM 1c

The distinction between man's natural and supernatural knowledge of God and for the discussion of mystical experience and the beatific vision *see* EXPERIENCE 7 HAPPINESS 7c(1) KNOWLEDGE 6c(5) RELIGION 6f WILL 7d WISDOM 1c

Other discussions of God's revelation of Himself of Sacred Scripture and of man's interpretation of the Word of God *see* EDUCATION 7a LANGUAGE 12 PROPHECY 3d SIGN AND SYMBOL 5e

Other discussions of the relation of creatures to God and especially of the problem of the resemblance between creatures and God *see* MAN 10a 11a RELATION 3 SAME AND OTHER 6

Other discussions of the names of God and for the bearing thereon of the distinction between the univocal the equivocal and the analogical *see* IDEA 4b(4) SAME AND OTHER 3a(3)–3b 6 SIGN AND SYMBOL 3d 5f

Sciences peculiarly concerned with God *see* ASTRONOMY 6 METAPHYSICS 2a 2d 3a THEOLOGY

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection
II Works by authors not represented in this collection

For the date place and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

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Chapter 30 GOOD AND EVIL

INTRODUCTION

THE theory of good and evil crosses the boundaries of many sciences or subject matters. It occupies a place in metaphysics. It is of fundamental importance in all the moral sciences—ethics, economics, politics, jurisprudence. It appears in all the descriptive sciences of human behavior, such as psychology and sociology, though there it is of less importance and is differently treated.

The relation of good and evil to truth and falsity, beauty and ugliness, carries the discussion into logic, aesthetics, and the philosophy of art. The true, it has been said, is the good in *the* sphere of our thinking. So it may be said of the beautiful that it is a quality which things have when they are good as objects of contemplation and love, or good as productions. It is no less possible to understand goodness and beauty in *terms* of truth, or truth and goodness in terms of beauty.

One aim of analysis, with respect to the true, the good, and the beautiful, is to preserve their distinctness without rendering each less universal. This has been attempted by writers who treat these three terms as having a kind of parallelism in their application to everything, but who also insist that each of the three notions conceives things under a different aspect or in a different relation. "As good adds to being the notion of the desirable," Aquinas writes, "so the true adds a relation to the intellect"; and it is also said that the end "of the appetite, namely good, is in the desirable thing, whereas the end of the intellect, namely the true, is in the intellect itself."

In that part of theology which goes beyond metaphysics and moral philosophy, we meet with the concept of infinite *goodness—the* goodness of an infinite being—and we then face the problem of how God's goodness is to be understood by man. The basic terms of moral theology—righteousness and sin, salvation and damnation—are, like virtue and vice, happiness and misery, conceptions of good and evil in the condition of man. (Their special theological significance comes from the fact that they consider the goodness or evil of man in terms of his relation to God.) But the theological problem which is traditionally called "the problem of evil" concerns the whole universe in its relation to the divine perfection.

That problem, which is further discussed in the chapter on WORLD, can be formulated in a number of ways. How are we to understand the existence of evil in a world created by a God who is omnipotent and perfectly good? Since God is good and since everything which happens is within God's power, how can we account for the sin of Satan or the fall of man with all the evil consequent thereupon, without limiting God's power or absolving the erring creature from responsibility? Can it be said that this is the best of all possible worlds, if it is also true that this world is far from perfectly good, and if, as certain theologians hold, God *could* make other things, or add something to *the present* creation, and then there would be another and a better universe?

THE CONTEMPORARY discussion of good and evil draws its terminology from economics rather than theology. The word "value" has almost replaced "good" and "evil." What in other centuries were the various moral sciences are now treated as parts of the general theory of value. The substitution of "value" for "good" or of "value judgment" for "moral judgment" reflects the influence of economics.

According to Marx, Aristotle "was the first to analyse ... the form of value." As indicated in the chapter on WEALTH, economics at its origin was *treated by* Aristotle, along with eth-

ics and politics as a moral discipline But he made it subordinate to them because it dealt not with the whole of human welfare but only with wealth—one of the goods

In the modern development of economics *the word goods comes to have a special significance* It refers to commodities or utilities as in the phrase goods and services More *generally anything which is useful or exchange*able has the character of an economic good This general sense is usually conveyed by the economist s use of the word value According to Adam Smith the word *value* has two different meanings and sometimes expresses the utility of some particular object and sometimes the power of purchasing other goods which the possessor of that object conveys These two meanings are distinguished as value in use and value in exchange Marx accepts this distinction but thinks that there is a more fundamental notion of value He thinks it is possible to abstract from both use-value and exchange value and to discover the underlying property which gives value to all exchangeable *things namely that they are products of labor*

With Smith and Marx as with Aristotle the theory of value does not deal with every type *of good but only with that type which earlier* moralists called external goods or goods of fortune But more recently the concept of value has been extended by economists and others to the evaluation of everything which men think of as desirable in any way In consequence the age old controversy about the objectivity or subjectivity of good and evil is now stated in terms of the difference between facts and values or between judgments of fact and judgments of value

The issue as currently stated is whether questions of value can be answered in the same way as *questions* of fact One position maintains that unlike questions of fact which can be answered by scientific investigation and can be objectively solved questions of value elicit no more than expressions of opinion relative to the individual s subjective response or to the conventions of his society at a given time The other side of the issue is *held by those who in*sist that the norms of value are as objective and as scientifically determinable as the criteria of fact or existence

THE WORD VALUE does not change the problem in any way for what does evaluating any thing mean except judging it as good or bad better or worse? The problem which has a history as long as the tradition of the great books *is the problem of how we can defend such judg*ments and what they signify about the things judged Are good and evil determined by na*ture or convention? Are they objects of knowl*edge or opinion?

The title of an essay by Montaigne— that the taste for good and evil depends in good part upon the opinion we have of them —indicates one set of answers to these questions *If evils have no admission into us* he writes *but by the judgment we ourselves make of them it should seem that it is then in our power to despise them or to turn them to good*

If what we call evil and torment is neither evil nor torment of itself but only that our fancy gives it that quality it is in us to change it Echoing Montaigne *Hamlet remarks that there is nothing either good or bad but thinking makes it so* The Greek sophists centuries *earlier appear to take the same view* The statement of Protagoras that man is the measure of all things Plato thinks does not significant*ly apply to all things but only to* such things as the good or the right the true or the beautiful In the *Theaetetus* Protagoras is made to say that as to the sick man his food appears to be bitter and to the healthy man the opposite of bitter so in general men estimate or judge all things according to their own condition and the way things affect them This theory of good and evil necessarily denies the possibility of moral science Socrates calls it a high argument in which all things are said *to be* relative

Plato and Aristotle respond to the sophists by *arguing in the opposite vein* For Plato the good *is not a matter of opinion* but an object of *knowledge* Knowledge of good and evil is the best fruit of the tree of knowledge Let each one of us leave every other kind of knowledge Socrates says at the end of the *Republic* and seek and follow one thing only that is, *to learn and discern between good and evil.*"

Aristotle does not think that ethics or any science which deals with good and evil can have as much precision as mathematics *Our discus*

sion will be adequate he writes if it has as much clearness as the subject matter admits of for precision is not to be sought for alike in all discus ons This however does not exclude the possib lity of our kno ving with great ex actitude the first principles of moral science such as the nature of happiness and virtue In definiteness and even a certain kind of relativi ty occur only when these principles are applied to particular cases Hence in Aristotle s view the moral sciences such as ethics and pol tics can have objective and universal val dity no less than physics or mathematics at least on the level of prir ciples

In mouern times Locke an I Kant also affirm th scientific character of ethics but without the qualification which Aristotle insists upon when we go from principles to practice Locke expla ns the grounds on which he is bold to think that morality is capable of demonstra tion as well as mathematics for h says the *precise real essence of the things moral words stand for may be perfectly known and so the congru ty an l incon ruity of the things them selves may be certainly discovered in hich consi ts perfect knowledg* He is confident that from self evident propos tions by neces sary consequences as incontestible as those in mathematics the measures of right and vrong m ht be made out to any one that w ll apply h mself with the same indifferency and att n tion to the one as he does to the other f these sciences But Locke adds this is not to be expected whilst the desire of esteem riches or po er makes m n espouse the well endowed opin ons in fashion He himself seems to tend n the opposite d rection vhen he identifies the good with the pleasant and makes t relative to ndi idual des res

For Kant the two maj r parts of ph losophy —phy sics and eth ics—are on equal footin, the ne concerned w th th laws of *nature* the other with the laws of *f eedom* In each case there is both emp rical and *a prior* kno vled e Kant calls the latter n each case metaphysics nd speaks of *a metaphysic of nature* an l a *met phys c of morals* The nature of science h thinks req es us to separate the empirical from the rat nal *part* and prefix to physics proper (or empirical phy ics) a metaphysic of nature and to practical anthr pology a meta physic of morals which must be carefully cleared of e erything empirical

This partial inventory of thinkers who stand against skepticism or relativism in the field of morals indicates that agreement on this point is accompanied by some disagreement about the reasons for holding v hat appears to be the same vie v The opposite vie v seems also to be shared by thinkers of quite different cast such as Spinoza and Mill who differ from each other as well as from Montaigne and the ancient sop hists

The terms good and evil Spinoza writes indicate nothing positive in things considered in themselves nor are they anything else than modes of thought One and the same thing may at the same time be both good and evil or indifferent —according to the person who makes the judgment of it *Spinoza therefore* defines good as that which v e certainly know is useful to us *Apart from society* he says th re is nothing v hich by universal con sent is good or evil since everyone in a natural state consults only his o vn profit Only when men live together in a civil society under law can it be decided by universal *consent* what is good and what is evil

Holding that all *men seek happiness* and that they determ ne v hat is good and evil in par ticular cases by *reference to* this end Mill seems *to offer* the standard of utility as an obj ctive *principle* of morality But insofar as he identi fies happiness with a sum total of pleasures or sat sfactions it tends to become relative to the individual or the group If competent judges d sagree concerning which of two pleasures is *the greater* or *higher* there can be no appeal Mill says except to the verdict of the majority To this extent at least judgments of value are expres ons of opinion not determinations of science *Nor* does Mill hesitate to say that the ult mate sanction of all morality is a *subjec tive* feeling in our minds

IN ORDER to clarify this basic issue it is neces sary to take *note of other* terms which are usually involved in the di cussion of good an l evil—such terms as pleasure and pain de re and avers on bein nature and reason In the course of doing this we will perce ve the relevance of the chap t rs which deal with those ideas.

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problem of the objective and the subjective good. The apparent good varies from individual to individual and from time to time. If there were a real good, it would be free from such relativity and variability. Unless there are real, as distinct from merely apparent, goods, moralists cannot distinguish between what men *should* desire and what in fact they *do* desire.

Since moral science deals with human behavior, its province can be separated from that of other sciences which treat the same subject matter—such as psychology and sociology—only in terms of a different treatment of that subject matter. Moral science must be normative or prescriptive rather than descriptive. It must determine what men *should* seek, not what they *do* seek. The very existence of normative sciences, as well as their validity, would thus seem to depend on the establishment of a real, as opposed to a merely apparent, good.

This creates no special difficulty for moralists who think that man knows what is really good for him, both in general and in particular, by intuition or rational deduction, through the commandments of the divine law, or through the precepts of the law of reason. But for those who insist that the good is always somehow relative to desire and always involves pleasure, the distinction between the real and the apparent good raises an extremely difficult problem.

To say that an apparent good is not really good suggests, as we have seen, that what is called "good" may not be in itself desirable. That something which is really good may not in fact appear to be so, seems to imply that the word "good" can be significantly applied to something which is not actually desired—at least not consciously. How, then, is the good always relative to desire? The traditional answer to this question must appeal to the distinction between natural and conscious desire which is discussed in the chapter on DESIRE. It is by reference to natural desire that the good is said to be in itself always desirable, even when the really good thing is not consciously desired.

The relation of good and evil to pleasure and pain can also be clarified by a basic distinction between the pleasure which is an object of desire and pleasure conceived as the satisfaction of desire. This is discussed in the chapter on PLEASURE AND PAIN. If obtaining a desired good is satisfying, then there is certainly a sense in which the good and the pleasant (or the satisfying) are always associated; but it may also be true that pleasure is only one kind of good among various objects of desire and that certain pleasures which men desire appear to be but are not really good.

THE FOREGOING considerations apply to the good in the sphere of human conduct. But the human good, the practicable good, the good for man, does not exhaust the meaning of the term *good*. The idea of the good is, for Plato, the measure of perfection in all things. It is "not only the author of knowledge to all things known, but of their being and essence, and yet the good is not essence, but far exceeds essence in dignity and power."

The absolute good is also, as in the *Divine Comedy*, the final cause or ultimate end of the motions of the universe. It is "the Alpha and Omega," Dante says, "of every scripture that Love reads to me ... the Essence wherein is such supremacy that every good which is found outside of It is naught else than a beam of Its own radiance ... the Love which moves the sun and the other stars."

So too, in Aristotle's cosmology, the circular motions of the celestial spheres, and through them all other cycles of natural change, are sustained eternally by the prime mover which moves all things by the attraction of its perfect being. It therefore "moves without being moved," for it "produces motion through being loved."

Though desire and love enter into the conception of the good as a cosmic final cause, they are not *human* desire or love. Though the goodness which inheres in things according to the degree of their perfection may make them desirable, it is not dependent on their being consciously desired by men.

In Jewish and Christian theology, for example, the goodness of God is in no way measured by human desires, purposes, or pleasures; nor is the goodness of created things which, according to Genesis, God surveyed and found "very good." The order of creation, moreover

It has been said for example that the good is identical with the plea ant that the good is what men desire that the good is a property of being or existence that the good is that which conforms to the nature of a thing that the good is that which is approved by rea on It is possible to see some truth in each of these statements But each taken by itself may be too great a simplification Searching questions can be asked by those who refuse to equate the good with the pleasant or the desirable the real the natural or the reasonable Are there no plea ures in any way bad no pains in any way good? Are all desires themselves good, or are all equally good? How does calling a thing good add anything to its being or existence? Does not evil exist or qualify existence? By what standards can the natural and the rational be judged good if the good is that which conforms to nature and reason?

These questions call for more analysis of each of these factors in the discussion of good and evil and suggest that no one of these factors *by itself* is sufficient to solve the problem of defining good and evil or formulating their criteria Of the five things mentioned two particularly —pleasure and desire—seem to leave open the question whether good and evil are objective or subjective They require us to decide whether things please us *because they are good* or are good *because they please us* whether we desire things because they are good or simply call them good when we desire them On this issue Spinoza flatly declares that we do not desire a thing because we adjudge it good but on the contrary we call it good because we desire it In saying that a thing is good so far as it is desirable Aquinas takes the opposite position for according to him a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect It can be desirable therefore without being actually desired by this or that individual

The other three terms—unlike pleasure and desire—seem to favor the objectivity of good and evil at least for those who regard the order of existence the nature of things and the laws of reason as independent of our desires or preferences Thus for Spinoza the *nature* of man and his *reason* seem to provide an objective standard for determining what is good alike for all men Nothing he writes can be good except in so far as it agrees with our nature and therefore the more an object agrees with our nature the more profitable it will be And in another place he says By *good* I understand every thing which we are certain is a means by which we may approach nearer and nearer to the model of human nature we set before us That model he tells us is the man of reason the man who always acts according to the dictates of reason for those desires which are determined by man s power or reason are always good

Nevertheless if desire and pleasure cannot be eliminated from the consideration of good and evil—at least not the good and evil which enter into human life—then the problem of finding a purely objective foundation for our moral judgments is not solved simply by an appeal to being nature and reason

Some help toward a solution may be found in one often reiterated fact about the relation between the good and human desire The ancients insist that no man desires anything but what at the time *seems* good to him in some way No man Socrates observes voluntarily pursues evil or that which he thinks to be evil To prefer evil to good is not in human nature and when a man is compelled to choose one of two evils no one will choose the greater when he may have the less This however does not prevent men from desiring what they suppose to be goods although they are really evils Since they are mistaken in their judgment and suppose the evils to be goods they really desire goods

The object consciously desired is always at least *apparently* good When men are mistaken in their estimate of things as beneficial or injurious to themselves the apparent good—the good actually desired—will be really an evil that is something actually undesirable An object which is really good may not appear to be so and so it will not be desired although it is desirable The deception of appearances Socrates says tricks us into taking at one time the things of which we repent at another both in our actions and in our choice of things great and small

THE DISTINCTION between the *real* and the *apparent* good is of course connected with the

reference to the general inclinations and wants of mankind has a *market value* whereas that which is above all value and therefore admits of no equivalent has a dignity — not a merely relative worth but an intrinsic worth

But since Kant thinks that only men or rational beings can have intrinsic worth he finds goodness only in the moral order He agrees with the Stoics that good and evil occur only in the realm of freedom, not at all in the realm of existence or nature Good or evil he writes, always implies a reference to the *will* as determined by the *law of reason* which is the law of freedom. According to Kant nothing can possibly be conceived in the world or even out of it which can be called good without qualification except a Good Will and in another place he says, If anything is to be good or evil absolutely it can only be the manner of acting the maxim of the will In this sense the free will complying with or resisting the imperatives of duty is either the seat or the source of all the goodness or evil that there is. Men may laugh Kant says, at the Stoic who in the severest paroxysms of gout cried out *Pain however thou tormentest me I will never admit that thou art an evil* he was right for pain did not in the least diminish the worth of his person but only that of his condition.

IN THE SPHERE of moral conduct and especially for those who make desire or pleasure rather than duty the principle there seems to be a plurality of goods which require classification and order

Some things, it would appear are not desired for themselves but for the sake of something else They are good only as means to be used Some things are desired for their own sake and are good as ends to be possessed or enjoyed This division of goods into means and ends—the useful and the enjoyable or pleasant —permits a third type of good which is an end in one respect and a means in another Analysis of this sort leads to the concept of a *summum bonum*—that good which is not a means in any respect but entirely an end the supreme or highest good for which all else is sought

The chief question with respect to the *summum bonum* is whether it is a good or *the* good —whether it is merely one type of good more desirable than any other or the sum of all good things which when possessed leaves nothing to be desired Aristotle and Mill seem to take the latter view in their conception of happiness as the *summum bonum* Human nature Mill says is so constituted as to desire nothing which is not either a part of happiness or a means of happiness. Happiness, he insists is not an abstract idea but a concrete whole including all other goods within itself It is the only good which is desired entirely for its own sake Aristotle treats virtue and knowledge as intrinsic good but he also regards them as means to happiness. In Mill's terms their goodness remains subject to the criterion of utility from which happiness alone is exempt since it measures the utility of all other goods.

If the evaluation of all things by reference to their contribution to happiness as the ultimate good constitutes *utilitarianism* in ethics, then Aristotle no less than Mill is a utilitarian even though Aristotle does not refer to the principle of utility does not identify the good with pleasure and conceives the virtues as *intrinsically* good not merely as means. Kant would regard them as in fundamental agreement despite all their differences—or at least he would regard them as committing the same fundamental error

To Kant any discussion of human conduct which involves the calculation of means to ends is pragmatic or utilitarian even when the controlling end is the *summum bonum* or happiness Kant makes a sharp distinction between what he calls pragmatical rules of conduct which consider what should be done by one who wishes to be happy and what he regards as the strictly moral or ethical law which has no other motive than the *worthiness of being happy* Morality he says in another place is not properly the doctrine of how we should *make* ourselves happy but how we should become *worthy* of happiness —through doing our duty

Kant's criticism of Aristotle's ethics of happiness is therefore applicable to the utilitarianism of Mill and Mill's rejoinder to Kant serves as a defense of Aristotle This basic issue concerning the primacy of happiness or duty—of desire or law—is discussed in the chapters on DUTY and HAPPINESS where it is suggested

involves a hierarchy of inequalities in being and goodness Even when each thing is perfect in its kind all things are not equally good for according to the differences in their natures diverse kinds are capable of greater or less *perfection*

In the metaphysical conception of goodness that which has more actuality either in existence or power has more perfection God s infinite goodness is therefore said to follow from the fact that he is completely actual—infinite in being and power Things which have life *Augustine writes* are ranked above those which have none And among those that have life the sentient are higher than those which have no sensation and among the sentient the intelligent above those that have no intelligence

Augustine contrasts these gradations of perfection which are according to the order of nature with the standards of value which are according to the utility each man finds in a thing That which is less good in a metaphysical sense may be preferred on moral grounds as being better for man Who he asks would not rather have bread in his house than mice gold than fleas? Is it not true that more is often given for a horse than for a slave for a jewel than for a maid ?

According to Augustine as well as to Aquinas later metaphysical goodness consists in the value a thing has in itself in the scale of creation while moral goodness depends upon the relation in which a thing stands to human need or desire and according to the estimation placed upon it by human reason It is in the moral not the metaphysical sense that we speak of a good man a good will a good life and a good society or of all the things such as health wealth pleasure virtue or knowledge which it may be good for man to seek and possess Only in the metaphysical sense can things be thought of as good entirely apart from man only then can we find a hierarchy of perfections in the world which accords with a hierarchy of beings Thus Spinoza declares that the perfection of things is to be judged by their nature and power alone nor are they more or less perfect because they delight or offend the human senses or because they are beneficial or prejudicial to human nature

THE METAPHYSICAL conception of goodness raises peculiarly difficult problems Are there as many meanings of good as there are of being ? When we say God is good are we making a moral or a metaphysical judgement? Are we attributing perfection of being or goodness of will to God? If goodness is a property of being then must not all evil become a privation of being? Conceiving evil in this way Augustine points out that if things be deprived of all good they shall cease to be so that there is nothing whatsoever evil in itself and Aquinas maintains that no being is said to be evil considered as being but only so far as it lacks being

If to understand what the notion of goodness adds to the notion of being it is necessary to say that being has goodness in relation to appetite the question inevitably arises Whose appetite? Not man s certainly for then the moral and the metaphysical good become identical If God s then not appetite in the form of desire but in the form of love for the divine perfection is usually thought to preclude desire

Problems of this sort confront those who conceiving the good both *apart from* and also *relative to* man are obligated to connect the metaphysical and the moral meanings of good and to say whether they have a common thread Some writers however limit their consideration to the strictly moral good and deny as do the Stoics goodness or evil to anything but man s free acts of will

We should says Marcus Aurelius judge only those things which are in our power to be good or bad In this we are entirely free for things themselves have no natural power to form our judgments If thou art pained by any external thing it is not this thing which disturbs thee but thy own judgment about it. And it is in thy power to wipe out this judgment now Suppose that men kill thee cut thee in pieces curse thee What then can these things do to prevent thy mind from remaining pure wise sober just?

Though Kant develops what he calls a metaphysic of ethics he does not seem to have a metaphysical as opposed to a moral conception of the good unless in some analogous form it lies in his distinction between value and dignity according to which whatever has

because they are all of the same nature but most strictly it is a common good if the happiness of each individual cannot be separated from the happiness of all

Aquinas seems to be using this meaning of *common good* when in defining law as a rule of conduct directed to the common good he refers not merely to the good of the community or body politic but beyond that to the last end of human life which is happiness or beatitude Law he says must needs concern itself properly with the order directed to universal happiness Mill also seems to conceive happiness as a common good in this sense What the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge he writes is that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent s own happiness but that of all concerned

The several meanings of the common good create a fundamental issue Some writers use it in one sense only rejecting the others Some not only use the term in all its meanings but also develop a hierarchy of common goods They regard universal happiness for example as a common good of a higher order than the welfare of the political community Yet in every order they insist upon the primacy of the common over the individual good In the political order for example they think the welfare of the community takes precedence over individual happiness They would regard Adam Smith s statement of the way in which individuals accidentally serve the common good while seeking their private interests as a perversion of the relationship To say that an individual considering only his own gain is led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention (i e the general prosperity of society) does not excuse the individual s failure to aim at the common good

The several meanings of the common good also complicate the statement of the issue between those who seem to say that the welfare of the community always takes precedence over individual well being, or happiness—that the good of the whole is always *greater than* the good of its parts—and those who seem to say that the state is made for man not man for the state or that the prosperity of the society in which men live is good primarily because it enables each of them to live well This issue which runs through all the great books of political theory from Plato and Aristotle to Hegel and Mill is discussed in the chapters on CITIZEN and STATE

The opposition between collectivism and individualism in economics and politics does not exhaust the issue which stated in its broadest moral terms is a conflict between self interest and altruism The primary problem to consider here is whether the issue is itself genuine or only an opposition between false extremes which needlessly exclude the half truth that each contains

The collective aspect of the common good *may not need to be emphasized at the expense* of its distributive aspect The good of each man and the good of mankind may be inseparable It may be the same good which in different respects is individual and common It may be that no good can be supreme which is not both immanent and transcendent—at once the highest perfection of the individual and a good greater than his whole being and his life

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that in an ethics of duty right and wrong supplant good and evil as the fundamental terms and the *summum bonum* becomes a derivative notion rather than the first principle of morality

At the other extreme are those who deny duty entirely and with it any meaning to right and wrong as distinct from good and evil A middle ground is held by those who employ right and wrong as subordinate terms in the analysis of good and evil finding their special significance in the consideration of the good of others or the social good To do right is to do good to others to do wrong is to injure them The question which Plato so insistently raises whether it is better to do injustice or to suffer it can also be stated in terms of good and evil or right and wrong Is it better to suffer evil or to do it? Is it better to be wronged by others or to wrong them? As justice for Aristotle is that one among the virtues which concerns the good of others and the common good and as it is the one virtue which is thought to involve duty or obligation so the criteria of right and wrong measure the goodness or evil of human acts by reference to law and society

THE DIVISION of goods into means and ends is not the only distinction made by moralists who recognize the plurality and inequality of goods

Goods have been divided into the limited and the unlimited with respect to quantity the pure and the mixed with respect to quality sensible and intelligible goods or particular goods and the good in general external goods goods of the body and goods of the soul the pleasant the useful and the virtuous More specific enumerations of the variety of goods list wealth health strength beauty longevity pleasure honor (or fame) virtue knowledge friendship

All of the foregoing classifications can be combined with one another but there is one distinction which stands by itself although it affects all the others That is the distinction between the individual and the common good or between private and public good the good for this one man and the good of all others and of the whole community In the language of modern utilitarianism it is the distinction between individual happiness and what Bentham called "the greatest good for the greatest number

The phrase common good has several meanings in the tradition of the great books One sense which some think is the least significant refers to that which can be shared or used by many as for example land held in common and worked by a number of persons or families Thus we speak of the commons of a town or village This meaning applies particularly to economic goods which may either belong to the community as a whole or be divided into parcels of private property

Another sense of common good is that in which the welfare of a community is a common good participated in by its members The welfare of the family or the state is a good which belongs to a multitude organized for some common purpose If the individual members of the group derive some benefit from their association with one another then the prosperity of the community is not only a common good viewed collectively but also a common good viewed distributively for it is the good of each member of the group as well as of the whole

With this in mind perhaps Mill speaks of an indissoluble association between [the individual's] happiness and the practice of such mode of conduct negative and positive as regard for the universal happiness prescribes so that not only he may be unable to conceive the possibility of happiness to himself consistently with conduct opposed to the general good but also that a direct impulse to promote the general good may be in every individual one of the habitual modes of action If this statement by Mill is used to interpret Bentham's phrase— the greatest good for the greatest number — then the greatest number cannot be taken to mean a majority for the good of nothing less than the whole collectively or of all distributively can be taken as the common or general good

Still another conception of the common good is possible A good may be common in the sense in which a specific nature is common to the members of the species —not as organized socially in any way but simply as so many like individuals If all men seek happiness for example then happiness is a common good even though each individual seeks his own happiness In a deeper sense it is a common good if the happiness each seeks is the same for all men

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PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES: *Psychology*, 116a–119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: *Symposium*, 163b–164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., *Iliad*, BK II [265–283] 12d.

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46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 157b c 160b 178a esp 168d 169d

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 40c d 41c 42a 95d 97a esp 96b c 217d 18a

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE I 646c 647b 650b c

53 JAMES *Psychology* 4a 6b 671b [fn 1]

1b Goodness in proportion to being: the grades of perfection and the goodness of order

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 1

7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 124c 126a / *Symposium* 167a d / *Gorgias* 282c 284b / *Timaeus* 447a 455c / *Philebus* 635b 639a c

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK I CH 9 [192 16-24] 268b c / *Heavens* BK I CH 2 359d 360d BK II CH 12 383b 384c / *Generation and Corruption* BK II CH 10 [336b25 34] 438d / *Metaphysics* BK IX CH 9 [1051 4 21] 577a b BK XII CH 7 602a 603b CH 10 [1075 11 24] 605d 606a BK XIV CH 4 624a d

9 ARISTOTLE *Generation of Animals* BK II CH I [731b 4 33] 272a b / *Ethics* BK I CH 6 [1096 17 b7] 341b d

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR VII CH I 2 26a d TR VIII 27b 34a / *Second Ennead* TR IX CH 3 67b c / *Third Ennead* TR VIII CH 8 10 132d

34 N T N *Principles* BK III GENERAL SC IOL, 370 371a
35 LO KE *Human U derstand g* BK II CH X II SECT 34 35 213a-c K III CH VI SECT 1 12 271b-272b pass m
35 HUME *Human U dersta ding* SECT XI DIV 1 6-107 499c 500a pass m DIV 113 502 b
41 GI B N *Decl ne and Fall* 230a b
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 205a b 237d 239a / F nd Prin Met physic of Morals 263a b 278b-d / *Practical Reaso* 307a d 325d 326a 342c 345 -c 351b 352c / *J dgement* 592a-c

2a God s goodness as d ffusi e causing the goodness of thi gs God s lo e

OLD T ST MENT *Genesis* 1 / *E odus* 2 4-6 esp 20 6 33 19 34 5 10 / *De tero omy* 4 1 4 esp 4 6-8 4 31 4 37 5 7 10 esp 5 10 7 6-11 / *Job* 33 13 33 / *Ps lms* passum esp 8 10 16-18 0 22 23 5 68 97 1 114 1 115 18 1 8 1 119 76—(D) *P lms* pass m esp 8-9 15 17 19 21 22 24 67 96 0 113 1 18 117 118 176 / *P overbs* 3 11 12 / *S g f Solomon*—(D) *Ca ticle* / *Ca t les* / *I ah* 40-66 pass m esp 42 44 46 3 4 49 1 26 52 1 5 56 1-8 63 8-9—(D) *Isaias* 40-66 passim esp 4 44 46 3 4 49 1 26 52 15 56 -8 63 8-9 / *Jere miah* 31 33—(D) *Jerem a* 31 33 / *Lamenta tio s* 3:22 33 esp 3 25 3 38 / *E ek el* 16 esp 16 6- 4 16 59-63—(D) *E ech el* 16 esp 16 6-4 16 9-63 / *Hosea* esp 2 14 23 3 1 3 5 6 1 3 11 1 4 13 16- 4 9—(D) *Ose* esp 2 14 23 3 3 5 6 1 3 11 1 4 14 1 10 / *J l* 2 esp 2 18 32 / *Ze h iah* 9 17—(D) *Za ha a* 9 7 / *M lachi* 1 1 3—(D) *Malach* 1 1 3
AP RY H T bit 13 D—(D) OT *Tob as* 13 / *Wi dom f Sol m n* 1 22 26 16-0- 29—(D) OT *Bo k of W sdom* 11 23 2 6 20-29 / *Ec les ast cus* 1 4 17 16 26-18 4 esp 16 29-3 39 16 25 34—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticu* 11 4 17 16 6-18 14 esp 16 30-3 39 2 39-40
NEW TEST M NT *Matthew* 6:25 34 7 7 11 / *Luk* 11 1 13 12 6-7 6-33 / *John* -5 3 16-2 3 31 35 14 21 5 9-16 7 21 26 / *Romans* 2 4 8 3 39 / *G latia* 2 20 / *Ephes* s 3 14 2 5 2 / *I Joh* 3 4 esp 3 3 16 4 7 12 / *Revelat on* 3 9—(D) *Ap c lyps* 3 9
7 P TO *Rep bl* K II 321d 322d BK I II 383 89c / *Tim* s 447 448a
8 A IS O LE *Gener t d Co rr pt n* BK I C I [336b25 34] 438d / *Met physic* BK X CH 7 602a 603b CH 10 [1075 1 24] 605d 606a
12 E CT TL *D co ses* K 1 8 146a 147
16 KE L R *H rm f th W ld* 1049b-1050b 1071b
17 PLOTI S *First Ennead* TR VI CH 26 d / *F, h E ne d* TR 228b-235b / *S th E nead* TR I H 9 358d 359
18 A GUSTI E *Co fessions* BK I PAR 7 2c d BK II PAR 10 11a b BK VII PAR 4 44b-c PAR 16-23 48c 50c BK XI PAR 6 90c d BK XIII PAR 1-5 110d 111d / *City of God* BK VII CH 31 261d 262a BK XI CH 21 24 333a 336a BK XII CH 1 342b d 343c CH 9 347b 348b BK XIV CH 13 387c 388c BK XXII CH 24 609a-612a / *Ch ist an Doctrine* BK I C 1 31 32 633b-d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2 A 3 A S and REP 1 12c 14a Q 3 A 1 REP 1 14b 15b A 2 ANS 15c 16a Q 6 28b 30d Q 13 A 2 ANS 63c 64d Q 19 A 2 ANS and REP 2 4 109c 110b A 4 A S and REP 1 111c 112c Q 20 119d 124a Q 21 A 3 ANS 126a-c Q 25 A 6 149a 150a Q 5 A 1 ANS 269b-270 A 3 A S 272a 273b Q 51 A 1 REP 3 275b-276b Q 59 A 1 ANS 306c 307b A 2 A S 307c 308b Q 60 A 5 313b-314c Q 91 A 1 A S 484a 485b Q 103 528a 534b Q 104 A 3 REP 2 537b d A 4 ANS 538a-c Q 105 A 4 ANS 541c 542a Q 106 A 4 ANS 548b-549a PART I II Q 1 A 4 REP 1 612a-613a Q 2 A 5 REP 3 618d 619c Q 9 A 6 ANS 662 d Q 19 A 4 A S 705b-c Q 28 A 3 CONTR RY 742a d
21 DA TE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XV [40-81] 75d 76a PARADISE II [112 148] 109a b V I [16 148] 115b-116c esp [64 75] 115d 116a XIII [52-87] 126a b XIX [40-90] 135c 136a XX I [1-69] 145d 146c XXVIII 148d 150b XXIX [13 36] 150b-c [127 145] 151c d
23 HOB ES *Le athan*, PART III 185d
31 D SCA T S *Object ons and Replies* 229c d
32 MILTON *Pa adise Lost* BK III [135 143] 138b BK V [153 208] 178b-1 9b BK VII [170-173] 220b-221a
35 BERKELEY *Human K ou ledge* INTRO S CT 3 405b-c SECT 154 444a b
37 FIELD G *Tom Jones* 186c-d
46 H GEL *Ph losophy of Hist ry* INTRO 169d 170
52 DO TOEVSKY *B other K amazo* BK V 127b-137c BK VI 167b-168c BK VI 189a 191 c

2b The d ne goodness and the problem of e l

OL T ST M NT *Deuteronomy* 30 15 2 esp 3 15 / *I S muel* 16 4 23—(D) *I Kings* 6 14 23 / *Job* / *Psalm* 5 esp 5 4-6 9-1 13 22 esp 22 7 8 37 39 esp 39 8-12 44 73 88—(D) *Psalms* 5 esp 5 5 7 9 12 21 e p 21 8-9 36 38 esp 38 9-13 43 7 87 / *Proverbs* 8 13 / *Eccles astes* 8 -9 2 esp 8 10-14 9 1 3 / *Isa h* 45 7—(D) *Is s* 45 / *Jerem ah* 12 esp 2 2—(D) *Jerem as* 1 e p 12 1 / *Lament t n* 3 38 / *Amos* 3 6 / *M cah* 1 2—(D) *M heas* 1 12
A OCRYPH *W d m of S lomo* 1 13 16 2 23 24 11-4—(D) OT *Book of W sdom* 1 13 16 23 25 11 25 / *E l si st cu* 11 4 16 15 11 20 33 0-15 39 25 31—(D) OT *Eccle ast cus* 11 14 16 15 1 33 1 39 30-37

(1 *The general theory of good and evil* 1d *The origin nature and existence of evil*)

CH 5 95d 96a CH 7 96d 97a TR VI CH II 113b c / *Fourth Ennead* TR III CH 16 150c d / *Fifth Ennead* TR IX CH 10 250c / *Sixth Ennead* TR VII CH 28 335b d

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK III par 11-12 15d 16b BK IV par 24 25b c BK V par 20 32d 33a BK VII par 3-7 44a 45d par 11 23 47a 50d BK XIII par 45 123a / *City of God* BK XI CH 9 327c d CH 22 333d 334c BK XII CH 1-9 342b d 348b BK XIX CH 13 519a 520a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 5 A 3 REP 2 25a d A 5 REP 3 4 26c 27c QQ 48-49 259b 268a c Q 65 A 1 REP 2 3 339b 340b PART I II Q 18 693b d 703a passim esp AA 1-4 694a 696d Q 29 A 1 ANS and REP 1 3 745a c A 5 ANS 747c 748b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 79 AA 1-2 156b-158a Q 80 159d 162d Q 81 AA 1 2 163a 165c A 5 167a d PART III SUPPL Q 69 A 7 REP 9 891d 893c Q 74 A 1 REP 1 925c 926c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE I [103 142] 107b d VII [19 148] 115b 116c XIII [52-87] 126a b XIX [40-66] 135c d XXIX [49-66] 150d 151a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART III 191b d 195d 196a

26 SHAKESPEARE *Romeo and Juliet* ACT II SC III [15-30] 296c

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I APPENDIX 369b 372d

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK IX [494 1189] 258a 273a

33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 116a b

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 153 154 443d-444b

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VIII DIV 76-81 485a 487a

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 81b c

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 330a b

42 KANT *Practical Reason* 316a 317d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART II par 139 48d 49b ADDITIONS 90-91 130b 131d / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 160a 162a 163a 168d PART I 237d 238c

48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* esp 30a 36b 117a 124b 131a 145a 171b 317a 321a 411a 419b

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK XI 344a d

2 The goodness or perfection of God the plenitude of the divine being

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 5 48 / *Luke* 18 18-19 / *I John* 1 5 / *Revelation* 15 4—(D) *Apocalypse* 15 4

7 PLATO *Republic* BK II 321d 323a / *Timaeus* 447a-448b / *Theaetetus* 530b d

8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 7 602a 603b

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VII CH 1 [1145 15 2 395a CH 14 [1154b20 31] 406c BK X CH [1178b8-23] 433b c / *Politics* BK VII CH 1 [1323b21-25] 527c

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK II CH 8 146a 147c

16 KEPLER *Harmonies of the World* 1009a 1049b 1050b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 12 4a BK II par 10 11a b BK VII par 1 7 43b-45d p 16-23 48c 50c BK X par 38 81a BK XI par 6 90c d BK XIII par 1-5 110d 111d par 13 124d 125a c / *City of God* BK XI CH 10 327d 328d BK XII CH 1-3 342b d 344b CH 8 346d 347b / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 5 7 625d 626c CH 31-32 633b d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2 A 1 REP 2 10d 11d A 3 ANS and REP 1 12c 14a Q 3 A 1 ANS 14b 15b A 2 ANS 15c 16a A 7 REP 2 19a c Q 4 20c 23b Q 6 28b 30d Q 13 A 2 ANS 63c 64d A 11 REP 2 73c 74b Q 18 A 3 106b 107c Q 19 A 1 REP 1 3 108d 109c Q 21 A 1 REP 4 124b 125b Q 26 150a 152a c Q 51 A 1 REP 3 275b 276b Q 54 A 2 ANS 285d 286c Q 60 A 5 313b 314c Q 61 A 3 REP 2 316a d Q 6 A 8 ANS and REP 1 2 323c 324a Q 66 A 1 CONTRARY 343d 345c Q 84 A 2 ANS and REP 3 442b 443c Q 91 A 1 ANS 484a 485b Q 100 A 2 ANS 521c 522b Q 103 528a 534b passim Q 104 A 3 REP 2 537b d A 4 ANS 538a-c Q 105 A 4 ANS 541c 542a A 5 ANS 542a 543b PART I II Q A 4 REP 1 618a d A 5 REP 2 618d 619c Q 9 A 6 ANS 662a d Q 18 A 1 ANS 694a d Q A 2 REP 1 721c 722c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 49 A 4 ANS 5a 6a Q 61 A 5 ANS 58b 59d Q 64 A 4 ANS and REP 3 69b 70a PART II II Q 9 A 4 REP 1 425d-426c Q 13 A 1 ANS 444b-445a Q 17 A 1 ANS 457a d Q 23 A 4 A 5 485d 486b Q 34 A 1 ANS 559a c Q 39 A 2 REP 3 575b 576b Q 184 A 2 ANS 629d 630d PART III Q 1 A 1 ANS 701d 703a Q 23 A 1 ANS 833a d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XV [40-81] 75d 76a XXVIII [91-96] 97a PARADISE VII [64 148] 115d 116c esp [64-66] 115d XIII [52-87] 126a b XIX [40-90] 135c 136a

22 CHAUCER *Merchant's Tale* [10 160-164] 336a

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 300c d

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 52a d 53d / *Meditation* I 77b c III 86a 88d IV 89a 93a passim / *Objections and Replies* 123d 124c DEF VIII 130d 228a c 229c d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I DEF 6 355b PROP 8 9 356d 357d PROP 10 SCHOL 358a b PROP 14 359d 360a PROP 16 362a PROP 33 SCHOL 2 367d 369a

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [135 166] 138b 139a BK VII [170 173] 220b 221a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 425 426 243b 244b 430 245a 247b

34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III GENERAL SCHOL, 370a 371a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH XXIII SECT 34 35 213a-c BK III CH VI SECT 11 12 2 1b-272b passim
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT XI DIV 106-107 499c 500a passim DIV 113 502a b
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 230a b
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 205a b 23 d 239a / *Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals* 263a b 278b-d / *Practical Reason* 307a-d 325d 326a 342c 345a-c 351b-352 / *Judgement* 597a-c

2a. God goodness as diffusive causing the goodness of things: God's love

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 1 / *Exodus* 4-6 esp 20:6 33:19 34:5 1 / *Deuteronomy* 4 3 40 esp 4 6-8 4 31 4 37 5 10 esp 5:10 26- 1 / *I Kings* 33 3 33 / *Psalms* passim esp 8-10, 16- 8 20, 22 23 25 68 97 114 115 115:1 119-6-(D) *Psalms* passim, esp 8-9, 15 1 19, 21 2, 24 67 96-70 13 1 18 11 1 8-6 / *Proverbs* 3 11 12 / *Song of Solomon*-(D) *Canticle of Canticles* / *Isaiah*, 40-66 passim, esp 42 44 46 3 4 49 6 52 1 15 56 1-8 63:5-9-(D) *Isaias* 40-66 passim, esp 4 44 46 3 4 49 1 6, 52 15 56 1-8 63:5-9 *Jeremiah*, 31 33-(D) *Jeremias* 3 33 *Lamentations* 3:22 39 esp 3:2 3:38 / *Ezekiel* 16 esp 16:6- 4 16:59-63-(D) *Ezechiel* 16 esp 6:6-14 16:59-63 *Hosea* esp 2 4 23 3 1 3 5 6 3 11 1 4 3:6- 4:9-(D) *Osee* esp 2 4 23 3 3:5 6 3 11 4 14 10 / *Joel*, esp 2:15-32 / *Zechariah* 9 1 -(D) *Zacharias* 9:2 / *Malachi* 1 3-(D) *Malachias* 3
APOCRYPHA *Tobit* 13:10-(D) OT *Tobias* 13:12 / *Wisdom of Solomon* 1:2 6 6:20-29-(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 1 23 6:20-9 / *Ecclesiasticus* 14 1 16:2 8 4 esp 16:29-3 39 16,2 34-(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 11 14 7 6:26-18 14 esp 6 30-3 39:21 30-40
NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 6:25 31 11 / *Luke* 11:1 13 12 6 6-33 / *John* 1 5 3 6-2 3 3 35 14:2 15:9-16 1 2 5 / *Romans* 2 4 8 31 39 / *Galatians* 2 / *Ephesians*, 3 14 1 5 2 / *I John*, 3 4 esp 3 1 3:6 4 1 / *Revelation*, 3 19-(D) *Apocalypse* 3 19
7 PLATO *Republic* BK II, 321d 322d BK VI 11 384a 389c / *Timaeus* 447 448a
8 ARISTOTLE *Generation and Corruption* BK II CH 1 [336b27 34] 438d / *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 602a-603b CH 10 [1075a 4] 605d 606a
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK II CH 8 146a 14 c
16 KEPLER *Harmonies of the World* 1049b-1050b 10 7b
17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR VII CH 2 26a-d / *Fifth Ennead* TR V 228b-235b / *Sixth Ennead* TR IX, CH 9 358d 359c
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 2c d BK II par 10 11 b BK VII par 4 41b-c par 16-2 48c 50c BK XI par 6 90c d BK XIII par 1-5 110d 111d / *City of God* BK VII CH 31 261d 262a BK XI CH 21 24 333a 335a BK XII CH 1 342b d 343c CH 9 347b-348b BK XIV 1 13 387c 388c BK XXII CH 24 609 612a / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 31 32 633b-d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2 A 3 A 5 and REP 1 12c 14a Q 3 A 1 REP 1 14b-15b A 2 ANS 15c 16a Q 6 28b-30d Q 13 A 2 A 5 63c 64d Q 19, A 2 ANS and REP 2 4 109c 110b A 4 ANS and REP 1 111c 112c Q 0 119d 124a Q 1 A 3 ANS 126a-c Q 5, A 6 149a 150a Q 5 A 1 ANS 269b-270 A 3 ANS 272a 273b Q 51 A 1 REP 3 275b-276b Q 59, A 1 AN 306c 307b A 2 ANS 30 c 308b Q 60, A 5 313b-314c Q 91 A 1 A 1 484a 485b Q 103 5 8a 534b Q 104 A 3 RE 2 53 b-d A 4 ANS 538a-c Q 1 5 A 4 ANS 541c 542a Q 106 A 4 ANS 548b-549a PART I II Q 1 A 4 REP 1 612a-613a Q 2 A 5 REP 3 618d 619c Q 9, A 6, ANS 662a d Q 19, A 4 A 5 05b-c Q 8 A 3 CONTRA Y 42a-d
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XV [40-81] 75d 6a PARADISE, II [112 148] 109a b VI [16-148] 115b-116c esp [64 5] 115d 116a XIII [52-87] 126a b XIX [40-90] 135c 136a XXVI [-69] 145d 146c XX III 148d 150b XXIX [13 36] 150b-c [1 145] 151c-d
23 HOBBES *Leviathan*, PART III 185d
31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 229c-d
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [135 143] 138b BK V [153 208] 1 8b-179b BK II [170 1 3] 220b-221a
35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO SECT 3 40 b-c SECT 154 444a b
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 186c-d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO, 169d 170a
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK V 127b-137c BK VI 167b-168c BK VII 189a 191a,c

2b. The divine goodness and the problem of evil

OLD TESTAMENT *Deuteronomy* 30 5 0 esp 3 15 / *I Samuel*, 16 14 23-(D) *I Kings* 16 14 23 / *Job* / *Psalms* 5 esp 5:4-6 9-1 3 22 esp 22:7-8 3 39 esp 39 8-12 44 3 88-(D) *Psalms* 5 esp 5:5 9 12 21 esp 21:5-9 36 38 esp 38:9-13 43 8 / *Proverbs* 8 3 / *Ecclesiastes* 8 -9 12 esp 8 0-14 9:1 3 / *Isaiah*, 4 7-(D) *Isaias* 45:7 / *Jeremiah*, 2 esp 1 -(D) *Jeremias* 1 esp 12 2 / *Lamentations* 3 38 / *Amos* 3:6 / *Micah* 1 1 -(D) *Micheas* 1:12
APOCRYPHA *Wisdom of Solomon* 13 16 23 24 11:24-(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 1 3 16 2:23 5 11:25 / *Ecclesiasticus* 11 14 6 5 11 20 33 10-5 39:25 3 -(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 14 6 15 1 21 33 0-5 39:30-37

(1 *The general theory of good and evil* 1d *The origin nature and existence of evil*)

CH 5 95d 96a CH 7 96d 97a TR VI CH II 113b c / *Fourth Ennead* TR III CH 16 150c d / *Fifth Ennead* TR IX CH 10 250c / *Sixth Ennead* TR VII CH 28 335b d

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK III par 11-12 15d 16b BK IV par 24 25b c BK V par 20 32d 33a BK VII par 3-7 44a 45d par 11 23 47a 50d BK XIII par 45 123a / *City of God* BK XI CH 9 327c d CH 22 333d 334c BK XII CH 1-9 342b d 348b BK XIX CH 13 519a 520a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 5 A 3 REP 2 25a d A 5 REP 3 4 26c 27c QQ 48-49 259b 268a c Q 65 A 1 REP 2-3 339b 340b PART I-II Q 18 693b d 703a passim esp AA 1-4 694a 696d Q 29 A 1 ANS and REP 1 3 745a c A 5 ANS 747c 748b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 79 AA 1-2 156b 158a Q 80 159d 162d Q 81 AA 1-2 163a 165c A 5 167a d PART III SUPPL Q 69 A 7 REP 9 891d 893c Q 74 A 1 REP 1 925c 926c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE I [103 142] 107b d VII [19 148] 115b 116c XIII [52-87] 126a b XIX [40-66] 135c d XXIX [49-66] 150d 151a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART III 191b d 195d 196a

26 SHAKESPEARE *Romeo and Juliet* ACT II SC III [15-30] 296c

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I APPENDIX 369b 372d

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK IX [494 1189] 258a 273a

33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 116a b

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 153-154 443d 444b

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VIII DIV 76-81 485a-487a

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 81b c

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 330a b

42 KANT *Practical Reason* 316a 317d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART II par 139 48d 49b ADDITIONS 90-91 130b 131d / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 160a 162a 163a 168d PART I 237d 238c

48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* esp 30a 36b 117a 124b 131a 145a 171b 317a 321a 411a 419b

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK XI 344a d

2 The goodness or perfection of God the plenitude of the divine being

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 5 48 / *Luke* 18 18-19 / *I John* 1 5 / *Revelation* 15 4—(D) *Apocalypse* 15 4

7 PLATO *Republic* BK II 321d 323a / *Timaeus* 447a-448b / *Theaetetus* 530b d

8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 7 602a 603b

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VII CH 1 [1145a15 2] 395a CH 14 [1154b20 31] 406c BK X CH 8 [1178b8 23] 433b c / *Politics* BK VII CH 1 [1323b22-25] 527c

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK II CH 8 146a 147c

16 KEPLER *Harmonies of the World* 1009a 1049b 1050b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 12 4a BK II par 10 11a b BK VII par 1 7 43b-45d par 16 23 48c 50c BK X par 38 81a BK XI par 6 90c d BK XIII par 1-5 110d 111d par 53 124d 125a c / *City of God* BK XI CH 10 327d 328d BK XII CH 1-3 342b d 344b CH 8 346d 347b / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 5 7 625d 626c CH 31-32 633b d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2 A 1 REP 2 10d 11d A 3 ANS and REP 1 12c 14a Q 3 A 1 ANS 14b 15b A 2 ANS 15c 16a A 7 REP 2 19a c Q 4 20c 23b Q 6 28b 30d Q 13 A 2 ANS 63c 64d A 11 REP 2 73c 74b Q 18 A 3 106b 107c Q 19 A 1 REP 1 3 108d 109c Q 21 A 1 REP 4 124b 125b Q 26 150a 152a c Q 51 A 1 REP 3 275b 276b Q 54 A 2 ANS 285d 286c Q 60 A 5 313b 314c Q 61 A 3 REP 2 316a d Q 6 A 8 ANS and REP 1 2 323c 324a Q 66 A 1 CONTRARY 343d 345c Q 84 A 2 ANS and REP 3 442b 443c Q 91 A 1 ANS 484a 485b Q 100 A 2 ANS 521c 522b Q 103 528a 534b passim Q 104 A 3 REP 2 537b d A 4 ANS 538a c Q 105 A 4 ANS 541c 542a A 5 ANS 542a 543b PART I II Q A 4 REP 1 618a d A 5 REP 2 618d 619c Q 9 A 6 A S 662a d Q 18 A 1 ANS 694a d Q 22 A 2 REP 1 721c 722c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 49 A 4 ANS 5a 6a Q 61 A 5 ANS 58b 59d Q 64 A 4 ANS and REP 3 69b 70a PART II II Q 9 A 4 REP 1 425d 426c Q 13 A 1 ANS 444b-445a Q 17 A 1 ANS 457a d Q 23 A 4 ANS 485d 486b Q 34 A 1 ANS 559a c Q 39 A 2 REP 3 575b 576b Q 184 A 2 ANS 629d 630d PART III Q 1 A 1 ANS 701d 703a Q 23 A 1 ANS 833a d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XV [40-81] 75d 76a XXVIII [91-96] 97a PARADISE VII [64 148] 115d 116c esp [64-66] 115d XIII [52 87] 126a b XIX [40-90] 135c 136a

22 CHAUCER *Merchant's Tale* [10 160-164] 336a

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 300c d

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 52a d 53d / *Meditations* I 77b c III 86a 88d IV 89a 93a passim / *Objections and Replies* 123d 124c DEF VIII 130d 228a c 229c d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I DEF 6 355b PROP 8 9 356d 357d PROP 10 SCHOL 358a b PROP 14 359d 360a PROP 6 362a PROP 33 SCHOL 2 367d 369a

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [135 166] 138b 139a BK VII [170 173] 220b 221a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 425 426 243b 244b 430 245a 247b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVI [52-
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30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 69d 6a
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35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH
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42 KANT *Pure Reason* 114d 115a 149d 150a
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43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 445a-4 6a,c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART II [ ]
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49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 304a 319a esp 304
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54 FREUD *War and Death* 7 7b- 60a esp 757d
758c, 9d 60a

34. Human nature and the determination of the good for man. the real and the apparent good, particular goods and the good in general

NEW TESTAMENT *Romans* [ ]
5 SOPHOCLES *Antigone* [53-631] 136b-c /
Philoctetes [895-903] 190a
7 PLATO *Charmides* 2d-3b esp 3a / *Protagoras*
57d-62d *Euthydemus* 69a 71a 4b- 6b /
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531a / *Sophist* 557b-d / *Philebus* 619d-670b
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8 ARISTOTLE *Prior* BK VII, CH 3 [2, [ ]]
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21 5] 499a BK XII CH [ ] 602b
9 ARISTOTLE *Motion of Animals* [ ]
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BK X, CH 6-8 430d-434a / *Politics* BK CH
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538a b *Rhetoric* BK I, CH 6-7 60 d-60 d
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12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK II [-6]
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12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I, CH 6 110c 112b
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12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK II, SECT 9 25 d
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14 PLUTARCH *Pericles* 121a 122b
15 TACITUS *Histories* BK IV 26 c
17 PLOTINUS *Fourth Ennead* TR IV CH 43 44
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18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X par 29-34 78d
80c / *City of God* BK XII CH 3 343d 344b
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19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 12
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4 A and REP 1 151c 152a,c Q 59, A 1 A 5
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318c Q 80 A 2, REP 2 428a-d Q 8 A 4 REP 1
434c-435c 5 A 5 435c-436c Q 9 A 1 A 5
483d-489d Q 105 A 4 ANS 541c 542a PART
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703b-d Q 22, A 3 REP 2 722d 723b Q 34 A 4
771c 772b
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 54
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64a Q 71 A 2 106d 10 Q 91 A 2 208d 209d
Q 94 220d 225b PART II II Q 29, A REP 3
531 -d A 3 RE 1 531d 532c
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVI [85-
14] 77d 78a XVII [92]-X III [75] 79b-80c
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 61 6-c 65a
96a b
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, BK I
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25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 149b-d 231d 233a 489b-
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27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT III SC I [3 134]
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30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 70d 71b
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PR F 423c-d PROP
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33 PASCAL *Pensées* 4-, 4-5 243b-244b 430
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35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* 90a-d BK I
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II, CH XXI SECT [ ]-[ ] 191d 192b S CT 53-56
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36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 2 [ ] 2[ ]
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 38c-40a 41a-43b 53b-
54d 82 -83b 85b-89c
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 343a 345d 351c 3 2a
42 KANT *Pure Reason*, 169b [fn 1] / *Fund. Prin.*
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270c-d / *Intro Meta* [ ] *of Morals* 38 d
388a / *Judgement* 584d 587a
43 MILL *Liberty* 293d 296d / *Representative*
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455a 456d-457b 458b-464d

(2 *The goodness or perfection of God the plenitude of the divine being 2b The divine goodness and the problem of evil*)

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 13:24-30 36-43 esp 13 38-39 / *John* 3 16 21 / *Romans* 3 1-10 5 / *James* 1 12-15 / *I John* 1 esp 1 5 6
5 AESCHYLUS *Eumenides* 81a 91d
7 PLATO *Republic* BK II 321d 322d / *Timaeus* 452c 453b
8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK IX CH 9 [1051 17-22] 577a b
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 12 118d 120b
14 PLUTARCH *Pericles* 140d
17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR VIII 27b 34a
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK III par 11 15d 16a BK IV par 24 25b c BK V par 20 32d 33a BK VII par 3-7 44a 45d par 11-23 47a 50d BK XIII par 45 123a / *City of God* BK VIII CH 24 283a b BK X CH 21 311c 312a BK XI CH 9 326d 327d CH 13-15 329c 331a CH 2. 333d 334c BK XII CH 1-9 342b d 348b CH 21-22 357a c CH 27 359c 360a c BK XIII CH 13-15 366a d BK XIV CH 10-15 385b-390a BK XIX CH 13 519a 520a BK XXII CH 1 586b d 587b / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 23 648a c BK III CH 37 673d 674a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2 A 3 REP 1 12c 14a Q 8 A 1 REP 4 34d 35c A 3 ANS 36b 37c Q 14 A 10 83d 84c Q 15 A 3 REP 1 93b 94a Q 17 A 1 100d 101d Q 18 A 4 REP 4 107d 108c Q 19 A 9 116d 117d A 12 ANS and REP 4 118d 119d Q 20 A 2 REP 4 121b 122a Q 22 A 2 REP 2 128d 130d A 3 REP 3 130d 131c Q 23 A 5 REP 3 135d 137d A 7 REP 3 138d 140a Q 25 A 3 REP 2 145b 147a Q 48 A 2 REP 3 260c 261b Q 49 AA 2 3 266a 268a c Q 63 A 4 328b-329a A 5 ANS 329a 330c A 7 REP 2 331c 332b Q 64 A 4 337d 338d Q 65 A 1 REP 2-3 339b 340b Q 66 A 3 ANS 347b 348d Q 72 A 1 REP 6 368b 369d Q 92 A 1 REP 3 488d-489d Q 103 A 3 REP 2 530a c A 7 REP 1 533b d A 8 533d 534b Q 114 A 1 ANS 581d 582c PART I II Q 39 A . REP 3 790d 791b
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 79 156a 159c PART III SUPPL, Q 74 A 1 REP 1 925c 926c
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL XXXIV [28 36] 51c PARADISE I [103-142] 107b d VII [19 148] 115b 116c VIII [91-148] 117d 118c XIII [52-87] 126a b XIX [40-90] 135c 136a XXIX [49-66] 150d 151a
22 CHAUCER *Friar's Tale* [7056-7085] 281a b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 160d 161a
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 17d 18a 80b 81a
31 DESCARTES *Meditations* IV 89a 93a
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 33 SCHOL 2 367d 369a APPENDIX 369b 372d
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* 93a 333a esp BK I [128 168] 96a 97a [209-220] 98a BK III [56-343] 136b 143a BK IV [3 113] 153a 155a BK V [62 295] 202a b BK VII [519-549] 228b 229a BK VIII [316-337] 239a b BK IX [6,9-779] 262a 264a BK X [585-640] 287a 288b BK XI [84-98] 301a / *Samson Agonistes* [1156-1177] 364b 365a / *Areopagitica* 394b-395b
33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 116a b / *Pensées* 735-736 317b 320 331b
35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 154 444a b
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VIII DIV 78-81 485c 487a SECT XI DIV 100 107 499c 500a passim
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 81b c
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 230b 330a b
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 401a b 482a d 539d 540a 549c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* ADDITIONS 90 130b d / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 160a PART III 304d 306a
47 GOETHE *Faust* PROLOGUE 7a 9b
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 381a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK VI 272a b
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK V 120d 121c 122c 123b 132a 135d BK XI 337a 346a
54 FREUD *Civilization and Its Discontents* 790d / *New Introductory Lectures* 877d 878b

3 The moral theory of the good the distinction between the moral and the metaphysical good

7 PLATO *Protagoras* 58b-62d / *Gorgias* 262a 263c 280d 285a / *Theaetetus* 530b 531a / *Philebus* 609a-639a c
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I 339a 348d esp CH 6 341b 342c / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 6 [1362b2 6] 603b CH 9 [1366a23 1367b27] 608c-610c
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* 105a 245a c esp BK I CH 1 105a 106c CH 6 110c 112b CH 11 116d 118d CH 15 121c d CH 18 124a 125a CH 2 127c 128c CH 25 129d 131b CH 27 29 132b-138a BK II CH 5 142c 144a CH 10-11 1 8c 151b BK III CH 1 175a 177c CH 3 178d 180a CH 10 185d 187a CH 24 203c 210a BK IV CH 1 213a 223d CH 6 230b 232c
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* 253a 310d esp BK II SECT 1 256b d SECT 9 257d SECT 11 1 258a c BK IV SECT 10 64c SECT 24 265c d SECT 32 266b c SECT 37 266d 267a SECT 39 267a BK V SECT 2 269a SECT 6 269b d SECT 10 270c d SECT 1 271a SECT 15 16 271b-d BK VI SECT 274a SECT 51 279b-c BK VII SECT 36 282b SECT 44 282b-c SECT 55 283b c BK VIII SECT 1 285a b SECT 10 286b SECT 19 286d 287a E T 3 28 d 288a SECT 39 288c SECT 41 288d SECT 51 289d 290a BK IX SECT 1 291a c SECT 16 293a SECT 4 295c 96a c
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XI CH 16 331a-c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II QQ 1-5 609a 643d Q 18 21 693b d 720a c

(3 *The moral theory of the good the distinction between the moral and the metaphysical good 3a Human nature and the determination of the good for man the real and the apparent good particular goods and the good in general*)

3b Goodness in the order of freedom and will

3b(1) The prescriptions of duty

168 4] 392b-d / Orest [491 15] 399a-401a / I hgenia at Aulis 425a-439d

6 HE ODOTUS History BK II 93c-d K VI 201d 202c BK VII 217d

6 T UCYDI ES Peloponnesian War BK V 505b-c

7 PLATO Apology 203c 204c 206d / Crito 213d 214a 215d 216c / Gorgias 265a 267c / Republic 295a-441a,c esp BK I II 300b-315a, BK X 436c-437c / La s K II 656d-658b BK V 687c-683a BK IX 741b-d / Seventh Letter 80 d-806a

9 ARISTOTLE Ethics BK X 376a 387 c / Poetics c 25 [1461 4-9] 697b-c

12 EPICTETUS Discourses BK I C I 28 133b-134d BK II CH 10 148c 150a K III CH 3 178d 180a CH 18 192 c CH 24 203c 210a BK IV CH 1 213a 223d CH 5 228a 230b

12 AU ELI S Meditations BK I S CT I 256b d SECT 16 259a K I S CT 10 264c K V SECT 6 269b-d K VII SECT 36 282b BK XI I CT 5 290b BK IX SECT 4 292 SECT 16 293a S CT 35 295a

18 AUGUSTI Co fessions BK par 19 5d / Christian Doctrine BK I CH 36 634d-635b

19 A UI S Summa Theologica RT I Q I A I 124b-12 b PART I II Q I A 3 4 718d 720a,c

20 AQUIN Summa Theologica P T I II Q 59, AA 4-5 48c-49d Q 60 2 50d 51b Q 9 A 2 3 235a-d

21 DANT Divine Comedy HELL, XI 15a 16b PU TOR X I [58-1 9] 77c 78a XVII [91 139] 79b-d

22 CH UCE Tale f Melibeus par 30-3 413b-414a

23 HO ES Leviathan P RT 78b-c 86b P RT 149b-c P T 272

26 S E RE 1st Henry I I ACT I SC V 12d 13a / 2 d Henry I I CT III [3 8] 49c 50 / Richard II ACT II 1 [140- 4] 334b

27 SH KE PEA Tro lus and Cressid ACT SC I [63 55] 115b-c CT S 3 [16- 4] 137b / King Lear ACT I C I [-68] 270b-271b Henry VIII CT III SC II [4 8-450] 573c-d

29 CE ANTE Do Q ixote RT I 68b-73a

30 B Advancement f Learning 74b-c 81d 82a 93 9

32 M LTO Comus 33a 56b

35 LOCKE Hum n Understand BK CH I CT 5-6 105a-c BK I CH XXX I S CT 9-13 230b-231c

38 M T SQUI U Spirit f Laws BK 11c d

38 ROU AU Inequality 351b-c

4 K T Pure Re son 149d 150a / Practical Re so 306b-c / Intro Met hysic f Moral 391d 392 Science f Right 39 a-399c 400b-401b

43 F ERALIS UMB R 41 132b-c

43 M L Liberty 302d 323a c pass m / Utilitarianism 448a 452b-455a 455c-456a 465c 471b pass m

44 BOSWELL Johnso 315b-c

46 H GEL Phil sophy of Right PART I par 81 34c d par 89 35c d par 9 35d 36a P T II par 112 41c-d par 129-132 45d-4 a par 138 48c-d par 140 49b-54a P RT III par 218 72c d par 3 73c d par 233 75d DDITIO S 59 125c-d 127b-c 89 129d 130a 92 100 131d 133a 138 139a b / Ph so hy f History INTRO, 165c 166b

48 M LVILLE Moby Dick 292a 297a 375a 376b

49 D RWIN Descent of Man 310a 316a 31 c d 319d 322c 592d 593a

51 TOL TOY War a d Peace BK V 194a 195a 214c 216d BK VIII 304b-305a BK XIV 611a-c

52 DOSTOEVSKY Bro hers Karamazov BK II 33c 34b K III 73a b BK V 123b 12 b BK 153d 157b 165c 168c 169c BK XII 398a d

54 FR UD Civilization and Its Discontents 792 793a

3f The sources of ev l in h man life

OLD TEST MENT Genesis 3 / Exod s 23 8 / Deutero omy 16 19 30 15 2 esp 30 15 / Job / Ecclesiast s 9 3 / Isaiah 45 7—(D) Isaias 45 7 / Lamentations 3 38 / Am 3 6

APOCRY H Wisd m of Sol m 1 1 16 esp 2 23 24 14 2 —(D) OT Book f Wisd m 1 12 16 2 esp 2 23 14 2 / Ecclesiasticus 8 2 10 9 11 6 14 1 10 15 10- 0 20 29 2 1 2 31 5 11—(D) OT Ecclesiasticus 8 3 10 9- 0 11 16 14 1 15 10-21 31 2 1 2 31 5 11

NEW TE T MENT Matthew 6 13 19-24 13 24 0 36 43 47 1 15 10-2 16 26 19 16-30 / Mark 1 13 4 1 2 7 14 8 36 10 21 30 / Luke 4 1 13 8 1 15 9 25 12 13 21 16 1 13 18 2 30 / Rom ns 5 12 19 15 25 / I Co rinthians 6 1 / Eph sians 5- / II Th ssal ans 2 1 2—(D) II The sa ans 11 / I Tim thy 6 9-10 / James 1 12 15 / I Peter 5 8-9 / I J hn 2 23 esp 2 15 17 / Revelation 12—(D) Apocalypse 12

5 SOPHOC ES Antigone [84 305] 133c d

5 ARI TOPH NES Plutus [7 183] 630a 631a

7 PLATO E thydemus 69a 71 / Republic BK II 318, 319a BK IV 354d 355c BK 7 3 7 379c BK II 389d 390b BK X 431b-434 / Timaeus 466a b / Th etet s 530b-531a / La s BK III 669a-670c BK III 733a 734 BK IX 751b-d

12 LU TI Nature f Thi gs BK III [31-93] 30b-31b BK V [31 43] 79b-d BK VI [1 42] 80a d

12 EPICTETUS Discourses K CI 5 179d 131b BK I CH 2 167d 170a CH 6 174c-d

12 AURELIUS M d tions BK I SECT I 256b d BK VI S CT 2 281b K I CT 4 295c 296a c BK XII S CT I 308b-c

15 T CITU 4 BK 51b

17 PLOTINUS First En ead TR I H 5 29a-c / Second Ennead TR IX H 3 73d 74b / Third

(3 *The moral theory of the good the distinction between the moral and the metaphysical good*)

3*d* Pleasure as *the* good *a* good or *feeling* good

7 PLATO *Protagoras* 59a 62d / *Gorgias* 275b 280d / *Republic* BK VI 384b d BK IX 421a 425b / *Philebus* 609a 639a c / *Laws* BK II 656d 658b 660a d BK V 689c 690c
8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK I CH 40 68b / *Topics* BK III CH 2 [117ᵃ23-25] 163d CH 3 [118ᵇ-7 36] 165d 166a CH 6 [119 37-ᵇ1] 166d BK IV CH 4 [124 15-20] 172d [124ᵇ7 14] 173b BK VI CH 8 [146ᵇ13 19] 200c BK VIII CH 9 [160ᵇ16-23] 218a b / *Physics* BK VII CH 3 [246ᵇ20 247ᵃ19] 330a b / *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 7 [1072ᵇ13-29] 602d 603a / *Soul* BK III CH 7 [431 8-ᵇ9] 663c 664a
9 ARISTOTLE *Motion of Animals* CH 6 [700ᵇ23-29] 236a / *Ethics* BK I CH 5 [1095ᵇ14 22] 340d CH 8 [1099ᵃ7-30] 344c d BK II CH 3 350a c BK III CH 4 359a c BK VII CH 4 398a 399a esp [1148 2 -ᵇ4] 398c d CH 11 14 403c-406a c BK X CH 1-5 426a 430d / *Politics* BK VIII CH 5 [1339ᵇ11-38] 545a c / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 6 [1362ᵇ5-9] 603b CH 7 [1364ᵇ23 27] 606c [1365ᵇ11-13] 607d
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK II [14-21] 15a b BK V [1412 1436] 79b d
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK II CH 11 150a 151b BK III CH 24 203c 210a
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK II SECT 11 12 258a c BK VI SECT 51 279b c BK VII SECT 27 281d SECT 64 284a b BK VIII SECT 10 286b SECT 19 286d 287a SECT 39 288c SECT 47 289b c BK IX SECT 1 291a c BK X SECT 34 35 301a b
17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR IV CH 12 17d / *Second Ennead* TR IX CH 15 74d 75a / *Sixth Ennead* TR VII CH 26 334c d CH 29 30 335d 336d
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK V CH 20 225b 226a BK X CH 18 310b d BK XIX CH 1-3 507a 511a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 5 A 6 ANS and REP 2 27c 28b PART I II Q 1 A 6 REP 1 614a c A 7 ANS 614c 615a Q A 6 619d 620d Q 3 A 4 625a 626b Q 4 AA 1 2 629d 631a Q 11 666b d 669b Q 27 A 3 ANS 738c 39c Q 30 A 4 REP 3 751c 752b QQ 31-34 752b 772b Q 39 790a 792d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II II QQ 28 -9 527b 533a
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVII [127-139] 79d XVIII [19-39] 80a b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 61d 62c
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 65c 66b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 28a d 70d 72a 35d 237d
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 71a 74a
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 39 SCHOL 408b d PART IV PROP 8 426b-c PROP 41 43 437a c
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK IV [5,7-945] 171b-173a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XX SECT 1-2 176b c CH XXI SECT 4, 188d SECT 55 56 192c 193b SECT 63 194d 195a CH XXVIII SECT 5 229c d
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 173b 174a / *Fund Pr Metaphysic of Morals* 259a b 265b / *Practical Reason* 298a 300a 304a 307d 314d 319b esp 315c 330 331a 338c 355d esp 341 342a / *Intro Metaphysic of Moral* 387b 388a / *Judgement* 478a 479d 584d 587a 588b [fn 2] 591b 592a 594c 596c
43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 445a-476a c passim esp 447b 457b 461c 464d
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 216c 378a b
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 316b c
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK IV 88d BK XI 343d 344a
53 JAMES *Psychology* 94a b 808b 814b esp 810a 812b-814b
54 FREUD *Instincts* 418d 420b *Civilization and Its Discontents* 772a c 792b c

3*e* Right and wrong the social incidence of the good doing or suffering good and evil

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 18 1 33 / *Exodus* 20 1- 17 22 21-28 23 1-9 / *Leviticus* 19 9-18 33 36 / *Numbers* 15 15 / *Deuteronomy* 5 16-21 10 17 19 / *I Samuel* 24 6—(D) *I Kings* 4 26 / *Proverbs* 3 27-35 1 21 15 1 1, 13 / *Isaiah* 3 13 15 10 1-3—(D) *Isaias* 3 13 15 10 1-3 / *Ezekiel* 18 5 22—(D) *Ezechiel* 18 5 22 / *Hosea* 4 1 3 7 1 7—(D) *Osee* 4 1 3 7 1-7 / *Amos* 2 6-8 4 1 2 8 4 / *Micah* 6 8—(D) *Micheas* 6 8 / *Zechariah* 7 9 10—(D) *Zacharias* 7 9 10
APOCRYPHA *Tobit* 1 1-2 9 4 1 0—(D) OT *Tobias* 1 1 2 9 4 1 20 / *Ecclesiasticus* 7-8 12 14 esp 1 3 14 5 7 28 34 21 2—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 7-8 12 14 esp 12 3 14 5 7 28 34 -5 -7 / *Susanna*—(D) OT *Daniel* 13
NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 5 7 passim esp 7 12 / *Luke* 6 7-38 / *Romans* 1 17 1 / *I Corinthians* 6 1 11 / *I Peter* 2 13 1 3 8 18
5 AESCHYLUS *Prometheus Bound* 40a 51d esp [941 1093] 50b 51d / *Agamemnon* 52a 69d esp [1331-1673] 66b 69d / *Choephoroe* 70a 80d esp [235-651] 72c 76b / *Eumenides* 81a 91d
5 SOPHOCLES *Oedipus the King* 99a 113a c / *Oedipus at Colonus* [55 291] 116c d [115 1207] 124d 125b / *Antigone* 131a 142d / *Ajax* 143a 155a-c esp [1035 1421] 152a 155a c / *Electra* 156a 169a c / *Philoctetes* 182a 195a c
5 EURIPIDES *Alcestis* 237a 247a c / *Suppliants* [195 250] 260a c / *Electra* 327a 339a c esp [880 1359] 335a 339a c / *Phoenician Maidens* 378a 393d esp [60 645] 380b 383d [162-

4c Goods of the body and goods of the soul

4d Intrinsic and external goods intrinsic worth and extrinsic value

(3 *The moral theory of the good the distinction between the moral and the metaphysical good 3f The sources of evil in human life*)

Ennead TR II CH 4-10 84c 88b CH 14 18 89b 93a / *Fourth Ennead* TR III CH 16 150c d TR IV CH 18 167b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par 9 18 10d 13a BK VII par 4 44b c BK VIII par 22-24 59a 60a / *City of God* BK VIII CH 24 283a b BK X CH 21 311c 312a BK XII CH 21-22 357a c BK XIII CH 13-15 366a d BK XIV CH 10-15 385b 390a BK XIX CH 13 519a 520a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 17 A 1 ANS 100d 101d Q 48 A 6 ANS 264a d Q 49 A 1 REP 3 264d 265d Q 63 A 9 REP 1 333b d Q 114 A 3 583b d PART I II Q 20 A 1 712a d Q 21 A 2 718a d

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II QQ 75-84 137c 178a

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL VIII [65] IX [103] 11c 13b XXIII [139-144] 34c XXVII [55-126] 40a-41b XXXIV [-8 36] 51c PURGATORY V [85 129] 59d 60c VIII [1 108] 64a 65b XVI [58 129] 77c 78a XVII [82]-XVIII [75] 79b 80c XXVIII [91-96] 97a PARADISE VII 115a 116c VIII [91-148] 117d 118c IX [127-142] 120a XIII [52-87] 126a b XVIII [115 136] 134d 135a XXIX [49-66] 150d 151a

22 CHAUCER *Knight's Tale* [2453-2469] 200a b / *Prologue of Pardoner's Tale* [12 263 -68] 372a / *Pardoner's Tale* [12 778 828] 380b 381b / *Tale of Melibeus* par 18 408a par 76-77 430b 431a / *Parson's Tale* par 20 508b 509a par 57-59 528b 529a par 62-64 530a 531a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 153b

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 218c 219a 231d 238d 326b 327b 381b c

26 SHAKESPEARE *Romeo and Juliet* ACT II SC III [15-30] 296c

27 SHAKESPEARE *Timon of Athens* ACT IV SC III [1-44] 410c 411a

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 17d 18a 80b 81a

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I APPENDIX 369b 372d PART IV APPENDIX VI 447c d

32 MILTON *Comus* 33a 56b esp [331-489] 40b 44a / *Paradise Lost* BK I [157 168] 97a [209-220] 98a BK II [496-505] 122a [629-870] 125a 130a [890-1009] 130b 133a BK III [56-134] 136b 138a BK IV [505-535] 163b 164a BK VII [519-549] 228b 229a BK VIII [316 337] 239a b BK IX [679-784] 262a 264b BK XI [84 98] 301a BK XI [334]-BK XII [649] 306b 333a / *Samson Agonistes* [38-59] 340b [5-1 540] 351a b / *Areopagitica* 394b-395b 409b 410a

33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 116a b 140a 162a / *Pensées* 850 340a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 58 70 193d 197b

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VIII DIV 70-81 485a 487a

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 338b-c 347d 348a 350c 351c 357a 360c 361c 363a 366d

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 81b-c

43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 451b-452b

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO par 18 16c d PART II par 139-140 48d 4a ADDITIONS 14 118c d 90 130b d / *Philosophy of History* PART I 237d 238c PART IV 346a-c 354a-c

48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 3b-4a 204a 205a 209b

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK V 214c 215a esp 215a

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK III 53b 54b BK V 122c 123b 130b 135d BK VI 164b 166a BK XI 307c 310c 344a d

54 FREUD *General Introduction* 531d 532a / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 767a 80?a c esp 787a 788b

4 Divisions of the human good

4a Sensible and intelligible goods

7 PLATO *Euthydemus* 69a 71a / *Phaedrus* 120a 122a / *Symposium* 162d 167d / *Phaedo* 224a c 230c 242c 243a / *Republic* BK VI 386b d BK VII 397c 398b BK IX 423b-424d / *Laws* BK V 689c 690c BK VIII 735c 736c

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR VI CH 6-9 24a 26a passim TR VIII CH 2 27c d / *Second Ennead* TR IX CH 15-18 74d 77d / *Third Ennead* TR V CH 7 104a 105a / *Fifth Ennead* TR V CH 12 13 234a 235b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK IV par 20 24b c par 24 25b c BK VI par 6 42d-43a BK VII par 23 50b c BK X par 43-66 82a 88b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 63 A 4 ANS 328b 329a Q 80 A 2 REP 2 428a d Q 82 A 5 ANS 435c-436c PART I II Q 2 A 6 ANS 619d 620d Q 3 A 4 ANS 625a 626b Q 4 A 2 REP 2 630b 631a Q 11 A 2 ANS 667b d Q 13 A 2 ANS 673c 674c Q 30 A 1 ANS 749a d Q 31 A 5 755c 756c A 6 ANS 756d 757c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART IV 362b-c

4b Useful and enjoyable goods good for an end and good in itself

5 AESCHYLUS *Persians* [153 171] 16d 1 a

7 PLATO *Lysis* 22c 24a / *Protagoras* 60d 61d / *Euthydemus* 69a 71a 74b 76b / *Meno* 183d 184b / *Gorgias* 262a 264b 266d 267a / *Republic* BK I 298a 299a BK II 310c d

8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK I CH 15 [106 1 9] 149d BK III CH 1 [116 28 b] 162d 163a [116b37 117a4] 163c CH 2 [118 6 16] 164d 165a CH 3 [118b ~ 36] 165d 166a BK IV CH 4 [124 15 0] 172d BK VI CH 9 [147 33 b1] 201b c CH 12 [149b31 39] 204b c BK VII CH 3 [153b36-154 2] 209b / *Metaphysics* BK V CH 2 [1013 32 b3] 533c [1013b25 8] 533d 534a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 55-56 192c 193b SECT 62 194c-d

42 KANT *Pure Reason*, 236b-240b esp 238d / *Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals* 253a-d esp 256a-257d, 258d 259a, 263a b, 266a-c, 267b-d, 273d 277b, 281b 283d, 285a-c / *Practical Reason*, 293a-314d esp 298a 300a, 304d-307d 338c-355d esp 344c 345b / *Pref. Meta. Moral Elements of Ethics* 365b 366d / *Intro. Meta. Metaphysic of Morals* 387b-388a / *Judgement* 584d-585a 591b-592c 593c 594d esp 595a-c 604d-606c

43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 445a-446a,c esp 448a, 450b-c, 461c-464d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I, 238c-d PART IV, 307b-308a

54 FREUD *Civilization and Its Discontents* 771d 772

5k. The judgment of diverse types of good: their subordination to one another

OLD TESTAMENT: *I Kings* 3:5-14—(D) *III Kings*, 3:5-14 / *II Chronicles* 1:7-12—(D) *II Paralipomenon*, 1:7-12 / *Psalms* 49 52 119:72—(D) *Psalms* 48 51 118:72 / *Proverbs*, 1:2-14; 3 ... / *Ecclesiastes* 5:9-19 6:2—(D) *Ecclesiastes* 5:9-18 6:2 / *Jeremiah*, 9:23-24 ... 11—(D) *Jeremias*, 9:23-24 ... 11

APOCRYPHA: *Ecclesiasticus* 13:24 6—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 13:30-31

NEW TESTAMENT: *Matthew* 5:21-42 ... 19 13:22,44 46 16:24 25 / *Mark* 8:34 38 10:17-31 / *Luke* 9:23-26 10-42 12:15-33 18:18-30 / *John* 6:63—(D) *John* 6:64 / *Romans*, 8:1 ... / *Galatians* 6-16 / *Philippians* 3:7-21 / *I Timothy* 6:9-12 / *James* 4:1-10 / *I John* 2:15-17

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 6c-8a

7 PLATO *Euthydemus* 69a 71a / *Symposium*, 165b-167d / *Meno* 183b-184c / *Gorgias*, 254d 255c 262a 284b / *Republic* BK I 310c 311 BK II 401b BK IX, 421 427b / *Philebus* 635b-639a,c / *Laws* BK I 643b-644a BK V 686-688d 690b-66..a BK III, 6 ..b BK V 685d-688 689c 690c 694d-695a BK IX 751b-d

8 ARISTOTLE *Pre. Analytics* BK II CH 22 [68a 25-b7] 89d 90a / *Topics* BK III CH 1-5 [116a 1-119a 11] 162c / BK V CH 1 152a 166b BK VIII CH 1 ... 211a / *Metaphysics* BK XII, CH 7 [1072b 3-9] 602d-603a

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I, CH 1-2 339a-d CH 4 [1095a 14-19] 340b-c CH 5 340d 341b CH 6 [1096b 8-25] 341d 342a CH 7 342c 343a BK CH 11 9 ... 0] 3 6d 377a BK X, CH 6-430d-432 *Politics* BK I CH 1 [1252b 27-1253a 6] 445a CH 9 [1257b 40-1258a 18] 452 b BK II, CH 9 [1271a 41-b 9] 467 d BK III CH 12 480c-481b BK VII CH 1 [1323a 21-1324a 4] 527a-c CH 3 [1325a 16-31] 536d 537 CH 14 [1333a 16-b 4] 538a b CH 15 [1334a 14-35] 539c-d *Rhetoric* BK I CH 3 [1358b 2] 599b ... 604c-607d

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK II [1-61] 15 d 15b BK V [1113 1135] 75c-d

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK II CH 9 14 c 148c CH 19 16 c 164b BK III CH 14 189c 190a BK I CH 52 ... 230b

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK III SECT 11 262a b BK V SECT 16 271c-d

14 PLUTARCH *Solon* 64c 75c / *Pericles* 121a 127b

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR IV 12b-19b esp CH 3-4 12d 16a, CH 14 16 18a 19b / *Second Ennead*, TR IX CH 15 74d 75b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 9-18 10d 13a BK X, par 43-66 82a-88b / *City of God* BK I CH 8-10 133a 136c BK IV CH 33 34 206c 207a,c BK XI CH 16 331 ... BK XII CH 8 3-6d 34 b BK XV CH ... 416a-c BK XIX CH 1 3 50 a 511a CH 13 17 519a 523a CH 20 523d 524a / *Christian Doctrine* BK I, CH 3 4 625b-c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I Q 5, A 6 REP 3 2 c 28b PART I-II Q 1 ... 5, REP 1 613a 614 A 6, REP 1 2 614 ... A 7 ANS 614c-615a QQ 4 615c-635c; Q ... A 1 4 712a 715b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVII [...] XVIII [ ] 79b-80c XXX [55]-XXXI [90] 100a 101d PARADISE, VI [11 ... 6] 114d 115a ... [1 ...] 122a

22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida* BK III ST ... 19 ... 199 80a b

23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* CH XVII 24b-c CH XIX 25a b

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 62a PART II 157b-c

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, BK IV 234a 235a

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays*, 28a-d 69d 75a esp 70d 72a 107a 112d passim 125a-c 126b-131a passim 216c 219a 231d 235d 279c 281a 300c 306a esp 306c-d 3.. 3d 489b-490c 538a 543a,c

26 SHAKESPEARE *Richard III* ACT III SC II [96-103] 128a b

27 SHAKESPEARE *Troilus and Cressida* ACT II SC II [51-96] 114a-c

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 70b-76a 85b-c 91d 92b

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 65-66 444b-d

33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 94a 9 a / *Pensées*, 233 213b-216a 793 326b-32 a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 55-56 192c 193b SECT 62 194c-d SECT ... 198a-c

38 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 373c 374 / *Social Contract*, BK II, 396b-d 400a-c

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 32a

42 KANT *Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals* 256a b 257c-d 266a-b 271c 272b 273d 277b esp 274d 2 5b / *Practical Reason*, 316a 317d 337 335d / *Pref. Meta. Moral Elements of Ethics* 377d / *Judgement* 478a-b 584d 587a 588b [fn 1] 591b-592a 594c 596c

(4 *Divisions of the human good 4d Intrinsic and external goods intrinsic worth and extrinsic value*)

33 PASCAL *Pensees* 462 255a
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH V SECT 37 33a b
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 538a 539a
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 263c d
42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 256b 274d 275b / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 387d 388a / *Judgement* 591b 592a
43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 462c d
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 349a c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 45 23c d par 49 24c 25a par 63 65 28b 29a par 67-69 29c 31a ADDITIONS 29 121c
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK V 194d
53 JAMES *Psychology* 826a

4e Individual and common goods

7 PLATO *Crito* 213a 219a c / *Republic* BK IV 342a d BK V 364c 365d / *Critias* 480a / *Statesman* 588a b
8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 10 [1075a11-24] 605d 606a
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VI CH 8 [1141b28-1142a11] 390d 391a / *Politics* BK I CH I [1252a1-6] 445a BK II CH 1-5 455b d 460a BK III CH 6-7 475d 477a BK IV CH 11 [1295a25-b1] 495b-c
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 19 125b 126c
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK III SECT 4 260b 261a BK VII SECT 5 280a b
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 60 A 5 ANS 313b 314c Q 65 A 2 ANS 340b 341b Q 92 A I REP I 3 488d 489d Q 96 A 4 512d 513c PART I II Q I A 5 ANS 613a 614a AA 7-8 614c 615c Q 19 A 10 ANS 710b 711d Q 21 AA 3 4 718d 720a c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 90 A 2 206b 207a A 3 ANS and REP 3 207a c A 4 ANS 207d 208b Q 91 A 5 ANS 211c 212c A 6 REP 3 212c 213c Q 93 A I REP I 215b d 216c Q 94 A 2 ANS 221d 223a A 3 REP I 223a c Q 95 A 4 ANS 229b 230c Q 96 A 3 ANS and REP 3 232b 233a A 4 ANS 233a d Q 97 A 4 238b 239b Q 100 A 2 ANS 252b 253a A 8 ANS and REP 3 259d 261a Q 111 A 5 REP I 355d 356c PART II II Q 39 A 2 REP 3 575b 576b Q 187 A 3 REP I 3 666a 669b PART III SUPPL Q 96 A 6 REP II 1058a 1061b
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XV [40-81] 75d 76a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 87c d
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 71a b
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 36 434a b
35 LOCKE *Toleration* 15d / *Civil Government* CH V 30b 36a passim
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III 112a 113a
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 114a d / *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 369c 373b / *Science of Right* 438d 439a
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 64 197d
43 MILL *Liberty* 297a / *Utilitarianism* 461d
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 393a-c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 46 23d 24a PART III par 170 60d par 199 67c par 249 78c par 287 97a ADDITIONS 2, 121b 127 137b 145 140b
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [11 559-572] 281b
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 316c 317a 592d
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI 158b 159a

5 The order of human goods

5a The supreme good or *summum bonum* its existence and nature

7 PLATO *Symposium* 164c 167d / *Gorgias* 254d 255c / *Republic* BK VI VII 383d-401d esp BK VI 383d 386c / *Philebus* 635b-639a c
8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK V CH 16 543a b BK XII CH 7 [1072b13-29] 602d 603a
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH I 339a 34 b esp CH 7 342c 344a BK VII CH 11 13 403c 405b passim esp CH 13 404d-405b BK X CH 1-8 426a-434a esp CH 6-8 430d 434a / *Politics* BK I CH I [1252a1-6] 445a BK III CH 12 [1282b15-18] 480c BK VII CH 1 3 527a 530a passim
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK II [1-61] 15a d BK VI [1 42] 80a d
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 3 108b c BK II CH 11 150a 151b CH 19 162c 164b BK III CH 2 177c 178d CH 10 185d 187a CH 24 203c 210a
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK V SECT 34 273c BK VI SECT 14 274d 275a
17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR II CH 4 8a b TR VIII CH 2 27c d / *Sixth Ennead* TR IX 353d 360d esp CH 6-11 357a 360d
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK IV par 4 25b-c BK VII par 7 45a d BK X par 29-34 78d 80c / *City of God* BK VIII CH 8 10 270a 271d BK X CH 1-3 298b d 301a CH 18 310b d BK XII CH I 342b d 343c BK XIX 507a 530a c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q I A I ANS 50c 51c Q 26 150a 152a c Q 62 A I ANS 317d 318c PART I II QQ 1-5 609a 643d Q 34 A 3 770c 771c
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVII [127-139] 79d PARADISE I [103 142] 107b d III [82-90] 110a b XXVI [1-69] 145d 146c XXXII [139]-XXXIII [145] 156a 157d
22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida* BK III STANZA 1-7 54b 55b STANZA 250 -53 87a b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 76c d
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 65c 66b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 28a d 149b d 279c 281a
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 70b d
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PR I 8 431c PROP 36 434a b APPENDIX IV 447b-c XXXII 450c d PART V PROP 42 463b d
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 73 185a b 462 255a

5f The supremacy of the individual or the common good. the relation of the good of the individual person to the good of other persons and to the good of the state

OLD TESTAMENT: Proverbs 11:10-11

5 AESCHYLUS: Seven Against Thebes 2a-39a,c esp [1-58] 38d 39a,c

5 SOPHOCLES: Oedipus the King 99a-113a,c esp [-6] 99a-d / Antigone 131a-142d esp [158-21] [132-d / 4 143a 159a,c esp [1045 14 1] 152a 159a,c / Philoctetes 182a-195a,c

5 EURIPIDES: Phoenician Maidens [834] 385c 387b [5 1654] 391d 39 d / Iphigenia at Aulis 425a-439d

5 ARISTOPHANES: Acharnians 455a-469a

6 HERODOTUS: History BK II 99a BK VII 235b c

6 THUCYDIDES: Peloponnesian War BK II 39 d 395, 40 b-c BK VI, 511c-d 570c-d

7 PLATO: Euthyphro 7c 6b / Apology 200a 211a,c esp 207a 208a / Crito 213a 219a,c esp 216d 211a,c / Gorgias 262a-270c / Republic BK I, 301-306a BK II 342a-d BK V 364c 365d BK VI, 379d 380b BK VII, 390b-391b 401a b Laws BK V 692d-693a BK VI 708a BK X 721d BK IX, 754a b 754d 755 BK XI 773d 778a / Seventh Letter 814b-c

9 ARISTOTLE: Ethics BK I, CH [1094b-6] 339c-d BK V CH [9 1130b13] 3 c BK VI, CH 8 [1141b5-1142a11] 390d 391a BK IX CH 6 [1167a-15] 470d-421 CH 8 [1168 5-1169a11] 422b-d CH 9 423a-42 b CH 1 424a-d / Politics BK I, CH 1 [1252a1-6] 445a CH [1253a8-39] 446c-d BK II, CH 1-4 b,d 456a BK III, CH 4 473c- a CH 4 be a CH [1 8] 482c CH 3 481b-483a BK V [1315 3-] 485d-48 BK VII CH 1 3 52 533a esp CH [3-45] 5 8a b CH 13 [1332a3-38] 53 a CH 14 [1333b9-37] 538 d BK I, CH [1337a5-30] 542b

12 EPICTETUS: Discourses BK CH 9, 135d BK II, CH 5, 1 3d 144a CH 9, 148c 1 9a BK III CH 182b-18 CH 198c 199d

12 AURELIUS: Meditations BK III, SECT 4 260b-261 BK IV SECT 4 25 BK SECT 6 269b-d SECT 6 271c-d SECT 22 272b BK VI, SECT 14 2 4d 2 a SECT 4 278 SECT 54 279c BK VIII SECT 28 b-c SECT 23 287b BK X, SECT 291 c SECT 3 293c SECT 4 293c 296a,c BK X, 6 297a b BK XI, SECT 302d 306a

14 PLUTARCH: Lycurgus 3 a 48d esp 44d-45c / Solon 71b 71d Cato the Younger 625d-627b 63 b-c 64b Demosthenes 699c 700

15 TACITUS: Histories BK II, 225d 228a

18 AUGUSTINE: City of God, BK XIX, CH 5 513d-514b CH 8 515c 515a CH 12 4 517 570d CH 5 521d 523a CH 19 523b-d CH 26 525 29a

19 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica, PART I, Q 60 5 313b-314c Q 65 A 3 20b-341b Q 9

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica PART I II Q 96 A 4 512d 513c PART II II Q 4 636a-c Q 19, A 10 ANS 710b-711d Q A3 718d 719c A 4 ANS and REP 3 719d 720a c Q 3 AS 5-6 6 a 63

20 AQUINAS: Summa Theologica PART II II Q 90 A 306b-30 A 3 ANS and REP 3 20 a-c Q 91 A 5, ANS 211c 212 A 6, REP 3 212 213c Q 92 A 1 A 3 and REP 1 3 4 213c 214c Q 93 A 1 REP 1 215b,d 216c Q 94 A 2 ANS 221d 223a Q 95 A 4 A 2 3b-230c Q 96, A 3 3 and REP 3 232b-233a A 4 ANS 233a-d A 6 ANS 235a d Q 97 A 1 ANS and REP 3 236a-d A ANS and REP 2 236d 237b 4 238b-239b Q 98 A 1 239b-240c Q 99, A 3 A 24 a 248a Q 100 A ANS 252b-253a A 8 A S and REP 3 259d 261 A 1 REP 3 263c 264d Q 105, A ANS and REP 1,4 309d 316a A 3 ANS and REP 5 316a 318b Q 111 A 5 REP 1 355d 356c P T I I Q 1 A 3 458-459a Q 26 510b-570d passim Q 39, A 2 REP 3 5b-5 6b Q 18 3 REP 1 3 666a-669b PART III SUPPL, Q 1 900d 917b Q 94 10-0d 1042c Q 96 A 6 REP 11 1058a 1061b A REP 3 1061b-1062a

21 DANTE: Divine Comedy PURGATORY X [10-81] 75d 6a

23 HOBBES: Leviathan PART I 91b-97b 93d 94a PART II 10 c-d 157b-c

25 MONTAIGNE: Essays 381a 388c esp 381c-d 388a-c 480b-482b 487b-488b

26 SHAKESPEARE: 2nd Henry VI ACT II SC I [3 1] 49c 50a / Henry V ACT I SC II [183 213] 53 d 535a

27 SHAKESPEARE: Troilus and Cressida 103a-141a,c esp ACT I SC 1 [5-134] 109a-c / Coriolanus ACT I SC I [6-16] 352a-353a

30 BACON: Advancement of Learning 71a 75a esp 4b-d 81d 8 a 94b-95b

31 SPINOZA: Ethics, PART IV PROP 35, CO OL 1 433c d P OP 3 SCHOL 2 435b-436a

32 MILTON: Samson Agonistes [843-870] 358a 359a esp [843-870] 358a b

33 PASCAL: Pensées 456 254a 4 4 451 256b-257b

35 LOCKE: Toleration 15d 16a 16d 17b / Civil Government CH VII SECT 8 -89 44a-d CH VIII SECT 95-99 46c-47 CH IX 53c 54d CH XI 5 b 56b passim CH X V 62b-6 c CH XV S 6 a-b / Human Understanding BK I CH II SECT 10 b SECT 6 10 b-c

36 SWIFT: Gulliver PART I 29b PART III 112a-115b esp 112a-113a

37 FIELDING: Tom Jones 291d 292a 330b-c

38 MONTESQUIEU: Spirit of Laws BK V 21a BK XIII 96a b BK XXIV 203a BK XXVI 221c 222a

38 ROUSSEAU: Inequality 323a 328a,c esp 323b-325b 343d 3 c 363a 3 6d esp 363b-36 a / Political Economy 368d 37 b / Social Contract BK II 391b-400c BK II, 40 a-c BK III 41 c 418a BK IV 425a-d

39 SMITH: Wealth of Nations BK I 109d 110d BK II 140b BK IV 193a 194b esp 194a b

40 GIBBON: Decline and Fall 193c 194a

27 SHAKESPEARE *Measure for Measure*, ACT I, SC I [33-41] 174d; ACT I, SC I [7] 184d
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning*, 26c-27a
31 DESCARTES *Discourse*, PART I, 43; PART III 49d-50b
31 SPINOZA *Ethics*, PART IV, PROP 4, 17 428a-d; PROP 18, SCHOL 429a-d; PROP 23-24 430c-d
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost*, BK VI [5-9-549] 228b-229a; BK VII [316-33] 239b; BK IX [69-779] 262a-264a; BK XI [84-98] 301a / *Samson Agonistes* [38-59] 340b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding*, BK I, CH III, SECT 16 117a; BK II, CH XXI, SECT 35 186b-d; SECT 64 195b
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36 SWIFT *Gulliver*, PART I, 28b-29a; PART IV 159b-160
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones*, 182a-c
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42 KANT *Pure Reason*, 149d / *Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals*, 265b; 282b-283d / *Practical Reason*, 326b-327a
43 MILL *Utilitarianism*, 458b-459b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right*, PART I, par 139-14 48d-54 / *Philosophy of History*, INTRO 168b-d; PART II, 280b-c
53 JAMES *Psychology*, 82a-b; 806a-808a
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14 PLUTARCH *Demetrius*, 726a-d
17 PLOTINUS *Fourth Ennead*, TR VIII, CH 7 204b-c
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions*, BK X, par 54-57 85a-86a
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48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick*, 4b-5
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53 JAMES *Psychology* 190a 191a 886b-888a

54 FREUD *War and Death* 758 -c 759a / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 792b-c

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I Works by authors represented in this collection.

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The general problem of the individual and the common good or the good of the person and the good of the state *see* CITIZEN 1 HAPPINESS 5-5b STATE 2f

General discussions of means and ends *see* CAUSE 4 RELATION 5a(2)

The controversy over the objectivity or subjectivity of judgments of good and evil *see* CUSTOM AND CONVENTION 5a OPINION 6a-6b RELATION 6c UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 7b

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A fuller treatment of the goodness and use of knowledge *see* ART 6c KNOWLEDGE 8a-8c PHILOSOPHY 4b-4c SCIENCE 1b(1)

ADDITIONAL READINGS

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I Wo ks by authors rep esented in this collection
II W ks by authors n t epresented in this colle t on

For the dat pla e d the fact oncerning the publicat on of the wo ks c ted con ult the B b graphy of Add tional Readings which f llows th last chapter of *The G t Ideas*

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— *Co cer the Nat e of G d*

AQU NA *Summ Contra Gent l* BK III CH 1-16
— *Q aest on s Di putata De Veritat* Q 21 *De M lo* Q 1
F B CON Of Goodness and Goodness of N tu *E s*
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KANT *Lectures on Ethics*
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Chapter 31 GOVERNMENT

INTRODUCTION

THE usual connotation of government is political. The word is often used interchangeably with state. But there is government in a university, in an economic corporation, in the church, in any organization of men associated for a common purpose. The theologian speaks of the divine government of the universe and the moralist speaks of reason as the ruling power in the soul which governs the appetites or passions.

In all these contexts, the notion of government involves the fundamental relations of ruling and being ruled, of command and obedience. Though the character of these relationships varies somewhat with the terms related, there is enough common meaning throughout to permit a general consideration of the nature of government. But that is not the way in which government is discussed in the great books. For the most part, government is considered in one or another of its special settings—as it functions in the family or the state, in the soul or the universe. The common thread of meaning is noted only indirectly, by the way in which comparisons are made or analogies are drawn between the various modes of government.

In view of this we have found it convenient to restrict this chapter to government in the political sense, treating domestic and ecclesiastical government under FAMILY and RELIGION, economic government under WEALTH, divine government in the chapters on GOD and WORLD, and government in the soul in the several chapters which consider the relation of reason to the passions, such as DESIRE and EMOTION.

Government and *state* are often used as if they were interchangeable terms. Some writers differentiate their meanings by using state to signify the political community itself, and government to refer to the way in which it is politically organized. Yet the two concepts tend to fuse in traditional political theory. The kinds of states, for example, are usually named according to their forms of government. The great books speak of monarchical and republican states as we today speak of the fascist or the democratic state.

Nevertheless, we recognize the distinction between a state and its government when we observe that the state can maintain its historic identity while it undergoes fundamental changes in its form of government. The state is not dissolved by a revolution which replaces a monarchy by a republic or conversely. There is a sense in which Rome is the same state under the Tarquins, under the Republic, and under the Caesars. In contrast, some rebellions, such as the War of Secession in American history, threaten to dissolve the state itself.

Despite the fact that government involves a relation between rulers and ruled, the word is often used to designate one term in that relationship, namely, the rulers. When the citizens of a republic speak of the government, they usually refer to the officialdom—*not* the body of citizens as a whole, but only those who for a time hold public office. But government can not consist of governors alone any more than education can consist of teachers alone. The different forms of government can be distinguished as readily by looking to the condition of the ruled as to the powers of the rulers. Furthermore, the same individuals may both rule and be ruled by turns, as Aristotle observes of constitutional government.

Though the notion of government includes both rulers and ruled, the word usually appears in political literature with the more restricted meaning. When writers refer to the branches or departments of government or when they

speak of the sovereignty of a government they direct attention to the ruling power and to the division of that power into related parts

THE GREAT BOOKS OF political theory ask a number of basic questions about government What is the origin of government its nature and necessity? What ends does government serve and how do these ends define its scope and limits? What is the distinction between good and bad government between legitimate and illegitimate or just and unjust government? What are the forms of government of good government of bad government? What are the various departments or branches of government and how should they function with respect to one another?

These questions are related The origin nature and necessity of government have a bearing on its ends and limits These same considerations enter into the discussion of the legitimacy and justice of governments They also have a bearing on the classification of the forms of government and on the evaluation of diverse forms The way in which the several branches of government should be related is affected by the way in which the various forms of government differ

These questions are not always approached in the same order Some of the great political theorists—for example Hobbes Locke and Rousseau—find their fundamental principles in the consideration of the origin of government They start with such questions as What makes it legitimate for one man to govern another? Is the exercise of political power both justified and limited by the end it serves? In answering these questions they imply or make a distinction between good and bad government and indicate the abuses or corruptions to which government is subject Though they enumerate the various forms of government in a manner which reflects the traditional classifications they do not seem to regard that problem as of central importance

Other eminent political thinkers make the classification and comparison of diverse forms the central problem in the theory of government Plato and Aristotle Montesquieu and Mill are primarily concerned with the criteria by which the justice or goodness of a government shall be judged They compare various forms of government as more or less desirable nearer to the ideal or nearer to the opposite extreme of corruption In the course of these considerations they answer questions about the necessity the legitimacy and the ends of government in general

THERE SEEMS TO BE considerable agreement on one point namely that government is necessary for the life of the state It is generally held by the authors of the great books that no community can dispense with government for without government men cannot live together in peace. None is an anarchist like Thoreau or Kropotkin although Kropotkin claims that *War and Peace* and even Mill s *Essay on Liberty* contain anarchist ideas Marx and Engels may be the other possible exception to the rule

If Marx and Engels take the opposite view they do so simply on the ground that with the advent of a classless society after the communist revolution the class war will come to an end and there will no longer be any need for government The state can quietly wither away But according to Aquinas even if society were free from all injustice and iniquity even if men lived together in a state of innocence and with the moral perfection they would possess if Adam had not sinned even then government would be necessary A social life he thinks cannot exist among a number of people unless government is set up to look after the common good

The great books do not agree about the naturalness of the state They do not agree about the way in which government originates historically or about the functions it should and should not perform They do not all reflect in the same way on the good and evil in government Nor do they all give the same reasons for the necessity of government In consequence they set different limits to the scope of government and assign it different functions which range from the merely negative function of preventing violence to the duty to provide positively for human welfare in a variety of ways

On all these things they differ but with the exceptions noted they do concur in thinking that anarchy—the total absence of government—is unsuitable to the nature of man Man be

in what he is, any form of government in Darwin's opinion is better than none. Some like Hobbes and Kant identify anarchy with the state of nature which is for them a state of war. Some like Locke think that the state of nature is not a state of war yet find great advantages to living in civil society precisely because government remedies the inconveniences and ills which anarchy breeds. But though they often write as if men could choose between living in a state of nature or in a civil society they do not think man has any option with respect to government if he wishes the benefits of the civilized life. They cannot conceive civil society as existing for a moment without government.

THE GENERAL AGREEMENT about the necessity of government tends to include an agreement about the two basic elements of government—authority and power. No government at all is possible not even the most attenuated unless men obey its directions or regulations. But one man may obey another either *voluntarily* or *involuntarily*—either because he recognizes the right vested in that other to give him commands or because he fears the consequences which he may suffer if he disobeys.

These two modes of obedience correspond to the authority and power of government. Authority elicits voluntary compliance. Power either actually coerces or by threatening coercion, compels involuntary obedience. Authority and power are the right and might of government. Either can exist and may *operate* apart from the other but as Rousseau points out when right is lacking government is illegitimate and as Hamilton points out when might is lacking it is ineffective.

In a famous passage the Federalists explain that rule by authority alone might work in a society of angels. But since men are men not angels, their obedience must be assured by the threat of force. In any society in which some men are good some bad and all may be either at one time or another force is the only expedient to get the unwilling to do what they should do *for* the common good. Even when the institutions of government have their authority from the consent of the governed they cannot function effectively without the use of power or force. For this reason Hamilton dismisses the idea of governing at all times by the simple force of law as having no place but in the reveries of those political doctors whose sagacity disdains the admonitions of experimental instruction.

If authority without force is ineffective for the purposes of government might without right is tyrannical. Wherever law ends, tyranny begins, Locke writes, and whosoever in authority exceeds the power given him by the law and makes use of the force he has under his command to compass that upon the subject which the law allows not ceases in that to be a magistrate. The use of unauthorized force may take the form of either usurpation or tyranny. If it is the exercise of power which another hath a right to, Locke declares it is usurpation; if it is the *exercise of power* beyond right which nobody can have a right to it is tyranny.

The distinction between legitimate rule and all dominations by *force* rests not on the use of *power* but on whether the power which must be employed is or is not legally authorized.

THE NOTION OF SOVEREIGNTY involves *considerations* of authority and power. The word itself is mediaeval and feudal in origin. It signifies the supremacy of an overlord who owes allegiance to no one and to whom fealty is due *from* all who hold fiefdoms under him. Since the supremacy of the sovereign lord is clothed with legal rights, according to the customs of feudal tenure sovereignty seems to imply the union of power with authority not the use of naked force.

The political philosophers of antiquity do *not* use the term *sovereignty*. But their discussion of the distribution of political power is certainly concerned with the possession of authority as well as the control of force. Aristotle's question, for example about "what is to be the supreme power in the state—the multitude? or the wealthy? or the good? or the one best man?" deals with the same problem which modern writers express by asking where sovereignty resides. As Aristotle sees the conflict between the oligarchical and the democratic constitutions the issue concerns the legal definition of the ruling class whether the constitu-

tion puts all the political power in the hands of the rich or in the hands of the freeborn rich and poor alike It does not seem to be too violent an interpretation for modern translators to use the word sovereignty here for *sovereignty can be said to belong to whatever* person or class holds the supreme power by law

Within this meaning of sovereignty the basic difference between absolute and limited government or between the despotic and the constitutional regime leads to a distinction between the sovereign man and the sovereign office

The ruler who holds sovereignty in his person is an absolute sovereign if his power and authority are in no way limited by positive law According to some political philosophers sovereignty must be absolute In the opinion of Hobbes for example the notion of a limited sovereignty seems to be as self contradictory as that of a supremacy which is not supreme

After discussing the absolute rights which constitute sovereignty Hobbes goes on to say *that this great authority being indivisible* there is little ground for the opinion of them that say of sovereign kings though they be *singulis majores* of greater power than every one of their subjects yet they be *universis minores* of less power than them all together For if by *all together* they mean not the collective body as one person then *all together* and *every one* signify the same and the speech is absurd But if by *all together* they understand them as one person (which person the sovereign bears) then the power of all together is the same as the sovereign s power and so again the speech is absurd

It makes no difference Hobbes argues whether the sovereignty is held by one man or by an assembly In either case the sovereign of a commonwealth is not subject to the civil laws For having the power to make and repeal laws he may when he pleases free himself from that subjection by repealing those laws that trouble him The sovereign therefore has absolute power which consists in the absolute right or liberty to do as he pleases for he that is bound to himself only is not bound at all

Aquinas seems to be taking the same view when he admits that the sovereign is *exempt from the law* as to its coercive power since properly speaking no man is coerced by himself and law has no coercive power save from the authority of the sovereign But Aquinas differs from Hobbes in thinking that *the authority if not the power* of the prince is limited by the constitutional character of the kingly office In the mediaeval conception of monarchy the king is bound not to himself alone as Hobbes insists but to his subjects Their oath of allegiance to him is reciprocated by his coronation oath in which he assumes the obligation to uphold the customs of the realm

WHERE AQUINAS CONCEIVES the sovereign prince as one element—the other being established law—in a government which is therefore both absolute and constitutional Hobbes conceives the sovereign as identical with a government which is wholly absolute The distinction here implied—between a mixed regime and one that is purely absolute—is more fully discussed *in the chapters on* CONSTITUTION and MONARCHY In contrast to both a republic or purely constitutional government substitutes the sovereign office for the sovereign man It denies the possession of sovereignty to men *except* in their capacity as office holders

According to the republican notions of Rousseau not even government itself has sovereignty except as representing the political community as a whole which is the sovereign Sovereignty he writes is vested in the government simply and solely as a commission an employment in which the rulers mere officials of the Sovereign exercise in their own name the power of which it makes them depositaries Since this power is not theirs except by delegation it can be limited modified or recovered at pleasure for the alienation of such a right is incompatible with the nature of the social body and contrary to the end of association

The unity of sovereignty is not impaired by the fact that a number of men may share in the exercise of sovereign power any more than the unity of government is destroyed by its division into separate departments or branches, such as the legislative executive and judicial. Since in a republic the government (in all its branches or offices) derives its power and

authority from the constitution (or what Rousseau calls "the fundamental law") and since it is the people as a whole not the officials of government who have the constitutive power the people are in a sense supreme or sovereign.

Popular sovereignty may mean that the people as a whole govern themselves without the services of magistrates of any sort but this would be possible only in a very small community. It is questionable whether a people has ever exercised sovereignty in this way in any state of historic importance. Popular sovereignty more usually means what is implied by Aquinas when he conceives the magistrate or ruler as merely the vicegerent of the people. "To order anything to the common good" he writes, "belongs either to the whole people or to someone who is the vicegerent of the whole people. Hence the making of a law belongs either to the whole people or to a public personage who has the care of the whole people." Similarly the exercise of coercive force is vested in the whole people or in some public personage to whom it belongs to inflict penalties.

The notion of a *public personage* as Aquinas uses it in these passages, is clearly that of a surrogate for or representative of the whole people. The people as a whole have in the first instance the authority and power to perform all the *functions of government*. Only if for convenience or some other reason they constitute *one or more public personages to act in their stead*, do individual men exercise sovereignty and then only as *representatives*.

Locke's fundamental principle—that men being by nature all free equal and independent no one can be put out of this estate and subjected to the political power of another without his own consent—is another expression of the idea of popular sovereignty. It reappears in the Declaration of Independence in the statement that since governments are instituted by men to secure their fundamental rights they must derive "their just powers from the consent of the governed."

Hegel objects to the sense in which men have recently begun to speak of the sovereignty of the people" as "something opposed to the sovereignty existent in the monarch. So opposed to the sovereignty of the monarch," he writes, "the sovereignty of the people is one of the confused notions based on the wild idea of the people." "If the sovereignty of the people means nothing more than the sovereignty of the whole state then," he says, "the sovereignty which is there as the personality of the whole is there in the real existence adequate to its concept as the person of the monarch."

But republican writers would reply that the sense in which they speak of the sovereignty of the people cannot be opposed to the sovereignty of government so long as that government is constitutional, not absolute. When the sovereignty of the people is conceived as the source or basis, not as the actual exercise of the legitimate powers of government there is no conflict between these two locations of sovereignty in the state. Yet the supremacy of the government always remains limited by the fact that all its powers are delegated and can be withdrawn or changed at the people's will.

THE QUESTION OF absolute or limited sovereignty and the connected question of unified or divided sovereignty have a different meaning in the case of the relation of governments to one another.

The theory of federal government discussed in *The Federalist* and in Mill's *Representative Government* contemplates a division of sovereignty not as between the people and their government but as between two distinct governments, to each of which the people grant certain powers. Distinguishing between the government of a national state and the government of a federal union Madison writes "Among a people consolidated into one nation ... supremacy is completely vested in the national legislature. Among communities united *for particular purposes* it is vested partly in the general and partly in the municipal legislatures. In the former case all local authorities are subordinate to the supreme and may be controlled directed or abolished by it at pleasure. In the latter the local or municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy no more subject within their respective spheres, to the general authority than the general authority is subject to them within its own sphere." The federal or general and the

tion puts all the political power in the hands of the rich or in the hands of the freeborn rich and poor alike It does not seem to be too violent an interpretation for modern translators to use the word sovereignty here for sovereignty can be said to belong to whatever person or class holds the supreme power by law

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The ruler who holds sovereignty in his person is an absolute sovereign if his power and authority are in no way limited by positive law According to some political philosophers sovereignty must be absolute In the opinion of Hobbes for example the notion of a limited sovereignty seems to be as self contradictory as that of a supremacy which is not supreme

After discussing the absolute rights which constitute sovereignty Hobbes goes on to say that this great authority being indivisible there is little ground for the opinion of them that say of sovereign kings though they be *singulis majores* of greater power than every one of their subjects yet they be *universis minores* of less power than them all together For if by *all together* they mean not the collective body as one person then *all together* and *every one* signify the same and the speech is absurd But if by *all together* they understand them as one person (which person the sovereign bears) then the power of all together is the same as the sovereign s power and so again the speech is absurd

It makes no difference Hobbes argues whether the sovereignty is held by one man or by an assembly In either case the sovereign of a commonwealth is not subject to the civil laws For having the power to make and repeal laws he may when he pleases free him self from that subjection by repealing those laws that trouble him The sovereign therefore has absolute power which consists in the absolute right or liberty to do as he pleases for he that is bound to himself only is not bound at all

Aquinas seems to be taking the same view when he admits that the sovereign is *exempt from the law* as to its coercive power since properly speaking no man is coerced by himself and law has no coercive power save from the authority of the sovereign But Aquinas differs from Hobbes in thinking that the authority if not the power of the prince is limited by the constitutional character of the kingly office In the mediaeval conception of monarchy the king is bound not to himself alone as Hobbes insists but to his subjects. Their oath of allegiance to him is reciprocated by his coronation oath in which he assumes the obligation to uphold the customs of the realm

WHERE AQUINAS CONCEIVES the sovereign prince as one element—the other being established law—in a government which i therefore both absolute and constitutional Hobbes conceives the sovereign as identical with a government which is wholly absolute The distinction here implied—between a mixed regime and one that is purely absolute—is more fully discussed in the chapters on CONSTITUTION and MONARCHY In contrast to both a republic or purely constitutional government substitutes the sovereign office for the sovereign man It denies the possession of sovereignty to men *except* in their capacity as office holders

According to the republican notions of Rousseau not even government itself has sovereignty except as representing the political community as a whole which is the sovereign Sovereignty he writes is vested in the government simply and solely as a commission an employment in which the rulers mere officials of the Sovereign exercise in their own name the power of which it makes them depositaries Since this power is not theirs except by delegation it can be limited modified or recovered at pleasure for the alienation of such a right is incompatible with the nature of the social body and contrary to the end of association

The unity of sovereignty is not impaired by the fact that a number of men may share in the exercise of sovereign power any more than the unity of government is destroyed by its division into separate departments or branches such as the legislative executive and judicial Since in a republic the government (in all its branches or offices) derives its power and

equally good all bad forms equally bad? If not what is the principle in terms of which some order of desirability or undesirability is established? For example is one good form of government better than another one bad form worse than another in terms of degrees of justice and injustice or in terms of efficiency and inefficiency? To put this question in another way is one form of good government better than another because it achieves a better result or merely because it achieves the same result more completely?

If there are several distinct forms of good government are there one or more ways in which these can be combined to effect a composite or mixed form? If a mixed form is comparable with the pure forms it unites is it superior to all to some to none of them? On what grounds? In what circumstances?

While proposing what they consider to be the ideal form of government some political philosophers admit that the ideal may not be realizable under existing circumstances or with men as they are Plato for example recognizes that the state he outlines in the *Republic* may not be practicable and in the *Laws* he proposes institutions of government which represent for him something less than the ideal but which may be more achievable The Athenian Stranger says of the state described in the *Republic* that whether it is possible or not no man acting upon any other principle will ever constitute a state which will be truer or better or more exalted in virtue The state which he is discussing in the *Laws* takes the second place He refers to a third best which far from being even the practicable ideal may be merely the best form of government which now actually exists.

Aristotle also sets down the various ways in which forms of government can be judged and compared We may consider he writes of what sort a government must be to be most in accordance with our aspirations if there were no external impediment but we must also consider what kind of government is adapted to particular states In addition Aristotle thinks it is necessary to know the form of government which is best suited to states in general as well as to say how a state may be constituted under any given conditions

Most important of all it is necessary to know not only what form of government is best but also what is possible Though political writers have excellent ideas Aristotle thinks they are often impractical Since the best is often unattainable the true legislator ought to be acquainted not only with what is best in the abstract but also with what is best relative to circumstances

Both Montesquieu and Mill later apply this basic distinction between the best form of government considered absolutely or in the abstract and the best form relative to particular historic circumstances. *Among these are a people s economic condition* level of culture political experience geography climate and racial characteristics Montesquieu for example thinks that government by law absolutely considered is better than despotic government yet *he also holds that despotic government is better for certain peoples* Mill thinks that the institutions of a representative democracy represent the ideal form of government but he acknowledges that absolute monarchy may be *better for a rude or uncivilized people who have* not yet advanced far from barbarism

The great question here is whether the circumstances themselves can be improved so that a people may become fit or ready for a better *form of government* and ultimately for the best that is attainable that is the form relative to the best possible conditions Since Montesquieu emphasizes what he considers to be fixed racial characteristics such as the servility of the Asiatics whereas Mill stresses *conditions* which are remediable by education economic progress and social reforms these two writers tend to give opposite answers The issue is more fully discussed in the chapters on DEMOCRACY MONARCHY and PROGRESS

Still other questions remain and should be mentioned here Are the ideal state and the ideal form of government inseparable or can one be conceived apart from the other? How shall the ideal government be conceived—in terms of the best that is practicably attainable given man as he is or can be or in terms of a perfection which exceeds human attainment and which men can imitate only remotely or imperfectly if at all? Does divine government for example set a model which human govern

state or local governments draw on the same reservoir of popular sovereignty but the sovereignty which each derives from that source is limited by the definition of matters reserved to the jurisdiction of the other

The fundamental difference between the condition of states in a federation and the condition of colonial dependencies or subject peoples is that imperial government unlike federal government claims an unlimited sovereignty The issues of imperialism which arise from the exercise of such power are discussed in the chapters on TYRANNY and SLAVERY

The one remaining situation is that of independent governments the governments of separate states associated with one another only by treaties or alliances or at most in the kind of loose hegemony or league represented by the Greek confederacies or the American *Articles of Confederation* In this situation the word sovereignty applied to independent governments signifies supremacy not in the sense of their having the authority and power to command but in the opposite sense of *not being subject to any political superior*

This radical difference in meaning is explicitly formulated in Hegel s distinction between internal and external sovereignty

After stating the conditions of the sovereignty of the state in relation to its own people Hegel says This is the sovereignty of the state at home Sovereignty *has another side i e* sovereignty *vis à vis* foreign states The state s individuality resides in its awareness of its own existence as a *unit in sharp distinction from* others and in this individuality Hegel finds the state s autonomy which he thinks is the *most fundamental freedom which a people possesses* as well as its highest dignity

But from the fact that every state is sovereign and autonomous against its neighbors it also follows according to Hegel that such sovereigns are in a state of nature in relation to each other It is this state of nature which Hobbes had earlier describ d as a state of war Precisely because independent states have absolute sovereignty in relation to one another they live in the condition of *perpetual war* and upon the confines of battle with their frontiers armed and cannons planted against their neighbors round about

In their relation to one another they are writes Kant like lawless savages Following Rousseau he thinks it is fitting that the state viewed in relation to other peoples should be called a power Unlike sovereign governments which unite authority with power in their domestic jurisdiction sovereign states in their external relations can exert force alone upon each other When their interests conflict each yields only to superior force or to the threat of it A fuller discussion of these matters will be found in the chapters on LAW STATE and WAR AND PEACE.

AS ALREADY INDICATED in several places, the materials covered in this chapter necessarily demand a study of many related chapters dealing with political topics This is peculiarly true of the problems concerning the forms of government Separate chapters are devoted to each of the traditionally recognized forms, *i e* ARISTOCRACY DEMOCRACY MONARCHY OLIGARCHY TYRANNY Each of these chapters d fines a particular form distinguishes it from others and compares their merits In addition the chapter on CONSTITUTION deals with what *is perhaps* the most fundamental of all distinctions in forms of government that between a republic *and a despotism* or between government by laws and government by men

Here then it is necessary only to treat generally *of the issues raised by* the classification and comparison of diverse forms of government They can be summarized in the following questions

What are the criteria or marks of good government? Is the goodness of government determined by the end it serves by the way in which it is instituted by its efficiency in promoting whatever end *it serves*? Are such criteria of good government as justice legitimacy and efficiency independent or interchangeable?

What is the nature of bad government? Can a distinction be made between the abuses or weakness to which good government is subject in actual operation and government which is essentially bad because perverse or corrupt in principle as well as practice?

Are there several forms of good government? Of bad government? How are they differentiated from one another? Are all good forms

ment should aim to approximate? Is that human government ideal which is most like the divine or on the contrary is the perfection of human government measured by standards drawn from the nature of man and the difficulties involved in the rule of men over men?

THE TRADITIONAL enumeration of the functions of government is threefold the legislative the judicial and the executive Locke adds what he calls the federative power the power of making treaties or alliances and in general of conducting foreign affairs It may be questioned whether this function is strictly coordinate with the other three since foreign like domestic affairs may fall within the province of the executive or the legislature or both as in the case of the Constitution of the United States

In our own day, the multiplication of administrative agencies and the development of planning boards have been thought to add a new dimension to the activities of government but again it may be questioned whether these are not merely supplemental to the functions of making law applying law to particular cases and regulating by administrative decree those matters which fall outside the domain of enforceable law The executive branch of government seems the most difficult to define because it involves both law enforcement and the administration of matters not covered by legislative enactment or judicial decision

If the threefold division of the functions of government is exhaustive the question remains how these distinct activities shall be related to one another and by whom they shall be performed In an absolute monarchy in which the king is the government all power are in the hands of one man Though he may delegate his powers to others they act only as his deputies or agents not as independent officials This does not obliterate the theoretical distinction between legislation adjudication, and execution but in this situation there can be no practical separation of the three powers, certainly no legal system of checks and balances

It is the separation of powers according to Montesquieu that is the basis of political liberty Power should be a check to power he writes In a system of separated powers the legislative body being composed of two parts they check one another by the mutual privilege of rejecting They are both restrained by the executive power as the executive is by the legislative

Whether or not Montesquieu is right in attributing this aspect of constitutionalism to the limited monarchy of England in his own day his argument can be examined apart from history for it raises the general question whether government by law can be preserved from degenerating into despotic government except by the separation of powers

For the American Federalists the system of checks and balances written into the Constitution so contrives the interior structure of the government that its several constituent parts may by their mutual relations be the means of keeping each other in their proper places This they consider the prime advantage to be gained from Montesquieu s principle of the separation of powers The principle itself they hold to be the sacred maxim of free government

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

7 PLATO *Protagoras* 44c-d / *Crito* 216b-217d / *Gorgias* 271b-272b / *Republic* BK II 316c-319a / *Laws* BK III 663d-667b

9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK I CH I [488a-b] 8d-9a / *Ethics* BK VIII CH 10 [1160b25] 414c BK IX CH 9 [1169b18-22] 423b / *Politics* BK I CH 2 445b-446d esp [1253a9-39] 446d BK III CH 6 [1278b15-29] 475d-476a

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK V [1011-1027] 74b-c [1136-1160] 76a-b

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK CH 3 125c-d

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK IV SECT 4 264a

14 PLUTARCH *Cato the Younger* 638b-d

15 TACITUS *Annals* BK III 51b-c / *Histories* BK I, 211c-212d

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK I CH 4 190d BK XI CH 2 359c-360a,c BK XIX CH 14-17 519a-523a CH 21 524a-525a CH 23-24 528a-c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 96, A 4 512d-513c

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21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY [-6-151] 61c-62c XVI [-105] 77d PARADISE, VIII [-117] 118a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 58c-d 77a 77-8c-87b 91a-b 96a-b PART II 99a 102-104b-d 109b 112b-d 113c 124c 12-a 231a-c 29d

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 462c-465c

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27 SHAKESPEARE *Troilus and Cressida* ACT I, SC III [-134] 109a-c

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation*, 454

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 20c-d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 37, SCHOL 2 435b-436a

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VI [169-185] 200a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 304 227b-228a 306 228a 330 231b-232a

35 LOCKE *Toleration* 4c-d 16a-c / *Civil Government*, CH I SECT 2a-c CH II SECT 3-CH III, SECT 29 28a 29d CH SECT 5 36d 3 b SECT 4-6 41b-42a CH SECT 8-CH X 32 44 5b CH X SECT 35 56c-d CH X SECT 63a b CH XVI SECT 5 65d CH SECT 74a b 297 b-c

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 135a 184a

36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 214b-21 b esp 216b-261b-262a 410a-411a

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I 1a-3d VIII 5a

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 333b-d / *Political Economy* 370b *Social Contract* BK I 391b-393c BK II 406b,d-40a 419b 423a-424a

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK 309a-311

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* b

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 87 b

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 222b-c / *Science of Right* 433-434d 435c-436b 437 d 450d-4 1c

43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE [7-25] 1b

43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. PREAMBLE 11a,c

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43 MILL *Liberty* 267d 268a 269c 302d 303a / *Utilitarianism* 472b-c

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 172d 173a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* ADDITIONS 47 124a b / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 173a 175c PART II 262a-c PART IV 342c-d

49 DARWIN *Descent of Man*, 310a-c 321b-c

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE II 680b-684a

54 FREUD *Civilization and Its Discontents* 780b-d

1b Comparison of political or civil government with ecclesiastical government and with paternal or despotic rule

5 SOPHOCLES *Antigone* [631-680] 136c 137a

5 EURIPIDES *Andromache* [464-493] 319b-c

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 107c 108d BK V 18a 180a

7 PLATO *Crito* 217a-c / *Statesman* 581a-c / *Laws* BK III 663d-677a

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VIII, CH 10 [1160b23-1161a9] 413a b / *Politics*, BK I CH 1-2 445a-446d CH 3 [1253b15-22] 447a CH 5 447d-448c CH 7 [1255b16-22] 449b-c CH 12-13 453d-455a,c BK III CH 4 [1277a33-b24] 474c-d CH 6 [1278b30-1279a22] 476a-c BK VII CH [1324b23-41] 528d 529a CH 3 [1325a18-b13] 529b-d CH 14 537b-538d

15 TACITUS *Annals* BK I 1a 2a 3a b BK III 51b-c 61c-6

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIX CH 13-17 519a 523a

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23 HOBBES *Leviathan*, PART II 109c 111b 121 b PART III 198a 199a PART IV 249a 266a-c

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 34a 101a

32 MILTON *New Forcers of Conscience* 68a b

35 LOCKE *Toleration*, 3a 5d 14b-15a / *Civil Government* CH I SECT 2 2a-c CH II, SECT 13 28a-b CH V 29d 30b CH VI-VII 36a-46c CH XIV XVIII 62b-73c

36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 214b-217b 410a-411a

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I 3b BK 4 9a c BK III, 12a 13c BK 15a-c 25d 31b BK VI 33a 35a 36a 37a BK VIII, 50d BK 54a b BK XIX, 137c-d BK XXIV 202b-c BK XX 214b,d 215a 216a b 218d 219a

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 357 c / *Political Economy* 367 36 370a 379b / *Social Contract* BK I 387d 388a 391a BK III 415d 418a 419c BK I 435d [fn 1]

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To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad* BK II [265 83] 12d the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119 When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164

AUTHOR S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases e g *Iliad* BK II [265-283] 12d

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e g OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—(D) *II Esdras* 7 46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface

1 The general theory of government

7 PLATO *Republic* 295a-441a c esp BK II-VIII 310c 416a / *Statesman* 598b 604b / *Laws* BK III 663d 677a BK IV 679a-c

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VI CH 8 [1141b24 1142 1] 390d 391a / *Politics* 445a 548a c esp BK I CH 5 447d 448c BK III CH 1 471b d-472c CH 6-13 475d 483a BK IV CH 14-16 498b 502a c

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK V [1136-1160] 76a b

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18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK II CH 21 161b 162d BK IV CH 4 190d BK XIX CH 13 17 519a 523a CH 21 524a 525a CH 23 24 528a c CH 26 528d 529a

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33 PASCAL *Pensées* 291 338 225a 233a passim

35 LOCKE *Toleration* 16a-c / *Civil Government* 25a 81d esp CH VII SECT 87-89 44a d CH VIII IX 46c 54d, CH XI SECT 136 56c d CH XV SECT 171 65a b CH XIX SECT 211 73d 74a

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART II 78a b PART III 112a 115b PART IV 157a 158a

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I 1a 3d

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39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK V 309a 311c

42 KANT *Science of Right* 435a-437c 450a-452a

43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE [1 25] 1a b

43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U S PREAMBLE 11a c

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43 MILL *Representative Government* 327b d 341d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART IV 364d 365a

54 FREUD *Civilization and Its Discontents* 780b 781a

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5 AESCHYLUS *Eumenides* [681 710] 88b c

5 SOPHOCLES *Antigone* [33 -372] 134a b

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 23b d

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK III 436d 438b

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5 SOPHOCLES *Antigone* 131a 142d
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 107c 108d
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12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK I SECT 14 254b c BK VI SECT 30 276d 277a
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35 LOCKE *Toleration* 3a-4b 8c 10d 11a 21c passim / *Civil Government* CH I SECT 3 25d CH VI SECT 57 36d 37b CH VII SECT 87-94 44a-46c CH VIII SECT 99 47c SECT 107 112 49b 51b CH IX 53c 54d CH XI SECT 136-139 56c 58a CH XIII SECT 149 59b d SECT 158 61d 62b CH XIV SECT 163 63a b CH XV SECT 171 65a b CH XVII XVIII 70c 73c CH XIX SECT 221 222 75d 76c SECT 229 78a
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART II 72b 80b PART IV 149b 159b
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 268c 269b
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38 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 368d 370b 374a 375b / *Social Contract* BK I 388d 389a 391b 393c BK II 396d 398b 400a 405a c BK III 406b d 409a 419b c 423c-424a 424d
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44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 220b 221d 224a
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5 AESCHYLUS *Eumenides* [681 710] 88b c
5 SOPHOCLES *Antigone* [631-680] 136c 137a / *Ajax* [1066-1096] 148d [1052 1090] 152a b
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15 T CITUS Annals I 1a a 3a b
19 AQUI S Summa Theolog ca PART I Q 96 A 4 512d 513 Q 03 A 3 530a-c
20 AQUIN S S mma Theologica P RT I II Q 90 A EP 3 205b 206b A 3 207a-c Q 96 A 5 A 5 a d EP 3 233d 234d Q 105 A I 307d 309d
23 HOB ES Levi tha PART I 71d 73a 74b-c 97c d PART II 100c 106d 113d 114b 130b d 131d 132a 149d 150 153a 158a
30 BA ON New Atlant s 208a-c
32 MILTON Parad s Lost BK I [587-612] 106a b BK II [32] 111a 112 BK [169-188] 200a
35 LOCK Toler t n 14b-d / Civil Government CH SECT 25a-c CH II 25d 28c CH T SECT 53 36b-c c I SECT 90-94 44d-46c CH X X SE T 232 39 78c-81b
37 FIEL Tom Jones 268c 269b
38 M NTESQ IEU Spi it of Laws BK I 3b BK II 4 7 d 8d 9 c BK I 12b-13c K V 26d 27b 30a-c BK VI 36a b BK XI 94c
38 R U SE U Inequ lity 323d / Social Co tract BK I I 406b d-407
40 G B O Decl e d Fall 24b d 28b passim esp 26b-27d 51a d
41 G ON Decl nd Fall 74c-d 320d 321a
42 KANT Science f Right 437c d 439a-441d 445 c 450a b 450d-452a
43 MI Liberty 267d 268a / Rep sentative Government 341d 344
44 BOSW LL Johnson 120 c
46 H EL Ph losophy f R ght PART III par 275 92 b par 279 93 94d par 32 106c DI TIO 167 145 / Ph los phy f History A T 300 301c T V 325a b 34 343a 355c-d 365 366b
51 T LSTOY War a d P c E LOGUE II 680b-684a

1g(2) The so e gn office the partition of o er gnty mong the offices created by constitution

7 PLA O Laws BK VI 697 705c
9 A I TOTL Pol tic BK I CH 2 [261a23 b6] 456a b K CH [275a2 21] 472 CH 11 [I 82a25 b 4] 480 c CH 10 [28 b7] 485c 486a K IV CH 3 [1290a3 13] 489 I 4 [1292a30-37] 491d CH 5 499c 501c BK VI C I 8 5 5b-526d
14 P Lycurgus 34d 35d / T berius G cchu 678b-d
23 H B E Leviatha P RT I 153 159c
35 LOCKE Ci l Government C I IX SECT I 7 131 54a d CH XI SECT 134 55b d CH XIII 59b 62b pas im CH IV SECT 163 166 63a 64a
36 SWIFT Gull er P RT II 71a 76b
38 MONTESQUIE Spirit of Laws BK XI 69d 75a
38 ROUSSEAU Social Contract BK II 395a d BK II 419b
40 C IB ON Decline and Fall 1a b 25a 28a pas im esp 28a
41 C BON Decl e and Fall 564a b
42 KANT Science of R ght 436b-c 444c-445a
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U S ARTICLE I III 11a 16a
43 FEDERALIST NUMB R 22 84c d NU IBER 39 125c d NUMBER 47-51 153c 165a NUMBER 53 167d 168b NUN BER 64 197a b
43 MILL Representat ve Government 355b 356b 362c 363 401d-402b
46 HEGEL Philosophy of Right PART III par 269 84d par 271 89c ADDITIONS 161 143 b / Ph l sophy of History PART IV 342b-d 368c d
51 TOLSTOY Wa and Peace BK VI 238 243d

1g(3) The so ereign people the community as the source of go ernmental so ere gnty

OLD TEST ENT Judges 8:22 23 / I Samuel 8—(D) I K gs 8 / II Samu l 2.4—(D) II Kings 2.4 / I King 12 I 20—(D) III K gs 12 I 20
APOC YPHA I Macc bees 14.25 47—(D) OT I Machabees 14.25 47
5 EURIPIDES Suppl ants [429 456] 262 b
5 A ISTOPHANES Kn ghts 470a-487a esp [1316-1408] 486a-487 c
6 HERODOTUS History K III 107c 108c
9 ARISTOTLE Politics BK I CH 9 [12 b20 22] 466d BK I I CH I [1275a22 b2] 472a-c CH 3 [1276a40-b1] 473b CH 7 476c-477a CH II 479b-480c CH 17 486c-487a BK IV CH 4 [1291b30- 292 37] 491a d CH 9 [1294b34 39] 494d CH 12 496d-497b C I 14 498b-499c
14 PLUTARCH Tiberius Gracchus 678b d
20 AQU NAS Summa Theologica RT I II Q 90 A 3 207a-c
23 HOBB Leviath n PA T II 100c 102c RT III 200a b
35 LOCKE Ci l Go ernment CH IV SECT I 29d C VII S CT 87-94 44a-46c CH VIII 46c 53c passim CI IX S CT 127-CH X SECT 13 54a 55b XI S CT 141 58a b C I XIII SECT 149 59b d CH XIV SECT 63 168 63a 64c CH X SECT 71 6 a b CH XVI SECT 179-184 66d 68d SECT 190-192 69b-d CH XVI SE T 198 70d 71 CH XIX 73d 81d pass m esp ECT 40-243 81b-d
38 M NT QUIE Spirit of Laws BK II 4a 6b BK X 109c
38 ROUSSE Inequal ty 323d / Social Cont a t I 391b-393b BK 395b-c 396d 398a 400 401a-c BK III 406b d-410a 420a-421 423a-424b
40 GIBBON Decl e and F ll 100d 241b

(1 *The general theory of government* 1e *The attributes of good government*)

43 MILL *Liberty* 272d 273d 322a 323a c / *Representative Government* 332d 350a 356d 357a 367c 370a 380c 382c 387c d 436b 437a 439b c
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 182c d 204b c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* ADDITIONS 165 145a b / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 174a 175c PART I 208b c PART II 275a b 276a PART IV 342a 343a
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [10 252 259] 249b 250a

1f The abuses and corruptions to which government is subject

OLD TESTAMENT *I Samuel* 8 3 20—(D) *I Kings* 8 3-20
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK III 436d 437d
7 PLATO *Republic* BK VIII IX 401d-427b / *Laws* BK IV 681d 682c
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK II CH 7 [1266b36-1267b10] 462c-463b BK III CH 15 [1286 31-b8] 484c d CH 16 [1287 1-b8] 485b 486a BK V CH 2 3 503b 505b CH 8 [1308b31-1309 32] 511a c passim CH 12 [1316a1-b27] 518d 519d / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 4 [1360 17 29] 600c
15 TACITUS *Histories* BK II 224d 225a
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIX CH 6 514b 515a
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL VI [58-75] 9a XXVII [19-54] 39d-40a PURGATORY VI [76-151] 61c 62c XVI [58-126] 77c 78a PARADISE XVI 130a 132a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 78b d PART II 100a c 104b d 116c d 148 153a 164a c PART IV 273a b CONCLUSION 279a c
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 381b d 384b c
27 SHAKESPEARE *Measure for Measure* 174a 204d
32 MILTON *Lord Gen Fairfax* 68b 69a / *Samson Agonistes* [237-76] 344b 345b / *Areopagitica* 412b
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH XI SECT 138 57b c CH XIII SECT 149 59b d CH XVIII SECT 199-201 71a c
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 11b 15b 16b 28b 29a PART II 74a 76b PART III 120a PART IV 152b 154a 157a 158a
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 100d 101a 268c 269b
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK VI 39c BK VIII 51a 55c BK XI 69a-c BK XXVIII 259b
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 360b 361c / *Political Economy* 372b 373a / *Social Contract* BK III 433a 434b
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK II 148b c 149d 150a
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 35a 521d 622d 623a
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 307a c 586c 587b
42 KANT *Science of Right* 435a-441d esp 435c 436b 437c d 438d-441d 450a-c
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 10 49c 53a passim NUMBER 15 65c 66a NUMBER 16 68c d NUMBER 22 82c 83d NUMBER 28 96c 98b passim NUMBER 37 120d 121a NUMBER 41 132b-c NUMBER 51 162d 165a passim NUMBER 6 190a b NUMBER 66 201d 202a
43 MILL *Liberty* 267d 269c / *Representative Government* 328d 330c 350d 351a 36 c 370a 376a c 387c d
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 120a-c 178b c 19c-d 261c d 374b c
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [4,7 4811] 118b-119b [10 42 284] 249b 250b
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK V 127b-137c passim

1g The sovereignty of government the unity and disposition of sovereignty

9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK III CH 6 [1278b9-14] 475d CH 7 476c-477a CH 10 478d-479a / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 8 [1365b27 1366a2] 608a b
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 90 A 3 207a-c
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 97c 98a c PART II 100c 105c 112b-c 114b c 116c d 117b-d 122b 124b 130d 131d 132a 148b 150b 151a 152a 153b 159c PART III 228b
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK V [769-799] 192a b
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK IX 58b d 60a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 323d / *Political Economy* 368c 369a / *Social Contract* BK I 39 a 393b BK II 395a 398b BK III 406b d-409a 420d BK IV 423a-424b
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 24b d 28b passim, esp 28a b 521b
42 KANT *Science of Right* 435a b 437c d 438b-c 439a-441d 450d-451b 452a d
43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION II 5a b
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 9 48b-49c esp 49b NUMBER 15 63d 66b NUMBER 16-20 66c 78 esp NUMBER 20 78a b NUMBER 32 105 107 passim esp 105d NUMBER 33 108d 109a NUMBER 39 126b 128b NUMBER 42 138c NUMBER 44 146d 147a NUMBER 62 189c d NUMBER 81 240d 241a NUMBER 82 242b-c
43 MILL *Representative Government* 331c 332d 355b 356b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 2 92b par 279 93a 94d par 285 96b par 321 322 106c 107a ADDITIONS 168 145c d 1 147d 148a 187 149b / *Philosophy of History* PART IV 355c d 365a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE II 680b 684a

1g(1) The sovereign person sovereignty vested in the individual ruler

OLD TESTAMENT *I Samuel* 8 4 0—(D) *I Kings* 8 4 0

(1g *The sovereignty of government: the unity and disposition of sovereignty.* 1g(3) *The sovereign people: the community as the source of governmental sovereignty.*)

42 Kant *Science of Right* 436c 437c d 439a 441d 450a b 450d 452a esp 451c 452a
43 Declaration of Independence [1-25] 1a b [43-47] 2a
43 Constitution of the U S preamble 11a c amendments ix-x 17d
43 Federalist number 22 84d 85a number 33 108b-c number 39 125a 128b number 46 150b c number 49 159c number 53 167d 168b number 84 252b c
43 Mill *Liberty* 267d 269c / *Representative Government* 341d 350a passim esp 344d 355b 356b 380c 382c 386d 393a esp 387c d
46 Hegel *Philosophy of Right* part iii par 279 93a 94d par 308 102c 103a / *Philosophy of History* part ii 272b 273a part iii 300a 301c part iv 365c 366b
51 Tolstoy *War and Peace* epilogue ii 680b 684a

1b Self-government: expressions of the popular will: elections, voting

Old Testament *Judges* 21 24
9 Aristotle *Politics* bk ii ch 6 [1266 5-30] 461c d ch 9 [1270^b7-34] 466d-467a [1271 9-17] 467b ch 12 [1273^b36-1274 22] 470c d bk iii ch 11 479b-480c bk iv ch 14 498b 499c bk vi ch 2-3 520d 522a / *Rhetoric* bk i ch 8 [1365^b32-33] 608a
14 Plutarch *Lycurgus* 34d 35c / *Coriolanus* 180b d / *Tiberius Gracchus* 676b 681a c
20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i ii q 90 a 3 ans 207a c
27 Shakespeare *Coriolanus* 351a 392a c esp act ii sc ii iii 364a 369a
32 Milton *Sonnets* xii 65a b
35 Locke *Civil Government* ch viii sect 95-99 46c-47c ch xiii sect 154 60c d ch xix sect 216 74d sect 222 75d 76c
36 Swift *Gulliver* part ii 73b 74b
38 Montesquieu *Spirit of Laws* bk ii 4a 6b bk xi 71a c bk xix 142a d
38 Rousseau *Inequality* 324c 325b / *Social Contract* bk i 393a b bk ii 396b d bk iv 425a-432b
40 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 241b c 521a 523a c passim
41 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 73b 562c 564b 587a
42 Kant *Science of Right* 436d 437c 451c 452a
43 Constitution of the U S preamble 11a c article i sect 2 [5 10] 11b sect 2 [17] sect 3 [66] 11b 12a sect 4 [96-102] sect 5 [107 109] 12b article ii sect 1 [321 374] 14b d amendments xii 18a c xvii 19b-c xxiii 20d
43 Federalist number 39 125a b number 49 50 159b 162c number 51 164d 165a number 52-61 165a 188d passim number 63 205b 207a number 84 252b-c
43 Mill *Liberty* 268d 269a / *Representative Government* 370a-406a
46 Hegel *Philosophy of Right* part iii par 308-311 102c 104a / *Philosophy of History* intro 172d 173a

2 The forms of government: their evaluation and order

2a The distinction and comparison of good and bad forms of government

5 Euripides *Suppliants* [399-456] 261d 262b
6 Herodotus *History* bk iii 107c 108c
6 Thucydides *Peloponnesian War* bk ii 396c d bk iii 432b-c bk vi 520b c bk viii 587a b
7 Plato *Republic* bk i 301c d bk viii-ix 401d-421a / *Statesman* 598b 604b / *Laws* bk iii 663d 677a esp 669d 672a 672c bk iv 679c 682c bk v 692c 693a
9 Aristotle *Ethics* bk viii ch 10-11 412c 413d / *Politics* bk iii ch 1 [1275 35-^{b}2] 472b ch 6-7 475d 477a ch 11 [1282^b8-14] 480c ch 15 [1286^b5-7] 484d bk iv ch 1 10 487a 495b / *Rhetoric* bk i ch 8 608a-c
14 Plutarch *Lycurgus-Numa* 61b d 64a c / *Dion* 800c
15 Tacitus *Annals* bk iii 51b bk iv 72a b
20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i ii q 95 a 4 ans 229b 230c q 105 a 1 ans 307d 309d
23 Machiavelli *Prince* ch i 3a b
23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part ii 104b 109a esp 104d 105a 114b 115a 129b 130a 150c 151a 154b c 158b c part iii 228b part iv 273a b
35 Locke *Civil Government* ch vii sect 90-91 44d 45c ch x sect 132 55a b
36 Swift *Gulliver* part ii 78a b
36 Sterne *Tristram Shandy* 216b
37 Fielding *Tom Jones* 268c 269b
38 Montesquieu *Spirit of Laws* bk ii iii 4a 13d bk iv 15a c bk v 25d 31b bk vi 33a 3 a 37d 38b bk viii 54a b bk xi 69a-c bk xv 109a b bk xix 145d
38 Rousseau *Inequality* 359a b / *Social Contract* bk iii 410b 415b
42 Kant *Pure Reason* 113b 115a / *Science of Right* 439c-440a 441b-c 450a-452a / *Judgement* 586a 587a
43 Federalist number 10 51c 52d number 14 60b 61a number 22 83b d number 39 125a 126b number 48 157c
43 Mill *Representative Government* 332d 355b
44 Boswell *Johnson* 195c d 260b 390a b
46 Hegel *Philosophy of Right* part iii par 273 90c 92a / *Philosophy of History* intro 203b-206a c

(2 *The forms of government: their evaluation and order.*)

2d. The influence of different forms of government on the formation of human character

6 HERODOTUS: *History*, BK V, 175b; BK VII, 232d-233d
6 THUCYDIDES: *Peloponnesian War*, BK II, 396c-d; BK VIII, 564a-c
7 PLATO: *Republic*, BK VIII, 401d-416a / *Laws*, BK VIII, 733b-734a
9 ARISTOTLE: *Ethics*, BK VIII, CH 10-11 412c-413d; BK X, CH 9 434a-436a,c / *Politics*, BK III, CH 4-5 473c-475d; BK IV, CH 7 [1293^{b}5-6] 493a-b; BK V, CH 9 [1310^{a}12-35] 512b-c; BK VII, CH 2 [1324^{a}5-^{b}23] 528a-d; CH 14 [1333^{a}11-15] 537d-538a
10 HIPPOCRATES: *Airs, Waters, Places*, par 16 15d-16a; par 23 18a-c
14 PLUTARCH: *Lycurgus* 32a-48d esp 34b-37c / *Numa Pompilius* 59c-60b / *Lycurgus-Numa* 61b-d, 64a-c / *Cleomenes* 659d-660a
25 MONTAIGNE: *Essays*, 60c-61d
32 MILTON: *Paradise Lost*, BK II [246-257] 116b / *Samson Agonistes* [241-276] 344b-345b / *Areopagitica*, 384b-385b
38 MONTESQUIEU: *Spirit of Laws*, BK II-V, 8d-19d; BK V, 26c-27a; BK XIX, 138c-140d, 142a-146a,c
38 ROUSSEAU: *Political Economy*, 372a-b / *Social Contract*, BK II, 400d-401a
40 GIBBON: *Decline and Fall*, 23c-24a,c; 79c-d; 91c-92b; 523d-524a
41 GIBBON: *Decline and Fall*, 161c-162b; 202b-c
42 KANT: *Judgement*, 586b-c
43 MILL: *Liberty*, 298d / *Representative Government*, 341d-350a passim
46 HEGEL: *Philosophy of Right*, PART III, par 273 90c-92a / *Philosophy of History*, INTRO, 174a-175c; PART III, 285b-d
51 TOLSTOY: *War and Peace*, EPILOGUE I, 668a-669d

2e. The ideal form of government: the distinction between practicable and utopian ideals

5 ARISTOPHANES: *Birds* 542a-563d / *Ecclesiazusae* 615a-628d esp [553-729] 621b-623c
6 HERODOTUS: *History*, BK III, 107c-108c
7 PLATO: *Republic*, 295a-441a,c esp BK II-VII, 310c-401d / *Timaeus*, 442b-443b / *Statesman*, 598b-604b / *Laws*, BK IV, 681b-d; BK V, 692c-693a, 696a-b; BK VII, 722d-723c; BK IX, 754a-b / *Seventh Letter*, 806b-807b
9 ARISTOTLE: *Ethics*, BK V, CH 7 [1135^{a}2-4] 382d / *Politics*, BK II, CH 1 [1260^{b}28]-CH 9 [1269^{a}37] 455b,d-465c; BK IV, CH 1 487a-488b; CH 2 [1289^{a}30-35] 488b; CH 7 [1293^{b}1-21] 493a-b; CH 11 495b-496d; BK V, CH 12 [1316^{a}1-20] 518d-519a; BK VII, CH 4-15 530a-539d
12 AURELIUS: *Meditations*, BK IX, SECT 29 294a-b
14 PLUTARCH: *Lycurgus* 32a-48d
18 AUGUSTINE: *City of God*, BK XIX, CH 21 524a-525a; CH 23-24 528a-c
23 MACHIAVELLI: *Prince*, CH XV, 22b
23 HOBBES: *Leviathan*, PART II, 112b-d, 164a,c
25 MONTAIGNE: *Essays*, 318a-319b, 462c-465c
27 SHAKESPEARE: *Tempest*, ACT II, SC I [143-169] 532d-533a
30 BACON: *Advancement of Learning*, 94d-95a / *New Atlantis* 199a-214d
32 MILTON: *Areopagitica*, 393a-b
36 SWIFT: *Gulliver*, PART I, 28a-31a; PART II, 76b-80b; PART III, 112a-115b; PART IV, 135a-184a
36 STERNE: *Tristram Shandy*, 216b
37 FIELDING: *Tom Jones*, 268c-269b
38 MONTESQUIEU: *Spirit of Laws*, BK XI, 68b,d-75a
38 ROUSSEAU: *Inequality*, 323a-328a,c / *Social Contract*, BK II, 400c-403a, 405a-c; BK III, 410d-411c, 417c-418a; BK IV, 427d
40 GIBBON: *Decline and Fall*, 68b,d-69a
42 KANT: *Pure Reason*, 114b-d / *Science of Right*, 438d-439a, 450b-452a / *Judgement*, 586a-587a
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 6, 40a-41a; NUMBER 16, 68d; NUMBER 38, 122b-124a; NUMBER 41, 132b-c; NUMBER 43, 141d-142d; NUMBER 49, 159d-160a; NUMBER 65, 200b-c; NUMBER 68, 206b-c; NUMBER 85, 257a-c, 258d-259a
43 MILL: *Representative Government*, 327b,d-355b esp 341c-d, 368c-370a, 380c-381a, 387c-d
46 HEGEL: *Philosophy of Right*, PREF, 6c-d; PART III, par 185 64b-d; par 273 90c-92a / *Philosophy of History*, INTRO, 173c-175c; PART I, 243b-c, 251b; PART II, 279c-d; PART III, 300c-d; PART IV, 365c-d
50 MARX-ENGELS: *Communist Manifesto*, 428d-429c, 432d-433c
51 TOLSTOY: *War and Peace*, BK VI, 245a-c
52 DOSTOEVSKY: *Brothers Karamazov*, BK V, 131c-d
54 FREUD: *New Introductory Lectures*, 883d-884c

3. The powers, branches, or departments of government: enumerations, definitions, and orderings of these several powers

7 PLATO: *Laws*, BK III, 665d-666c
9 ARISTOTLE: *Politics*, BK IV, CH 14-16 498b-502a,c / *Rhetoric*, BK I, CH 1 [1354^{a}13-1355^{a}3] 593b-594a
23 HOBBES: *Leviathan*, PART II, 122b-124b
35 LOCKE: *Civil Government*, CH VII, SECT 88-89 44c-d; CH IX, 53c-54d; CH XI-XIV, 55b-64c
38 MONTESQUIEU: *Spirit of Laws*, BK XI, 69d-75a
39 SMITH: *Wealth of Nations*, BK V, 301a-357 passim
42 KANT: *Science of Right*, 436b-439a
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: ARTICLE I-III, 11a-16a passim
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 37, 119b-d; NUMBER 47-82, 153c-244a esp NUMBER 48, 157c-d; NUMBER 64, 197a-b; NUMBER 78, 230b-d

(3 *The powers, branches, or departments of government: enumerations, definitions, and orderings of these several powers.*)

3c The legislative department of government: the making of law

3c(1) The powers and duties of the legislature

3c(2) Legislative institutions and procedures

APOCRYPHA *I Maccabees*, 8:1 13—(D) OT *I Machabees* 8:1 13 / *II Maccabees* 5:11 -42 —(D) OT *II Machabees* 5:11 7:42

NEW TESTAMENT *Acts* 16:19-40 21:28 passim

5 AESCHYLUS *Persians* [852-908] 24b-d

5 ARISTOPHANES *Lysistrata* [567-586] 590b-d

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 31d 32a 35c 36a BK II 109d 111b

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK I 353d 368b-369a BK II 403c-404a BK III 425a 428d BK V 504c 507c BK VIII 579d 580b

7 PLATO *Laws* BK III 698c-d

9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK III CH 13 [1284a36-b3] 482c BK V CH 7 [1307b19-24] 509d BK VI CH 2 [1324b35-1325a15] 528b-529a CH 14 [1333a10-1334a10] 538c-d

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK I [254-296] 110a 111a BK V [545-603] 233b-234a BK VIII [714-731] 278a-b

14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 47d-48c / *Lucullus* 409b-410d

15 TACITUS *Annals* BK II 39d-40c BK XI 104a-c 106a-d BK XII 122a-c BK XIII 139c 140d BK XV 162c 163a / *Histories* BK I 191d 192a BK I 290a-d

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK I PREF 129a-d BK I CH 14-15 190b-197a BK V CH 12 216d 219b CH 221b-222a BK XIX CH 21 524c-d

23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* CH I 1a 3c 14c CH XX 30a 31

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 106d 107c 108d 109c 110b-111a 119a-c 126d 127a 131c CONCLUSION 280b-281a

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK III 131b-d 133b

29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 40d

32 MILTON *Samson Agonistes* [-4 2-6] 344b-345b

35 LOCKE *Toleration* 13c-d 14c 15a / *Civil Government* CH IV SECT 22 23 30a-b CH VI SECT 57 43c-d CH X SECT 65b-c XVI 65d 70c passim CH XIX SECT 11 73d 74a

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I, 23b-25a PART IV 182b-183a

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK X 61b-d 68d BK XI 83c-84c BK XV 109b-c 110a-d BK XXI, 1 0c 171d

38 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 380a-b

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK IV 239a 79b

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 14d 15c 18a 25a-c 134 b 245d 245d 420b-d 518b-519a 522 523a-c 550b-551b 608b-d 624b-c 632d-633a 638a-639a

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 6a-c 216c-d 235a-c 505b-c

42 KANT *Science of Right* 413d 454 -455a 456c 457

43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 1a 3b passim

43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. ARTICLE IV SECT 3 [44-5 0] 16b

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 43 140d 141a

43 MILL *Liberty* 272a 281d 282b [passim] / *Representative Government* 339a 341a 353c 411b-412 427a-428a passim 433b-44 d

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 179c 354c 365a 3 0a 511c-d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 242d 243d PART III 299a-c

5c. The relation of local to national government: the centralization and decentralization of governmental functions

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5d Confederat on nd f d ral union the di vis on of jurisd ct on between st te and federal go ernments

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The consideration of the art and science of government *see* EDUCATION 8d KNOWLEDGE 8c PRUDENCE 6a RHETORIC 1c STATE 8c–8d(3) and for the relation of politics to ethics and economics *see* PHILOSOPHY 2c SCIENCE 3a STATE 8d WEALTH 9

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection
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Chapter 32. HABIT

INTRODUCTION

THE familiar word "habit" has a tremendous range of meaning. Some of its meanings in technical discourse are so divergent from one another—as well as from the popular understanding of the term—that it is difficult to find a common thread of derivation whereby to pass from one meaning to another.

We can eliminate at once the use of the word to designate apparel, as when we speak of a "riding habit." Yet even this sense contains a root of meaning which cannot be dismissed. Augustine points out that the term "habit" is derived from the verb "to have"; and Aristotle, considering the meanings of "to have," includes the sense in which a man may be said "to have a coat or tunic" along with the sense in which a man may be said to have a habit—a piece of knowledge or a virtue. Just as clothes are something a person *has* or *possesses* in a manner more or less fitting to the body, so habits in the psychological sense are qualities which a person has or possesses, and they too can be judged for their fitness.

This understanding of habit is conveyed in the ancient remark which has become a common expression—that "habit is second nature." Habit is not original nature, but something added thereto as clothes are added to the body. But unlike clothes, which are added externally and merely by contact, habits as second nature are nature itself transformed or developed. In the words of an ancient poet whom Aristotle quotes with approval, "habit's but long practice, and this becomes men's nature in the end."

Not all, as we shall see, would grant that practice is essential to habit. Nevertheless the word "practice" suggests one notion that is common to all theories of acquired habit, namely, that habit is a *retained effect*—the result of something done or experienced. Within this common understanding, there are opposite views. According to one view, the acquisition of habits depends on activity. According to another, habits are modifications, passively, not actively, acquired.

The word "habit" is also used in a sense diametrically opposite to the meanings so far considered. It is the sense in which Aristotle, in the *History of Animals*, discusses the habits of animals and differentiates species according to the differences in their habits. Here the word "habit" is used to signify *not an acquired pattern of behavior* but an innate predisposition to act or react in a certain way. The difference between acquired habits and "the habits to which there is an innate tendency," James tells us, is marked by the fact that the latter generally "are called *instincts*."

The opposition between these two meanings of "habit" is clear. On the one hand, habits represent what, in the case of living things at least, is added by nurture to nature—the results of experience, training, or activity. On the other hand, habits which are identical with instincts belong to original nature itself—part of the native endowment of the animal. Is there any common thread of meaning in the notions of acquired and innate habit, which may explain the use of the word in such opposite senses?

The familiar statement that a person does what he is in the habit of doing indicates that a habit is a tendency to a particular sort of behavior. Knowledge of a person's habits enables us to predict what he is likely to do in any situation which elicits habitual conduct on his part. So, too, an animal's behavior in a particular situation may be predicted from a knowledge of its instincts. Instinct and habit—or innate and acquired habits—seem to have this common character, that they are tendencies to behavior of a specific or determinate sort. They are definitely not random behavior. In the one case the

tendency is preformed a part of the inherited nature of the organism In the other the tendency is somehow a product of experience and learning In neither case does habit refer to mere capacity for action unformed and indeterminate nor does it refer to the action but rather to the tendency to act

THE MODIFIABILITY OF instincts by experience indicates another and more dynamic connection between innate and acquired habits William James conceives innately determined behavior as if it were a plastic material out of which new patterns of conduct can be formed The process of animal learning he thinks can be generally described as the replacement of instincts by habits Most instincts he writes are implanted for the sake of giving rise to habits and this purpose once accomplished the instincts themselves as such have no *raison d'etre* in the psychical economy and consequently fade away

Some years before the Russian physiologists Bechterev and Pavlov experimentally studied the conditioning of reflexes James described animal learning in terms of the substitution of new for old responses to stimuli which had previously called forth an instinctive reaction or in terms of the attachment of instinctive responses to new stimuli The actions we call instinctive James writes all conform to the general reflex type and are called forth by determinate sensory stimuli For example a predatory animal instinctively responsive to various perceptible signs of the whereabouts of its prey may learn to hunt for its food in a particular locality at a particular time and in a particular way Or to take the example James gives if a child in his first attempts to pat a dog gets snapped at or bitten so that the impulse of fear is strongly aroused it may be that for years to come no dog will excite in him the impulse to fondle again Similarly an animal which has no instinctive fear of man may acquire an habitual tendency to flee at man s approach as the result of experiences in which the appearance of man is associated with instinctively recognized signs of danger

In the classification of animals from Aristotle on the instincts peculiar to each species have been used in their differentiation In addition the degree to which the instincts of an animal are either relatively inflexible at one extreme or easily modifiable at the other has been thought to indicate that animal s rank in the scale of intelligence The higher animals seem to have a greater capacity to form habits and to be capable therefore of modifying their instinctive patterns of behavior as the result of experience In consequence their behavior is both more adaptive and more variable than that of animals which always follow the lines of action laid down by instinct

Species whose instincts are largely unmodifiable are at a disadvantage in a changing environment or in one to which they are not innately adapted In the struggle for existence Darwin observes it is the organism that varies ever so little either in habits or structure which "gains an advantage over some other inhabitant of the same country Though for the most part instincts seem to be directed toward the animal s survival intelligence or the power of modifying instincts by learning may sometimes be needed to save the animal from his own instincts

If the lower animals are most dependent on their instincts and least able to modify them that would seem to indicate a kind of opposition between instinct and intelligence Darwin quotes Cuvier to the effect that instinct and intelligence stand in an inverse ratio to each other but he himself does not wholly accept this view He thinks that the behavior of beavers for example or of certain classes of insects, shows that a high degree of intelligence is certainly compatible with complex instincts Yet he admits that it is not improbable that there is a certain amount of interference between the development of free intelligence and of instinct

On this subject of instinct in relation to intelligence or reason James seems to take a less equivocal position According to him man possesses all the impulses that [animals] have and a great many more besides After enumerating what he considers to be the instinctive tendencies of the human species he concludes by saying that no other mammal not even the monkey shows so large an array But since James also thinks that man has the keenest intelligence and may even be the only reasoning animal he cannot believe that there is any material antagonism between instinct and reason On the

contrary a high development of the faculties of memory of associating ideas and of making inferences implies not the absence of instinct but the modifiability of instinct by experience and learning Though the animal richest in reason might be also the animal richest in instinctive impulses too James writes he would never seem the fatal automaton which a *merely* instinctive animal would be

The opposite position is taken by those who like Cuvier hold that the more adequate an animal s instinctive equipment is for its survival the less it needs free intelligence for adaptive purposes and the less important is the role of learning and habit formation Some writers like Aquinas go further than this and maintain that *in the case of man* the power of reason as an instrument of learning and of solving life s problems supplants instinct almost entirely or needs to be supplemented by instinctive impulses of an extremely rudimentary sort—hardly more complex than simple reflexes

What other animals do by instinct man does by reason Brute animals Aquinas writes do *not* act at the command of reason but if they are left to themselves such animals act from *natural instinct* Since in his opinion habits can be formed only by acts which involve reason as a factor he does not think that strictly speaking habits are to be found in brutes But he adds to the extent that man s reason *may* influence brutes by a sort of conditioning to do things in this or that way so in this sense to a certain extent we can admit the existence of habits in brute animals

THE MODIFICATION of instincts in the course of individual life raises a question about their modifiability from generation to generation The question has obvious significance for the theory of evolution

It is thought by some that an animal s instincts represent the past experience of the race In a passage quoted by James Herbert Spencer for example maintains that reflex actions and instincts result from the registration of experience continued for numberless generations Freud appears to hold much the same opinion All organic instincts are conservative he writes They are historically acquired and are directed towards regressions towards reinstatement of something earlier Indeed he claims that the instincts of living things revert back *beyond* ancestral history to the inorganic They go back to an ancient starting point which the living being left long ago They are an imprint left upon the development of the organism by the evolution of our earth and its relation to the sun

James on the other hand claims that there is perhaps not one single unequivocal item of positive proof in favor of the view that adaptive changes are inherited He thinks the variability of instincts from generation to generation must be accounted for by some other means than the inheritance of acquired characteristics according to which the habits *acquired* by earlier generations gradually become through hereditary transmission the *innate* habits of later generations

The question of their origin aside what is the structure of instincts? In the *chapter on* EMOTION where this matter is considered instinctive behavior is described as having *three* components It involves first an innate ability to recognize certain objects second an *emotional* reaction to them which includes an impulse to act in a certain way and *third* the ability to execute that impulse without benefit of learning

James covers *two* of these three points when he defines an instinct as the faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends without *foresight* of the ends and without previous education in the performance and he touches on the *remaining* one when he declares that instinctive reactions and emotional expressions shade *imperceptibly* into each other Every object that excites an instinct he goes on to say excites an *emotion* as well but emotions fall short of instincts in that the emotional reaction usually terminate in the *subject s own body* whilst the instinctive reaction is apt to go further and enter into practical relations with the exciting object

In the discussion of instincts from Aristotle to Freud the emphasis on one or another of these components has varied from time to time Mediaeval psychologists if we take Aquinas as an example seem to stress the cognitive aspect He speaks of the sheep running away when it sees the wolf not because of its color or shape but as a natural *enemy* The point which he thinks

notable here is not the fact that the sheep runs away but rather the fact that without any previous experience of wolves the sheep recognizes the wolf as dangerous The sheep seeing the wolf judges it a thing to be shunned not from deliberation but from natural instinct This instinctive power of recognizing what is to the animal s advantage or peril Aquinas calls the estimative power and assigns it along with memory and imagination to the sensitive *faculty*

Later writers stress the emotional and conative aspects of instinct—feeling and impulse James for example indicates this emphasis when he says that every instinct is an impulse and Freud makes desire central rather than perception or action An instinct he says may be described as a stimulus but it would be *more* exact to speak of a stimulus of instinctual origin as a need The instincts are the basic cravings or needs and these instinctual needs are the primary unconscious determinants of behavior and thought

What Freud calls instinctual needs seem to be the counterpart of what in an earlier phase of the tradition are called natural desires These two notions are far from being strictly interchangeable but they do have a certain similarity *in their reference to* desires which are not conscious or acquired through experience This matter is further discussed in the chapter on DESIRE

IF WE TURN NOW to the consideration of habit as something acquired by the individual we find two major issues The first of these has already been mentioned in connection with the conception of habit as a *retained effect*

According to William James the capacity for habit formation is a general property of nature found in inanimate matter as well as in living things The moment one tries to define what habit is he writes one is led to the fundamental properties of matter He regards the laws of nature for example as nothing but the immutable habits which the different elementary sorts of matter follow in their actions and reactions upon each other In the organic world however the habits are more variable than this

James attributes this universal capacity for habit formation to what he calls the plasticity of matter which consists in the possession of a structure weak enough to yield to an influence but strong enough not to yield all at once Each relatively stable phase of equilibrium in such a structure is marked by what we may call a new set of habits He cites as examples of habit formation in inorganic matter such things as the magnetizing of an iron bar the setting of plaster scratches on a polished surface or creases in a piece of cloth The matter in each of these cases is not only plastic and yielding but retentive through its inertia When the structure has yielded he writes the same inertia becomes the condition of its comparative permanence in the new form and of the new habits the body then manifests

The habits of living things or of the human *mind are to be regarded only as* special cases of nature s general plasticity and retentiveness James does not fail to observe the difference between the magnetized bar the scratched surface or the creased cloth and the habits of a trained animal or a skilled workman The latter are acquired by activity—by practicing the same act repeatedly Furthermore they are not merely passive relics of a past impression but are themselves tendencies to action They erupt into action almost spontaneously when the occasion for performance arises

It may be questioned whether the word habit should be used so broadly Unlike James most writers *restrict* its application to living things *and even there they limit habit formation* to the sphere of learning If the capacity to *learn from* experience is not a property of plant life then plants cannot form habits The same may be said of certain species of animals whose activity is entirely and inflexibly instinctive Habits are possessed only by those organisms—animals or men —whose future conduct can be determined by their own past behavior Aquinas as we have seen goes further than this and limits habit formation in a strict sense to man alone

This leads at once to the second issue For those who believe that man is not specifically different from all other animals man s habits and his habit formation require no special distinction *or* analysis They hold that human intelligence differs from animal intelligence only in degree not in kind No other factors they think are present in human learn

ing th.n those which operate when animals somehow profit from experience or acquire new modes of behavior In the great books there is to be found however a very special theory of habit which is part of the doctrine that man is specifically different from all other animals in that he alone is rational and has free will

The issue about man s nature is discussed in other chapters (ANIMAL, EVOLUTION MAN MIND) Here we must examine the consequences for the theory of habit of these opposing views. Do animals and men form hab ts *in the same sense* of that term? The use of the word is not at stake for habit may be used in a different sense for the acquired dispositions of animals. Those who hold that brute animals and men do not have hab ts in the same sense acknowledge that men may have, in addition to the r specifically human habits, the sort of modified instincts or cond tioned reflexes which are typical of animal habit formation. Further more it is recognized that human and animal habits are alike in certain respects. Both are acquired by activity and both are tendencies to activity of a determinate sort.

The question therefore is simply this Does one conception of habit apply to men and animals, or does human nature require a special conception applicable to man alone? To clarify this issue it is necessary to summarize the analys s of human habits wh ch Aristotle and Aquinas develop more fully *than other* writers, even than those who share their view of the rationality and freedom of man

THAT ARISTOTLE and Aquinas should be the authors of an elaborate theory of human habits becomes intelligible in terms of *two facts.*

In the first place they consider habit in the context of moral theory For them *the* virtues moral or intellectual are habits, and so necessarily are the opposite vices. Virtues are good habits, vices bad habits hence good or bad human habits must be so *formed* and constituted that they can have the moral quality connoted by virtue or vice S nce virtue is praiseworthy and v ce blameworthy only if the *r* possessor is responsible human habit is conceived as aris ng from freely chosen acts.

In the second place the r understanding of habit s affected by their psychological doctrine of faculties and especially by their analysis of the po vers and activities which they think belong peculiarly to man This in turn gives a metaphysical meaning to habit for they treat human powers and human acts as special cases of potentiality and actualization

Aquinas bases much of his discussion of habit on Aristotle s definition of it as a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill and this, either in regard to itself or in regard to another In calling a habit a disposition Aristotle goes on to say that all dispositions are not necessarily habits, for while dispositions are unstable or ephemeral habits are permanent or at least difficult to alter

For a disposition to be a habit certain other conditions mu t be present *according to* Aquinas That which is disposed should be distinct from that to which it is disposed he writes and hence should be related to it as potentiality is to act If there is a being which lacks all potentiality he points out *we can find no* room in such a thing for habit as is clearly the case in God

It is also necessary that that which is in a state of potentiality in regard to something else be capable of determination in several ways and to *various things* If there were a potentiality which could be actualized in one way and *one* way only then such a *power of* operation could not be determined by habits Some of man s powers seem to be of this sort. *His* faculty of sensation, for example functions perfectly when the sense organs have normally matured A man does *not* learn *to see* colors or to *hear* tones, and so the simple use of his senses—apart from aesthetic perceptions and trained discriminations—*does not* lead to sensory habits

The exterior apprehensive powers as sight hearing and the like Aquinas maintains are not suscepti e of habits but are ordained to the r fixed acts according to the disposition of their nature

In contrast man s faculty of thinking and knowing can be improved or perfected by activity and exercise The words improved and perfected are misleading if they are thought to exclude bad hab ts, for a bad habit *is no* less a habit than a good *one* The definition of habit Aquinas *points* out includes disposit ons which *dispose* the sub ect well or

ill to its form or to its operation Hence when we say that a power of operation is improved or perfected by being exercised we must mean only that after a number of particular acts the individual has a *more determinate* capacity for definite operation than he had before

A man may have at birth the mere capacity for knowing grammar or geometry but after he has learned these subjects he has the habit of such knowledge. This according to Aristotle and Aquinas means that his original capacity has been rendered more determinate in its activity It would be so even if he had learned errors that is even if the intellectual habits he had formed disposed his mind in a manner which would be called ill rather than well

The difference between a man who has learned grammar and one who has not is a difference in their capacity for a certain intellectual performance a difference resulting from the intellectual work which has been done by the man who has learned grammar That difference is an intellectual habit The man who has not learned grammar has the same undeveloped capacity for knowing grammar with which he was born The man who has learned grammar has had his native capacity for grammatical knowledge developed That developed capacity is a habit of knowledge or skill which manifests itself in the way in which he writes and speaks But even when he is not actually exercising his grammatical skill the fact that he has formed this particular habit means that he will be able whenever the occasion arises to do correctly with speed and facility what the man who does not have the habit cannot do readily or easily if he can do it at all

It may be helpful to illustrate the same points by reference to a bodily habit such as a gymnastic or athletic skill which being an art is a habit not of body alone but of mind as well If two men are born with normal bodies equally capable of certain muscular coordinations they stand in the same relation to performing on the tennis court Both are equally able to learn the game But when one of them has learned to play his acquired skill consists in the trained capacity for the required acts or motions The other man may be able to perform all these acts or go through all these motions but not with the same facility and grace or as pleasantly as the man whose mastery of the game lies in a habit formed by much practice in doing what is required As the habit gradually grows awkwardness is overcome speed increases and pleasure in performance replaces pain or difficulty

Clearly then the habit exists even when it is not in operation It may even develop du periods of inactivity As William James remarks there is a sense in which we learn to swim during the winter and to skate during the summer when we are not actually engaging in these sports This would seem to be inconsistent with the general insight common to all observers that habits are strengthened by exercise and weakened or broken by disuse or by the performance of contrary acts But James explains that his point stated less paradoxically means only that during periods of rest the effects of prior activity seem to consolidate and build up a habit

The dynamism of habit formation and habitual activity is summarized in the language of Aristotle and Aquinas by the statement that habit is a kind of medium between mere power and mere act On the one hand a habit is like a power or capacity for though it is an improvement on native ability it is still only an ability to perform certain acts it is *not* the actual performance of them On the other hand habit is like operation or activity for it represents an actualization or development of capacity even as a particular operation is an actualization of the power to act That is why habit is sometimes called a second grade of potentiality (compared to natural capacity as first potentiality) and also a first grade of actuality (compared to operation as complete act)

According to the theory of specifically human habits habits are situated only in man's powers of reason and will Habits are formed in the other powers only to the extent that they are subject to direction by his reason and will. Specifically human habits can be formed only in that area of activity in which men are free to act or not to act and when they act free to act this way or that Habit the product of freedom is not thought of as abolishing freedom However difficult it may be to exert a free choice against a strong habit even the strongest

habit is not conceived as unbreakable and if it is breakable it must permit action contrary to itself. Habitual behavior only seems to lack freedom because a man does habitually without conscious attention to details, what he would be forced to do by conscious choice at every step if he lacked the habit.

In the theory under consideration habits are classified according to the faculty which they determine or perfect on the ground that every power which may be variously directed to act needs a habit whereby it is well disposed to its act. Consequently there are intellectual habits, or habits of thinking and knowing and appetitive habits, or habits of desire which involve the emotions and the will and usually entail specific types of conduct. Within a single faculty such as the intellect habits are further differentiated by reference to their objects or to the end to which their characteristic operation is directed. For example the habit of knowing which consists in a science like geometry and the habit of artistic performance such as skill in grammar both belong to the intellect but they are distinct habits according to their objects or ends.

All of these distinctions have moral as well as psychological significance. They are used in formulating the criteria of *good* and *bad* habits which are more appropriately discussed in the chapter on VIRTUE AND VICE. But here one further psychological distinction deserves comment. Some of man's acquired habits are regarded as natural in a special sense—not in the sense in which instincts are called "natural" or "innate" habits. The distinction is drawn from the supposition that certain habits develop in *all* men because since human nature is the same for all men will inevitably form these habits if they act at all. This word "natural" here applied to a habit simply means that it is common to all having the same nature.

For example the understanding of the law of contradiction—that *the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time*—and other simple axioms of theoretic knowledge are said to be possessed by the human mind as a matter of natural habit. If a man thinks at all he will come to know these truths. "It is owing to the very nature of the intellectual soul," Aquinas writes, "that man having once grasped what is a whole and what is a part should at once perceive that every whole is larger than its part."

The sense in which Aquinas says that "*the understanding of first principles* is called a natural habit" applies to the first principles of the practical reason as well as to the axioms of theoretic knowledge. Just as no man who makes theoretic judgments about the true and the false can be, *in his opinion*, without habitual knowledge of the principle of contradiction so he thinks no man who makes practical judgments about good and evil can be without habitual knowledge of the natural moral law the first principle of which is that *the good is to be sought and evil avoided*. "Since the precepts of the natural law *are sometimes considered by* reason actually," Aquinas writes, "while sometimes they are in the reason only habitually in this way the natural law may be called a habit."

In a different phase of the tradition Hume regards it as an inevitable tendency of the human mind to interpret any repeated sequence of events in terms of cause and effect. If one thing has preceded another a certain number of times in our experience we are likely *to infer* that if the first occurs the second will follow. The principle which determines us to form such a conclusion is, Hume says, "Custom or Habit." "All our inferences from experience are effects of custom not of reasoning" and since the habit of inferring a future connection between things which have been customarily conjoined in the past is in his opinion universally present in human nature Hume refers to it as "a species of natural instinct which no reasoning or process of thought and understanding is able either to produce or prevent."

Even Kant's synthetic judgments *a priori* have a certain similarity to the thing called "natural habit." They comprise judgments the mind will make because of its own nature or in Kant's terms, its transcendental structure. Though *a priori* the judgment itself is not innate for it arises only when actual experience provides its subject matter. So too the natural habit of first principles of which Aquinas speaks is not innate but a result of experience.

THERE IS STILL ONE other traditional meaning of the phrase "natural habit." It occurs in

Christian theology Habits are there distinguished according as they are acquired by man s own efforts or are a gift of God s grace which adds to or elevates human nature The former are natural the latter supernatural

In the sphere of supernatural habits the theologian makes a distinction between grace itself and the special habits which accompany grace Aquinas for example writes that just as the natural light of reason is something different from the acquired virtues which are ordained to this natural light so also the light of grace which is a participation of the divine nature is something different from the infused virtues which are derived from and are ordained to this light These infused virtues like the natural virtues are good habits—principles of operation determining acts of thought or desire They are either the specifically theological virtues of faith hope and charity or the supernatural counterparts of the acquired intellectual and moral virtues—the habits which are called the infused virtues and the moral and intellectual gifts

Grace taken in itself rather than in its consequences is not an *operative* habit that is it is not a habit of performing certain acts Nevertheless regarded as something added to and perfecting nature it is considered under the aspect of habit But rather than a habit whereby power is inclined to an act Aquinas includes it among those habits by which the nature is well or ill disposed to something and chiefly when such a disposition has become a sort of nature Through the habit of grace man s nature is elevated by becoming a partaker of the divine nature

To distinguish this kind of habit from those in the operative order it is sometimes called an entitative habit —a habit of the very *being* of man s personality On the purely natural plane health may be thought of in the same way as a habit which is entitative rather than operative It is a habit not of thought desire or conduct but of man s physical being

THE WORD CUSTOM is sometimes a synonym for habit and sometimes a variant with special connotations What a man does habitually is customary for him to do So far as the single individual is concerned there seems to be no difference between habit and custom But we usually think of customs in terms of the group or community rather than the individual As indicated in the chapter on CUSTOM AND CONVENTION the prevailing modes of behavior in a society and its widely shared beliefs represent common habits of thought and action on the part of its members Apart from the habits of individuals social customs have no existence whatsoever But social customs and individual habits cannot be equated because with respect to any customary practice or opinion, there may be non conforming individuals —men of divergent habit The prevalent or predominant customs are the habits of the majority

No society endures for long or functions peacefully unless common habits generate the ties of custom To perpetuate itself the state necessarily attempts to mould the habits of each growing generation—by every means of education by tradition by law So important is the stability of custom in the life of society according to Montaigne that it is very unjust to subject public and established customs and institutions to the weakness and instability of a private and particular fancy He doubts whether any so manifest benefit can accrue from the alteration of a law received let it be what it will as there is danger and inconvenience in altering it His extreme caution with regard to changing the law comes from a preference for the stability of settled customs and from the recognition that government is a structure composed of diverse parts and members joined and united together with so strict connection that it is impossible to stir so much as one brick or stone but the whole body will be sensible of it

Without habits of action at least neither the individual nor society can avoid chaos Habits bind day to day in a continuity which would be lost if the recurring problems of conduct or thought had to be solved anew each time they arose Without habits life would become unbearably burdensome it would bog down under the weight of making decisions Without habits men could not live with themselves much less with one another Habits are as William James remarks the fly wheel of society

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to For example in **4** HOMER *Iliad* BK II [265 83] **12d** the number **4** is the number of the volume in the set the number **12d** indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page For example in **53** JAMES *Psychology* **116a 119b** the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119 When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page For example in **7** PLATO *Symposium* **163b 164c** the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164

AUTHOR S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases *e g* *Iliad* BK II [265 283] **12d**

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a *(D)* follows *e g* OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—*(D) II Esdras* 7 46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface

1 Diverse conceptions of habit as second nature perfection of power retained modification of matter

7 PLATO *Republic* BK III **330a**

8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 8 [8^b 26–9 13] **13d 14a** / *Physics* BK VII CH 3 [246 10–248 6] **329c 330d** / *Metaphysics* BK V CH 20 **544a** / *Soul* BK II CH 5 [417 21–418 6] **647d 648d**

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK II CH 1 [1103 14 ^{b}2] **348b d 349a** BK VII CH 10 [1152 8 33] **403b** / *Politics* BK VII CH 13 [1332 39 ^{b}10] **537a b** / *Rhetoric* BK I CH II [1370 5–8] **613b**

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK VIII par 10 **55c d** / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 24 **630d 631a**

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 18 A 2 REP 2 **105c 106b** Q 87 A 2 **466c 467b**

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 49 **1a 6a** Q 94 A I **221a d**

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* **489c d**

27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT III SC IV [160–170] **56b**

33 PASCAL *Pensees* 93 **190a**

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXXIII SECT 6 **249a b**

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT V DIV 36 **464d**

43 MILL *Liberty* **269c d**

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 151 **57a**

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* **119b d**

53 JAMES *Psychology* **68a 83b** esp **68a 69b 73b 74a 78b 79a**

1a Habit in relation to potency and act

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK VII CH 3 [246^a10–248 8] **329 330d** BK VIII CH 4 [255 30–^{b} 3] **340a c** / *Metaphysics* BK IX CH 1 **570b d 572a** CH 5 **573a c** / *Soul* BK II CH 1 [412 22 28] **642b** CH 5 [417^a21 418 6] **647d 648d** BK III CH 4 [429^b5–23] **661d 662a** / *Sense and the Sensible* CH 4 [441^b16–24] **679**

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK II CH I [1103 14 ^{b}2] **348b d 349a**

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 14 A 1 REP 1 **75d 76c** Q 18 A 2 REP 2 **105c 106b** Q 79 AA 6–7 **419b 421c** A 10 ANS **423d-424d** A 12 **425c 426b** Q 87 A 2 ANS **466c-467b** Q 89 A 6 REP 3 **478b d**

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II QQ 49–56 **1a 35a** passim Q 71 A 4 ANS and REP 1 **108b 109a** Q 94 A I REP I **221a d**

1b Habit in relation to the plasticity of matter

20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I II Q 50 A 1 A 6a 7b A 6 ANS and REP 1 11a 12a

53 JAMES Psychology 68a 71a 423 -424a passim 429a-430a

54 FREUD Beyond the Pleasure Principle 651d 652c

2 The kinds of habit the distinction of habit from disposition and other qualities

8 ARISTOTLE Categories CH 8 [8b 6-9 13] 13d 14 CH 15 21c d / Physics BK VII CH 3 [246 10-248a0] 329c 330d / Metaphysics BK I CH 1 [981b2-5] 499d BK V CH 19 20 543d 544 BK I CH 1 2 570b d 572 CH 5 573 -c

9 ARISTOTLE Ethics BK I II [1103 14 2] 348b d 349a

20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I II Q 49 A 1 3 1b-5 Q 54 22d 25d Q 7 A 4 ANS and REP 3 108b-109a Q 4 4 P 3 131a d PART III Q 7 13 REP 2 755c 756c Q 9 3 REP 2 765b 766b

2a Differentiation of habits according to origin and function innate and acquired instinctive and operative habits

8 ARISTOTLE Metaphysics BK V CH 5 [1015b31 34] 573

20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I II Q 49 A 2 A 2b-4 3 A and REP 2 4b 5 Q 5 A 1 6a 8a 6 11a 12 Q 51 12 15d Q 54 1 22d 23d 23d 24c A 3 24c 25b Q 55 2 a d Q 82 168a d Q 11 AA 3 4 350 351d

23 HOBBES Leviathan PART I 51 66c d 68b

28 HARVEY On Animal Generation 4 8 c

35 HUME Human Understanding SECT V DIV 83-85 487 -488c

42 KANT Practical Reason 303d 304a

43 MILL Utilitarianism 459b-461c

49 DARWIN Origin of Species 68b 69c esp 69 119a d / Descent of Man 304b d [fn 5] 310b

53 JAMES Psychology 68

54 FREUD General Introduction 591d 92b 594d 595b / II and D th 758a 759c

2b Differentiation of habits according to the capacity habituated or to the object of the habitual activity

7 PLATO Theaetetus 518a b

8 ARISTOTLE Physics BK VII CH 3 [246a 0-[8a6] 329c 330d

9 ARISTOTLE Ethics BK I C 13 [1102a26-11 3] 347d 348d K I 12 [44 1] 393c d / Politics K II 4 [1333 16-36] 538a b 5 [1334 8 9] 539b d

20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica Q 50 6a 12 Q 54 1 22d 24c 3 REP 3 24c 25b 4 25b d 1 Q 24 5 492b-493d

28 HARVEY On Animal Generation 333a b

3 The instincts or innate habits of animals and men

7 PLATO Republic BK II 320b-c

8 ARISTOTLE Categories CH 8 [9 13 8] 14b / Metaphysics BK IX CH 5 [1048b31 34] 573a

9 ARISTOTLE History of Animals BK I CH 1 [487a11 488b29] 7d 9d BK III CH 1 114b d 115b esp [588 23-589a10] 115b CH 12 [596b 0-8] 122d / Politics BK II C 1 13 [133 39-b10] 537a b

10 GALEN Natural Faculties BK I CH 12 173a c

12 LUCRETIUS Nature of Things BK III [41 4] 39c d

19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I Q 18 A 3 ANS 106b 107c Q 59 A 3 ANS 308b 309a Q 83 A 1 N 436d-438a PART I II Q 40 A 3 794c 795a Q 46 A 4 REP 815b d

20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I II Q 50 A 3 8b 9a

26 SHAKESPEARE Henry V ACT I SC II [187 204] 535d 536a

28 HARVEY On Animal Generation 428a-c

35 HUME Human Understanding SECT IX DIV 85 488c

38 MONTESQUIEU Spirit of Laws BK I 2b d

38 ROUSSEAU Inequality 334d 336

40 GIBBON Decline and Fall 409d-410a

49 DARWIN Origin of Species 119 135 c esp 119a 121 134d 135a c / Descent of Man 287d 291c esp 287d 288d 308 312d

51 TOLSTOY War and Peace BK VII 278a 287a passim K XI 499c 500c

53 JAMES Psychology 6a 17b esp 12b 47b 52a esp 49b 50a 68a 700a 737a esp 700a 703a

54 FREUD Instinct 412a-421a c esp 412b 415b / Unconscious 439d / General Introduction 615b 616 / Beyond the Pleasure Principle 639a 663d esp 651d 653a / Ego and Id 708d 709b / Civilization and Its Discontents 789b 791d esp 90a d 791b d / New Introductory Lectures 846 853b esp 846a 847b 851a d

3a Instinctual needs or drives

6 HERODOTUS History BK I 62d 63 67b c K III 111d 112c

7 PLATO Symposium 157b 159b 165c 166b

8 ARISTOTLE Metaphysics BK I CH 1 [980a22 8] 499

9 ARISTOTLE History of Animals BK V C 8 [542 7 b] 68d 69a BK CH 18 [571b6-5 3 30] 97b 99a BK VI H 1 [59 a21 b2] 107 b K VII CH 12 [59 20-28] 122d / Generation of Animals BK I C 1 [749b1 750a] 290d 291b H 2 [53b 1] 294a b / Ethics BK I CH 11 [1118b8 18] 365a b K VII C 1 6 [1149b24 1 50 8] 400b-c

10 GALEN Natural Faculties BK I CH 12 173a c

12 LUCRETIUS Nature of Things BK IV [1037 1 57] 57d

12 EPICTETUS Discourses BK I CH 3 128c-d

3d The instinctive basis of habit formation: the modification of instincts and reflexes through experience or learning

3e The genesis, transmission and modification of instincts in the course of generations

4 Habit formation

4a The causes of habit: practice, repetition, teaching, and the law

4b The growth and decay of habits: ways of strengthening and breaking habits

(4 *Habit formation* 4b *The growth and decay of habits ways of strengthening and breaking habits*)

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 27 132b 133b BK II CH 18 161a 162b BK III CH 12 187b 188b
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK V SECT 16 271c d
17 PLOTINUS *Sixth Ennead* TR III CH 20 293a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II QQ 52-53 15d 22d Q 54 A 4 REP I 3 25b d
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 64a b 390b c 391c 393b 395b 396d 525d 527a
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 69a 69d 70a 79b-c 80a b
31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART III 48b 49d
33 PASCAL *Pensees* 6 173a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 71 197b 198a
43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 464a d
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 259a
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 309c
53 JAMES *Psychology* 79b 83b 332a

5 The analysis of specifically human habits

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK VII CH 3 [246 10-248 6] 329c 330d
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK II CH 1-6 348b d 352d passim
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II QQ 49-54 1a 25d
31 DESCARTES *Rules* I 1a 2a
53 JAMES *Psychology* 73b 83b

5a Habits of body manual arts and the skills of play

7 PLATO *Protagoras* 46c / *Republic* BK III 334d 335b BK VII 391d / *Theaetetus* 518a b / *Laws* BK VII 717b d
8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK VII CH 3 [46 10-^{b}19] 329c 330a / *Heavens* BK II CH 12 [292 14 ^{b}18] 383d 384b / *Metaphysics* BK V CH 20 [102_^{b} 10-13] 544a
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK II CH I [1103 33-35] 348d [1103^{b}6-13] 349a / *Politics* BK IV CH I [1288^{b}10-20] 487a b BK VII CH 15 [1334^{b}7 28] 539b d CH 17 [1336 3 22] 541a b BK VIII CH 4 544a c
10 HIPPOCRATES *Articulations* par 52 109b 110a par 55 111c par 58 112b 113a / *Aphorisms* SECT II par 49-50 133d
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK III CH 15 190a-c
13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK IX [590-620] 295a b
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 40d 42a / *Coriolanus* 175b / *Philopoemen* 293d 294a / *Demosthenes* 693c 695b
17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR II CH 8 87a b
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 49 A 2 REP I 3 2b 4a A 3 REP 3 4b 5a A 4 ANS 5a 6a Q 50 A I 6a 7b A 3 REP 2 8b 9a Q 52 A I ANS 15d 18a A 2 ANS 18a 19a Q 54 A I ANS 22d 23d
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I, 28a 29b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 43d 66c 67a 73c 316b c
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 53d 54a
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART IV 166b 167a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 335a b
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 53a BK V 337d 338a
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 5a b
42 KANT *Judgement* 586a b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 52 25c / *Philosophy of History* PART II 267b-268b
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 269b 271a 278c-d
50 MARX *Capital* 164b 167a 170c 171a 237d 240c
53 JAMES *Psychology* 73b 78b esp 75a 332a 774a

5b Habits of appetite and will the moral virtues as good habits

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK VII CH 3 [246^b 0-247 19] 330a b
9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK VII CH I [581^{b}11 22] 107b / *Ethics* BK II CH 1-6 348b d 352d BK VII CH 5 [1148^{b}15 1149 4] 399a-c CH 10 [1152 28-33] 403b / *Politics* BK VII CH 15 [1334^{b}8-28] 539b d
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK III CH 3 178d 180a CH 8 184b c BK IV CH I 213a 223d
14 PLUTARCH *Cato the Younger* 637b-c
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK VIII par 10 55c d par 20-21 58c 59a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 49 A I REP 3 1b 2b A 2 REP 3 2b-4a Q 50 A 3 8b 9a A 5 10b d Q 56 A 4 32b 33c A 6 34b-35a QQ 58-61 41a 59d Q 94 A I REP I 221a d
27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT III SC IV [160-170] 56b
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 69d 70a 78d 81c esp 79a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 71 197b 198a
42 KANT *Practical Reason* 357c 360d / *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 368d 378a b / *Judgement* 521b 523c 604d 606d esp 606a d
43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 445d 446a 463d 465b
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 386a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 171b-c
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 304a 305c esp 304b d [fn 5] 310c 319a esp 311c d 318a-319a 321b 322d 593a b
53 JAMES *Psychology* 80a 83b 798b 808a passim esp 799a b
54 FREUD *War and Death* 757c 759d

5c The natural habits of reason innate predispositions of the mind

8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK I CH I [980^{a}21 28] 499a BK IV CH 3 [1005^{b}15-34] 524d 525a BK XI CH 5 [1061^{b}34 1062 5] 590a b

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH II [1143b5 b13] 392d 393a / *Rhetoric* BK I CH I [1355b14] 5-b

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 23 127c 128c BK II, CH II 150a 151b

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK IV SECT 4 264a

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III CH I 3 10a 11a TR VIII, CH 9, 31c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 16 A 6, REP 1 98b-d Q 18 A 3 ANS 106b-107c Q 79, AA 2 3 425c-427a PART I II Q I A 4 REP 612a-613a A 5 ANS 613a-614a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 51 A I A and REP I 2 12b-13c Q 53 A I ANS 19d 21a Q 94 A I 221a-d PART III Q 9, A I A-5 763b-764c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVI [73 81] 77c-d XVIII [19-21] 80a [49-66] 80b-c

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 54a 60a b 86b-d

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 9c-d 60c 61c / *Novum Organum* BK I, APH 48 110d 111a

31 DESCARTES *Rules* I 1a b IV 5c-d VIII 13c-d / *Discourse* PART I 41b PART V 54c / *Objections and Replies* 224b,d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 19 429d

33 PASCAL *Pensées* I 171a 81 186b / *Geometrical Demonstration* 440b

35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH II, SECT 5-8 26a 2 / *Human Understanding* BK I 9 b d 121a,c passim

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT V DIV 38 466b DIV 45 469c SECT XI DIV 18 504c-d

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 20a 48a-c 58 59b 66d 72c esp 67 -69c 109b-c 15 d 229b-c 234c / *Judgement* 562a 564c 604d-606d esp 606a-d

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 3 103c-d

43 MILL *Liberty* 44 d-446a 465a b 469b-470c

53 JAMES *Psychology* 851a-890a esp 801 -802a, 879b-882a, 889a b

5d The acquired habits of mind: the intellectual virtues

7 PLATO *Theaetetus* 518b 542a-c

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK VII CH 3 [247b-b] 248 9] 330b-d BK VII CH 4] 53b30-b23] 340a-c / *Metaphysics* BK IX, CH 5 [1 4-b3 34] 573a CH 8 [49 3- 1050a3] 575c-d / *Soul*, BK II CH 5 [4 4 5b6] 647d-648d / *Memory and Reminiscence* CH 2 [451b 0-45 b6] 693a-694b

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VI 38 394d / *Politics* BK VII, CH 5 [1334b8- 5] 539b-d

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK III, CH 3 1 8d 180a H 8 184b-c BK IV CH I 216c 223d

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK III SECT 4 260b-261 SECT 6 271 -d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I, Q 14 1 2 75d 6c Q 79, AA 6-7 419b-421c 423d-424d Q 86, A 2 A 5 462a 463a Q 5 REP 2 3 466c-467b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 49, A I REP 3 1b-2b A F 3 2b-4a Q 50 A 3 REP 3 8b 9a A 4 9a 10b Q 51 A 3 14b-15a Q 52, A I ANS 15d 18a A 2 ANS 18a 19 Q 53 A I A s and REP 3 19d 21a A 3 AN and REP 3 21d 22d Q 54 A 4 REP 3 25b-d QQ 5 -58 32a-45c Q 64 A 3 68b-69b

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 54a 60a b 66c 68c

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 26a 27a

31 DESCARTES *Rules* I 1a 2a / *Discourse* PART I 41b d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 52 28 430d 431c PART V PROP 10 SCHOL 4 5a-456a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH IX SECT 8-10 139b-140b CH XXXIII SECT 5 18 248d 251c passim BK IV CH I 3 ECT 8-9 308b-309b

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT V DIV 35 38 464c-466c DIV 40 467c DIV 44 468d-469c SECT II DIV 59-61 4 6b-4 8a passim SECT IX DIV 83-84 48 c-488b

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 347a b

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 223a-d

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 135c 136a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* ADDITIO S 97 132 133a

49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 320b-321a passim 593a

53 JAMES *Psychology* 83b 295b-298a esp 296b 331b-336a 361 380a passim 427b-430a 433a-434a esp 434a 50 a 50 a esp 504 520a 526b esp 520b, 524a 525a 555a 557b passim 852b-853a 860b-862a

5e Supernatural habits

5e(1) Grace as an entitative habit of the person

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 50 A ANS c-8a Q 51 A 4 15a-d Q 8 A I 168a-d Q 110 347d 351d

5e(2) The infused virtues and the supernatural gifts

OLD TESTAMENT *I Kings* 3:5 15 4:29-34—(D) *III Kings* 3:5 5 4:29-34 / *I Chronicles* 1—(D) *I Paralipomenon* 22 12 / *II Chronicles* 1—1 —(D) *II Paralipomenon*, 1— 2 / *Job* 32:8 / *Psalms* 119 34 40 3 125 130 144 169—(D) *Psalms* 8 34 40-73 1 130 144 169 / *Proverbs* 2 esp 2:6 / *Ecclesiastes* 2:26 / *Isaiah* 11:2-5—(D) *Isaias* 11:2-5 / *Daniel* 1 esp 1 1 2:20- 3

APOCRYPHA *Wisdom of Solomon*, 3:9 7:7-2 8—21 9—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom*, 3:9 7—2 8—1 9 / *Ecclesiasticus* 1 15 1 11 15 5 5 24:24 28 43:33 50:29 51:17—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 1 5 10 11 15 15:5 4 34 38 43:3 5 31 51:2 23

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 6:33 / *Acts* 2 1 21 / *I Corinthians* 1 30 2 2-4 11 / *Ephesians* 1:16-18 4 1—5 1 / *Philippians* 3:9 / *James* 1:5 17 3 13 8 / *II Peter* 1 1 10

(5e *Supernatural habits* 5e(2) *The infused virtues and the supernatural gifts*)

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 51 A 4 15a d Q 55 A 4 ANS and REP 6 28c 29d Q 63 AA 3 4 65a 66c Q 68 87c 96c esp A 3 90d 91b Q 100 A 12 ANS and REP 3 264d 265d Q 110 A 3 ANS and REP 3 350a d A 4 REP I 350d 351d PART II II QQ 8 9 416d-426c Q 19 465a 474d Q 45 598c 603c

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 57c PART III 176d 177b PART IV 270c d

5e(3) The theological virtues

OLD TESTAMENT *Psalms* 22 25 71—(D) *Psalms* 21 24 70 / *Proverbs* 3 1-26 / *Isaiah* 40 31—(D) *Isaias* 40 31 / *Jeremiah* 39 18—(D) *Jeremias* 39 18

APOCRYPHA *Wisdom of Solomon* 3 9—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 3 9 / *Ecclesiasticus* 2 6-9 13 14—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 2 6-10 13 18

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 9 20 22 27-30 15 22-28 17 14 21 esp 17 19 21 19 16-23 esp 19 21—(D) *Matthew* 9 20-22 27-30 15 22 28 17 14-20 esp 17 18-20 19 16-23 esp 19 21 / *Mark* 9 17-27 esp 9 23-24—(D) *Mark* 9 16-26 esp 9 22-23 / *Luke* 17 5-6 / *John* 14 21 20 26-29 / *Romans* 1 5 16-17 3 20-5 9 8 24 25 10 / *I Corinthians* 13 / *Galatians* 5 5 6 / *Ephesians* 2 1-10 / *Colossians* 1 1-8 / *I Thessalonians* 5 8 / *Hebrews* 6 11 / *James* 2 14-26 / *II Peter* 1 5 8 / *I John* / *II John* / *III John*

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK X CH 3 300b 301a BK XXI CH 16 573b 574a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 51 A 4 15a d Q 58 A 3 REP 3 43b 44a Q 6 59d 63a Q 63 A 3 65a d Q 64 A 4 69b 70a Q 67 AA 3-6 83b 87c Q 110 A 3 REP 3 350a d A 4 ANS 350d 351d PART II II Q 23 482c 489c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE XXIV [1]-XXVI [81] 142d 146c

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 149c d PART III 241c 242a

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 2c 4c

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK XII [576-605] 331b 332a

6 The force of habit in human life

OLD TESTAMENT *Job* 20 11 13 / *Proverbs* 2 6 / *Jeremiah* 13 23—(D) *Jeremias* 13 23

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 3 c d BK III 97d 98a BK IV 137a 138c

7 PLATO *Laws* BK VII 716a b 717d 718d

8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK II CH 3 [994^{b}31-995^{a}6] 513c

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK II CH 1-6 348b d 352d passim esp CH 1 [1103^{b}22 25] 349b BK VII CH 9 [1148^{b}15-1149^{a}4] 399a c CH 10 [1152^{a}28-33] 403b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 10 [1368^{b}28-1369^{b}27] 612a 613a esp [1369^{a}1-7] 612a b [1369^{b}6-8] 612d [1369^{b}16-19] 612d 613a

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [307-322] 34a b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK VII par 23 50b-c BK VIII par 18 57d 58a par 25 26 60a b / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 24 630c 631a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 49 AA 3-4 4b 6a

23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* CH XXV 35d

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 16c d 42b-43d 63d 64b 307c 308a 316b c 390b-c 391c 393b 395b 396d 489b-490c 524b 527a

28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 285b-c

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART III 48b-49d

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 6 173a

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT V DIV 35 36 464c 465c DIV 44-45 469b-c

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 347a b

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 464d

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 125a

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 27 95c d

43 MILL *Representative Government* 370c-d / *Utilitarianism* 464a d

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 259a

49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 308b 317b d

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK III 150c BK VI 244a b BK VIII 303a 305b BK XI 486a BK XII 556d 557a BK XIV 609d BK XV 639c

53 JAMES *Psychology* 73b 83b

54 FREUD *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 643d 646a esp 645b 646a

6a The automatic or unconscious functioning of habits

8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 8 [8^{b}26-9^{a}13] 13d 14a

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VII CH 10 [1152^{a}28-33] 403b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 11 [1370^{a}5-8] 613b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 49 A 2 2b 4a Q 109 A 8 ANS 344d 346a

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 307c 308a 316b-c

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH IX, SECT 8-10 139b 140b passim

43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 464a b

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 119b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 3b 73b 78b 93a 95b-298a esp 296b 774a 788a 789a esp 788b-789a 790b 791a 810a b

54 FREUD *General Introduction* 455b

6b The contribution of habit to the perfection of character and mind

OLD TESTAMENT *Proverbs* 22 6 / *Jeremiah* 13 23—(D) *Jeremias* 13 23

APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 30 8—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 30 8

5 EURIPIDES *Suppliants* [857-917] 266a b

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 396d 397a

7 PLATO *Republic* BK III 330a 331c 333b-d BK VII 389d 390b 391c d / *Timaeus* 474d 475d / *Theaetetus* 518b / *Laws* BK II 653a-c

8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 10 [13^{a}16-31] 18d / *Physics* BK VII CH 3 [246^{a}10-248^{a}6] 329c 330d

7 The social significance of habit: habit in relation to law

(*5e Supernatural habits 5e(2) The infused virtues and the supernatural gifts*)

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 51 A 4 15a d Q 55 A 4 ANS and REP 6 28c 29d Q 65 AA 3-4 65a 66c Q 68 87c 96c esp A 3 90d 91b Q 100 A 12 ANS and REP 3 264d 265d Q 110 A 3 ANS and REP 3 350a d A 4 REP 1 350d 351d PART II-II QQ 8-9 416d-426c Q 19 465a 474d Q 45 598c 603c

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 57c PART III 176d 177b PART IV 270c d

5e(3) The theological virtues

OLD TESTAMENT *Psalms* 22 25 71—(D) *Psalms* 21 24 70 / *Proverbs* 3 1-26 / *Isaiah* 40 31—(D) *Isaias* 40 31 / *Jeremiah* 39 18—(D) *Jeremias* 39 18

APOCRYPHA *Wisdom of Solomon* 3 9—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 3 9 / *Ecclesiasticus* 2 6 9 13 14—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 2 6-10 13 18

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 9 20-22 27 30 15 22-28 17 14-21 esp 17 19-21 19 16-23 esp 19 21—(D) *Matthew* 9 20-22 27-30 15 22-28 17 14-20 esp 17 18-20 19 16-23 esp 19 21 / *Mark* 9 17-27 esp 9 23 24—(D) *Mark* 9 16-26 esp 9 22-23 / *Luke* 17 5 6 / *John* 14 21 20 26-29 / *Romans* 1 5 16-17 3 20-5 9 8 24-25 10 / *I Corinthians* 13 / *Galatians* 5 5 6 / *Ephesians* 2 1 10 / *Colossians* 1 1-8 / *I Thessalonians* 5 8 / *Hebrews* 6 11 / *James* 2 14 26 / *II Peter* 1 5 8 / *I John* / *II John* / *III John*

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK X CH 3 300b 301a BK XXI CH 16 573b 574a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 51 A 4 15a d Q 58 A 3 REP 3 43b 44a Q 62 59d 63a Q 63 A 3 65a d Q 64 A 4 69b 70a Q 67 AA 3 6 83b 87c Q 110 A 3 REP 1 350a d A 4 ANS 350d 351d PART II II Q 23 482c 489c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE XXIV [1]-XXVI [81] 142d 146c

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 149c d PART III 241c 242a

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 2c 4c

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK XII [576-605] 331b 332a

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK VII par 23 50b c BK VIII par 18 57d 58a par 25 6 60a b / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 24 630c 631a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 49 AA 3-4 4b 6a

23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* CH XXV 35d

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 16c d 42b-43d 63d 64b 307c 308a 316b c 390b-c 391c 393b 395b 396d 489b-490c 524b 527a

28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 285b-c

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART III 48b-49d

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 6 173a

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT V DIV 35 36 464c 465c DIV 44 45 469b-c

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 347a b

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 464d

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 125a

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 27 95c d

43 MILL *Representative Government* 370c-d / *Utilitarianism* 464a d

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 259a

49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 308b 317b d

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK III 150c BK VI 244a b BK VIII 303a 305b BK XI 486a BK XII 556d 557a BK XIV 609d BK XV 639c

53 JAMES *Psychology* 13b 83b

54 FREUD *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 643d 646a esp 645b 646a

6 The force of habit in human life

OLD TESTAMENT *Job* 20 11 13 / *Proverbs* 6 / *Jeremiah* 13 23—(D) *Jeremias* 13 23

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 35c d BK III 97d 98a BK IV 137a 138c

7 PLATO *Laws* BK VII 716a b 717d 718d

8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK II CH 3 [995ᵃ31-995ᵃ6] 513c

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK II CH 1 6 348b d 352d passim esp CH 1 [1103ᵇ22 25] 349b BK VII CH 5 [1148ᵇ15-1149ᵃ4] 399a c CH 10 [1152ᵃ28 33] 403b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 10 [1368ᵇ28 1369ᵇ27] 612a 613a esp [1369ᵃ1 7] 612a b [1369ᵇ6-8] 612d [1369ᵇ16-19] 612d 613a

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [307 322] 34a b

6a The automatic or unconscious functioning of habits

8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 8 [8ᵇ26-9ᵃ13] 13d 14a

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VII CH 10 [1152ᵃ28-33] 403b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 11 [1370ᵃ5-9] 613b

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II Works by authors not represented in this collection

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Chapter 33 HAPPINESS

INTRODUCTION

THE great questions about happiness are concerned with its definition and its attainability. In what does happiness consist? Is it the same for all men or do different men seek different things in the name of happiness? Can happiness be achieved on earth or only hereafter? And if the pursuit of happiness is not a futile quest by what means or steps should it be undertaken?

On all these questions the great books set forth the fundamental inquiries and speculations as well as the controversies to which they have given rise in the tradition of western thought. There seems to be no question that *men want happiness*. *Man wishes to be happy*, Pascal writes, and only wishes to be happy and cannot wish not to be so. To the question what moves desire? Locke thinks only one answer is possible: happiness and that alone.

But this fact even if it goes undisputed does not settle the issue whether men are right in governing their lives with a view to being or becoming happy. There is therefore one further question: *Should* men make happiness their goal and direct their acts accordingly?

According to Kant, the principle of *private* happiness is the direct opposite of the principle of morality. He understands happiness to consist in the satisfaction of all our desires *extensive* in regard to their multiplicity, *intensive* in regard to their degree, *protensive* in regard to their duration. What Kant calls the pragmatic rule of life which aims at happiness tells us what we have to do if we wish to become possessed of happiness.

Unlike the moral law, it is a hypothetical not a categorical imperative. Furthermore Kant points out that such a pragmatic or utilitarian ethics (which is for him the same as an ethics of happiness) cannot help being empirical, for it is only by experience, he say that I can learn either what inclinations ex which desire satisfaction or what are the natu ral means of satisfying them. Such empiric knowledge is available for each individual his own way. *Hence there can be no univers* solution in terms of desire of the problem how to be happy. To reduce moral philosoph to a theory of happiness must result there fore in giving up the search for ethical pri ciples which are both universal and *a priori*.

In sharp opposition to the pragmatic rul Kant sets the moral or ethical law, the mo tive of which is not simply to be happy bu *rather to be worthy* of happiness. In addition being a categorical imperative which impos an absolute obligation upon us this law, he say takes no account of our desires or the *m ans* satisfying them. Rather it dictates *how* w ought to act in order to deserve happiness. I is drawn from pure reason not from experien and therefore has the universality of an *a prio* principle without which in Kant's *opinion* genuine science of ethics—or *metaphysi* morals—is impossible.

With the idea of moral worth—that whic alone deserves happiness—taken away, happ ness alone is, according to Kant, far fro being the complete good. Reason does not ap prove of it (however much inclination ma desire it) except as united with desert. On t other hand, Kant admits, morality alone and with it mere *desert* is likewise far *fro* being the complete good. These two thing must be united to constitute the true *summu bonum* which, according to Kant, means bo the *supreme* and the *complete* good. The ma who conducts himself in a manner not un worthy of happiness must be able to hope fo the possession of happiness.

But even if happiness combined with mora

worth does constitute the supreme good Kant still refuses to admit that happiness as a practical objective can function as a moral principle Thou h a man can hope to be happy only if under the moral law he does his duty he should not do his duty with the hope of thereby becoming hap py A dispost ion h writes which should require the prospect of happi ess as its necessary condition would not be moral, and hence also would not be worthy of complete happiness The moral law commands the performance of duty *u conditionally* Happiness should be a consequence but it cannot be a condition of moral action

In other words happiness fails for Kant to impose any moral obl gation or to provide a standard of right and wrong in human conduct No more than pleasure can happiness be used as a first principle in ethics if morality must avoid all cal ulations of utility or exped ency whereby things are done or left undone for the sake of happiness, or any other end to be enjo ed

THIS ISSUE BETWEEN an ethics of duty and an eth s of happiness as well as the conflict it invol es between law and desire as sources of morality are cons dered from other points of ew in the chapters on DESIRE and DUTY and again in GOOD AND EVIL where the problem of the *summum bonum* is raised *In this chapter* we shall be concerned with happiness as an ethical principle and therefore ith the problems to be faced by those ho in one way or another accept happiness as the supreme good and the end of lif They may see *no* reason to reject moral principles which work through desir rather than duty They may find nothin repugnant in appealing to happiness as the ul timate end which ju tifies the means and *determines* the order of all other goods But they cannot make happ ness the first princip of ethics without having to face many questions concerning the ature of happiness and its relation to irtue

Discus on begins rather than ends with the fact that happiness is what all men desire. Once they have asserted that fact once they have made happiness the most fundamental of all thical term writers l ke Aristotle or Locke Aquinas or Mill cannot escape the quest on whether *all* who seek happiness look *for* it or find it in the *same* things

Holding that a definite conception of happi ness cannot be formulated Kant thinks that happiness fails even as a pragmatic principle of conduct The notion of happiness is so in definite he rites that although every man wishes to attain it yet he never can say defi nitely and consistently what it is that he really wishes He cannot determine with certainty what would make him truly happy because *to* do so he would need to be omniscient If this is true of the individual how various must be the notions of happiness which prevail among men in general

Locke plainly asserts what is here *implied* namely the fact that everyone does not place his happiness in the same thing or choose the same way to it But *admitting this fact* does not prevent Locke from inquiring ho in matters of happiness and misery men come *often to prefer* the worse to the better and to choose that which by their own confession has *made* them miserable Even though he de*clares* that the same thing is not *good to every* man alike Locke thinks *it is* possible to ac count for the *misery* that men often bring on *themsel* es by explaining how the individual may *make errors in* judgment— how things *come to* be represented to our desires under deceitful appearances by the judgment pro nouncing wrongly concerning them.

But this applies to the individual only Locke does not think it is possible to show that when two *men* differ in their notions of happiness one is right and the other wrong Though all men s desires tend to happiness, yet they are *not moved* by the same object Men may choose different things and yet all choose right He does not quarrel w h the theologians ho on the basis of divine re elation describe the eternal happiness in the life hereafter *which is to be* enjoyed *alike* by all who are saved But revela tio is on thin and reason another

W th respect to temporal happ ness *on earth* reason cannot achieve a definition of the end that has the *certainty* of faith concerning sal va *ion* Hence Locke quarrels with the philos ophers of old *who in his* opinion vainly sought to define the *summum bonum* or happiness in such a way that all men would a ree o what

happiness is or if they failed to some would be in error and misled in their pursuit of happiness

It may be wondered therefore what Locke means by saying that there is a science of what man ought to do as a rational and voluntary agent for the attainment of happiness He describes ethics as the science of the rules and measures of human actions which lead to happiness and he places morality amongst the sciences capable of demonstration wherein from self evident propositions by necessary consequences as incontestable as those in mathematics the measures of right and wrong might be made out to any one that will apply himself with the same indifferency and attention to the one as he does to the other of these sciences

THE ANCIENT philosophers with whom Locke disagrees insist that a science of ethics depends on a first principle which is self evident in the same way to all men Happiness is not that principle if the content of happiness is what each man thinks it to be for if no universally applicable definition of happiness can be given —if when men differ in their conception of what constitutes happiness one man may be as right as another—then the fact that all men agree upon giving the name happiness to what they ultimately want amounts to no more than a nominal agreement Such nominal agreement in the opinion of Aristotle and Aquinas does not suffice to establish a science of ethics with rules for the pursuit of happiness which shall apply universally to all men

On their view what is truly human happiness must be the same for all men The reason in the words of Aquinas is that all men agree in their specific nature It is in terms of their specific or common nature that happiness can be objectively defined Happiness so conceived is a common end for all since nature tends to one thing only

It may be granted that there are in fact many *different opinions* about what constitutes happiness but it cannot be admitted that all are equally sound without admitting a complete relativism in moral matters That men do *in fact* seek different things under the name of happiness does not according to Aristotle and Aquinas alter the truth that the happiness they *should* seek must be something appropriate to the humanity which is common to them all, rather than something determined by their individually differing needs or temperaments If it were the latter then Aristotle and Aquinas would admit that questions about what men should do to achieve happiness would be answerable only by individual opinion or personal preference not by scientific analysis or demonstration

With the exception of Locke and perhaps to a less extent Mill those who think that a science of ethics can be founded on happiness as the first principle tend to maintain that there can be only one right conception of human happiness They regard other notions as misconceptions which may appear to be but are not really the *summum bonum* The various definitions of happiness which men have given thus present the problem of the real and the apparent good, the significance of which is considered in the chapter on GOOD AND EVIL.

IN THE EVERYDAY discourse of men there seems to be a core of agreement about the meaning of the words happy and happiness This common understanding has been used by philosophers like Aristotle and Mill to test the adequacy of any definition of happiness

When a man says I feel happy he is saying that he feels pleased or satisfied—that he has what he wants When men contrast tragedy and happiness they have in mind the quality a life takes from its end A tragedy on the stage in fiction or in life is popularly characterized as a story without a happy ending This expresses the general sense that happiness is the quality of a life which comes out well on the whole despite difficulties and vicissitudes along the way Only ultimate defeat or frustration is tragic

There appears to be some conflict here between *feeling* happy at a given moment and *being* happy for a lifetime that is living happily It may be necessary to choose between having a good time and leading a good life Nevertheless in both uses of the word happy there is the connotation of satisfaction When men say that what they want is happiness they imply that having it they would ask for nothing more If they are asked why they want to be

appy they find it difficult to give any reason except for its own sake. They can think of no bin beyond happiness for which happiness serves as a means or a preparation. This aspect of ultimacy or finality appears without qualification in the sense of happiness as belonging to a whole life. There is quiescence too in the momentary feeling of happiness but precisely because it does not last it leaves another and another such moment to be desired.

Observing these facts Aristotle takes the word happiness from popular discourse and gives it the technical significance of ultimate good last end or *summum bonum*. The chief good he writes is evidently something final. Now we call that which is in itself worthy of pursuit more final than that which is worthy of pursuit for the sake of something else and that which is never desirable for the sake of something else more final than the things that are desirable both in themselves and for the sake of that other thing. Therefore we call final without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else. Such a thing happiness above all else is held to be for this we choose always for itself and never for the sake of something else.

The ultimacy of happiness can also be expressed in terms of its completeness or sufficiency. It would not be true that happiness is desired for its own sake and everything else for the sake of happiness, if the happy man wanted something *more*. The most obvious mark of the happy man according to Aristotle is that he wants for nothing. The happy life leaves nothing to be desired. It is this insight which Boethius later expresses in an oft repeated characterization of happiness as a life made perfect by the possession in aggregate of all good things. So conceived happiness is not a particular good itself but the sum of goods. If happiness were to be counted as one good among others Aristotle argues it would *clearly be made* more desirable by the addition of even the least of goods. But then there would be something left for the happy man to desire and happiness would not be something final and self-sufficient and the end of action.

Like Aristotle Mill appeals to the common sense of mankind for the ultimacy of happiness. The utilitarian doctrine he writes is that happiness is desirable and the only thing desirable as an end all other things being only desirable as means. No reason can or need be given why this is so except that each person so far as he believes it to be attainable desires his own happiness. This is enough to prove that happiness is *a* good. To show that it is *the* good it is necessary to show not only that people desire happiness but that they never desire anything else.

Here Mill's answer like Aristotle's presupposes the rightness of the prevailing sense that when a man is happy he has everything he desires. Many things Mill admits may be desired for their own sake but if the possession of any one of these leaves something else to be desired then it is desired only as a part of happiness. Happiness is a concrete whole and these are some of its parts. Whatever is desired otherwise than as a means to some end beyond itself and ultimately to happiness is desired as itself a part of happiness and is not desired for itself until it has become so.

THERE ARE OTHER conceptions of happiness. It is not always approached in terms of *means* and ends utility and enjoyment or satisfaction. Plato for example identifies happiness with spiritual well being—a harmony in the soul an inner peace which results from the proper order of all *the soul's parts*.

Early in the *Republic* Socrates is challenged to show that the just man will be happier than the unjust man even if in all externals he seems to be at a disadvantage. He cannot answer this question until he prepares Glaucon for the insight that justice is concerned not with the outward man but with the inward. He can then explain that the just man does not permit *the several elements within him to interfere* with one another. He sets in order his own inner life and is his own master and his own law and is at peace with himself.

In the same spirit Plotinus asks us to think of *two* wise men one of them possessing all that is supposed to be naturally welcome while the other meets only with the very *reverse*. He wants to know whether we would assert that they have an equal happiness. His own answer is that we *should* if they are equally

wise [even] though the one be favored in body and in all else that does not help towards wisdom We are likely to misconceive happiness Plotinus thinks if we consider the happy man in terms of our own feebleness We count alarming and grave what his felicity takes lightly he would be neither wise nor in the state of happiness if he had not quitted all trifling with such things

According to Plotinus Plato rightly taught that he who is to be wise and to possess happiness draws his good from the Supreme fixing his gaze on That becoming like to That living by That All else he will attend to only as he might change his residence not in expectation of any increase in his settled felicity but simply in a reasonable attention to the differing conditions surrounding him as he lives here or there If he meets some turn of fortune that he would not have chosen there is not the slightest lessening of his happiness for that Like Plato Plotinus holds that nothing external can separate a virtuous man from happiness—that no one can injure a man except himself

The opposite view is more frequently held In his argument with Callicles in the *Gorgias* Socrates meets with the proposition that it is better to injure others than to be injured by *them* This can be refuted he thinks only if Callicles can be made to understand that the unjust or vicious man is miserable in himself regardless of his external gains The fundamental principle he says is that the happy *are made* happy by the possession of justice and temperance and the miserable miserable by the possession of vice Happiness is one with justice because justice or virtue in general is the health and beauty and well being of the *soul*

This association of happiness with health—the one a harmony in the soul as the other is a harmony in the body—appears also in Freud s consideration of human well being For Freud *the* ideal of health not merely bodily health but the health of the whole man seems to identify happiness with peace of mind Anyone who *is* born with a specially unfavorable instinctual constitution he writes and whose libido-components do not go through the transformation and modification necessary for successful achievement in later life will find it hard to obtain happiness The opposite of happiness is not tragedy but neurosis In contrast to the neurotic the happy man has found a way to master his inner conflicts and to become well adjusted to his environment

The theory of happiness as mental health or spiritual peace may be another way of seeing the self sufficiency of happiness in which all striving comes to rest because all desires are fulfilled or quieted The suggestion of this point is found in the fact that the theologians conceive beatitude or supernatural happiness in both ways For them it is both an ultimate end which satisfies all desires and also a stat of peace or heavenly rest

The ultimate good Augustine writes is that for the sake of which other things are to be desired while it is to be desired for its own sake and he adds it is that by which the good is finished so that it becomes complete —all satisfying But what is this final blessedness, the ultimate consummation the unending end ? It is peace Indeed Augustine says, we are said to be blessed when we have such peace as can be enjoyed in this life but such blessedness is mere misery compared to that final felicity which can be described as either peace in eternal life or eternal life in peace

There may be differences of another kind among those who regard happiness as their ultimate end Some men identify happiness with the possession of one particular type of good—wealth or health pleasure or power knowledge or virtue honor or friendship—or if they do not make one or another of these things the only component of happiness they make *it* supreme The question of which is chief among the various goods that constitute the happy life is the problem of the order of goods to which we shall return presently But the identification of happiness with some one good to the exclusion or neglect of the others seems to violate the meaning of happiness on which there is such general agreement Happiness cannot be *that* which leaves nothing to be desired if any good —anything which is in any way desirable—is overlooked

But it may be said that the miser desires nothing but gold and considers himself happy

when he possesses a hoard That he may consider himself happy cannot be denied Yet this does not prevent the moralist from considering him deluded and in reality among the unhappiest of men. The difference between such illusory happiness and the reality seems to depend on the distinction between conscious and natural desire According to that distinction considered in the chapter on DESIRE, the miser may have all that he consciously desires, but lack many of the things toward which his nature tends and which are therefore objects of natural desire He may be the unhappiest of men if with all the wealth in the world yet self-deprived of friends or knowledge virtue or even health his exclusive interest in one type of good leads to the frustration of many other desires. He may not consciously recognize these but they nevertheless represent needs of his nature demanding fulfillment.

As suggested in the chapter on DESIRE, the relation of natural law to natural desire may provide the beginning, at least of an answer to Kant s objection to the ethics of happiness on the ground that its principles lack universality or the element of obligation. The natural moral law may command obedience at the same time that it directs men to happiness as the satisfaction of all desires which represent the innate tendencies of man s nature The theory of natural desire thus also has a bearing on the issue whether the content of happiness must really be the same for all men regardless of how it may appear to them.

Even if men do not identify happiness with one type of good but see it as the possession of every sort of good can there be a reasonable difference of opinion concerning the types of good which must be included or the order in which these several goods should be sought? A negative answer seems to be required by the view that real as opposed to apparent goods are the objects of natural desire.

Aquinas, for example admits that "*happy is the man who has all he desires* or *whose every wish is fulfilled*" is a good and adequate definition only if it be understood in a certain way It is an inadequate definition if understood in another For if we understand it simply of all that man desires by his natural appetite then it is true that he who has all that he desires is happy since nothing satisfies man s natural desire except the perfect good which is Happiness. But if we understand it of those things that man desires according to the apprehension of reason Aquinas continues, then it does not belong to Happiness to have certain things that man desires rather *does it belong to unhappiness*, in so far as the possession of such things hinders a man from having all that he desires naturally For this reason Aquinas points out when Augustine approved the statement that *happy is he who has all he desires* he added the words provided he *desires nothing amiss*

As men have the same complex nature so they have the same set of natural desires. As they have the same natural desires, so the real goods which can fulfill their needs comprise the same variety for all. As different natural desires represent different parts of human nature —lower and higher—so the several kinds of good are *not* equally good And according to Aquinas, if the natural object of the human will is the universal good it follows that "naught can satisfy man s will save the universal good " This, he holds, is to be found not in any created thing but in God alone

We shall return later to the theologian s conception of perfect happiness as consisting in the vision of God in the life hereafter The happiness of this earthly life (which the philosopher considers) may be imperfect by comparison, but such temporal felicity as men can attain is no less determined by natural desire If a man s undue craving for one type of good can interfere with his possession of another sort of good then the various goods must be ordered according to their worth and this order since it reflects natural desire must be the same for all men. In such terms Aristotle seems to think it possible to argue that the reality of happiness *can be defined* by reference to human nature and that *the rules* for achieving happiness can have a certain universality—despite the fact that *the rules* must be applied by individuals differently to the circumstances of their own lives. No particular good should be sought excessively or out of proportion to others, for the penalty of having too much of one good thing is deprivation or disorder with respect to other goods.

wise [even] though the one be favored in body and in all else that does not help towards wisdom We are likely to misconceive happiness Plotinus thinks if we consider the happy man in terms of our own feebleness We count alarming and grave what his felicity takes lightly he would be neither wise nor in the state of happiness if he had not quitted all *trifling with such things*

According to Plotinus Plato rightly taught that he who is to be wise and to possess happiness draws his good from the Supreme fixing his gaze on That becoming like to That living by That All else he will attend to only as he might change his residence not in expectation of any increase in his settled felicity but simply in a reasonable attention to the differing conditions surrounding him as he lives here or *there If he meets some turn of fortune that* he would not have chosen there is not the slightest lessening of his happiness for that Like Plato Plotinus holds that nothing external can separate a virtuous man from happiness—that no one can injure a man except himself

The opposite view is more frequently held In his argument with Callicles in the *Gorgias* Socrates meets with the proposition that it is better *to injure others than to be injured by* them This can be refuted he thinks only if Callicles can be made to understand that the unjust or vicious man is miserable in himself regardless of his external gains The fundamental principle he says is that the happy are made happy by the possession of justice and temperance and the miserable miserable by the possession of vice Happiness is one with justice because justice or virtue in general is the health and beauty and well being of the soul

This association of happiness with health—the one a harmony in the soul as the other is a harmony in the body—appears also in Freud s consideration of human well being For Freud the ideal of health not merely bodily health but the *health* of the whole man seems to identify happiness with peace of mind Anyone who is born with a specially unfavorable instinctual constitution he writes and whose libido-components do not go through the transformation and modification necessary for successful achievement in later life will find it hard to obtain happiness The opposite of happiness is not tragedy but neurosis In contrast to the neurotic the happy man has found a way to master his inner conflicts and to become well adjusted to his environment

The theory of happiness as mental health or spiritual peace may be another way of seeing *the self sufficiency of happiness* in which all striving comes to rest because all desires are fulfilled or quieted The suggestion of this point is found in the fact that the theologians conceive beatitude or supernatural happiness in both ways For them it is both an ultimate end which satisfies all desires and also a state of peace or heavenly rest

The ultimate good Augustine writes, is that for the sake of which other things are to be desired *while it is to be desired for its own* sake and he adds it is that by which the good is finished so that it becomes complete —all satisfying But what is this final blessedness, the ultimate consummation the unending end ? It is peace Indeed Augustine says, we are said to be blessed when we have such peace as can be enjoyed in this life but such blessedness is mere misery compared to that final felicity which can be described as either *peace in eternal life or eternal life in peace*"

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act as an obstacle to happiness. Pierre Bezukhov in *War and Peace* learned during his period of captivity that "man is created for happiness that happiness lies in himself, in the satisfaction of his natural human cravings that all unhappiness arises not from privation but from superfluity."

The vicissitudes of fortune seem to be what Solon has in mind when, as reported by Herodotus, he tells Croesus, the king of Lydia that he will not call him happy "until I hear that thou has closed thy life happily ... for oftentimes God gives men a gleam of happiness, and then plunges them into ruin." For this reason, in judging of happiness, as "in every matter it behoves us to mark well the end."

Even if it is possible to call a man happy while he is alive—on the ground that virtue which is within his power may be able to withstand anything but the most outrageous fortune—it is still necessary to define happiness by reference to a complete life. Children cannot be called happy Aristotle holds, because their characters have not yet matured and their lives are still too far from completion. To call them happy or to call happy men of any age who *still* may suffer great misfortune is merely to voice the hopes we have for them. "The most prosperous," Aristotle writes, "may fall into great misfortunes in old age, as is told of Priam in the Trojan cycle and one who has experienced such chances and has ended wretchedly no one calls happy."

Among the goods of fortune which seem to have a bearing on the attainment of happiness, those which constitute the *individual nature* of a human being at birth—physical traits, temperament, degree of intelligence—may be unalterable in the course of life. If certain inherited conditions either limit the capacity for happiness or make it completely unattainable, then happiness, which is defined as the end of man, is not the *summum bonum* for all, or not for all in the same way.

In the Aristotelian view, for example, women cannot be happy to the same degree or in the same manner as men, and natural slaves, like beasts, have no capacity for happiness at all, though they may participate in the happiness of the masters they serve. The theory is that through serving him, the slave gives the master the leisure necessary for the political or speculative life open to those of auspicious birth. Even as the man who is a slave belongs wholly to another man so the highest good of his life lies in his contribution to the happiness of that other.

The question whether happiness can be achieved by all normal human beings or only by those gifted with very special talents, depends for its answer in part on the conception of happiness itself. Like Aristotle, Spinoza places happiness in intellectual activity of so high an order that the happy man is almost godlike and at the very end of his *Ethics* he finds it necessary to say that the way to happiness "must indeed be difficult since it is so seldom discovered." Nevertheless, "*true peace of soul*" can be found by the rare individual. "All noble things are as difficult as they are rare." In contrast a statement like Tawney's—that "if a man has important work to do, and enough leisure and income to enable him to do it properly, he is in possession of as much happiness as is good for any of the children of Adam"—seems to make happiness available to more than the gifted few.

Whether happiness is attainable by all men, even on Tawney's definition, may also depend on the economic system and the political constitution, to the extent that they determine whether all men will be granted the opportunity and the leisure to use whatever talents they have for leading a decent human life. There seems to be a profound connection between conceiving happiness in such a way that all normal men are capable of it and insisting that all normal men deserve political status and economic liberty. Mill, for example differs from Aristotle on both scores.

DIFFERING FROM the position of both Aristotle and Mill is the view that happiness is an illusory goal—that the besetting ills of human life as well as the frailty of men lead inevitably to tragedy. The great tragic poems and the great tragedies of history may, of course, be read as if they deal with the exceptional case but another interpretation is possible. Here writ large in the life of the hero, the great or famous man, is the tragic pattern of human life which is the lot of all men.

THE RELATION OF happiness to particular goods raises a whole series of questions each peculiar to the type of good under consideration Of these the most insistent problems concern pleasure knowledge virtue and the goods of fortune

With regard to pleasure the difficulty seems to arise from two meanings of the term which are more fully discussed in the chapter on PLEASURE AND PAIN In one of these meanings pleasure is an object of desire and in the other it is the feeling of satisfaction which accompanies the possession of objects desired It is in the latter meaning that pleasure can be identified with happiness or at least be regarded as its correlate for if happiness consists in the possession of all good things it is also the sum total of attainable satisfactions or pleasures Where pleasure means satisfaction pain means frustration not the sensed pain of injured flesh Happiness Locke can therefore say is the utmost pleasure we are capable of and Mill can define it as an existence exempt as far as possible from pain and as rich as possible in enjoyments Nor does Aristotle object to saying that the happy life is also in itself pleasant.

But unlike Locke and Mill Aristotle raises the question whether all pleasures are good and all pains evil Sensuous pleasure as an object often conflicts with other objects of desire And if pleasure means satisfaction there can be conflict among pleasures for the satisfaction of one desire may lead to the frustration of another At this point Aristotle finds it necessary to introduce the principle of virtue The virtuous man is one who finds pleasure in the things that are by nature pleasant The virtuous man takes pleasure *only* in the right things and is willing to suffer pain for the right end If pleasures or desires and their satisfaction can be better or worse there must be a choice among them for the sake of happiness Mill makes this choice depend on a discrimination between lower and higher pleasures not on virtue He regards virtue merely as one of the parts of happiness in no way different from the others But Aristotle seems to think that virtue is the principal means to happiness because it regulates the choices which must be rightly made in order to obtain all good things hence his definition of happiness as activity in accordance with virtue

This definition raises difficulties of still another order As the chapter on VIRTUE AND VICE indicates there are for Aristotle two kinds of virtue moral and intellectual the one concerned with desire and social conduct the other with thought and knowledge There are also two modes of life sometimes called the active and the contemplative differing as a life devoted to political activity or practical tasks differs from a life occupied largely with theoretic problems in the pursuit of truth or in the consideration of what is known Are there two kinds of happiness then belonging respectively to the political and the speculative life? Is one a better kind of happiness than another? Does the practical sort of happiness require intellectual as well as moral virtue? Does the speculative sort require both also?

In trying to answer these questions and generally in shaping his definition of happiness, Aristotle considers the role of the goods of fortune such things as health wealth auspicious birth native endowments of body or mind and length of life These gifts condition virtuous activity or may present problems which virtue is needed to solve But to the extent that having or not having them is a matter of fortune they are not within a man s control—to get, keep or give up If they are indispensable happiness is precarious or even unattainable by those who are unfortunate In addition if the goods of fortune are indispensable the definition of happiness must itself be qualified More is required for happiness than activity in accordance with virtue

Should we not say Aristotle asks that he is happy who is active in accordance with complete virtue and is sufficiently equipped with external goods not for some chance period but throughout a complete life? Or must we add and who is destined to live thus and die as befits his life? If so we shall call happy those among living men in whom these conditions are and are to be fulfilled—but happy *men*

THE CONSIDERATION of the goods of fortune has led to diverse views about the attainability of happiness in this life For one thing they may

ma..tained," Augustine describes as "the feli city of a life which is done with bondage"—to vice or conflict, to time and change. In contrast the best human life on earth is miserable with f...rations and an ennui that human nature c...not escape.

The doctrine of immortality is obviously pre supposed in the theological consideration of happiness. For Kant immortality is a necessary condition of the soul's infinite progress toward the moral perfection, the holiness, which alone deserves perfect happiness. But for theologians like Augustine and Aquinas, neither change nor progress play any part in immortal life. On the contrary, the immortal soul finds its salvation in eternal rest. The difference between motion and rest, between time and eternity, belongs to the very essence of the theologian's distinction between imperfect happiness on earth and perfect happiness hereafter.

These matters, of relevance to the theory of happiness, are discussed in the chapters on ETERNITY and IMMORTALITY, and in the chapter on SIN we find another religious dogma, that of original sin, which has an obvious bearing on earthly happiness as well as on eternal salvation. Fallen human nature, according to Christian teaching, is incompetent to achieve even the natural end of imperfect temporal happiness without God's help. Milton expounds this doctrine of indispensable grace in *Paradise Lost* in words which God the Father addresses to His Son:

Man shall not quite be lost, but sav'd who will,
Yet not of will in him, but grace in me
Freely vouchsaft; once more I will renew
His lapsed powers, though forfeit and enthrall'd
By sin to foul exorbitant desires;
Upheld by me, yet once more he shall stand
On even ground against his mortal foe,
By me upheld, that he may know how frail
His fall'n condition is, and to me owe
All his deliv'rance, and to none but me.

God's grace is needed for men to lead a good life on earth as well as for eternal blessedness. On earth, man's efforts to be virtuous require the reinforcement of supernatural gifts—faith, hope, and charity, and the infused moral virtues. The beatific vision in Heaven totally exceeds the natural powers of the soul and comes with the gift of added supernatural light. It seems, in short, that there is no purely natural happiness according to the strict tenets of Christian doctrine.

Aquinas employs the conception of eternal beatitude not only to measure the imperfection of earthly life, but also to insist that temporal happiness is happiness at all only to the extent that it is a remote participation of true and perfect happiness. It cannot be said of temporal happiness that it "excludes every evil and fulfills every desire. In this life every evil cannot be excluded. For this present life is subject to many unavoidable evils: to ignorance on the part of the intellect, to inordinate affection on the part of the appetite, and to many penalties on the part of the body.... Likewise," Aquinas continues, "neither can the desire for good be satiated in this life. For man naturally desires the good which he has to be abiding. Now the goods of the present life pass away, since life itself passes away.... Wherefore it is impossible to have true happiness in this life."

If perfect happiness consists in "the vision of the Divine Essence, which men cannot obtain in this life," then, according to Aquinas, only the earthly life which somehow partakes of God has a measure of happiness in it. Earthly happiness, imperfect because of its temporal and bodily conditions, consists in a life devoted to God—a kind of inchoate participation here and now of the beatific vision hereafter. On earth there can be only a beginning "in respect of that operation whereby man is united to God.

In the present life, in as far as we fall short of the unity and continuity of that operation, so do we fall short of perfect happiness. Nevertheless it is a participation of happiness, and so much the greater, as the operation can be more continuous and more one. Consequently the active life which is busy with many things, has less of happiness than the contemplative life which is busied with one thing, i.e., the contemplation of truth."

When the theologians consider the modes of life on earth in terms of the fundamental distinction between the secular and the religious, or the active and the contemplative, they seem to admit the possibility of imperfect happiness in either mode. In either, a devout Christian dedicates every act to the glory of God, and through such dedication embraces the divine in the passing moments of his earthly pilgrimage.

Sophocles seems to be saying this when he writes in *Oedipus at Colonus* Not to be born is past all prizing best but when a man hath seen the light this is next best by far that with all speed he should go thither whence he hath come For when he hath seen youth go by with its light follies what troublous affliction is strange to his lot what suffering is not therein? —envy factions strife battles and slaughters and last of all age claims him for her own— age dispraised infirm unsociable unfriended with whom all woe of woe abides

Death is sometimes regarded as the symbol of tragic frustration Sometimes it is not death but the fear of death which overshadows life, so that for Montaigne learning how to face death well seems indispensable to living well The very felicity of life itself he writes which depends upon the tranquility and contentment of a well descended spirit and the resolution and assurance of a well ordered soul ought never to be attributed to any man till he has first been seen to play the last and doubtless the hardest act of his part There may be disguise and dissimulation in all the rest but in this scene of death there is no more counterfeiting we must speak out plain and discover what there is of good and clean in the bottom of the pot

So too for Lucretius what happiness men can have depends on their being rid of the fear of death through knowing the causes of things But neither death nor the fear of death may be the crucial flaw It may be the temporal character of life itself

It is said that happiness consists in the possession of all good things It is said that happiness is the quality of a whole life not the feeling of satisfaction for a moment If this is so then Solon s remark to Croesus can be given another meaning namely that happiness is not something actually enjoyed by a man at any moment of his life Man can come to possess all good things only in the succession of his days not simultaneously and so happiness is never actually achieved but is always in the process of being achieved When that process is completed the man is dead his life is done

It may still be true that to live well or virtuously—with the help of fortune—is to live happily but so long as life goes on happiness is pursued rather than enjoyed On earth and in time man does not seem able to come to rest in any final satisfaction with all his desires quieted at once and forever by that vision of perfection which would deserve Faust s Stay thou art so fair!

As ALREADY INTIMATED the problem of human happiness takes on another dimension when it is treated by the Christian theologians The happiness which men can have on earth and in time is according to Augustine rather the solace of our misery than the positive enjoyment of felicity

Our very righteousness he goes on to say though true in so far as it has respect to the true good is yet in this life of such a kind that it consists rather in the remission of sins than in the perfecting of virtues For as reason though subjected to God is yet pressed down by the corruptible body so long as it is in this mortal condition it has not perfect authority over vice For though it exercises authority the vices do not submit without a struggle For however well one maintains the conflict and however thoroughly he has subdued these enemies there steals in some evil thing which if it do not find ready expression in act slips out by the lips or insinuates itself into the thought and therefore his peace is not full so long as he is at war with his vices

Accepting the definition of happiness as the possession of all good things and the satisfaction of all desires the theologians compare the successive accumulation of finite goods with the unchanging enjoyment of an infinite good An endless prolongation of the days of our mortal life would not increase the chances of becoming perfectly happy because time and change permit no rest no finality Earthly happiness is therefore intrinsically imperfect

Perfect happiness belongs to the eternal life of the immortal soul completely at rest in the beatific vision for in the vision of God the soul is united to the infinite good by knowledge and love In the divine presence and glory all the natural desires of the human spirit are simultaneously satisfied—the intellect s search for truth and the will s yearning for the good That final peace to which all our righteousness has reference and for the sake of which it is

REFERENCES

To fi d the passages cited use the numbers in hea y type which are the olume and page umbers of the passages referred to For example in 4 HOMER *Il ad* K II [265 283] 12d, the number 4 is the umber of the olume in the set the number 12d indicates that the pas sage i in section d of pa e 12

P GE SECTIO S When the text is pr nted in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lowe hal es of the page F r example in 53 J es *Psychology* 116a 119b the passa e begins in the upper half of pag 116 and end in th lo er half of page 119 When the text is p inted in two colum s, the letters a a d b ref r to the upper and lower hal es of the left hand side of the pa e the l tters c and d to the upper a d l wer hal es f the right hand side of the page. For example in 7 PLATO *Sympos m* 163b-164c the passage begins in the lower half f the left hand side of pag 163 and ends in th upper half of the right hand side of pa e 164

A TH DIV S O S On or more of the main di isions of a work (such as PART BK CH S T) a e sometimes i cluded in the reference l ne numbers, in brackets, are gi en in cer tain cases e g *Il ad* BK II [26 283] 12d.

BIBL REF RENCES The references are to book chapter and verse When the King James and Douay ersions diff r n title of books o in the numbering of chapters or verses the K ng James rsion is cited first and th Douay nd cated by a (*D*) follows e g OLD TESTA MENT *Nehem ah* 7:45—(*D*) *II Esd as* 7:46

S MBOLS Th bb eviation esp calls the reader s attention to one or mo e especially rele nt parts of whole reference passim sign fies that the topic is discussed interm t tently rathe than c ntinuo sly in the wo k or passage cited

For add tional inf rmation c nce ning the style of the r f rences, see the Explanation of R ference Styl f r general guidance in the use of *The Great Idea* consult the Preface.

Th de ire for happ n ss its naturalne s and univ rsality

7 PLA O *Euthydemu* 69a / *Sympos m* 164c-d
9 ARISTOTL *Ethics* K I CH 4 [1095a13 29] 340b-c CH 7 [1097a-34 b22] 342c 343a BK X CH 6 [1,6 30-b8] 430d-431a / *Pol ics* BK VII CH 13 [331b39-1332 4] 536c / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 5 [360b4 13] 600d-601a c I 6 [1362b10-12] 603b
11 N COMACHUS *Arithmetic* K I 811d
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25 MONTAIGNE: *Essays*, 26d-28a; 538a-543a,c

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38 ROUSSEAU: *Inequality*, 325b-d

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44 BOSWELL: *Johnson*, 144d

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47 GOETHE: *Faust*, PART II [9695-9902] 235a-240b

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7 PLATO: *Gorgias*, 284a-285a / *Philebus*, 614b-d; 617d-618a; 635b-639a,c

9 ARISTOTLE: *Ethics*, BK I, CH 7 [1097^{a}15-1098^{b}19] 342c-343a; CH 8 [1098^{b}20-29] 344a-b; CH 9 [1099^{b}33]-CH 10 [1101^{a}20] 345b-346c; BK X, CH 7-8 431d-434a / *Politics*, BK VII, CH 8 [1328^{a}37-^{b}2] 532d; CH 13 [1331^{b}24-1332^{a}4] 536b-537a / *Poetics*, CH 6 [1450^{a}15-20] 684c

12 LUCRETIUS: *Nature of Things*, BK II [1-61] 15a-d

12 EPICTETUS: *Discourses*, BK III, CH 24 203c-210a

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15 TACITUS: *Annals*, BK VI, 91c

18 AUGUSTINE: *City of God*, BK V, PREF 207b; BK VIII, CH 8 270a-d; BK X, CH 1-3 298b-d; 301a; BK XII, CH 1 342b-d; 343c; BK XIX, CH 13-14 519a-520d; CH 20 523d-524a; CH 26 528d-529a

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20 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART I-II, Q 84, A 4, ANS 176d-178a

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9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 4 [1095 13-27] 340b CH 5 [1096 5-10] 341a b CH 7 [1098 18-19] 343c CH 8 [1099 31-^{b}8] 344d 345a CH 10-11 345c 347a BK VII CH 13 [1153^{b}14-24] 405a BK X CH 8 [1178^{b}33 1179 16] 433c d / *Politics* BK VII CH 1 527a d esp [1323^{b}22-29] 527c d CH 13 [1331^{b}39-1332 27] 536c 537a / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 5 [1360^{b}14-30] 601a b [1361^{b}7-35] 602b-c

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK II [1-61] 15a d BK III [59-78] 30d 31a [1076-1094] 44a c BK V [1113-1135] 75c d

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK IV CH 6 230b 232c

14 PLUTARCH *Solon* 74c 75c / *Aemilius Paulus* 224d 225c 229a c / *Marcus Cato* 285c d / *Pyrrhus* 320c 321a / *Caius Marius* 353d 354a c / *Demosthenes* 691b d

15 TACITUS *Annals* BK VI 91c BK XIV 154a-c

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR V 19b 21a

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK VIII CH 8 270a b BK XIX CH 3 510a-c CH 13-14 519a 520d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 26 A 4 ANS and REP 2 151c 152a c PART I-II Q 1 A 7 ANS 614c 615a Q 2 AA 1-5 615d 619c esp A 4 ANS 618a d Q 4 AA 5-7 632c 636a Q 5 A 4 ANS 639a 640b Q 12 A 3 REP 1 670d 671b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL VII [25-96] 9d 10c PURGATORY XV [40-81] 75d 76a

22 CHAUCER *Prologue of Man of Law s Tale* [4519-4546] 235b 236a / *Tale of Melibeus* par 49-50 422a-423a / *Parson s Tale* par 28 515a

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK III 133b 140b BK IV 234a 235a

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 33b 36a 108c 110c 122a 124d 126b 129d 368d

26 SHAKESPEARE *As You Like It* ACT II SC I [1-20] 603c d

27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT III SC II [68-79] 49c d / *Othello* ACT I SC III [199-220] 211a b / *Sonnets* CXLVI 608c

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 86b c

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART VI 61a d

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III 124a 129a

37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 2b 263c d 283a b

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 350c 363a 366d

42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 256a b / *Practical Reason* 330d 331a / *Pref Metaphysical Element of Ethic* 370b d

43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 451d-452b 462c-463b

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 102d 103a 124d 125d 349a c 403a 491b 492b-c 494b 498d 499a

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK V 194c d BK X 430a b BK XI 514b d BK XIII 577a 578b BK XIV 605b-d BK XV 630c 631a

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI 164b d

53 JAMES *Psychology* 189a b

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5 SOPHOCLES *Antigone* [1155 1171] 140d 141a

5 EURIPIDES *Alcestis* [773-802] 243d 244a ... *Cyclops* [163 174] 441d

7 PLATO *Protagoras* 57d 62d / *Gorgias* 2 ... 284d / *Republic* BK IX 421a 427b / *Philebus* ... 609a 639a c esp 635c 639a c / *Laws* BK I ... 646a BK V 689c 690c BK VII 715c 716a ... *Seventh Letter* 801b c

8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 7 [10... 14-24] 602d 603a

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 5 [1095^{b}13 ... 340d CH 8 [1099^{a}7-30] 344c d BK VII CH 11-14 403c-406a c esp CH 13 [1153^{b}8-1154^{a}6] 404d-405b BK IX CH 9 423a-424b BK X CH 1-... 426a-430d passim CH 6 [1176^{b}8]-CH 7 [11... 431a 432c esp CH 7 [1177 24 28] 431d 432a ... *Politics* BK VIII CH 3 [1337^{b}27 1338 9] 543a b ... CH 5 [1339^{b}32 40] 545b-c / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 5 [1360^{b}14-18] 601a

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK II [1 ... 15a-c BK III [1003 1010] 43a BK V [14... 1435] 79b d

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18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK VIII CH ... 270a d

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12 Lucretius *Nature of Things* BK III [59 78] 30d 31a
12 Epictetus *Discourses* BK I CH 21 127b-c BK IV CH 6 230b 232c
12 Aurelius *Meditations* BK II SECT II 258a b BK VI SECT 51 279b c BK VIII SECT I 285a b
13 Virgil *Aeneid* BK I [441-493] 115a 116b BK VI [886-892] 234b 235a BK VIII [608-731] 275a 278b BK X [276-286] 309b 310a [656-689] 320a 321a BK XI [376-444] 338b 340a
14 Plutarch *Poplicola Solon* 86a c / *Pelopidas* 245c d / *Lysander* 354b d / *Agis* 648b d 649a / *Cicero* 717a b
15 Tacitus *Histories* BK IV 267c d
18 Augustine *Confessions* BK X par 59-64 86b 87d / *City of God* BK V CH 12-20 216d 226a BK VIII CH 8 270a d
19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 26 A 4 ANS 151c 152a c PART I II Q 2 AA 2-3 616d 618a Q 4 A 8 REP I 636a c
20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* PART II II Q 185 A I 639c 641c PART III SUPPL, Q 96 A 7 REP 3 1061b 1062a
21 Dante *Divine Comedy* HELL III [2-69] 4b d PARADISE VI [112 126] 114d 115a
22 Chaucer *Knight's Tale* [3041-3056] 210a / *Parson's Tale* par 10 500a
23 Hobbes *Leviathan* PART II 161c
25 Montaigne *Essays* 112a d 125a-c 300c 306a passim
26 Shakespeare *Richard II* ACT I SC I [175-185] 322b-c / *1st Henry IV* ACT I SC III [160-208] 439b d ACT V SC I [127-144] 462a b / *Henry V* ACT IV SC III [16-67] 555d 556b / *Julius Caesar* ACT I SC II [84-96] 570b
27 Shakespeare *Troilus and Cressida* ACT II SC II 113c 115d ACT V SC III [23 28] 137b / *Othello* ACT II SC III [262 270] 219d ACT III SC III [155-161] 223d / *Coriolanus* ACT I SC III [1-28] 355b c / *Sonnets* XXV 590a
29 Cervantes *Don Quixote* esp PART I 32c 33a 57d 58a 145b 147d PART II 222b c 227c 228d
31 Descartes *Discourse* PART VI 65c d
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32 Milton *Lycidas* 27b 32a esp [64-84] 29a b
33 Pascal *Pensées* 147 155 200b 201b 158 164 202a b 400-401 240b 241a 404 241a
38 Rousseau *Inequality* 360 361a 362b d
41 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 176c
42 Kant *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 256a b
43 Mill *Utilitarianism* 449a c
44 Boswell *Johnson* 124d 125d 128b 163d [fn 4] 498c-499a
46 Hegel *Philosophy of Right* PART II par 124 44b d PART III par 253 79a c
49 Darwin *Descent of Man* 310c d 312a 314b passim esp 312c 322a c 592d
51 Tolstoy *War and Peace* BK II 82a 83c BK III 146d 147c BK V 214c 215a
53 James *Psychology* 189b-191a 198b 199b

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7 Plato *Lysis* 18d / *Phaedrus* 126c 129d / *Symposium* 155d 157a 164c 167d / *Republic* BK III 325b-c BK IX 417b-418a / *Critias* 485b c
9 Aristotle *Ethics* BK I CH II 346c 347a BK VIII CH I [1155^{a}1-3] 406b d CH 3 [1156^{b}6-32] 408a-c CH 5 [1157^{b}25 38] 409c d CH 6 [1158^{a}22 28] 410a b BK IX CH 9 423a-424b CH II 425a d / *Politics* BK I CH 2 [1253^{a}25 29] 446c-d / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 5 [1360^{b}19 7] 601a
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22 Chaucer *Troilus and Cressida* BK II STANZA III 112 36a STANZA 119-128 37a 38a BK III STANZA 1-7 54b 55b STANZA 117 120 69b 70a STANZA 41 242 86a STANZA 250-253 87a b
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21 DANTE Divine Comedy esp PURGATORY XX 11 XXXIII 94c-105d
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25 MONTAIGNE Essays 6d 7 149b-d 541b-c
35 LOCKE Human Understanding BK II CH XXI SECT 44 188d 189b SECT 52 191d SECT 63-64 194d 195b passim
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43 MILL Utilitarianism 448a-453a
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9 ARISTOTLE Ethics BK I CH 9 [1099b33 1100a9] 345b-c BK I CH 14 [1154 0-30] 406c BK X CH 6 [1176a11] 431c CH 7 [1177b26-1178 8] 432c c 8 432d-434 passim esp [1178 23 32] 433c / Politics BK VII CH 8 [1328 37 b2] 532d CH 13 [1331b24 1332 3] 536b-537a
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43 MILL Liberty 293b 302c esp 299b-c / Representative Government 367d 368a / Utilitarianism 448d-450a 450c-453a 461c-464d
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46 HEGEL Philosophy of Right PART III par 166 59d 60a / Philosophy of History INTRO, 166b-168a
48 MELVILLE Moby Dick 54b-55a 122b 123a
51 TOLSTOY War and Peace BK III 117d BK V 215b-d BK VI 235a 238a 262d 263a BK VIII 303a 305b BK XI 480a-482b BK XIII 577a 578b BK XIV 605b-d BK XV 630c-631c
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7 PLATO Apology 205d 206d 211b 212a c / Crito 213a 219a c / Phaedo 220a 251d / Republic BK I 295d 297c BK VI 374a-d
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12 EPICTETUS Discourses BK I CH 24 108d 110a c 24 129 d BK II CH 16 156b 158d BK III CH 24 203c 210a
12 AURELIUS Meditations BK II SECT 11 12 258a-c BK SECT 50 268c BK V SECT 16-18 271 d SECT 34 273c BK VII SECT 33 282 SECT 44 45 282b-c BK IX SECT 3 291d 292a
14 PLUTARCH Solon 66b-d 74c 75c / Aemilius Paulus 224d 225c 229a-c / Pelopidas 245c d
15 TACITUS Annals BK I 91b-d
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18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK VIII CH 8 270a d BK XIX CH 4-8 511a 516a BK XXII CH 22-24 606d 612a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 5 636d 643d

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32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK II [496-505] 122a BK X [782-844] 291b 292b

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46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 162a 170b PART I 245b d PART III 285a b

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48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* esp 175b-176a 313b-314a 316a b 319a b 341b 342a 357a 360b-361a

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK II 80d-81a BK III 117d BK VI 235a 238a 262d 263a BK VII 294b 296a BK VIII 303a 305b BK IX 357d 358b 373b 374d BK XII 560a 562a BK XIII 577a 578b BK XIV 605b d BK XV 630c 631c EPILOGUE I 659c d 671c 672a

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK II 25d 27d BK III 53b 54b BK V 121d 127b 127b-137c passim BK XI 345a-c

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9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH I 2 339a d BK V CH I [1129b11 1130 13] 377a-c / *Politics* BK III, CH 9 [1280 31 34] 477d 478a BK IV CH II [1 95a25-b1] 495b c BK VII CH 1 3 527a-530a CH 13 15 536b 539d

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51 TOLSTOY *War a d Peace* BK III 116c 117a 127d 128d K V 197b-c 214c 216d BK X 430a b EPILOGUE I 670d 671c

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Ka amazo* BK II 25d 27d 37c 38a BK 121d 127b BK VI 154d 159a 165b-167b

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9 AR STOTL *Ethics* K I CH 2 [1094^b8 1] 339c d / *Politics* K I CH 1 [125 1-6] 445a BK CH 5 [264^b16-25] 459d-460a BK III CH 6 [1278^b 5 9] 475d-476 BK VII CH 1 3 527a 530 CH 8 [13 8 35] 532 d CH 9 [1328^b33 1329^a2] 533b [329^a 4] 533c CH 13 4 536b-538d BK V CH 1 [337^a28 30] 542b

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20 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART I-II, Q 90, A 2 206b-207a; A 3, REP 3 207a-c; Q 92, A 1, ANS and REP 1, 3-4 213c-214c; Q 94, A 2, ANS 221d-223a; Q 95, A 4, ANS 229b-230c; Q 96, A 3, ANS and REP 3 232b-233a; A 4, ANS 233a-d; A 6, ANS 235a-d; Q 97, A 4 238b-239b; Q 98, A 1, ANS 239b-240c; Q 99, A 3, ANS 247a-248a; Q 100, A 2, ANS 252b-253a; A 8, ANS and REP 3 259d-261a; A 11, REP 3 263c-264d; Q 105, A 2, ANS and REP 1-4 309d-316a; A 3, ANS and REP 5 316a-318b; Q 111, A 5, REP 1 355d-356c; PART III SUPPL, Q 96, A 6, REP 11 1058a-1061b
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38 MONTESQUIEU: *Spirit of Laws*, BK IV, 16c; BK V, 19a-c, 26c; BK VI, 38a-b
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5 SOPHOCLES: *Oedipus the King* [1186-1212] 110b-c; [1524-1530] 113c / *Antigone* [582-614] 136b-c; [1348-1353] 142d / *Trachiniae* [121-140] 171b / *Philoctetes* [1314-1347] 193d-194a
5 EURIPIDES: *Helen* [1687-1692] 314c / *Andromache* [91-102] 316a; [1284-1288] 326c / *Bacchantes* [878-911] 347b-c / *Hecuba* [952-961] 360d-361a / *Iphigenia at Aulis* [16-33] 425b
6 HERODOTUS: *History*, BK I, 6c-10a esp 6c-8a, 9c-10a, 20b-21a; BK II, 77a-b; BK III, 98b-99a
7 PLATO: *Apology*, 211c-d / *Phaedo*, 223a-223c / *Republic*, BK VII, 401a-b; BK X, 437c-438c / *Laws*, BK II, 658c-d; BK X, 689c
9 ARISTOTLE: *Ethics*, BK I, CH 10-11 345c-347a; BK VII, CH 14 [1154b20-30] 406c; BK X, CH 7 431d-432c esp [1177b26-1178a8] 432b-c; CH 8 [1178b8-32] 433b-c
12 LUCRETIUS: *Nature of Things*, BK I [62-135] 1d-2d; BK III [1-93] 30a-31b; [978-1023] 42d-43b; BK V [1161-1240] 76b-77b; BK VI [43-95] 80d-81b
12 EPICTETUS: *Discourses*, BK IV, CH 1 213a-223d
12 AURELIUS: *Meditations*, BK II, SECT 11 258a-b
13 VIRGIL: *Aeneid*, BK VI [264-678] 218a-229a; [724-751] 230b-231a
15 TACITUS: *Annals*, BK VI, 91b-d / *Histories*, BK I, 190a
18 AUGUSTINE: *Confessions*, BK VI, par 26 42d-43a

7. The distinction between temporal and eternal happiness

18 AUGUSTINE: *City of God*, BK X, CH 18 310b-d; BK XIX, CH 4-11 511a-517b

7b to 7c

19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I-II QQ 2-5 615c-643d passim
22 CHAUCER Merchant's Tale [9,055-9,558] 325b-326a
23 HOBBES Leviathan PART I 65a b
38 ROUSSEAU Social Contract BK IV 437d-438b
39 SMITH Wealth of Nations, BK V 336c-d
52 DOSTOEVSKY Brothers Karamazov BK V 127b-13 c passim

7 The effects of original sin: the indispensability of divine grace for the attainment of natural happiness

OLD TESTAMENT Genesis 3 4 4
NEW TESTAMENT Romans 5:14 2 / I Corinthians 15:21 22
18 AUGUSTINE Confessions BK X par 33 34 79d 80c / City of God BK IX CH 14 17 293a 295c BK X, CH 2 3 299d 301a CH 32 32 312a 322a BK XIV CH 1 376b,d 377a BK XXI CH 15 16 572c 574a BK XXII CH 22 24 606d 612a / Christian Doctrine BK I, CH 15 628b-c
20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I-II Q 85 178b-184a Q 91 A 6 212 213c Q 109 A 2 339c 340b AA 7-8 344a 346a
21 DANTE Divine Comedy PURGATORY XXVIII [9]-XXIX [36] 97a 98a PARADISE, VII 115a 116c
22 CHAUCER Second Nun's Tale [15,588-822] 46 a b / Parson's Tale par 1 15 495a 506b
23 HOBBES Leviathan, PART III 195d 196a
32 MILTON Paradise Lost BK III [56-415] 136b-144b esp [130-34] 138a, [227 235] 140b BK XI [44] 299a 300a BK XI [334]-BK XII [649] 306b-333a
33 PASCAL Pensées 425-433 243b-247b 447 253a
37 FIELDING Tom Jones 38d
52 DOSTOEVSKY Brothers Karamazov BK 121d 127b esp 125d 126b BK 168a-c

7b The imperfection of temporal happiness: its failure to satisfy natural desire

18 AUGUSTINE Confessions BK IV par 19 20d 24b BK VIII par 17 57d BK IX, par 3 26 68a-d / City of God BK VIII CH 8 270a-d BK IX, CH 14 15 293a 294a BK XII CH 1 342b d 343c BK XIX CH 4 1 511a 516d CH 20 523d 524a CH 27 529a-d / Christian Doctrine BK I CH 4 625b-c CH 38 635c-d
19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I II Q 2 A 1 R 3 615d-616c 3 617b-618a A 8 621 622b Q 3, R P 4 623a-624b AA 6-8 627b-629c Q 5, A R P 636d-637 A 3 638b-639a A 4 A 639a 640b A 5 esp REP 3 640b-641
20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica ART II Q 66 5 R 2 79b-80c
21 DANTE Divine Comedy PARADISE, XI [12] 122a
22 CHAUCER Knight's Tale [3 3 1324] 181b / Nun's Priest's Tale [20 5] 456b
23 HOBBES Leviathan PART I 65a-b 76c-d
25 MONTAIGNE Essays 99b-100a
29 CERVANTES Don Quixote PART II 366d 367a
32 MILTON Paradise Lost BK II [496-505] 122a
33 PASCAL Pensées 106 193b 109-110 193b-194a 126-147 195b-201 156-157 201b-202a 164 183 202b-204b 184 41 205a 217b 389 239b 425-533 243b-2 0a passim
35 LOCKE Human Understanding BK II CH XXI SECT 5 132c CH XXI SECT 45 189b-d SECT 61-62 194b-d SECT 2 198a-c
35 HUME Human Understanding SECT XI DIV 107 499d 500a
38 ROUSSEAU Inequality 366c-d
42 KANT Practical Reason 346b-347 b
44 BOSWELL Johnson 256d 401a b
47 GOETHE Faust PART I [1544 1571] 37b 38a
51 TOLSTOY War and Peace BK V 216d 218b BK VI 273c 2 4a c BK XI 525c 526b BK XII 560a 562a EPILOGUE I 650b 659c d 671c 672a
52 DOSTOEVSKY Brothers Karamazov BK 127b-13 c passim BK VI 153d 167b

7c Eternal beatitude: the perfection of human happiness

18 AUGUSTINE Confessions BK I par 31 8d 9a BK IX, par 3 6 68a-d BK XII par 50-52 124c-d / City of God BK VII, CH 31 261d 262 BK IX CH 1 293a 294a BK X, CH 1 3 298b d 301a CH 18 310b-d CH 22 312a b CH 32 319d-322a c BK XI CH 12 379b-c BK XII CH 1 342b d 343c BK XIII CH 20 370c 371 BK XIX CH 4 511a 513c CH 10-11 516c 517b CH 3 519a 520a CH 0 523d 524a CH 7 529a-d BK XXI CH 15 572c 573b BK XXII 586b d 618d esp CH 1 586b d-587b CH 3 588a b CH 29-30 614b-618d / Christian Doctrine BK I CH 4 625b-c CH 15 628b-c CH 3 33 633c 634b
19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I Q 12 A 1 A 50c 51 Q 18 A 2 R P 2 105c 106b Q 26 150a 1 2a,c Q 62 317c 325b Q 66 A 3 A 347b-348d Q 73 A 2, R P 3 371b-d Q 7 A 7 REP 1 3 4d 385c Q 8 A 2 ANS 432d 433c PART I II Q 2, 8 621 -622b Q 3 A 8 628d-629c QQ 4-5 629c-643d Q 19, A 10 R P 1 710b-711d
20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I-II Q 5 A 2 REP 3 27a-d Q 6 59d-63a Q 63 A 3 A S and R P 2 65a-d Q 67 81b-87c Q 68, AA -6 89c-94c Q 69 96c 101c Q 109 338a 347d PART II II, Q 2 AA 3-8 392d 398b Q 1 A 2-3 457d-4 9a Q 26 A 13 519d 520d PART III SUPPL, Q 75 A 1 935b-937a QQ 82-85 968a 992a QQ 92-96 1025b-1066a
21 DANTE Divine Comedy PURGATORY XV [40-8] 75d 76a PARADISE, III [43-90] 109d 110b XIV [1-66] 126d 127 XXII [1 2] 138b-139b XXIII [ ] 139d 140c XXVI [-69] 145d 146c XX I [1 4] 148d 150a
22 CHAUCER Merchant's Tale [9,055-9,558] 325b-326a

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23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 65a b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 99b 100a
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 366d 367a
31 DESCARTES *Meditations* III 88d 89a
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART V PROP 42 463b d
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 184-241 205a 217b 425-555 243b 270a passim
35 LOCKE *Toleration* 15d 16a / *Human Understanding* BK II CH VII SECT 5 132c CH XXI SECT 38 187b-c SECT 45 189c d SECT 62 194c d SECT 72 198a c
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 366c d
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 233c 234d
42 KANT *Practical Reason* 346b 347c
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK V 216d 218b BK VI 273c 274a c BK XI 525c 526b
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK V 120d 121c 125d 126d 127b 137c passim

7c(1) The beatific vision

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 32 24 30 / *Exodus* 24 esp 24 9-11 33 11-23 / *Numbers* 12 6-8 / *Deuteronomy* 34 10 / *Job* 19 26-27 / *Isaiah* 26 10—(D) *Isaias* 26 10
NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 5 8 / *John* 1 18 14 19-21 / *I Corinthians* 13 12 / *II Corinthians* 12 1-4 / *I Timothy* 6 15-16 / *I John* 3 1-2 / *Revelation* esp 4-5 7-8 11 14 1 5 16 1-19 21 21 1-22 21—(D) *Apocalypse* esp 4 5 7-8 11 14 1-5 16 1-19 21 21 1-22 21
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK IX par 25 68c BK XIII par 18 115b c / *City of God* BK IX CH 15 293a 294a BK X CH 2 299d 300a BK XII CH 20 355b BK XXII CH 29-30 614b 618d / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 10-11 627b c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 12 AA 1-11 50c 60d Q 26 A 3 151a-c Q 60 A 5 REP 5 313b 314c Q 62 A 1 ANS 317d 318c A 2 ANS 318d 319c Q 64 A 1 REP 1 334a 335c Q 82 A 2 ANS 432d-433c Q 84 A 5 446c-447c Q 89 A 2 REP 3 475a d Q 93 A 8 REP 4 499b 500c Q 94 A 1 ANS and REP 1 501d 503a Q 100 A 2 ANS 521c 522b PART I II Q 3 A 8 628d 629c Q 4 AA 1-2 629d 631a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 67 A 3 83b 84d A 6 REP 3 87a-c Q 69 A 2 REP 3 97b 98c A 4 ANS and REP 3 100c 101c PART II II Q 1 A 8 ANS 387a 388c Q 8 A 7 421d 422c Q 9 A 4 REP 3 425d 426c Q 180 A 5 611d 613a PART III Q 9 A 2 764c 765a Q 15 A 10 795b 796a PART III SUPPL Q 90 A 3 1014d 1016a Q 92 1025b 1037c Q 94 A 1 1040d 1041b Q 98 A 5 ANS 1075b d
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE V [1 12] 112a b XIV [1-66] 126d 127c XV [28-84] 128c 129b XXI [1 102] 138b 139b XXVIII [94 114] 149d 150a XXXII [139]-XXXIII [145] 156a 157d
22 CHAUCER *Parson's Tale* par 10 499b 500a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 65a b
31 DESCARTES *Meditations* III 88d 89a
42 KANT *Practical Reason* 346b 347a

7c(2) The joy of the blessed the communion of saints

OLD TESTAMENT *Psalms* 16 esp 16 10 36 esp 36 8-9 37 84 149—(D) *Psalms* 15 esp 15 10 35 esp 35 9-10 36 83 149 / *Isaiah* 65 8-25—(D) *Isaias* 65 8 25 / *Daniel* 7 18
APOCRYPHA *Wisdom of Solomon* 3 1-9 13 15 4 7-5 5 5 15-16—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 3 1-9 13-15 4 7-5 5 5 16-17
NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 5 1 1 19-20 6 19-21 33 13 43 19 16-30 esp 19 21 25 31 46 esp 25 34 25 46 / *Mark* 10 17 31 / *Luke* 16 19-26 18 18 30 / *John* 6 38-40 8 51 10 23 3 11 23 27 16 20-24 17 1-3 / *Romans* 8 18 14 17 / *I Corinthians* 15 40 57 / *II Corinthians* 4 17-5 10 / *Galatians* 6 8 / *Ephesians* 2 18 22 / *Hebrews* 10 34 / *James* 1 12 / *I Peter* 1 3 10 / *I John* 2 15-17 3 1 3 / *Revelation* passim, esp 4-5 7 14 15 19 21 22—(D) *Apocalypse* passim esp 4-5 7 14 15 19 21 22
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK IV par 16 23b c BK IX par 6 63a b par 23 25 68a-c BK X par 38 39 81a-c par 65 87d 88a BK XII par 23 104b c BK XIII par 50-53 124c 125a c / *City of God* BK XI CH 11 13 328d 330b CH 29-33 339a 341d BK XII CH 20 355b 357a BK XVIII CH 48 501b d BK XIX CH 10-11 516c 517b c 13 519a 520a CH 17 522b-523a CH 20 523d 524a CH 27 529a d BK XX CH 1 544d 545c BK XXII CH 30 616d 618d / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 19-22 629a 630a CH 38 635c d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 95 A 4 ANS 509b 510a Q 113 A 7 580b 581a PART I II Q 2 A 3 REP 1 617b 618a Q 4 AA 1 2 629d 631a Q 34 A 3 770c 771c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 67 A 4 84d 85d PART II II Q 18 A 2 462d-463d Q 19 A 11 472d-473d Q 26 A 13 519d 520d Q 28 A 3 528d 529c PART III SUPPL, Q 90 A 3 1014d 1016a Q 93 1037c 1040c Q 94 A 3 1041d 1042c Q 96 1049d 1066a
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XV [40-81] 75d 76a XXVIII XXXIII 96a 105d PARADISE 106a 157d esp III [43-90] 109d 110b II [112 126] 114d 115a XIV [1-66] 126d 127c XX [130-138] 138a XXI [1-102] 138b 139b XXII [52 72] 140b XXVIII [94 114] 149d 150a XXX-XXXIII 151d 157d
22 CHAUCER *Parson's Tale* par 103 549b 550a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART III 195d
32 MILTON *On Time* 12a b / *At a Solemn Music* 13a b / *Lycidas* [165 185] 31b / *Sonnets* XIV 66a / *Paradise Lost* BK III [135 143] 138b [344 415] 143a 144b BK VII [150-161] 220b BK VIII [618-630] 245a 246a BK XI [57-66] 300b [696-707] 314b BK XII [451-465] 328a 329a
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 643 290b 291a
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 234b-d

7c(3) to d

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 192d 193a
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK II 22b-23c BK XI 341d 342c
53 JAMES *Psychology* 199b

7c(3) The misery of the damned

OLD TESTAMENT *Job* 20:4-29 / *Psalms* 9:16-17; 11:6; 13; 14:3 / *Isaiah* 5:14 ... 66:24—(D) *Isaias* 5:14 ... 66:24 / *Ezekiel* 31:10-18—(D) *Ezechiel*, 31:10-18 / *Daniel* 12:2

APOCRYPHA *Judith* 16:17—(D) OT *Judith* 16:20 / *Wisdom of Solomon* 4:16-5:23 passim—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 4:16-5:24 passim / *Ecclesiasticus*, 21:9-10—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus*, 7:19; 21:10-11

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 8:12; 13:41-42,49-50; 18:6-9; 25:41-46 / *Mark* 9:43-48—(D) *Mark* 9:42-47 / *Luke* 16:19-26 / *Romans*, 2:5-9 / *II Thessalonians* 1:7-9 / *Jude* 5-7 / *Revelation* passim, esp 14:9-11; 20:10-15—(D) *Apocalypse* passim, esp 14:9-11; 20:10-15

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God*, BK XI, CH 33 341a-d; BK XIII, CH 2 360b-361a; CH 12 365d 366a; CH 14 ... 366b-367d; BK XIX, CH 28 ...; BK XXI, CH 1-3 ...a,c 377a; BK XIV, CH 15 388d 390a; BK XV, CH 1 397b-d 398c; BK XIX, CH 13 519a-520a; CH 28 529d 530a,c; BK XX, CH 6 534 535a; CH 14-15 542d-544b; BK XXI 560a-586a,c esp CH 1-3 560a-562a, CH 9-10 568d-570b, CH 13 571c 572a, CH 17 574a-b, CH 23 576c-577b / *Christian Doctrine* BK I, CH 20-21 629b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I, Q 21, A 3, REP 2 42c-43b; Q 21 ... 4, REP 1 126c 127c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II, Q 87, A 3-5 187b-189c; PART III SUPPL, Q 70, A 3 897d-900d; Q 86 992b-996a,c; Q 87, A 1, REP 4 997b-998c; Q 90, A 3 1014d-1016a; Q 94 1040d-1042c; QQ 97-99 1066a-108...a,c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL 1a-52d esp III [13]-4b, [82-129] 5a-b; VI [100-115] 9c, XI [00-...] 10c-d, XI 15a-16b; XIV [16-...] 19c-20b; XX [...] [55-136] 40a-41b; XXXIII [91-148] 50c-51...; PURGATORY ... [64-93] 115d-116a; X [10-12] 128c

22 CHAUCER *Friar's Tale* [7234] 283b-284a / *Summoner's Prologue* 284b-285a / *Parson's Tale* par 1 498b-502a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART III 195b-d
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, BK II 119b-122a
26 SHAKESPEARE *Richard III* ACT I, SC IV [42-63] 115a-b
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 418c-419a
31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 226d 227a
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I 93a-134a; BK II [560-8..] 215a-b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II, CH XXI, SECT 62 194c-d; SECT 72 198a-c
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 188d 189a
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 234a-c
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK V 127c-d; BK VI 169c-170b; BK XI 185a-c

7d The beatitude of God

OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 33:18-20 / *I Chronicles* 29:11-13—(D) *I Paralipomenon* 29:11-13 / *Psalms* 8; 19; 24; 104; 113:4; 138; 145—(D) *Psalms* 8; 18; 23; 103; 112:4; 137; 144 / *Isaiah* 6:1-4—(D) *Isaias* 6:1-4

NEW TESTAMENT *Mark* 8:38 / *John* 8:54 / *I Peter* 4:11 / *II Peter* 1:16-18 / *Revelation* 5:9-14—(D) *Apocalypse* 5:9-14

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XI, par 4 111c; par 53 124d-125a,c / *City of God* BK VIII, CH 6 268d-269c; BK XII, CH 17 353a-354

BK XXII, CH 29 614b-616d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I, Q 6 150a-152a,c; Q 62, A 4, ANS 320b-321b; Q 63, A 3 327b-328b; Q 65, A 2, ANS 340b-341b; Q 73, A 2, REP 3 371b-d; PART I-II, Q 2, A 2, REP 2 616d-617b; Q 3, A 1, REP 1 622c-623a; A 2, REP 1,4 623a-624b; A 8, REP 2 628d-629c; Q 5, A 3, REP 2 638b-639a; A 7, ANS and REP 2 642a-d

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III, Q 19, A 3 819c-820c; Q 26, A 1, REP 2 845b-846a; PART III SUPPL, Q 71, A 8, REP 1 909d-910d; Q 92, A 1, REP 5 1025c-1032b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE I [1-9] 106a; XXXIII [46-145] 156d-157d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART V, PROP 17 456c-d; PROP 35-36 460d-461c

32 MILTON *Upon the Circumcision* 12b-13a / *Paradise Lost* BK III [56-415] 136b-144b

42 KANT *Practical Reason* 347d-348b / *Judgement* 594d [fn 1]

CROSS-REFERENCES

For: Matters most relevant to the general theory of happiness, *see* GOOD AND EVIL 3a, 5a; PLEASURE AND PAIN 6-6b, 6d.

Particular goods or virtues which are related to happiness, *see* COURAGE 5; HONOR 2b; KNOWLEDGE 8b(4); LOVE 3a; PRUDENCE 2a; TEMPERANCE 3; VIRTUE AND VICE 1d; WEALTH 10a; WISDOM 2c; and for the discussion of means and ends in the order of goods, *see* GOOD AND EVIL 4b, 5b-5c.

Other treatments of the conflict between an ethics of happiness and an ethics of duty, *see* DUTY 2; PLEASURE AND PAIN 8b; PRINCIPLE 4-4b.

For The bearing of natural desire on the pursuit of happiness *see* DESIRE 2a 3a 7b LOVE 5a–5a(1) WILL 7d

The relation of happiness to death and the fear of death *see* IMMORTALITY 1 LIFE AND DEATH 8a–8c

Other considerations of individual happiness in relation to the state or the common good *see* GOOD AND EVIL 5d STATE 2f

Basic notions involved in the Christian doctrine of supernatural happiness or eternal beatitude *see* ETERNITY 4d GOD 6c(4) 7d 7g IMMORTALITY 5e–5g LOVE 5a(2) PUNISHMENT 5d 5e(1) SIN 3c–3d 4d 6d 7 VIRTUE AND VICE 8b 8e WILL 7e–7e(2)

Another discussion of the beatitude of God *see* GOD 4h

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection
II Works by authors not represented in this collection

For the date place and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

I

PLUTARCH Of the Tranquillity of the Mind Whether Vice is Sufficient to Render a Man Unhappy in *Moralia*
AUGUSTINE *The Happy Life*
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DANTE *Convivio* (*The Banquet*) FOURTH TREATISE CH 12
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A SMITH *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* PART VI
KANT *Lectures on Ethics*
DOSTOEVSKY *Notes from Underground*
—— *The Idiot*

II

CICERO *De Finibus* (*On the Supreme Good*)
—— *Tusculan Disputations* V
SENECA *De Beata Vita* (*On the Happy Life*)
SEXTUS EMPIRICUS *Against the Ethicists*
—— *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* BK III CH 21–32
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BOETHIUS *The Consolation of Philosophy* BK III
ABAILARD *Ethics* (*Scito Teipsum*)
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Chapter 34 HISTORY

INTRODUCTION

In our language the term *History*," Hegel observes, "unites the objective with the subjective side. . . . It comprehends not less what has *happened* than the *narration* of what has happened. This union of the two meanings we must regard as of a higher order than mere outward accident; we must suppose historical narrations to have appeared contemporaneously with historical deeds and events."

Our daily speech confirms Hegel's observation that "history" refers to that which has happened as well as to the record of it. We speak of the history of a people or a nation, or of the great events and epochs of history; and we also call a history the book which gives a narrative account of these matters.

It is as if we used the word "physics" to name both the object of study and the science of that object, whereas normally we *tend* to use "physics" for the science and refer *to its subject* matter as the physical world. We do not say that matter in motion is physics, but that it is the object of physics, one of the things a physicist studies. We might similarly have adopted the convention of using "history" in a restricted sense to signify a kind of knowledge or a kind of writing, and then called the phenomena written about or studied "historical" but not "history."

That, however, is not the prevailing usage. The word "history" *seems to* have at least four distinct meanings. It *ref*ers to a kind of knowledge. It refers to a type of literature. It means an actual sequence of events in time which constitutes a process of irreversible change. This can be *either* change in the structure of the world or any part of nature *or* change in human affairs, in society or civilization.

Historical knowledge and historical writing can be about natural history or human history. In his classification of the kinds of knowledge Francis Bacon makes this distinction when he divides history into "natural, civil, ecclesiastical and literary." Whereas the last three deal with human things, the first is concerned with the non-human part of the natural world. At the same time, this natural history is not, in Bacon's judgment, the same thing as "natural philosophy," or what we would now call "natural science."

In this set of great books, natural history, even cosmic history, makes its appearance in works which we ordinarily classify as science or philosophy; for example, Darwin's *Origin of Species*, Lucretius' *On the Nature of Things*, or Plato's *Timaeus*. The great books of history deal with man and society, not nature or the universe. For the most part this is true also of the great philosophies of history. They, too, are primarily concerned with human civilization, not the physical world.

In its original Greek root, the word "history" means research, and implies the act of judging the evidences in order to separate fact from fiction. The opening line of Herodotus is sometimes translated not "these are the histories of Herodotus of Halicarnassus," but "these are the researches."

The word "research" can, of course, mean any sort of inquiry—into what is *the case* as well as into what has happened. The title of one of Aristotle's biological works, the *History of Animals*, suggests that it is concerned with researches about animals. The book does not deal with natural *history*; it is not a history of animals in the sense of giving the stages of their development in the course of time. The redundancy of "historical research" can therefore be excused on the ground that it is necessary to distinguish between two kinds of inquiry or research—scientific and historical.

For The bearing of natural desire on the pursuit of happiness *see* DESIRE 2a 3a 3b LOVE 5a–5a(1) WILL 7d

The relation of happiness to death and the fear of death *see* IMMORTALITY 1 LIFE AND DEATH 8a–8c

Other considerations of individual happiness in relation to the state or the common good, *see* GOOD AND EVIL 5d STATE 2f

Basic notions involved in the Christian doctrine of supernatural happiness or eternal beatitude *see* ETERNITY 4d GOD 6c(4) 7d 7g IMMORTALITY 5e–5g LOVE 5a(2) PUNISHMENT 5d 5e(1) SIN 3c–3d 4d 6d 7 VIRTUE AND VICE 8b 8e WILL 7e–7e(2)

Another discussion of the beatitude of God *see* GOD 4h

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection
II Works by authors not represented in this collection

For the date place and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

I

PLUTARCH Of the Tranquillity of the Mind Whether Vice is Sufficient to Render a Man Unhappy in *Moralia*
AUGUSTINE *The Happy Life*
AQUINAS *Summa Contra Gentiles* BK I CH 100–102 BK III CH 17–63
DANTE *Convivio (The Banquet)* FOURTH TREATISE CH 12
—— *On World Government or De Monarchia* BK III CH 16
HUME *An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*
A SMITH *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* PART VI
KANT *Lectures on Ethics*
DOSTOEVSKY *Notes from Underground*
—— *The Idiot*

II

CICERO *De Finibus (On the Supreme Good)*
—— *Tusculan Disputations* V
SENECA *De Beata Vita (On the Happy Life)*
SEXTUS EMPIRICUS *Against the Ethicists*
—— *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* BK III CH 21–32
POMERIUS *The Contemplative Life*
BOETHIUS *The Consolation of Philosophy* BK III
ABAILARD *Ethics (Scito Teipsum)*
MAIMONIDES *The Guide for the Perplexed* PART III CH 8–9
NICOLAS OF CUSA *The Vision of God*
TERESA OF JESUS *The Way of Perfection*
SUÁREZ *Disputationes Metaphysicae* XXX (11 14)
JOHN OF THE CROSS *Ascent of Mount Carmel*
S JOHNSON *History of Rasselas*
HUTCHESON *A System of Moral Philosophy*
VOLTAIRE *Candide*
PALEY *Moral Philosophy* BK I CH 6
T REID *Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind* III PART III CH 1–4
BENTHAM *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* CH 1
WORDSWORTH *The Prelude*
SCHOPENHAUER *The World as Will and Idea* VOL I, BK IV VOL III SUP CH 45–50
LEOPARDI *Essays Dialogues and Thoughts*
WHEWELL *The Elements of Morality* BK II CH 25
KIERKEGAARD *Philosophical Fragments*
—— *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*
LOTZE *Microcosmos* BK VIII CH 2
FLAUBERT *Madame Bovary*
EMERSON *The Conduct of Life*
H SIDGWICK *The Methods of Ethics* BK II CH 1–6 BK III CH 14 BK IV
IBSEN *A Doll s House*
NIETZSCHE *Beyond Good and Evil*
—— *The Will to Power*
HAUPTMANN *The Weavers*
CHEKHOV *Three Sisters*
MANN *Buddenbrooks*
DEWEY and TUFTS *Ethics* PART II CH 14–15
MOORE *Principia Ethica* CH –3
—— *Ethics* CH 1–
UNAMUNO *The Tragic Sense of Life*
B RUSSELL *What I Believe* CH 4–5
—— *Sceptical Essays* VIII
A E TAYLOR *The Faith of a Moralist* SERIES I (9)
KIRK *The Vision of God*
SANTAYANA *Some Turns of Thought in Modern Philosophy* CH 4
MARITAIN *Scholasticism and Politics* CH VII
ADLER *A Dialectic of Morals*
LUBAC *Surnaturel*
O CONNOR *The Eternal Quest*

The contrast between history and science—or what for the purpose of comparison may be the same philosophy—is formulated in Aristotle's statement concerning poetry that it is more philosophical than history because poetry tends to express the universal history the particular History deals with what has actually happened whereas poetry like philosophy may be concerned with whatever is or can be

One comparison leads to another Unlike poetry history and science are alike in that they both attempt to prove what they say But in distinction from science or philosophy history resembles poetry especially the great epic and dramatic poems in being narrative literature. The historian and the poet both tell stories.

If the poet and the historian—including of course a biographer like Plutarch—are also moralists they are moralists in the same way Their works do not contain expositions of ethical or political doctrine but rather concrete exemplifications of theories concerning the conduct of human life and social practices That fact explains why much of the content of the great historical books is cited in other chapters dealing with moral and political even psychological topics But in this chapter we are concerned with history itself rather than with the particulars of history We are concerned with the methods and aims of history as a kind of knowledge and literature and we are concerned with the historical process as a whole the consideration of which belongs to the philosophy of history

THE AIMS AND methods of writing history are discussed by the historian himself as well as by the philosopher Philosophers like Hobbes Bacon or Descartes consider history largely from the point of view of the kind of knowledge it is and the contribution it makes to the whole of human learning Historians like Herodotus Thucydides, Tacitus and Gibbon state more specifically the objectives of their work the standards of reliability or authenticity by which they determine what is fact and the principles of interpretation by which they select the most important facts ordering them according to some hypothesis concerning the meaning of the events reported

Herodotus writes he tells us "in the hope of preserving from decay the remembrance of what men have done and of preventing the great and wonderful actions of the Greeks and the barbarians from losing their due meed of glory Thucydides proceeds in the belief that the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians was the greatest movement yet known in history not only of the Hellenes but of a large part of the barbarian world—I had almost said of mankind Not very different is the declaration of Tacitus My purpose is not to relate at length every motion but only such as were conspicuous for excellence or notorious for infamy This I regard as history's highest function to let no worthy action be uncommemorated and to hold out the reprobation of posterity as a terror to evil words and deeds

But though there seems to be a striking similarity in the purpose of these historians Tacitus alone of the three avows a moral purpose Furthermore each of the three is conscious of the individual way in which he has put his intention into effect Thucydides for example seems to have Herodotus in mind when he fears that the absence of romance in my history will detract somewhat from its interest but if it be judged useful by those inquirers who desire an exact knowledge of the past I shall be content Like Thucydides Tacitus is an historian of contemporary events and he fears comparison with the historian of antiquity who can enchain and refresh a reader's mind with descriptions of countries the various incidents of battle glorious deaths of great generals His own work may be *instructive* he thinks but it may also give very little pleasure because he has to present in succession the merciless biddings of a tyrant incessant prosecutions faithless friendships the ruin of innocence the same causes issuing in the same results, and [he is] everywhere confronted with a wearisome monotony in [his] subject matter

As we have already noted Herodotus seems satisfied to let the reader decide between conflicting accounts. Only occasionally does he indicate which is more likely in his own judgment Thucydides claims that he has made a greater effort to determine the facts I did not even trust my own impressions, he writes the narrative rests partly on what I saw myself *partly*

Originally research set the historian apart from the poet and the maker of myths or legends They told stories too but only the historian restricted himself to telling a story based on the facts ascertained by inquiry or research Herodotus deserves the title father of history for having originated a style of writing which differs from poetry in this extraordinary respect He tries to win the reader s belief not by the plausibility of his narrative but rather by giving the reader some indication of the sources of information and the reliability of the evidence on which the narrative is based

The poet tries to tell a likely story but the historian tries to make credible statements about particular past events He makes an explicit effort to weigh the evidence himself or as Herodotus so frequently does to submit conflicting testimony to the reader s own judgment Such is the account which the Persians give of these matters he writes but the Phoenicians vary from the Persian statements or this much I know from information given me by the Delphians the remainder of the story the Milesians add or that these were the real facts I learnt at Memphis from the priests of Vulcan or such is the truth of this matter I have also heard another account which I do not at all believe or again thus far I have spoken of Egypt from my own observation relating what I myself saw the ideas that I formed and the results of my own researches What follows rests on accounts given me by the Egyptians which I shall now repeat adding thereto some particulars which fell under my own notice

Herodotus seems quite conscious of the difference between himself and Homer especially on those matters treated by the poet which fall within his purview as an historian The Trojan War lies in the background of the conflict with which Herodotus is directly concerned—the Persian invasion of Greece—for the Persians trace to the attack upon Troy their ancient enmity towards the Greeks

Herodotus does not doubt that the siege of Troy took place as Homer relates but he learns from the Egyptians a legend about the landing of Paris and Helen on Egyptian soil and the detention of Helen by Proteus king of Memphis Such is the tale told me by the priests concerning the arrival of Helen at the court of Proteus It seems to me that Homer was acquainted with this story and while discarding it because he thought it less adapted for epic poetry than the version which he followed showed that it was not unknown to him

Herodotus cites passages in the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* to corroborate this point He is willing to use the Homeric poems as one source of information but not without checking them against conflicting accounts I made inquiry he writes whether the story which the Greeks tell about Troy is a fable or not When he comes to the conclusion that Helen was never within the walls of the city to which the Greeks laid siege for ten years he tells the reader his reasons for thinking so Homer however when he narrates Helen s actions during the siege does not bother to establish the facts of the matter or to give the reader contrary versions of what took place That is not the poet s task as Herodotus recognizes It belongs to the historian not the poet The story which may have greater probability in fact may not be the better story for the poet

Since he is both an investigator and a story teller the historian stands comparison with the scientist in one respect and with the poet in another The special character of history as a kind of knowledge distinct from science or philosophy seems clear from its object—the singular or unique events of the past The scientist or philosopher is not concerned with what has happened but with the nature of things Particular events may serve as evidences for him but his conclusions go beyond statements of particular fact to generalizations about the way things are or happen at any time and place In contrast the historian s research begins and ends with particulars He uses particulars directly observed by himself or testified to by others as the basis for circumstantial inference to matters which cannot be established by direct evidence The method of investigation developed by the early historians may be the precursor of scientific method but the kind of evidence and the mode of argument which we find in Hippocrates or Plato indicate the divergence of the scientist and philosopher from the procedure of the historian

even ages, corresponding to the seven days of creation. "The first age as the first day extends from Adam to the deluge the second from the deluge to Abraham. From Abraham to the advent of Christ there are as the evangelist Matthew calculates, three periods, in each of which are fourteen generations—one period from Abraham to David a second from David to the captivity a third from the captivity to the birth of Christ in the flesh. There are thus five ages in all. The sixth is now passing and cannot be measured by any number of generations. After this period God shall rest as on the seventh day when He shall give us (who shall be the seventh day) rest in Himself. The seventh shall be our Sabbath which shall be brought to a close not by an evening but by the Lord's day as an eighth and eternal day consecrated by the resurrection of Christ and prefiguring the eternal repose not only of the spirit but also of the body This is what shall be in the end without end.

This same projection of history—in all essentials, at least—is laid before Adam by the archangel Michael in Milton's *Paradise Lost* just before Adam leaves the Garden of Eden.

Unlike the four major dispensations of which Augustine and Milton speak Hegel's four stages of the world are *epochs* in the development of Spirit as manifested in the State. They are secularly defined as the Oriental, the Greek, the Roman, and the German world and are seen as a progress of the consciousness of Freedom. The various grades in the consciousness of Freedom, Hegel writes supply us with the natural division of universal History The Orientals have not attained the knowledge that Spirit—Man *as such* is free and because they do *not* know this, they are not free. They only know that *one is free* that *one* is therefore only a Despot not a *free man* The consciousness of Freedom first arose among the Greeks, and therefore they were free but they and the Romans likewise knew only that *some* are free—not man as such. The Greeks, therefore had slaves and their whole life and the maintenance of their splendid liberty was implicated with the institution of slavery The German nations, under the influence of Christianity were the first to attain the consciousness that man as man is free

With the complete emancipation of man in the German-Christian world history is consummated for Hegel. 'The grand principle of being is realized, he declares consequently the end of days is fully come." Another sign of the finality of the German-Christian world seems to be its reconciliation of Church and State European history is the exhibition of the growth of each of these principles severally then of an antithesis on the part of both lastly of the harmonizing of the antithesis. In the German-Christian world the secular and the religious *modes of life* are ultimately harmonized fused in a single order of rational Freedom.

APART FROM THE opposition between the philosophical and theological *approaches* here represented by Hegel and Augustine, there seem to be two main issues in the general theory of human history The first concerns the pattern of change the second the character of the causes at work.

The pattern most familiar because of its prevalence in modern speculations is that of progress or evolution. The progress may be conceived as a dialectical motion in the realm of Spirit, contrasted by Hegel with the realm of Matter or Nature according as the essence of Matter is Gravity and the essence of Spirit is Freedom. But it may also be thought to occur as in the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels, through the resolution of conflicting material or economic forces.

"The whole history of mankind" Engels writes in his preface to the *Communist Manifesto* since the dissolution of primitive tribal society holding land in common ownership has been a history of class struggles contests between exploiting and exploited ruling and oppressed classes the history of these class struggles forms a series of evolutions in which nowadays, a stage has been reached where the exploited and oppressed class, the proletariat cannot attain its emancipation from the sway of the exploiting and ruling class, the bourgeois without at the same time and once for all emancipating society at large from all exploitation, oppression class-distinction and

on what others saw for me the accuracy of the report being always tried by the most severe and detailed tests possible My conclusions have cost me some labor from the want of *coincidence between the accounts of the same* occurrences by different eye witnesses But he thinks that his conclusions may safely be relied on undisturbed either by *the lays of a* poet displaying the exaggeration of his craft or by the compositions of the chroniclers which are attractive at truth s expense

The historians are aware of the difficulty of combining truth telling with storytelling Most men Thucydides remarks are unwilling to take enough pains in the investigation of truth accepting readily the first story that comes to hand The difficulty according to Tacitus is the obscurity of the greatest events so that some take for granted any hearsay whatever its source others turn truth into falsehood and both errors find encouragement with posterity

Reviewing the enormous scope of his work *Gibbon at the very end concludes that* the historian may applaud the importance and variety of his subject but while he is con*scious of his own imperfections he must often* accuse the deficiency of his materials Because of the scarcity of authentic memorials he tells us in another place the historian finds it hard to preserve a clear and unbroken thread of narration Surrounded with imperfect fragments always concise often obscure and sometimes contradictory he is reduced to collect to compare and to conjecture and though he ought never to place his conjectures in the rank *of facts yet the knowledge of human nature* and of the sure operation of its fierce and unrestrained passions might on some occasions *supply the want of historical materials*

Clearly the historians have different criteria of relevance in determining the selection and rejection of materials and different principles of interpretation in assigning the causes which explain what happened These differences are reflected in the way each historian constructs from the facts a grand story *conceives the line* of its plot and the characterization of its chief actors Herodotus for example has been compared with Homer as writing in an epic manner Thucydides with the dramatic writers of tragedy Even if they all agreed on the ascertainment of fact the great historians would differ from one another as the great poets do each has a style and a vision as personal and poetic as *Homer* or *Virgil* *Melville* or Tolstoy

ONLY ONE OF THE great books is by title and *design devoted entirely to the philosophy of* history—to the formulation of a theory which embraces the whole of man s career on earth. This is Hegel s *Philosophy of History* Augustine s *City of God* presents an equally comprehensive vision but a comparison of the two suggests that they differ from one another as philosophy from theology

The point of this comparison is not that God and His providence are omitted from the philosopher s view On the contrary Hegel regards the history of the world as a process of development and the realization of Spirit—this is the true theodicy the justification of *God in* History Only this insight can reconcile Spirit with the History of the World—*it* that what *has happened and is happening every* day is not only not without God but is essentially His Work

The *difference is r*ather to be found in the ultimate source of insight concerning human development and destiny Augustine sees everything in the light of God s revelation of His plan in Holy Writ Hegel and other philosophers of history from Vico to Toynbee seek and sometimes claim to find in the records of history itself the laws which govern *and the* pattern which inheres in the procession of events from the beginning to the end of human *time*

For Augustine the great epochs of history are defined religiously They are stages in the development of the city of God on earth not the city of man Man is viewed as dwelling on earth under four distinct dispensations from God (1) in Paradise before the Fall (2) in the world after expulsion from Eden and before the Promise and the Law were given to the Jews (3) under the Law and before the coming *of* Christ *(4) between the first* and second coming under the dispensation of grace

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With the complete emancipation of man in the German-Christian world, history is consummated for Hegel. The grand principle of being is realized, he declares; "consequently the end of days is fully come." Another sign of the finality of the German-Christian world seems to be its reconciliation of Church and State. "European history is the exhibition of the growth of each of these principles severally ... then of an antithesis on the part of both ... lastly, of the harmonizing of the antithesis." In the German-Christian world, the secular and the religious modes of life are ultimately harmonized, fused in a single order of rational Freedom.

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"The whole history of mankind," Engels writes in his preface to the *Communist Manifesto*, "since the dissolution of primitive tribal society, holding land in common ownership, has been a history of class struggles, contests between exploiting and exploited, ruling and oppressed classes; the history of these class struggles forms a series of evolutions in which, now-a-days, a stage has been reached where the exploited and oppressed class, the proletariat, cannot attain its emancipation from the sway of the exploiting and *ruling* class, the bourgeoisie, without, at the same time and once for all, emancipating society at large from all exploitation, oppression, class-distinction and

class struggle The four great economic systems—the systems of slave labor feudal serfdom industrial capitalism and the communistic or classless society—are thus seen as the stages of progress toward an ultimate perfection in which history comes to rest because it has at last fully realized its controlling tendency

The pattern of progress may be conceived not as a dialectical motion involving conflict and synthesis but rather as by Kant in terms of an increasing actualization of the potentialities for good in human life Giving the name of *culture* to the production in a rational being of an aptitude for any ends whatever of his own choosing Kant declares it is only culture that can be the ultimate end which we have cause to attribute to nature in respect of the human race The progressive realization of culture consists in the liberation of the will from the despotism of desires whereby in our attachment to certain natural things we are rendered incapable of exercising a choice of our own In these terms history moves toward a perfection which can never be fully achieved on earth for man s own nature is not so constituted as to rest or be satisfied in any possession or enjoyment whatever

As conceived by the evolutionist progress may or may not attain its limit but in either case its manifestation in human history appears to be analogous to as well as an extension of the line of development along which the world or all of living nature has gradually advanced

These views are given further discussion in the chapters on Evolution Progress and World Whether or not the same pattern of change obtains in the historical order of nature as in the history of man and society is a question to be answered by those who deny as well as by those who affirm progress There is cyclical change in nature the same pattern of birth growth decay and death repeating itself generation after generation That history too repeats itself with the rise and decline of cities and civilizations seems to be the ancient view It reappears in our day with Spengler and somewhat qualified by the possibility of progress with Toynbee

The cities which were formerly great Herodotus observes have most of them become insignificant and such as are at present powerful were weak in olden time I shall therefore discourse equally of both convinced that prosperity never continues long in one stay Lucretius finds the cyclical pattern both in the succession of worlds and in the succession of civilizations The myth of the golden age of Kronos and the earth bound age of Zeus, which Plato tells in the *Statesman* also applies both to nature and society

According to the myth there is a time when God himself guides and helps to roll the world in its course and there is a time on the completion of a certain cycle when he lets go, and the world being a living creature and having originally received intelligence from its author and creator turns about and by an inherent necessity revolves in the opposite direction Thus the history of the world runs through infinite cycles of years and one age succeeds another in an endless round

There is still a third view which sees history as neither cyclical nor simply progressive Virgil reverses the order of the Platonic myth by placing the golden age in the future It dawns with Rome where in the words of the 4th *Eclogue* the majestic roll of circling centuries begins anew Justice returns returns old Saturn s reign with a new breed of men sent down from heaven and the iron shall cease the golden race arise

Rome for Virgil is not only the beginning of the golden age it is also the consummation of history In the *Aeneid* Jupiter himself declares that he has given the Romans dominion without end —that he has ordained for them neither period nor boundary of empire The gowned race of Rome shall be the lords of the world then war shall cease and the iron ages soften Thus Jupiter says is it willed and so a day will come in the lapse of cycles The perpetuity of Rome seems to leave little room for any further essential progress and no chance for another cycle of decay and regeneration

The Christian dogma of the fall of man from grace and his return through divine mediation to grace and salvation seems to give history a pattern that is partly Platonic in the sequence which makes the loss of a golden age the occasion for striving to regain it But it also seems

to be Virgilian in part The epochal transitions of history happen only once The coming of Christ is an absolutely singular event after which there is no essential progress in man s condition until the Last Judgment at the end of the world

COMMON TO THESE diverse conceptions of the pattern of history is the problem concerning the causes which are at work as history unfolds. Whatever the factors they will operate in the future as they have in past unless the millennium is already upon us or about to dawn From the knowledge of their own past or from their dim perception of divine providence men derive a sense of the future but they look forward to that future differently according as some part of it will stem from choices freely made or according as all of it is inexorably determined by causes beyond their control

The basic alternatives of fate and freedom of necessity and contingency God s will and man s choice are considered in the chapters on CHANCE FATE, and NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY Sometimes the issue is resolved in the same way for the course of nature and the course of history necessity reigns in both as there is contingency in the events of nature so there is freedom in the acts of history Sometimes the processes of nature and history are distinguished the motions of matter are governed by inviolable laws whereas the motions of men are directed by laws which leave them free to work out a destiny which is determined by rather than determines the human spirit

Those who do not deny freedom entirely in the realm of history seldom give it unlimited scope What men can do is conditioned from below by the operation of material forces and from above by what Hegel calls God s purpose with the world The vast arras web of Universal History is woven by the interaction between God s will (the Absolute Idea) and human purposes or interests which Hegel calls the complex of human passions

History for him is the union of Freedom and Necessity where the latent abstract process of Spirit is regarded as Necessity while that which exhibits itself in the conscious will of men, as their interest belongs to the domain of freedom. But this freedom which coheres with necessity seems to belong more to the human race as a whole than to individual men The individual man is tossed aside if he tries to obstruct the path of history He is powerless to change its course

Not even great men can make or determine history They are great only because sensing the next phase of the historical process they identify themselves with the wave of the future and conform their purposes to the march of events—*the dialectical development of the Absolute Idea* A few men thus become world historical individuals because their own particular aims involve those large issues which are the will of the World Spirit They have an insight into the requirements of the time —what was ripe for development the very Truth for their age for their world the species next in order so to speak and which was already formed in the womb of time

Like Hegel and unlike the ancient historians Tolstoy also regards the leadership of great men as illusory To believe in the efficacy of heroes or great men he thinks is to commit the fallacy of the man who watching the movements of a herd of cattle and paying no attention to the varying quality of the pasturage in different parts of the field or to the driving of the herdsman attributes the direction the herd takes to the animal which happens to be at its head

Great men are only celebrated puppets, pushed ahead on the *moving front of history* The motion of history derives its force and direction from the individual acts of the innumerable nameless men who comprise the human mass The act of the individual counts little The mass motion is a complex resultant of slight impulses tending in many directions But however slight the impulse each man gives his contribution to history is a free act conditioned only by the circumstances under which he makes a choice and by the divine providence which grants him the freedom to choose Like every human action, history according to Tolstoy thus "appears to us as a certain combination of freedom and inevitability

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DIFFERENT FROM speculations on a grand scale concerning the whole historical process is that

type of philosophizing about history which considers its place in education—the light it affords to the mind and the lessons it teaches for the guidance of conduct

Montaigne for example makes the reading of history and biography the window through which a man looks out upon the world This great world he writes is the mirror wherein we are to behold ourselves to be able to know ourselves as we ought to do in the true bias Only against the large scene history reveals and amidst the variety of human nature it exhibits can a man truly know himself and his own time In a similar vein Gibbon declares that the experience of history exalts and enlarges the horizon of our intellectual view Hegel on the other hand insists that what experience and history teach is that peoples and governments never have learned anything from history or acted on principles deduced from it

On the practical side political writers like Machiavelli Montesquieu and the Federalists use history to exemplify or confirm their generalizations They agree with Thucydides that an exact knowledge of the past is an aid to the interpretation of the future which in the course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect it Most men adds Tacitus learn wisdom from the fortunes of others

It is on these grounds that the great books of history belong with treatises on morals and politics and in the company of philosophical and theological speculations concerning the nature and destiny of man Liberal education needs the particular as well as the universal and these are combined in the great historical narratives Apart from their utility they have the originality of conception the poetic quality the imaginative scope which rank them with the great creations of the human mind

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to For example in 4 HOMER Iliad BK II [265 283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page For example, in 53 JAMES Psychology 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119 When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page For example in 7 PLATO Symposium 163b-164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets, are given in certain cases e g Iliad BK I [265 283] 12d.

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e g OLD TESTAMENT Nehemiah 7 45—(D) II Esdras 7 46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas consult the Preface

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6 HERODOTUS History BK II 71a 73b esp 72 b 75b BK V 127a b BK 242c d

6 THUCYDIDES Peloponnesian War BK I 354a d

7 PLATO Cratylus 112b / Republic BK II 323d 324a / Timaeus 447a / Critias 479d / Laws BK III 663d-677a

9 ARISTOTLE Poetics CH 9 [1451 36-^{b}32] 686a-c 3 695a-c

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15 TACITUS Annals BK I 60d BK 71d 72b 107c BK 133b / Histories BK I 228a b

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31 DESCARTES Rules 3b-d / Discourse PART 43a b

33 PASCAL Pensées 6 8 287a / Vacuum 355a 356a

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35 HUME Human Understanding SECT VII DIV 65 479b-c SECT XI DIV 132 509c

37 FIELDING Tom Jones 19 20a 49b 50c

40 GIBBON Decline and Fall 88a d 9 c 98d passim 211a 398b 471c d

41 GIBBON Decline and Fall 337c

44 BOSWELL Johnson 203a b 258d 259 353b c

46 HEGEL Philosophy of Right INTRO par 3 10a 11 PART par 355 112d / Philosophy of History INTRO 153 158a 182d 183d 193d 194 PART 230c 231b 248 PART III 285d 285a

51 TOLSTOY War and Peace BK X 430d-431a BK XI 469 -470c BK XIII 563a b EPILOGUE II 675 696d passim

53 JAMES Psychology 863b [fn 2]

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OLD TESTAMENT: *Deuteronomy*, 6:20-25; 7:6-11; 17-19; 8; 16:1-12; 29 / *Joshua*, 24:1-27—(D) *Josue*, 24:1-27 / *I Samuel*, 12:6-25—(D) *I Kings*, 12:6-25 / *Ezra*, 4:7-23—(D) *I Esdras*, 4:7-23 / *Nehemiah*, 9—(D) *II Esdras*, 9 / *Psalms*, 44:1-3; 78; 81; 105; 106; 136 esp 136:10-24—(D) *Psalms*, 43:1-4; 77; 80; 104-105; 135 esp 135:10-24 / *Ecclesiastes*, 1:11; 2:16 / *Isaiah*, 46:8-11—(D) *Isaias*, 46:8-11 / *Jeremiah*, 2:1-9—(D) *Jeremias*, 2:1-9 / *Ezekiel*, 20:1-44—(D) *Ezechiel*, 20:1-44

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NEW TESTAMENT: *II Peter*, 2 / *Jude*

4 HOMER: *Iliad*, BK IX [485-605] 62a-63b

6 HERODOTUS: *History*, BK I, 2b; BK V, 175b; BK VIII, 273b-c; BK IX, 309d-310a

6 THUCYDIDES: *Peloponnesian War*, BK I, 354b-c; 379c-d

7 PLATO: *Timaeus*, 452b / *Statesman*, 587d / *Philebus*, 612a / *Laws*, BK III, 663d-677a esp 667a-b; BK XII, 788a

8 ARISTOTLE: *Sophistical Refutations*, CH 34 [183^b16-184^b8] 253a-d / *Metaphysics*, BK I, CH 3-10 501c-511d esp CH 3 [983^b1-7] 501c-d, CH 10 511c-d; BK II, CH 1 [993a30-$^b19$] 511b-d; 512a; BK III 513b-d; 522a-c passim esp CH 1 [995a23-$^b4$] 513b-d; BK XII, CH 1 [1069a25-29] 598b; CH 8 [1074^b1-14] 604d-605a / *Soul*, BK I 631a-641d passim esp CH 2 [403^b20-23] 633a

9 ARISTOTLE: *Ethics*, BK X, CH 9 [1181^b12-24] 436c / *Politics*, BK VII, CH 10 [1329a40-$^b35$] 533d-534b / *Rhetoric*, BK I, CH 4 [1360a30-37] 600d; BK II, CH 20 [1393a25-$^b3$] 641a

12 AURELIUS: *Meditations*, BK VI, SECT 46 278c-d; BK VII, SECT 1 279b; SECT 49 282d; BK IX, SECT 28 293d-294a; BK X, SECT 27 299d; BK XI, SECT 26 306b

14 PLUTARCH: *Pericles*, 121a-122b / *Timoleon*, 195a-b; 201b-202c / *Nicias*, 423a-c / *Alexander*, 540b-d; 541a / *Cato the Younger*, 634a-c / *Demetrius*, 726a-d

15 TACITUS: *Annals*, BK III, 58b-d; 60d; BK IV, 71d-72b / *Histories*, BK I, 189d-190a; BK III, 255b-c

18 AUGUSTINE: *Confessions*, BK II, par 1 9a; BK X, par 3-6 72a-73a; BK XI, par 1 89b-c / *City of God*, BK I, CH 8-9 133a-135a; BK IV, CH 33-34 206c-207a,c; BK V, CH 25 228b-c; BK XI, CH 18 331d-332a; BK XV, CH 21 415b-416a; BK XVII 449a-472a,c esp CH 3 450c-451c; BK XXII, CH 30 618a-b / *Christian Doctrine*, BK II, CH 28 650a-d; CH 39 654c-655b

20 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART I-II, Q 97, A 1, ANS 236a-d

21 DANTE: *Divine Comedy*, PARADISE, VI [31-111] 113d-114d; XI [43-139] 122c-123c; XII [22-126] 123d-125a; XV [88]-XVI [154] 129b-132a; XVII [103-142] 133b-c

22 CHAUCER: *Monk's Tale* 434a-448b

23 MACHIAVELLI: *Prince*, CH VI, 8c-d; CH XIV-XV, 22a-b; CH XVIII, 25a-26a

23 HOBBES: *Leviathan*, PART I, 53c-54a

24 RABELAIS: *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, BK I, 58a-59d

25 MONTAIGNE: *Essays*, 24a-c; 41b-42a; 68b-69d; 198c-200d; 455d-456b

26 SHAKESPEARE: *2nd Henry IV*, ACT III, SC I [45-96] 483b-d

29 CERVANTES: *Don Quixote*, PART I, 23c-d; 32c-33a

30 BACON: *Advancement of Learning*, 4c; 6c; 32d-34b; 85a-c / *Novum Organum*, BK I, APH 98 126d-127b

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33 PASCAL: *Pensées*, 619-641 284b-290a / *Vacuum*, 355a-358b

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35 HUME: *Human Understanding*, SECT VIII, DIV 65 479b-c

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39 SMITH: *Wealth of Nations*, BK V, 334c-343d

40 GIBBON: *Decline and Fall*, 33c; 211a; 632a-b

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42 KANT: *Pure Reason*, 5a-8d; 248d-250a,c / *Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals*, 266d [fn 2] / *Practical Reason*, 357c-d

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44 BOSWELL: *Johnson*, XIIa-c; 3c-4c; 116b; 258d-259a; 314c-315b; 347c-d; 458d

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47 GOETHE: *Faust*, PART I [570-585] 16a

50 MARX: *Capital*, 7b-d

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6 HERODOTUS: *History*, BK I, 1a-48a,c passim esp 1a-c; 2b; 4d; 5a; 23a-b; BK II, 68b-d; 75b; BK VII, 242c-d

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3b The explanation or interpretation of historic fact: the historian's treatment of causes

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39 Smith *Wealth of Nations* BK II 148d 149a BK V 305b 309a c
40 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 179a d 190a d 200a 201b 207b 211a-c 232b 233c 294a 296d 409b 410a 456c-457a c 630b d 634a c esp 631a 632a
41 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 244b 245a 386a b 451c-453a c
44 Boswell *Johnson* 166c
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50 Marx Engels *Communist Manifesto* 430b 433d passim
51 Tolstoy *War and Peace* BK IX 342a 344b BK X 389d 390a 405a b 430b-432c 447c 448c BK XI 469a 470c BK XIII 563a 564a 582b d BK XIV 588a 589a 610d 611c BK XV *619c 620a* EPILOGUE II 675a 696d

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12 Lucretius *Nature of Things* BK I [449-482] 6c 7a BK II [1105 1174] 29a 30a c BK V [65-109] 62a c [170-194] 63b-c [772-1457] 71a 80a c
12 Aurelius *Meditations* BK V SECT 8 269d 270b BK IX SECT 28 293d 294a
18 Augustine *City of God* BK I PREF 129a d CH 36 149c d BK II CH 2-3 150c 151c BK IV CH 33 206c d BK V CH I 207d 208c CH 11-26 216c 230a c BK XI CH 18 331d 332a BK XII CH 21 357a b BK XIV CH 28 BK XV CH I 397a 398c BK XV CH 21-22 415b-416c BK XVIII CH I 2 472b d 473d
21 Dante *Divine Comedy* HELL VII [61-96] 10b-c PURGATORY XVI [52-114] 77b 78a
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43 Federalist NUMBER 3 33c
43 Mill *Representative Government* 327b d 332d passim
46 Hegel *Philosophy of Right* PART II par 115 42b c PART III par 340 360 110b 114a,c esp par 342 110c d par 347 111b c ADDITIONS 153 141d / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 156d 170b 190b 201a c esp 190b d 194b 196a PART I 258b d PART II 262c 263d 274a 275a
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52 Dostoevsky *Brothers Karamazov* BK XI 345a c
53 James *Psychology* 361b
54 Freud *Civilization and Its Discontents* 781a 789b esp 787a 788d 791b d 799a 802a c / *New Introductory Lectures* 834b-c 882b 884c

4a(1) The alternatives of fate or freedom necessity or chance

6 Herodotus *History* BK I 21d 22a BK IX 291b-c
6 Thucydides *Peloponnesian War* BK IV 462a b
7 Plato *Laws* BK IV 679a-c
12 Aurelius *Meditations* BK V SECT 8 269d 270b
13 Virgil *Aeneid* BK I [254-296] 110a 111a
14 Plutarch *Romulus* 18d 20b c / *Camillus* 109c 110a / *Coriolanus* 188d 192b / *Timoleon* 195a 213d esp 201a 203b / *Philopoemen* 300b c / *Demosthenes* 698b 699a / *Marcus Brutus* 814d 815c 822a b
15 Tacitus *Annals* BK III 49c BK IV 69a b BK VI 91b d / *Histories* BK I 194b BK II 232d 233a
18 Augustine *City of God* BK V CH I 207d 208c CH 11-26 216c 230a c
21 Dante *Divine Comedy* HELL VII [61-96] 10b-c PURGATORY XVI [52 129] 77b 78a
23 Machiavelli *Prince* CH VI 8d 9b CH XXV 35a 36b
26 Shakespeare *Julius Caesar* ACT IV SC III [215-224] 590d
40 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 609b c 630b
41 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 590a b
46 Hegel *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 340 110b-c par 342 345 110c 111b par 348 111d / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 153a 190b esp 156d 158a 158c 160b 161d 162a 166b-168b 1 0d 172b 178a 179c 203a 206a c PART I 258b d PART II 283d 284a c PART III 285a b 300a 301c
47 Goethe *Faust* PART II [10 849-872] 264a b
50 Marx *Capital* 6d 7b-c 10b 11b 174a-c 378b-d
50 Marx Engels *Communist Manifesto* 421d 422c passim
51 Tolstoy *War and Peace* BK III 143a-c BK IX 342a 344b BK X 389a 391c BK XIII 563a b BK XV 618b 621b 626d 630a EPILOGUE I 645a 650c EPILOGUE II 675a 696d

(4 *The philosophy of history* 4b *The laws and patterns of historical change cycles progress evolution*)

15 Tacitus *Annals* bk iii 51b 52b 58b d
18 Augustine *City of God* bk x ch 14 307c 308a bk xi ch 18 331d 332a bk xv-xviii 397b d 507a c bk xxii ch 30 618c d
20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i-ii q 97 a 1 ans 236a d
21 Dante *Divine Comedy* hell vii [67-96] 10b c xiv [94-120] 20c d
25 Montaigne *Essays* 439c 440b 443a b 465a c
26 Shakespeare *2nd Henry IV* act iii sc i [45-91] 483b c / *Julius Caesar* act iv sc iii [218-224] 590d
36 Swift *Gulliver* part ii 79a 80a part iii 121a b
40 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 544d 545d 632a 634a c
41 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 62c d 349a
42 Kant *Judgement* 584d 587a
43 Mill *Liberty* 300d 301c
46 Hegel *Philosophy of Right* part iii par 340 110b c par 344 111a par 347 111b c par 354-360 112c 114a c / *Philosophy of History* intro 161a c 174d 175c 178a 179c 187a c 203b 206a c part i 235d 236a 258b d part ii 259c d 282d 284a c part iii 286c 287a 308a b part iv 315b 317d 342d 343a
49 Darwin *Descent of Man* 323a 327a 330a c esp 327b
50 Marx *Capital* 10b 11d 377c 378d
50 Marx Engels *Communist Manifesto* 416c d
51 Tolstoy *War and Peace* bk xi 469a 472b epilogue i 645a 650c epilogue ii 675a 696d
54 Freud *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 651d 652d / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 781a 789b esp 785c 799a 802a c / *New Introductory Lectures* 834c 882c 883a 883c

4c The spirit of the time as conditioning the politics and culture of a period

33 Pascal *Pensees* 354 234b
38 Rousseau *Inequality* 362a d
46 Hegel *Philosophy of Right* pref 6c 7a intro par 3 10a 12c part iii par 218 72c d / *Philosophy of History* intro 173a 175c 177c 178a 182d 183a 185a 186d 187d 189a part i 211a 219d esp 219c d 219d 235c esp 220b 221a 222a 223a 233b 235c 247b 257c part ii 259d 260c 263d 281b part iii 286c 298a
47 Goethe *Faust* part i [570 580] 16a
51 Tolstoy *War and Peace* epilogue i 645a 646c
52 Dostoevsky *Brothers Karamazov* bk xi 345a-c

5 The theology of history

5a The relation of the gods or God to human history the dispensations of providence

Old Testament *Genesis* 3 6-9 passim 16 17 21 1-24 22 1-18 esp 22 15-18 28 11 16 35 9-13 45 1-13 46 1-4 / *Exodus* 3 20 passim 23 20-33 / *Deuteronomy* 4 1 40 7-11 passim 29 / *Joshua* 6 1 20 10 -4 1 25—(D) *Josue* 6 1 20 10 24 1 25 / *I Samuel* 12 6 25—(D) *I Kings* 12 6 25 / *Nehemiah* 9 1-10 29—(D) *II Esdras* 9 1 10 29 / *Psalms* 44 1-3 78 81 105 106 136 esp 136 10-24 —(D) *Psalms* 43 1 4 77 80 104 105 135 esp 135 10 24 / *Jeremiah* 43 8-13 44 30 46—(D) *Jeremias* 43 8 13 44 30 46
Apocrypha *Judith* passim esp 5-6 8 16—(D) OT *Judith* passim esp 5-6 8-16
New Testament *Romans* 1-11 / *I Corinthians* 15 19-55 / *Galatians* 3 4 / *II Thessalonians* 1 7 2 14 / *Hebrews* passim / *II Peter* 3 3 13 / *Revelation*—(D) *Apocalypse*
5 Aeschylus *Persians* 15a 26d esp [737-908] 23a 24d / *Prometheus Bound* 40a 51d esp [436-502] 44c 45a
6 Herodotus *History* bk i 21d 22a bk vi 204b c bk vii 214d 220b esp 218b 220b 237a b 238d 239a 250b d bk viii 273b c bk ix 309d 310a
7 Plato *Protagoras* 44a 45a / *Symposium* 157b 159b / *Republic* bk vi 378a b / *Critias* 478a-485d / *Statesman* 587a 589c / *Laws* bk iv 679a b 682d 683d bk x 765d 768d
12 Epictetus *Discourses* bk iii ch 22 195a 201a bk iv ch 1 213a 223d ch 3 224b d ch 7 232c 235a
12 Aurelius *Meditations* bk ii sect 11 258a b bk iii sect 11 262a b bk vi sect 44 278b-c
13 Virgil *Aeneid* 103a 379a
14 Plutarch *Romulus* 18d 28b 29c / *Numa Pompilius* 50d 51c / *Camillus* 107b d / *Coriolanus* 188d 192b / *Sulla* 372a c / *Demosthenes* 698a 699a / *Marcus Brutus* 822a b
15 Tacitus *Histories* bk i 189b 190a
18 Augustine *Confessions* bk xiii par 49-51 124a d / *City of God* bk i pref 129a d ch 36 149c d bk ii ch 2-3 150c 151c bk iv ch 33 34 206c 207a c bk v ch 11 26 216c 230a c bk x ch 14 307c 308a bk xi ch 1 322b d 323a ch 18 331d 332a bk xii ch 21 357a b bk xv ch 1 397b d 398c ch 21-22 415b-416c bk xvii ch 1 3 449a-451c bk xviii ch 1 2 472b d-473d bk xxii ch 30 618c d
19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 73 a 1 rep 1 370a 371a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II, Q 98, A 6 244c-245b; Q 105, AA 3-4 323a-325c; PART II-II, Q 1, A 7 385c-387; PART III, Q 1, A 5-6 707-709c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy*, HELL, II [13-27] 2d; VII [61-96] 10b-c; PURGATORY, XVI [52-129] 77b-78a; XXIX 97d-99b; XXXII [3]-XXXIII [15] 102d-105a; PARADISE, VI [1-111] 113c-114d; VIII [91-148] 117d-118c; X [8-39] 122b; XI [37-45] 124a; XVIII [52]-XX [148] 134a-138b passim; XXX [124]-XXXII [138] 153a-156a

23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince*, CH XXVI 36b-37a

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 306a-d

26 SHAKESPEARE *Richard III* 105a-148a,c esp ACT V, SC III 143b-147d

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 19b-d; 35b; 37c-38a / *Novum Organum*, BK I, APH 93 125d-126a

31 SPINOZA *Ethics*, PART I, APPENDIX 369b-372d

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* 93a-333a esp BK I [1-26] 93b-94a, BK III [80-134] 137a-138a, BK V [224-245] 180a-b, [519-543] 186b-187a, BK VI [169-188] 200a, BK VII [139-173] 220a-221a, BK X [1-62] 274b-275a, [616-640] 288a-b, [770-844] 290a-291b, BK XI [334]-BK XII [605] 306b-332a / *Samson Agonistes* [60-67] 340b-341a, [300-325] 346a-b, [373-419] 347b-348b, [667-709] 354a-355a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 619-641 282b-283a; 693-736 284b-317b esp 653 292b, 699 302b

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 292d-293b

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right*, PART III, par 343 110d-111a / *Philosophy of History*, INTRO, 156c-160b; PART III, 303c-309d; PART IV, 321b-d; 368d-369a,c

48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 8a

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace*, BK IX, 343b-c; EPILOGUE II, 675a-677b; 680b-c; 684b-d

5*b*. The city of God and the city of man, church and state

OLD TESTAMENT: *Psalms* 46:4; 48:1-8; 72:8-11; 87:3; 137:5-6; 147:2—(D) *Psalms* 45:5; 47:2,9; 121:3-4; 86:3; 100:3; 136:1 / *Isaiah* 60:14—(D) *Isaias* 60:14 / *Daniel* 2:44; 4:3,34; 7:14—(D) *Daniel* 2:44; 3:100; 4:31,34

APOCRYPHA: *Wisdom of Solomon* 6:1-4—(D) OT, *Book of Wisdom* 6:3-5

NEW TESTAMENT: *Matthew* 6:33; 17:24-27; 22:15-22—(D) *Matthew* 6:33; 17:23-26; 22:15-22 / *Mark* 12:13-17 / *Luke* 12:31; 20:21-26 / *John* 18:33-37 / *Acts* 5:29 / *Romans* 13:1-8 / *I Corinthians* 15:24-25 / *Ephesians* 2:19 / *Colossians* 1:12-13 / *I Timothy* 2:1-3 / *Titus* 3:1 / *I Peter* 2:13-17

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12 AURELIUS *Meditations*, BK III, SECT 11 262a-b; BK IV, SECT 23 265c

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God*, BK I, PREF 129a-d; CH 35 149b-c; BK IV, CH 33-34 206c-207a,c; BK V, CH 15-16 220d-221b; CH 25 228b-c; BK XI, CH 1 322b,d-323a; BK XIV, CH 28-BK XV, CH 5 397a-400c; BK XV, CH 21-22 415b-416c; BK XVII, CH 1-3 449a-451c; BK XVIII, CH 1-2 472b,d-473d; BK XIX, CH 5 513d-514b; CH 11 516d-517b; CH 14 520a-d; CH 17 522b-523a; CH 19-26 523b-529a / *Christian Doctrine*, BK I, CH 10 627b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy*, HELL, II [10-30] 2d-3a; XIV [94-120] 20c-d; XXXIV [61-68] 51d-52a; PURGATORY, VI [91-96] 61d; XIII [91-96] 72d; XVI [52-134] 77b-78b; XXIX 97d-99b; XXXII [3]-XXXIII [78] 102d-105a; PARADISE, VI [1-111] 113c-114d; XVIII [52]-XX [148] 134a-138b passim; XXX [124]-XXXII [138] 153a-156a

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38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract*, BK IV, 435a-439c esp 437c-438c

42 KANT *Science of Right* 443c-d; 444a-c / *Judgement* 509d-510a

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The educational significance of history or of historical examples *see* EDUCATION 4d VIRTUE AND VICE 4d(4)

Other discussions of the logic or method of historical research *see* LOGIC 4c REASONING 6d

The theory of historical causation *see* CAUSE 8 and for the factors of chance and fate freedom and necessity *see* CHANCE 6b FATE 6 LIBERTY 6a NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 5f PROGRESS 1a WILL 7b

The idea of progress in the philosophy of history *see* EVOLUTION 7c PROGRESS 1–1c and for a cyclical theory of history *see* LABOR 1a MAN 9a PROGRESS 1c

Other discussions of a materialist philosophy of history *see* DIALECTIC 2d LABOR 7c–7c(3) MATTER 6 OPPOSITION 5b PROGRESS 1a WAR AND PEACE 2c WEALTH 11

Other considerations of history as a dialectical process in the development of Spirit *see* DIALECTIC 2d–2d(2) LIBERTY 6a MIND 10f–10f(2) PROGRESS 4b

The role of the great man or hero in history *see* HONOR 5d

The historian or philosopher of history as a prophet *see* FATE 6

Other expressions of historical relativism *see* CUSTOM AND CONVENTION 9–9b RELATION 6–6c UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 7–7c

Divine providence in relation to the events of history and to the issue of necessity and freedom in history *see* FATE 4 GOD 7b LIBERTY 5a–5b WILL 7b

Other discussions of the city of God and the city of man or of the issue of church and state *see* RELIGION 4 STATE 2g

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection
II Works by authors not represented in this collection

For the date place and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

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Chapter 35 HONOR

INTRODUCTION

THE notions of honor and fame are sometimes used as if their meanings were interchangeable and sometimes as if each had a distinct connotation In the tradition of the great books both usages will be found It is seldom just a matter of words The authors who see no difference between a man s honor and his fame are opposed on fundamental issues of morality to those who think the standards of honor are independent of the causes of fame This opposition will usually extend to psychological issues concerning human motivation and to political issues concerning power and justice It entails contrary views of the role of rewards and punishments in the life of the individual and of society

Praise and blame seem to be common elements in the significance of fame and honor The meaning of honor seems to involve in addition the notion of worth or dignity But whether a man is virtuous or not whether he *deserves* the good opinion of his fellow men does not seem to be the indispensable condition on which his fame or infamy rests Nor does his good or ill repute in the community necessarily signify that he is a man of honor or an honorable man

The connection and distinction of these terms would therefore appear to be the initial problem of this chapter Any solution of the problem must consider the relation of the individual to the community and the standards by which the individual is appraised—by himself and his fellow men Honor and fame both seem to imply public approval but the question is whether both presuppose the same causes or the same occasions for social esteem

The manifestation of the value we set on one another writes Hobbes is that which is commonly called Honoring and Dishonoring To value a man at a high rate is to *honor* him at a low rate is to *dishonor* him But high and low in this case is to be understood by comparison to the rate that each man setteth on himself Does Hobbes mean that the value a man sets on himself is the true standard of his worth? Apparently not Let men he says rate themselves at the highest value they can yet their true value is no more than it is esteemed by others What then is the measure of such esteem? The *value* or worth of a man answers Hobbes is as of all other things his price that is to say so much as would be given for the use of his power and therefore is not absolute but a thing dependent on the need and judgment of another

Here then honor is not what a man has in himself but what he receives from others Honor is paid him He may think himself dishonored if others do not pay him the respect which accords with his self respect but their evaluation of him is somehow independent of the standard by which he measures himself It depends on the relation in which he stands to them in terms of his power and their need Virtue and duty—considerations of good and evil right and wrong—do not enter into this conception of honor The distinction between honor and fame tends to disappear when honor reflects the opinion of the community based on the political utility rather than the moral worth of a man

THERE IS ANOTHER conception of honor which not only separates it from fame but also makes it independent of public approbation This is not an unfamiliar meaning of the term The man who says on my honor or my word of honor may not be an honest man but if he is he pledges himself by these expressions to fulfill a promise or to live up to certain expectations He is saying that he needs no ex

ternal check or sanction A man who had to be compelled by threat or force to honor his obligations would not be acting from a sense of honor

It is not for outward show that the soul is to play its part Montaigne writes, but for ourselves within where no eyes can pierce but our own there she defends us from the fear of death of pain of shame itself there she arms us against the loss of our children friends and fortunes and when opportunity presents itself she leads us on to the hazards of war 'Not for any profit but for the honor of honesty itself

A sense of honor thus seems to function like a sense of duty Both reflect the light of conscience Both operate through an inner determination of the will to do what reason judges to be right in the particular case If there is a difference between them it is not so much in their effects as in their causes

Duty usually involves obligations to others but a man s sense of honor may lead him to act in a certain way though the good of no other is involved To maintain his self respect he must respect a standard of conduct wh ch he has set for himself Accordingly a man can be ashamed of himself for doing or thinking what neither injures anyone else nor ever comes to the notice of others A sense of shame—the reflex of his sense of honor—torments him for having fallen short of his own ideal for bein d sloyal to his own concept ons of what is good or right and his shame may be even more intense in proportion as the standard he has iolated is not one shared by others, but s his own measure of what a man should be or do

Dmitri Karamazov exhibits these mixed feel ngs of honor and shame when he declares at the preliminary legal investigation You have to deal with a man of honor a man of the highest honor above all—don t lose si ht of it—a man who s done a lot of nasty things but has always been and still is, honorable at bottom in h s inner being That s just what s made me wretched all my life that I yearned to be honorable that I was so to say a martyr to a sense of honor seeking for it with a lantern with the lantern of Diogenes, and yet all my lif I ve been doing filthy things "

The sense of honor and the sense of duty differ in still another respect Duty presupposes law The essence of law is its universality A sense of duty therefore leads a man to do what is expected of him but not of him alone for he is no different from others in relation to what the law commands In contrast a sense of honor presupposes *self consciousness* of virtue in the individual It binds him in conscience to live up to the image of his own character insofar as it has lineaments which seem admirable to him

Without some self respect a man can have no sense of honor In the great tragic poems the hero who dishonors himself in his own eyes dies spiritually with the loss of his self respect To live on in the flesh thereafter would be almost a worse fate than the physical demise which usually symbolizes the tragic ending

THE SENSE IN WHICH a man can honor or dishonor himself is closely akin to the sense in which he can be honored or dishonored by others Both involve a recognition of virtue or its violation But they differ in this that a man s personal honor is an internal consequence of virtue and inseparable from it whereas public honor bestowed upon a man is an external reward of virtue It is not always won by those who deserve it When it is it is given to a man as Aquinas points out on account of some excellence in him and is a sign and testimony of the excellence that is in the person honored

There can be no separation between what a community considers honorable and what it considers virtuous or excellent in mind or character But it does not necessarily follow that the man who is actually virtuous will always receive the honor which is due him Public honor can be misplaced——either undeservedly g ven or unjustly withheld The virtuous should be prepared for this in the judgment of Aquinas since honor is not the reward for which the virtuous work but they receive honor from men by way of reward *as from those who have nothing greater to offer* Happiness he goes on to say is the true reward for which the virtuous work for if they worked for honor it would no longer be virtue but ambition.

Tolstoy however deplores the injustice of the honor given Napoleon and the dishonor in which Kutuzov was held Napoleon he writes that most insignificant tool of history who never anywhere even in exile showed human dignity—Napoleon is the object of adulation and enthusiasm he *is grand* But Kutuzov—the man who from the beginning to the end of his activity in 1812 never once swerving by word or deed from *Borodino to Vilna presented an example exceptional in* history of self sacrifice and a present conscious ness of the future importance of what was hap pening—Kutuzov *seems to them something* indefinite and pitiful and when speaking of him and of the year 1812 they always seem a *little ashamed*

Kutuzov later received some measure of honor when he was presented with the rarely awarded *Order of St George* But what is per haps a much higher honor came to him after his death when Tolstoy enshrined him as one of the heroes of *War and Peace* Sometimes the virtuous or truly honorable man living in a bad society goes without honor in his own time to be honored only by posterity He may even be dishonored by a society which has contempt for virtue Sometimes a man of indifferent char acter and achievement or even one who is actually base and ignoble wins honor through cleverly simulating the possession of admirable traits

It seems appropriate to consider the propor tion between a man s intrinsic worth and the honor he receives The distribution of honors raises questions of justice—in fact it is thought to be one of the chief problems of distributive justice For those who hold that honor and fame are utterly distinct in principle this is the clear mark of their difference Justice does not require that fame be proportionate to vir tue Though there is a sense in which fame may not be deserved the qualities in a person which justify fame are of a different order from those which honor should reward Fame belongs to the great the outstanding the exceptional without regard to virtue or vice Infamy is fame no less than good repute The great scoun drel can be as famous as the great hero Existing in the reputation a man has regardless of his character or accomplishments fame does not tarnish as honor does when it is unmerited But for the same reason fame is often lost as fortuitously as it is acquired Fame has no stability Aquinas observes it is easily ruined by false report And if it sometimes endures, this is by accident

The distinction between honor and fame is not acknowledged by those who ignore merit as a condition of praise Machiavelli for ex ample places fame—or as he sometimes calls it glory—in that triad of worldly goods which men want without limit and without relation to justice If the aim of life is to get ahead in the world money fame and power are the chief marks of success A man is deemed no less successful if he acquires power by usurping it or gains it by foul means rather than fair so too if he becomes famous through chicanery or deception and counterfeits whatever form of greatness men are prone to praise

Along with riches fame says Machiavelli is the end which every man has before him This men seek to obtain by various methods one with caution another with haste one by force another by skill one by patience another by its opposite and each one succeeds in reaching the goal by a different method Some methods he admits in another place may gain empire but not glory such as to slay fellow citizens to deceive friends to be without faith without mercy without reli gion Nevertheless he declares Let a prince have the credit of conquering and holding a state the means will always be considered hon est and he will be praised by everybody

Because fame seems to be morally neutral it replaces honor in the discussions of those who measure men in terms of success instead of vir tue duty or happiness Because it is morally neutral it is the term used by those who wish to judge not men but the impression they make What counts is the magnitude of that impression not its correspondence with reality

To be famous is to be widely not necessarily well spoken of by one s fellow men now or hereafter The man who stands above the herd whose outlines are clear and whose deeds are memorable takes his place among the famous of his time or of all times. Plutarch the moralist certainly does not regard the men whose lives

he writes as paragons of virtue On the contrary he plainly indicates that many of them are examples of extraordinary depravity But Plutarch the biographer treats them all as famous. He takes that as a matter of historic fact not of moral judgement Good or bad they were acknowledged to be great men leaders, figures of eminent proportions, engaged in momentous exploits. They were not all victorious. Few if any were successful in all that they attempted or were able to preserve what successes they achieved. But each ventured beyond the pale of ordinary men and each succeeded at least in becoming a symbol of great deeds, a monument in human memory

The opposite of fame is anonymity In Dante's moral universe, only the Trimmers on the rim of *Hell* are totally anonymous neither good nor bad they lack name and fame. Because they lived without infamy and without praise Hell will not receive them for the damned would have some boast of them. To them alone no fame can be allowed Honor and glory belong only to the blessed but the damned in the pits of Hell by the record they left for men to revile are as well remembered, and hence as famous, as the saints in Heaven.

THAT MEN NORMALLY desire the esteem of their fellow men seems to be undisputed "He *must* be of a strange and unusual constitution" Locke writes, "who can content himself to live in constant disgrace and disrepute with his own particular society Solitude many men have sought and been reconciled to but nobody that has the least thought or sense of a man about him, can live in society under the constant dislike and ill opinion of his familiars, and those he converses with This is a burden too heavy for human sufferance."

A society of misanthropes, despising each other is as unthinkable as an *economy of* misers. The social nature of man requires sympathy and fellow feeling love and friendship and all of these involve some measure of approval based on knowledge or understanding According to one theory the highest type of friendship springs from mutual *admiration*, the respect which *men* have for one another The old saying that "*there is honor among thieves*" suggests that even among bad men there is a desire to hold the approbation of those who share a common life With this in mind apparently William James describes fame and honor as a man's "image in the eyes of his own set" which exalts or condemns him as he conforms or not to certain requirements that may not be made of one in another walk of life

Though Pascal regards "the pursuit of glory" as "the greatest baseness of man" he must admit that "it is also the greatest mark of his excellence for whatever possessions he may have on earth whatever health and essential comfort he is not satisfied if he has not the esteem of men He values human reason so highly that whatever advantages he may have on earth he is not content if he is not also ranked highly in the judgment of man ... Those who most despise men and put them on a level with brutes, yet wish to be admired and believed by men and contradict themselves by their own feelings."

But is this universal wish for the esteem of others a desire for honor or a desire for fame? Does it make any difference to our conception of happiness whether we say that men cannot be happy without honor or that they *cannot* be happy unless they are famous?

Even those who do not distinguish between honor and fame are led by these questions to discriminate between fame and *infamy* As we have already noted fame and infamy are alike since both involve the notoriety enjoyed by the outstanding the exceptional, the great whether good or bad If what men desire is simply to be known by others *and to* have a kind of immortality through living on in the memory of later generations then evil will serve as well as good repute All that *matters is* the size of the *reputation* and its vitality But if the desire is for approbation or praise, good opinion alone will satisfy *and then* the question becomes whether the object is fame or honor Which does Iago have in mind *when he says*, "*Good* name in man and woman dear my Lord is the immediate jewel of their souls"?

Opposite answers seem to be determined by opposite views of human nature and human happiness. Those who, like Plato think that virtue is an indispensable ingredient of happiness, include honor among the good things

which the virtuous man will seek in the right way Possession of good things by itself is not sufficient Socrates says in the *Euthydemus* A man must also use them and use them well for the wrong use of a thing is far worse than the non use Applied to honor this would seem to mean that the virtuous man will not seek praise for the wrong reasons—either for that which is not praiseworthy in himself or from others whose lack of virtue disqualifies them from giving praise with honesty The virtuous man will not seek fame or be unhappy lacking it for fame like pleasure or wealth can be enjoyed by bad men as well as good and be sought for wrong as well as right reasons or in the wrong as well as the right way Virtue according to the moralists protects a man from the seductions of money fame and power—the things for which men undisciplined by virtue seem to have an inordinate desire

In the theory of virtue honor unlike fame belongs only to the good and is always a good object worthy of pursuit Honor is in fact the object of two virtues which Aristotle defines in the *Ethics* One of these virtues he calls ambition and the Greek name for the other which is literally rendered by high mindedness is sometimes translated by the English word magnanimity and sometimes by pride The Christian connotation of pride makes it a difficult word to use as the name for a virtue but it can nevertheless be so used when it is understood to mean a justifiable degree of self respect—not conceit but a middle ground between undue self esteem and inordinate self deprecation When the Aristotelian names for these two vices are translated in English by vanity and humility it is again necessary to point out that humility must be understood not in its Christian significance as meaning the virtue of the truly religious man but rather as signifying an exaggerated meekness or pusillanimity

The difference between pride and ambition lies in the magnitude of the other virtues they accompany and the scale of honor with which they are concerned Both are concerned with honor which Aristotle calls the greatest of external goods In both cases honor is the prize of virtue and it is to the good that it is rendered The proud man is one who being truly worthy of great things also thinks himself worthy of them for he who does so beyond his deserts is a fool but no virtuous man is foolish or silly The proud man will be pleased only by honors that are great and that are conferred by good men Honor from casual people and on trifling grounds he will utterly despise since it is not this that he deserves

Humility and vanity are according to Aristotle the vices of defect and excess which occur when a man fails to be proud The unduly humble man underestimating his worth does not seek the honor he deserves The vain man at the other extreme overestimates himself and wants honor out of proportion to his qualities Honor like any other external good may be desired more than is right or less or from the right sources and in the right way We blame both the over ambitious man as aiming at honor more than is right and from the wrong sources and the unambitious man as not willing to be honored even for noble reasons

However words are used the point seems to be clear It is possible for men to desire honor more than they should and less It is also possible for honor to be rightly desired Honor desired to excess or in the wrong way may be called fame even as the excessive desire for honor is sometimes regarded as the vice of ambition or an aspect of the sin of pride The word pride seems to have both a good and a bad connotation But the point remains that the difference between these two meanings of pride like the difference between honor and fame is understood by moralists in terms of virtue and it is discounted by those who reject the relevance of virtue

THOUGH HONOR MAY be regarded as inseparable from virtue in moral theory certain political philosophers make its separation from virtue the principle of a type of government

In Plato s *Republic* monarchy and aristocracy are defined in terms of the virtue of the rulers—either of the one wise man or of the excellent few Government by the few is oligarchy rather than aristocracy when wealth rather than virtue is the principle of their selection Plato sees the possibility of an intermediate between these two which occurs as a kind of transitional form when aristocracy

tends to degenerate into oligarchy. He calls that intermediate "timocracy" and describes it as "a mixture of good and evil" in which the ruler is "a lover of power and a lover of *honor*; claiming to be a ruler, not because he is eloquent, or on any ground of that sort, but because he is a soldier and has performed feats of arms." In such a state, he claims, "one thing, and one thing only, is predominantly seen—the spirit of contention and ambition; and these are due to the prevalence of the passionate or spirited element." In a timocracy, in other words, honor is divorced from virtue and wisdom and becomes the only qualification for public office.

With Montesquieu, the situation is quite reversed. For him, virtue is absolutely requisite in popular government or democracy and to a less extent in that other form of republic which he calls "aristocracy." As virtue is necessary in a republic, so is honor in a monarchy. Honor—that is, the prejudice of every person and rank—supplies the place of political virtue. "A monarchical government supposes pre-eminences and ranks, as likewise a noble descent. Since it is the nature of honor to aspire to preferments and titles, it properly placed in this government."

Though Montesquieu and Plato differ in their classification of the forms of government they seem to agree that honor divorced from virtue is a counterfeit. Honor identified with ranks and titles, honor which moves individuals to serve the public good *in order to promote* their own interests, Montesquieu admits is a false honor, "but even this false honor is as useful to the public as true honor could possibly be to private persons." Considering the laws of education characteristic of monarchical governments, Montesquieu points out that it is not in colleges or academies, but in the world itself which is the school of honor, that the subjects of monarchy are chiefly trained. "Here the actions of men are judged, not as virtuous, but as shining; not as just, but as great; not as reasonable, but extraordinary."

HEROISM IS DISCUSSED in the chapter on COURAGE, and the role of the hero—the leader or great man—in the chapter on HISTORY. Here we are concerned with the hero in the esteem of his fellow men, the symbol of human greatness and the object of human admiration.

Honor, fame, and glory combine in various proportions to constitute the heroic figures of classical antiquity: honor, to the extent that none is without some virtue and each possesses certain virtues at least to a remarkable degree; fame, because they are the great among men, outstanding and well known; godlike in their pre-eminence and glory almost in the theological sense, inasmuch as the heroes celebrated by Homer and Virgil are beloved by the gods.

It is not accidental that the central figure in the Greek tragedies is called a "hero," since in the ancient view the tragic character must necessarily belong to a great man, a man of noble proportions, one who is "better than the ordinary man," says Aristotle. If he also has some fault or flaw, it is a consequence of *strength* misused, not a mark of individual weakness. Such weakness as he has is the common frailty of man.

In the modern world heroism and the heroic are more difficult to identify or define. We tend to substitute the notion of genius in considering the exceptionally gifted among men. Glory is dimly recognized and honor takes second place to fame. That portion of modern poetry which deals in heroes—as, for example, the tragedies and historical plays of Shakespeare—borrows them from, or models them on, legendary figures. The great modern novels, counterparts of the epic poems of antiquity, portray exceptional men and women without idealizing them to heroic stature. One of these novels, Tolstoy's *War and Peace*, seeks to deflate the fame of great men. They do not deserve even their reputation for great deeds, much less the honor owed the truly great.

"If we assume as historians do that great men lead humanity to the attainment of certain ends ... then it is impossible," Tolstoy declares, "to explain the facts of history without introducing the conceptions of *chance* and *genius*." But in Tolstoy's opinion "the words *chance* and *genius* do not denote any really existing thing and therefore cannot be defined." We can dispense with these meaningless words, he thinks, if we are willing to renounce "our claim to discern a purpose immediately intelligible to us and admit "the ultimate purpose to be beyond

our ken Then not only shall we have no need to see exceptional ability in Napoleon and Alexander but we *shall* be unable to consider them to be anything but like ordinary men and we shall not be obliged to have recourse to *chance* for an explanation of those small events which made these people what they were but it will be clear that all those small events were inevitable

This view of history with its emphasis on *impersonal forces finds another expression in* Marxist theory The machine and the proletariat mass are the heroes of history or of the revolution Yet the modern period is not without an opposite strain of thought Machiavelli calls for a great man a hero to become the liberator of Italy who shall yet heal her wounds and put an end to the ravaging and plundering *of Lombardy to the swindling and taxing of the* kingdom and of Tuscany and cleanse those sores that for long have festered His maxims for the prince may be read not merely as advice for getting and holding power but as preparing for an heroic effort in which the prince s power and fame will be used for liberty The great man has the historic mission of a pioneer not the role of a puppet

Even in the Renaissance however Machiavelli is answered by Montaigne who prizes *moderation too much to praise heroism more* than a little Comparing Socrates and Alexander Montaigne places all of the latter s actions under the maxim Subdue the world whereas Socrates he says acts on the principle that it is wise to carry on human life conformably with its natural condition To Montaigne the virtue of the soul does not consist in flying high but in walking orderly its grandeur does not exercise itself in grandeur but in mediocrity

The mediaeval Christian conception of heroism centers on the practice of heroic virtue by which the theologian defines sanctity In the calendar of saints *there is every type of spiritual* excellence but all alike—martyrs virgins confessors doctors—are regarded as having with God s grace superhuman strength The saints not only perform acts of exemplary perfection they are godlike men in their exemption from the frailties of human flesh

The heroes of antiquity also wear an aspect of divinity but like *Achilles* each has a weakness in his armor Moreover the heroes of the *Iliad* the *Odyssey* and the *Aeneid* are men of overweening pride They are relentlessly jealous of their honor They strive not so much for victory as for the due meed of honor which is its fruit Nothing grieves them so much as to have *their deeds go unrequited by abundant* praise In the contribution made by this love of praise to the growth of the Roman empire Augustine sees the providential working of God In order that that empire might overcome the grievous evils which existed among other nations he writes God purposely granted it to such men as for the sake of honor and praise and glory consulted well for their country in whose glory they sought their own and whose safety they did not hesitate to prefer *to their own suppressing the desire of wealth* and many other vices for this one vice namely the love of praise

To Augustine however this glory found in human praise is far removed from the true glory *It is* in fact a sin So hostile is this vice to pious faith he writes if the love of glory be greater in the heart than the fear or love of God that the Lord said How can ye believe who look for glory from one another and do not seek the glory which is from God alone?

The Christian hero consequently seeks not his own glory but the glory of God and in contrast to the pagan hero he is great not in pride but in humility His model is seen in the Apostles who according to Augustine amidst maledictions and reproaches and most grievous persecutions and cruel punishments were not deterred from the preaching of human salvation And when great glory followed them in the church of Christ they did not rest in that as in the end of their virtue but referred that glory itself to the glory of God For their Master had taught them not to seek to be good for the sake of human glory saying Take heed that ye do not your righteousness before men to be seen of them but Let your works shine before men that they may see *your good deeds and glorify your Father who* is in heaven

The word glory in its theological connotation thus has a meaning distinct from and even opposed to the sense in which it is sometimes

used as a synonym for "fame." In the liturgy of the church, the psalms and hymns (especially those of the doxology which sing the *gloria Patri* and the *gloria in excelsis Deo*) render unto God the homage which is due His infinite goodness, the reflexive splendor of which is the divine glory. As in the strict moral sense honor on the human plane is due to virtue alone, so in a strict theological sense glory belongs only to God.

Strictly, God's glory cannot be increased by human recognition. Yet every act of religious devotion is said to redound to the greater glory of God and to diffuse His glory among creatures through the divinity they acquire when they love God and are beloved by Him. God is "all fullness in Himself and the height of all perfection," nevertheless, Montaigne writes, "His name may be augmented and increased by the blessing and praise we attribute to His exterior works."

According to Dante "the glory of Him who moves everything, penetrates through the universe and is resplendent in one part more and in another less." In his journey through Paradise he beholds the saints whom God loves especially, each with a distinct degree of glory according to the proximity with which he approaches the presence of God. Their halos and aureoles, in the imagery of Christian art, are the symbols of the glory in which they are bathed as in reflected light.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to For example, in **4** Homer *Iliad* BK II [265 283] **12d** the number **4** is the number of the volume in the set the number **12d** indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12

Page Sections When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page For example in **53** James *Psychology* **116a** **119b** the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119 When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page For example in **7** Plato *Symposium* **163b** **164c** the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164

Author s Divisions One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases *e g* *Iliad* BK II [265 283] **12d**

Bible References The references are to book chapter and verse When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a *(D)* follows *e g* Old Testament *Nehemiah* 7 45—*(D) II Esdras* 7 46

Symbols The abbreviation esp calls the reader s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface

1 The relation of honor and fame praise and reputation

4 Homer *Iliad* BK I **3a** **9a c**

5 Euripides *Andromache* [319-332] **318a** [693-705] **321a b** / *Hecuba* [251-257] **355a** [623-628] **358a** / *Heracles Mad* [140-205] **366b d**

6 Thucydides *Peloponnesian War* BK II **395d** **396a**

7 Plato *Protagoras* **52a b** / *Laws* BK VII **788d** **789a**

8 Aristotle *Topics* BK II CH II [115^b29-35] **162a c** BK VI CH 8 [146^b20-24] **200c**

9 Aristotle *Ethics* BK I CH 5 [1095^b22-30] **340d** **341a** BK IV CH 3-4 **370b** **372d** BK VIII CH 8 [1159 13-26] **411b** / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 9 **608c** **611c**

12 Aurelius *Meditations* BK VI SECT 16 **275b d** SECT 51 **279b-c** BK IX SECT 30 **294b c**

13 Virgil *Aeneid* BK I [441-493] **115a** **116b**

14 Plutarch *Marcellus Pelopidas* **262d** / *Aristides* **265c d** / *Marcus Cato* **282a** / *Agis* **648b d** **649a** / *Demetrius* **737b d**

15 Tacitus *Annals* BK IV **73b d**

18 Augustine *Confessions* BK IV par 21 23 **24c** **25a** / *City of God* BK V CH 12 20 **216d** **226a**

19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 2 AA 2 3 **616d** **618a**

22 Chaucer *Troilus and Cressida* BK II STANZA 25-27 **24b** **25a** STANZA 53-55 **28b** STANZA 100-115 **34b** **36b** STANZA 162 163 **42b-43a** BK III STANZA 22-25 **57b** STANZA 36-50 **59a** **61a** / *Knight s Tale* [3041-3056] **210a**

23 Machiavelli *Prince* CH VIII **13b-c**

23 Hobbes *Leviathan* PART I **71d** **76b** esp **73b c** **76b** PART II **146d**

25 Montaigne *Essays* **126b** **127c** **300c** **307a** **390a** **391c** **411a d** **445c** **446a** **450c-453c** **462b c** **494b d** **496c d**

26 Shakespeare *Love s Labour s Lost* ACT IV SC I [1-40] **264b d** / *Richard II* ACT I SC I [165-185] **322b-c**

27 Shakespeare *Troilus and Cressida* ACT III SC III [38 241] **122d** **125a** / *Othello* ACT II SC III [262 277] **219d** ACT III SC III [155 161] **223d** / *Cymbeline* ACT III SC IV **466d** **468d** / *Henry VIII* ACT III SC II [350-458] **572c** **573d** / *Sonnets* LXIX LXX **596d** **597a** CXXI **604d**

29 Cervantes *Don Quixote* PART II **203a b** **222b c** **227d** **228d**

30 Bacon *Advancement of Learning* **91d** **92b**

31 Spinoza *Ethics* PART III PROP 29 **405b** PROP 53 COROL **413a** PART IV PROP 58 SCHOL **441d-442a**

32 Milton *Samson Agonistes* [960-996] **360b** **361a**

33 PASCAL *Pensees* 147 159 200b 202a 333 232b 400-401 240b 241a 404 241a
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 119a 121b
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 223d 224b
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK III 11c 12a BK IV 13b d 15a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 360a 362d passim esp 362b-d / *Social Contract* BK IV 434b 435a
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 412b-d
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 310c d 312a 313a passim
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK III 146d 147c BK I 170d 171c BK V 204a b 214d 215a BK VI 241c 242b 247a-c 250c BK VIII 304c BK XV 619c-621b
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK X 273a d
53 JAMES *Psychology* 189b-191a

2 Honor and fame in the life of the individual

2a The sense of honor and of shame loyalty to the good

4 HOMER *Iliad* BK I [1-510] 3a 8b BK III 19 23d BK IV [326-418] 27b 28a BK V [520-532] 35c BK VI [312 338] 43b-d [440-465] 44c d BK IX 57a 64 c esp [96-114] 58a b [307 429] 60b 61c [606-619] 63b BK XII [290-328] 85b-c BK XXII [99 130] 156b-c [289-305] 158b
5 SOPHOCLES *Ajax* [430-480] 146d 147b / *Philoctetes* 182a 195a c esp [50-122] 182d 183b
5 EURIPIDES *Hippolytus* [373 430] 228b-d / *Heracleidae* [11] 248a [484-596] 252 253b / *Suppliants* [857-917] 266a b / *Helen* [838-854] 306b-c / *Hecuba* [342 383] 355d 356a / *Heracles Mad* [275 311] 367c d / *Phoenician Maidens* [991 1018] 387a b
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK VI 187b-188d BK VII 225d 226b 228a-c 255b-259a BK IX 304d 305c
7 PLATO *Symposium* 152b-d 154d 155a / *Apology* 205d 206a / *Laws* BK I 651a 652 BK V 686d 688a BK VII 730d 731d BK XII 788d 789a / *Seventh Letter* 802 -803
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK IV CH 3 4 370b 372d CH 9 375d-376a BK X CH 9 [1179^{b}4 180 11] 434b-d / *Rhetoric* BK II CH 6 629d 631
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 5 110b-c
13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK IV [1 30] 167a b BK X [656-688] 320a-321
14 PLUTARCH *Aristides* 264a d
15 TACITUS *Annals* BK I 11a b BK III, 58a 1 92c BK XVI 180d 183a 183d 184a / *Histories* BK IV 266d 267b-268a 289d 290a
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions*, BK II par 9 10d 11a par 16-17 12c 13a BK VI par 18 30 57d 61c / *City of God* BK V CH I 216d 219b
22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida* BK I STANZA 53-59 28b-29a STANZA 100 115 34b 36b STANZA 161 163 42b-43a BK III STANZA 22 25 57b STANZA 36-50 59a-61a / *Prologue* [43 78] 159b-160a / *Knight's Tale* [859-1004] 174a 176b [3041 3056] 210a / *Franklin's Tale* [11 667-928] 361b-366a / *Physician's Tale* 366a-371a esp [12 137 191] 369b-370b
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 65c d
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 13d 14c 16a d 174d 176a 300c 307a 386a 388c
26 SHAKESPEARE *Richard II* ACT I SC I [165 185] 322b-c / *2nd Henry IV* ACT IV SC V [21 47] 494c-d / *Much Ado About Nothing* ACT IV SC I 520b-523d / *Henry V* ACT IV SC VII [124]-C VIII [77] 560a 561b
27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT IV SC IV [53-66] 59b-c / *Troilus and Cressida* ACT II SC II 113c 115d / *Measure for Measure* ACT II SC IV [87 187] 185c 186c ACT III SC I [133 1 6] 188b-c / *Antony and Cleopatra* ACT II SC VII [61-9] 326a-c / *Cymbeline* ACT I SC I [55 169] 450 -451c / *Winter's Tale* ACT III SC II [9 117] 502b-c
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 32c 34d 57d 58a 81b-84c 123a b 147b-d PART II 203a b 222c 227d 228d 254d 255a 290a d
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 58 SCH L 441d-442a
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 630 287b
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 36a 38b esp 38a b 146b-147a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 69 30c-d PART III par 207 69b-c par 244 7 c par 253 79a-c ADDITIONS 130 137c d 149 140d 141a / *Philosophy of History* PART I 214d 215a PART IV 320c 334b-c
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 310d 314b esp 310d 312 313a 322b-c
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK II 102b-d BK IV 173d 179 esp 177d 178a BK VII 281a d 291 292b 301b-302d BK VIII 321d 323b 333b-334c 336b-337d BK IX 365d 366a BK XI 527b-528b EPILOGUE I 650d-652a
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK II 41a b BK III 54b-58a BK VI 153d 157b BK IX 245 b 260 263a
53 JAMES *Psychology* 190a 191a 207a 208a

2b Honor as an object of desire and as a factor in virtue and happiness

OLD TESTAMENT *Esther* 5 9-14 / *Proverbs* 25 6 7
APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 7 4—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 7 4 / *I Maccabees* 3 4 9 10—(D) OT *I Machabees* 3 14 9 10
4 HOMER *Iliad* BK I [1-510] 3a 8b BK IX 57a 64 c esp [96- 14] 58a b [307 429] 60b 61 [606-619] 63b BK XII [290-328] 85b-c / *Odyssey* BK I [267 305] 185d 186a
5 AESCHYLUS *Seven Against Thebes* [683-684] 34c
5 SOPHOCLES *Philoctetes* [50- 22] 182d 183b [13 4 1347] 193d 194

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to For example, in 4 HOMER *Iliad* BK II [265 283] 12d the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119 When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half *of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164*

AUTHOR S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases *e g* *Iliad* BK II [265-283] 12d

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a *(D)* follows *e g* OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—*(D) II Esdras* 7 46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface

1 The relation of honor and fame praise and reputation

4 HOMER *Iliad* BK I 3a 9a c

5 EURIPIDES *Andromache* [319-332] 318a [693-705] 321a b / *Hecuba* [251-257] 355a [623-628] 358a / *Heracles Mad* [140-205] 366b d

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 395d 396a

7 PLATO *Protagoras* 52a b / *Laws* BK XII 788d 789a

8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK II CH II [115^b29 35] 162a c BK VI CH 8 [146^b20-24] 200c

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 5 [1095^b22-30] 340d 341a BK IV CH 3 4 370b 372d BK VIII CH 8 [1159 13-26] 411b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 9 608c 611c

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK VI SECT 16 275b d SECT 51 279b c BK IX SECT 30 294b c

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK I [441-493] 115a 116b

14 PLUTARCH *Marcellus Pelopidas* 262d / *Aristides* 265c d / *Marcus Cato* 282a / *Agis* 648b d 649a / *Demetrius* 737b d

15 TACITUS *Annals* BK IV 73b d

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK IV par 21 23 24c 25a / *City of God* BK V CH 12-20 216d 226a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 2 AA 2 3 616d 618a

22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida* BK II STANZA 25-27 24b 25a STANZA 53-55 28b STANZA 100-115 34b 36b STANZA 162 163 42b-43a BK III STANZA 22-25 57b STANZA 36-50 59a 61a / *Knight s Tale* [3041-3056] 210a

23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* CH VIII 13b-c

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 71d 76b esp 73b c 76b PART II 146d

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 126b 127c 300c 307a 390a 391c 411a d 445c 446a 450c-453c 462b c 494b d 496c d

26 SHAKESPEARE *Love s Labour s Lost* ACT IV SC I [1-40] 264b d / *Richard II* ACT I SC I [165-185] 322b c

27 SHAKESPEARE *Troilus and Cressida* ACT III SC III [38-241] 122d 125a / *Othello* ACT II SC III [262 277] 219d ACT III SC III [155 161] 223d / *Cymbeline* ACT III SC IV 466d-468d / *Henry VIII* ACT III SC II [350-458] 572c 573d / *Sonnets* LXIX LXX 596d 597a CXXI 604d

29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 203a b 222b c 227d 228d

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 91d 92b

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 29 405b PROP 53 COROL 413a PART IV PROP 58 SCHOL 441d-442a

32 MILTON *Samson Agonistes* [960-996] 360b 361a

43 F DERALIST NUMBER 57 177b-c NUMBER 72 217 -c
43 MILL Utilitaria ism 448d-449c
44 BOSWELL Johnson 128b 163d [fn 4] 479a-d 498c-499a
46 HEGEL Philo ophy of Right P RT I par 124 44b-d P RT I I par 207 69b-c par 253 79a-c
48 MELVILLE Moby Dick 45b-46a
49 D RWIN Descent of Ma 310c d 312a 317b esp 312 313b 322 -c 592d
51 TOLSTOY War a d Peace BK I 15d 16a BK III 146d 147c BK IV 177d 178a BK 214c 215a BK IX 365d 366a 370c 372a BK XIV 590d-604b
53 JAM S Psychology 189b-191a 198b-199b 203a 204b 207 b 208b

2c Honor as due self-esteem. magnanimity or proper pride

4 HOM R Iliad K XII [290-328] 85b-c
5 AE CHYLL Ag memnon [9 4-957] 61d-62b
6 THUCYDIDES P loponnesian War BK T 513a-d
7 PL TO Apology 208c 209b / Laws BK V 686d-689c
9 A STOTLE Ethics BK II CH 7 [1107b22-1108 1] 353b-c BK I CH 2 4 368d 372d esp CH 2 [1122 19-4] 369c CH 7 [1127b9-33] 374d 375a
12 E CTETUS Discourses BK I CH 19, 125c-d
12 AURELIUS Medi at s BK T SECT 16 275b-d
14 PL T CH Marcus Cato 283b-d / Cicero 706b-c 713b-c / Demosthenes Cicero 724c d
15 T CITUS Annals BK IV 73c d
18 AUGU TI E Co fessio s K X, par 59-65 86b-88b / City of God X XIV CH 13 387 388c
20 AQU S Summ Theol gic PART I II Q 60 5 A 53a 54d Q 66 A 4 REP 3 78c 79b
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25 MONTAIG E Essays 180c 181d 307a 320b passim, esp 307a-c 322b-323b 408b-409c 456c-d
27 SHAKE EARE Troil s and Cressida CT I SC III-III 113c 118c / Coriolanus 351a 392 c esp CT I SC IX 359c 360c CT II C 1 [71 64] 364d 366a SC II [44 16] 366b-367d CT SC I [39- 45] 374 375a, ACT IV SC VII [3-59] 384c-d
29 CE ANTES Don Q ixote P RT I 40b-c 57d 58a 123a b 177 b P T II 203a b
32 M LTON Paradise Lost BK VIII [56 -594] 244b-245a
33 PASCAL Pensées 100 191a 192b 147 159 200b-202a / Vacuum 361
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38 ROUSSE Ineq lity 362b-d
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43 FE R LI T NUM ER 70 212a

43 MILL Utilitarianism 448d-449c
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46 H GEL Ph osophy of History PART II 267c 268b
51 TOLSTOY War and Peace BK II 72d 74a 102b-d BK III 133b-c BK IV 173d 179a esp 177d 178a BK II 291a 292b 301b-302d BK VIII 321d 322d 335b-337d 338b-339c esp 339b-c BK IX 365d 366a BK X 442c 443b BK XI 498b-d 527b-528b BK XIII 569d 570a
52 DOSTOEVSKY Brothers Karamazov BK IV 104b-109a c BK V 110c 111c
53 JAMES Psychology 211a 212a
54 FREUD Narcissism 407b-409c passim / Ego a d Id, 707c

2d Honor or fame as a mode of immortality

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4 HOMER Iliad BK IX [307 429] 60b-61c BK XII [90-328] 85b-c BK XXII [289-305] 158b / Odyssey K XXIV [191 2 2] 319a
5 AESCHYLUS Seven Against Thebes [683-684] 34c
5 SOPHOCLES Philoctetes [408-1444] 194d 195a c
6 THUCYDIDE Peloponnesia War BK II 398a-c
7 PLATO Symposium 166b-167a
9 ARI TOTLE Ethics BK I CH 10 [1100a10-31] 345c d / Politics BK V CH 10 [1312a23 39] 514d
12 E CTETUS Discourses BK I CH 19 126b
12 AURELI Meditations BK I SECT 10 261d 262a K I SEC 3 263d SECT 19 265 SECT 33 266c d S CT 35 266d SECT 48 267d 268a BK VI ECT 18 275d BK VII ECT 6 280b S CT 34 282a BK VIII SECT 21 287 SECT 44 289a BK IX S CT 30 294b-c BK X SECT 34 301a
13 VI G Aeneid BK I [450-465] 115b
14 PLUT R H Pericles 125b
15 TACITU Histories BK I 195b
21 DANTE Divine Comedy HELL, III [22-69] 4b-d IV 5c 7a VI [76-93] 9a b XIII [31 78] 18b-c X T [1-90] 22c 23b XXXII [1]-XXXIII [9] 47c-49c U TORY XI [73 117] 69c 70a P RAD SE IX [37-63] 119a
23 HOBBES Leviathan PART I 77a b
24 R BELAIS Gargantua and Pantagruel BK II 81a-d
25 MO T N Essays 112d 113a 267a b 301b-c 304d 306a
27 SH KE EA Sonnets LV 594c-d LXV 596a b LXXXI 598c-d

(2 *Honor and fame in the life of the individual 2b Honor as an object of desire and as a factor in virtue and happiness*)

5 EURIPIDES *Rhesus* [756-761] 209d / *Hippolytus* [373-430] 228b-d / *Andromache* [768-801] 321d-322a / *Hecuba* [299-331] 355b-c / *Heracles Mad* [275-311] 367c-d

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 6c-7b BK III 118a-c 122a-d 123c-d BK VI 205a-b BK VII 215c-216b 243d-245a 255c-d BK VIII 264c 282c-283a BK IX 304a

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK I 370a-c BK II 397d-398d BK V 486a-d

7 PLATO *Euthydemus* 69a-b / *Symposium* 154d-155a / *Apology* 205d-206a / *Republic* BK II 310c-315c BK V 370b-c BK VIII 404d-405a BK IX 421a-422b / *Laws* BK I 651a-652a BK V 686d-688a BK XII 788d-789a / *Seventh Letter* 805c-806a 807d-808a 810d-811a 814b-c

8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK VI CH 8 [146b20-24] 200c

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 5 [1095b22-30] 340d-341a CH 10 [1100a10-31] 345c-d BK II CH 7 [1107b22-1108a1] 353b-c BK III CH 10 [1117b24-36] 364b-c BK IV CH 3-4 370b-372d CH 7 [1127b9-22] 374d-375a BK VII CH 4 398a-399a BK VIII CH 8 [1159a13-26] 411b BK IX CH 8 [1168a28-34] 421d-422a BK X CH 9 [1179b4-1180a11] 434b-d / *Politics* BK VII CH 13 [1332a9-29] 536d-537a CH 14 [1333a30-b10] 538a-b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 5 [1360b4-1361b2] 600d-602a esp [1361a25-b2] 601d-602a CH 6 [1362b10-28] 603b-c esp [1362b20-23] 603c CH 11 [1371a7-17] 614c

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [59-86] 30d-31b BK V [1105-1135] 75c-d

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 21 127b-c BK IV CH 6 230b-c

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK II SECT 11-12 258a-c BK IV SECT 33 266c-d BK VI SECT 51 279b-c BK VIII SECT 1 285a-b

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK I [441-493] 115a-116b BK VI [886-892] 234b-235a BK VIII [608-731] 275a-278b BK X [276-286] 309b-310a [656-688] 320a-321a BK XI [376-444] 338b-340a

14 PLUTARCH *Theseus* 2c-3b / *Themistocles* 89a-90b 95d-96a / *Alcibiades* 155b-d 174d / *Alcibiades-Coriolanus* 194b-195a,c / *Aristides* 264a-b 265c-d / *Marcus Cato* 282a / *Flamininus* 302b-d 313a-c / *Lysander* 354b-d / *Sulla* 369a-d / *Lysander-Sulla* 387d-388a / *Pompey* 499a 538a-c / *Alexander* 540b-d 576d esp 542a-d / *Caesar* 599b-d / *Agis* 648b-d 649b / *Cicero* 704a-723d esp 706b-c 717a-b

15 TACITUS *Annals* BK IV 73b-d BK VI 92c-d BK XI 101c-102a BK XIV 154a-b BK XV 162c-163a / *Histories* BK I 195a-b BK II 226d-228a BK IV 267b-d

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par 13 11d BK X par 59-64 86b-87d / *City of God* BK V CH 12-16 216d-221b BK VIII CH 8 270a-b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 26 A 4 ANS 151c-152a,c PART I-II Q 2 AA 2-3 616d-618a Q 4 A 8 REP 1 636a-c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 60 A 5 ANS 53a-54d PART II-II Q 25 A 1 REP 2 501b-502a Q 185 A 1 ANS and REP 1-2 639c-641c PART III SUPPL Q 96 A 7 REP 3 1061b-1062a

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL, III [22-69] 4b-d IV 5c-7a VI [76-93] 9a-b XIII [31-78] 18b-c XVI [1-90] 22c-23b XXIV [43-60] 35a-b XXXII [1]-XXXIII [9] 47c-49c PURGATORY XI [73-117] 69c-70a PARADISE I [13-36] 106a-b VI [112-126] 114d-115a IX [37-63] 119a

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24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 65c-d

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 110d-111a 112a-d 125a-c 300c-307a 462b-c 495d-496d

26 SHAKESPEARE *Titus Andronicus* ACT V SC III [35-64] 196d-197a / *Love's Labour's Lost* ACT IV SC I [1-40] 264b-d / *Richard II* ACT I SC I [165-185] 322b-c ACT IV SC I [162-334] 343b-345a / *1st Henry IV* ACT I SC I [78-90] 435b SC III [160-208] 439b-d ACT III SC II [129-161] 454b-c ACT V SC I [127-144] 462a-b SC IV [59-101] 464d-465b / *Henry V* ACT IV SC I [261-301] 554a-c SC III [18-67] 555d-556b SC V 558a-b / *Julius Caesar* ACT I SC II [84-96] 570b

27 SHAKESPEARE *Troilus and Cressida* ACT II SC II 113c-115d ACT V SC III [23-28] 137b / *Othello* ACT II SC III [262-270] 219d ACT III SC III [154-161] 223d / *Coriolanus* ACT I SC III [1-50] 355b-d / *Sonnets* XXV 590a

29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* esp PART I 32c-33a 57d-58a 147b-d PART II 222b-c 227c-228d

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART VI 65c-d 66d-67a,c

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 53 413a PROP 55 SCHOL 413b-d PART IV PROP 52 439d-440a

32 MILTON *Lycidas* [64-84] 29a-b

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 100 191a-192b 158-164 202a-b 400-401 240b-241a 404 241a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* 90c-d BK II CH XXVIII SECT 10-12 230b-231c

37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 146c-147a 223d-224b 273b 313d-314d

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 360a-362d esp 360c-361a 362b-d

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 44d-45c BK IV 269d-271a

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 3a

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 176c 194c 494b-d 495a

42 KANT *Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals* 256a-b 258b-c

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12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK IV SECT 3 263d
13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK I [142-156] 107a [450-465] 115b
14 PLUTARCH *Themistocles* 95b-c 97b-d / *Camillus* 117a-c / *Fabius* 141 154a,c esp 149b-c / *Alcibiades* 155b d 174d esp 161d 162b 165c-d / *Coriolanus* 177b-179c / *Timoleon* 212c 213d / *Aemilius Paulus* 226c 229c / *Pelopidas* 245a-d / *Marcellus* 256b-d / *Aristides* 265c 266b / *Flamininus* 309 b 310b / *Sertorius* 464a-c / *Pompey* 499a b / *Caesar* 598d-601 / *Cato the Younger* 624a-625b 637a-c / *Cicero* 712d 713b / *Demetrius* 737b-d
15 TACITUS *Annals* BK II 33c 41c d 43c-44a BK III 45 -46b 60d BK IV 73b-d BK XIV 153d 155a
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK V CH 12 218b-c CH 15 220d 221a CH 17 8 221b 224b
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 2 A 2 616d 617b
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL, IV [64 147] 6a 7a PURGATORY XI [21 139] 65c d X [73 117] 69c 70a PARADISE XVI [16-154] 130a 132 XVII [46-142] 132 133c
23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* CH XVI I 25d 26a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 3b-c 75 b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 181d 183a 445c-446a
26 SHAKESPEARE *Julius Caesar* ACT I SC I [37 65] 568d 569a ACT V SC V 595a 596a c esp [68-8] 596a c
27 SHAKESPEARE *Troilus and Cressida* ACT III SC I [175 233] 124b-125 / *Coriolanus* 351a 392 esp ACT I SC IX 359c 360c ACT II SC I [134 24] 362b-363c SC II III 364 369a / *Timon of Athens* ACT I I SC V 406d-408a
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 65c-68b
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 20b-c
32 MILTON *Areopagitica* 383a
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 337 232b-233
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 28b PART I I 119 121b
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 54d 55a 313d 314d
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 360 362d passim esp 360b-c / *Political Economy* 374d 375b / *Social Contract* BK IV 434a
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 28b-29b 92 219d 220a 298b 381b-d
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 318b-319b
42 KANT *Judgement* 504 b
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 57 177a-c
43 MILL *Liberty* 278c 279a 298b-299a
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* XIA 8a-c 383c 479 d 498c-499a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 348 111d / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 167 168a PART I 262a-c 272c 273a 280b-281a
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [011 1021] 25b-26a
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 79a-82b 84b-85a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 171 173d BK III 338c-d BK X 578b 582a 584b BK X 619c-621b 629b-c

3b The conditions of honor or fame and the causes of dishonor or infamy

OLD TESTAMENT *Joshua* 6:27—(D) *Josue* 6:27 / *Judges* 5 / *I Samuel* 18:6-8—(D) *I Kings* 18:6-8 / *I Kings* 10—(D) *III Kings* 10 / *I Chronicles* 29:12—(D) *I Paralipomenon* 29:12 / *II Chronicles* 9:1 28—(D) *II Paralipomenon* 9:1 28 / *Proverbs* 3:16 4:8 18 8:18 14:28 31:23,25,28-31 / *Ecclesiastes* 1:11 2:16 7:1—(D) *Ecclesiastes* 1:11 2:16 7:2 / *Isaiah* 14:20—(D) *Isaias* 14:20 / *Jeremiah* 9:23 24—(D) *Jeremias* 9:23 24
APOCRYPHA *Judith* 8:8—(D) OT *Judith* 8:8 / *Wisdom of Solomon* 3:16-17 4:1-8 8:9-10—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 3:16-17 4:1-8 8:9-10 / *Ecclesiasticus* 1:19 10:5 10:19-11:2 37:26 44:1 15—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 1:24 10:5 0:23 11:2 37:29 44:1 15 / *I Maccabees* 2:50-51—(D) OT *I Machabees* 2:50-51
NEW TESTAMENT *Acts* 21:26-40 / *Romans* 14:15 18 / *II Corinthians* 10:8-18 11:16-30 / *I Thessalonians* 1:6-10
4 HOMER *Iliad* BK I 3a 9a c BK III 19a 23d BK VI [312 358] 43b-d [503-529] 45b-d BK IX 57 -64 c esp [307 429] 60b-61c BK X [1 213] 66a b BK XII [290-328] 85b-c BK XXII [99-130] 156b-c [289-305] 158b
5 AESCHYLUS *Seven Against Thebes* [011 1084] 38b-39a,c
5 SOPHOCLES *Oedipus the King* 99a 113a c esp [31-57] 99b-d, [463-511] 103c d, [1187 1221] 110b-c / *Antigone* [163 21] 132c d [441-525] 134d 135c / *Ajax* 143a 155a c esp [430-480] 146d 147b [1047 1421] 152 155a
5 EURIPIDES *Rhesus* [149-2 3] 204c 205 / *Suppliants* [857-917] 266a b / *Hecuba* [251 25] 355a [299-331] 355b-c
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK II 70c d 76a b 85d-86b BK III 93c BK IV 134d 135b BK V 160d 161 168d 169 BK VI 206d 207a BK I 231d 233d 234b 248d 257a 257c BK IX 303c 304a 305a-c
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK I 350b BK II 395d 396a 398d 399 402c d 403c 404 BK III 427 -c BK VI 513a-d
7 PLATO *Laches* 27b-d 31a-c / *Symposium* 152d 153b 154d 155a / *Apology* 205d 206a / *Republic* BK I 296c-d BK V 366c-367b 370b-c BK VIII 405d-406a BK IX 422 / *Laws* BK III 673d
8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK II CH II [115^{b}22 35] 161d 162a,c
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK IV CH 3-4 370b-372d / *Politics* BK V CH 10 [1312^{a}23 39] 514d / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 5 [1361^{a}27 34] 601d CH 9 608c 611c BK II CH I [1388^{a}28-^{b} 8] 635b-636a
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK V [05-1135] 75c d
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK IV SECT 3 263d BK VII SECT 34 282a

(2 *Honor and fame in the life of the individual* 2d *Honor or fame as a mode of immortality*)

28 HARVEY *Circulation of the Blood* 312c d
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 226d 228d
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 27d 28c 29a b 36a c 72c 73a
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 148 201a
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 535a 536a
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 273b 274d
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 94a b 219d
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 494b d 495a
42 KANT *Science of Right* 428b 429a
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 57d 58a 163d [fn 4]
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 348 111d / *Philosophy of History* PART I 211d 212c 255b d PART II 274a 275a
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [9981-9982] 243a
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* EPILOGUE 408a c

2e Honor as the pledge of friendship the codes of honor among social equals

4 HOMER *Iliad* BK I 3a 9a c BK IX 57a 64a c
5 EURIPIDES *Alcestis* [509-604] 241c 242b
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 31d 32a BK III 91d 92b BK V 183b c BK VI 191a b
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 396c d
7 PLATO *Symposium* 152b d 154d 155a / *Apology* 205d 206a / *Crito* 213d 214b
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK IV CH 6 373d 374b BK VIII CH 8 [1159 13-26] 411b CH 14 415d 416d BK IX CH 2 [1165 15-35] 418a b CH 8 [1168 28-34] 421d-422a [1169 12-b2] 422d 423a
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK II CH 22 169b 170a BK IV CH 2 223d 224b
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II-II Q 25 A 1 REP 2 501b 502a
22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida* BK IV STANZA 63 64 96b 97a STANZA 206 115b STANZA 211-212 116a STANZA 231-239 118b 119b BK V STANZA 235-244 151a 152a / *Knight's Tale* 174a 211a
23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* CH XVII 24a b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 125b 126b 181d 183c
26 SHAKESPEARE *Two Gentlemen of Verona* ACT IV SC I 245b 246b
27 SHAKESPEARE *Troilus and Cressida* ACT III SC II [165-212] 121d 122b / *Timon of Athens* ACT III SC II [71-94] 404c d SC III [27-42] 405b ACT IV SC I 409c d SC III [249 305] 413c 414a
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 8c 10b 71c 73a 120b 134b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXVIII SECT 10-13 230b 231c
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART II 70b
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 313d 314d
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 90b
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 389b d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 207 69b c par 253 79a-c ADDITIONS 130 137c d
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 317a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 15b 16a BK II 72d 74a BK IV 173d 179a BK VI 241c 242b BK VIII 328a c BK X 442c 443b
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI 153d 157b
53 JAMES *Psychology* 189b 191a

3 The social realization of honor and fame

3a The reaction of the community to its good or great men

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 41 14-45 / *Joshua* 9 8-11—(D) *Josue* 9 8 11 / *Judges* 8 35-9:20 / *I Samuel* 18 6 8—(D) *I Kings* 18 6-8 / *II Samuel* 1 17-2 7—(D) *II Kings* 1 17 27 / *I Kings* 4 30-34 10—(D) *III Kings* 4 30-34 10 / *I Chronicles* 14 17—(D) *I Paralipomenon* 14 17 / *II Chronicles* 9 1-28—(D) *II Paralipomenon* 9 1-28 / *Esther* 6 / *Job* 16:20-17 6 19 9 21 29-30 / *Proverbs* 10 7 20 7 22 1 31 10-31 esp 31:23 31:28 31 31 / *Ecclesiastes* 10 5-7 / *Isaiah* 9 15—(D) *Isaias* 9 15
APOCRYPHA *Judith* 8 15 7-16:25—(D) OT *Judith* 8 15 8 16 31 / *Wisdom of Solomon* 4 1-2—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 4 1 2 / *Ecclesiasticus* 10 19-20 24 37:26 39 1 11 44 50 esp 44 1-15—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 10 23 24 7 37 29 39 1-15 44-50 esp 44 1 15 / *Susanna* 4—(D) OT *Daniel* 13 4 / *I Maccabees* 3 1-9 5 63-64 9 19-21 10 59-65 13 25 30 14 4-49—(D) OT *I Machabees* 3 1-9 5 63-64 9 19-21 10 59-65 13:25 30 14 4 49
NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 4:23-25 9 30-31 13 53-58 / *Mark* 1:27-28 6 1-6 / *Luke* 4 14 30 36-37 5 15 / *John* 4 44
4 HOMER *Iliad* BK X [203 217] 67a b BK XXIII XXIV 161a 179d
5 SOPHOCLES *Oedipus the King* 99a 113a c esp [31 57] 99b d [463-511] 103c d [1187 1221] 110b-c / *Antigone* [683-704] 137a b / *Ajax* 143a 155a c esp [430-480] 146d 147b [1047-1421] 152a 155a c
5 EURIPIDES *Hecuba* [299-331] 355b-c
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 14a d BK II 85d 86b BK III 101c d 122a d 123c d BK IV 134d 135b 136a-c BK VI 192c 195d 196c 198a 199a 211a BK VII 233d 234b 248d BK VIII 282c 283a
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK I 383d 384a BK II 395c 399a esp 395c d 399a BK V 484c-485c BK VI 513b d
7 PLATO *Republic* BK V 362a b 366c 367b BK VII 401b
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK IV CH 3-4 370b 372d BK VIII CH 14 [1163b5-13] 416a-c / *Politics* BK II CH 7 [1267 12 17] 462d / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 5 [1361a25-b3] 601d 602a

45 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 73 91c-d / *Philosophy of History* PART II 262a-c PART IV 334b-c
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK 7 241c 242b

4b The scale of honor in the organization of the state: the just distribution of honors

NEW TESTAMENT: *Romans* 13:7
4 HOMER *Iliad*, BK [1-5 0] 3a-8b BK IX 5 a-64a,c BK XII [290-328] 85b-c
5 AESCHYLUS *Seven Against Thebes* [1 11 084] 36b-39a,c
5 SOPHOCLES *Antigone* [16 10] 132 -d / *Ajax* 143a 153a,c esp [430-480] 146d 147b, [104 -1421] 152a 155a,c
5 EURIPIDES *Hecuba* [299-331] 355b-c
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK II 85a BK VI 194d 197b
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 395d 399a BK III, 427a-c BK VIII 587a b
7 PLATO *Republic* BK I 305d 306b BK V 366d 36 / *Laws* BK III, 673d-674b BK IV 683b-c BK V 685d-688a BK VI 699d 700b
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK V CH 2 [1130b30-31] 378b CH 3 [1131a24 29] 378d CH 6 [1134b1] 382b BK VIII, CH 14 [1163b13] 416a,c / *Politics* BK I, CH 12 [1259b5-8] 454a BK II, CH [1 66b36-1 67a] 462c [1266a37-41] 463b CH 9 [8-] 466d-46 a CH 1 [1273a32-b] 469d-470a BK III, CH 5 [2 35 30] 475c CH 1 [1 9-34] 479a CH 13 481b-483a BK CH [30 16]-CH 3 [30] 503b-504a BK 4 [1304 1-35] 505d 506a CH 8 [1305-11] 510a [308 10-1] 510d [1309 13-15] 511b CH 2 [13 6 1 24] 519d BK VII CH 14 [1332 4- 333 16] 53 d 538a / *Athenian Constitution* CH 1 par 5 b-c
14 PLUTARCH *Pompey* 505a-c / *Cato the Younger* 636d-637c
15 TACITUS *Annals*, BK XI 105d 107b
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK V CH 12, 218b-c
23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* CH XXI, 32d 33a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan*, PART I 73b-c 4b-c 75b-6b PART II 103c-d 104b 146d 156c
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 181d 183a
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK II [430-456] 120b-121 / *Areopagitica* 383a
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 305 225a
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I, 15b-16b 28a b PART III, 119a 121b
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws*, BK III 11 12b BK 23c 25c 31 b BK XI 71d 72a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 325b-32 348b-c-360a 362d passim, esp 360b,d [fn 1] / *Social Contract* BK II, 408 d
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 17 b 240c 244c esp 240c 241b, 244b-c 245d 4 passim 501c
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 39d 81c-d 317b-318b
42 KANT *Science of Right* 444c-445a

43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION VI [8 -93] 6b
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S ARTICLE I SECT 9 [89- 93] 14a
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 84 2 2a
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 141a 197c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 306 68d-69b par 310, 106b-c / *Philosophy of History* PART I 222a 224a
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [10,549-976] 264a 26 a
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 105a-112a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK III 131c-135c BK 205b-c 228b-234a BK 7 241c 242b 250c

4c Honor as a political technique: the uses of praise, prestige, public opinion

4 HOMER *Iliad*, BK X [60- 1] 65d
5 EURIPIDES *Hecuba* [1 5] 355a [299-331] 35 b-c
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 395d 399a BK III 42 a-c
7 PLATO *Republic* BK I 305d 306b BK VI 377a 379c / *Laws* BK VII, 730d 731d
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK I, CH 12 [1 59b5-8] 454a BK 1 CH 11 [1273a32-b] 469d-470a BK I CH 5 [12 8b35 39] 475c BK V CH 8 [30 10-] 510d CH 11 [315a4 -4] 517d 518a BK VII CH 2 [3 4 10- 3] 528 d / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 9 608 611c
13 VIRGIL *Aeneid*, BK I [42 156] 10 a [450-45] 115b
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 45c-46b / *Alcibiades* 165c-d / *Caesar* 598d 599b / *Cleomenes* 659d 660a
15 TACITUS *Histories*, BK I, 209d 210b
23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* CH XXI 32d 33a CH XXII, 33
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II, 146d 156c
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays*, 181d 183a 306a-d
27 SHAKESPEARE *Troilus and Cressida* ACT III SC III [35- 41] 122d 125a
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 15b-16b PART III 119a-121b
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK III, 11c 12b
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 358b-c 360a-36 d passim, esp 360a b / *Political Economy* 375a b
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK IV 269d 2 0d
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 4d 644d
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 81c-d 317b-318b
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 5 17 b-c NUMBER 68 206b-c NUMBER 72, 217a-c
44 BOSWELL *Johnson*, 1 4d 127b-c 141
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III, par 318 105b ADDITIONS, 1 6 149b
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [0,549-9 6] 264a 26
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK IV 170d 173d BK V 204c 205b 228c-d 230b 232a 233b BK VI, 241c 242b BK IX 356d 357b

(3 *The social realization of honor and fame* 3b *The conditions of honor or fame and the causes of dishonor or infamy*)

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK I [441-493] 115a 116b [561-568] 118b BK IX [590-620] 295a b
14 PLUTARCH *Camillus* 117a-c / *Fabius* 141a 154a c esp 149b c / *Alcibiades* 155b d 174d esp 172b / *Alcibiades Coriolanus* 194a 195a c / *Aemilius Paulus* 224d 229c / *Pelopidas* 243c 244b / *Marcellus Pelopidas* 262d / *Aristides* 264a d 265c d / *Cimon* 392d 393b / *Nicias* 425c d / *Agesilaus* 497a b / *Pompey* 509d 510a / *Caesar* 598d 601a / *Phocion* 604b d 605d / *Cato the Younger* 637a c / *Agis* 648b d 649b / *Cleomenes* 659d 660a / *Cicero* 712d 713b / *Demetrius* 737b d / *Dion* 784a b
15 TACITUS *Annals* BK I 16d 17a BK II 33c 41c d BK III 60d 61a BK IV 72d 73d BK XI 101c 102a BK XV 169a / *Histories* BK II 226d 228a BK III 248b c 259c 260a BK IV 289d 290a
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK V CH 12-20 216d 226a passim
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 2 AA 2-3 616d 618a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 73 A 10 ANS 128a d PART II II Q 25 A I REP 2 501b 502a Q 43 585a 592d
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL III [22-69] 4b d VI [76-93] 9a b VII [1-66] 9c 10b XIII [31-78] 18b-c XVI [1-90] 22c 23b XXIV [43 60] 35a b XXXII [1]-XXXIII [9] 47c-49c PURGATORY VIII [121-139] 65c d XI [73-117] 69c 70a PARADISE XVI [16-154] 130a 132a XVII [46-142] 132c 133c
22 CHAUCER *Parson's Tale* par 10 500a
23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* CH VIII 12d 14c esp 13b-c CH XIV-XIX 21b 30a CH XX 30d CH XXI 31d 33a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 74c 75b PART II 146d PART IV 261c
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 7a d 103c 104d 112d 113d 126b 127c 130b d 302b 306a 314c 316a 390c 391c 445a 446a 450c 453c 495d 496d
26 SHAKESPEARE *2nd Henry VI* ACT I SC II 36b 37c / *Richard II* ACT V SC II [1-40] 346b d / *Henry V* ACT IV SC I [247-301] 554a c
27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT IV SC IV [46-66] 59b c / *Troilus and Cressida* ACT II SC II 113c 115d ACT III SC III [74-233] 123b 125a / *Coriolanus* ACT II SC I [220-275] 363b 364a ACT III SC II III 373c 377a ACT IV SC VII [27-57] 384c d / *Henry VIII* ACT III SC II [350-458] 572c 573d / *Sonnets* XXV 590a
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 227a 228d 303a c
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 83c 92a b
32 MILTON *Lycidas* [64-84] 29a b / *Paradise Lost* BK II [430-456] 120b 121a / *Samson Agonistes* [960-996] 360b 361a
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 319-324 229b 230b 337 232b 233a
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 15b 16b PART III 119a 121b
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 9a d 38b 146c 147a 223d 224b 308a 310a 313d 314d
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 360a 362d esp 362b d / *Political Economy* 372d 374d 375b / *Social Contract* BK IV 434b 435a
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK V 354c d
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 2a 3a 92a 435a 436b
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 27c 29a 31b d 32c 68a b 71b d 176c d 209d 494b d 495d 504c 505c
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 68 206b c
43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 452c-453a
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 62b c 124d 125d 140b-141a 160b 189d 190b 194c 195a 197c 198b d 250d 251a 256d 299a b 412b d 479a d 498c 499a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 244 77c
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [3734 3763] 91a b
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 79a 82b 84b 85a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK IV 170d 171c 173d 179a esp 177d 178a BK V 204a 205b 228b 234a BK VI 247a-c 250c BK VIII 304c 338c d BK XIII 582a 584b BK XIV 610c 611c BK XV 619c 621b
54 FREUD *Civilization and Its Discontents* 767a

4 Honor in the political community and in government

4*a* Honor as a principle in the organization of the state timocracy and monarchy

4 HOMER *Iliad* BK XII [290-328] 85b c
7 PLATO *Symposium* 152b d / *Republic* BK VIII 402b 405c
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK V CH 10 [1310^b40-1311^a7] 513b BK VII CH 2 [1324^b2 1325^a7] 528c 529a
14 PLUTARCH *Themistocles* 99b c / *Lysander Sulla* 387d 388a
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK V CH 12 218d 219b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 74b c
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 181d 182c
26 SHAKESPEARE *Richard II* ACT IV SC I [162-334] 343b 345a ACT V SC II [1 40] 346b d
27 SHAKESPEARE *Coriolanus* ACT III SC I [142-161] 370d 371a
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III 120a
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK III 11c 12b BK IV 13b d 15a BK V 32d BK VIII 53b c
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 326b 327a 360a 362d passim esp 360a 361a / *Political Economy* 375a b
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 630b
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 81c d 317b 318b

5c to 5d

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays*, 103, 104d 126b-128d 145d 146d 35-a-365a 390c-391c 4a2d-4a3b

26 SHAKESPEARE *Richard II* ACT V SC II [1-40] 346b-d / *King John* ACT I 3 6a 379c / *Julius Caesar* ACT SC I [3-6] 568d 569a SC I [90-161] 570b-571a ACT V SC V [.8-75] 595a,c

SHAKESPEARE *Antony and Cleopatra*, ACT V SC II [S. 00] 347a b

29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I, 1a 8c 32c 33a 41a-c 82c-d PART II 2a4d 255a

32 MILTON *Lord Gen. Fairfax* 68b-69a / *Lord Gen. Cromwell* 69a-b

33 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 373c-d

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 12b-c 25b-d 9-a 263a 298b 47c-d, 637a-d

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 131b 209d 415d 416c 536c-d

43 MILL *Liberty* 298d 299a

48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 10 b

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 9c 10d BK II, 9 c 101c BK III, 135c 13 c 140c 142d 159b-161b 16.b-164a,c BK IV 170d 173d BK V 230b-234a, BK VI, 238c 243d esp 242 243c 250a-251a BK IX, 344b-3-6a 354a-355c 366d 367b 382a-388a BK X, 405a-406c 444a-445d BK XI, 518c-d BK XIII, 578b 582a 584b BK XIV 600d 610c-611c BK XV 619c-621b EPILOGUE I, 647b-649d, 673d-6 4a,c

53 JAMES *Psychology* 826b-827a

54 FREUD *Group Psychology* 669a-c 6 4b-673b 6 6b-c 683c-684a 685b-689d 691d 693a / *War and Death*, 762c

5c The occasions of heroism in war and peace

4 HOMER *Iliad* 3a 179d esp BK IV [.20-418] 25b-28a, x [520-532] 33c, BK X [203- 3] 67 -c, BK XI [290-3.5] 80b-c / *Odyssey* BK I [.6-305] 185d 186a

5 EURIPIDES *Rhesus* [49-263] 204c 205c / *Heracles Mad* [40-205] 366b-d / *Phoenician Maidens* [99 10 5] 387a b

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK II, 69a-b BK III, 101 -d 122a 123d BK IV 134d 135b K 1, 187b-188d BK VII, 233d 234b 238a-c 248d 255a-257d BK IX, 291c 292a 303c 304a

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 395d 399a BK IV 457b-c BK V 48-c-482c 502b-c

7 PLATO *Apology* 205d 206a

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics*, K III CH 6-9 361a 364b BK IV CH 3 370b-372b passim / *Politics* BK VII, CH [1324b10- 3] 528c-d

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid*, BK IX [168-449] 283b-291a

14 PLUTARCH *Theseus* 1a 15a,c / *Poplicola* 83b-84a / *Coriolanus*, 174b,d 179c / *Aemilius Paulus* 219d 229c / *Marcellus* 246b,d 251a,c / *Alexander* 540b,d 576d / *Cato the Younger* 629a 648a,c / *Demosthenes*, 695d 703b / *Cicero* 712d-713b

15 TACITUS *Annals*, BK I, 11a b BK III, 49d K 1, 92c BK XVI, 182d 183a 183d 184a / *Histories* BK I, 200b-c BK II, 225d 228a K III, 245b-c 248b-c 249b 256a-c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL, Q 96, AA 5 1055c 1062a AA II I 1063d 1065b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL, XXVI 38a 39c

22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida* BK II STANZA 9 24b-25b STANZA 83-9 33a b BK V STANZA 258 154a / *Prologue* [43-78] 159b-160a / *Knight's Tale* 174a 211a esp [859-1004] 174a 1 6b

23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* CH XXVI 36b-37d

23 HOBBES *Leviathan*, PART I 73b- 6b

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, BK I 32c 35a 42a-44a 50c 52d

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 302b-303a 340a 353b passim 362a 365a 390c-391c

26 SHAKESPEARE *Henry V* ACT III SC I 543d 544b ACT IV SC III [16-67] 555d 556b

27 SHAKESPEARE *Troilus and Cressida* ACT II SC II 113c 115d / *Coriolanus*, ACT I, SC I [56-.50] 354b-c ACT II, SC I [130-1 9] 362b-c C III [86-1.8] 366d 367b / *Timon of Athens* ACT III, SC V 406d-408a

29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* esp PART I 147b-d, PART II 203a b, 230b-c

32 MILTON *Lord Gen. Fairfax* 68b-69a

38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract*, BK IV 437d-438c

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 217d 220d esp 219c 220d 240b-247a passim 359d-3 6c esp 370a-c 375b-c 644d-645c

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 19d 20a 357c 359c 415d-416c; 534b-536d passim 549c 550c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 241d 242b 24 a PART II, 262c-263a 274a 2 5a 281d 282d PART III, 298a b

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK II, 77c-81b 89b-d 97c 106d BK III, 146d 14 c 150a 164a,c BK V, 250c BK IX, 366d-36 b 369a 372a BK XIV 590d-604b

5d The estimation of the role of the hero in history

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid*, BK VI [756-892] 231a 235a BK VIII [608-731] 275a-278b

14 PLUTARCH *Theseus* 1a 15a,c esp 9a-d / *Romulus* 15a-30a,c / *Lycurgus* 32a-48d esp 47a-48c / *Numa Pompilius* 49a-61d esp 59c-60b / *Pericles* 121a 141a,c esp 129c 130b, 140c-141a,c / *Timoleon* 195a 213d esp 212c 213d / *Flamininus*, 301d-302a / *Pompey* 499a 538a,c / *Caesar* 577a-604d / *Antony* 48a-779d esp 750a b / *Marcus Brutus* 802b,d-824a,c

23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* CH VI 9a b CH XX 30d CH XXV XXVI, 35a-37a

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, BK IV 257c 258a

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays*, 352a-365a

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws*, BK X, 65d-68a

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 362a b 364a-b / *Political Economy* 373c 3 4a / *Social Contract*, BK II 400c-402a

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 633d-634a,c

25 MONTAIGNE: *Essays*, 103c-104d; 126b-128d; 145d-146d; 362a-365a; 390c-391; 452d-453b

26 SHAKESPEARE: *Richard II*, ACT V, SC II [-40] 346b-d / *King John*, ACT I 376a-379c / *Julius Caesar*, ACT I, SC I [37-63] 568d-569a; SC II [90-161] 570b-571a; ACT V, SC V [68-75] 596a,c

27 SHAKESPEARE: *Antony and Cleopatra*, ACT SC II [5-100] 347a-b

29 CERVANTES: *Don Quixote*, PART I, 1a-8c; 32c-33a; 41a-c; 82c-d; PART II, 254d-255a

32 MILTON: *Lord Gen. Fairfax*, 68b-69a / *Lord Gen. Cromwell*, 69a-b

38 ROUSSEAU: *Political Economy*, 373c-d

40 GIBBON: *Decline and Fall*, 12b-c; 28b-d; 92a; 263a; 298b; 471c-d; 627a-d

41 GIBBON: *Decline and Fall*, 131b; 209d; 415d-415c; 536c-d

43 MILL: *Liberty*, 298d-299a

48 MELVILLE: *Moby Dick*, 107b

51 TOLSTOY: *War and Peace*, BK I, 9c-10d; BK II, 99c-101c; BK III, 135c-137c; 140c-142d; 159b-161b; 162b-164a,c; BK IV, 170d-173d; BK V, 230b-234a; BK VI, 238c-243d esp 242-243c; 250a-262a; BK IX, 344b-346a; 354-355c; 366d-367b; 382a-388a,c; BK X, 405a-406c; 444a-445d; BK XI, 518c-d; BK XIII, 578b-582a; 584b; BK XIV, 600d; 610c-611c; BK XV, 619c-621b; EPILOGUE I, 647b-649d; 673d-674a,c

53 JAMES: *Psychology*, 825b-827a

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40 GIBBON: *Decline and Fall*, 217d-220d esp 219c-220d; 240b-247a passim; 369d-376c esp 370a-c, 375b-c; 644d-645c

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5d. The estimation of the role of the hero in history

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25 MONTAIGNE: *Essays*, 362a-365a

38 MONTESQUIEU: *Spirit of Laws*, BK X, 65d-68a

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43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 72 217d 218a
43 MILL *Liberty* 298d 299a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 93 36a b PART II par 124 44b d PART III par 318 105b par 344 111a par 348 111d par 350 112a ADDITIONS 58 125c 186 149b / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 162a 170b 184b-d PART I 241d 242b PART II 259b c 273a 274a 275a 275d 276a 280b 281a 281d 282d 283c d PART III 298a b 300a 301c PART IV 360b c 361d 362a 366b
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48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 107a b
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* passim esp BK I 8d 10d BK III 143a-c 162b 164a c BK IX 342a 344b 350d 355c BK X 389a 391c 405a b 430b 432c 447c 448c 465c 467a BK XI 469a 470c 497c-499c 507a BK XIII 563a 575a BK XIV 610d 611c BK XV 619d 621b EPILOGUE I 645a 650c EPILOGUE II 675a 696d passim
53 JAMES *Psychology* 826b 827a
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6 The idea of glory: its distinction from honor and fame

NEW TESTAMENT *John* 5:44
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK V CH 12 218b c CH 14 220a d CH 17-19 221b 225b
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 2 A 3, REP 2 616d 617b A 3 ANS and REP 1-2 617b 618a Q 4 A 8 REP 1 636a c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL Q 90 A 2 1013d 1014d Q 96 A 7 REP 3 1061b 1062a
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE I [1-9] 106a VII [1-9] 115a b XIV [1 66] 126d 127c
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 300c d
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 227d 228d
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 793 326b 327a
38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK IV 437d-438c
42 KANT *Practical Reason* 347d 348b
53 JAMES *Psychology* 203a 204b

6a The glory of God: the signs and the praise of the divine glory

OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 15:1-21 / *II Samuel* 6:22—(D) *II Kings* 6:22 / *I Kings* 8—(D) *III Kings* 8 / *I Chronicles* 16:7-36; 17:16-27; 29:10-19—(D) *I Paralipomenon* 16:7-36; 17:16-27; 29:10-19 / *Psalms* passim esp 8; 18; 19; 24; 29-30; 33-34; 47; 57; 66; 68; 81; 92-93; 95-96; 111; 117; 134-136; 138; 145; 150—(D) *Psalms* passim esp 8; 17-18; 23; 28-29; 32-33; 46; 56; 65; 67; 80; 91-92; 94-95; 110; 116; 133-135; 137; 144; 150 / *Isaiah* 6:1-6 esp 6:3; 12:1-6; 25-26; 42 esp 42:8-12—(D) *Isaias* 6:1-6 esp 6:3; 12:1-6; 25-26; 42 esp 42:8-12

APOCRYPHA *Tobit* 8:15-17; 12:6-7; 13—(D) OT *Tobias* 8:16-19; 12:6-7; 13 / *Judith* 16:1-18—(D) OT *Judith* 16:1-22 / *Rest of Esther* 13:8-18—(D) OT *Esther* 13:8-18 / *Ecclesiasticus* 18; 39:14-35; 42:15-43:33; 51:1-12—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 18; 39:16-41; 42:15-43:37; 51:1-17 / *Song of Three Children* 28-68—(D) OT *Daniel* 3:51-90 / *I Maccabees* 4:24—(D) OT *I Machabees* 4:24
NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 5:13-16 / *Luke* 1:46-55, 68-79; 2:8-14 / *John* 8:54 / *I Peter* 4:11 / *II Peter* 1:16-19 / *Revelation* 5:9-14; 7:9-17; 11:16-18; 21:22—(D) *Apocalypse* 5:9-14; 7:9-17; 11:16-18; 21:22
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 1 1a b par 4 2a par 31 8d 9a BK II par 13 11d BK V par 1 27a b BK VII par 19 49c d par 23 50b c BK IX par 1 61c d par 34 70c d BK X par 38 81a / *City of God* BK V CH 14 220a d CH 17 221b 222a BK VIII CH 6 268d 269c BK XI CH 29 339a b BK XII CH 4-5 344b 345b BK XXII CH 29 614b 616d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 26 A 4 ANS 151c 152a c Q 44 A 4 241a d Q 65 A 2 340b 341b Q 70 A 2 ANS 364b 365a PART I-II Q 2 A 3 REP 2 616d 617b A 3 REP 1 617b 618a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II-II Q 25 A 1 REP 2 501b 502a Q 31 A 1 REP 1 536d 537c PART III Q 19 A 3 819c 820c Q 25 839c 845a PART III SUPPL, QQ 90-92 1012a 1037c passim
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XI [1-30] 68d 69a PARADISE I [1-9] 106a VII [1-9] 115a b XIII [1-30] 125b c XXVII [1-9] 147b XXXIII [49-145] 156d 157d
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 161b 163d PART IV 261c d
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 300c d
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART V PROP 36 SCHOL 461b-c
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6b The reflected glory of the angels and saints

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The sense in which pride is a vice and humility a virtue see SIN 4c VIRTUE AND VICE 8f.

Fame as a mode of immortality see IMMORTALITY 6b

Mutual respect or honor as a condition of friendship see LOVE b(3) VIRTUE AND VICE 6c.

The political significance of honor see GOVERNMENT 2a JUSTICE 9e STATE 9c.

The rhetorical uses of praise or honor see RHETORIC 4a.

Other discussions of heroism and the heroic see COURAGE 5 TEMPERANCE 6a and for the conception of the tragic or epic hero see POETRY 7b

Various estimations of the role of heroes, leaders, and great men in history see HISTORY 4a(4)

The theological significance of glory see GOD 4h HAPPINESS 7c(2) and IMMORTALITY 5f.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups

I. Works by authors represented in this collection.

II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

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Chapter 36 HYPOTHESIS

INTRODUCTION

A COMPARISON of their Greek and Latin roots shows that the English words hypothesis and supposition are synonymous. To hypothesize or to suppose is *to place under*—to make one thing the basis of another in the process of thought.

The word "hypothesis" is today often popularly misapplied to mean a guess or hunch. The sleuth in a detective story speaks of having an hypothesis about who committed the crime. The popular notion of what it means to suppose something or to entertain a supposition more accurately reflects the meaning of hypothesis in logic, mathematics, and scientific or philosophical method.

A supposition is generally understood to be something taken for granted, something assumed for the purpose of drawing implications or making inferences. What is supposed is not known to be true; it may be true or false. When we make a supposition, our first concern is to see what follows from it, and only then to consider its truth in the light of its consequences. We cannot reverse this order when we employ suppositions and ask first about their truth.

The word "if" expresses the essence of supposing. The word "then" or the phrase "it follows that" introduces the consequences for the consideration of which we make the supposition. We are not interested in the "if" for its own sake, but for the sake of what it may lead to. In any statement of the "if . . . then" sort, it is the if-clause which formulates the supposition or the hypothesis; the other part of the statement, the then-clause, formulates the consequences or implications. The whole complex statement which makes an *if* the logical basis for a *then* is not an hypothesis. Rather it is what is traditionally called in logic a hypothetical proposition.

THERE IS ONE use of the word "hypothesis" in mathematics which seems at odds with the foregoing summary. In Euclid's *Elements*, for example, an hypothesis is that which is given, not as the basis from which the conclusion is drawn or proved, but as a condition of solving the geometric problem under consideration. Let us take *Proposition 6 of Book I*. It reads: "*If* in a triangle two angles be equal to one another, *then* the sides which subtend the equal angles will also be equal to one another." In the demonstration of this theorem, a triangle having two equal angles is *regarded* as *given* or *granted*. That figure or geometrical condition is a fact obtained by *hypothesis*. It is the fact stated in the hypothesis or the if-clause of the theorem.

If the geometrical reality of that fact itself is questioned, the answer would have to be obtained by a prior proof that such a figure, conforming to the definition of an isosceles triangle, can be constructed by the use of no other instruments than a straight edge and a compass. The construction is not made, however, as part of the proof of Theorem 6, any more than is the demonstration of an antecedent theorem, which may have to be used in the proof of Theorem 6. In the proof of Theorem 6, the first line, beginning with the word "let," declares that the constructibility of the figure is to be taken for granted as a matter of hypothesis.

The whole problem of Theorem 6 is to prove that the then-clause follows from the if-clause. Euclid appears to accomplish this by introducing other propositions—drawn from his axioms, definitions, postulates, or theorems previously demonstrated—which establish this connection and so certify the conclusion as following from the hypothesis. Two points about this procedure should be noted.

First, the conclusion does not follow from

the hypothesis directly for if that were so the *if then* proposition would be self evident and would need no proof The mind which sees immediately that the sides opposite to the equal angles in an isosceles triangle are necessarily equal does not need any demonstration of the connection between equal angles and equal sides The Euclidean demonstration consists in making this connection which is not *immediately* evident *mediately* evident that is evident through the mediation of other propositions It is not the hypothesis alone which proves the conclusion but the hypothesis in the company of other propositions which serve to take the mind step by step from the hypothesis granted to the conclusion implied

Second the proposition with the truth of which the reasoning seems to end is not the proposition to be proved The Q E D at the end of a Euclidean demonstration does not apply to the last proposition in the line of proof but to the theorem itself for that is the proposition to be proved The last proposition in the reasoning is merely the consequent which according to the theorem is proposed as following from the hypothesis When he is able to verify the proposed connection between the hypothesis and its conclusion or consequent Euclid says Q E D to the theorem as a whole—*the whole if then statement*

The process of proof seems to be the same when the theorem is stated categorically rather than hypothetically For example Theorem 6 might have been stated as other Euclidean theorems are in the following manner The sides subtended by equal angles in a triangle are also equal to one another This variation in mode of statement raises a question not about the meaning of by hypothesis in Euclidean proof but about the difference between hypothetical and categorical propositions which we will consider later

The Euclidean use of a given (that is a constructible) figure as an hypothesis does not seem to be a method of making a supposition in order to discover its implications Nor does it seem to be a way of testing the truth of an hypothesis by reference to its consequences Both of these aspects of hypothetical reasoning do appear however in Plato s dialogues

In the *Meno* for example Socrates proposes, at a certain turn in the conversation about virtue and knowledge that he and Meno entertain the hypothesis that virtue *is* knowledge Socrates immediately inquires about the consequences If virtue is knowledge he asks, will it be taught? Since Meno already understands that knowledge is teachable he answers the question affirmatively The utility of advancing the hypothesis that virtue is knowledge gradually appears in the next phase of the dialogue wherein it is discovered that virtue is not teachable at all or at least not in the way in which the arts and sciences are teachable The discovery throws some doubt on the truth of the hypothesis that virtue is knowledge at least it does not seem to be knowledge in the same sense as science or art

This mode of reasoning exemplifies the use of an hypothesis to test its truth in terms of its consequences The underlying logical principle is that the denial of the consequences requires a denial of the antecedent hypothesis just as an affirmation of the antecedent would require an affirmation of the consequent Nothing follows logically from a denial of the hypothesis, or from an affirmation of its consequences

This example from the *Meno* also illustrates the difference between Euclid s and Plato s use of hypotheses Socrates is not here trying to prove that *if* virtue is knowledge *then* virtue is teachable The validity of the foregoing if then statement is already understood in terms of the fact that *knowledge is teachable* With the if-then statement accepted as valid Socrates uses it for the purpose of ascertaining whether or in what sense virtue is knowledge It is not the hypothetical or if then statement which is proved but the hypothesis—the antecedent in that statement—which is tested

The same general method of employing hypotheses and testing them is found in the empirical sciences In medical practice the physician according to Hippocrates must be able to form a judgment from having made himself acquainted with all the symptoms and estimating their powers in comparison with one another he should then cultivate prognosis since he will manage the cure best who has foreseen what is to happen from the present state of matters

The preliminary diagnosis states an hypothesis (what the disease may be) and the prognosis foresees a set of consequences (what is likely to happen if the diagnosis is correct) Observation of the course of the symptoms and the patient s changing cond tion will either confirm or invalidate the prognosis Confirmation leaves the diagnosis a lucky guess but fails to prove it If the disease does not run the predicted course however the diagnosis on which the prognosis was based can be d smissed as a false hypothesis.

WHEN AN HYPOTHESIS takes the form of a prediction of what should happen if the hypothesis is true the failure of the consequences to occur refutes the hypothesis. Though discussions of scientific method frequently speak of pre diction and verification it would seem as though prediction can only lead to the refutation of an hypothesis rather than to its verification An hypothesis is overthrown when its prediction fails but it is not verified when its prediction comes true To think that it can be verified in thi way is to commit the logical fallacy of arguing from the truth of a conclus on to the truth of its premises How then do empirical scientists prove an hypothes s to be true? What do they mean by prediction and verification in relat on to the use of hypothesis?

There seem to be two possible ways in which an hypothesis can be proved by empirical or experimental research One way can be used when e know that the consequences implied follow *only* from the truth of the *hypothesis* Should the consequences implied be impossible *unless* the supposed condition exists, then the confirmation of the pred ction verifies the hypothesis.

The other possible method of verification has come to be called the method of multiple working hypotheses The validity *of this method* depends on our knowing that the several hypotheses being entertained *exhaust* all the relevant possibilities Each hypothesis generates a pred ct on and if upon investigation the observed facts negate *every prediction* except one then that one remaining hypothesis is verified If negat ve instances ha e eliminated the false hypotheses, the hypothesis remaining must be true on the condition *of course* that it is the *only* possibility which is left

Both of these methods seem to be valid only if a prerequisite condition is fulfilled To verify one of a series of multiple hypotheses through the elimination of the others the scientist must know that the hypotheses enumerated are truly *exhaustive* In the verification of a single hypothesis by the confirmation of its prediction the scientist must know that the observed consequences can follow from no other supposition Since such knowledge is often unavailable probability rath r than complete proof results from the testing of hypotheses by observation or experiment

In his *Treatise on the Vacuum* Pascal offers a summary of the logical situation by distinguishing the true the false and the doubtful or probable hypothesis. Sometimes its negation brings a conclusion of obvious absurdity and then the hypothesis is true and invariable Or else one deduces an obvious error from its affirmation and then the hypothesis *is held to be* false And when one has not been able to find any mistake either in its negation or its affirmation then the hypothesis remains doubtful so that *in order that the hypothesis may be* demonstrable it is not enou h that all the phenomena result from it but rather it is necessary *if there ensues* something contrary to a single one of the expected *phenom na that this* suffice to establish its falsity

BOTH THE USE of hypotheses and the method of verifying th m vary from science to science according as the character of the science happens to be purely empirical (*e g* the work of Hippocrates, Darwin Freud) or experimental (*e g* the work of Harvey and Faraday) or a combination of experimentation with mathematical reasoning (*e g* the work of Galileo Newton Fourier) Not all scientific work is *directed or controlled by hypotheses* but in the absence of well formulated hypotheses, the research can hardly be better than exploration

A well-constructed experiment especially what Bacon calls an *experimentum crucis* derives *its demonstrative* character from the hypothetical *reasoning* which formulates the problem to be solved The value of such a crucial experiment appears in Bacon s reasoning about the rise and fall of the tides If it be *found* he writes, that during the ebb the surface of the

waters at sea is more curved and round from the waters rising in the middle and sinking at the sides or coast and if during a flood it be more even and level from the waters returning to their former position, then assuredly by this decisive instance the raising of them by a magnetic force can be admitted if otherwise it must be entirely rejected

In the field of mathematical physics and particularly in astronomy, the meaning of hypothesis is both enlarged and altered So far we have considered hypotheses which are single propositions implying certain consequences But in mathematical physics a whole theory—a complex system of propositions—comes to be regarded as a single hypothesis

In his preface to the work of Copernicus Osiander says that the task of the astronomer is to use painstaking and skilled observation in gathering together the history of the celestial movements and then—since he cannot by any line of reasoning reach the true causes of these movements—to think up or construct whatever causes or hypotheses he pleases such that by the assumption of these causes those same movements can be calculated from the principles of geometry for the past and for the future too The elaborate system constructed by Copernicus and the system constructed by Ptolemy which Copernicus hopes to replace are sometimes called the Copernican hypothesis and the Ptolemaic hypothesis and sometimes *these two theories are referred to as* the heliocentric hypothesis and the geocentric hypothesis

A whole theory regarded as an *hypothesis* must be tested in a different way from a single proposition whose implication generates a prediction As rival hypotheses one theory may be superior to another in internal consistency or in mathematical simplicity and elegance Kepler is thus able to argue against Ptolemy by appealing to criteria which Ptolemy accepts pointing out that Ptolemy himself wishes to construct hypotheses which are as simple as possible if that can be done And so if anyone constructs simpler hypotheses than he—understanding simplicity geometrically—he on the contrary will not defend his composite hypotheses

But even if the Copernican hypothesis is superior on the grounds of being geometrically simpler it must meet another test As indicated in the chapter on ASTRONOMY mathematical theories about physical phenomena must be more than ideal constructions of possible universes They must try to account for this one real world and are therefore subject to the test of their applicability to reality However elegant it may be mathematically an hypothesis —when considered from the point of view of physics—is satisfactory only if it accounts for the phenomena it was invented to explain In the words of *Simplicius* it must save the appearances

An hypothesis can therefore be tested for its application *to reality* by the way in which it fits the observed facts In those sciences where mathematical demonstrations are applied to natural phenomena Galileo writes the principles which are the foundations of the entire superstructure must be established by well chosen experiments By such means Galileo chooses between the hypothesis that the uniform acceleration of a freely falling body is proportional to the units of space traversed and the hypothesis that it *is* proportional to the units of time elapsed

To borrow Plato s *expression in* the *Timaeus* the mathematical *consistency* of a theory makes it a likely story The theoretical integrity of the hypothesis makes it credible But when competing credible hypotheses exist each saving the relevant appearances equally well *which is to be believed? The fact that one of* them as in the case of the Copernican Ptolemaic controversy is mathematically superior *cannot decide the question* since the question is Which is true of reality?

Sometimes a single fact such as the phenomenon of the Foucault pendulum may exercise a decisive influence if one of the two competing theories finds that fact congenial and the other leaves it inexplicable Sometimes as appears in the discussion of the Copernican hypothesis in the chapter on ASTRONOMY of two hypotheses which are equally satisfactory so far as purely astronomical phenomena are *concerned* one may have the additional virtue of covering other fields of phenomena which that hypothesis was *not originally designed to explain*

As interpreted by Kepler and as developed in Newton s theory of universal gravitation

the Copernican hypothesis brings the terrestrial phenomena of the tides and of falling bodies under the same set of laws which applies to the celestial motions The hypothesis then has the amazing quality of consilience—a bringing together under one formulation of phenomena not previously thought to be related. This seems to be what Huygens has in mind when he considers the degree of probability that is attainable through experimental research We have scarcely less than complete proof he writes when things which have been demonstrated by the principles assumed correspond perfectly to the phenomena which experiment has brought under observation and further principally when one can imagine and foresee new phenomena which ought to follow from the hypotheses which one employs and when one finds that therein the fact corresponds to our prevision

Then in common parlance we say that it is no longer a theory but has become a fact. Yet the question remains whether the empirical tests which eliminate the less satisfactory hypothesis can ever make the more satisfactory hypothesis more than a likely story

IN THE *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy* Newton says I have not been able to discover the cause of those properties of gravity from phenomena and I frame no hypotheses for whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is to be called an hypothesis and hypotheses whether metaphysical or physical whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy The context of this passage and of a similar statement at the end of the *Optics* as well as the association in Newton s mind of hypotheses with occult qualities substantial forms, and hidden causes seems to indicate a special meaning of hypothesis

Newton criticizes the vortices in the physics of Descartes on the ground that it is unnecessary to appeal to occult or unobservable *entities* in order to explain natural phenomena The Cartesian vortices like the substantial forms of Aristotle are for Newton hypotheses in a very special sense They are *hypothetical entities* They are not inferred from the phenomena Although treated as if they were realities underlying the phenomena they are as Gilbert says of the *primum mobile* a fiction something not comprehensible by any reasoning and evidenced by no visible star but purely a product of imagination and mathematical hypothesis.

There is almost a play on words in this identification of hypotheses with imaginary entities to which reality is attributed for in their Greek and Latin roots the words hypothesis and hypostasis, supposition and substance are closely related The first word in each of these pairs refers to a *proposition* which underlies reasoning the second to a *reality* which underlies observable qualities or phenomena To make hypotheses in the sense in which Newton excludes them from experimental philosophy is to *hypostatize* or to *reify* that is, to make a thing out of or to give reality to a fiction or construction of the mind

It has seemed to some critics that no less than the Cartesian vortices, the ether in Newton s theory of light is an hypothesis in precisely this sense—an imaginary entity For many centuries the atoms and molecules postulated to explain chemical combinations and changes were attacked as fictions and defended as useful hypotheses On the one hand there is an issue concerning the theoretic usefulness of such constructions on the other a question concerning their counterparts in reality

It is sometimes thought that fictions are useful for purposes of explanation even when their unreality is admitted. Rousseau for example explicitly denies any historical reality to the idea of man living in a state of nature prior to the formation of society by the social contract. In this matter he says we can lay facts aside as they do not affect the question These related notions—the state of nature and the social contract—are rather calculated to explain the nature of things, than to ascertain their actual origin just like the hypotheses which our physicists daily form respecting the formation of the world

Similarly Lavoisier posits the existence of caloric" for its explanatory value It is difficult " he writes "to comprehend these phenomena without admitting them as the effects of a real and material substance or very subtile fluid which insinuating itself between the particles of bodies separates them from each

other and even allowing the existence of this fluid to be hypothetical we shall see in the sequel that it explains the phenomena of nature in a very satisfactory manner

ONE OTHER MEANING of hypothesis remains to be considered It is the sense in which postulates or assumptions are distinguished from axioms in the foundations of a science In Euclid s geometry as in Descartes both sorts of principles appear The axioms or common notions are those propositions which are immediately seen to be true without proof The postulates or assumptions are hypotheses in the sense that their truth is taken for granted without proof

Both sorts of propositions serve as principles or starting points for the demonstration of theorems or the conclusions of the science Both are principles of demonstration in that they are used to demonstrate other propositions without themselves being demonstrated But axioms are traditionally regarded as intrinsically indemonstrable whereas hypotheses—postulates or assumptions—may not be indemonstrable They are simply asserted without demonstration

The possibility of demonstrating an hypothesis gives it the character of a provisional assumption In the *Discourse on Method* Descartes refers to certain matters assumed in his *Dioptrics* and *Meteors* and expresses his concern lest the reader should take offence because I call them hypotheses and do not appear to care about their proof He goes on to say I have not named them hypotheses with any other object than that it may be known that while I consider myself able to deduce them from the primary truths which I explained above yet I particularly desired not to do so in order that certain persons may not for this reason take occasion to build up some extravagant philosophical system on what they take to be my principles

The distinction between axioms and postulates or hypotheses raises two issues The first concerns the genuineness of the distinction itself Axioms self evident propositions or what William James calls necessary truths have been denied entirely or dismissed as tautologies The only principles of science must then be hypotheses—assumptions voluntarily made or conventionally agreed upon This issue is more fully discussed in the chapter on PRINCIPLE The other issue presupposes the reality of the distinction but is concerned with different applications of it in the analysis of science

Aristotle for example defines scientific knowledge in terms of three elements one of which consists of the *primary premises* upon which demonstrations rest The principles of a particular science may be axioms in the strict sense of being self evident truths and hence absolutely indemonstrable or they may be provisional assumptions which though not proved in this science can nevertheless be proved by a higher science as in the application of geometrical demonstrations to theorems in mechanics or optics or of arithmetical demonstrations to those of harmonics The latter are not axioms because they are demonstrable yet in a particular science they may play the role of axioms insofar as they are used without being demonstrated to demonstrate other propositions

Reasoning which rests either on axioms or on demonstrable principles Aristotle calls *scientific* but reasoning which rests only on hypotheses he regards as *dialectical* Reasoning results in scientific demonstration according to Aristotle when the premises from which the reasoning starts are true and primary or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premises which are primary and true In contrast reasoning is dialectical if it reasons from opinions that are generally accepted and Aristotle explains those opinions are generally accepted which are accepted by everyone or by the majority or by the philosophers—i e by all or by a majority or by the most notable and illustrious of them In another place he adds one important qualification In defining a dialectical proposition as one that is held by all men or by most men or by the philosophers he adds provided it be not contrary to the general opinion for a man would assent to the view of the philosophers only if it were not contrary to the opinions of most men

For Aristotle dialectical reasoning or argument moves entirely within the sphere of opinion Even an opinion generally accepted not only by the philosophers but also by most

men, remains an opinion. The best opinions are probabilities—propositions which are not self evident and which cannot be proved. They are not merely *provisional* assumptions. Resting on assumptions which cannot ever be more than probable the conclusions of dialectical reasoning are also never more than probable Since they lack the certain foundation which axioms give they cannot have the certitude of science.

Plato, on the other hand, seems to think that the mathematical sciences are hypothetical in their foundation, and that only in the science of dialectic, which he considers the highest science does the mind rise from mere hypotheses to the ultimate principles of knowledge. "The students of geometry arithmetic, and the kindred sciences," Socrates says in the *Republic* "assume the odd and the even, and the figures and the three kinds of angle and the like in their several branches of science these are their hypotheses, which they and everybody are supposed to know and therefore they do not deign to give an account of them either to themselves or others." There is a higher sort of knowledge he goes on, "which reason herself attains by the power of dialectic using the hypotheses not as first principles, but only as hypotheses—*that is to say* as steps and points of departure into a world which is above hypotheses, in order that she may soar beyond them to first principles.

The issue between Plato and Aristotle *may* be only verbal—a difference in the use of such words as "science" and dialectic Whether it is verbal or real is considered in the chapters on DIALECTIC and METAPHYSICS. In any case, the issue throws light on the difference between an hypothesis as a merely provisional assumption, susceptible to proof by higher principles, and an hypothesis as a probability taken for granted for the purposes of argument which is itself incapable of being proved.

FINALLY WE COME to the meaning of hypothetical in the analysis of propositions and judgments. The distinction between the categorical and the hypothetical proposition or judgment, briefly touched on in Aristotle's *Organon*, is developed in the tradition of logic which begins with that book.

In his work on *Interpretation* he distinguishes between simple and compound propositions. The compound proposition consists of several simple propositions in some logical relation to one another In the tradition of logical analysis, three basic types of relation have been defined as constituting three different kinds of compound proposition One type of relation is the *conjunctive* it is signified by the word "and" Another is the *disjunctive* it is signified by the words "either or The third type is the *hypothetical* and is signified by the words "if then "

To take an example we have already used virtue is knowledge and virtue is teachable are simple propositions. In contrast the statement, "*if* virtue is knowledge *then* virtue is teachable is a compound proposition hypothetical in form. If the *proposition were* stated in the sentence *either* virtue is knowledge *or* it is not teachable" it would be disjunctive in form if stated in the sentence virtue is knowledge *and* virtue is teachable it would be conjunctive in form. In each of these three cases, the compound proposition consists of the two simple propositions with which we began though in each case they appear to be differently related

Whereas Aristotle divides propositions into simple and compound Kant divides all judgements into the categorical, the hypothetical, and the disjunctive. In the categorical judgment, he says, "we consider two concepts in the hypothetical, "two judgements" in the disjunctive "several judgements in their relation to one another As an example of the hypothetical proposition he offers the statement "If perfect justice exists, the obstinately wicked are punished " As an example of the disjunctive judgment we may say [that] the world exists either by blind chance or by internal necessity or by an external cause Each of these three alternatives, Kant points out "occupies a part of the sphere of all possible knowledge with regard to the existence of the world while all together occupy the whole sphere." The *hypothetical* judgment does no more than state the relation of two propositions Whether both these propositions are true remains unsettled. It is only the consequence," Kant says, "which is laid down by this judgement."

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REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in hea y type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passa es referred to. For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad*, BK II [265 283] 12d, the number 4 is th number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PAGE S CTIONS When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer t the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower hal es of the left hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower hal es of the right hand side of the page. For example, in 7 PL TO *Symposium* 163b-164c the passage begins in the lower half of th left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand sid of page 164.

AUTHOR S DI ISIONS One or more of the main di isions of a work (such as P RT BK, CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers, in brackets, are gi en in certain cases e.g. *Iliad* BK II [265 283] 12d.

BIBLE R F CES The references are t book, chapter and erse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or erses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e g OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7:45—(D) *II Esdras* 7:46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader s attention to one or more especially relevant parts f a whole reference passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the tyle of the references, see the E planation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface.

1 The use of hypotheses n the process of dia lect c

7 PLATO *Charmides* 9d 10a / *Protagoras* 49a / *Meno* 183b-190a,c / *Phaedo* 242b-243c / *Republic* BK IV 350d 351b BK VI 383d 388a c, 386d 388a K II, 397a 398c / *Timaeus*, 462b-c / *Parmenides* 491a 511d / *Sophist*, 570a-d

8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK I CH 1 [24b21 6] 39a-c / *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 6 [75a15- 5] 10a b / *T pics* 143a 223a,c esp BK I CH 3 143a 144b CH 10-11 147b-148c, BK 14 149a d, BK VIII 211 223a,c

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK CH 7 112b-113d

4 KANT *Pure Reason* 227a 230c esp 227d 228b / *Science of Right* 457a-b / *Judgement* 603b-c

2. Hypothetical reasoning and hypothetical constructions in philosophy

7 PLATO *Meno* 183b-190a,c / *Phaedo* 242b-243c / *Republic* BK VI 386d 388a K 397a 398c / *Parmenides* 491a 511d

8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* K I CH [72b19-2] 98d BK II CH 6 125d 126b / *Heavens* BK I, CH 12 [81b3 23] 373a b / *Metaphysics* BK IV CH 3 [1005b5] 524c-d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* ART 1 Q 14 6 s 680c-681a

25 MONTAIGNE *Essay* 258d 259a

31 DESCARTES *Rules* XII, 23a-c / *Discourse* PART II-III 44c 50b passim PART VI 66a b / *Meditations* 72b d I-II 75a 78a / *Objections and Replies* 123d 124c

35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH I, SECT 1 25a-c / *Human Understanding* BK II CH I SECT 10 123b-d CH XIII SECT 19- 0 152c-d CH XXIII S CT 204a-c

35 HUME *Human Understanding* S CT XI DIV 107 499c 500b

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 329a 331d passim, esp 329d 330b 333d 334a 348a,c

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 7 -d 176d 177b 186d 187a 194b-200c 227a 230c 232 233d / *Science of Right* 457a b / *Judgement* 603b-c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO, 156d 158a

53 JAMES *Psychology* 84a 119b passim 221a 238b 820b-827 880b-886a esp 884b-886a

3 Th foundations of mathematics: postulates assumptions

7 PLATO *Meno* 183b-c / *Republic* BK VI 386d 388a BK VII, 397 -d

8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK I, CH 1 [71a1 6] 97a b CH 2 [72 19-24] 98d CH 10 104d 105d CH 1 [77a36-b15] 106c-d BK I CH 9 [93b1 25] 12 a b / *Physics* BK CH 2 [85a 3] 259c-d / *Heavens*, K III CH 4 [302b27-31] 394a / *Metaphysics* BK XI, CH 3

In the *Prior Analytics* Aristotle distinguishes between the categorical and the hypothetical syllogism The following reasoning is categorical in form Knowledge is teachable virtue is knowledge *therefore virtue is teachable* The following reasoning is hypothetical in form *If* virtue is knowledge it is teachable *but* virtue is knowledge *therefore* it is teachable or *If* virtue is knowledge it is teachable *but* virtue is not teachable *therefore it is* not knowledge

The basic issue with respect to the distinction between categorical and hypothetical syllogisms is whether the latter are always reducible to the former One thing seems to be clear The rules for the hypothetical syllogism formally parallel the rules for the categorical syllogism In hypothetical reasoning the consequent must be affirmed if the antecedent is affirmed the antecedent must be denied if the consequent is denied In categorical reasoning the affirmation of the premises requires an affirmation of the conclusion and a denial of the conclusion requires a denial of the premises

With respect to the distinction between the categorical and hypothetical proposition there is also an issue whether propositions stated in one form can always be converted into propositions having the other form of statement In modern mathematical logic for example general propositions such as All men are mortal are sometimes expressed in hypothetical form If anything is a *man* it is *mortal* Logicians like Bertrand Russell think that the hypothetical form is more exact because it explicitly refrains from suggesting that men exist it merely states that if the class *man* should have any existent members they will also belong to the class *mortal*

Apart from the question whether a universal proposition should or should not be interpreted as asserting the existence of anything there seems to be a formal difference between the categorical and hypothetical proposition This is manifest only when the hypothetical is truly a compound proposition not when it is the statement of a simple proposition in hypothetical form as for example the simple proposition All men are mortal is stated in hypothetical form by If anything is a man it is mortal Because it is truly a compound proposition and not merely the hypothetical statement of a general proposition the proposition If virtue is knowledge then virtue is teachable cannot be restated in the form of a simple categorical proposition

A simple proposition whether stated categorically or hypothetically may be the conclusion of either a categorical or a hypothetical syllogism But the hypothetical statement which is really a compound proposition can never be the conclusion of any sort of syllogism though it may be one of the premises in hypothetical reasoning

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

49 D RWIN *Origin of Species* 42a
53 JAMES *Psychology* xiiib-xiva 95a 231b [fn 3]
54 FREUD *Narcissism* 400d-401d / *Instincts* 412a b / *General Introduct on* 483d-485a / *New Introductory Lectures* 818c-819b

4c The purpose of hypotheses saving the appearances the formulation of predictions

7 PLATO *Meno* 183b-c / *Republic* BK VI 386d 388a BK VII 39 398c / *Timaeu* 447a-d
8 ARISTOTLE *Heavens* BK II CH 5 379b-c BK III CH 7 [306 18] 397b-c / *Meteorology* BK I CH 7 [344ᵇ5-9] 450b
10 HIPPOCRATES *Ancient Medicine* par 1 1a b / *Prognostics* par 1 19a b par 5 26a,c
16 PTOLEMY *Almagest* BK II 83a BK IX 270b-273a BK XIII 429a b
16 CO ERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* 505a 506a
16 KE ER *Ep tome* BK IV 852a b 888b-890b 911a b 929a BK V 964b
18 AUGUSTI E *Co f ssions* BK V par 4 27d 28a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theol gica* PART I Q 32 A 1 REP 2 17 d 178a
28 GILB RT *Loadstone* BK 1, 119a b
8 H ey *Circulati n of the Blood* 316a b
30 B con *Novum Orga um* BK I APH 18 149d APH 36 165d 166a
31 DESC s *Discourse* P RT 1 66a b
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VIII [66-84] 233b-234
34 NEWTON *Princi les* BK III GENERAL SCHOL, 371b-372a / *Optics* K 1 379a
34 HUYG S *Light* PR 551b-552a CH 1 553a b
35 LOCK *Human Understa ding* BK IV CH III SECT 16 317 -c CH XI S CT 13 362 -d
35 B K LEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 1 5 433b-c
35 H M *Human Understand g* SECT IV 1 6 460b-c CT IX DI 8 487b-c SECT X D 107 499d 500a
36 STER E *Tristram Shandy* 272b-273b
38 ROU SE *Ineq ality* 329d 330 333d 334
42 KANT *Pure Reason*, 228b-c / *Science of Right* 457a b
45 LAVOISI R *Elemen f Chemistry* PART 1 9d 10a ART II, 6 a-63a
45 F RAD Y *Researches in Electricity* 850b d 851c
49 D WIN *Or gin f Species* 42a 239c
53 J M *Ps hology* 357b 367b [fn 5] 655a 862a 863a 883a 884b
54 FR U *General I troducto* 483d-484a / *Group Psych logy* 686c-d / *New Introductory Lectures*, 840a b

4d Cons st ncy mpl city a d bea ty as sta d ards n the construction of hypotheses

16 PTOLEMY *Almagest* BK II 93a BK XIII 429a b
16 COPER ICU *Revolutions f th H avenly Spheres* 505a 506a 507a 508a BK IV 675b-6 8a esp 677b 678a BK V 740a b 784b-785b
16 KEPL R *Epitome* BK I 888b-890a BK 984b-985b
42 K NT *Pure Reason* 227d 228d / *Judgement* 551a 553c
45 LAVOISIER *Elements of Chemistry* PART II 61a-63a
53 JAMES *Psychology* 655a-659a esp 655a 657b-658b
54 FREUD *Narcissism* 400d-401a

4e The task of verificat on the plurality of hypotheses

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK II 49a-c
8 A ISTOTL *Heavens* BK II CH 14 387d-389d BK III CH 7 [306ᵃ6-18] 397b-c
10 GALE *Natural Faculties* BK I CH 14 177a 178d
11 ARCHIMEDES *Sand Reckoner* 520a b
12 LUC ETIUS *Nature of Things* BK VI [703 711] 89c-d
16 PTOLEMY *Almagest* BK I 9a 12b BK III 86b-93a BK IV 120a 122b
16 COPERNICU *Revolut ns f the Heavenly S heres* 505a 506a BK I 514b-515b BK III 653b-656b
16 KEPL R *Epitome* K IV 852a b 857b-860b 907b-916a / *Harmonies of the World* 1014b-1016a
18 AUGU TINE *Co fessions* BK V par 3-6 27c 28c
19 AQUI AS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 32 A 1 REP 2 175d 178a
28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences* THIRD DAY 203d 205b
28 HARVEY *M tion f the Heart* 268d 273c esp 268d 273c 286b-304a c esp 286b-c 295d 296a / *Circulation of the Blood* 311c 312c 324c-d
30 B CON *Novum Org num* BK II APH 36 164a 168d
31 D CAR ES *Discourse* P RT I 61d-62c 66a b
3 MILTON *Paradise Los* K VI I [66-1 8] 233b-236a
33 PASCAL *Vacuum* 368b-370a / *Weight of Air* 404 -405b 425a-429a
34 N WTON *Principles* K II RO 52 SCHOL, 265a b O 53 CHO 266a 267a BK III GENER L SCHOL, 369a / *O tics* K 1 453a 455a BK III 525b-530b 543a b
34 HUYGEN *Light* REF 551b-552a
35 LOCK *Huma U derstanding* BK IV CH XII SECT 13 362c-d
36 SWIFT *G llver* P RT II 118b-119a
42 K NT *Pure Re so* 8d [fn 2]
43 MILL *Liberty* 283d 284b
45 LAVO R *Elemer s of Chem stry* PRE 2a b
45 FOURIER *Theory f Heat* 181b
45 F R DAY *Researche in Electricity* 385b-c 440b d 830b-832c
49 DARWIN *Origin f Speci s* 42a b 239c
53 J M S *Psychology* 655a-659a esp 655a b 863a 865a 882a-884b

(3 *The foundations of mathematics: postulates, assumptions.*)

[1061a29–b4] 589c BK XIII CH 2 [1077b11]–CH 3 [1078a31] 609a d
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VII CH 8 [1151a15–19] 402a
11 EUCLID *Elements* BK I POSTULATES COMMON NOTIONS 2a
11 ARCHIMEDES *Sphere and Cylinder* BK I ASSUMPTIONS 404b / *Spirals* 484b / *Quadrature of the Parabola* 527a b
31 DESCARTES *Rules* II 2d 3b / *Meditations* 73a / *Geometry* BK II 304a 305a 316a b
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 1–5 171a 173a / *Vacuum* 365b 366a / *Geometrical Demonstration* 430b 439b passim 442a 443b
34 NEWTON *Principles* 1a b
34 HUYGENS *Light* PREF 551b 552a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK IV CH XII SECT 1–7 358c 360c passim
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 17d 18d 24c 25b 46a c 110a 211c 218d esp 217a c / *Practical Reason* 302d 303b 312c d 330d 331a / *Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 376c d / *Judgement* 551a 553c
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 31 103c 104a
43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 445b c
45 FOURIER *Theory of Heat* 175b
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK V 120d 121b
53 JAMES *Psychology* 869a 870a 874a 878a

4 The role of hypotheses in science

7 PLATO *Meno* 183b c / *Republic* BK VI 386d 388a / *Timaeus* 447a d
8 ARISTOTLE *Meteorology* BK I CH 7 [344a5–9] 450b / *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 6 [1071b12]–CH 7 [1072a22] 601b 602b CH 8 603b 605a
10 HIPPOCRATES *Prognostics* par 1 19a b par 25 26a c
16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* 505a 506a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 32 A 1 REP 2 175d 178a PART I–II Q 14 A 6 ANS 680c 681a
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK I APH 105 106 128b c
31 DESCARTES *Rules* XII 23a-c / *Discourse* PART VI 66a b
33 PASCAL *Vacuum* 368b 370a
34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III RULE I 270a RULE IV 271b GENERAL SCHOL 371b 372a / *Optics* BK III 543a b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK IV CH III SECT 16 317a c CH XII SECT 12 13 362a-d
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III 118a 119a
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 7a d / *Judgement* 603b-c
45 LAVOISIER *Elements of Chemistry* PREF 2a b 6d 7a PART I 23b-c
45 FOURIER *Theory of Heat* 184a
45 FARADAY *Researches in Electricity* 467a b 607a c 851a c
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 239c / *Descent of Man* 590a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XIII 563a b
53 JAMES *Psychology* 324b 862a 866a 882a 884b
54 FREUD *Interpretation of Dreams* 351c / *Narcissism* 400d-401a / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 661c 662b

4a Theories: provisional assumptions, fictions, reifications

7 PLATO *Meno* 183b c / *Republic* BK VI 386d 388a BK VII 397c d / *Timaeus* 447d-450c / *Laws* BK VII 730a-c
8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 10 [76b22–77a4] 105c d / *Heavens* BK I CH 12 [281b3 25] 373a b BK II CH 5 379b c / *Metaphysics* BK VI CH 1 [1025b1 13] 547b BK XI CH 7 [1064a4–9] 592b BK XII CH 6 [1071b12]–CH 7 [1072a22] 601b 602b CH 8 603b-605a
11 ARCHIMEDES *Equilibrium of Planes* BK I POSTULATES 502a b / *Floating Bodies* BK I POSTULATE 1 538a POSTULATE 2 541b
16 PTOLEMY *Almagest* BK III 83a 86b 87a BK IX 270b 273a 291a 292a BK XIII 429a b
16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* BK I 513b 514b BK III 628b 629a BK IV 675b 678a BK V 740a b 784b 785b
16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 863b 872b 890b-892a 929a b 932a 933a BK V 964b 966a 967a 984b 985b 991a 994b / *Harmonies of the World* 1023b 1080b
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 32 A 1 REP 2 175d 178a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 258d 259a
28 GILBERT *Loadstone* BK VI 108b 110b
28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences* SECOND DAY 179c d THIRD DAY 200a d 203d 205b FOURTH DAY 240d 241c
28 HARVEY *Circulation of the Blood* 316a 318b passim esp 316a b / *On Animal Generation* 383d
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK I APH 66 114d 115c BK II APH 36 165d 166b APH 46 178c
31 DESCARTES *Rules* XII 23a c
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 72 182b / *Vacuum* 367a 370a
34 NEWTON *Principles* BK II HYPOTHESIS 259a BK III HYPOTHESIS I 285a HYPOTHESIS II 331b GENERAL SCHOL 371b 372a / *Optics* BK I 379a BK III 516a 544a esp 520a 522b 525b 530b
34 HUYGENS *Light* CH I 557b 560b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK IV CH III SECT 16 317a-c CH XII SECT 13 362c d
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III 118a 119a
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 227d 228b / *Science of Right* 457a b / *Judgement* 603b-c
43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 445b c
45 LAVOISIER *Elements of Chemistry* PART I 9a 10b
45 FARADAY *Researches in Electricity* 273a 277a 758a 759c 777d 778c 830b 832c 850b d 855a c esp 850b d 851c

4*b* The purpose of hypotheses s ing the appearances the formulation of pred c t ons

4*c* Consist cy s mplicity and beauty as standards n the construction of hypoth s

4*d* The task of erification the plurality of hypotheses

(3 *The foundations of mathematics postulates, assumptions.*)

[1061 29–^{b}4] 589c BK XIII CH 2 [1077^{b}11]–CH 3 [1078 31] 609a d
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VII CH 8 [1151 15–19] 402a
11 EUCLID *Elements* BK I POSTULATES COMMON NOTIONS 2a
11 ARCHIMEDES *Sphere and Cylinder* BK I ASSUMPTIONS 404b / *Spirals* 484b / *Quadrature of the Parabola* 527a b
31 DESCARTES *Rules* II 2d 3b / *Meditations* 73a / *Geometry* BK II 304a 305a 316a b
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30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK I APH 105–106 128b-c
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34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III RULE I 270a RULE IV 271b GENERAL SCHOL 371b 372a / *Optics* BK III 543a b
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11 ARCHIMEDES *Equilibrium of Planes* BK I POSTULATES 502a b / *Floating Bodies* BK I POSTULATE 1 538a POSTULATE 2 541b
16 PTOLEMY *Almagest* BK III 83a 86b 87a BK IX 270b 273a 291a 292a BK XIII 429a b
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Chapter 37 IDEA

INTRODUCTION

AS the topical analysis or outline in each chapter indicates, the great ideas are not simple objects of thought. Each of the great ideas seems to have a complex interior structure—an order of parts involving related meanings and diverse positions which, when they are opposed to one another, determine the basic issues in that area of thought.

The great ideas are also the conceptions by which we think about things. They are the terms in which we state fundamental problems; they are the notions we employ in defining issues and discussing them. They represent the principal content of our thought. They are *what* we think as well as what we think *about*.

If, in addition to its objects and content, we wish to think about thought itself—*its* acts or processes—we shall find in the tradition of the great books a number of related terms which indicate the scope of such inquiry. Some of them are: idea, judgment, understanding and reasoning, perception, memory and imagination, sense and mind. Here we are concerned with one of these—the idea IDEA. It is probably the most elementary of all these related terms, for according to different conceptions of the nature and origin of ideas, the analysis of thought and knowledge will vary. Different positions will be taken concerning the faculties by which men know, the acts and processes of thinking and the limits of human understanding.

Does the word "idea," when it is used in the technical discourse of metaphysics or psychology, signify that which is known or understood? Does it signify not the object of thought but the thought itself? Or both? Certainly in popular speech the word is used both ways, for men speak of understanding an idea and note differences in their understanding of the same idea; and they also say that they have different ideas about the same thing, meaning that they understand the same thing differently.

The word "idea" has many other oppositions of meaning in its tremendous range of ambiguity. It is sometimes used exclusively for the eternal types in the divine mind or the intelligible forms that exist apart from material things which are their copies; sometimes for concepts in the human mind abstracted from sense-experience; sometimes for the seeds of understanding, which belong innately to the intellect and so do not need to be derived from sense. Sometimes "idea" means a sensation or a perception as well as an abstract thought, and then its connotation extends to almost every type of mental content; sometimes it is denied that there are any abstract or general ideas, and sometimes "idea" has the extremely restricted meaning of an image which is the memory of a sense-impression.

Kant vigorously protests against what he thinks is a needless abuse of the term *idea*. "I beg those who really have philosophy at heart," he writes, "to exert themselves to preserve to the expression *idea* its original signification. There is," he insists, "no want of words to denominate adequately every mode of *representation* without encroaching upon terms which are proper to others."

Kant proposes a "graduated list" of such terms. He begins with *perception* which he divides into *sensation* and *cognition* according as it is subjective or objective. A cognition, he then goes on, "is either an *intuition* or a *conception*," according as it has either an immediate or a mediate relation to its object. Dividing conceptions into the *empirical* and the *pure*, Kant finally reaches the term *idea* as one subdivision of pure conceptions. If the pure conception has its origin in the understanding

(4 *The role of hypotheses in science* 4d *The task of verification, the plurality of hypotheses*)

54 Freud *Narcissism* 401a / *General Introduction* 502d 503c / *New Introductory Lectures* 815a b 818c 819b

5 Hypothetical propositions and syllogisms the distinction between the hypothetical and the categorical

8 Aristotle *Prior Analytics* BK I CH I [24 21–b16] 39a c CH 23 [40b23 9] 57b-c [41 21-41] 58a b CH 29 62d 63d CH 44 68d 69b BK II CH 11-14 81b 84b / *Posterior Analytics* BK II CH 6 125d 126b

19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 14 A 13 REP 2 86d 88c Q 19 A 8 REP 1 3 116a d

42 Kant *Pure Reason* 39c-41c esp 40d 41c 51d 52a 110d 111c esp 111b 129c-d 179c 180c 193a 200c esp 194b d 232c 233c / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 265c 267a esp 266a-c / *Practical Reason* 297a 298a

CROSS REFERENCES

For The distinction between axioms and postulates assumptions and hypotheses *see* Judgment 8a Principle 2b(2) 3c–3c(3) Truth 4c 7a

Other discussions of the use of hypotheses in dialectic and philosophy *see* Dialectic 2a(2) Logic 4d Philosophy 3b–3c *and for the distinction between scientific and dialectical* reasoning *see* Principle 3c(2) Reasoning 5b–5c

Other discussions of postulates in mathematics *see* Logic 4a Mathematics 3a and for other treatments of hypothetical judgments and hypothetical reasoning *see* Judgment 6d Reasoning 2b

The employment and verification of hypotheses in empirical science *see* Astronomy 2b Experience 5a–5c Logic 4b Mechanics 2b Physics 4b–4d Science 4c 5c

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection
II Works by authors not represented in this collection

For the date place and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

I

Descartes *The Principles of Philosophy* PART III 43–47
Hobbes *Concerning Body* PART IV CH 26
Spinoza *Correspondence* VI XIII
Kant *Introduction to Logic* X
J S Mill *A System of Logic* BK III CH 14

II

Arnauld *Logic or the Art of Thinking* PART II
Boyle *Reflections upon the Hypothesis of Alkali and Acidum*
T Reid *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man* I CH 3
Brown *Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind* VOL I pp 220–241
Herschel *A Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy* par 202 208 210 216
Comte *The Positive Philosophy* BK III CH I
Whewell *The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences* VOL II BK XIII
—— *On the Philosophy of Discovery* APPENDIX H
Bernard *Introduction to Experimental Medicine* PART I CH 2
Tyndall *Scientific Use of the Imagination*
Jevons *The Principles of Science* CH 23
Bradley *The Principles of Logic* BK I CH 2
Bosanquet *Logic* VOL II CH 5
C S Peirce *Collected Papers* VOL II par 619–644 669–693 755–791 VOL VI par 7–34
Venn *Principles of Empirical or Inductive Logic* CH 16
Poincaré *Science and Hypothesis* PART IV CH 9–10
Mach *Erkenntnis und Irrtum* (Die Hypothese)
Duhem *La théorie physique son objet—sa structure*
Pareto *The Mind and Society* VOL I CH 4–5
N P Campbell *Physics the Elements* CH 6
—— *What Is Science?* CH 5
Bohr *Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature*
Northrop *Science and First Principles*
Einstein *On the Method of Theoretical Physics*
Fisher *The Design of Experiments*
Dewey *Logic the Theory of Inquiry* CH 7

tion which would destroy the universe of discourse There is a slender thread of meaning which ties all the elements of the tradition together—not in a unity of truth or agreement but in an intelligible joining of issues.

This unity can be seen in two ways It appears first in the fact that any consideration of ideas—whether as objects or contents of the mind—involves a theory of knowledge This much is common to all meanings of idea.

Those like Plato and Berkeley for whom ideas constitute a realm of intelligible or sensible being make knowledge of reality consist in the apprehension or understanding of ideas. Those like Aristotle and James for whom ideas have no being except as perceptions or thoughts, make them the instruments whereby reality is known On either view knowledge involves a relationship between a knower and a known or between a knowing faculty and a knowable entity but on one view ideas are the reality which is known and on the other they are the representations by which is known a reality that does not include ideas among its constituents. These two views do not exhaust the possibilities.

Ideas are sometimes regarded both as objects of knowledge and as representations of reality Some writers (as for example Plato) distinguish two orders of reality—the sensible and the *intelligible*—and two modes of apprehension—sensing and understanding and they use the word idea for both the *intelligible* object and the understanding of it Locke begging the reader s pardon for his frequent use of the word idea says that it is the term which serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a *man thinks* But Locke also distinguishes between knowledge of real existences through ideas that the mind has of things as they are in themselves and knowledge of the relations among our own ideas, which the mind gets from their comparison with one another For Hume too, ideas as well as impressions are involved in our knowledge of *matters* of fact but relations between ideas may also be objects of knowledge as in the sciences of geometry algebra and arithmetic.

This double use of idea is sometimes accompanied as in Aquinas, by an explicit acknowledgement and ordering of the two senses. For Aquinas concepts are primarily the means of knowledge not the objects of knowledge A concept Aquinas writes is not *what* is actually understood but *that by which* the intellect understands —that by which something else is known Secondarily however concepts become *that which* we know when we reflexively turn our attention to the contents of our own mind Using the phrase "intelligible species to signify concepts Aquinas explains that since the intellect reflects upon itself by such reflection it understands not only *its own act of intelligence* but also the species by which it understands. Thus the intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily but that which is primarily understood is the object of *which the species is the* likeness.

It is possible therefore to have ideas about things or ideas about ideas. In the vocabulary of this analysis by Aquinas, the ideas or concepts whereby real things are understood are sometimes called the first intentions of the *mind* The ideas whereby we understand these ideas or *first intentions* are called the mind s second intentions An idea is always a mental intention an awareness or representation *never* an independent reality for the mind to know

Locke s differentiation between ideas of sensation and ideas of reflection seems to parallel the *mediaeval* distinction between first and second intentions but whereas second intentions are *ideas engaged* in a reflexive understanding of ideas as objects to be understood Locke s ideas of reflection comprise the *perception* of the operations of our own mind within us as it is employed about the ideas *it has* got A closer parallel perhaps is to be found *in* Locke s distinction between our knowledge of reality or of real existences and our knowledge of the relations existing between our own ideas.

THE SECOND WAY of *seeing* a connection among meanings of idea depends on recognizing what is common to contrary views.

The word pen is utterly equivocal as we have noted, when it names a writing instrument and an animal enclosure. Hence men

alone and is not the conception of a pure sensuous image it is a *notio* or notion and a conception formed from notions which transcends the possibility of experience is an *idea* or a conception of reason

According to Kant anyone ' who has accustomed himself to these distinctions will find it quite intolerable to hear the representation *of the color red called an idea Tolerable* or intolerable the word idea has been used quite persistently with the very meaning that Kant abominates as well as with a variety of others The reader of the great books must be prepared for all these shifts in meaning and with them shifts in doctrine for according to these differences in meaning there are different *analyses of the nature or being of ideas* different accounts of their origin or their coming to be in the human mind and different *classifications of ideas These three questions*— what ideas are how ideas are obtained and of what sorts they are—are so connected that the answer given to one of them tends to circumscribe the answers which can be given to the other two

THE UNITY OF EACH chapter in this guide to the great books depends on some *continuity* of meaning in its central term some common thread of meaning however thin or tenuous which unites and makes intelligible the discussions of various authors about the same thing Without this they would not move in the same universe of discourse at all Nor could they even disagree with one another if the words they used were utterly equivocal as for example the word pen is equivocal when it designates a writing instrument and an enclosure for pigs

The extraordinary ambiguity of the word idea as it is used in the great books puts this principle to the test Are *Plato and Hume* talking about the same thing *at all* when the one discusses ideas as the only intelligible reality and the other treats ideas as the images derived through memory from the original impressions of sense experience? Is there any common ground between Aristotle and Berkeley—between the identification of human ideas with abstract or general conceptions quite distinct from the perceptions or images of sense and the identification of ideas with particular perceptions accompanied by a denial of abstract or general notions?

Do writers like Locke or William James for whom ideas of sensation and abstract ideas (or *percepts and concepts) belong to the one faculty* of understanding or to the single stream of consciousness communicate with writers like *Plotinus Descartes and Spinoza* for whom ideas belong to the intellect or to the thinking being separate from matter and from sensations which are only bodily reactions? Or with writers like Aristotle and Aquinas for whom there is a sharp distinction between the faculties of sense and intellect? Can Aristotle and Aquinas in turn explain the origin of concepts or *intelligible species by reference to the intellect s* power of abstracting them from experience or sensible species and still carry on discussion with *Plato* Augustine and Descartes who regard the intellect as in some way innately endowed with ideas with the principles or seeds of understanding?

The foregoing is by no means an exhaustive inventory *It fails* for example to ask about the sense in which the theologians speak of ideas in the mind of God and of the illumination *of the angelic or the human intellect by* ideas divinely infused (What is the common thread of meaning between such discourse and that concerned with the formation of abstract concepts or with the revival of sense impressions in images?) It fails also to question the meaning of idea in Kant s tripartite analysis of the faculties of intuition judgment and reasoning or in Hegel s ultimate synthesis of all nature and history in the dialectical life of the Absolute Idea (What do these meanings of idea have in common with the sense in which Freud distinguishes between conscious and unconscious ideas?)

The inventory is also incomplete in that it does not indicate the many divergent routes taken by authors who seem to share a common starting point Even those who on certain points seem to talk the same language appear to have no basis for communication on other points in the theory of ideas But the questions which have been asked suffice for the purpose at hand However great the ambiguity of idea it does not reach that limit of equivoca

Just as the extreme version of the first position is taken by those who identify ideas with perceptions, so here the opposite extreme consists in the denial of any connection between ideas and all the elements of sense-experience. The ideas in the divine mind or the ideas infused by God into the angelic intellects, have no origin in experience nor any need for the perceptions, memories, or images of sense. They are not abstract ideas, that is, they are not concepts abstracted from sense materials.

"Our intellect," Aquinas writes, "abstracts the intelligible species from the individuating principles"—the material conditions of sense and imagination. But the intelligible species in the divine intellect," he continues, "is immaterial not by abstraction, but of itself. The divine ideas, Aquinas quotes Augustine as saying, "are certain original forms or permanent and immutable models of things which are contained in the divine intelligence." Following Augustine's statement that "each thing was created by God according to the idea proper to it," Aquinas restricts the word "idea" to the "exemplars existing in the divine mind" and to the species of things with which God informs the angelic intellects. He uses the word "concept" where others speak of "ideas" in the human mind.

Descartes, on the other hand, endows the human mind with ideas—not concepts abstracted from and dependent on sense, but intuitive apprehensions which, since they cannot be drawn in any way from sense-experience, must be an innate property of the human mind. He does not, however, always use the word "idea" in this strict sense. Some ideas, he says, "appear to be innate, some adventitious, and others to be formed or invented by myself." The ideas called "adventitious" are those which seem to come from the outside, as when "I hear some sound, or see the sun, or feel heat." Those which we form or invent ourselves are "constructions of the imagination." Only innate ideas, in Descartes' view, are truly ideas in the sense of being the elements of certain knowledge and the sources of intellectual intuition. "By intuition," he says, "I understand, not the fluctuating testimony of the senses, nor the misleading judgment that proceeds from the blundering constructions of the imagination," but "the undoubting conception of an unclouded and attentive mind, which springs from the light of reason alone."

As mind and body are separate substances for Descartes—mind being conceived by him as a *res cogitans* or thinking substance quite separate from a *res extensa* or the extended matter of a bodily substance—so ideas and sensations are independent in origin and function. Like infused ideas in the angelic intellect, innate ideas in the human mind are not abstract, for they are not abstracted. But unlike the angelic intellect, the human mind, even when it employs innate ideas, is discursive or cogitative. It is never conceived as entirely free from the activities of judgment and reasoning, even when its power is also supposed to be intuitive—that is, able to apprehend intelligible objects without analysis or without recourse to the representations of sense.

The doctrine of innate ideas does not always go as far as this in separating intellectual knowledge—or knowledge by means of ideas—from sense-experience. In the theories of Plato and Augustine, for example, sense-experience serves to awaken the understanding to apprehend the intelligible objects for the intuition of which it is innately equipped.

"To learn those things which do not come into us as *images* by the senses," Augustine writes, "but which we know within ourselves without images ... is in reality only to take things that the memory already contains scattered and unarranged ... and by thinking bring them together." Moreover, the memory contains, not only "images impressed upon it *by the* senses of the body," but also the notions of the very things themselves, which notions we never received by any avenue of the body."

This process of learning by remembering *appears to be similar* to the process which Plato also calls "recollection" or reminiscence. In the *Meno* Socrates demonstrates that a slave-boy who thinks he knows no geometry can be led simply by questioning to discover that he knew all the while the solution of a geometric problem. "There have always been true thoughts in him," Socrates tells Meno, thoughts "which only needed to be awakened into knowledge by putting questions to him. Hence "his soul must always have possessed this knowledge."

cannot contradict one another no matter what *opposite things they may say about pens in one* sense and *pens* in the other The two meanings of pen are not even connected by being opposed to one another But all the meanings of idea do seem to be connected by opposition at least so that writers who use the word in its different senses and have different theories of idea cannot avoid facing the issues raised by their conflicting analyses

The root of this opposition lies in the positive and negative views of the relation of ideas to sensations—or more generally to sense and the sensible Though there are different analyses of sensation one or both of two points seems to be *agreed upon that sensations are particular per*ceptions and that sensations result from the impingement of physical stimuli upon the sense organs of a living body

Berkeley insists upon the first point while emphatically denying the second Ideas or sensations are always particulars but he says the various sensations or ideas imprinted on the sense however blended or combined together (that is whatever objects they compose) cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them and their cause is neither physical matter nor the perceiving mind but some other will or spirit that produces them Others like *Lucretius and Hobbes who regard sensations as* particular perceptions do not use the word idea as Berkeley does for perceptions of ex*ternal origin but restrict it to inner productions* of the mind itself in its acts of memory or imagination

The various theories of *idea thus range from* those which identify an idea with a sensation or perception or with the derivatives of sensation to those which deny the identity or even any relationship between ideas and sensations or images of sense

THE FIRST POSITION is taken by writers who conceive mind or understanding in men or animals as the only faculty of knowledge It performs all the functions of knowing and thinking It is sensitive as well as reflective It perceives and remembers as well as imagines and reasons

Within this group of writers there are differences Berkeley for example thinks the *objects* of human knowledge include either ideas actually imprinted on the senses or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind or lastly ideas formed by the help of memory and imagination—either compounding dividing or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways Hume on the other hand divides all the perceptions of the mind into two classes or species which are distinguished by their different degrees of force or vivacity The less forcible and lively are commonly denominated *Thoughts or Ideas The other species* want a name in our language and in most others

Let us therefore use a little freedom and *call them Impressions* By this term Hume explains I mean all our more lively perceptions when we hear or see or feel or love or hate or desire or will

Another use of terms is represented by Locke who distinguishes between ideas of sensation and reflection simple and complex ideas particular and general ideas and uses the word idea both for the original elements of sense experience and for all the derivatives produced by the mind s activity in reworking these given materials whether by acts of memory imaginative construction or abstraction Still another variation is to be found in William James Despite the authority of Locke he thinks that the word idea has not domesticated itself in the language so as to cover bodily sensations Ac*cordingly he restricts the word idea* to concepts and never uses it for sensations or perceptions Nevertheless like Locke he does not *think that the development of concept from* percept needs the activity of a special faculty Both concept and percept belong to the single stream of thought and are *states of con*sciousness

THE SECOND POSITION is taken by writers who in one way or another distinguish between sense and intellect and regard them as quite separate faculties of knowing The one is supposed to perform the functions of perception imagination and memory the other the functions of thought—conception judgment and reasoning or if not these then acts of intellectual vision or intuition Here too there are differences within the group

the Ideas or Forms apart from both matter and mind It is in the context of this argument that the traditional epithet realism gets one of its meanings, when it signifies the view that ideas or uni ersals ha e an ind pendent reality of their own. Th e various opponents of this view are not called idealists. If they deny any exist ence to universal ideas outside the mind they are usually called con eptualists if they deny the presence of uni ersals even in the mind they are called "nominalists. These doctrines are more fully discussed in the chapters on SAME AND OTHER, UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR.

The controversy about the bein of ideas has another phase that has already been noted in this chapter and it is in th s connection that the epithet "idealism gets one of its traditional meanings. The doctrine is not that ideas have real existence outs de the mind On the con trary it is that the only realities are mental—either minds or the ideas in th em.

Berkeley s famous proposition—*esse est percipi* to be is to be perceived—seems intended to permit only one exception. The perceiv ing mind has being without being perceived but nothin else has. Everything else which exists is an idea a being of and in the mind. According to this doctrine (which takes different forms in Berkeley and in Hegel *for ex ample*) the phrase idea of" is meaningless. Nothin exists of which an idea can be a representat on. There is no *meaning* to the distinc tion between thing and idea. The real and the ideal are identical

Plato is sometimes called an idealist" but not in this sense He has never been interpreted as completely denying reality to the changing material things which imitate or copy the eter nal ideas, the immutable archetypes or Forms. Applied to Plato or to Plotinus, idealism seems to signify the superior reality of ideal (as opposed to material or physical) existence Just as idealism has these widely divergent mean ings, so does realism when it designates, on the one hand those who attribute independent reality to ideas and on the other hand those who affirm the existence of an order of real existences independent of the ideas which represent them in the mind.

Writers who distinguish between things and ideas, or between the order of reality and the mind s conception of it face the problem of differentiating between these two modes of be ing. To say that ideas or concepts exist only in the mind is not to say that they do not exist at all but only that they do not exist in the same way as things outside the mind

Does an entity in its real existence apart from knowledge have the same character that it has when as an object known it somehow belongs to the knowing mind? Is there a kind of neutral essence which can assume both modes of existence—real existence independent of mind and ideal existence or existence in the mind as an object conceived *or known*? Is an idea or concept in the mind nothing but the real thing objectified or transformed into an object of knowledge or is the real thing the *thing in itself, utterly different from the objects* of experience or knowledge—*neither knowable* nor capable of representation by concepts?

These questions, relevant to the consider ation of ideas as representations of reality are of course also relevant to problems considered in the chapters on BEING, EXPERIENCE, and KNOWLEDGE. The issues indicated are there discussed.

Intimately connected with them are ques tions about the truth of ideas. Can ideas or concepts be true or false in the sense in which truth and falsity are attributed to propositions or judgments? Under what conditions is an idea true? In what does its truth consist and what are the signs or marks of its truth? These matters are discussed in the chapter on TRUTH Here it is sufficient to point out that the tradi tional distinction between adequate and in adequate ideas, and the comparison of clear and distinct with obscure and confused ideas are used to determine the criteria of truth. It may be the truth of a concept taken by itself or of the judgment into which several concepts enter To the extent that ideas are regarded as representative their *truth* (or the truth of the judg ments *they* form) seems to consist *in* some mode of a greement or correspondence with the reality they represent or as Spinoza says its *ideatum*

Within the conceptual or mental order it self, there is a further distinction between ideas which do not perform a representative function and those which do The former are treated as

Learning according to this doctrine of innate ideas must therefore be described as an attempt to recollect not what you do not know but rather what you do not remember

Learning by recollection or reminiscence seems to be a process in which latent ideas (whether they are retained by the soul from a previous life or are part of the soul s endowment at its creation) become active either through the questioning of a teacher or through being awakened by the perceptions of the bodily senses Though such bodily stimulation of thought implies a functional connection between body and soul nevertheless both Plato and Augustine hold that ideas are independent in origin They are not derived from sense though their appearance may be occasioned by events in the world of sense

One other view still remains to be considered It denies that ideas are innate in the human mind at the same time that it distinguishes between the intellect and the senses as separate faculties of knowing Having to explain whence the intellect gets its ideas writers like Aristotle and Aquinas attribute to the human intellect an abstractive power by which it draws the intelligible species from sensory images which Aquinas calls phantasms

The concepts by which our intellect understands material things we obtain by abstracting the form from the individual matter which is represented by the phantasms Through the universal concept thus abstracted we are able Aquinas holds to consider the nature of the species apart from its individual principles It should be added here that abstractions are not vehicles of intuitive apprehension Conception which is the first act of the mind yields knowledge only when concepts are used in subsequent acts of judgment and reasoning

Abstract or universal concepts are as different from the ideas which belong to intellects separate from bodies—the divine or angelic intellects—as they are different from the particular perceptions or images of sense They occupy an intermediate position between the two just as according to Aquinas the human intellect holds a middle place between angelic intelligence and corporeal sense On the one hand the human intellect is for Aquinas an incorporeal power on the other hand it functions only in cooperation with the corporeal powers of sense and imagination So the concepts which the human intellect forms being universal are immaterial but they are also dependent in origin and function on the materials of sense Not only are universal concepts abstracted from the phantasms but for the intellect to understand physical things it must of necessity Aquinas writes turn to the phantasms in order to perceive the universal nature existing in the individual

This theory of abstract ideas seems not far removed from the position of Locke who distinguishes between particular and general ideas (which he calls abstract) or that of William James who distinguishes between universal concepts and sense perceptions Yet on one question the difference between them is radical namely whether particular sensations and universal ideas belong to the same faculty of mind or to the quite distinct faculties of sense and intellect

This difference seems to have considerable bearing on the way in which these writers explain the process of abstraction or generalization with consequences for certain subtleties acknowledged or ignored in the analysis of the grades of abstraction Nevertheless the resemblance between the positions of Locke and Aquinas or those of William James and Aristotle each affirming in his own way that the mind contains nothing not rooted in the senses serves to mediate between the more extreme positions

The dispute about innate ideas and the controversy over abstract ideas are issues in psychology inseparable from fundamental differences concerning the nature and operation of the faculty or faculties of knowing There are other issues which concern the being or the truth of ideas Here the first question is not whether ideas are objects of knowledge but whether the existence of ideas is real or mental —outside the mind or in it

One aspect of this controversy is considered in the chapter on Form ir the argument between Aristotle and Plato about the being of

less inclusive classes. What seems to be peculiar to Aristotle's analysis of species and genera is the setting of upper and lower limits to the hierarchy of universal terms, with a small number of irreducible categories (or *summa genera*) under which all species fall, and at the other extreme with a limit number of lowest (or *infimae*) species which are incapable of subsuming other species.

The terms which fall under the lowest species must either be particulars or accidental classes. Those which seem to be predicable of the categories themselves, such as *being* or *one*, cannot be genera. These are the terms which Aristotle's mediaeval followers call "transcendental" and "analogical." Using the word "transcendental" in a different sense, Kant enumerates a set of concepts which bear some resemblance to Aristotle's *summa genera* but which he treats as transcendental categories.

The difference among concepts with respect to generality is of interest to the psychologist as well as the logician, for it raises the problem of whether the more or the less general takes precedence in the order of learning. The order and relation of ideas is even more the common ground of both logic and psychology. Both, for example, deal with the position and sequence of terms or concepts in reasoning, though the logician aims to *prescribe* the forms which reasoning must take in order to be valid, whereas the psychologist tries to *describe* the steps by which thinking actually goes on.

Only the logician, however, is concerned with the way in which terms are ordered to one another as positive and negative, or as contraries, just as from Aristotle to Freud only the psychologist deals with the association of ideas in the stream of thought by relationships of contiguity and succession, similarity and difference. According as the logical connection of ideas or their psychological association is made the primary fact, radically divergent interpretations are given of the nature of mind, the life of reason, and the process of thought.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

fantasies fictions or chimeras the latter are called by contrast real ideas or ideas having some reference to reality The question of the reality of ideas takes precedence over the question of their truth at least for those who regard the division into true and false as applicable only to representations Yet the criteria of the distinction between the real and the imaginary are difficult to separate from the criteria of true and false The separation is made most readily by those who use idea to mean memory image They can test the reality of an idea by tracing it back to the impression from which it originated

Another sort of test is applied by those who measure the reality of abstract ideas by their fidelity to the sense perceptions from which they were abstracted Still another criterion proposed by William James is that of freedom from contradiction An idea has truth and its object has reality if it remains uncontradicted The idea of a winged horse illustrates the point

If I merely dream of a horse with wings James writes my horse interferes with nothing else and has not to be contradicted But if with this horse I make an inroad into the world otherwise known and say for example That is my old mare Maggie having grown a pair of wings where she stands in her stall the whole case is altered for now the horse and place are identified with a horse and place otherwise known and what is known of the latter objects is incompatible with what is perceived with the former

The consideration of ideas or concepts belongs to logic as well as to psychology and metaphysics The logician sometimes deals with concepts directly and with the judgments into which they enter sometimes he deals with them only as they find verbal expression in terms and propositions

The distinction between concepts and judgments (or between terms and propositions) is discussed in the chapter on Judgment There also we see that the classification of judgments or propositions depends in part on the acceptance or rejection of the notions of subject and predicate in the analysis of concepts or terms and if they are accepted on the way in which terms are distinguished both as subjects and as predicates

This in turn depends upon certain traditional divisions which are applicable to terms if not always to concepts such as the familiar distinctions between concrete and abstract and particular and universal terms When the concept which is sometimes called the mental word is regarded as by its very nature abstract and universal these distinctions are applicable only to the physical words which are terms Concrete and particular terms are then treated as verbal expressions of sense perceptions or images abstract and universal terms as verbal expressions of ideas or concepts But when ideas are identified with sense perceptions or images and abstract concepts are denied the existence of general names in ordinary discourse suffices for the distinction between particular and universal terms even though the latter do not express any actual content of the mind

Unlike the foregoing other divisions of terms, as for example the distinction between the univocal and the analogical or between species and genera do not occur throughout the tradition of logic They tend to be characteristic of the logic of Aristotle and its mediaeval development Of these two distinctions that between univocal and analogical terms or concepts appears explicitly so far as this set of great books is concerned only in the *Summa Theologica* Nevertheless Aquinas does have some background for his special theory of analogical terms in Aristotle s treatment of univocal and equivocal names and in his separation of terms which predicate a sameness in species or genus from those which predicate a sameness by analogy The analysis of these distinctions is undertaken in the chapters on Same and Other and Sign and Symbol

Other writers in dealing with universal terms recognize that they have different degrees of generality They sometimes formulate this as an order of more and less inclusive classes Sometimes they refer to the intension and extension or connotation and denotation of terms The more general terms have a less restricted connotation and hence represent more extensive or inclusive classes The more specific terms have a more determinate meaning and so also have a narrower denotation and represent

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad*, BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a-119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119 When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example, in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b-164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK, CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases e.g. *Iliad* BK II [265 283] 12d.

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book, chapter and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (*D*) follows e.g. OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah*, 7 45—(*D*) *II Esdras* 7 46.

SYMBOLS The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas*, consult the Preface.

1 Doctrines of idea

1a. Ideas or relations between ideas as objects of thought or knowledge: the ideas as eternal forms

7 PLATO *Cratylus* 113c 114a,c / *Phaedrus*, 125a 126d / *Symposium*, 167a-d / *Euthyphro* 193a-c / *Phaedo* 224a-c 228d 230c 231c 232a 242b-243c / *Republic* BK III, 333b-334b BK V 368c 373c BK VI 383d 388a BK VII 392b-393b 397a 398c / *Timaeus* 455c-458b / *Parmenides* 486a 511d / *Theaetetus* 534d 536a / *Sophist* 571a 574c / *Statesman*, 595a-c / *Philebus* 610d-613a / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810d

17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead*, TR IX CH 1 136a-d / *Fifth Ennead*, TR V CH 1 2 228b-229d TR IX CH 6-9 249a 250b / *Sixth Ennead*, TR II CH 21 279b-280a

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X par 16-19 75b-81a passim / *City of God* BK VIII CH 6-7 268d 269d BK XII CH 7 346c-d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 84 AA 1 2 440d-443c A 4 ANS 444d-446b AA 5 7 446c-450b Q 85 A 1 ANS and REP 2 451c 453c A 2, ANS 453d-455b A 3 REP 1,4 455b-457a A 8 ANS 460b-461b Q 86 A 4 REP 2 463d-464d Q 88 A 465 -466c Q 88 A 1 469a-471c 2, A 471c-472c

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 43d-44c

31 DESCARTES *Meditations* 71d 72a III 82d 83a VI 96d-97a / *Objections and Replies* 121a-c DEF II-III 130a b AXIOM V VI 131d 132a 137d 157b-158a 212c 213a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* INTRO, SECT 8 95c-d BK II CH VIII, SECT 8 134b-c CH IX SECT 1 138b-c CH XXI SECT 5 179c-d BK III CH V SECT 12 266d 267 SECT 14 263b-c BK IV CH I SECT 1-CH IV SECT 12 307a 326d passim, esp CH II SECT 1 7 309b-311a, SECT 15 312d 313a, CH III SECT 31 323c-d CH IV SECT 18 328d 329a CH VI SECT 13 335c-d SECT 16 336d CH VII SECT 1-7 337a 338c esp SECT 2 337a CH XI SECT 13 14 357d 358c CH XVII SECT 2 371d 372b SECT 8 377b-d

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* 404 -444d passim, esp INTRO, SECT 2 5 411b-412a c, SECT 1 413a b, SECT 18 416b-c, SECT 23 417b-c SECT 86-91 429c-431a, SECT 135 142 440 441c

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT IV DIV o 458b

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 16a-c esp 16b 113b-115c esp 113c-d 173b-174 esp 173b-d / *Practical Reason* 352c 353a / *Judgement* 551 552c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART II par 140 53a b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 300a 301a 307a

and REP 1 3,4 5d-6c Q 105, A 3 ANS 540c 541b Q 106, A 1 ANS and REP 1 545d 546d Q 107 549b-553b Q 108 A 1 ANS and REP 2 552c 553c Q 113, A ANS 587c-588c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I-II Q 61 A 5, ANS 58b-59d PART III Q 9, A 3 ANS 65b-766b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE, XIII [52-8] 126a b

30 BACON *Novum Organum*, BK I APH 23 108c APH 124 133c-d BK II, APH 15 149a

31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 137d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics*, PART I, PROP 8 SCHOL 362c 363c passim PART II PROP 3, DEMONST 374a-b PROP 4-5 3 4c-d PROP 9 376a-c PROP 19-20 382b-d

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost*, BK II [146-151] 114b BK V [469-505] 185b-186a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III, CH VI, SECT 3 268d CH XI, SECT 23 305a b

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 0-33 418c-419a esp SECT 33 419a SECT 0-71 426d 427a SECT 5-6 42d-4 SECT 81 428a-d

42 KANT *Pure Reason*, 113c 115a 173b-174a esp 173b-c / *Judgement* 551 552c 575b-577 580c-d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO, 169d 170b

1f Idea as the unity of determinate existence and concept: the Absolute Idea

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right*, PREF 6a 7a INTRO, par. 1 2 9a 10a par 3 32 19c 20b PART III, par 259, 93b-c par 245 111b par 352-353 113b-c par 360 113d 114a,c ADDITIONS, 2 115d 9 119c-d / *Philosophy of History* INTRO, 156c 162a esp 156d 157b, 158c, 160b-162a 163a 165b esp 165a b 166b-c 169d 171b 176b-c 182d

2. The origin or derivation of ideas in the human mind

2a. The infusion of ideas: divine illumination

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions*, BK IV par 25c BK VII, par 8 45d par 16 48-49a par 23 50b-c BK XI, par 10 115c-d / *City of God*, BK III, CH 299c-d CH 9 270d 2 1 BK X CH 299d 300a BK XI, CH 335c 336d CH 33 d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 84, A 444d-446b Q 89 A 1 REP 3 473b-475a A 2 A 4 5a-d 4, ANS 476c-477a A 5 478d-479c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I-II, Q 9, A 3 65b-66b 4 REP 2 3 66b-767b PART III SUPPL, Q 1 ANS 102a,c 1037b

31 DESCARTES *Meditations* VI 99a b

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 6-33 418a-419a SECT 423d 424 SECT 6 426a b

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 113b-c

2b. The innate endowment or retention of ideas: the activation of the mind's native content or structure by sense, by memory, or by experience

7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 124a 126c esp 126a-c / *Meno* 179d 183a 188d 189a / *Phaedo* 225a 230d / *Theaetetus* 515d 51 b

8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 1 97a-d BK II CH 19 [99^b20-33] 136a b / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 9 [992^b24-993^a11] 511a-c

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I, CH 22 127c 128, BK II CH 11 150a 151b

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead*, TR II CH 4 8b-c / *Fourth Ennead* TR III CH 155b TR IV CH 5 160d 161b / *Fifth Ennead*, TR III CH 2, 216b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions*, BK X par 15 19 75a 6b par 6-35 8a-81a / *City of God* BK VIII CH 6, 269b-c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I Q 55, A 2 289d 290d A 3 REP 1 291a-d Q 57 A 1 REP 3 295a-d Q 84 A 3 443d-444d A 4 444d 445b A 6, ANS 44 c-449a Q 89, A 1 REP 3 473b-475a Q 117 A 1 ANS and REP 4 595d 59 c

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 333d 335a esp 334c-d

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 1b-c

31 DESCARTES *Rules* IV 5c-d 6d VIII 13c-d / *Discourse* PART IV 53b PART V 54c / *Meditations* II 77d-81d III 83b 88-d VI 96d 97a 99a-c / *Objections and Replies* 120c-d 140c 215b-c 224b,d

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* 90d 91b BK I, CH 1 SECT 1 95b,d 96a SECT 15 98d 99a SECT 23 24 101b-102b CH 3 SECT 12 107b-d CH III 112c 121a,c passim, esp SECT 1 118b-119a BK II, CH 1 SECT 1 121a b SECT 6 122b-c SECT 9 123a SECT 17 125c-d CH IX, SECT 6 139a CH XI SECT 16 14 a

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT II DIV 17 457b,d [fn 1]

42 KANT *Pure Reason*, 14a 108a,c esp 14a b, 22a,c, 23a 34c, 41c-42b, 48d 51d, 53b-55a, 58d 59a, 61a-62c, 66d-93c 113b-115a / *Practical Reason*, 352c 353a / *Judgement* 551a 589c

53 JAMES *Psychology* 851a-890a esp 851b-85 a, 856a b, 859a-860b, 867 -868b, 879b, 889a

54 FREUD *General Introduction*, 512b-513b esp 512b 526c-d 531b 599a b / *Group Psychology* 688d-689a 689b [fn 1] / *Ego and Id*, 70 c 708b esp 708b

2c. The acquirement of ideas by perception or intuition: simple ideas or forms as direct objects of the understanding

7 PLATO *Phaedo* 224a c / *Republic* BK VI 383d 388a BK 1 397b-398c / *Timaeus* 45 c 458a / *Parmenides* 487d-488a / *Theaetetus*, 535b-d

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK VIII CH 6, 269b-c BK XII CH 346c-d

(1 *Doctrines of idea*)

1b Ideas or conceptions as that by which the mind thinks or knows

8 Aristotle *Interpretation* ch 1 [16 4-8] 25a / *Soul* bk iii ch 4 661b 662c

19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 12 a 2 51c 52c aa 9-10 58b 59d q 13 a 1 ans 62c 63c a 5 ans 66b 67d q 14 a 1 ans and rep 3 75d 76c a 2 ans and rep 2-3 76d 77d a 4 ans 78b 79a a 5 esp rep 2-3 79a 80a a 6 rep 1 80a 81c a 8 ans 82c 83b a 12 ans 85d 86d q 16 a 2 95c 96b q 17 a 3 ans 102d 103c q 27 a 1 ans and rep 2-3 153b 154b a 2 ans and rep 2 154c 155b q 32 aa 2-3 178a 180b q 34 a 1 185b 187b qq 55-58 288d 306b q 82 a 3 ans 433c 434c q 84 440b-451b q 85 a 2 453d-455b a 4 457a d a 8 rep 3 460b 461b q 86 a 1 ans 461c 462a a 2 ans and rep 2-4 462a 463a q 87 a 1 465a-466c q 88 a 1 rep 2 469a 471c q 89 a 2 ans and rep 2 475a d a 6 ans and rep 2 478b d

31 Descartes *Meditations* 71d 72a iii 82d 83a / *Objections and Replies* 108b 109d 121a-c def ii-iii 130a b axiom v-vi 131d 132a 137d 157b 158a 212c 213a

31 Spinoza *Ethics* part ii def 3 373b

35 Locke *Human Understanding* bk iv ch iv sect 3 324b c

42 Kant *Pure Reason* 15b c 22a c 30b-c 31a d 38a 39c 41c 42a 53b 54b 58c 59b 85d 93c 109d 113b esp 112d 113b 115b-c 130b-c 197a b

53 James *Psychology* 300a 314b esp 300a 301b 302b 303a 307a 313a 314a

1c Ideas as the data of sense experience or their residues

12 Lucretius *Nature of Things* bk iv [722 817] 53d 54d

18 Augustine *City of God* bk viii ch 7 269c d

23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part i 49a 52c 54b-c part iv 261a 262a b

31 Descartes *Objections and Replies* 137d

31 Spinoza *Ethics* part ii prop 48 schol 391b-c prop 49 schol, 392a c

35 Locke *Human Understanding* bk i ch i sect 15 98d 99a bk ii ch i sect 1-8 121a 123a sect 17 125c d ch i sect 20-ch iv sect 1 126d 129c ch iv sect 6-ch v 131a b ch vii ix 131c 141a passim esp ch ix sect 1 7 138b 139b sect 15 141a ch xii sect 1-2 147b d passim sect 8 148c d ch xiii sect 2 149a ch xiv sect 31 161d 162a ch xx sect 1-2 176b-c sect 15 177d ch xxiii sect 1 204a b sect 3 204c d sect 7 205d 206a sect 9 206b c sect 15 208c d sect 29-30 211d 212b sect 32 37 212c 214b passim ch xxxii sect 14 16 245c 246b bk iii ch i sect 5 252b c ch iv sect 7 15 260d 263b esp sect 11 15 261d 263b ch vi sect 46 47 281d 282b ch xi sect 21 -3 304d 305b bk iv ch ii sect 11-13 311c 312b ch iii sect 23 320a c ch iv sect 4 324c

35 Berkeley *Human Knowledge* sect 1 413a b sect 18 416b c sect 29 33 418c 419a sect 36 419c d sect 88-91 430a 431a

35 Hume *Human Understanding* sect ii 455b 457b sect vii div 49 471c d div 61 477c 478a

36 Sterne *Tristram Shandy* 234b 236b

42 Kant *Pure Reason* 45b 46a esp 45d-46a 48b-c 54b 55a 101b 102a esp 102a 115b-c / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 282b c

54 Freud *Unconscious* 442b 443a / *Ego and Id* 700a 701a 701d

1d Ideas as the pure concepts of reason regulative principles

42 Kant *Pure Reason* 15c 16a 37b 39c 108a 209d esp 108a 109c 113b 115c 117b 119a 129c 131c 158a 159d 166c 171a 173b-174a 187a c 193b d 200d 202a 203b-d 209b-d 237b 239a 240b / *Practical Reason* 310d 311d 329a d 343a 349b 355d esp 349b 350c / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 390b / *Judgement* 461a-462d 464c-467a 489b-c 504d 505a 506a 511a esp 509d 510a 528c 530c 542b 544c 570b 572c 581a 582c 596c 598b 604a b

1e Ideas in the order of supra human intelligence or spirit the eternal exemplars and archetypes the modes of the divine mind

12 Lucretius *Nature of Things* bk v [181 200] 63b-c

17 Plotinus *First Ennead* tr iii ch 1 2 10a d tr vi ch 2 3 21d 23a ch 9 26a / *Third Ennead* tr ix ch 1 136a-c / *Fourth Ennead* tr iv ch 13 164d 165b / *Fifth Ennead* 208a 251d passim esp tr iii 215d 226c tr v vii 228b 239b tr viii ch 7 242d 243c tr ix 246c 251d / *Sixth Ennead* tr ii ch 21 279b 280a tr vii ch 2-17 322b-331a

18 Augustine *Confessions* bk i par 9 3a bk xii par 38 108d 109a / *City of God* bk viii ch 3-4 266a 267c bk xi ch 10 328c d bk xii ch 17 18 353a 354d / *Christian Doctrine* bk ii ch 38 654b-c

19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 14 preamble 75c d a 4 ans 78b 79a a 5 79a 80a a 6 esp rep 3 80a 81c a 8 ans 82c 83b a 11 rep 1-2 84c 85c a 14 ans and rep 2 88d 89b q 15 91b 94a q 16 a 1 ans and rep 2 94b 95c q 18 a 4 107d 108c qq 22-24 127c 143c passim q 34 a 3 rep 4 188b 189a q 44 a 3 240b-241a q 47 a 1 rep 2 256a 257b qq 55-56 288d 294d q 58 300b 306b passim q 74 a 3 rep 5 375a 377a c q 84 a 2 ans and rep 3 442b-443c a 3 rep 1 443d 444d aa 4 5 444d-447c q 85 a 4 ans 457a d q 87 a 1 ans and rep 2 3 465a 466c q 89 a 3 ans

(2 *The origin or derivation of ideas in the human mind* 2c *The acquirement of ideas by perception or intuition simple ideas or forms as direct objects of the understanding*)

10 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 84 A 1 ANS and REP 1 440d-442a A 2 ANS 442b 443c A 4 ANS and REP 1-2 444d 446b AA 5-7 446c-450b
31 DESCARTES *Rules* III 4a b / *Meditations* VI 99a-c
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 14-23 380c 383c
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH I SECT 15 98d 99a CH III SECT 21 118b 119a BK II CH I-IX 121a 141b passim esp CH I SECT 1-8 121a 123a SECT 17 125c d CH I SECT 20-CH IV SECT 1 126d 129c CH IV SECT 6-CH V 131a b CH IX SECT 1 7 138b 139b SECT 15 141a CH XI SECT 17-CH XII SECT 2 147a d CH XII SECT 8 148c d CH XIII SECT 149a CH XIV SECT 2 155b c SECT 31 161d 162a CH XV SECT 9 164b d CH XVI SECT 1 165c d CH XVII SECT 22-CH XVIII SECT 1 173d 174a CH XVIII SECT 6 174c d CH XX SECT 1 2 176b c SECT 15 177d CH XXI SECT 75 200b d CH XXIII SECT 1 204a b SECT 3 204c d SECT 5 205a b SECT 7 205d 206a SECT 9 206b c SECT 15 208c d SECT 29 30 211d 212b SECT 32 37 212c 214b passim CH XXV SECT 9 216d SECT 11 217a CH XXX SECT 238b c CH XXXI SECT 2 239b d CH XXXII SECT 14-16 245c 246b BK III CH I SECT 5 252b-c CH IV 260a 263c passim esp SECT 11 15 261d 263b CH V SECT 2 263d 264a CH VI SECT 46-47 281d 282b CH XI SECT 21-23 304d 305b BK IV CH II SECT 11-13 311c 312b CH III SECT 23 320a c CH IV SECT 4 324c CH XVIII SECT 3 381b-c
35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 1 413a b SECT 18 416b-c SECT 25-33 417d 419a passim SECT 36 419c d SECT 88-91 430a 431a passim
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT II 455b 457b SECT VII DIV 49 471c d DIV 61 477c-478a
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 318b 319a
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 14a b 23a 33d esp 25b c 27c 28d 29d 32a-c 34a c 41c-42a 45b 46a 53b 55a 66d 72c esp 69c 72c 85d 93c 99a 107b 131a-c 186d 187a / *Judgement* 465a-c 528c 530c 570c 572b
45 LAVOISIER *Elements of Chemistry* PREF 1c d
53 JAMES *Psychology* 502a 505b esp 502a

2d Reflection as a source of ideas the mind's consideration of its own acts or content

8 ARISTOTLE *Soul* BK III CH 4 [429b26-430 9] 662b-c
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH I 105a 106c CH 17 122d 124a CH 20 126c 127b
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X par 1- 31 74b-79d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 12 9 REP 2 58b 59a Q 28 A 4 REP 2 160c 161 Q 85 A 2 453d 455b Q 87 A 3 467b-468a
31 DESCARTES *Meditations* VI 96d 97a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH I SECT 1-8 121a 123a SECT 17 125c d SECT 24 127b c CH III SECT 1 128d CH VI VII 131b-133b CH IX SECT 1-2 138b c CH XI SECT 14 146d CH XII SECT 1 2 147b d SECT 8 148c d CH XIV SECT 2-6 155b 156c SECT 31 161d 162a CH XVII SECT 22 173d 174a CH XVIII SECT 6 174c d CH XX SECT 1 2 176b-c SECT 15 177d CH XXI SECT 4 178d 179c SECT 73 200b d CH XXIII SECT 1 204a b SECT 5 205a b SECT 15 208c d SECT 29 30 211d 212b SECT 3 -37 212c 214b passim CH XXV SECT 9 216d SECT 11 217a BK III CH I SECT 5 252b-c CH V SECT 2 263d 264a BK IV CH III SECT 23 320a-c
35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 1 413a b
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT II DIV 14 456b
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 15c 16c 55a 56c 99a 107b 121a 123b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART II par 138 48c d ADDITIONS 89 129d 130a
53 JAMES *Psychology* 121a b 122b 126a passim esp 122b 124b

2e The genesis of ideas by the recollection of sense impressions the images of sense

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X par 8 18 73b-76a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 49a d PART IV 258b-c 262a b
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 26 156a 157a
31 DESCARTES *Rules* XII 19a 20d
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 17 18 380d 382b PROP 40 SCHOL 2 388a b PROP 49 SCHOL 391d 392c
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH III SECT 21 118b 119a BK II CH X 141b 143d passim esp SECT 2 141b-c SECT 7 142c d BK IV CH II SECT 14 312b d
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT II 455b-457b SECT VII DIV 49 471c d DIV 61 477c 478a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 341d 342a
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 54b 55a
53 JAMES *Psychology* 480a 501b esp 480a b
54 FREUD *Interpretation of Dreams* 351c 352d esp 351d 352a 363c 364b 367b-c 384c 385c esp 385b-c / *Unconscious* 442d-443a / *General Introduction* 518c d / *Ego and Id* 700a 701d

2f The production of ideas by the reworking of the materials of sense the imaginative construction of concepts or the formation of complex from simple ideas

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [722 748] 53d 54a

4b The classification of terms problem in the use of different kinds of terms

4b(1) Concrete and abstract terms

4b(2) Particular and uni ersal terms

4b(3) Specific and generic terms *infimae species* and *summa genera*

(3 *The division of ideas according to their objective reference 3a Ideas about things distinguished from ideas about ideas the distinction between first and second intentions*)

23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part iv 270a
24 Rabelais *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk ii 79c bk iii 150a
35 Locke *Human Understanding* bk iii ch ii 252d 254c passim ch iv sect 2 260b ch v sect 12 266d 267a sect 14 267b c ch vi sect 19 273b sect 48–50 282b d ch xi sect 10 302b sect 24 305b d
42 Kant *Pure Reason* 15d 16c esp 16c 55a 56c 99a 101b 121a 123b
46 Hegel *Philosophy of History* intro 156d 158a
53 James *Psychology* 300b

3b Adequate and inadequate ideas clear and distinct ideas as compared with obscure and confused ideas

8 Aristotle *Physics* bk i ch i 259a b
19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 12 a 6 ans and rep 3 55b 56a q 13 62b 75b q 14 a 6 80a 81c a 12 rep 2 85d 86d q 55 a 3 291a d q 85 a 3 455b-457a a 4 rep 3 457a d a 8 ans 460b-461b q 89 a 1 ans 473b 475a a 2 ans and rep 2 475a d a 3 ans and rep 2 4 475d 476c a 4 ans and rep 2 476c-477a q 94 a 1 rep 3 501d 503a q 117 a 1 rep 4 595d 597c
20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part iii q 10 a 2 rep 3 768b 769c part iii suppl q 92 a 1 rep 2 1025c 1032b
28 Harvey *On Animal Generation* 332a 333d
30 Bacon *Novum Organum* bk i aph 14–17 107d 108a
31 Descartes *Discourse* part iv 51b 52a / *Meditations* 73d 74a iii 82a d 85b 86b vi 99a c / *Objections and Replies* postulate v–vi 131b-c
31 Spinoza *Ethics* part ii def 4 373b prop 34–36 385d 386b prop 38 386c d prop 40–43 387a 389b part iii def 1–3 395d 396a prop 1 396a-c prop 3 398b c part iv appendix ii 447b part v prop 3–4 453a d
35 Locke *Human Understanding* 91d 92c bk i ch iii sect 19 117c d bk ii ch xiii sect 17 20 152a d ch xvi sect 3 4 165d 166b ch xxii sect 7–8 169b 170a sect 12–21 170d 173d passim esp sect 15 171b 172a ch xxv sect 8 216b c ch xxviii sect 19 233b c ch xxix 233d 238a ch xxxi 239b 243c passim ch xxxii sect 18 246d 247a bk iii ch vi sect 37 279b sect 40 280a b sect 43–51 280c 283a ch x sect 2 4 291d 292c ch xi sect 4 305b d bk iv ch ii sect 15 312d 313a ch iii sect 26 321b c ch xii sect 14 362d 363a
35 Berkeley *Human Knowledge* sect 30 418c sect 33 419a sect 36 419c d
35 Hume *Human Understanding* sect vii div 48–49 470d-471d sect xii div 125 506d 507a
42 Kant *Pure Reason* 1a 4a c 30b 31a 125b [fn 1] 193a b / *Judgement* 603c d
53 James *Psychology* 311b 312b [fn 1] 480b 484a

3c Real and fantastic or fictional ideas negations and chimeras

12 Lucretius *Nature of Things* bk iv [722 748] 53d 54a
19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 12 a 9 rep 2 58b-59a q 17 a 2 rep 2 102a d
23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part i 50d 57b-c part iv 258b d 261a 262a c
30 Bacon *Novum Organum* bk i aph 60 112c 113a
31 Descartes *Meditations* i 76a 77c iii 83b / *Objections and Replies* 210d
35 Locke *Human Understanding* bk ii ch viii sect 1–6 133b-134a ch xvii sect 12 21 170d 173d esp sect 15 171b 172a ch xxx 238a 239b bk iii ch i sect 4 252a bk iv ch iv sect 1–12 323d 326d passim ch v sect 7–8 330b d
35 Berkeley *Human Knowledge* sect 29–30 418c sect 33–34 419a c sect 36 419c d sect 8–84 428d-429c sect 86–91 429c 431a
42 Kant *Pure Reason* 62d 63a 174d 175b 193a-c
53 James *Psychology* 300b 639a 644a esp 640a 641b 642b [fn 2] 643b [fn 1] 646b 655a 659a 660b
54 Freud *Interpretation of Dreams* 158a d 270c 271a / *General Introduction* 597b 598a

4 The logic of ideas

4a The verbal expression of ideas or concepts: terms

7 Plato *Cratylus* 85a 114a c / *Phaedrus* 138c 140c / *Sophist* 575d 577b / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810d
8 Aristotle *Categories* 5a 21d / *Prior Analytics* bk i ch i [24b16–18] 39c ch 35 66c d
18 Augustine *Confessions* bk xiii par 36 120c d
19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 34 a 1 ans 185b 187b q 85 a 2 rep 3 453d-455b q 107 a 1 ans 549b 550b
23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part i 54c 58a part iv 270a
30 Bacon *Advancement of Learning* 57d 58a 60b c 61b c 62c d / *Novum Organum* bk i aph 14 107d 108a aph 59 112b c
31 Descartes *Rules* xiii 26b c / *Objections and Replies* 137a
31 Spinoza *Ethics* part ii prop 49 schol, 392a-c
33 Pascal *Pensées* 392 239b 240a

(4b The classification of terms problems in the use of different kinds of terms 4b(3) Specific and generic terms infimae species and summa genera.)

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH III SECT 8-9 256a-c CH IV SECT 16 263b c CH VI SECT 11-12 271b 272b SECT 32-33 277c 278c SECT 36 41 279a 280b
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 341b 342b
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 42b-43b 193a 200c
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 30d 31b 64a 207a 208a esp 207d 210b 211b 238b-c 241d 242a / *Descent of Man* 332b c 347a b
53 JAMES *Psychology* 345a b 870b 871a

4b(4) Univocal and analogical terms

8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 1 5a b / *Topics* BK I CH 15 [107 3-18] 151a b BK VI CH 10 [148 23-25] 202b [148 38-^{b}4] 202c BK VIII CH 3 [158^{b}8 159 2] 215b c / *Sophistical Refutations* CH 1 [165 6-12] 227b-c CH 33 [182^{b}13 -1] 251d / *Physics* BK I CH 2 [185 -0]-CH 3 [187 10] 260a 262a BK VII CH 4 [49 3-24] 331d 332b / *Metaphysics* BK IV CH 2 [1003 33 ^{b}15] 522b-c BK VII CH 4 [1030 3-^{b}3] 553a b BK XI CH 3 [1060^{b}34 1061 10] 589a b BK XII CH 4 5 599d 601a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 6 REP 1 18c 19a Q 13 AA 5-6 66b 68c A 10 72c 73c Q 16 A 6 ANS 98b d Q 29 A 4 REP 4 165c 167a Q 32 A 1 REP 2 175d 178a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 61 A 1 REP 1 54d 55c PART III Q 60 A 1 ANS and REP 3 847b 848a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 57d 58a
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 60b-c / *Novum Organum* BK I APH 43 109d 110a APH 59-60 112b 113a
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 40 SCHOL 1 387b-388b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH IV SECT 5 131a CH XIII SECT 18 152a c CH XXIX SECT 6-12 234d 236c BK III CH VI SECT 28 276a b SECT 4,-51 282a 283a CH IX 285a 291c
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VIII DIV 62-63 4,8b-d
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 307b 308b
42 KANT *Judgement* 547b 548c 602b 603a
53 JAMES *Psychology* 549b 550a 689a b

4c The correlation opposition and order of terms

7 PLATO *Protagoras* 49a 50b / *Phaedo* 226d 227a 242d 245c / *Republic* BK IV 350c 353d esp 351b 352b BK VII 392b 393b / *Sophist* 573b 574a
8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 5 [3^{b}24 31] 8a CH 6 [5^{b}11-6^{a}18] 10a-c CH 7 11a 13d CH 8 [10^{b}11-25] 15d CH 10-15 16d 21d / *Prior Analytics* BK I CH 46 70b 71d / *Topics* BK II CH 7-8 158b 160a BK IV CH 3 [123^{b}1 124 10] 171d 172c CH 4 [124 35 ^{b}34] 173a d [125) ^{b}1] 173d 174c BK V CH 6 187a 188c BK VI CH 8 200b 201a CH 9 [147^{a}23-148 9] 201b 202a CH 12 [149^{b}4 23] 203d 204a / *Physics* BK III, CH 1 [201^{a}4-8] 278c / *Metaphysics* BK IV CH 2 [1004 9-17] 523a b [1004^{b}27 1005 2] 523d 524a BK V CH 10 539a-c CH 15 542a 543a BK IX CH 1 [1046 29-36] 571b CH - [1046^b 7-15] 571c d BK X CH 3 [1054^{b}23]-CH 10 [1059 15] 581c 586d BK XI CH 3 [1061 18 5] 589b-c BK XII CH 10 [1075^{b}20-24] 606c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 11 A 7 68d 70d Q 16 AA 3-4 96b 97c Q 17 A 1 ANS 100d 101d A 4 ANS 103c 104b Q 28 15/c 161d passim Q 3 A 2 ANS 178a 179b Q 33 A 4 REP 1-3 183c 185a QQ 40 41 213a 224a passim Q 48 A 1 ANS and REP 1 259b 260c A 3 REP 3 261b 262a Q 49 A 3 ANS and REP 1 266d 268a c Q 103 A 3 REP - 530a-c A 8 REP 3 533d 534b PART I II Q 18 A 8 REP 1 699d 700b Q 29 A 2 REP 1 745c 746b Q 35 A 4 ANS and REP 2 774d 775d Q 36 A 1 ANS 780c 781b Q 46 A 1 REP 2 813b 814a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 64 A 3 REP 3 68b 69b Q 67 A 3 ANS 83b-84d Q 71 A 6 REP 1 110b 111b Q 72 A 6 116b-117a PART II-II Q 21 A 3 REP 2 3 479c-480b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 57b-c 58a-c
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 12d 13b
53 JAMES *Psychology* 869a 872b 878a-879b

5 Ideas or concepts in the process of thought

5a Concept and judgment the division of terms as subjects and predicates kinds of subjects and predicates

8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 2 3 5b d CH 5 [2 11-3^{b}24] 6a 8a / *Interpretation* 25a 36d / *Prior Analytics* BK I CH -7 [43^{a}25-44] 60c d / *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 4 100a 101b CH 19 [81^b-3-30] 111d / *Topics* BK I CH 4-9 144b 147b / *Physics* BK I CH 3 [186 22 18, 10] 261b-262a CH 6 [18) 28 33] 264d
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK IV par 8 29 26a b
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2 A 1 ANS 10d 11d Q 3 A 4 REP 2 16d 17c Q 13 A 12 74c 75b Q 16 A 2 95c 96b Q 58 A 2 301b d A 4 302d 303c Q 6 A 3 ANS 391a 393a Q 85 A 2 REP 3 453d 455b AA 5-6 457d-459c A 8 ANS 460b-461b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART IV 270a-c
31 DESCARTES *Rules* XII 22a b / *Meditations* III 83a / *Objections and Replies* DEF IX 130d
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 39a-44c 51d 52b 59c 66d esp 63d 64a 180c 182b / *Judgement* 480d 482b 562a d 572b 575b
53 JAMES *Psychology* 144a b 178a 179a 313a b 638b 861b 870b 873a

(6 The being and truth of ideas 6a The distinction between real and intentional existence between thing and idea ideas as symbols, or intentions of the mind)

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2 A 1 REP 2 10d 11d Q 3 A 4 REP 2 16d 17c Q 5 A 2 ANS 24b 25a Q 11 A 1 esp REP 3 46d-47d A 3 REP 2 49a c Q 12 A 2 51c 52c Q 13 A 1 ANS 62c 63c A 3 ANS and REP 3 64d 65c A 4 65c 66b A 7 ANS and REP 2 4-6 68d 70d A 9 ANS and REP 2 71b-72c A 11 ANS 73c 74b A 12 74c 75b Q 14 A 1 ANS and REP 3 75d 76c A 2 ANS and REP 2-3 76d 77d A 6 REP 1 80a 81c A 8 ANS 82c 83b A 9 ANS 83b d A 13 REP 2-3 86d 88c Q 15 A 1 ANS and REP 1 3 91b 92a A 3 REP 4 93b 94a Q 16 A 2 95c 96b A 7 REP 2 99a d Q 17 A 3 ANS 102d 103c Q 18 A 4 107d 108c Q 19 A 3 REP 6 110b 111c Q 27 A 1 ANS and REP 2 153b 154b A 2 ANS and REP 2 154c 155b A 3 ANS 155c 156a A 4 ANS and REP 2 156b d Q 28 157c 161d passim Q 29 A 1 REP 3 162a 163b Q 30 A 1 REP 4 167a 168a A 4 170c 171b Q 32 AA 2 3 178a 180b Q 34 A 1 185b 187b A 3 ANS 188b 189a Q 37 A 1 ANS 197c 199a Q 50 A 2 ANS 270a 272a QQ 55-58 288d 306b passim Q 66 A 2 REP 2 345d 347b Q 67 A 3 ANS 351b 352a Q 74 A 3 REP 5 375a 377a,c Q 76 A 3 REP 4 391a 393a A 6 REP 2 396a d Q 78 A 3 ANS 410a-411d A 4 ANS and REP 2 411d-413d Q 79 A 4 REP 4 417a-418c Q 82 A 3 ANS 433c-434c Q 84 440b-451b Q 85 A 2 453d-455b A 3 REP 1 4 455b-457a A 4 457a d A 5 REP 3 457d 458d A 8 REP 3 460b 461b Q 86 A 1 ANS 461c 462a Q 87 A 1 465a-466c Q 88 A 1 REP 2 469a-471c A 2 REP 4 471c 472c Q 89 A 2 ANS and REP 2 475a d A 3 ANS and REP 1 3 475d-476c A 5 ANS 477a 478b PART I II Q 5 A 6 REP 2 641a 642a Q 6 A 6 ANS and REP 2 649a 650a Q 8 A 1 ANS and REP 3 655b 656a Q 12 A 3 REP 3 670d 671b Q 17 A 4 ANS 688d 689c Q 22 A 2 ANS and REP 3 721c 722c Q 28 A 1 REP 3 740b 741a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 93 A 1 REP 2 215b d 216c PART III Q 2 A 5 REP 2 715a 716b PART III SUPPL Q 82 A 3 ANS and REP 2 971a 972d

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 53c PART III 172a d PART IV 262a d 270a c

26 SHAKESPEARE *Richard II* ACT V SC V [1-41] 349d 350a

29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* esp PART I 1a 8c 18d 22a PART II 285a 288c

31 DESCARTES *Meditations* 71d 72a III 83b 86a V 93a-94a / *Objections and Replies* 108b-109d 121a-c DEF I IV 130a b AXIOM V-VI 131d 132a 157b 158a 212c 213a

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I APPENDIX 369b-372d esp 371c 372c PART II PROP 5-9 374c 376c

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH VIII 133b-138b passim esp SECT 8 134b c CH XXII SECT 2 201a b CH XXX SECT 2 238b c CH XXXI SECT 2 239b d CH XXXII SECT 8 244d SECT 14-18 245c 247a BK III CH III, SECT 12 0 257b 260a CH IV SECT 2 260b CH V SECT 12 266d 267a CH VI 268b-283a passim BK IV CH II SECT 14 312b d CH IX SECT 1 349a CH XI SECT 4-9 355b 357a

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 1-96 413a-431d esp SECT 1-24 413a 417d SECT 29-44 418c 421a SECT 48-49 422a b SECT 82-84 428d 429c SECT 86-91 429c 431a

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT V DIV 44 468d-469c SECT XII DIV 117 123 504a 506a

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 23a 33d 85d 93c 95a d 97a b 117b 118a 200c 209d 211c 212a / *Practical Reason* 295b d / *Judgement* 528c d 551a 553c 604a b

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 134c d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PREF 6a 7a / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 153a c 158a 160b 188d 189a PART I 219d 220a 236a c 257c d PART IV 354b 364b-c

48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 385b

50 MARX *Capital* 11b c

53 JAMES *Psychology* 128a b 149a b 176a 184a passim esp 176a b 178a 181a 191b 192a 299a 302a esp 302b [fn 1] 307a 311a esp 311b-312b [fn 1] 639a 645b esp 640a 659a b 852a 865b 866a 868b 878a 882a esp 880b 882a 889a 890a

54 FREUD *General Introduction* 467d 597d 598a

6b The nature and being of ideas in relation to the nature and being of the mind

7 PLATO *Cratylus* 113c 114a c / *Phaedrus* 125a b / *Republic* BK V 369a 373c BK VI 383d 388a / *Timaeus* 457b 458a / *Parmenides* 486a 491d / *Sophist* 567a 569a

8 ARISTOTLE *Soul* BK III CH 4 661b 662c

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [722-817] 53d 54d

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X par 16-38 75b-81a / *City of God* BK VIII CH 6 269b c / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 38 654c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 15 A 1 esp REP 1 91b 92a Q 16 A 7 REP 2 99a d Q 29 A 2 REP 4 163b 164b Q 76 A 2 REP 3 388c 391a Q 79 A 3 ANS 416a 417a Q 84 A 1 ANS 440d 442a QQ 85-89 451b 480c passim Q 110 A 1 REP 3 564c 565d

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 49a

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 43d 44c

31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 162b 212c 213a

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II DEF 3 373b PROP 11 DEMONST 377b PROP 49 SCHOL 392a-c

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH I SECT 15 98d 99a BK II CH VIII 133b 138b passim CH XXII SECT 2 201a b CH XXX 238a 239b passim esp SECT 2 3 238b d CH XXXI SECT 2 239b d CH XXXII SECT 14 16 245c 246b BK III CH V 263d 268a CH VI SECT 26-

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in Great Books of the Western World but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection
II Works by authors not represented in this collection

For the date place and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

I

AQUINAS *On the Trinity of Boethius* QQ 5 6
—— *Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate* Q 3
—— *De Nat Verbi Intellectus*
DESCARTES *The Principles of Philosophy* PART I 9–10 45 47
SPINOZA *Of the Improvement of the Understanding*
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of consideration the theme of immortality is never merely a matter of speculative interest, never merely a question of spiritual substances and their subsistence. It is always a problem for the moralist.

Is this earthly life and its brief temporal span enough for the aspirations of the human spirit and for its striving toward a perfection of knowledge, of love and of repose? If external sanctions are needed to support the voice of conscience, are earthly rewards and punishments—either humanly dispensed or capriciously distributed by chance or fortune—sufficient sanction for the moral law? Can perfect justice be done unless there is a divine law and a divine judge—a judge who can see beyond the acts of men into their hearts, from whose judgment no one escapes, and whose rewards and punishments are supernaturally established states of blessedness and misery for the soul?

Whether or not God, freedom, and immortality are, as Kant suggests, the three great objects of speculative thought, they do seem to form the basic triad of religious beliefs. In the religions of the west these beliefs take various forms, but the belief in immortality is seldom if ever found separate from belief in a supernatural order, in gods or a God to whom man owes certain duties and before whom man stands to be judged as a responsible moral agent who was free to obey or disobey the divine commands. But this fact admitted, the question remains whether the principles of morality can be adequately stated or made effective in the regulation of human conduct without a religious foundation, or at least without reference to God and immortality.

On this the moralists disagree. The argument in Plato's *Gorgias*, for example, about whether it is better to do or suffer injustice, ends with a myth which tells of the soul standing naked before its divine judge after a man's death, showing no marks of the evil the individual has suffered during his life, but only of the evil he has done. The reader who thinks the myth is necessary to complete the argument concerning justice and punishment, takes one position on the question. He adopts the view that without the judgment of souls *in an after life* justice cannot be done.

The preoccupation with immortality in a great many of Plato's dialogues is not always based upon moral considerations. It appears as frequently in discussions of the relation between the soul and the objects of its knowledge. If, to be proper objects of knowledge, the Ideas must be eternal, the soul which knows them must also be immortal. But when the discussion of immortality involves a comparison of this life and the life to come, it usually turns on considerations of goodness rather than of knowledge and truth. For Kant, if not for Plato, immortality is almost entirely a moral matter; and where the Platonic myth deals with just rewards and punishments in an after life, the Kantian argument is concerned with the achievement of moral perfection.

In his *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant affirms immortality, along with the existence of God and the freedom of the will, as necessary practical postulates—indispensable conditions of the moral life. "The perfect accordance of the will with the moral law," Kant writes, "is *holiness*, a perfection of which no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moment of his existence. ... It can only be found in a progress *in infinitum* towards that perfect accordance. ... It is necessary to assume such a practical progress as the real object of our will. The realization of happiness, or the *summum bonum*," Kant concludes, "is only possible *practically* on the supposition of the immortality of the soul."

The opposite view appears to be taken in Aristotle's *Ethics* and Mill's *Utilitarianism*. The *summum bonum* is a temporal happiness, a perfection attainable on earth and by purely natural means. In those passages in which Aristotle defines happiness in terms of contemplative activity, he also speaks of it as a godlike life and therefore one which has a touch of immortality. Man is able to lead such a life, he writes, only "in so far as something divine is present in him." To lead the life of reason, which is divine in comparison with any other mode of human life, we must, he says, "so far as we can, make ourselves immortal, and strain every nerve to live in accordance with the best thing in us."

But to be immortal in this way seems to mean the possession of a godlike quality in this life rather than the promise of a life hereafter

Chapter 38 IMMORTALITY

INTRODUCTION

THE mortality of man defines by contrast the immortality which some men hope for some men fear some men scoff at but no man ever fails sooner or later to consider The life of man like that of other animals moves through a normal span of years between birth and death Legend tells of certain heroes upon whom the immortal gods bestowed immortal life gracing them with an aspect of their own divinity Jewish and Christian faith holds that Adam with all his posterity would never have suffered disease or death if he had refrained from sin But according to the theologians the imperishability of the bodily frame of man in a state of grace is a preternatural condition Except then for the miraculous or the supernatural death follows birth and life that which comes to be passes away all things of flesh and blood perish

The proposition All men are mortal has been repeated during centuries of lessons in logic Its truth has never been seriously challenged even by those who have criticized the syllogism which reaches the conclusion that since he is a man Socrates is mortal But throughout the same period the great books of poetry and religion of philosophy and theology have recorded the qualifications which men have placed upon this truth

Man dies in the flesh to be reborn in the spirit Man composite of soul and body perishes as do all things which are subject to dissolution but the soul itself a simple spiritual substance is immortal living on after its union with the body is dissolved The immortal soul is sometimes conceived as having many incarnations inhabiting now this body now that in an endless pilgrimage through endless time and sometimes as in the Christian faith each soul has only one embodiment on earth It is specially created by God to inform the body of a human being It is destined to be his immortal spirit in a future which belongs to eternity rather than to time

Except for the form it takes in the doctrine of reincarnation or the transmigration of souls the idea of immortality is usually attended by conceptions of an after life in another world—the life of the shades in the Elysian Fields or in Hades the life of the blessed in Heaven or of the damned in Hell The after life is never merely a continuation of the life begun on earth The other world is not just an abode for the disembodied soul It is a place of judgment of rewards and punishments in which the soul realizes the good or pays the penalty for the evil toward which its earthly career inclined The connection of immortality with rewards and punishments appears even in the theory of reincarnation for as the soul passes from one embodiment to another it enjoys or suffers the consequences befitting its previous existence

STATED AS A speculative problem the question of immortality is traditionally formulated as a question about the soul or the spirit of man whether it exists by itself either before or after its conjunction with a human body and if so in what manner it subsists For those who affirm the soul s separate existence there seems to be no question about its everlasting endurance either without beginning at all or from the moment of its creation But the manner of the soul s subsistence leads to speculation concerning an after life or an other life in a world of spirits or in realms as far apart as Heaven and Hell

We shall presently consider to what extent such speculations have been submitted to argument and to what extent they have been matters of religious belief But in both these modes

of Hades and dread Proserpine we are told that the Theban prophet Teiresias alone has his reason still unshaken All the other ghosts flit about aimlessly The shades of good men and bad alike languish in the domain of darkness Tityus Tantalus and Sisyphus are subjected to special punishments for their grievous sins and transgressions but all the shades—even of those men whom the gods loved and honored —seem to be in a state of misery Though they are not all beset with torments and agonies, none seems to be overcome with joy or to have reached contentment

Those whom the gods love do not join the deities on Mount Olympus. When they enter the somber realm of Pluto—the deity of the underworld—they like all the other shades whom Charon ferries across the river Styx are more remote from the gods than are mortal men on earth The only exception perhaps is Heracles whom Odysseus meets in Hades or rather his phantom only for he is feasting ever with the immortal gods and has lovely Hebe to wife

The general attitude of all who dwell in the underworld is summed up by Achilles when he tells Odysseus Say not a word in death s favor I would rather be a paid servant in a poor man s house and be above ground than king of kings among the dead And the mother of Odysseus describes the condition of the dead in the abode of darkness as one in which the sinews no longer hold the flesh and bones together these perish in the fierceness of consuming fire as soon as life has left the body and the soul flit away as though it were a dream

Among other ancient peoples such as the Egyptians the Babylonians and the Persians, Herodotus found other views of immortality than those which prevailed in Greece He reports for example the doctrine of transmigration or reincarnation—a doctrine which also appears in the myth of Er at the end of Plato s *Republic* and is alluded to elsewhere in the Platonic dialogues 'The Egyptians Herodotus writes were the first to broach the opinion that the soul of man is immortal and that when the body dies it enters into the form of an animal which is born at the moment thence passing on from one animal into another until it has circled through the forms of all creatures which tenant the earth the water and the air after which it enters again into a human frame and is born anew

Herodotus however seems more interested in the effect of such beliefs on the practices of the living especially their funeral rites and other devotions than he is with the truth of conflicting theories of immortality

The doctrine of a future state according to Gibbon was scarcely considered among the devout polytheists of Greece and Rome as a fundamental article of faith Before the time of Christ the description of the infernal regions had been abandoned to the fancy of painters and of poets who peopled them with so many phantoms and monsters who dispensed their rewards and punishments with so little equity that a solemn truth the most congenial to the human heart was oppressed and disgraced by the absurd mixture of the wildest fictions Lacking an acceptable or satisfying belief yet inclined to believe in as men are inclined to hope for a better life the pagan world Gibbon thinks, could not long resist the appeal of Christian teaching When the promise of eternal happiness was proposed to mankind on condition of adopting the faith and of observing the precepts of the Gospel it is no wonder he declares that so advantageous an offer should have been accepted by great numbers of every religion of every rank, and of every province in the Roman empire

THE ARGUMENTS for personal immortality which Christian theologians draw from the nature of the human soul do not differ essentially from the proofs offered by philosophers without recourse to religious faith This applies to arguments advanced before Christianity by Plato and Plotinus as well as to those developed by philosophers like Descartes and Locke who belong to the Christian community The exclusively theological aspects of the Christian doctrine of immortality are those matters which since they are beyond the reach of reason belong to faith alone

The doctrine that the individual soul is created and that it has a unique affiliation with one human body is not capable of being proved or defended by reason against the quite opposite theory that the soul has always existed and

Aristotle demands only a complete term of life as a necessary condition for the complete happiness of man.' He passes lightly over the question whether the dead share in any good or evil. So far as he considers a *blessedness* which the gods can add to human happiness it does not belong to an after life but consists rather in the good fortune which the gods grant to some men and which increases and secures their happiness beyond that which is attainable by virtue alone.

The moral issue concerning immortality is more explicitly faced by Mill in his examination of the need for religious or supernatural sanctions. While he does not admit their indispensability, neither does he deny their utility. "There is evidently no reason," he declares, "why all these motives for observance should not attach themselves to the utilitarian morality as completely and as powerfully as to any other." Yet he himself stresses the possibility of giving to the service of humanity, even without the aid of belief in a Providence, both the psychological power and the social efficacy of a religion.

Mill does not go as far as Lucretius in regarding the belief in immortality with the attendant possibility of everlasting torment for the soul as itself an immoral doctrine. For Lucretius it is a nightmare which haunts the waking hours of men, filling them with false fears and putting future pains in the way of present pleasures. He dedicates his poem to "driving headlong forth that dread of Acheron, troubling as it does the life of man from its inmost depths and overspreading all things with the blackness of death, allowing no pleasure to be pure and unalloyed."

Where others see in man's fear of death his natural desire for immortality, Lucretius thinks it is the dread of immortality which causes man's fear of death. "We have nothing to fear after death," he says, if death is the end. "He who exists not cannot become miserable."

In the great poems of antiquity we find the imagery and detail of the pagan conception of the life hereafter. Both Odysseus and Aeneas visit the underworld. They see the shades of the departed heroes—all that is visible to the bodily eye are shimmering wraiths. They talk with the departed, listen to their memories, or hear them speak prophetically of the future. From Anchises, his dead father, Aeneas learns his destiny, and Odysseus hears in Hades what has befallen his companions at Troy and his family at home during his years of wandering.

Yet there is a striking difference between Virgil's poem and Homer's with respect to the after life. The division which Virgil makes between Elysium and Tartarus corresponds much more closely than anything in Homer—or for that matter in the other Greek poets—to the Christian distinction between Heaven and Hell. Though Elysium and Tartarus both belong to the underworld, one is the abode of the blessed, the other a place of torment for sinners.

In the sixth book of the *Aeneid*, the Sibyl explains the topography of the underworld to Aeneas. There is a place "where splits the road in twain," she says.

The right leads to the giant walls of Dis,
Our way to Elysium, but the left wreaks doom
On sinners and to guilty Tartarus sends.

Tartarus, the abode of the condemned, is surrounded by "a fierce torrent of billowy fire" and is filled with the noise of punishment. Elysium, on the other hand, is

The happy region and green pleasaunces
Of the blest woodlands, the abode of joy.
An ampler ether with purpureal light
Clothes here the plain; another sun than ours
And other stars they know.

Its inhabitants, in sharp contrast with the unfortunates in Tartarus, seem to pass their time in peace and pleasure.

Homer makes no such sharp division between the realm of the blessed and the realm of the condemned. Plutarch speaks of "the isles of the blessed celebrated by Homer," but the reference cannot be substantiated. In one passage in the *Iliad* Menelaus is promised that he will be taken "to the Elysian plain, which is at the end of the world. There fair-haired Rhadamanthus reigns, and men lead an easier life than anywhere else in the world, for in Elysium there falls not rain, nor hail, nor snow." But even this seems to describe a different life rather than an after life.

So far as the underworld is described on the occasion of Odysseus' descent into the house

of Hades and dread Prosperine we are told that the Theban prophet Teiresias alone has his reason still unshaken All the other ghosts flit about aimlessly The shades of good men and bad alike languish in the domain of dark ness Tityus Tantalus, and Sisyphus are subjected to special punishments for their grievous sins and transgressions but all the shades—even of those men whom the gods loved and honored —seem to be in a state of misery Though they are not all beset with torments and agonies, none seems to be overcome with joy or to have reached contentment

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inhabits any number of bodies in the course of many reincarnations The existence of Hell Purgatory and Heaven as supernatural states of the soul the time place and manner of the Last Judgment the resurrection of the body and the difference between the bodies reunited with the souls of the blessed and the damned the joy of eternal happiness and the misery of eternal damnation—these dogmas of Christian orthodoxy go far beyond all merely philosophical attempts to prove the soul s immortality or to consider its life apart from the body

The great theologians undertake to do more than expound these articles of faith Reason asks questions which the man of faith must try to answer defending his faith not by proof but by overcoming doubts by answering objections b making dogmas intelligible Yet the great theologians admit an irreducible core of mystery The joy of the soul united to God in the beatific vision surpasses temporal understanding The mysteries of Hell are perhaps even greater

The deprivation of God s love and exclusion from His presence constitute a spiritual misery comparable to the beatitude of beholding God and being within the circle of the divine light One is an infinite anguish of frustration and loss the other an infinite rest of peace and fulfillment But the theologians also teach that the damned suffer the pains of sense in Hell as well as the pains of deprivation "That hell which also is called a lake of fire and brimstone Augustine says will be material fire and will torment the bodies of the damned When hell fire and the expiatory punishments of Purgatory are not merely symbols for the imagination they raise extraordinarily difficult questions as both Augustine and Aquinas admit

Dante asks us to read the descriptions he gives of Hell Purgatory and Paradise in the *Divine Comedy* in a strictly literal sense as well as in several symbolic meanings such as the moral and the allegorical But he explains in his own commentary on the poem that the literal meaning also involves symbolism insofar as the things that the words refer to when taken in their literal sense are themselves the symbols of other things In any case the poet may be more successful than the theologian in making intelligible through symbol and metaphor what in its literal significance is strictly unimaginable The imagery of darkness sultriness noise and heaviness which grows more intense as the descent proceeds in the *Inferno* does more than the anguished outcries of the damned to convey the reality of Hell

The metaphors of music and agility express the harmony of Heaven But it is especially the symbolism of light which captures the invisible in terms of vision except perhaps when it reaches a climax in the blinding effulgence at the end of the *Paradiso* As Dante moves upward in the realm of love where courtesy prevails in every speech and charity suffuses every will he sees the mystic rose of Heaven entirely through reflected light The saints and especially those glorious spirits who instruct his progress become pale mirrors of the ineffable vision which they themselves behold

Milton too pictures Heaven and Hell but in *Paradise Lost* the destiny of the immortal soul remains a prophecy a consequence of the earthly immortality which Adam lost Except for the Prologue Hell and Heaven are offstage in Goethe s *Faust* though they are the main implications of the wager Faust makes with Mephistopheles which puts his immortal soul in the balance

The philosophical issue concerning immortality cannot be separated from issues concerning the existence and nature of man s soul The various arguments for immortality seem to rest not merely on the reality of the distinction between soul and body but more precisely on the immateriality of the soul Lucretius for example does not deny the existence of soul nor does he fail to differentiate the soul from the body wherein it is located The soul according to Lucretius like everything else in the universe consists of atoms They differ from those of the body by their roundness smoothness and mobility They are much smaller than those of which our body and flesh are formed they are also much fewer in number and are disseminated merely in scanty number through the frame

On this view of the soul as material in nature and as constituted of many quite separable parts the soul is necessarily as perishable as the rest of the body When the body has been

shattered by the mastering might of time Lucretius writes, and the frame has drooped with its forces dulled ... it naturally follows then that the whole nature of the soul is dissolved like smoke into the high air since we see it is begotten along with the body and grows up along with it and ... breaks down at the same time worn out with age

It should be observed however that it is not the materiality of the soul but rather its divisibility into parts which accounts for its mortality The atoms after all are material but since as the ultimate units of matter they are simple bodies and so are absolutely indivisible they cannot perish. Only the simple is imperishable

The *imperishability of the simple* (*i e* of that which has no parts) occurs as a premise in one of the great arguments for the immortality of the soul. In Plato s *Phaedo* which formulates this argument as immortality is discussed in the prison cell where Socrates awaits his execution two assumptions seem to be made first that the soul is the principle of life in animate bodies, for as Socrates says whatever the soul possesses, to that she comes bearing life and second, that as an immaterial being the soul must be simple for only bodies are composite and changing

From the first of these assumptions the argument proceeds in terms of what it means for bodies to be alive or dead Socrates argues from examples. If any one asks you he says what that is, of which the inherence makes *the body* hot you will reply not heat but fire Or if any one asks you why a body is diseased you will not say from disease but from fever So if any one asks, what is that of which the inherence will render the body alive? the answer is not life but "the soul. As the principle of life itself the soul will never receive *the opposite* of what she brings, namely death Therefore the soul is immortal.

On the second assumption the endless duration of the soul follows from its simplicity as an immaterial and immutable being 'The compound or composite Socrates says may be supposed to be naturally capable as of being compounded so also of being dissolved but that which is uncompounded and that only must be, if anything is, indissoluble " When the soul leaves the body for which it has been both motor and pilot the body ceases to be alive and perishes in the manner of material things the soul lives on freed from temporary bondage to the body its prison house It departs to the invisible world—to the divine and immortal and rational.

The argument from simplicity as repeated in Moses Mendelssohn s *Phadon* is criticized by Kant Admitting that a truly simple being cannot cease to exist Kant contends that the *knowable* soul—which is for him the empirical ego or consciousness—may have intensive though it lacks extensive quantity It would therefore be capable of diminution in reality and so it can become less and less through an infinite series of smaller degrees

With regard to the soul as an immaterial and simple substance (*i e* the transcendental ego) Kant is willing to affirm that immortality necessarily belongs to such a nature But he denies that we can have any knowledge of the soul except as a phenomenon of experience There can be no valid theoretic argument for immortality precisely because there can be *no* scientific knowledge of the nature of transcendental objects—beings beyond all possible experience What Kant calls the paralogisms of *rational* psychology are offered to show the dialectical futility of proofs or disproofs of immortality in the same way that the cosmological antinomies" attempt to expose the untenability of arguments for or against the infinity of time and space, the infinite divisibility of matter the existence of a free will and of God

Without deciding whether Kant s theory of experience and knowledge is true this much we can learn from him about the issue of *immortality* Those philosophers who like Descartes and Locke think they have grounds for affirming the existence of the soul (or mind or spirit) as an immaterial substance *also have grounds* for affirming its immortality Those who like Lucretius and Hobbes think they have grounds for denying the existence of anything except material particles also *have grounds for denying* either the existence of the soul or its having a permanence not possessed by other material wholes. And those who, like Hume think there are no grounds for affirming the existence of any kind of enduring substance material or

spiritual—even to the point of doubting personal identity from moment to moment—can admit no grounds for affirming a substantial much less an immortal soul

One other position remains to be considered Though it does not fall outside the foregoing alternatives Aristotle s theory represents an important variation on one of them As against Hume or Kant Aristotle holds that substances exist and are knowable The sensible material things of experience are such substances But according to Aristotle these substances are not exclusively material They are composed of two principles matter and form neither of which is a substance capable of existing by itself As the exposition of this theory (in the chapters on Form and Matter) tries to make plain form and matter exist only in union with one another It is the composite substance resulting from their union which exists in and of itself

The form which enters into the composition of a substance can be called its substantial form In relation to the matter with which it is united the substantial form is the actualization of the potentiality in matter to exist as a substance of a certain kind Not all substances are of the same kind Some are alive some inanimate and inert In the case of living substances the substantial form according to Aristotle confers upon matter not only the act of existing as a substance but also the act of being alive Because it thus differs from the form of an inanimate substance Aristotle gives a special name to the substantial form of a living thing Because the word soul has long been used to designate the principle of life in living things Aristotle feels justified in using it as the name for the substantial forms of plants and animals as well as men

This theory and its principal opposite (which regards the human soul as a complete substance not a substantial form) are more fully discussed in the chapter on Soul. Here we are concerned only with the consequences of Aristotle s theory for human immortality If as he seems to hold substantial forms exist only insofar as they exist in the substances of which they are the forms then when a composite substance perishes through the decomposition of its matter and form the form perishes also Souls—the substantial forms of living things—would seem to be no exception The soul Aristotle writes, is inseparable from its body or at any rate certain parts of it are (if it has parts)—for the actuality of some of them is nothing but the actualities of their bodily parts Yet some may be separable because they are not the actualities of any body at all

The exception which Aristotle seems to have in mind is that part of the human soul which is the intellect It differs from other powers of the soul he suggests as the eternal from the perishable It alone he says is capable of existence in isolation from all other psychic powers He argues that in so far as the realities it knows —or at least some of them— are capable of being separated from their matter, so is it also with the power of the mind

What is the significance for the immortality of the human soul of the supposed ability of the intellect to act independently of the body? Aristotle answers in terms of the principle that if there is any way of acting or being acted upon proper to soul soul will be capable of separate existence if there is none its separate existence is impossible If we consider nutrition sensation and emotion there seems to be he admits no case in which the soul can act or be acted upon without involving the body The one possible exception may be thinking but Aristotle adds at once that if this too proves to be a form of imagination or to be impossible without imagination it too requires a body as a condition of its existence

Later when he is discussing the power of thought Aristotle flatly insists that the soul never thinks without an image and that no one can learn or understand anything in the absence of sense for when the mind is actively aware of anything it is necessarily aware of it along with an image According to his own principles it would seem to follow that since thinking proves to be impossible without imagination it too requires a body as a condition of its existence Hence the intellect is not separable from matter nor is the human soul of which the intellect is the highest power

Nevertheless Aristotle declares in a passage which has become famous that mind as the active power of thinking is separable im

passible unmixed and with this declaration of the intellect s separability from matter he seems to affirm immortality at least for the intellectual part of the soul When mind is set free from its present conditions, he writes it appears as just what it is and nothing more this alone is immortal and eternal

THE PASSAGES QUOTED have been subject to conflicting interpretations The Arabic commentators on Aristotle notably Averroes find in them no basis for the immortality of the individual human soul The texts according to their view support the theory of a *single active intellect which* exists apart from the minds of indi id ial men—almost a divine principle in the universe which acting on the rational souls of *indivi lual men* enables them to think and understand Aquinas argues against tl em to the opposite *conclusion*

Aga n t the Averroists Aquinas contends that if the indi idual man Socrates can be said to think then whatever *powers are required* for thinking must belong to his ind vidual nature The powers required for thinking are according *to Aquinas* twofold an active intellect able to abstract the *intelligible forms* of things *from* their material representation in sensory images and a poss ble or *potential intellect* capable of rece ving these forms when separated from matter by th act of abstraction

The theory of knov ledge and thought wh ch this invol es is discussed in the chapters on FORM IDEA MI D and UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR H re we are concerned *only* with the point which Aquinas makes that since th nking in ol es universal notions and *since forms* can be uni ersal only apart from matter the intellect *which abstracts* and receives ab tractions must itself be immaterial The intell ctual powers *do* not operate through a bod ly organ as the power of nutrition operates through the alimentary system or the power of v sion through *the eye* The brain in other words is not the organ of understand ng *or thought* but rather) ng with the external sense-organs it s th material *organ* of per eption memory and *imagination*.

The argument for the immortal ty of the human *soul* then proceeds on the premise that that which *can act* apart from matter can also *exist* apart from matter The intellectual principle which we call the mind or the intellect has an operation *per se* apart from the body *Now* only that which subsists can have an operation *per se* for nothing can operate but what is actual wherefore a thing operates according as it is Hence Aquinas concludes that the human soul which is called the intellect or mind is something incorporeal and subsistent The attribution of subsistence to the human soul means that although it is the substantial form of the human body it is also capable of existing in and of itself as if it were a simple substance

Unlike angels which as spiritual substances are by their very nature *separate* forms not forms of matter human souls *are substantial* forms which having a certain degree of immateriality are also to that degree separable from matter But the *reverse is also true* To the extent that the soul s powers such as *sensation* and imagination require corporeal organs the soul *is inseparable* from the body Since furthermore Aquinas agrees with Aristotle that every act of understanding *or thought* involves imagination he faces the difficulty of explaining how the soul can function in any way when separated from the body after death

To solve this diffi ulty he says we must consider that as nothing *acts* except as it is actual the mode of action in every agent follows *from its mode* of existence Now the soul has one mod of being *when in* the body and another when apart from it The soul *therefore* when united to the body has consistently with that mode of existence a mode of understand ng by turning to corporeal images which are *in corporeal* organs but when it is separated *from the body* it has a *mode* of understanding by turning to simply intell gible obj cts as i proper to other separate substances Nevertheless Aquinas adds it is not natural *for* the soul to understand in the latter way for *it is* not by nature a separate substance Therefore to be separated from the body is *not in* accordance with its nature

THIS LAST POINT has both philosophical and theolog cal *significance* Philosophically it may be easier to p ove the immortality of the soul if one starts as the Platonists do with the proposition that the soul *is a* purely spiritual prin

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For Hegel it is Spirit itself which is immortal. "The successive phases of Spirit that animate the Nations in a necessitated gradation," he writes, "are themselves only steps in the development of the one Universal Spirit which through them elevates and completes itself to a self-comprehending totality." In considering the history of the world, he regards everything as the manifestation of Spirit; and because of this, even when we traverse the past, we have, he says, "only to do with what is present; for philosophy, as occupying itself with the True, has to do with the eternally present. Nothing in the past is lost for it, for the Idea is ever present; Spirit is immortal; with it there is no past, no future, but an essential now. This necessarily implies that the present form of Spirit comprehends within it all earlier steps. . . . The grades which Spirit seems to have left behind it, it still possesses in the depths of its present."

What Spirit is for Hegel, Nature is for Spinoza. Spinoza, however, conceives a kind of immortality for the individual man, which is achieved through his participation in the eternity of Nature. The body of the individual man, according to Spinoza, belongs to the infinite matter of Nature. It is "a certain mode of extension actually existing." The individual human mind is similarly "a part of the infinite intellect of God." In one sense, both the body and the mind are temporal things which, like all other finite modes of God or Nature, have a fixed and limited duration. Furthermore, the personal memories and thoughts of the individual man depend on the co-existence of his mind and body. "The mind can imagine nothing, nor can it recollect anything that is past," Spinoza writes, "except while the body exists."

But Spinoza also maintains that "only in so far as it involves the actual existence of the body can the mind be said to possess duration, and its existence be limited by a fixed time." Of every individual thing—whether it is a finite mind or a finite body—there exists in the infinite and eternal essence of God a conception or idea. "To conceive things under the form of eternity," Spinoza writes, "is to conceive them in so far as they are conceived through the essence of God." Because he holds that the human mind can have adequate knowledge of God, he holds that the mind can conceive "itself and its body under the form of eternity." Hence through knowing God, or the eternal truth about temporal things, the mind participates in eternity.

Imagination and memory may belong to time, but not the intellect which is capable of knowing God. To explain why we feel "that we are eternal," Spinoza points out that "the mind is no less sensible of those things which it conceives through intelligence than of those which it remembers." Although we cannot imagine or remember that "we existed before the body," we can know intellectually something about mind and body which belongs to eternity, because in addition to conceiving them as "existing with relation to a fixed time and place," we can conceive them as "contained in God" and as following "from the necessity of the divine nature." Since it "pertains to the nature of the mind to conceive the essence of the body under the form of eternity," Spinoza concludes that "the human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed with the body, but something of it remains which is eternal."

Such immortality is, in a way, enjoyed in this life, for it is a present participation in eternity through the mind's knowledge of God. There is also the impersonal immortality which men enjoy through contemplating the perpetuation of the species, or more particularly the perpetuation of an image of themselves in their offspring. In the *Symposium*, Socrates reports a conversation with Diotima in which she explains to him that in procreation "the mortal nature is seeking as far as is possible to be everlasting and immortal." Men hope that offspring "will preserve their memory and give them the blessedness and immortality which they desire in the future." But if procreation through the pregnancy of the body is a way of achieving immortality, artistic creation through a kind of pregnancy in the soul, Diotima argues, is even more so. "Who, when he thinks of Homer and Hesiod and other great poets," she asks, "would not rather have their children than ordinary ones? Who would not emulate them in the creation of children such as theirs, which have preserved their memory and given them everlasting glory?"

One need think "only of the ambition of men" and what they will do "for the sake of

ciple or substance which does not depend upon the body But then according to Aquinas you prove the immortality of the soul at the expense of destroying the unity of man for if the soul is a substance rather than a form the individual man *composed of body and soul consists* of two distinct substances

Theologically, Christian faith believes in the *resurrection of the body after the Last Judgment* and the end of the world as well as in the soul s separate existence immediately after death *From the point of view of a theologian* like Aquinas a philosophical proof of immortality must corroborate both of these dogmas In his judgment a proof which rests upon the proposition that the soul has a nature akin to that of an angel (*i e* a purely spiritual substance) makes the Christian dogma of the resurrected body unintelligible or even abhorrent

If the immortal soul were a complete and separate substance it would have no need for its body in the life hereafter It has that need only if its nature is that of a substantial form partly immersed in matter and partly separate therefrom Then because of these two aspects of its nature it can be said not only that the human soul retains its proper existence when separated from the body but also that it has an aptitude and a natural inclination to be united to the body

The incompleteness of the soul without the body and even more the dependence of man s *mind upon his bodily senses and imagination* raise as we have seen the difficult problem of *how the soul exists and operates when separated* from the body by death and before it is reunited to a resurrected body It may even raise the question whether the reasoning of Aquinas constitutes a valid philosophical argument for the actual existence of the soul in separation from the body or merely suggests the possibility of such existence But the facts which create these difficulties are the very facts to which Aquinas appeals in his Treatise on the Resurrection in order to explain the basis in nature for the miraculous re union of the body with the soul

THE ARGUMENTS FOR and against immortality *so far* considered are couched in the form of proofs or disproofs which aim at certainty *All* except one are moreover theoretical or speculative in the sense that they proceed in terms *of observations assumptions* and *inferences* about the nature of things—about atoms and substances matter and form extension and *thought inert bodies and living organisms* The one exception already mentioned is Kant s practical argument based on the moral necessity *of an immortal life*

There is still another argument both speculative and practical in character which does not aim at certainty nor take the form of a proof It is the proposal of a wager concerning the equally unknown alternatives of oblivion after death and eternal life Supposing no rational evidence to favor the truth of either alternative Pascal weighs the probability of gain and loss which is consequent upon living according to each hypothesis The probability he thinks vastly preponderates on the side of those who choose to forego the worldly life because to take the chance of gaining the whole world during the short term of earthly life they would risk the loss of eternal happiness for their immortal souls

Locke engages in the same type of calculation When infinite happiness is put into one scale, against infinite misery in the other if the worst that comes to the pious man, if he mistakes be the best that the wicked can attain to if he be right who Locke asks can without madness run the venture? Who in his wits would choose to come within the possibility of infinite misery which if he miss there is yet nothing to be got by that hazard? Whereas on the other side the sober man ventures nothing against infinite happiness to be got if his expectation comes to pass If wagering on immortal life the good man be right he is eternally happy but if he mistakes —if death ends all— he *is not* miserable he feels nothing

ALL THESE THEORIES including Kant s postulate and the wager *proposed* by Pascal and Locke are clearly concerned with arguing *for* personal immortality or individual survival Among those who *deny the survival of the* individual human spirit some—Hegel and Spinoza for example—conceive an *impersonal type of immortality*

REFERENCES

To fi d the passage cited u e the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and pa e numbers of the passages referred to Fo example in **4** HOM R *Iliad* BK II [265 283] **12d** the n mber **4** is the numbe of the volume in the set th number **12d** ind cates that the pas sa e is in section d f page 12

PA SECTIO S When the text is printed in one column the letters **a** and **b** refer to the upper nd lowe h l es of the page For exampl in **53** JAMES *Psychology* **116a 119b** the passage begins in th upper h lf of page 116 and nds in the lower half of page 119 When the text is printed in t c lumns, the letters **a** and **b** ref r to the upper and l wer hal es of the left hand side of the page the letters c nd d to th upper and lowe hal es of the r ght hands de of the page For example i 7 PLA O *Symposium* **163b-164c** the passage begins n the lower half of the left hand sid of page 163 a d ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164

AUTHOR S D VISI NS One or more of the m in d vi i ns of a wo k (such as PART BK CH S CT) are sometimes ncl ded in the refe ence l ne numbers, in brackets are given in cer tain cases *e g Ili d* BK I [265 283] **12d**

BI LE REFERENCES The refe ences a e to book ch pter and verse When the King James and Douay rs on diff r in title of books or i the numbering of chapters or verses the King James ersion s ted fir t nd the Douay ind cated by a (*D*) follows *e g* OLD TESTA ME *Nehemiah* 7 45—(*D*) *II Esdras* 7 46

SYM O The abb iat on esp c lls the reader s attention to one or more especially rel nt parts of a whole ef re ce pass m s gnifies that th topic i discus ed intermit tently rather than conti uously in the work or passa e cited

For dd t n l inf rmat c n rn n the style of the references see the Explanation of R ference Styl f r general gu dance in the use of *The G eat Ideas* c n lt th Preface

1 The de re for mmortality the fear of death

OLD T ST MENT *II Samuel* 22 5 7—(*D*) *II K g* 22 5 7 / *J b* 14 3 23 24 / *Ps lm* 6 esp 6 4-5 13 esp 13 3 16 esp 16 1 8 4-6 49 6-12 55 esp 55 4-8 83 4 -48 16 -9— (*D*) *P lms* 6 esp 6 5-6 1 esp 2 4 15 esp 15 1 7 5 7 45-7 3 54 esp 54 5-9 88 48-49 14 / *Ec les* 1 5 8 8 / *I ah* 38 0-19— (*D*) *Isa* s 38 0-19

APOC PH *II Macc bees* 6 8 7 42 esp 7 9— (*D*) OT *II Ma habee* 6 18 7 4 esp 7 9

N W T S ENT *M tthew* t 28 19 6-3 / *M k* 17 3 / *Luke* 10:25 37 / *Acts* 7 54-60—(*D*) *Act* 7 54-59 / *Roma* 2 5-8 esp 7 / *I Corinth an* 5 / *II Corin h a* 1 9-1 4 9 8 5 1-9 / *I Thess l* 5 4 13 1 — (*D*) *I Thess l* ians 4 12 7 / *I T moth* 6 1-19 esp 6 1 6 9 / *II Tim thy* 4 6-8 / *H bre* 4 15

4 HOME *Iliad* K XII [309-328] **85b-c** / *Odys* ey BK V [3 224] **210 b**

5 SO HOC *Oed p s at C l ous* [1579-1779] **128c 130**

7 PLATO *Symposi m* **165b-167a** / *Ap logy* **211b-212a c** / *Pha do* **230d 235a** *Rep b ic* **1 297a b** K I **324c 325b** **374a d** / *La* BK **687 b**

9 A ISTOTLE *Ethics* BK X CH 7 [1177b26-1178 1] **432**

12 LUCR T US *N ture of Th* BK I [10 126] **2b-c** K I I [31-93] **30b 31b** [830-1 94] **40c 44 c**

12 EPICTETUS *Disco rses* K I CH 9 **11 b-d** BK I CH I **139b**

12 AURE IU *M ditat ns* BK II SECT 11 12 **58a-c** BK III S CT 3 **260b** BK V SECT 45 **267d 268a** SECT 5 **268c** BK V II S CT 25 **287b-c** SECT 58 **290d** BK IX SECT 3 **291d 92a**

14 PLUT RCH *Arist d s* **265d**

17 P OTINUS *Fir t E ne d* TR IV CH 16 **19a** TR VC C 6 24 B TR VII H 3 **26d 27a**

18 A GUSTIN *Conf ss o s* BK IV par 11 **21d 22a** par 14 **22d 23a** K VI pa 18-19 **40d 41b** BK IX par 23 9 **68a 69c** / *C ty of God* BK I CH 22 **143b** BK IX CH 14 15 **293a 294a** K XIII CH 4 **361d 362** BK XIX CH 4 1 **511 516d** BK X I CH 23 **608 609a**

19 AQU N *S mma Theol gica* PART I Q 75 6 A 3 **383 384c**

20 AQ INAS *Summa Theol ic* P T I-II Q 85 A 6 **182d 184**

22 CHAU ER *S co d N s Tale* [15 788-8 1] **467a**

25 M N AIG E *Ess ys* **33d 36b 99b-100a 211a b 267a-c 402 403c**

leaving behind them a name which shall be eternal to realize how deeply they are stirred by the love of an immortality of fame Even deeper according to Diotima is their love of the good or more precisely their desire for the everlasting possession of the good which leads all men necessarily to desire immortality together with the good

Whether it is to be attained through the perpetuation of the species through survival in the memory of mankind through knowledge of God or through the subsistence of the soul the desire for immortality seems to express man s dread of disappearance into utter nothingness Yet facing death Socrates faces the alternatives with equanimity Either death he declares is a state of nothingness and utter unconsciousness or as men say there is a change and migration of the soul from this world to another Either it is like a dreamless and undisturbed sleep or it opens a new world to which the good man can look forward with hope On either alternative we can be of good cheer he tells his friends if we believe that no evil can happen to a good man either in life or after death

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

(1 *The desire for immortality the fear of death*)

27 Shakespeare *Hamlet* act iii sc i [56-88] 47c d / *Measure for Measure* act iii sc i [116-136] 188a b
29 Cervantes *Don Quixote* part ii 366d 367a
30 Bacon *Advancement of Learning* 28a-c
31 Spinoza *Ethics* part v prop 23 458b d prop 32 460b prop 38-39 461d 462c
32 Milton *Paradise Lost* bk x [770-844] 291a 292b
33 Pascal *Pensées* 166 168 169 203a 210 211b 239 217a
36 Swift *Gulliver* part iii 124a 129a
37 Fielding *Tom Jones* 86c d
40 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 186a 219c 220d 327d 328a 376a c
41 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 238c
42 Kant *Judgement* 600c d
44 Boswell *Johnson* 174b 238b 347a-c 394a c 399d-400a 573a 574a
51 Tolstoy *War and Peace* bk v 200c d 217c 218b bk xii 560a 562d
52 Dostoevsky *Brothers Karamazov* bk ii 26a 27d passim bk vi 148d 150d
53 James *Psychology* 224a 225a 653a
54 Freud *War and Death* 763c 764b

2 The knowledge of immortality arguments for and against personal survival

7 Plato *Phaedrus* 124b c / *Meno* 179d 183a / *Apology* 211b 212a c / *Phaedo* 220a 251d / *Republic* bk x 434d 436a / *Laws* bk xii 793c d
8 Aristotle *Metaphysics* bk xii ch 3 [1070 24-30] 599c / *Soul* bk i ch i [403 2-15] 632a b ch 2 [405 29-34] 634d bk ii ch i [413 3-9] 643a ch 2 [413b24-29] 643d 644a bk iii ch 4 [4 9 19-b4] 661c d ch 5 662c d ch 7 [431 15] 663d ch 8 [432 5-10] 664c
9 Aristotle *Generation of Animals* bk ii ch 3 [736b15-737 12] 277b d
12 Lucretius *Nature of Things* bk iii [323-1023] 34b 43b
12 Epictetus *Discourses* bk iii ch 24 203d
12 Aurelius *Meditations* bk ii sect 14 258d sect 17 259b d bk iv sect 21 265b c bk v sect 13 271b bk vii sect 50 283a bk viii sect 37 288c bk x sect 7 297b c bk xii sect 5 307d 308a sect 14 308c
17 Plotinus *Fourth Ennead* tr i 139a b tr iv ch 15 165c d tr vii 191c 200c
18 Augustine *City of God* bk x ch 31 319b d bk xiii ch 2 360b 361a
19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 61 a 2 rep 3 315c 316a q 75 a 2 379c 380c a 6 383c 384c q 76 a i 385d 388c a 3 rep i 2 391a 393a part i ii q 22 a i rep 3 720d 721c
20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i ii q 85 a 6 182d 184a
21 Dante *Divine Comedy* purgatory xxv [1-108] 91b 92c paradise vii [64-84] 115d 116a [121-148] 116b c
23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part iii 192c 193c part iv 250c 251b 253b 254a 269d 270d
25 Montaigne *Essays* 250a 264b 269b
30 Bacon *Advancement of Learning* 27d 28c
31 Descartes *Discourse* part iv 51d 52a part v 60b c / *Meditations* 69a 71a c passim 73a c / *Objections and Replies* 127c d def x 130d prop iv 133c
31 Spinoza *Ethics* part v prop 21 40 458a 462d esp prop 21- 3 458a d prop 38 461d 462a prop 40 462c d
32 Milton *Paradise Lost* bk x [782-844] 291b-292b
33 Pascal *Pensées* 556 271b
35 Berkeley *Human Knowledge* sect 141 441a b
40 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 186a 187b passim
42 Kant *Pure Reason* 120c 129c esp 124d 128a 203d 204c 218d 223d esp 219b d 234c 240b esp 234c 235c 237d 238a / *Practical Reason* 291a 292a / *Judgement* 600c d 610a b
44 Boswell *Johnson* 57d 58a
51 Tolstoy *War and Peace* bk ii 77d 78b 97a c
53 James *Psychology* 224b 225a

3 Belief in immortality

5 Euripides *Helen* [1009 1016] 307d
6 Herodotus *History* bk ii 75b bk iv 140c 141a
7 Plato *Apology* 211b 212a c / *Seventh Letter* 806a
12 Aurelius *Meditations* bk iii sect 3 260b
13 Virgil *Georgics* iv [219-227] 89b
14 Plutarch *Romulus* 29a b
17 Plotinus *Fourth Ennead* tr vii ch 15 200c
18 Augustine *Confessions* bk vi par 26 42d 43a
22 Chaucer *Second Nun s Tale* [15,787-800] 467a
24 Rabelais *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk iv 269a b
26 Shakespeare *Romeo and Juliet* act v sc i [17-21] 314d / *2nd Henry IV* act ii sc ii [109-114] 477a
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41 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 135a

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18 AUGUSTINE City of God BK X CH 30 318b-319b BK XI CH 20 3 5b-357a BK XXII C I 27 8 613b-614a
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4 HOMER Iliad BK XXI [361 366] 159a BK XXI [34 07] 161 1 162b / Odyssey BK XI 243a 249d BK XX V [1 2 3] 317a 319a
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12 AURELIUS Meditations BK I SEC 21 265b-c BK VI SECT 50 283
13 VIRGIL Georgics IV [4 47] 96b
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24 RABELAIS Gargantua and Pantagruel BK III 150d 151c
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31 SPINOZA Ethics PART V PROP 38-40 461d 462d
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48 MELVILLE Moby Dick 28a

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4 HOMER Odyssey BK XI [568-571] 248d
5 AESCHYLUS Suppliant Maidens [228-231] 3d
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7 PLATO Phaedrus 125b-126a / Phaedo 249c 250a / Gorgias 292b-294d / Republic BK X 437c-438c / Laws BK XII 793c d / Seventh Letter 806a
13 VIRGIL Aeneid BK [4 6-439] 222b [548-569] 225b-226a
17 PLOTINUS Fourth Ennead TR II CH 24 154b-d
18 AUGUSTINE City of God BK XX 530a 560a c BK XXI CH 11 27 5 0b-586a c passim
20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART III SUPPL, Q 8 -99 997a 1016a
21 DANTE Divine Comedy HELL III [70-136] 4d 5b [1 24] a b VI [94 115] 9b-c XIII [8 -108] 18d 19 XX [39] 28b-d XX II [55 136] 40a-41b XXIX [03 20] 44a b PURGATORY IX 65d-67b PARADISE X X [100 148] 136 c
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13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK VI [637-678] 228a-229a; [724-751] 230b-231a
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8 ARISTOTLE *Soul* BK I, CH 3 [406b30-407b25] 635d
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23 H B ES Leviatha PART I 254c

24 RAB LAI Garg ntua a d Pantagr l BK I 81a-d

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13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK VI [264-751] 218a 231a

14 PLUTARCH *Romulus* 28a 29b

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR I CH 11 5b c / *Third Ennead* TR IV CH 6 99b 100b / *Fourth Ennead* TR III CH 27 156d

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK X CH 30 318b 319b BK XX CH 25 554c 555a BK XXI CH 13 571c 572a CH 24 577b 579d

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL Q 69 A 2 ANS and REP 2 886c 887d A 7 ANS and REP 6 891d 893c Q 71 A 6 908b 909c Q 97 A 1 REP 2 1066b d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY 53a 105d esp I II 53a 55d IX 65d 67b X [106 139] 68c d XIII [34 93] 72b d XVII [82-139] 79b d XIX [97-126] 82c d XXI [34-72] 85b d XXIII [1-75] 88b 89a XXVII 94c 96a XXX-XXXI 99b 102b

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41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 234b 520c

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7 PLATO *Phaedo* 249c 250a / *Republic* BK X 437c 438c / *Laws* BK IX 757a BK X 767c 768c

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [978-1023] 42d 43b

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK VI [548-627] 225b 227b [735-747] 230b 231a

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XI CH 33 341a d BK XIII CH 2 360b 361a CH 12 365d 366a CH 14-15 366b d BK XIII CH 23 BK XIV CH 1 372a 377a BK XIV CH 15 388d 390a BK XV CH 1 397b d 398c BK XIX CH 13 519a 520a CH 28 529d 530a c BK XX CH 15 543d 544b BK XXI 560a 586a c / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 20-21 629b

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20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL, Q 69 885a 893c Q 70 A 3 897d 900d Q 86 992b 996a c Q 87 A 1 REP 4 997b 998c Q 90 A 3 1014d 1016a QQ 97-99 1066a 1085a c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL 1a 52d esp III [1-18] 4a b [82-129] 5a b VI [100-111] 9c VII [100-130] 10c d XI 15a 16b XIV [16-72] 19c 20b XXVII [55-136] 40a 41b XXVIII [139-142] 43a XXXIII [91-150] 50c 51a PARADISE VII [64-84] 115d 116a XV [10 12] 128c

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41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 149c 150c passim 234a c

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48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 347a

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For Other d scussions of man s attitude toward mutability and death *see* CHANGE 12b HAPPINESS 4b LIFE AND DEATH 8c TIME 7

The basic terms and propositions involved in arguments for or against the immortality of the soul *see* BEING b(1)–7b(4) ETERNITY 4a FORM d MAN 3a–3a( ) 3 MATTER d MIND 1b 2a d–e SOUL 3a–3d 4b and for the contrast between souls and angels with respect to their mode of being *see* ANGEL 4 ETERNITY 4a FORM d MAN 3b SOUL 4d(2)

Other d scussions of immortality as a postulate of the practical reason *see* METAPHYSICS 2d NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 4b

Another statement of the doctrine of reincarnation or the transmigration of souls, *see* SOUL 4d(1)

Articles of religious belief bearing on immortality such as *predestination* the Last Judgment and the resurrection of the body *see* GOD 7f–7h HAPPINESS 7c SOUL 4d(3)

The relevance of the doctrine of innate ideas to immortality *see* IDEA 2b KNOWLEDGE 6c(3) MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 3a MIND 4d(2)

The relevance to immortality of the theory of mind or intellect as an incorporeal power *see* MAN 3a( ) MATTER 4d MIND 2a SOUL 3b

The state of the soul separated from the body *see* KNOWLEDGE 7c SOUL 4d

The moral significance of immortality in relation to divine rewards and punishments *see* GOD 5i PUNISHMENT 5d.

Other d scussions of the underworld or of Hell Purgatory and Heaven *see* ETERNITY 4d HAPPINESS 7c–7c(3) PUNISHMENT 5e–5e(2) SIN 6d–6e.

The immortality of enduring fame *see* HONOR d

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection.

II Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date place and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

I

AUGUSTINE. *On the Immortality of the Soul*

AQUINAS *Summa Contra Gentiles* BK IV CH 9–95

—— *Quaestiones Disputatae De Anima* 14

DANTE *Convivio (The Banquet)* SECOND TREATISE, CH 9 (4–6)

F BACON Of Death in *Essays*

HUME. *Of the Immortality of the Soul*

—— *Of Suicide*

J S MILL. Theism," PART in *Three Essays on Religion*

W JAMES *Human Immortality*

II

EPICURUS. *Letter to Menoeceus*

CICERO. *De Republica (The Republic)* VI

—— *Tusculan Disputations*

—— *De Senectute (Of Old Age)*

OVID *Metamorphoses*

SENECA. *De Consolatione ad Marciam (On Consolation to Marcia)*

GREGORY OF NYSSA. *On the Soul and the Resurrection*

PROCLUS *The Elements of Theology* PROPOSITIONS 1 4–103 208–210

SAADIA GAON *The Book of Beliefs and Opinions* TREATISE VIII

BONAVENTURA. *Breviloquium* PART VII

R BACON *Opus Majus* PART VII

ALBO. *The Book of Principles (Sefer ha-Ikkarim)* BK IV CH 9–41

NICOLAS OF CUSA. *The Vision of God*

POMPONAZZI *On the Immortality of the Soul*

VAUGHAN. *The Retreat*

KING *The Exequy*

BROWNE. *Hydriotaphia*

H. MORE. *The Immortality of the Soul*

Chapter 39 INDUCTION

INTRODUCTION

As the list of Additional Readings indicates, the theory of induction falls within the province of logic and is part of the logician's concern with the methods of inference or reasoning employed in the sciences. The great controversies about induction seem to be of relatively recent origin in the history of logic, beginning perhaps with the argument between William Whewell and J. S. Mill over the contributions of reason and experience to the inductive process. Later in the nineteenth century and in our own time writers like Johnson and Keynes, Russell and Nicod, who present different formulations of inductive inference, call attention to the unsolved problems with which any theory is left. They undertake the assumptions that seem to be unavoidable in any statement of the formal conditions which validate the so-called "inductive leap"—the jump from observed particulars to general truths, truths having a wider generality than the particular evidences from which they are drawn or on which they are based.

The problem of induction, in anyone's version of it, is the problem of generalization. Thus may involve psychological questions about how the mind generalizes from experience. But however they are answered, the basic logical questions remain substantially unaltered. By what criteria is valid distinguished from fallacious induction? Can induction be secured from error by rules of inference? Is induction indispensable in the development of scientific knowledge, or is there, as Whewell, for example, suggests, a sharp distinction between the inductive and the deductive sciences?

What is the relation of induction to deduction? Is it the relation of a method of discovery to a method of demonstration or proof? Is it a relation between two modes of reasoning, both of which can be formulated as processes of proof? Is there both an inductive and a deductive type of syllogism, or is induction the very opposite of all forms of reasoning and proof?

It is with these last questions that the discussion of induction begins in the great books, especially in Aristotle's *Organon* and Bacon's *Novum Organum*, but also in the writings of Descartes and Locke, and in observations on scientific method by Newton, Harvey, and Pascal. Though many of the controversies and problems which become central in the nineteenth century do not appear explicitly in the earlier tradition, they are anticipated by the fundamental distinctions and issues which can be found in the earlier writers.

Bacon's dissatisfaction with Aristotle, for example, leads him to formulate specific rules for induction. Going further in the same general direction, Mill later develops his elaborate theory of inductive inference. We move in the opposite direction if we are guided by Aristotle's distinction between scientific and dialectical induction and by his way of setting induction off as the very opposite of reasoning. The question then arises whether Bacon and Mill are treating induction in all or in only one of several quite distinct senses.

As THE CHAPTER on LOGIC indicates, the names of Aristotle and Bacon are sometimes used as the symbols of opposed tendencies in logic. The one is supposed to represent an almost exclusive emphasis on deduction, the other the primacy and importance of induction. An opposition between Aristotle and Bacon is also implied in the current use of such phrases as "inductive logic" and "deductive logic." These phrases are sometimes used to suggest that the inductive or the deductive process can be favored to the exclusion, or at least the subordination, of the other. Such understanding of

LEIBNITZ *Discourse on Metaphysics* XXXII-XXXVI
—— *Monadology* par 19-28
J BUTLER *The Analogy of Religion* PART I CH I
LAW *An Appeal to All That Doubt the Truths of the Gospel* CH I
SWEDENBORG *Heaven and Its Wonders and Hell*
VOLTAIRE Heaven Hell Hell (Descent into) Purgatory Resurrection in *A Philosophical Dictionary*
MENDELSSOHN *Phadon oder Ueber di Unsterblichkeit der Seele*
LESSING *How the Ancients Represented Death*
WORDSWORTH *Intimations of Immortality*
COUSIN *Lectures on the True the Beautiful and the Good* PART III (16)
HAZLITT *On the Feeling of Immortality in Youth*
FEUERBACH *Gedanken uber Tod und Unsterblichkeit*
I H FICHTE *Die Idee der Personlichkeit und der individuellen Fortdauer*
J H NEWMAN The Immortality of the Soul in *Parochial and Plain Sermons*
KIERKEGAARD *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* pp 152-158
SCHOPENHAUER *The World as Will and Idea* VOL III SUP CH 41
—— Immortality A Dialogue in *Studies in Pessimism*
FECHNER *Life After Death*
—— *Religion of a Scientist*
CLIFFORD The Unseen Universe in VOL I *Lectures and Essays*
ROYCE *The Conception of Immortality*
FISKE *Life Everlasting*
POHLE *Eschatology*
SANTAYANA *Reason in Religion* CH 13-14
HÜGEL *Eternal Life*
BOSANQUET *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*
VONIER *The Human Soul and Its Relations with Other Spirits*
BRADLEY *Essays on Truth and Reality* CH 15(B)
FARNELL *Greek Hero Cults and Ideas of Immortality*
MCTAGGART *The Nature of Existence* CH 43 62
SCHELER *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*
LAKE *Immortality and the Modern Mind*
BROAD *The Mind and Its Place in Nature* CH 11 12
FRAZER *The Golden Bough* PART II CH 2 PART III PART IV BK I CH 5-6 PART V CH 16 PART VII CH 10-11
—— *Man God and Immortality* PART IV
J S HALDANE *The Sciences and Philosophy* LECT XVIII
WHITEHEAD *Process and Reality* PART V
KIRK *The Vision of God*
HOCKING *Thoughts on Death and Life*
A E TAYLOR *The Christian Hope of Immortality*
PERRY *The Hope for Immortality*

Induction and intuition are however not identical for Aristotle. In one passage in the *Prior Analytics* he considers syllogistic induction, which can hardly be called "intuitive." And in the *Ethics* where he discusses intuitive reason, he distinguishes between two sorts of primary truth that can be known by intuition.

"Intuitive reason" he writes, "is concerned with the ultimates in both directions for both the first terms and the last are objects of intuitive reason and not of argument and the intuitive reason which is presupposed by demonstrations grasps the unchangeable and first terms, while the intuitive reason involved in practical reasoning grasps the last and variable fact i.e., the minor premise. For these variable facts are the starting points for the apprehension of the end since the universals are reached from the particulars of these therefore we must have perception, and this perception is intuitive reason."

This applies to theoretic as well as practical knowledge. By intuitive reason, it seems, we grasp both the universal principles or axioms and the particular facts of sense-perception. As perception is intuition on the part of the sensitive faculty so induction is an intuitive use of the intellect (though Aristotle attributes both to intuitive reason")

These two forms of intuition are functionally related. The induction of universal truths from particulars is impossible without sense perception, for it is sense-perception alone which is able to grasp the particulars. But, according to Aristotle, a single isolated perception does not give rise to an intuitive induction. Repeated perceptions of things of a certain sort—particulars of a certain class—are formed by memory into what he calls "an experience." Because the experience refers, not to a single individual, but to a class of similar individuals, it provides the material for the mind's intuitive act of induction.

This theory of the role of experience in induction is more fully discussed in the chapter on EXPERIENCE. For our present purposes, the main point is that the universal, lying implicitly in the experience is ready as it were to be extracted therefrom and made explicit. "Though the act of sense-perception is of the particular its content is universal," Aristotle writes. With the help of memory and experience induction makes the latent universal manifest

BACON'S CRITICISM of the logic of Aristotle seems to rest on two counts first he complains of Aristotle's over-emphasis on syllogisms, whether they are used dialectically or demonstratively and second he charges Aristotle with a superficial understanding of induction. One of the chief efforts of the *Novum Organum* is to correct the latter mistake

"There are and can exist" says Bacon "but two ways of investigating and discovering truth. The one hurries on rapidly from the senses and particulars to the most general axioms, and from them, as principles, and from their supposed indisputable truth deduces the intermediate axioms. This is the way now in use. *The other constructs its axioms from the* senses and particulars, by ascending continually and gradually until it finally arrives at the most general axioms, which is the true but unattempted way"

Where Aristotle proposes that only the primary truths or first principles be established by induction, while all the others (which Bacon calls "intermediate axioms") are to be derived from them by demonstration, Bacon urges a method of induction which shall mount gradually from the least general to the most universal propositions. We should not "suffer the understanding to jump and fly from particulars to remote and most general axioms." We should "proceed by a true scale and successive steps, without interruption or breach, from particulars to the lesser axioms, thence to the intermediate (rising one above the other) and lastly to the most general."

According to this theory induction can intuitively draw more general from less general truths, as well as the least general truths from the particulars of *perception. It* might seem at first as if there were *no* place for deduction in the development of science. But Bacon divides the study of nature into two phases "the first regards the eliciting or creating of axioms from experiments, the second the deducing or deriving of new *experiments from* axioms." Here too there seems to be a crucial difference between Bacon and Aristotle. This difference is indicated by Bacon's emphasis upon *experiments* both as

the matter usually includes the popular notion that induction is always reasoning from particulars to universals and deduction always reasoning from universals to particulars

But none of these things seems to be true or at least not without serious qualification Neither Aristotle nor Bacon emphasizes deduction or induction to the exclusion of the other On the contrary both appear to insist on the absolute priority of induction since according to them it provides deductive reasoning with its ultimate premises Far from conflicting induction and deduction complement each other The consilience of the results of both these processes Mill writes each corroborating and verifying the other is requisite to give to any general proposition the kind and degree of evidence which constitutes *scientific proof*

Until principles are established the deduction of their implications or consequences cannot begin Unless principles once they are obtained are then used in the proof of other truths or are otherwise rationally employed the purpose of inductive generalization is not fully realized In this understanding of the relationship between induction and reasoning Aristotle and Bacon do not seem to disagree nor does either of them conceive induction as a process of *reasoning* from particulars to universals

There is no question that the direction of induction is from particulars but in the precise sense in which induction precedes deduction—the sense in which both Bacon and Aristotle regard it as the *source of axioms—they do not think it is a process of reasoning or a form of proof* As for deduction it is questionable at least for Aristotle whether its direction can be described as from the universal to the particular

Aristotle seldom uses the word deduction as the name for that phase of thought which is complementary to induction He speaks rather of demonstration Demonstration takes place through the various forms of reasoning which he calls syllogisms As the chapter on REASONING explains these are collections of premises each of which yields a conclusion by valid inference In the most perfect forms of reasoning the conclusion is as universal as its premises and though there are syllogisms in which a particular proposition can be demonstrated from a universal and a particular premise it is seldom the case that from *exclusively universal premises* a particular conclusion can be validly drawn The statement that deduction is reasoning from universals to particulars certainly does not seem to fit Aristotle s theory of the syllogism and even less his conception of scientific demonstration the aim of which is to prove universal not particular propositions

WE LEARN EITHER by induction or by demonstration Aristotle writes in the *Prior Analytics* Demonstration develops from universals induction from particulars In the *Posterior Analytics* he says that the ultimate premises of demonstration must be primary or basic truths A basic truth is an immediate proposition—what *is sometimes called a first principle* or an axiom Since in his view an immediate proposition is one which has no other proposition prior to it *the basic premises cannot* be demonstrated

Whence come these primary premises which are indispensable to demonstration but which demonstration cannot establish? Aristotle s answer is that we know the primary premises by induction In another place he says, it is by intuition that we obtain the *primary* premises

The word intuition indicates an essential characteristic of the sort of induction *which* because it is not itself a form of reasoning can be prior to all reasoning and *must be* in order to *supply the premises from which reasoning proceeds* Reasoning is discursive It is a process involving steps One proposition is drawn from another by the mediation of a third Intuition in contrast is immediate Like an act of seeing it apprehends its object at once and directly When Aristotle speaks of induction as a kind of intuition he implies therefore that it consists in the immediate grasp of a universal truth The proposition thus held he calls immediate precisely because it can be known intuitively and in no other way Intuitive induction as opposed to what may be called inductive reasoning consists in seeing the universal in the particular When what is seen is expressed in the form of a proposition the universal implicit in the known particulars is made explicit

our inferences from experience are frequently fallacious," Descartes writes, deduction or the pure illation of one thing from another cannot be erroneous when performed by an understanding that is in the least degree rational."

Nevertheless, Descartes does not exclude induction as the source of the axioms of mathematics or for that matter of metaphysics he only excludes the kind of induction which depends upon experiments. Such axioms as *when equals are taken from equals the remainders are equal or the whole is greater than any of its parts* are products of induction, as may be seen he points out, from the fact that a child can be taught these general truths only by showing him examples in particular cases." Similarly the metaphysical truth in the proposition *I think, therefore I exist* cannot be learned by deduction or syllogistic reasoning The axiom that *to think is to exist* has to be learned by induction from the experience of the individual—that unless he exists he cannot think. For our mind is so constituted by nature that general propositions are formed out of the knowledge of particulars."

FROM THE FOREGOING we can gather that different theories of induction may be in large part theories about different kinds of induction. Common to induction of every sort is the motion of the mind from particulars, apprehended by sense to general propositions or universal notions. But the character of the induction, or its conditions and method may differ according to the precise character of its source (1) whether it arises from ordinary sense-experience or from planned experiments and (2) whether it is based upon a single experiment or upon an enumeration of instances. There remains the most radical distinction in type of induction (3) whether it is intuitive or discursive—accomplished by an act of immediate insight or by a process of reasoning from premises to conclusion.

These three divisions cross one another to some extent. Descartes, for example, seems to regard the complete enumeration of a series of connected facts as a way of drawing a general conclusion about their connection. That he has inductive reasoning rather than intuitive induction in mind, we learn from his statement that by adequate enumeration or induction is meant that method by which we attain surer conclusions than by any other type of proof with the exception of simple intuition."

Pascal seems to be making the same point when he says that in all matters whose proof is by experiment and not by demonstration no universal assertion can be made except by the general enumeration of all the parts and all the different cases." Bacon on the other hand, always thinks of induction as intuitive generalization and therefore maintains that "induction which proceeds by simple enumeration is puerile leads to uncertain conclusions, and is exposed to danger from one contradictory instance

The elaborate procedure which Bacon proposes for collating instances stresses, not completeness of enumeration but an examination of their relation to one another and in the light thereof an interpretation of their significance Mill's four or five methods of induction bear a close resemblance to Bacon's more numerous tables of instances but Mill's methods are attempts to formulate the rules of inference for inductive reasoning whereas Bacon's rules are rules, not of reasoning but of tabulating the particulars from which intuitive generalizations can be formed.

On Mill's view of induction, it may be questioned whether induction from an exhaustive enumeration is induction at all for it seems to result in a *summary* of the facts enumerated rather than a *generalization* from particulars. Where there is no inductive leap there is no induction. Where the inductive leap does occur however it seems easier to understand it as an intuitive act—a seeing of the universal in the particular—rather than as a process of reasoning Each of Mill's methods requires a rule of inference which is itself a universal proposition. His critics have asked Whence come these universal propositions about the relations of cause and effect or about the order and uniformity of nature? They point out that he cannot answer that these propositions are themselves conclusions of inductive reasoning without begging the question.

SUCH CRITICISM of inductive reasoning does *not seem to apply* to Aristotle's conception of

the source of inductive generalization and also as that which is ultimately derived by deduction from axioms

The difference between *experience* (which Aristotle makes the source of induction) and *experiment* is more than verbal The axioms now in use Bacon contends are derived from a scanty handful as it were of experience and a few particulars of frequent occurrence There has been too little attention given to negative instances that is of cases which seem to run counter to the generalization being formed In establishing any true axiom Bacon insists the negative instance is the most powerful

The chapter on EXPERIENCE dwells on the difference between ordinary experience and planned experiments Where Aristotle seems to be satisfied with the ordinary experience which arises from the perceptions of men in the course of daily life Bacon thinks it does not suffice Because it is haphazard it fails to collect the *variety of instances both positive and negative* upon which genuine and solid inductions can be founded Unusual and special experiences must be sought out and the effort must be made to invent experiences which do not arise spontaneously For this experiment—or the production of experiences—is necessary Bacon thinks we must by every kind of experiment elicit the discovery of causes and true axioms

TWO CONSEQUENCES FOLLOW from the several differences we have noted between Aristotle s and Bacon s theories of induction

In the first place Aristotle does not seem to think that induction can be methodically prescribed by *logical rules It is a natural act of* intelligence to draw universals from experience Though men may differ in the readiness of their native wit the induction of the primary truths which are the axioms or first principles of science does not require special genius nor can it be improved or rendered more certain by following rules Precisely because it is intuitive rather than discursive induction unlike reasoning cannot be regulated by rules of inference such as those which govern the syllogism

Without disagreeing that it is intuitive rather than argumentative Bacon seems to think that induction *requires the practice of the most* detailed and precise method Not only must the various ascending stages of induction be regulated by observance of an order of generality but the making of experiments and the collection and arrangement of particulars forming tables and coordinations of instances must be governed by a complex set of rules The twenty seven tables of instances set forth in the second book of the *Novum Organum* constitute the heart of Bacon s method of induction This new method of discovering the sciences he observes levels men s wits and leaves but little of their superiority since it achieves everything by the most certain rules

In the second place since genuine induction depends for Bacon upon ample experiments it belongs primarily to the method of the experimental sciences—the physical or natural sciences in which experimentation is possible Though the first principles or axioms of arithmetic and geometry may be learned by induction *the method of gradual ascent from experiments* through intermediate generalizations does not apply to mathematics Here we may have the beginning of the notion that only the experimental sciences are primarily inductive whereas other sciences like mathematics are primarily deductive

But such a division of the sciences does not accord with Aristotle s theory of induction He thinks mathematics and metaphysics require induction for their foundation no less than physics and in no different way if anything induction is of the greatest importance for metaphysics because all its principles are indemonstrable whereas some of the principles *needed in mathematics and physics can be dem*onstrated in metaphysics Yet no science is peculiarly inductive just as none stands in a special relation to experience All depend equally upon experience for the induction of the primary truths on which their demonstrations rest

Descartes seems to fall somewhere between Aristotle and Bacon He regards arithmetic and geometry as more certain than the physical sciences because mathematics is largely developed by deduction whereas the study of nature depends upon induction from experiments In this lies the superiority of mathematics While

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Descartes seems to fall somewhere between Aristotle and Bacon He regards arithmetic and geometry as more certain than the physical sciences because mathematics is largely developed by deduction whereas the study of nature depends upon induction from experiments In this lies the superiority of mathematics While

our inferences from experience are frequently fallacious, Descartes writes, deduction or the pure illation of one thing from another "can not be erroneous when performed by an understanding that is in the least degree rational."

Nevertheless, Descartes does not exclude induction as the source of the axioms of mathematics or, for that matter, of metaphysics. He only excludes the kind of induction which depends upon experiments. Such axioms as *when equals are taken from equals the remainders are equal* or *the whole is greater than any of its parts* are products of induction, as may be seen, he points out, from the fact that a child can be taught these general truths only "by showing him examples in particular cases." Similarly, the metaphysical truth in the proposition *I think, therefore I exist* cannot be learned by deduction or syllogistic reasoning. The axiom that *to think is to exist* has to be learned by induction "from the experience of the individual—that unless he exists he cannot think. For our mind is so constituted by nature that general propositions are formed out of the knowledge of particulars."

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On Mill's view of induction, it may be questioned whether induction from an exhaustive enumeration is induction at all, for it seems to result in a summary of the facts enumerated rather than a generalization from particulars. Where there is no inductive leap, there is no induction. Where the inductive leap does occur, however, it seems easier to understand it as an intuitive act—a seeing of the universal *in* the particular—rather than as a process of reasoning. Each of Mill's methods requires a rule of inference which is itself a universal proposition. His critics have asked, Whence come these universal propositions about the relations of cause and effect or about the order and uniformity of nature? They point out that he cannot answer that these propositions are themselves conclusions of inductive reasoning without begging the question.

Such criticism of inductive reasoning does not seem to apply to Aristotle's conception of

it for with him it is not as with Mill distinct in form from the syllogism It is simply a distinct type of syllogism which consists in reasoning from effect to cause rather than from cause to effect *Nor does the observation that an inductive inference cannot be more than probable apply to what Aristotle means by an inductive syllogism*

The certainty or probability of non syllogistic *induction depends on the source of the* inference—whether it derives from a single specially constructed experiment or from an enumeration of particular instances with or without a statistical calculation based on their frequency The conception of a *perfect* experiment implies that the operation of a universal law can be exhibited in a single case *It is almost as if the controlling aim of the experiment were to make the universal manifest in the particular*

Newton s experiments on reflection and refraction seem to be of this sort From them certain laws of optics are directly induced even as according to *Aristotle and Descartes* the axioms of mathematics or metaphysics can be directly induced from simple experiences available to a child or familiar to all men Yet Newton does not think that the inductive establishment of such laws is as certain as demonstration

The analytic method he writes consists in making experiments and observations and in drawing general conclusions *from them by* induction And although the arguing from experiments and observations by induction be no demonstration of general conclusions yet *it is* the best way of arguing which the nature of *things admits of* and may be looked upon as so much stronger by how much the induction is more general If no exception *occur from* phenomena the conclusion *may be pronounced* generally but if at any time afterwards any exception shall *occur* from experiments it may then begin to be pronounced with such exceptions as occur

Because it must depend on inductive generalizations from experience which in his view can never be certain Locke doubts that physics can ever become a science *I deny not* he writes that a man accustomed *to rational* and regular experiments shall be able to see further into the nature of bodies and *guess righter* at their yet unknown properties than one that is a stranger to them but yet as I have said this *is but judgment and opinion not knowledge* and certainty This way of *getting and improving our knowledge in substances only by experience and history* which is all that the weakness of our faculties in this state of *mediocrity* can attain to makes me suspect Locke concludes that *natural philosophy is not capable of being made a science*

*Hume offers two reasons for the inconclusive*ness and uncertainty which he thinks qualify all our generalizations or inductions from experience The first *calls attention to the fact* that unlike mathematical reasoning inferences *from experience in the realm of physical matters* depend on the number of cases observed

The conclusions which [reason] draws from *considering one circle* he says are the same it would form upon surveying all the circles in the universe But no man having seen only one body move after being impelled by another could infer that every other body will move after a *like impuls*

The principle which determines *him to form such a conclusion is according* to Hum Custom or Habit and precisely because inductive generalization is *an effect of custom rather than of reasoning in the strict sense* the *strength of the induction*—or the force of custom—varies *with the number of cases from which it arises After the constant conjunction* of two objects—heat and flame for instance weight and solidity—we are determined by custom *alone to expect the one from the appear*ance of the other This hypothesis Hume maintains seems the only one which explains *the difficulty why we draw from a* thousand instances an inference which we are *not able to draw from one instance that is in no respect different from them* Reason is incapable of any such variation

*Since all the relevant cases can never be ex*haustively observed the inference from a customary *conjunction must always remain* uncertain no matter how high a probability it derives *from the multiplication of like in*stances *To this first point* concerning the dependence of the probability of generalizations *from experience upon the frequency of the ob*served *instances Hume adds a second point* about the similarity *of the cases under obser*

vation. Analogy, he says, "leads us to expect from any cause the same events, which we have observed to result from similar causes. Where the causes are entirely similar, the analogy is perfect, and the inference drawn from it is regarded as certain and conclusive. ... But where the objects have not so exact a similarity, the analogy is less perfect, and the inference is less conclusive; though still it has some force, in proportion to the degree of similarity and resemblance." The absence of perfect similarity is Hume's second reason for the inconclusiveness or uncertainty of inductive generalizations.

The contrary supposition—that one case can be perfectly representative of an infinite number of similar cases—may explain why Aristotle seems to think that induction is able to produce the primary truths or principles of science with a certitude which gives certainty to all the demonstrations founded on these axioms. Another explanation of Aristotle's view may be found in his distinction between scientific and dialectical induction. He regards the former as based on the kind of common experience which, unlike even the best experiment, admits of no exceptions. In contrast, dialectical induction, or the still weaker form of induction which he calls "rhetorical," is based on an enumeration of cases (which may not be complete) or upon a single example (which provides no safeguard against possible exceptions).

In its dialectical form, the inductive argument proceeds from a number of particulars taken for granted. Aristotle offers this example of dialectical induction: "Supposing the skilled pilot is the most effective, and likewise the skilled charioteer, then in general the skilled man is the best at his particular task." In its rhetorical form, no more than a single example may be used, as when the orator generalizes that honesty is the best policy from the story of a particular individual who was finally rewarded for his virtue.

In both forms, the inductive generalization is at best probable, and it is more or less probable according to the soundness of the suppositions or the examples from which it originates—to be tested only by extending the enumeration of particulars. But if an induction is merely probable in the first place, it can only be made more probable; it can never be made certain by multiplying cases or by increasing their variety.

Aristotle's theory of dialectical induction thus seems to have a bearing on the probability of induction from limited experiments (or from a single experiment whose perfection is not assured) and of induction from the frequency or variety of observed instances. The other point to be noted is that Bacon's basic rule of gradual ascent from particular cases through less general to more general propositions seems to be relevant to dialectical induction, but not, on Aristotle's view, to that kind of induction which produces the axioms or principles of science.

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to For example in **4** HOMER *Iliad* BK II [265- 83] **12d** the number **4** is the number of the volume in the set the number **12d** indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters **a** and **b** refer to the upper and lower halves of the page For example in **53** JAMES *Psychology* **116a 119b** the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119 When the text is printed in two columns the letters **a** and **b** refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters **c** and **d** to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page For example in **7** PLATO *Symposium* **163b 164c** the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164

AUTHOR S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases *e g* *Iliad* BK II [65–283] **12d**

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a *(D)* follows *e g* OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—*(D) II Esdras* 7 46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface

1 The theory of induction generalization from particulars

1*a* Induction and intuition their relation to reasoning or demonstration

8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 3 [72^{b}18 -4] **99b c** CH 23 [84^{b}31–85 1] **115d 116a** CH 31 [87^{b}39–88 17] **120a c** CH 33 [88^{b}30–89 1] **121b c** BK II CH 2 [90 24–30] **123b c** CH 19 **136a 137a c** / *Topics* BK I CH 12 **148d** BK VIII CH 1 [155^{b}35 156 7] **211d 212a** [156^{b}10–18] **212c d** / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 9 [992^{b}24–993 1] **511a b**

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 7 [1098 34-^{b}3] **343d** BK VI CH 3 **388b c** CH 6 **389d** CH 8 [1142 23–31] **391b c** CH 11 **392c 393b** esp [1143 32-^{b}6] **392d 393a** / *Rhetoric* BK II CH 20 [1393 25 -6] **641a**

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* **332a 335c** esp **333d 334d**

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* **43d 44c 59c 61d 96d 97a** / *Novum Organum* **105a 195d** esp BK I APH 11–26 **107d 108d** APH 69 **116a b** APH 105 **128b c** BK II APH 1 10 **137a 140d** APH 15–16 **149a b** APH 20–2- **150d 153c** APH 52 **194c 195d**

31 DESCARTES *Rules* III **3b 5a** esp **4a b** VII **10c 12a** IX **14d 15d** XI **17b d** / *Objections and Replies* **123a b 167c d**

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 40 SCHOL 2 **388a b**

33 PASCAL *Pensees* 1–5 **171a 173a**

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT I DIV 2 **451b c** DIV 9 **454c 455a** SECT IV DIV 26 **460b c**

1*b* Inductive reasoning the issue concerning inductive and deductive proof

8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK II CH 3 **90a c** / *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 1 [71 1 11] **97a** CH 3 [72^{b}25–33] **99c** CH 18 **111b c** BK II CH 7 [92 34 ^{b}1] **126b** / *Topics* BK I CH 18 [108^{b}7 12] **152d** / *Physics* BK VIII CH 1 [252 23 25] **336a**

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 4 [1095 30–^{b}8] **340c** CH 7 [1098 35–^{b}3] **343d** BK VI CH 3 **388b c** / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 2 [1356^{b}5 18] **596a b**

28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences* FOURTH DAY **252a b**

28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* **280c**

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* **42a c 57b 58b 61d 96d 97a** / *Novum Organum* **105a 195d** esp BK I APH 11 26 **107d 108d** APH 69 **116a b** APH 103 106 **127d 128c** BK II APH 10–52 **140c 195d**

31 DESCARTES *Rules* II **2d 3a** VII **10c 12a** XI **17b 18b** XII **24a b** / *Discourse* PART VI **61d 62c** / *Objections and Replies* **167c d**

(4 *The use of induction in argument*)

4b Rhetorical induction inference from example in the process of persuasion

8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK II CH 24 90c 91a / *Topics* BK VIII CH 1 [156b10–18] 212c d CH 8 [160 35–b1] 217d / *Metaphysics* BK II CH 3 [995 6–8] 513c

9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK I CH 2 [1356 36–1358 3] 596a 597d CH 9 [1368 29–31] 611b c BK II CH 20 640d 641d CH 23 [1398 32–b18] 646d 647a CH 25 [1403 5–9] 652d BK III CH 17 [1417b35–1418 3] 672b

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 58c 59a

42 KANT *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 376c d

5 The role of induction in the development of science the methods of experimental and enumerative induction

8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK II CH 23 90a c / *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 3 [72b25–33] 99c CH 18 111b c BK II CH 19 136a 137a c / *Physics* BK I CH 2 [185 13–14] 259d BK V CH 1 [224b8–30] 304d BK VIII CH 1 [252 23–b5] 336a b / *Generation and Corruption* BK I CH 2 [316 5–14] 411c d / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 9 [992b30–993 1] 511b BK VI CH 1 [1025b 1 16] 547b BK XI CH 7 [1064 4–9] 592b BK XIII CH 4 [1078b28–30] 610b

9 ARISTOTLE *Generation of Animals* BK V CH 8 [788b10–21] 330c / *Ethics* BK I CH 4 [1095 30–b8] 340c CH 7 [1098 34–b3] 343d BK VI CH 3 388b-c

10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK III CH 1–2 199a 200a esp 199c d

28 GILBERT *Loadstone* PREF 1a c

28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences* THIRD DAY 200a b 207d 208a

28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 280c 285c-d / *Circulation of the Blood* 324c d / *On Animal Generation* 332a 335c esp 334c d 383d 473a

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 16a 34b 42a-c 56b 58c 96d 97a / *Novum Organum* 105a 195d esp BK I APH 11 26 107d 108d APH 69 116a b APH 104–106 128a-c BK II APH 1–10 137a 140d APH 15 16 149a b APH 20 21 150d 153b APH 52 194c 195d

31 DESCARTES *Rules* II 2d 3a VII 10b 12a / *Discourse* PART VI 61d 62c / *Objections and Replies* 167c d

33 PASCAL *Vacuum* 358a b / *Arithmetical Triangle* 451b 452a 458b 459b 464a-466a

34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III RULE III IV 270b 271b GENERAL SCHOL, 371b 372a / *Optics* BK III 543a b

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 107 433d-434a

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT I DIV 9 454c 455a SECT III DIV 19 458a SECT IV DIV 26 460b c

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 5a 13d 45b-46a 72c 85d esp 72c 74b 82a b / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 387a b / *Judgement* 562d 563b

43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 445d-446b 475b d [fn 1]

45 FARADAY *Researches in Electricity* 659a

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE II 690b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 385a b 677b 862a 865a

54 FREUD *Instincts* 412a b

CROSS REFERENCES

For Other discussions of induction as an intuitive act of generalization *see* JUDGMENT 8a KNOWLEDGE 6c(2) PRINCIPLE 3a(1) 3a(3)–3b REASONING 5b(1) SCIENCE 5d

Other treatments of inductive reasoning and its relation to deductive reasoning *see* REASONING 4c 6c SCIENCE 5d and for parallel distinctions in modes of argument *see* EXPERIENCE 2d REASONING 5b(3) 5b(5)

Discussions dealing with the sources or conditions of induction generalization or abstraction *see* EXPERIENCE 2b IDEA 2g MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 3c 6c(1) SENSE 5b UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 4c

Induction as the source of principles axioms or scientific laws *see* PRINCIPLE 3b SCIENCE 4d UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 4f

Other treatments of dialectical and rhetorical induction *see* DIALECTIC 2b 3b RHETORIC 4c(1) and *for their contrast with dialectical and rhetorical reasoning* *see* DIALECTIC 3c REASONING 5c–5d RHETORIC 4c(2)

The role of induction in the experimental sciences *see* EXPERIENCE 5a REASONING 6c SCIENCE 4d 5d

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World*, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:

I. Works by authors represented in this collection.
II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*.

I

J. S. MILL. *A System of Logic*, BK III, IV

II

PHILODEMUS. *On Method of Inference*
JOHN OF SAINT THOMAS. *Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Ars Logica*, PART I, BK II, CH 2, Q 8 (2); PART II, Q 5
WHATELY. *Elements of Logic*, BK IV, CH 1
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WHEWELL. *The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*, VOL II, BK I, CH 1–6; BK XIII
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MISES. *Probability, Statistics and Truth*
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B. RUSSELL. *The Problems of Philosophy*, CH 6
—— *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy*, CH 3
—— *Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits*, PART CH ; PART VI, CH 2, 3

Chapter 40 INFINITY

INTRODUCTION

ONE of the persistent questions concerning infinity is whether we can know or comprehend it Another is whether the infinite exists and if so to what kind of thing infinity belongs It is not surprising therefore that the discussion of infinity often borders on the unintelligible

The idea of infinity like the idea of eternity lacks the support of the imagination or of sense experience The fact that the infinite cannot be perceived or imagined seems sufficient to lead Hobbes and Berkeley to deny its reality Whatsoever we imagine is *finite* writes Hobbes Therefore there is no idea or conception of anything we call *infinite* When we say anything is infinite we signify only that we are not able to conceive the ends and bounds of the thing named having no conception of the thing but of our own inability

On similar grounds Berkeley rejects the possibility of infinite division If I cannot perceive innumerable parts in any infinite extension he writes it is certain that they are not contained in it but it is evident that I cannot distinguish innumerable parts in any particular line surface or solid which I either perceive by sense or figure to myself in my mind wherefore I conclude that they are not contained in it

But for most of the great writers on the subject the impossibility of representing infinity and eternity to the imagination does not render them inconceivable or meaningless Yet it does account for the difficulty of grasping their meaning a difficulty further increased by the fact that whatever their meaning *infinity* and *eternity* are indefinable To define the infinite would be to limit—even in thought—the unlimited

The notion of infinity involves greater perplexities than that of eternity The meaning of eternity is weighted with the mystery of God the world and time All these affect the conception of infinity but for the infinite there are also the mysteries of number and of space of matter and motion In the sphere of quantity or of things subject to quantity infinity is itself the source of mystery or at least the root of difficulty in analysis It is the central term in the discussion of the continuous and the indivisible the nature of series and of limits

As INDICATED in the chapter on ETERNITY that idea in each of its applications seems to have one or the other of two meanings—(1) the meaning in which it signifies infinite time time without beginning or end and (2) the meaning in which it signifies the timelessness or immutability of being Both meanings are negative so far as our understanding is concerned Yet what is signified by the second is in itself something positive at least in the opinion of those who think that to be exempt from change entails having every perfection or being lacking in nothing

This split in meaning also occurs in the idea of infinity As applied to being the term *infinite* signifies something positive even though our understanding of what is signified remains negative or at best analogical An infinite being is one which lacks no attribute that can belong to a being This is the positive condition of absolute perfection The infinite here still means the unlimited but that which is unlimited in being has no defect To lack deficiencies is to be perfect

It is in this sense that Spinoza defines God as Being absolutely infinite that is to say substance consisting of infinite attributes each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence Like Spinoza Aquinas maintains that besides God nothing can be infinite But he

distinguishes the absolute or positive sense in which God alone is infinite from the sense of the word in which it can be said that things other than God can be relatively infinite but not absolutely infinite This other meaning according to Aquinas, is not only relative but negative for it connotes "something imperfect" It signifies indeterminacy or lack of perfection in being

What Aquinas calls the relative or potential infinite he attributes to matter and to quantities—to bodies to the magnitudes of space and time and to number This sense of infinite corresponds to that meaning of "eternal," according to which time consists of an endless series of moments, each having a predecessor each a successor no matter how far one counts them back into the past or ahead into the future

But in the field of quantities other than time the meanings of infinite and eternal part company There is, of course some parallelism between infinite space and infinite time insofar as an infinite extension is one which does not begin at any point or end at any but the consideration of space and number leads to an aspect of infinity which has no parallel in the consideration of eternity

In sizes or numbers, Pascal writes, "nature has set before man two marvelous infinities. For from the fact that they can always be increased it *follows* absolutely that they *can* always be decreased If we can multiply a number up to 100 000 times, say we can also take a hundred thousandth part of it by dividing it by the same number we multiply it with and thus every term of increase will become a term of division by changing the integer into a fraction. So that infinite increase includes necessarily infinite division. As endless addition produces the *infinitely large* so endless division produces the infinitesimal or the infinitely small

A trillion trillion is a finite number because the addition of a single unit creates a larger number The fact that the addition of another unit produces a different number indicates that a trillion trillion has a determinate size which is the same as saying that it is a finite number An infinite number cannot be increased by addition for it is constituted—in thought at least—as a number larger than the sum of any two finite numbers which is another way of saying that it is approached by carrying on the process of addition endlessly The size of an infinite number is therefore indeterminate

What Galileo points out about two infinite quantities seems to hold for an infinite and a finite quantity He asks us to consider the totality of all integers (which is infinite) and the totality of their squares (which is also infinite) On the one hand there appear to be as many squares as there are integers on the other hand the totality of integers includes all the squares. Precisely because "the number of squares is not less than the totality of all numbers, nor the latter *greater than the former*" Galileo insists that the attributes equal, greater and less are not applicable to infinite but only to finite quantities." Nor does the sense in which one finite quantity can be greater or less than another—that is, by a determinate difference between them—apply to the comparison of a finite and an infinite quantity The latter being indeterminately large is indeterminately larger than any finite quantity

These remarks apply to the infinitely small as well. The infinitesimal is immeasurably small or indeterminately less than any finite fraction, no matter how small, because its own size is indeterminate The finite fraction, itself a product of division, can be divided again, but if an infinitesimal quantity were capable of further division, it would permit a smaller and since that smaller quantity would be a determinate fraction of itself the infinitesimal would have to be determinate in size Since that is not so, the infinitesimal must be conceived as the indivisible or as the limit approached by carrying on division endlessly

Because the hypothesis of indivisibles seems somewhat harsh Newton proposes an analysis in terms of what he calls nascent and evanescent quantities, or quantities just *beginning* to be more than nothing or just at the point at which they *vanish* into nothing As there is a limit which the velocity at the end of a motion may attain but not exceed there is a like limit in all quantities and proportions that begin or cease to be Newton warns his

reader therefore that if he should happen to mention quantities as least or evanescent or ultimate the reader is not to suppose that quantities of any determinate magnitude are meant but such as are conceived to be always diminished without end

Later speaking of quantities which are variable and indetermined and increasing or decreasing as it were by a continual motion or flux he adds Take care not to look upon finite quantities as such The method of fluxions provides an infinitesimal calculus on the hypothesis of limits rather than of indivisibles

THROUGH ALL THESE conceptions of infinity—metaphysical mathematical and physical—run the paired notions of the unlimited and of limits approached but not attained The finite is neither unlimited nor does it insensibly approach a limit There are also the opposite notions of the perfect and the indeterminate The finite is neither for it is determinate without being a totality or complete

Though they have a common thread of meaning and though each raises similar difficulties for the understanding the conception of infinity in being or power and the conception of infinite (or infinitesimal) quantity require separate consideration The same questions may be asked of each questions about the existence of the infinite and about our knowledge of it but the same answers will not be given in each case There are those who deny the existence of an actually infinite body or an actually infinite number yet affirm the infinite existence of God There are those who declare the infinity of matter to be intrinsically unintelligible but maintain that God Who is infinite is intrinsically the most intelligible object They add of course that the infinite being of God cannot be comprehended by our finite intellects

On each of these points an opposite view has been taken but the dispute concerning the infinity of God involves issues other than those which occur in the controversy over the infinite divisibility of matter or the infinity of space and time It seems advisable therefore to deal separately with the problems of infinity as they arise with respect to different objects or occur in different subject matters

THE CONCEPTION of God in the words of Anselm as a being than which a greater can not be conceived —or in the words of Kant as an *ens realissimum* a most real being—expresses the plenitude of the divine nature and existence The mediaeval thesis defended by Descartes that God s essence and existence are identical implies that neither is contracted or determined by the other The still earlier notion of Aristotle repeated by Aquinas that God is pure actuality carries with it the attributes of completeness or perfection which are the positive aspects of immutability or incapacity for change Spinoza s definition of substance as that which exists not only in itself but through itself and by its very nature entails the autonomy or utter independence of the divine being

These are so many different ways of stating that God is an infinite being Both Aquinas and Spinoza make infinity the basis for proving that there can be only one God When Spinoza argues that a plurality of substances possessing the same nature is absurd he has in mind the identification of infinite substance with God

If many gods existed Aquinas writes they would necessarily differ from each other Something would therefore belong to one which did not belong to another And if this were a privation one of them would not be absolutely perfect but if it were a perfection one of them would be without it So it is impossible for many gods to exist —that is of course if infinity is a property of the divine nature Aquinas makes this condition clear when he goes on to say that the ancient philosophers constrained as it were by the truth when they asserted an infinite principle asserted likewise that there was only one such principle

But while it is impossible for there to be two infinities of being it is not impossible for there to be two or more infinite quantities One explanation of this difference seems to be the actuality or existence of an infinite being in contrast to the conceptual character of the infinite objects of mathematics which are sometimes called potential infinites because they are conceived as in an endless process of becoming or as approaching a limit that is never reached

When the physical existence of infinite quan

ntes is asserted as, for example a universe of infinite extent or an infinite number of atoms, the uniqueness of these actual totalities seems to follow Two infinite worlds cannot co-exist, though the one world can be infinite in several distinct respects—in space or duration, or in the number of its constituents—even as the infinity of God, according to Spinoza involves infinite attributes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence "

Spinoza's argument against two actual infinities seems to find confirmation in the position taken by Aquinas that God's omnipotence does not include the power to create an infinite world. God's infinity as we have already noted, follows from the identity of God's essence and existence. Since a created being has existence added to its essence Aquinas asserts that it is against the nature of a created thing to be absolutely infinite. Therefore " he continues, as God, although He has infinite power cannot make a thing to be not made (for this would imply that two contradictories are true at the same time) so likewise He cannot make anything to be absolutely infinite "

On this view an infinite world cannot co-exist with an infinite God if in their separate existence one is dependent on the other as creature upon creator The infinity of the world or of nature in Spinoza's *conception*, is not separate from the infinity of God but consists in the infinity of two of God's attributes—extension and thought.

In our time there has arisen the conception of a finite God—a God who, while the most perfect being yet is not without capacity for growth or change a God who is eternal without being immutable. This conception, which in the light of traditional theology appears to be as self-contradictory as *round square* has arisen in response to the difficulties certain critics have found in the traditional doctrine of an infinite being They point to the difficulty of understanding how finite beings can exist separate from, yet in addition to, an infinite being they also cite difficulties in the notions of infinite knowledge infinite power and infinite goodness.

The infinity of the divine omniscience extends to the possible as well as to the actual. But the possible includes things which are incompatible with one another things which in the language of Leibnitz are not *compossible* The *incompossible* would thus seem to be embraced in the infinite scope of divine thought or knowledge In the view of one theologian Nicolas of Cusa the mystery of God's infinity is best expressed by affirming that in God all contradictions are somehow reconciled.

The infinity of God's power or the divine omnipotence also raises questions about the possible and the impossible Is nothing impossible to God or must it be said that there are certain things which not even God can do, such as reverse the order of time or create a world which shall be as infinite and perfect as himself? In the assertion that God cannot do the impossible Aquinas sees no limitation on God's power The impossible he writes does not "come under the divine omnipotence not because of any defect in the power of God but because it has not the nature of a feasible or possible thing " For this reason, he claims, "it is better to say that such things cannot be done than that God cannot do them." The inability to do the *undoable* constitutes no violation of *infinite* power even as the lack of nothing does not deprive infinite being of anything.

The infinite goodness of God is sometimes set against the fact of evil or the existence of imperfections, in the created world This aspect of the problem of evil, like that which concerns man's freedom to obey or disobey the divine will, cannot be separated from the fundamental mystery of God's infinity—in power and knowledge as well as in goodness. The problem is considered in the chapter on GOOD AND EVIL. The point there mentioned that evil is essentially non being or deprivation of being leads to one solution of the problem. It accepts the finitude and consequently the imperfection of creatures as *a necessary consequence of* God's infinity The best of all possible worlds cannot be infinitely good.

TO MAN ALONE, among all admittedly finite things, has infinity been attributed and even made a distinctive mark of his nature. Does this introduce a new meaning of infinity neither quantitative nor divine?

It has seldom if ever been questioned that man is finite in being and power The limits of

human capacity for knowledge or achievement are a perennial theme in man s study of man Yet it is precisely with regard to *capacity* that certain writers have intimated man s infinity

Pascal for example finds the apparent contradictions in human nature intelligible only when man is understood as yearning for or impelled toward the infinite We burn with desire he says to find solid ground and an ultimate sure foundation whereon to build a tower reaching to the Infinite But our whole groundwork cracks and the earth opens to abysses In this fact lies both the grandeur and the misery of man He aspires to the infinite yet he is a finite being dissatisfied with his own finitude and frustrated by it

It is sometimes said that the touch of infinity in man—with the suggestion that it is a touch of madness—consists in his wanting to be God Those who regard such desire as abnormal or perverse interpret it as a misdirection of man s natural desire to know God face to face and to be filled with the love of God in the divine presence But according to the theory of natural desire the tendency of each nature is somehow proportionate to its capacity If man s restless search for knowledge and happiness can be quieted only by the possession of the infinite truth and goodness which is God then man s intellect and will must somehow be as infinite in nature as they are in tendency Yet that is not an unqualified infinity for the same theologians who teach that man naturally seeks God also hold that man s finite intellect cannot *comprehend* the infinite being of God as God knows Himself Nor do they think that man s capacity for knowing and loving God can be fulfilled except in the beatific vision which is a supernatural gift rather than a natural achievement

These and related matters are discussed in the chapters on DESIRE and KNOWLEDGE The great books speak of other objects than God as objects of man s infinite desire The appetite for money for pleasure or for power seems to be an infinite craving which no finite quantity of these goods ever satisfies Two comments are made upon this fact which is so amply evidenced in the human record One is that man s infinite lust for worldly goods expresses even as it conceals his natural desire for a truly infinite good The other is that these worldly goods are seductive objects precisely because they are infinite

Here the word infinite is used not in the sense which signifies perfection but in the quantitative sense which has the meaning of indetermination Plato s division in the *Philebus* of goods into the finite and the infinite separates measured and definite goods from those which need some limitation in quantity Socrates exemplifies the distinction by reference to the fact that into the hotter and the colder there enters a more and a less and since there is never any end of them they must also be infinite In contrast when definite quantity is once admitted there can be no longer a hotter or a colder Such things he says which do not admit of more or less belong in the class of the limited or finite

Following the line of this example Socrates later distinguishes between infinite and finite pleasures or pleasures without limit and those which have some intrinsic measure Pleasures which are in excess he says have no measure but those which are not in excess have measure the great the excessive we shall be right in referring to the class of the infinite and of the more and less and the others we shall refer to the class which has measure The fact that the goodness of wealth or of certain pleasures is indeterminate or indefinite makes it necessary to determine or measure the amount of wealth it is good to possess or the quantity of such pleasure it is good to enjoy

As in the case of desire so the human intellect is also said to be infinite in the sense of reaching to an indefinite quantity On the theory which he holds that the intellect knows by means of universal concepts Aquinas attributes to the human mind an infinite power for it apprehends the universal which can extend itself to an infinitude of singular things Each universal signifies what is common to an indefinitely large class of particular instances

There is still another sense in which the intellect is said to be infinite namely by reason of its having the potentiality to apprehend *all* knowable things But this is a relative infinity as is the corresponding infinity of prime matter which is conceived as the potentiality for taking on all forms In both cases the infinite is qualified by a restriction—on the kind of things

knowable to the intellect and the type of forms receivable in matter The infinity of prime matter—matter totally devoid of form—is also comparable to the infinity of God in a contrast of extreme opposites the absolute indeterminacy of pure potentiality on the one hand the absolute perfection of pure actuality on the other

THE INFINITY OF matter involves different considerations when the problem concerns, not prime matter but material things—bodies. The question is twofold Can there be a body of infinite magnitude? Is there an infinite number of bodies? To both questions Aristotle gives the negative answer while Spinoza seems to answer the first and Lucretius the second affirmatively

Spinoza s affirmation may be qualified of course by his conception of infinite body as an attribute of God But there is no qualification on Lucretius assertion that the first beginnings of things are infinite unless it is his statement that the first beginnings of things have different shapes, but the number of shapes is finite It is only the number of atoms which is infinite not their variety

Aristotle presents many arguments *against* the existence of an infinite body *or an infinite* number of things, all of which ultimately rest on his distinction between an actual and a *potential* infinite It is not that infinity in *magnitude* or multitude is impossible—for he affirms the infinity of time and he insists upon the infinite divisibility of matter—but rather that if an infinite body existed its infinity would have to be actual. Its actuality would *necessarily* involve certain determinations, especially those of dimension and place which would be inconsistent with the indeterminacy of *the infinite* Similarly a multitude of co-existing things—unlike the moments of time *which* do not co-exist—cannot be infinite because their co-existence implies *that they* can be actually numbered whereas *their infinity* implies that they are numberless

The potential infinite Aristotle writes exhibits itself in different ways—in time in the generations of man and *in the* division of magnitudes. For generally he says, the infinite has this mode of existence one *thing is* always being taken after another and each thing that is taken is always finite but always different When this takes place in the division of spatial magnitudes, what is taken persists, while in the succession of times and of men, it takes place by the passing away of these in such a way that the source of supply never gives out

The opposition between Lucretius and Aristotle with regard to the divisibility of matter is discussed in the chapter on ELEMENT The notions of infinity and continuity are differently employed on the two sides of the argument Where Aristotle makes the continuity of matter the condition of its infinite divisibility Lucretius makes the atom s continuity—its solidity or lack of void—the cause of its indivisibility Where Aristotle asserts that at any moment there can be only a finite number *of particles* in the world because the partition of *matter* cannot be infinitely carried out short of infinite time Lucretius, on the *contrary* thinks that the division of matter into smaller *and smaller parts finds an end in the atom* particles and yet he also asserts an infinite number of atoms.

To contain an infinite number of atoms an *infinite* space is required according to Lucretius. This presents no greater difficulty for him than an infinite time Aristotle on the other hand differentiates between space and time with respect to infinity Time can be potentially infinite by way of addition because each part that is taken passes in succession out of existence But though space may be infinitely divisible it cannot be infinitely extended for all its parts unlike those of time must coexist It would therefore have to be an *actually* rather than a *potentially* infinite quantity and this Aristotle thinks is impossible

These and other conflicting views *concerning* the infinity of space and time appear in Kant s statement of the first cosmological antinomy His intention is not to resolve the issues but to show that they *cannot be* resolved by proof or argument To do this, Kant sets up what seems to him to be equally strong—or equally inconclusive—*arguments* for and against the infinity of space and time

Suppose it be granted Kant argues on the one hand that the world has no beginning in time Then it would follow that up to every given moment in time an eternity must have

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elapsed and therewith passed away an infinite series of successive conditions or states of things in the world But since the infinity of a series consists in the fact that it can never be completed by means of a successive synthesis it also follows that an infinite series already elapsed is impossible and that consequently a beginning of the world is a necessary condition of its existence

On the other hand Kant argues with what he thinks is equal force let it be granted that [the world] has a beginning A beginning he explains is an existence which is preceded by a time in which the thing does not exist Then Kant continues on the above supposition it follows that there must have been a time in which the world did not exist that is a void time But in a void time the origination of a thing is impossible because no part of any such time contains a distinctive condition of being in preference to that of non being Consequently *many series of things may have a* beginning in the world but the world itself cannot have a beginning and is therefore in relation to past time infinite

With regard to the infinity or finitude of space Kant proceeds similarly If we suppose space to be infinite then the world must be an infinite given total of co existent things But *in order to cogitate the world which fills all* spaces as a whole the successive synthesis of the parts of an infinite world must be looked upon as completed that is to say an infinite time must be *regarded as having elapsed in the* enumeration of all co existing things This Kant argues is impossible and therefore an infinite aggregate of actual things cannot be considered as a given whole *Hence it fol*lows that the world is as regards extension in space *not infinite* but enclosed in limits

If however we suppose that the world is finite and limited *in space it follows according* to Kant that it must exist in a void space which is not limited We should therefore meet not only with a relation of things *in space* but also a relation of things *to space But the* relation of the world to a void space is merely a relation to *no object* and such a relation and consequently the limitation of the world by void space is nothing *It follows therefore* Kant concludes that the world as regards space is not limited that is it is infinite in regard to extension

The way in which these opposite arguments nullify each other reveals more than our inability to prove or disprove the infinity of space and time It shows in Kant s theory of human knowledge that we are not entitled to make any assertion at all respecting the whole object of experience—the world of sense

One other problem of infinity in the sphere of physics receives its initial formulation in one of the great books—in the part of the *Dialogues Concerning the Two New Sciences* where Galileo discusses the uniform acceleration of a freely falling body The body which is said to accumulate equal increments of velocity in equal intervals of time is also said to start from infinite slowness *i e* from rest One of the persons in the dialogue challenges this saying that as the instant of starting is more and more *nearly approached* the body moves so slowly that if it kept on moving at this rate it would not traverse a mile in an hour or in a day or in a year or in a thousand years indeed it would *not traverse a span in an even greater time* a phenomenon which baffles the imagination while our senses show us that a heavy falling body suddenly acquires great speed

What our senses seem to show us is corrected by an experiment which refines the observation But this still leaves a purely analytical question Against the statement that the *velocity can be increased or diminished without* limit Simplicio points out in the dialogue that if the number of degrees of greater and greater slowness is limitless they will never be *all exhausted and therefore the body will* never come to rest when it is slowing down or be able to start to move when it is at rest

This would happen Salviati answers if *the moving body were to maintain its speed for* any length of time at each degree of velocity but it merely passes each point without delaying more than an instant and since each time *interval however small may be divided into* an infinite number of instants these will always be sufficient to correspond to the infinite degrees of diminished velocity

The problem of the infinitesimal velocity provides another illustration of the difference

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: *Iliad*, BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES: *Psychology*, 116a-119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: *Symposium*, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., *Iliad*, BK II [265-283] 12d.

BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (*D*) follows; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: *Nehemiah*, 7:45—(*D*) *II Esdras*, 7:46.

SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas*, consult the Preface.

1. The general theory of infinity

8 ARISTOTLE: *Physics*, BK I, CH 4 280c-286d

12 LUCRETIUS: *Nature of Things*, BK I [951-1113] 12d-14d

17 PLOTINUS: *Sixth Ennead*, TR VI, CH 2 311b-c; CH 7-9 319d-320d

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART I, Q 7 31a-34c

20 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART III SUPPL, Q 92, A 1, REP 6-12 1025c-1032b

28 GALILEO: *Two New Sciences*, FIRST DAY 139c-153a passim, esp 144b-145a

30 BACON: *Novum Organum*, BK I, APH 48 110d-111a

31 DESCARTES: *Meditations*, III 86b / *Objections and Replies*, 112a-c; 123c-d

31 SPINOZA: *Ethics*, PART I, DEF 2 355a; DEF 6 355b; PROP 8 355c; PROP 8-13 356c-357d

33 PASCAL: *Pensées*, 72 181-184b; 231-233 213b-214a / *Geometrical Demonstration*, 434b-439b

34 NEWTON: *Principles*, BK I, LEMMA II 25a-32a

35 LOCKE: *Human Understanding*, BK II, CH XVI-XVII, SECT 22 167c-174a

35 BERKELEY: *Human Knowledge*, SECT 123-132 437-439c

35 HUME: *Human Understanding*, SECT XII, DIV 124-125 506a-507a

42 KANT: *Pure Reason*, 24d-26d; 130b-149d esp 130b-133c, 136a-137a [thesis]; 155b-157d

46 HEGEL: *Philosophy of Right*, ADDITIONS, 17 119a

51 TOLSTOY: *War and Peace*, EPILOGUE II 693c-694d

1a. The definite and indefinite: the measured and the indeterminate

7 PLATO: *Parmenides*, 505c-506d; 510c-511a / *Philebus*, 609a-639c esp 615c-617d

8 ARISTOTLE: *Prior Analytics*, BK I, CH 13 [32b4-23] 48b-d / *Metaphysics*, BK I, CH 5 [987a12-b] 504b-c; CH 6 [987b19-988a16] 505d-506b; CH 8 [989b30-b21] 507c-d; BK VII, CH 30 547a-d; BK VIII, CH 10 [1036a2-9] 559b-c; BK IX, CH 7 [1049a19-b3] 574d-575a; BK XIII, CH 1 [1087b10-25] 619c

9 ARISTOTLE: *Ethics*, BK II, CH 6 [1106b28-35] 352b-c

11 NICOMACHUS: *Arithmetic*, BK I 811d-812a; 826d-827

16 KEPLER: *Harmonies of the World*, 1078a-b

17 PLOTINUS: *First Ennead*, TR VIII, CH 3 28a-c / *Second Ennead*, TR IV, CH 13-16 55b-57c / *Sixth Ennead*, TR V, CH 18 320c-d

even granted an infinite time the relation between the premises and conclusion of reasoning permits an infinite regression If the truth of a conclusion cannot be known until the truth of its premises is known then the pursuit of truth may be vitiated by a search *ad infinitum*

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in hea y type wh ch are the vol me and pa e numbers f the passages referred to. For example in 4 HOME I ad II [265 283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the olume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of pa e 12

P GE S CTI When the text i pr nted in one col mn, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower hal es of the page. For example in 53 J MES Ps h logy 116a 119b the pa sage begins in the upper half of pa e 116 and end in the lower half of p ge 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the l tters a and b refer to the upper and lower hal es of the l ft hand side f the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower hal es f th right hand side of the pa For exam le in 7 PLATO Sympos um 163b 164c the passa e begin in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and end in the upper half of the r ght hand side of pa e 164

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BI LE R FERE CES The ref rences a e to book, cha ter and verse When the K ng J mes and Douay ersions differ n t tl of books or in the mber ng of cha ers or erses the K g James ersion i cited first nd the Douay indicated by a (D) f llows e g OLD TESTA MENT N hemiah 7 45—(D) II Esdras 46

S M LS The abbreviation esp" calls the read r s attention t one or more especially relevant parts of a whole refere c passim sig ies that the topic n d scussed i t m t tent rath r than cont nuously n th work or pa sage cited

For add tional information conce ng the tyle of the references, see the Explanation of R ference Styl f r general g idance in the use of The G eat Ide consult the Pref ce

The general theory of nfinity

8 A TOTLE Physics BK I I CH 4-8 280c 286d
12 LUC ETIUS Nature f Thing BK I [95 1113] 12d 14d
17 PLOTI US Si th Enne d TR VI CH 2 311b-c CH 7 18 319d 320d
19 A L S Summa Theologica T I Q 7 31 34c
20 AQUI S mm Theologica P T III UPPL. Q 92, I 6 12 1025c 1032b
28 G LILEO Two New Sciences FIRST D Y 139c 153a passim, esp 144b-145a
30 B CON Novum Org m K APH 48 110d 111
31 DESCA ES M dita ons III 85b / Objections and Replies 112a-c 123c d
31 SPINOZ Ethics I D 2 355a DEF 6 355b D 8 355c -8 356c 357d
33 P CAL Pensee 72 181 184b 231 233 213b-214 / Geometrical Dem stra. 434b-439b
34 N WTO Princi les BK I L MMA I II and CHOL 25a 32a
35 LOCK Hum Understanding BK CH XV S CT 8-CH X CT 167 174
35 B RK E Human Knowledg S CT 123 132 437-439c
35 H ME Human Understa din SECT XII II 124 125 506a 507a
42 K NT Pure Re so 24d 26d 130b 149d esp 130b-133c 136a 137a [thesis] 156b 157d
46 H E EL Philoso hy f Right ADDITIO 17 119
51 TOLSTOY W ar a d P ace EPILOGUE II 693c 694d

1a The d fi te d indefin te: the measured and the ndeterm nate

7 PLATO Parmenides 505c 506d 510c 511a / Ph eb s 609 639a,c esp 615c 617d
8 ARI OTLE Prior Ana ytics BK I C 13 [32b4 23] 48b d / Metaphy s BK I C 5 [6a 12 b] 504b-c CH 6 [987b19-988 16] 505d 506b H 8 [989a3 b21] 507c d BK V CH 30 547 d BK VII CI 10 [1 36a2-9] 559b-c BK IX CH 7 [049a19-b1] 574d 575a BK XIII CH [1083a10-25] 619c
9 AR STOTLE Ethics BK II CH 6 [1106a28-35] 352b-c
11 N OM CHUS Arithmetic BK I 811d-812 826d-827
16 K PLE Harmo s f the World 1078a b
17 PLOTI S First Enne d TR I C 1 3 28a-c / Second Enn d TR IV CH 13 16 55b-57c / S xth Enne d TR VI CH 18 320c d

(1 *The general theory of infinity* 1a *The definite and indefinite the measured and the in determinate*)

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK V par 20 32d 33a / *City of God* BK XII CH 18 354b d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 48 A I REP 4 259b 260c PART I-II Q I, A 4 612a 613a Q 7 A 2 REP 2 652d 653c
31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 112a b
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 158a 159d 196c 197a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* ADDITIONS 6 117a b

1b The infinite in being and quantity the actual and potential infinite the formal and the material infinite

7 PLATO *Parmenides* 495c-497c / *Sophist* 571d 573b
8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK I CH 2 [185ᵃ28-ᵇ4] 260a b [185ᵇ17-19] 260c BK III CH 4-8 280c 286d / *Generation and Corruption* BK I CH 3 [318 13-24] 414c d / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 5 [98, 13-19] 505b BK IX CH 6 [1048ᵇ9 17] 574a BK XI CH 10 [1066 35-ᵇ 2] 594d 595b BK XII CH 7 [1073 3-13] 603a b
11 NICOMACHUS *Arithmetic* BK I 812a
17 PLOTINUS *Sixth Ennead* TR VI CH 17 319d 320a
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK VII par 20-21 49d 50a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 7 31a 34c Q 12 A I REP 2 50c 51c Q 14 A I ANS 75d 76c Q 50 A 2 REP 4 270a 272a Q 54 A 2 ANS 285d 286c PART I II Q I A 4 REP 2 612a 613a Q 2 A 6 ANS 619d 620d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q 7 A 12 REP I 754c 755c Q 10 A 3 REP 1-2 769d 771b PART III SUPPL Q 92 A I REP 12 1025c 1032b
28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences* FIRST DAY 145b 146c 150d 151c
31 DESCARTES *Meditations* III 86a 88d / *Objections and Replies* 112b DEF VIII 130d
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I DEF 3 6 355b PROP 8 DEMONST and SCHOL I 356d PROP 9 357d PROP 10 SCHOL 358a b PROP 13 14 359c 360a PROP 15 SCHOL-PROP 16 360b 362a PROP 21-23 364a 365a PROP 28 DEMONST 365d 366a
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 121 195a / *Geometrical Demonstration* 434b 439b
34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III GENERAL SCHOL 370a 371a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XIII SECT 4-6 149b d CH XIV SECT 26-27 160c 161a SECT 30 161c d CH XV SECT 2-4 162c 163b CH XVI SECT 8 167c CH XVII 167d 174a passim esp SECT 7 169b-c CH XXIX SECT 16 237b 238a
35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 123 132 437c-439c
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT XII DIV 124 506b
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 124d 125b 130b 133c 135a 137a c 160b 163a / *Judgement* 498b 501b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO par 2: 17c d PART I par 104—PART II par 105 39b 40a ADDITIONS 17 119a / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 156d 160b 165a b
53 JAMES *Psychology* 668a 669a

2 Infinity in the logical order

2a The infinity of negative and indefinite terms

7 PLATO *Sophist* 571d 573c / *Philebus* 615c 616c
8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation* CH 2 [16 30-33] 25c CH 3 [16ᵇ11-16] 25d CH 10 [19ᵇ5 11] 29d / *Prior Analytics* BK I CH 46 70b 71d
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 158a 159d

2b The distinction between negative and infinite judgments

8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 10 [12ᵇ6 15] 17d 18a / *Interpretation* CH 5 [17 8-9] 26b CH 26c d CH 10 29d 31c / *Prior Analytics* BK CH 3 [25ᵇ19-26] 40c CH 46 70b 71d
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH VII SECT I 283a b
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 40a c 210c d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 5: 25c d

2c Infinite regression in analysis and reasoning

7 PLATO *Parmenides* 489a d / *Theaetetus* 542a 544a esp 543d 544a
8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 3 99b 100a CH 19-23 111c 116a / *Physics* BK I CH 4 [187ᵇ7 14] 262d CH 6 [189 11 19] 264c / *Metaphysics* BK IV CH 3 [1005ᵇ15 34] 524d 525a CH 4 [1006 5-12] 525a b CH 6 [1011 3 14] 530d BK XI CH 6 [1063ᵇ7 12] 591d / *Soul* BK I CH 3 [40, 2 30] 636d 637a
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 2 [1094 18 2] 339b BK III CH 3 [1112ᵇ33 1113 3] 358d 359a
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 17 122d 123a BK II CH 20 164c d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 36 A 3 REP 4 194c 195d PART I II Q I A 4 REP 2 612a 613a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 94 A 2 ANS 221d 223a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 292c d
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK I APH 48 110d 111a
31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 111a d 213c d 224b d
33 PASCAL *Geometrical Demonstration* 431b-434a / *Arithmetical Triangle* 451b 452a 458b-459b 464a-466a

(3 *The infinite in quantity*)

3d The infinite extent of space

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK III CH 5 [205 10–206 8] 283b 284b BK IV CH 5 [212b11–21] 292a / *Heavens* BK I CH 5–7 362c 367b / *Metaphysics* BK XI CH 10 [1066b– 1067 38] 595b 596a
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [951–1113] 12d 14d esp [951–1007] 12d 13b BK II [89–94] 16a b [294–307] 18d 19a [1048–1066] 28b c
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XI CH 5 324d 325c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 23 A 7 ANS 138d 140a Q 46 A 1 REP 8 250a 252d Q 66 A 4 REP 5 348d 349d
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 54b c PART II 162b c PART IV 271b
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK I APH 48 110d 111a
31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 112b
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 121 195a 205 206 211a / *Geometrical Demonstration* 434b 439b passim
34 NEWTON *Principles* DEFINITIONS SCHOL 8b 11a / *Optics* BK III 542b 543a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XIII SECT 4 149b SECT 21 152d 153b CH XIV SECT 26 160c d CH XV 162b 165c passim CH XVI SECT 8 167c CH XVII 167d 174a passim esp SECT 3–4 168b d SECT 11 170c
35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 117 436a
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 24c d 28d 29c 135a 137a c 152a d 160b 163a / *Judgement* 501a b
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE II 693c 694a
53 JAMES *Psychology* 631a

3e The infinite duration of time and motion

7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 124b c / *Timaeus* 450c 451a 460c d
8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK I CH 11 [104b13–18] 148a b / *Physics* BK III CH 7 [207b21–27] 286b CH 8 [208a20–23] 286d BK IV CH 13 [222 29–32] 302b BK VI CH 2 [233 13 b16] 315a c CH 10 [241 26–b20] 325b d BK VIII CH 1–2 334a 337b CH 6 344b 346b passim CH 8–9 348b 353b / *Heavens* BK I CH 2 [269b2–10] 360c d CH 3 [270b1 24] 361c 362a BK I CH 9 [279 12]–BK II CH 1 [284b6] 370b 376a passim BK II CH 6 379c 380c / *Generation and Corruption* BK II CH 10 11 437d 441a c / *Meteorology* BK I CH 14 [353 15–19] 459c / *Metaphysics* BK IX CH 8 [1050b20–28] 576c d BK XI CH 10 [1067a33–38] 596a BK XII CH 6 [1071b3] CH 7 [1072b14] 601b 602d CH 7 [1073 5 11] 603b CH 8 [1073a24–34] 603c
9 ARISTOTLE *Motion of Animals* CH 6 [700b29–701a7] 236a b
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [215 264] 3d 4b [483–634] 7a 8d [988 1051] 13b 14a BK II [80 141] 16a d [294–307] 18d 19a [569–580] 22b [1048 1066] 28b c [1105 1147] 29a c BK V [170–194] 63b-c [376–379] 66a [416–431] 66c d [1204–1217] 76d 77a
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK V SECT 13 271b SECT 23 272b BK VI SECT 15 275a b BK IX SECT 28 293d 294a BK X SECT 7 297b-c SECT 27 299d
16 PTOLEMY *Almagest* BK XIII 429a b
16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 888b 891a
17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR I CH 1–5 35a 37c / *Third Ennead* TR VII 119b 129a passim / *Fourth Ennead* TR IV CH 8 161d 162d
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK VII par 21 49d 50a BK XI par 12 17 92b 93c par 40 98d 99a / *City of God* BK XI CH 4–6 324a 325d BK XII CH 12–20 349b 357a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 10 A REP 2 41d 42c A 4 ANS 43b-44b A 5 ANS 44b 45c Q 14 A 12 ANS 85d 86d Q 46 250a 255d Q 61 A 315c 316a Q 66 A 4 348d 349d Q 75 A 1 REP 1 378b 379c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL Q 77 A 2 ANS and REP 1 945a 946b Q 91 A 1017c 1020c
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE I [73–81] 107a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 50a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 293d 294a
28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences* FOURTH DAY 245b d
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK I APH 48 110d 111a BK II APH 35 163a b APH 48 186b d
31 DESCARTES *Rules* XIII 27b-c
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 121 195a 205 206 211a 231 232 213b / *Geometrical Demonstration* 434b 439b passim
34 NEWTON *Principles* DEF III 5b DEFINITIONS SCHOL 8b LAW I 14a / *Optics* BK III 540a 541b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XIV SECT 26–31 160c 162a CH XV SECT 3 5 162d 163c SECT 11–12 165a c CH XVI SECT 8 167c CH XVII 167d 174a passim esp SECT 5 168d 169a SECT 10 170b c SECT 16 172a b CH XXIX SECT 15 237a SECT 16 237d 238a
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 292a 293b
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 26d 27b c 130b 133c 135a 137a c 152c 160b 161d
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE II 693c 694a
53 JAMES *Psychology* 882a

4 The infinity of matter

4a The infinite quantity or extent of matter the problem of an actually infinite body

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK I CH 4 [187b14 2] 262d BK III CH 4 [203b15 29] 281c d CH 5 [204 35 206 8] 282b 284b / *Heavens* BK I CH 5–7 362c 367b / *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 7 [1073 3 13] 603a b

12 LUCRETIUS Na re of Things BK I [1008-1051] 13c 14 [1093-1113] 14c-d BK II [i 5-565] 21a 2 b [1 45-1059] 28b-d
17 PLOTI s Second Enne d, TR IV CH 52b-c
19 AQUI s Summa Theologica T I Q A 3 3-33c Q 4 3 EP 258c 259a
31 SPI OZ Ethics P RT I PROP 13 359c-d PROP 14 CO OL 2 360a PROP 15 SCHOL 3 0b-361d P RT II, P O 2 3 4
35 LOCKE Human U erstanding BK II XIII SECT 1 22 152d 153c CH XXI I SECT 27 211a b
35 B RKELEY Human K wle ge SECT 4 421c 422a

4b The infini e di s bility of matter the i sue concern g atoms

8 ARISTOTLE Physics BK III CH 6- 84b-285c K I, CH 4 316d 318a / Heavens BK III CH 6 [304a23 305a9] 396a b BK I H 6 [1 3b6- 2]405a / Genera on d Corruption K I, CH 2 [315b-5 31-1] 411b-413a CH 8 423b-425d CH 9 [12-1 23] 426a-c CH 10 [5- b14 3 5 15] 42 b-c / Me h sics BK VII CH 3 [1 39a 11] 561d BK X CH 1 [1 53a t 4] 579d / Sense and the Sensible CH 6 [445 4 44-] 683b-684c CH 7 [449a21 3] 688d 689a
12 LUCRETIUS Nature f Thing K I [483-634] 8d
16 COP ICU Revolutions of the Heavenly S heres BK I, 51 b
17 PLOTI US Second Enne d TR I 52a-c / F urth Ennead TR II CH 1 139d
19 AQUIN s Summa Theo ogica P T I Q 3 I A. 14b-15b Q 3 REP 3 32 33c A 4 and RE 1 33d 34c Q 5 A 2 AN 270a 272a
28 GALILEO Two New Sciences, FI T D 147d 148b
30 B CON Novum Org um BK I PH 8 140b
31 D CART S Objections and Repli 112b
34 N WTO Principle B I RULE III 270b-2 1a / Optic BK I 541b
35 LOCK Human U erstanding BK I CT X II, SECT 12 170d CH XXI I ECT 31 212b-c CH XXIX ECT 16, 237b-d BK IV H X S CT 10 3 1d 352a
35 BE ELE Huma Kno le ge SECT 4 421 422
42 KANT Pure Reason 100c-d 131c 137a 140c 15 a-d 161d 163a
43 FEDER LI T N 31 103d
45 FARAD Researches in Electricity 850b d 855a,c

4c The infinite potentiality of matter the conception of prime o forml s matt r

7 PL TO Timaeus 455c-458b
8 AR STOTLE P'ys BK I CH 7 [91b 12] 266d CH 9 [19 b5 33] 268c / Generatio and Corruption K I I [3 5 32 329a 24] 428b,d 429a CH 5 [332a19 26] 432c-d / S I BK I I CH 5 [435a10-] 66 c
17 PLOTI I Second Ennead T I C I 3 50a d CH 6 51d 3 / Third E d TR I CH 19 110d 119a
18 A UST Co f ssio BK XII par 3 6 99d 100c par 9, 101 par 14 19 1 2b 103a par 22 104a b par 4 6 104c 105b par 28 31 105c 10 par 4 109b 110a BK XII par 48 124a
19 AQU I S mma Theo g a P RT I Q I s and a 2 31a-d A 2 and REP 3 31d 3 A 3, REP 4 32c 33c A 4 33d 34c Q 66, A 1 2 343d 347b
28 H EY On A mal Gener tion 494a b

5 Infinity in the world

5a. The infinite n mber of th ngs and the infinite number of kinds

7 PLATO Soph 3 3a b
8 ARI TOTLE Soph stical Refutations CH I [165a5 13] 22 b-c / Physics B I CH [184a15 24] 259b-c CH 4 [a25 I 15] 2b 263c CH 6 [a 1 2] 2 4c BK II CH 4 [2 3 15 9] 281c-d / Meta hysic BK I CT 3 [i 4 11] 502b BK III CH 4 [999a24 2 518a
9 A ISTOTLE Gener tion f Anima BK I CH I [715b] 255c-d / Rhetoric BK I [135 a28 35] 596b-c
12 LUCRETIUS Nature f Thin BK I [1008 1051] 13c 14a BK II [4 5-565] 21a 22b [1048 1069] 28b-d
17 PLOTI I Si h Ennead TR I CH 1 252 c
19 A Summa Theo gica P T I Q 4 33d 34c Q 23 A 7 138d 140a Q 46 A 2 r 8 253a 255a Q 5 A 3 272 273b
31 SPI OZ Ethics PART I PROP 16 362a P OP 21 23 364a 365a
33 PASC L Pensée 121 195a
42 K NT Pure Re son 193a 200c esp 19 b 19 a
53 J ME Ps hology 873a b

5b The number of causes

8 A TOTLE Phy ics BK VII CH 1 326a 327b / Gener io a d Corruption B I CH I [1333b26-29] 440a / Met hysics BK II CH 2 512b-513b BK VII CH 6 [1 31b28 103 4] 554d C 1 8 [1033b2-5] 556c / Soul, K III CH 2 [425b I] 657d
19 AQU S S mma Theo gica P RT I Q 2 A 3 ANS 12c 14 Q 75 A I REP 1 378b 379c PART I II Q I A 4 and REP 2 3 612 613a
30 B CO dva cement of Learni g 43a-d / Novum Orga um K I APH 48 110d 111
31 DESCAR ES M ations I I 87c 88a / Objec n and Replies 111a d 213c-d
31 S I OZ Ethics P T I AP I DIX 3 0c 3 1b
42 K T Pure Re so 130b-133c 140b d 143a 152a 153a 164a 171 / Judgement 556b-c 57 578a
51 TOLSTOY War and P ace EPILOGU II 693c 694

6 The finite and the infinite in the nature of man

6a The infinity of desire and will the limits of human capacity

OLD TESTAMENT *Psalms* 42 63—(D) *Psalms* 41 62 / *Proverbs* 27 20 / *Ecclesiastes* 4 7-8 5 10-12 6 7—(D) *Ecclesiastes* 4 7-8 5 9 11 6 7 / *Isaiah* 14 12-14—(D) *Isaias* 14 12-14 / *Habakkuk* 2 5—(D) *Habacuc* 2 5

APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 10 9 11 10 14 9 23 16-17 31 1-11—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 10 10 11 10 14 9 23 21-24 31 1-11 / *Baruch* 3 16-19—(D) OT *Baruch* 3 16-19

NEW TESTAMENT *John* 4 13-14 / *I Timothy* 6 10

5 EURIPIDES *Phoenician Maidens* [499 525] 382b c

5 ARISTOPHANES *Plutus* [143-197] 630d 631b

7 PLATO *Gorgias* 275d 277b / *Republic* BK VIII 412a / *Philebus* 609a 639a c / *Laws* BK VIII 733b d BK IX 751b d

8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK II CH 2 [994b9-16] 512d 513a

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 2 [1094 18-22] 339b BK III CH 12 [1119b6 12] 366c / *Politics* BK I CH 8 [1256b26] CH 9 [1258 18] 450c 452b BK II CH 7 [1267 4 -b5] 463b

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [59-93] 30d 31b [931-977] 42a c [1003 1010] 43a [1076-1084] 44a BK IV [1097 1120] 58c d BK V [1405-1435] 79b d BK VI [1-34] 80a c

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK III CH 9 184c 185d BK IV CH 4 5 225a 230b CH 9 237d 238d

14 PLUTARCH *Pyrrhus* 319b 321a / *Caius Marius* 353d 354a c / *Pompey* 525a b 533a c / *Caesar* 599b-c / *Cicero* 706b c

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 1-6 1a 2c par 19 5d BK II par 2-4 9b d BK IV par 15 19 23a 24b BK VI par 26 42d-43a BK XI par 1-4 89b 90b BK XII par 10 101c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 63 A 3 327b 328b PART I II Q 1 A 4 612a 613a Q 2 A 1 REP 3 615d 616c Q 30 A 4 751c 752b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II-II Q 27 A 6 524c 525c Q 28 A 3 528d 529c

22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida* BK I STANZA 58-66 8b 9b / *Wife of Bath's Prologue* [5933-5960] 262a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 76c d

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 123d 149b d 224d 225a 350d 354b 429a b 489b-c 503b d

26 SHAKESPEARE *Julius Caesar* ACT II SC I [10-34] 574c d ACT III SC II 583c 586c

27 SHAKESPEARE *Troilus and Cressida* ACT I SC III [109-124] 109b ACT III SC II [65 107] 120d 121b / *Macbeth* ACT I SC V 288a d SC VII 289b 290b

31 DESCARTES *Meditations* IV 89a 93a passim esp 90b 91b

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 109 193b-194a 125 183 195b 204b 425 243b 244b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 45 189b d

36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 236b 238a

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 71b d

42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 256c 257c / *Practical Reason* 298d 300a / *Judgement* 584d 585c 586d 587a

43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 462c-463a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO par 5 10 13a 15a par 13-14 15c 16a par 22 2, 17c 18d PART I par 35 21a b PART II par 10, 40a ADDITIONS 6 117a b 11 118a 17 119a 2 120c d 26 121a b 118 136a b

47 GOETHE *Faust* esp PART I [3217 3250] 79a b PART II [11 239 58] 273b 274a

50 MARX *Capital* 62a b 71d 72c 292c 295a

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE I 671d 672a EPILOGUE II 692c 694d

54 FREUD *Civilization and Its Discontents* 800d 801a

6b The infinity of the intellect man's knowledge of the infinite

OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 33 12 33 / *Job* 11 7 9 26 14 28 36 26 38 41 / *Proverbs* 20 24 25 3 / *Ecclesiastes* 3 11 8 17 11 5

APOCRYPHA *Wisdom of Solomon* 9 13 16—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 9 13 16 / *Ecclesiasticus* 1 2 18 4 7—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 1 2 18 2-6

NEW TESTAMENT *John* 1 18 / *Romans* 11 33 34 / *I Corinthians* 2 16 / *I Timothy* 6 15 16

7 PLATO *Philebus* 610d-613a

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK I CH 4 [187b7 14] 262d CH 6 [189 11 19] 264c BK III CH 6 [207a21-31] 285c d / *Metaphysics* BK II CH 2 [994b17-30] 513a b BK III CH 4 [999 24 29] 518a BK XII CH 7 [1072b14 29] 602d 603a BK XIII CH 10 [1087 10 25] 619c / *Soul* BK I CH 3 [407 22-30] 636d 637a BK III CH 4 [429 19-28] 661c CH 5 [430 10 17] 662c

9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK I CH 2 [1356b28 35] 596b-c

11 NICOMACHUS *Arithmetic* BK I 812a

16 KEPLER *Harmonies of the World* 1080a

17 PLOTINUS *Sixth Ennead* TR VI CH 3 312a b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK V par 20 32d 33a BK VII par 20 21 49d 50a BK XII par 3-6 99d 100c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 1 A 1 3b 4a Q 7 A 2 REP 2 31d 32c QQ 12 13 50b 75b Q 14 A 1 ANS 75d 76c A 12 85d 86d Q 28 A 4 REP 2 160c 161d Q 32 A 1 175d 178a Q 54 A 2 ANS 285d 286c Q 79 A 2 ANS 414d 416a Q 86 A 2 462a-463a Q 87 A 3 REP 2 467b 468a Q 88 A 1 ANS 469a-471c A 3 472c-473a Q 91 A 3 REP 2 486b-487d Q 94 A 1 ANS 501d 503a PART I II Q 2 A 6

(7 *The infinity of God*)

7b The infinite power of God

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 18 14 / *Exodus* 15 18 / *Deuteronomy* 10 14 32 39 / *I Samuel* 2 6-8 —(D) *I Kings* 2 6-8 / *Job* 12 14 15 38-41 / *Psalms* 62 11 114 148—(D) *Psalms* 61 12 113 1-8 148 / *Isaiah* 40 22-31 44 24-46 13 —(D) *Isaias* 40 22-31 44 24-46 12 / *Jeremiah* 32 27—(D) *Jeremias* 32 27 / *Daniel* 4 34-35 —(D) *Daniel* 4 31 32

APOCRYPHA *Judith* 16 13 17—(D) OT *Judith* 16 15-21 / *Rest of Esther* 13 9 11—(D) OT *Esther* 13 9-11 / *Wisdom of Solomon* 11 17-26 12 12-18—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 11 18-27 12 12-18 / *Ecclesiasticus* 18 1-7—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 18 1-6 / *II Maccabees* 8 18—(D) OT *II Machabees* 8 18

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 3 9 19 26 / *Mark* 10 27 / *Luke* 1 37 / *Revelation* 19 6—(D) *Apocalypse* 19 6

8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 7 [1073 3-11] 603a b

17 PLOTINUS *Fifth Ennead* TR V CH 10 233b c

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 12 4a BK V par 20 32d 33a BK VII par 6-7 44d 45d / *City of God* BK V CH 10 215c 216c BK VII CH 30 261b d BK XIV CH 27 396c 397a BK XXI CH 5-8 563d 568d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 25 AA 2-3 144c 147a Q 45 A 5 REP 3 245c 247a Q 65 A 3 REP 3 341c 342b Q 92 A 2 REP 2 489d 490c PART I II Q I A 4 REP I 612a 613a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 113 A 9 368d 369c PART II II Q 23 A 2 REP 3 483d-484d PART III Q 10 A 3 REP 3 769d 771b

31 DESCARTES *Meditations* III 86a / *Objections and Replies* 229c d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I DEF 3-6 355b DEF 8 355c PROP 1-8 355d 357d PROP 11 17 358b 363c PROP 20 25 363d 365b PROP 32-35 367a 369a APPENDIX 369b 372d PART II PROP 3 374a-c

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK II [119-225] 113b 116a BK III [372-415] 143b 144b / *Samson Agonistes* [300 329] 346a b

33 PASCAL *Pensees* 654 292b

34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III GENERAL SCHOL 370a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XV SECT 12 165b c CH XVII SECT I 167d 168a CH XXIII SECT 34-35 213a c passim BK III CH VI SECT 11 12 271b 272b passim

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 152 443c d

36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 334a b

37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 186c d

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 180b c 181b 192c d 201b-c / *Practical Reason* 352a c / *Judgement* 502d 503a 504b d 592a c 600d 601c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 156d 160b

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE II 684b-d

7c God s infinite goodness and love

OLD TESTAMENT *Isaiah* 43 1 4 46 3 4 49 14 15 63 8-9—(D) *Isaias* 43 1 4 46 3 4 49 14 15 63 8-9 / *Jeremiah* 31 esp 31 3—(D) *Jeremias* 31 esp 31 3

APOCRYPHA *Wisdom of Solomon* 11 23 26 16 20 29—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 11 24 27 16 20-29

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 19 16-17 / *John* 3 16 13 31-17 26 / *Romans* 8 35 39 / *Galatians* 2 20 / *Ephesians* 3 14 21 / *I John* 3 1

17 PLOTINUS *Fifth Ennead* TR V CH 10-11 233b-234a

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK V par 20 32d 33a BK XIII par 2 5 111a d / *City of God* BK XI CH 10 327d 328d BK XII CH 1 3 342b d 344b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2 A 3 REP I 12c 14a Q 4 A I 20d 21b Q 6 AA 1 3 28b 30b Q 11 A 3 ANS 49a-c Q 54 A 2 ANS 285d 286c PART I II Q I A 4 REP I 612a 613a Q 5 A 2 REP 3 637c 638a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 63 A 4 REP 3 69b 70a PART II II Q 23 A REP 3 483d-484d PART III Q I A I 701d 703a

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XV [40-81] 75d 76a PARADISE XXIX [127 145] 151c d

31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 229c d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART V PROP 35-36 460d 461c

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VII [139-1 3] 220a 221a

33 PASCAL *Pensees* 580 276b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XVII SECT I 167d 168a BK III CH VI SECT 11 12 271b 272b passim

37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 186c d

42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 263a b / *Practical Reason* 325d 326a 345a c 351b 352c / *Judgement* 592a c

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 539d 540a

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK II 24a c

7d God s infinite knowledge

OLD TESTAMENT *I Samuel* 2 3—(D) *I Kings* 2 3 / *Job* 11 5-11 34 21 25 36 4 3 16 / *Psalms* 94 7 12 100 5 117 2 119 142 16 139 146 6 147 5—(D) *Psalms* 93 7 12 99 5 116 2 118 142 160 138 145 6-7 146 5 / *Proverbs* 15 3 11 / *Isaiah* 29 15 16 40 28—(D) *Isaias* 29 15 16 40 28

APOCRYPHA *Rest of Esther* 13 12—(D) OT *Esther* 13 12 / *Ecclesiasticus* 15 18 19 16 1 20 17 15 17 19 20 23 18-0 39 19-21 42 18 21—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 15 19 20 16 16 20 17 13 17 23 25 29 39 24 25 4 18 2 / *Susanna* 42 43—(D) OT *Daniel* 13 42 43

New Testament: *Romans* 8: 11 33 35 / *I Corinthians* 1: 2:6 / *Ephesians* 3:1 / *Colossians* 2:3 / *Hebrews* 4:13 / *I John* 3:20

17 Plotinus: *Sixth Ennead*, tr ii, ch 1 ... 2b-280a

18 Augustine: *Confessions*, bk i, par 10 15b-d; bk ... par 5 28b-c / *City of God*, bk v, ch 9-10 213b-216c; bk xi, ch 1 ... 325c-d; ch 21 333a-d; bk xii, ch 1 ... 18 353a-354d / *Christian Doctrine*, bk i, ch 5-6 6c-6d

19 Aquinas: *Summa Theologica*, part i, q 11 ... 1 ans 75d-76c; ... 3 77d-78b; ... 12 85d-86d; q 6 a 5, a ... 97 98b; q 15 ... 4 107d-108c; q 54 ... 2 ... 5 285d-286c; q ... 9, a 2 ans 414d-416a; part i-ii, q ... 4 ... 1 612 613a

21 Dante: *Divine Comedy*, paradise, i [115]-v [12] 111d-112b; xix [22-99] 135b-136a; xxi [... 105] 139a-b

30 Bacon: *Advancement of Learning*, 98d-99b

31 Descartes: *Objections and Replies*, 112 b

31 Spinoza: *Ethics*, part i, prop 21 364a-c; part ii, prop 23 3d3 ... prop 43 ... 4a-c

32 Milton: *Paradise Lost*, bk ii [... 193] 115b; bk iii [... 134] 136b-138a; bk vii [109-139] 219b-220a; bk vi ... [112 43] 241a-b

35 Locke: *Human Understanding*, bk ii, ch xv, sect 12 165b-c; ch xvii, sect 1 16 d-168a; ch xxiii, sect 34-35 213a-c passim; bk iii, ch ... , sect 11 12 271b 2 2b passim

42 Kant: *Practical Reason* 303b-304a; 325d-326a; 344a-348a; 351b-352c / *Judgement* 590b-d; 592a-c

CROSS REFERENCES

For: The distinction between the potential and actual infinite and the infinite of divisions and addition, *see* Quantity ...

Other discussions of the infinity of space, time, and motion, *see* Astronomy 8c(1); Change 13; Eternity ...; Space 3a; Time ...b; World 4a; and for the conception of eternity as infinite time, *see* Eternity 1; Time ...

The issue concerning the existence of atoms or the infinite divisibility of matter, *see* Element 5b; One and Many 3a(3).

The problem of an infinite regression in causes, *see* Cause 1b, ...; Change 14; Principle 1b; and for the related problem of infinite regression in definition and reasoning, *see* Definition 1c; Principle 3a(3); Reasoning 5b(1).

The treatment of the infinite and the infinitesimal in mathematics, *see* Mathematics 4d; Quantity 2, 3a, 3c, 4c, 7.

The special logical sense in which judgments are called "infinite," *see* Judgment 6b.

The conception of the human intellect and of prime matter as having comparable types of infinity, *see* Mind 2b.

Another discussion of the finite and the infinite in relation to human nature, *see* Man 10d, 13.

The special consideration of infinity in relation to human desire, *see* Desire ...a(3); and for the special consideration of the limits of human knowledge, *see* Knowledge 5a-5a(6).

The problem of our knowledge of the infinite, *see* Knowledge 5a(4).

The infinity of God, and of God's knowledge, power, and goodness, *see* Being 7b(4); God 4e-4f, 5c, 5f; Good and Evil ...; Knowledge ...a; Liberty 5d; Mind 10f; Nature 1b; Truth 2d; Will 4b; World 3a.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection
II Works by authors not represented in this collection

For the date place and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

I

DESCARTES *The Principles of Philosophy* PART I 26–27
SPINOZA *Correspondence* XII
NEWTON *The Method of Fluxions and Infinite Series*
BERKELEY *The Analyst*
—— *A Defence of Free Thinking in Mathematics*
HUME *A Treatise of Human Nature* BK I PART II SECT I II
KANT *De Mundi Sensibilis (Inaugural Dissertation)*
—— *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic* par 50–54
HEGEL *Science of Logic* VOL I BK I SECT I CH 2 (B C) SECT II CH 2 (C)
W JAMES *Some Problems of Philosophy* CH 10–11

II

PROCLUS *The Elements of Theology* (J)
ANSELM OF CANTERBURY *Monologium*
—— *Proslogium*
MAIMONIDES *The Guide for the Perplexed* PART I CH 73
DUNS SCOTUS *Opus Oxoniense* BK I DIST 13
—— *Reportata Parisiensia*
CRESCAS *Or Adonai* PROPOSITIONS 1–3
NICOLAS OF CUSA *De Docta Ignorantia*
BRUNO *De l infinito universo e mondi*
—— *De Immen o et Innumerabilibus*
DONNE *Lovers Infinitenesse*
SUÁREZ *Disputationes Metaphysicae* XXVIII XXX (2) XXXV (3) XLI (5)
LEIBNITZ *New Es ays Concerning Human Understanding* BK II CH 17
—— *Correspondence with Clarke*
VOLTAIRE Infinity in *A Philosophical Dictionary*
—— *The Ignorant Philosopher* CH 18
BOLZANO *Paradoxien des Unendlichen*
WHEWELL *On the Philosophy of Discovery* CH 26
STALLO *Concepts and Theories of Mod rn Physics* CH 13
BRADLEY *The Principles of Logic* Terminal Essays VI
FULLERTON *The Conception of the Infinite and the Solution of the Mathematical Antinomies*
BOSANQUET *Logic* VOL I CH 4
C S PEIRCE *Collected Papers* VOL VI par 112 126
COUTURAT *De l infini mathematique*
CANTOR *Contributions to the Founding of the Theory of Transfinite Numbers*
ROYCE *The World and the Individual* SERIES I Supplementary Essay (4)
PEANO *Formulaire de mathématiq ie*
F W HOBSON *The Theory of Functions of a Real Variable and the Theory of Fourier s Series*
POINCARÉ *Science and Method* BK II CH 3
WHITEHEAD and RUSSELL *Principia Mathematica* PART III SECT C PART V ECT E
B RUSSELL *Principles of Mathematics* CH 13 1, 23, 37–43
—— *Our Knowledge of the External World* V VII
—— *Introdu tion to Mathematical Philosophy* CH 3, 9 13
SITTER *Kosmos* (The Expan ling Universe)
WEYL *The Open World* LECT III

Chapter 41 JUDGMENT

INTRODUCTION

THE word "judgment" has a range of meanings which includes three principal variants referring to (1) *a quality of the mind*, (2) *a faculty of the mind*, and (3) *an act of the mind*. Of these three meanings, it is the third which is extensively considered in this chapter; and it is this meaning of "judgment" which many writers use the word "proposition" to express. They sometimes substitute the one word entirely for the other; sometimes they use both words, not as strict synonyms, but to express distinct yet closely related aspects of the same fundamental phenomenon.

The sense in which judgment is *a quality of the mind* is the sense in which we ordinarily speak of a person as having sound judgment or poor judgment. "We credit the same people," Aristotle says, "with possessing judgment and having reached years of reason and with having practical wisdom and understanding." To be "a man of understanding and of good or sympathetic judgment," he continues, is to be "able to judge about the things with which practical wisdom is concerned."

The capacity to judge well concerning what is to be done is often connected with the capacity to deliberate about the advantages and disadvantages or other circumstances relevant to the action in question. It may or may not be accompanied by a capacity to resolve thought into action, to carry into execution the decision which judgment has formed. These three qualities of mind—deliberateness, judgment, and decisiveness—are conceived by Aristotle and Aquinas as belonging together as parts of the intellectual virtue they call "prudence" or "practical wisdom." The qualities may occur separately, but the prudent man will possess all three.

This meaning of "judgment" is reserved for discussion in the chapter on PRUDENCE; and in the chapter on LAW will be found the consideration of the judgment which a court renders—the judgment which is the decision of a judge when he applies the law to the particular case. In the legal sense of a judicial decision, judgment reflects not so much the quality of the judge's mind as his duty and authority to dispose of the case and to have his decision executed by the appropriate officers of the law. The legal significance of judgment is not primarily psychological or logical; and just as the moral consideration of judgment falls under prudence, the legal consideration is also more appropriately developed in the context of other ideas.

We are left with the meanings which belong to psychology, logic, and the theory of knowledge. The sense in which "judgment" designates *a faculty or function of the mind*—a distinct sphere of mental operation—is much more special than the sense in which "judgment" or "proposition" signifies *a particular act of the mind* in the process of knowing or in the verbal expression of that process. Many authors discuss the kinds of judgment which the mind makes, and the kinds of propositions it forms and asserts or denies, but only a few—notably Locke and Kant—use the word "judgment" to name a mental faculty.

Locke, for example, says that "the mind has two faculties conversant about truth and falsehood." One is the faculty of knowing; the other of judging. "The faculty which God has given man to supply the want of clear and certain knowledge, in cases where that cannot be had, is *judgment*: whereby the mind takes its ideas to agree and disagree; or, which is the same, any proposition to be true or false, without perceiving a demonstrative evidence in the proofs." The way in which Locke distinguishes between knowing and judging, and the fact that he relates this distinction to the difference be-

tween certainty and probability suggest the parallel distinction between knowledge and opinion The faculty of judgment for Locke is the equivalent of what other writers treat as the forming of opinions

Kant also makes judgment a faculty Along with understanding and reason judgment is one of the three faculties of cognition It has a distinct function of its own and is coordinate with the other two As the laws of nature are the work of the understanding in the sphere of speculative reason as the rules of the moral law are the work of the reason in the practical sphere wherein it is related to the faculty of desire so the purposiveness of nature comes under the faculty of judgment which operates in relation to the faculty of pleasure and pain

Kant divides all the faculties of the soul into three which cannot be any further derived from one common ground the *faculty of knowledge* the *feeling of pleasure and pain* and the *faculty of desire* He sees each of the three cognitive functions (of understanding judgment and reason) as standing in a peculiar relation to these three primary faculties The faculty of judgment functions with respect to pleasure and pain which is connected with the faculty of desire Yet the aesthetic judgment of beauty and the theological judgment of purposiveness in nature are of a speculative rather than a practical character Because of these two related facts Kant holds that the judgement in the order of our cognitive faculties forms a mediating link between Understanding and Reason

Kant perhaps more than any other thinker makes judgment—both as a faculty and as an act—one of the central terms in his philosophy It is pivotal in each of the three critiques but it is the *Critique of Judgement* which serves to connect the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Critique of Practical Reason* The Understanding legislates *a priori* for nature as an object of sense—for theoretical knowledge of it in a possible experience Reason legislates *a priori* for freedom and its peculiar causality as the supersensible in the subject for an unconditioned practical knowledge The realm of the natural concept under one legislation and that of the concept of freedom under the other are entirely removed from all mutual influence which they might have upon one another (each according to its fundamental laws) by the great gulf that separates the supersensible from phenomena It is the judgment according to Kant which furnishes the mediating concept between the concept of nature and that of freedom

KANT S THEORY of the faculties of understanding judgment and reason is so complex a doctrine that it cannot be readily compared with other analyses of the capacities or functions of mind His threefold division bears a superficial —perhaps only a verbal—resemblance to Aquinas division of mental acts into conception judgment and reasoning

According to Aquinas judgment is the second of the three acts of a single cognitive faculty variously called mind or intellect or reason This faculty he writes first apprehends something about a thing such as its essence and this is its first and proper object and then it understands the properties accidents and various dispositions affecting the essence Thus it necessarily relates one thing with another by composition or division and from one composition and division it necessarily proceeds to another and this is *reasoning*

The first act of the mind is conception *i e* the simple apprehension of the essence and properties of a thing Judgment the second act unites or separates concepts by affirming or denying one of another As in the Kantian analysis judgment is a kind of mediating link for after the judgment is formed by what Aquinas calls the composition or division of concepts it in turn serves as the unit of the mind s third act which is reasoning Reasoning is the process of going from judgment to judgment

The act of judgment is that act of the mind and the only act which can have the quality of truth or falsity Truth Aquinas writes resides in the intellect composing and dividing for when the intellect judges that a thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing then it first knows and expresses truth In every proposition the mind either applies to or removes from the thing signified by the subject some form signified by the predicate Moreover the judgment involves assertion or denial as the

concept does not. Whatever truth there is implicitly in concepts must be explicated in judgments and the truth of the conclusion in reasoning depends upon the truth of the judgments which are the premises. The judgment therefore is the basic unit of knowledge.

On this last point Kant seems to be in agreement with earlier writers. It is possible, therefore, to compare Kant's classification of judgments or propositions with the classifications of Aristotle, Descartes, or Locke. But it is necessary first to consider the relation between judgment and proposition. After that we can examine the difference between theoretic and practical judgments. With respect to the theoretic judgment (or proposition), we shall be able to state opposite views of the nature of the judgment and diverse views of the formal structure of judgments, their material content, their relation to one another and to the whole process of knowing.

THE SENTENCE "all men are mortal" can be interpreted as expressing a judgment or a proposition. From certain *points of view*, the choice of interpretation makes no difference. For example, it does not matter whether, in a consideration of "all men are mortal" and "some men are not mortal," the comparison is expressed in terms of universal and particular affirmative and negative judgments *or* propositions, or whether it is said that these are contradictory judgments or contradictory propositions. The basic problems of logic seem to be conceived in the same way by writers like Aristotle and Locke who tend to use "proposition" in place of "judgment," and by writers like Aquinas, Descartes, and Kant who tend to use both words with some difference in meaning.

What is the difference? It is sometimes understood as a difference between an act of the mind asserting or denying and the subject matter being asserted or denied. The proposition is that which may be either asserted or denied, or, in the third alternative stressed by Descartes, the mind may suspend judgment and merely entertain the *proposition*. It may decline to judge it true or false and so refuse to assert or deny it. The fact that the proposition is itself either affirmative or negative does not signify its assertion or denial by a judgment of the mind, for an affirmative proposition can be denied and a negative can be affirmed.

Judgment adds *to the proposition* in question the mind's decision with respect to its truth or falsity. That decision may be right or wrong. A proposition which is in fact true may be denied. The truth of the proposition is unaffected by the falsity of the judgment, or if the mind suspends judgment on a proposition which is true, the truth of the proposition has failed to elicit a judgment. This seems to confirm the separation between the proposition and the judgment.

Sometimes the difference between the judgment and the proposition is found in the difference between the mind's act of "composing" or "dividing" concepts and the *formulation* of that act in words. On this view, the proposition is related to the judgment as the term to the concept, as the physical to the *mental* word, as language to thought. In consequence, there is no separation for either the judgment or the proposition between that which can be asserted or denied and the assertion or denial of it. The affirmative judgment *is* an assertion, the negative a denial, and the same holds for the affirmative and the negative proposition.

But on either theory of the difference, it is thought necessary to distinguish between the sentence and the proposition, especially when the proposition is also regarded as a verbal formulation—a statement of thought in words. This is particularly important in a logical treatise like Aristotle's which analyzes *terms, propositions*, and *syllogisms* rather than *concepts, judgments*, and *reasonings*.

In both the *Categories*, which deals with terms, and the treatise *On Interpretation*, which deals with propositions, Aristotle differentiates between a grammatical and a logical handling of the units of language. His distinction, for example, between simple and composite expressions (words and phrases on the one hand, and sentences on the other) is related to, but it is not identical with his *distinction* between terms and propositions. Not every simple expression can be used as a term. For example, prepositions and conjunctions cannot be used as terms, as nouns and verbs can be. Nor can every sentence be used as a proposition.

"A sentence is a significant portion of speech,"

Aristotle writes "some parts of which have an independent meaning that is to say as an utterance though not as the expression of any positive judgment Every sentence has meaning" he goes on "by convention Yet every sentence is not a proposition only such are propositions as have in them truth or falsity Thus a prayer is a sentence but is neither true nor false Let us therefore dismiss all other types of sentence but the proposition for this last concerns our present inquiry whereas the investigation of the others belongs rather to the study of rhetoric or of poetry"

It seems possible to relate the two separate distinctions we have been considering—that between sentence and proposition and that between proposition and judgment As the proposition can be regarded as a sentence logically (rather than grammatically) construed so it can also be regarded as the linguistic expression of a judgment of the mind The proposition thus appears to be a kind of middle ground between language and thought for when a sentence is used for the purpose of stating a proposition it can also express a judgment When a judgment is expressed in words the verbal statement is also a proposition The proposition is thus the logical aspect of a sentence and the verbal aspect of a judgment A similar consideration of terms in relation to words and concepts occurs in the chapter on IDEA

WHAT IS PERHAPS the most fundamental division in the sphere of judgments—the separation of the practical from the theoretic or speculative—can be initially explained by reference to the forms of language Aristotle s remark about sentences and propositions tends to identify propositions with declarative sentences Sentences in the subjunctive mood state prayers or wishes not propositions An interrogative sentence asks a question to which the answers may be propositions or they may be hopes and desires The imperative sentence issues a command to act in a certain way whether the command is a direction for others or a decision for one s self This last type of sentence represents the practical mood of thought as well as speech —thought concerned with actions to be done or not done rather than with what does or does not exist

The imperative sentence is not the only kind of practical statement It is merely the most terse and emphatic It is also the expression of that type of practical judgment which most immediately precedes action itself or the execution of a command There are other sentences which because they are apparently declarative in form conceal their imperative mood Yet upon examination their essentially practical rather than theoretic significance can be discovered

Sentences which contain the words "ought" or "should" are of this sort e g "Men ought to seek the truth" "You should work for peace" "I ought to make this clear" By omitting "should" or "ought" these sentences can be changed into the strictly declarative mood of theoretic propositions e g "Men do seek the truth" "You will work for peace" "I shall make this clear" They can also be made plainly imperative e g, "Seek the truth" etc The chief difference between the blunt form of the imperative and its indicative expression using "ought" or "should" is that the latter indicates the person to whom the command is addressed

The contrast in significance between a declarative and an imperative statement does therefore convey the distinction between a theoretic and a practical proposition or judgment Kant s further division of practical judgments into the hypothetical and the categorical simply differentiates commands or "oughts" which involve no preamble from those which propose that action be taken to achieve a certain end or which base a direction to employ this or that means on the supposition that a certain end is desired or sought Examples of hypothetical or conditional imperatives would be such judgments as "If you want to be happy seek the truth" or "Seek the truth in order to be happy"

The distinction between theoretic and practical judgments is currently made in terms of the contrast between statements of fact and statements of value or as in judicial procedure between statements of fact and rules of law A rule of law has the form of a general practical statement usually a conditional rather than a categorical imperative whereas the decision of a court applying the rule to a case is a particular practical judgment

Beginning with Francis Bacon, the distinction between the theoretic and the practical is also made in terms of the difference between the pure sciences and their applications in technology. Technical judgments, prescribing the way to make something or produce a certain effect, are traditionally associated under the head of the practical, with moral judgments concerning the good to be sought and the ways of seeking it. Both are prescriptive of conduct rather than descriptive of existence or nature in the manner of theoretical statements.

Thinkers like Aristotle, Aquinas, and Kant who divide science or philosophy into the theoretical disciplines (e.g., physics, mathematics, metaphysics) and the practical or moral disciplines (e.g., ethics, economics, politics) place the discussion of the difference between theoretical and practical judgments in the context of other distinctions, as, for example, between the speculative and the practical reason, or between theoretic and practical knowledge, or in the context of considering the kinds of truth appropriate to each, and the modes of inference or demonstration in each. These related distinctions and considerations are treated in the chapters on KNOWLEDGE, MIND, REASONING, and TRUTH.

For the most part, however, the great books in the tradition of logic itself do not give an analysis of practical judgments or reasoning in any way comparable to their treatment of the theoretic forms of thought and statement. The logical problems concerning propositions or judgments, now to be considered, apply only to the theoretic forms.

Two basic issues in the theory of propositions or judgments have their origin in the tradition of the great books, but for their explicit and full development other works must be consulted—the special treatises on logic of relatively recent date, listed in the Additional Readings. One of these two issues has already been briefly commented on, but for the full implications of the distinction between propositions and judgments one must go to such writers as Hegel, Bradley, Bosanquet, Cook Wilson, W. E. Johnson, and John Dewey who make this distinction the crux of a controversy over the scope of formal logic.

The other basic issue lies in the opposition between what has come to be called "subject-predicate logic" and "relational logic." Here one side is fully represented by the *Organon* of Aristotle and by the later books which adopt the Aristotelian logic of predication. The other logical theory is intimated but not fully developed by such writers as Locke, Hume, Kant and William James who, though they sometimes employ the subject-predicate formulation, tend to construct the unit of knowledge—the proposition or judgment—as a *relation* between ideas or concepts.

The fact that Kant places substance and accident under the category of relation can be taken as exemplifying this tendency, as can Locke's emphasis on the connection of and agreement or disagreement between, our ideas. Nevertheless, these are at most intimations of the theory that the proposition is a *relation* of two or more terms, not the *application of a predicate to a subject*. As indicated in the chapter on LOGIC, the relational theory does not receive an adequate exposition until the modern development of symbolic or mathematical logic, beginning with the writings of Boole, Jevons, and Venn, and culminating in such works as the *Principia Mathematica* of Russell and Whitehead.

In the Aristotelian logic, simple propositions consist of a subject and a predicate—what is being talked about and what is said of it. The copula "is" is the sign of predication; it also signifies an affirmation of the unity of subject and predicate. For example, in "Socrates is a man," the predicate *man* is applied to the subject *Socrates* and the unity of *being Socrates* and *being a man* is affirmed. All the terms of discourse can be classified according to their character as subjects and predicates; so, too, can propositions be classified by reference to the type of subject term and the type of predicate term which compose them. The formal structure not only of the proposition, but also of the syllogism, is determined by the order of subjects and predicates. "When one term is predicated of another," Aristotle writes, "any term which is predicable of the predicate will also be predicable of its subject."

According to the theory of the proposition as a relation of terms or of classes, predication

represents merely one type of relationship—the membership of an individual in a class or the inclusion of one class in another There are many other types of relation which it is held cannot be reduced to class membership or class inclusion as for example the relationship stated by the proposition John hit James or the proposition January comes before February Propositions can be classified according to the number of terms involved in a single relationship or by reference to the type of relation which organizes them whether it is symmetrical or asymmetrical transitive or intransitive reflexive or irreflexive In this theory it is the character of the relationship not the character of the terms which is the fundamental element in logical analysis and this determines the formal structure of inference as well as of propositions

It has been claimed for each of these logical theories that it is the more general analysis and that it is able to reduce the formulations of the opposite theory to its own terms or subsume them as a special case Certainly it is verbally possible to convert all predications into statements of relationship or all relational statements into subject predicate propositions But this by itself does not seem to resolve the issue to the satisfaction of either theory each side contends that such reductions violate its fundamental principles Stated in its most drastic form the unresolved question is whether there is one logic or two—or perhaps more

WITHIN THE tradition of Aristotelian logic there are divergent schemes for classifying propositions or judgments So far as the great books are concerned this can be best illustrated by mentioning Kant s departures in analysis

Aristotle distinguishes between simple and composite propositions the former consisting of a single subject and predicate the latter compounded of several propositions For example since the two predicates in the proposition This man is good and a shoemaker do not form a unity the sentence expresses a conjunction of two simple propositions This man is good and This man is a shoemaker Other types of compound propositions are the hypothetical and the disjunctive *e g* If Socrates is a man Socrat s is mortal and Either all men are mortal or no men are mortal Kant treats these distinctions under the head of *relation* He calls the proposition which is a relation of the predicate to the subject categorical and he regards the hypothetical or disjunctive judgment (based on relations of cause and effect or of the parts of a whole) as concerned with propositions in relation to each other

Aristotle classifies simple propositions by reference to their quantity and quality In regard to quantity he distinguishes between the universal (*e g* All men are mortal) and the particular (*e g* Some men are mortal) To these he adds the indefinite proposition which leaves the quantity (*all* or *some*) undetermined Under the head of quantity Kant makes a threefold division according to unity plurality and totality He adds the singular proposition Socrates is mortal to Aristotle s particular and universal The difference between the singular on the one hand and the particular and the universal on the other seems to be represented in Aristotle s thought by the distinction between propositions about an individual subject and propositions about a universal subject

The quality of categorical propositions according to Aristotle is either affirmative (*i e* positive) or negative *e g* All men are mortal and Some men are *not* mortal To these two Kant adds a third type of judgment under the head of *quality*—the infinite judgment which affirms a negative predicate of a subject *e g* The soul is non mortal Though Aristotle recognizes the special character of a term like non mortal since it is both negative and indefinite he does not seem to think that the use of such terms affects the quality of a proposition

Finally Aristotle divides propositions according to whether they are simple assertions of fact or are assertions qualified by the notions of necessity or contingency (*i e* possibility) Every proposition he says states that something either is or must be or may be the attribute of something else The distinction between the necessary and contingent modes of statement has come to be called a difference in modality and statements which have one or another modality are called modal propositions

It is sometimes thought that the Aristotelian classification treats only necessary and contin

gent propositions with their several opposites as modal propositions and separates the simple or pure assertion from them as non modal In contrast to this Kant makes a threefold division of judgments under the head of modality the problematical (i e the possible what *may be*) the assertoric (i e the existent what is) and the apodictic (i e the necessary what *must be*)

THE CLASSIFICATION of the types of judgment or proposition is usually preliminary in logical analysis to a consideration of their order and connection

The formal pattern of what is traditionally called the square of opposition is determined by the quality and quantity of the simple propositions which are therein related as contradictory contrary and sub-contrary Two propositions are contradictory if they are opposite in both quality and quantity (e g All men are mortal is contradicted by Some men are not mortal) Two universal propositions are contrary if one is affirmative and the other negative (e g All men are mortal is contrary to No men are mortal) and an affirmative and a negative particular proposition are related as sub-contraries (e g Some men are mortal and Some men are not mortal) The significance of these three basic relationships for the truth and falsity of the opposed propositions is discussed in the chapter on OPPOSITION and in the chapter on NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY the special problems of opposition among modal propositions are examined.

Other than their opposition the only formal relationship of propositions or judgments occurs in the structure of inference or reasoning According to the traditional analysis the implication of one proposition by another—insofar as that is determined by the form of each—is immediate inference In contrast the pattern of mediated inference or reasoning always involves at least three propositions ordered not only with respect to the *sequence* from premises to conclusion but also by the relation of the premises to one another These matters are discussed in the chapter on REASONING

With respect to their origin status or import judgments or propositions are subject to further distinctions in type The certainty or probability with which propositions are asserted or judgments are made is connected by some writers with the distinction between knowledge and opinion, by others with the difference between science and dialectic and by others with the difference between knowing the relation of ideas and knowing matters of fact or real existence *Propositions* which express certain knowledge are furthermore divided by some analysts into those which are axiomatic self evident or immediate and those which are known only by mediated inference reasoning or demonstration, not by intuition or induction. The former are also sometimes called principles," the latter conclusions.

Locke s distinction between trifling and instructive propositions, like Kant s distinction between analytic" and synthetic judgment is made in the general context of an examination of how we learn or know

Trifling propositions according to Locke are universal propositions which though they be certainly *true* yet they add no light to our *understanding* bring no increase to our knowledge All purely identical propositions are of this sort—propositions such as body is body or a vacuum is a vacuum." Such propositions teach nothing but what every one who is capable of discourse knows without being told it that the same term is the same term and the same idea the same idea They are all instances of the law of identity or as Locke expresses it they are all equivalent to this proposition *what is is* If the trifling proposition the analytical judgment or what in our day is called a tautology goes beyond the statement of an identity between subject and predicate it goes no further than the explication of a definition It predicates Locke says a *part* of the definition of the word defined, as for example in the proposition Lead is a metal.

Analytical or explicative judgments Kant says in the *Prolegomena* express nothing in the predicate but what has already been actually thought in the concept of the subject When I say all bodies are extended I have not amplified *in the least* my concept of body but have only analyzed it On the contrary this judgment All bodies have weight contains in

represents merely one type of relationship—the membership of an individual in a class or the *inclusion* of one class in another There are many other types of relation which it is held cannot be reduced to class membership or class inclusion as for example the relationship stated by the proposition John hit James or the proposition January comes before February Propositions can be classified according to the number of terms involved in a single relationship or by reference to the type of relation which organizes them whether it is symmetrical or asymmetrical transitive or intransitive *reflexive* or *irreflexive* In this theory it is the character of the relationship not the character of the terms which is the fundamental element in logical analysis and this determines the formal structure of inference as well as of propositions

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Aristotle distinguishes between simple and composite propositions the former consisting of a single subject and predicate the latter compounded of several propositions For example since the two predicates in the proposition This man is good and a shoemaker do not form a unity the sentence expresses a conjunction of two simple propositions This man is good and This man is a *shoemaker* Other types of compound propositions are the hypothetical and the disjunctive *e g* If Socrates is a man Socrates is mortal and Either all men are mortal or no men are mortal Kant treats these distinctions under the head of *relation* He calls the proposition which is a relation of the predicate to the subject categorical and he regards the hypothetical or disjunctive judgment (based on relations of cause and effect or of the parts of a whole) as concerned with propositions in relation to each other

Aristotle classifies simple propositions by reference to their quantity and quality In regard to quantity he distinguishes between the universal (*e g* All men are mortal) and the particular (*e g* Some men are mortal) To these he adds the indefinite proposition which leaves the quantity (*all* or *some*) undetermined Under the head of quantity Kant makes a threefold division according to unity plurality and totality He adds the singular proposition Socrates is mortal to Aristotle s particular and universal The difference between the singular on the one hand and the particular and the universal on the other seems to be represented in Aristotle s thought by the distinction between propositions about an individual subject and propositions about a universal subject

The quality of categorical propositions according to Aristotle is either affirmative (*i e* positive) or negative *e g* All men are mortal and Some men are *not* mortal To these two Kant adds a third type of judgment under the head of *quality*—the infinite judgment which affirms a negative predicate of a subject *e g* The soul is non mortal Though Aristotle recognizes the special character of a term like non mortal since it is both negative and indefinite he does not seem to think that the use of such terms affects the quality of a proposition

Finally Aristotle divides propositions according to whether they are simple assertions of fact or are assertions qualified by the notions of necessity or contingency (*i e* possibility) Every proposition he says states that something either is or must be or may be the attribute of something else The distinction between the necessary and contingent modes of statement has come to be called a difference in modality and statements which have one or another modality are called modal propositions

It is sometimes thought that the Aristotelian classification treats only necessary and contin

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its predicate something not actually thought in the general concept of body it amplifies my knowledge by adding something to my concept and must therefore be called synthetical

For Locke not all axioms or self evident propositions are trifling or tautological for some go beyond statements of identity or the explication of definitions as for example that the whole is greater than the part Nor are they all useless Some which Locke distinguishes from the rest by calling them maxims are of use he maintains in the ordinary methods of teaching sciences as far as they are advanced but of little or none in advancing them further They are of use in disputes for the silencing of obstinate wranglers and bringing those contests to some conclusion

For Kant there is a further division of judgments into the *a posteriori* and the *a priori* according as their truth is or is not grounded in the data of experience The former are empirical in origin the latter transcendental that is they have a foundation which transcends experience These two types of judgment express two corresponding types of knowledge—*a priori* knowledge by which Kant understands not such as is independent of this or that kind of experience but such as is absolutely so of *all* experience Opposed to this is empirical knowledge or that which is possible only *a posteriori* that is through experience

In Kant s view there is no problem about the truth of analytic judgments for these have an *a priori* foundation in the principle of contradiction (The contradictory of an analytic judgment is always self contradictory) Nor do synthetic judgments which are empirical or *a posteriori* raise any special difficulties The central question in the theory of knowledge concerns the possibility and validity of synthetic judgments *a priori*

If I go out of and beyond the conception A in order to recognize another B as connected with it what foundation have I to rest on Kant asks whereby to render the synthesis possible? I have here no longer the advantage of looking out in the sphere of experience for what I want Let us take for example the proposition everything that happens has a cause In the conception of something that happens I indeed think an existence which a certain time antecedes and from this I can derive analytical judgments But the conception of a cause lies quite outside the above conception and indicates something entirely different from that which happens and is consequently not contained in that conception How then am I able to assert concerning the general conception— that which happens —something entirely different from that conception and to recognize the conception of cause although not contained in it yet as belonging to it and even necessarily? What is here the unknown X upon which the understanding rests when it believes it has found outside the conception A a foreign predicate B which it nevertheless considers to be connected with it? It is the discovery and solution of this problem which Kant believes to be the signal contribution of his transcendental logic of the judgment

It may be wondered whether this problem can be stated in terms other than those peculiar to Kant s analytical vocabulary Other writers admit that propositions which are particular and contingent have existential import Their truth concerns real existences and so whether they are true or not can and must be learned from experience These are like Kant s synthetic judgments *a posteriori* Universal and necessary propositions on the other hand are sometimes interpreted as having no existential significance Instead of being read as asserting that anything exists they are taken simply as statements of the relation between our own ideas These for Locke and Hume are like Kant s *a priori* analytic judgments

What remains is to discover a parallel for Kant s synthetic judgments *a priori* In terms other than Kant s the most likely parallel seems to be the universal and necessary proposition conceived as a statement about reality rather than about relations in the realm of our own concepts. When universal propositions are so interpreted two questions arise How do we establish that the subjects of such propositions really exist? What is the ultimate ground for the truth of such propositions the unlimited universality of which outruns experience? In these two questions we find a problem which is at least analogous to Kant s problem of the possibility of synthetic judgments *a priori*

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PAGE

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REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in **4** HOMER: *Iliad*, BK II [265–283] **12d**, the number **4** is the number of the volume in the set; the number **12d** indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in **53** JAMES: *Psychology*, **116a–119b**, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in **7** PLATO: *Symposium*, **163b–164c**, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., *Iliad*, BK II [265–283] **12d**.

BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (*D*), follows; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: *Nehemiah*, 7:45—(*D*) *II Esdras*, 7:46.

SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas*, consult the Preface.

1. Judgment as an act or faculty of the mind: its contrast with the act of conception or with the faculties of understanding and reason

8 ARISTOTLE: *Categories*, CH 4 [2ª4–10] **6a** / *Interpretation*, CH 1 [16ª9–18] **25a–b** / *Metaphysics*, BK VI, CH 4 [1027^{b}18–28] **550a–c**; BK IX, CH 10 **577c–578a,c** / *Soul*, BK III, CH 6 **662d–663c**

18 AUGUSTINE: *Confessions*, BK VII, par 23 **50b–c**; BK X, par 10 **73d–74a** / *City of God*, BK VIII, CH 6 **269b–c**

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART I, Q 3, A 4, REP 2 **16d–17c**; Q 13, A 12, ANS **74c–75b**; Q 14, A 14 **88d–89b**; Q 16, A 2 **95c–96b**; Q 17, A 3 **102d–103c**; Q 58, A 2, ANS **301b–d**; A 4, ANS **302d–303c**; Q 85, A 5, ANS and REP 3 **457d–458d**; A 6 **458d–459c**

20 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART II–II, Q 1, A 2 **381a–c**

23 HOBBES: *Leviathan*, PART I **66c–67a**

30 BACON: *Advancement of Learning*, **59c–61d** esp **59c–60a**, **64a–b**

31 DESCARTES: *Rules*, XII **21d–22a** / *Meditations*, II **81a**; IV **89a–93a** esp **89c–90a** / *Objections and Replies*, **124b–c**; **141a**; **215d–216c**

31 SPINOZA: *Ethics*, PART II, PROP 48–49 **391a–394d**

35 LOCKE: *Human Understanding*, BK II, CH XX, SECT 5 **179c–d**; BK IV, CH V, SECT 5–6 **329d–330b**; CH XIV **364b–365a**

42 KANT: *Pure Reason*, **16d–19a**; **34a–45b** esp **39a–c**; **41c–42c**; **51d–52b**; **59c–64a** esp **60a–c**; **64d–66d**; **99a–101b**; **108a–112d** esp **110d–111c**; **166c–171a**; **193a–200c**; **240b–243c** / *Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals*, **282b–c** / *Judgement*, **461a–475d** esp **465c–467d**, **474b–475d**; **550a–551a,c**; **558a**; **572b–575b**

53 JAMES: *Psychology*, **178a–179a**; **213b–214a**; **313b**; **638a–b**; **859a**; **861b**

2. The division of judgments in terms of the distinction between the theoretic and the practical

8 ARISTOTLE: *Heavens*, BK III, CH 7 [306ª14–18] **397b–c** / *Metaphysics*, BK I, CH 1 **499a–500b**; BK IV, CH 4 [1008^{b}–32] **527d–528b** / *Soul*, BK III, CH 7 [431^{b}2–12] **664a–b**; CH 9 [432^{b}26–433ª9] **665c**

9 ARISTOTLE: *Ethics*, BK I, CH 3 **339d–340b**; CH 7 [1098^{a}25–35] **343d**; BK II, CH 2 [1103^{b}26–1104ª9] **349b–c**; BK VI, CH 2 [1139ª21–31] **387d–388a**; CH 5 [1140^{b}11–19] **389b–c**; CH 8 [1142ª13–19] **391b**

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART I, Q 14, A 16 **90b–91b**; Q 79, AA 11–13 **424d–427a**; PART I–II, Q 13, A 6, REP 2 **676c–677b**

19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part I, q 14 a 81d 82b q 55 3 301d 30 d a 4 and 303d 303c q 79 a 8-9 421c-423d q 85, a 4 45 d 458d

23 Hobbes *Leviathan*, part I 58a c 60a

30 Bacon *Advancement of Learning* 59c 60a

31 Descartes *Rules* x v 8b c

35 Locke *Human Understanding* bk iv ch ii sect 2-8 309d 311a ch xv sect 4 365a c ch xvii, sect 4 373a 3 5a passim sect 15 1 378d 379c

42 Kant *Pure Reason* 110d 112d 115d 119a / *Practical Reason*, 379a-d

53 James *Psychology* 313b 666b-6 4b esp 66 b-668a, 672b 868b-879b esp 8 5 873a, 8 8a

8. The differentiation of judgments according to origin, ground, or import

8a. Self-evident and demonstrable propositions immediate and mediated intuitive and reasoned judgments

8 Aristotle *Posterior Analytics* bk i, 97a-d ch 3 99b-100a ch 5 109a b ch 9 22 111c 11 b ch 23 [84 9-85 1] 115c 115a ii 3 [ ] 119b-c bk ii, ch 9 125a b ch 19 1 a 13 a c

9 Aristotle *Ethics* bk v ch 3 [1 3 5 34] 38 ch 6 389d ch 8 [1] 391b c ch 1 [ ] 392d 393a / *Rhetoric* bk ch 2 [3] 595b

19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i, q 10d 11d q 4 a 1 rep 5d 76c a 81d 82b q 3 rep 2 10 d 103c q a 415c-426b q 84 3 rep 3 443d-444d q 8 6 456a-459c q 595d 59 q 1 612a-613a

20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i-ii, q 5 2 35a 37b q 94 2, a 2 1d 223a 4 a 223d 224d part ii-ii q 4 ans 38 383 q 6 ep 2 41 a-d

25 Montaigne *Essays* 259d 261a 272a d

30 Bacon *Advancement of Learning* 59c d 9

31 Descartes *Rules* ii 4 -d xii 20d 25a / *Objections and Replies* 123a b 125a b

33 Pascal *Pensées* 1 1a-172a

35 Locke *Human Understanding* bk ch 5 98d-99c sect 5 99d 100b sect 23 101b-10 ch ii sect 1 103d 104a sect 4 104d 1 5a ch iii, 3 119b-120a bk ch i, 9 308, 309b passim, esp 309b ii 309b-313a ch i i, sect 2 4 313a-c ch ii sect 1-4 33 342d passim ch ix sect 3 349a-c ch x sect 365a-c ch x ii sect 3 371d 372b sect 14 3 8c 379c

42 Kant *Pure Reason* 39a-c 99a-c 110d 111c 21 218d / *Judgement* 542d 543a

43 Federalist number 31 103c-d number 5 244b-c

43 Mill *Utilitarianism*, 445a-44

8b. Analytic and synthetic judgments: trifling and instructive propositions

35 Locke *Human Understanding* bk i ch v sect 6, 330b ch viii 345a 348d

42 Kant *Pure Reason* 1 d 19a 31a-d 64d 66d 179c 180b / *Practical Reason* 331a 351c / *Science of Right* 405b-c / *Judgement* 516b d

53 James *Psychology* 879a 880b [2]

8c. A priori and a posteriori: non-existential and existential judgments: the problem of a priori synthetic judgment

35 Locke *Human Understanding* bk i ch i sect 15 16 98d 99c sect 23 1 1b 1 a bk iv ch i, sect 1 30 a 305a ch i sect 7 -21 315b-319c ch ix sect 1 344a ch x sect 13 14 35 d 358c ch xvii, sect 2 3 1d

35 Hume *Human Understanding* sect 1 45 a 463d passim, esp div 20 21 458a-c div 30 46 a sect div 34 35 454b-466c sect x div 89 490b-c sect xii, div 131 13 505 509d passim

42 Kant *Pure Reason* 5a 8b 14 108a c esp 14 20c 23a 24a, 25b b 2 b 28b, 29d 33d 35b-36a, 41c-42b 46a-45d, 5 d 5 b 64b 66d. 85d 88a 103b-d 110a 113b 134c-d 14 a 179c 182b 19 a b 211c 218d 224a 22 a / *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals* 2 b d 280a b 281b / *Practical Reason* 309b d 379d 330c 351c / *Pref. Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 36 d 3 8a / *Science of Right* 405b-407 esp 405b d / *Judgement* 45 a-4 5d 570b 5 2d 603a b

43 Mill *Utilitarianism* 445d 446d

46 Hegel *Philosophy of History* intro 156d 158a 182d 183

53 James *Psychology* 639a-641a esp 64 b 659 660a 851a 893a esp 851 85 a, 8 9a 861b 867 8 9a, 879b, 880b-881a, 884b-885a, 889b 890a 89 a b

8d. The division of judgments into the determinant and the reflective: judgments as constitutive or as regulative

42 Kant *Pure Reason* 72c 4b 193a 200c esp 193c-d, 194b-c 201d 202a 206a 20 b / *Judgement* 461a-4 5d esp 471b-4 4b 550a 551a-c 558a 559a 560c 56 a-d 564 c 56 b-568 570b 5 2 5 b 584d 585a 585c 597b-599b 601d

9. Degrees of assent: certainty and probability

8 Aristotle *Interpretation*, ch 9 28a 29d / *Topics* bk v ch 3 [31 9-30] 182b-c / *Metaphysics* bk x i ch 8 [10 4 14 16] 604c

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(5 *The nature of theoretic judgments 5b The judgment as a predication the classification of subjects and predicates*)

BK I CH 4-9 144b 147b / *Physics* BK I CH 3 [186a22-187 10] 261b 262a CH 6 [189 28-33] 264d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2 A 1 ANS 10d 11d Q 3 A 4 REP 2 16d 17c Q 13 A 5 66b 67d A 12 ANS 74c 75b Q 16 A 2 95c 96b A 6 ANS 98b d Q 58 A 2 301b-d A 4 302d 303c Q 76 A 3 ANS 391a 393a Q 85 A 5 REP 3 457d 458d

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART IV 270a c

31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* DEF IX 130d

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 51d 52b 180c 182b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 144a b 313a b 638b 861b 870b 873a

5c The judgment as relational types of relation

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK IV CH I SECT 1-7 307a 308a CH XII SECT 6-8 360a c

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT IV DIV 20 458a b

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 39c-41c esp 40c d 51d 52b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 174b 176a 302b 304b 638b 869a 873a esp 870b 871a 872b 878a 879b 889a b

6 The division of theoretic judgments according to formal criteria

6a The division of judgments according to quantity universal particular singular and indefinite propositions

8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 2 5b c / *Interpretation* CH 7 [17 37-b16] 26d 27a / *Prior Analytics* BK I CH 1 [24 16-21] 39a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 55b 56a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK IV CH V SECT 10 331a CH VI 331b-336d passim CH IX SECT 1 349a CH XI SECT 13-14 357d 358c

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 39c 41c esp 39d-40a

6b The division of judgments according to quality positive negative and infinite propositions

8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 10 [12b6-15] 17d 18a / *Interpretation* CH 5 [17a8-9] 26b CH 6 26c d CH 10 29d 31c / *Prior Analytics* BK I CH 3 [25b19-26] 40c CH 46 70b 71d / *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 25 [86b30-38] 118d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 13 A 12 ANS 74c 75b

30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 33 161b d

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH VII SECT 1 283a b BK IV CH V SECT 5-6 329d 330b passim

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 39c-41c esp 40a 210c d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 25c d

6c The division of judgments according to modality necessary and contingent propositions problematic assertoric, and apodictic judgments

8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation* CH 12 13 32d 35c / *Prior Analytics* BK I CH 3 40a-c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 14 A 13 REP 2 86d 88c Q 19 A 3 ANS 110b 111c A 8 REP 1 3 116a d

31 DESCARTES *Rules* XII 22a b 23a-c

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 14c 15c 39c-41c esp 40d 41c 179c 180c 193a 200c esp 194b-d 217c d / *Judgement* 491c 495a c

53 JAMES *Psychology* 851a

6d The classification of judgments by reference to relation simple and composite propositions categorical hypothetical, and disjunctive judgments

8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation* CH 5 [17a20-24] 26c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 14 A 13 REP 2 86d 88c Q 19 A 8 REP 1 3 116a-d

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 39c-41c esp 40c d 44a b 110d 111c esp 111b 194b-c / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 265c 266d / *Practical Reason* 297a 298a / *Judgement* 483d-491c

53 JAMES *Psychology* 859b

7 The order and connection of judgments

7a The formal opposition of judgments the square of opposition

8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 10 [13b1-35] 19a-c / *Interpretation* CH 6-7 26c 27d CH 10 29d 31c CH 12-14 32d 36d / *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 2 [72 13] 98c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 64 A 3 REP 3 68b 69b

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 64d 65c 156d 157b 174b d

7b The conversion of propositions the problem of immediate inference

8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation* CH 7 [17b23 31] 27b c CH 10 [20 16-37] 30d 31b / *Prior Analytics* BK I CH 2-3 39d 40c BK II CH 8 10 79b 81b CH 22 [67b 6-68 24] 89b d

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 17d 18a 109d 111c esp 109d 110a 110d 111c

7c Reasoning as a sequence of judgments the chain of reasoning

8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 3 [1b10-16] 5c d / *Prior Analytics* BK I CH 1 3 39a-40c CH 23 [40b30-41b7] 57c d / *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 1 2 97a 99a

For: The theory of predication and the analysis of subjects and predicates, *see* IDEA 5a; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 5c.

The relational theory of propositions, *see* RELATION 4b.

Other discussions bearing on the quantity, quality, and modality of propositions, *see* INFINITY 3b; NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 4e(1); UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 5c–5d; and for other considerations of the distinction between the categorical and the hypothetical in judgment and reason, *see* HYPOTHESIS 5; REASONING 2b.

Another treatment of the square of opposition, *see* OPPOSITION 1d(1)–1d(2).

The relation of judgments to one another in immediate inference or in reasoning, *see* REASONING 4a; RELATION 4b.

The distinction between self-evident and demonstrable judgments, *see* INDUCTION 3; KNOWLEDGE 6c(2); PRINCIPLE 3b(2); and for other treatments of the *a priori* and the *a posteriori*, *see* EXPERIENCE 2d; KNOWLEDGE 6c(4); REASONING 5b(3).

A discussion relevant to the distinction between existential and non-existential judgments, *see* KNOWLEDGE 6a(3).

The problem of the truth and falsity of judgments, or their certainty and probability, *see* KNOWLEDGE 6d(1)–6d(2); OPINION 3a–3b; TRUTH 2e, 3b(2), 7a.

Another consideration of the aesthetic judgment, *see* BEAUTY 5; UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 7c.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World*, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:

I. Works by authors represented in this collection.
II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place, and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*.

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II.

CICERO. *Academics*, II (XI–XII)
SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. *Against the Logicians*
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—— *Principles of Empirical or Inductive Logic*, CH 8–10
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Discussions relevant to the distinction between theoretic and practical judgments *see* KNOWLEDGE 6e(1) PHILOSOPHY 2a PRUDENCE 2a REASONING 5e-5e(1) THEOLOGY 4d TRUTH 2c WISDOM 1b

Other considerations of practical or moral judgments and of judgment in relation to prudence *see* GOOD AND EVIL 5b-5c KNOWLEDGE 6e(2) PRUDENCE 5a and for the theory of the categorical imperative *see* DUTY 5 NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 5a(2)

Other treatments of language in relation to thought *see* IDEA 4a LANGUAGE 7

The thesis seems to have two applications. For the stronger it means that they have the right as far as they have the might to exact from the weaker whatever serves their interests. Their laws or demands cannot be unjust. They cannot do injustice. They can only fail to exert sufficient might to hold on to the power which can secure them not from the charge of injustice but from reprisals by those whom they have oppressed or injured.

The thesis also means, for the weaker, that they can only do injustice but not suffer it. Injustice on their part consists in disobeying the law of their rulers. Hence for them, too, justice is expediency—only now in the sense that they are likely to suffer if they try to follow their own interests rather than the interests of the stronger.

This thesis appears to be repeated in somewhat different language by Hobbes and Spinoza. To men living in a purely natural condition, the notions of justice and injustice do not apply. They apply only to men living in civil society. "Where there is no Commonwealth," Hobbes writes, "there is nothing unjust. So that the nature of justice consists in the keeping of valid covenants: but the validity of covenants begins not but with the constitution of a civil power sufficient to compel men to keep them." The breach of civil laws or covenants may be called injustice, and the observance of them justice.

It is Spinoza's opinion that "everything has by nature as much right as it has power to exist and operate." It follows therefore that "in a natural state there is nothing which can be called just or unjust, but only in a civil state." Here as before justice consists in obedience, injustice in disobedience, to whatever laws the state has the power to enforce—the laws themselves being formulated not by reference to justice but to the interests of the state which must seek its own preservation and has the right to do so, so long as it has the power.

THOSE WHO TAKE the opposite view agree that justice is political in the sense that the state, in organization and operation, is a work of justice. Wisdom is the virtue of the rulers in the *Republic*, but justice is the organizing principle of Plato's ideal state.

Aristotle maintains that man is a political animal, whereas other animals are merely gregarious. He cites the fact that man alone has a power of speech able to communicate opinions about the expedient and the just. "Justice is the bond of men in states, for the administration of justice, which is the determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society." Aristotle describes man "when separated from law and justice" as the worst of animals. Augustine describes the state without justice as "no better than a band of robbers thieves."

Those who agree that political institutions involve justice are confronted by these alternatives: *either* the principle of justice is antecedent to the state, its constitution, covenants, and laws, *or* the determination of what is just and unjust is entirely relative to the constitution of a state, dependent upon its power, and consequent to its laws.

When the second alternative is chosen, the proposition that justice is political is seriously qualified. It is *merely* political. There is no natural justice, no justice apart from man-made laws, nothing that is just or unjust in the very nature of the case and without reference to civil institutions. On this theory only the individual who is subject to government can be judged just or unjust. The government itself cannot be so judged; nor can its constitution, its laws, or its acts; for since these determine what is just and unjust, they cannot themselves be judged for their justice.

The opposite answer conceives political justice as a determination of natural justice. "Political justice," Aristotle remarks, "is partly natural and partly conventional or legal." The fact that there is a sense in which just action on the part of a citizen consists in law-abiding conduct does not exclude another sense in which the laws themselves can be called just or unjust—not only the laws, but the constitution of the state itself. Though the justice of civil laws is partly relative to the constitution under which they are made and administered, there are some enactments which, since they violate natural justice, cannot be justified under any constitution. The constitution, moreover, cannot be regarded as the ultimate standard of justice by those who compare the justice of different forms of government or diverse constitutions. On

Chapter 42 JUSTICE

INTRODUCTION

THE discussion of justice is the central theme in two dialogues of Plato—the *Republic* and the *Gorgias* The dispute between Socrates and Thrasymachus in the one and between Socrates and Callicles in the other is of such universal scope and fundamental character that it recurs again and again in the great books with little change except in the personalities and vocabularies of the disputants

It is a conflict of such polar opposites that all other differences of opinion about justice became arguable only after one or the other of the two extreme positions is abandoned It is the conflict between the exponents of might and *the exponents of right—between those who* think that might *makes* right and that justice *is* expediency and those who think that power can be wrongly as well as rightly exercised and that justice the measure of men and states cannot be measured by utility

Though Plato gives us the first full fashioned statement of this i sue he does not fashion it out of whole cloth The issue runs through the fabric of Greek life and thought in the age of the imperialistic city states which played the *game of power politics culminating in the* Peloponnesian War In his history of that war Thucydides highlights the Melian episode by dramatically constructing *a conversation* between the Athenian envoys and the representatives of Melos a little island colony of Sparta which had refused to knuckle under to Athenian aggression

Recognizing the superior force of the aggressors the Melians enter the conference with a sense of its futility for as they point out if they insist upon their rights and refuse to submit they can expect nothing from these negotiations except war and in the end slavery The *Athenians reply* with a frankness that is seldom found in the diplomatic exchanges of our own day though in their real contentions the conferences which have preceded or followed the world wars of our century repeat what happened *if not what was said at Melos*

The Athenians tell the Melians that they will not waste time with specious pretences either of how we have a right to our empire or are now attacking you because of a wrong you have done us Why make a long speech they say which would not be believed? Instead they come directly to the point and put the matter simply or as we now say realistically You know as well as we do they tell the Melians that right as the world goes is only in question *between equals in power whereas* the stronger do whatever they can and the weaker suffer whatever they must There is nothing left for the Melians except an appeal to expediency You debar us from talking about justice and invite us to obey your interest they reply to the Athenians before trying to persuade them that their policy will end in disaster for Athens

The language of Thrasymachus in the *Republic* resembles that of the Athenian envoys I proclaim he says *that justice is nothing else* than the interest of the stronger The different forms of government make laws democratical *aristocratical tyrannical with a view to* their several interests and these laws which are made by them for their own interests are *the justice which they deliver to their subjects* and him who transgresses them they punish as a breaker of the law and unjust And this is what *I mean when I say that in all states there* is the same principle of justice which is the interest of the government and as the government must be supposed to have power the only reasonable conclusion is that everywhere there is one principle of justice which is the interest of the stronger

part of the natural law Sometimes the statement of the first precept of the natural law is Seek the good avoid evil Sometimes it is Do good to others injure no one and render to every man his own In this second formula too the natural law seems to be identical with the precept of justice The essential content of this precept seems to be present—separate from any doctrine of natural law—in Aristotle's analysis of the nature of justice both as a virtue and as a quality of human acts.

"The just Aristotle says is the lawful and the fair What he means by the word lawful in this context does not seem to be simply the law-abiding in the sense of conforming to the actual laws of a particular society He thinks of law as aiming at the common advantage We call those acts just he writes, that tend to produce and preserve happiness and its components for the political society Lawful (or just) actions thus are those which are for the common good or the good of others unlawful (or unjust) actions, those which do injury to others or despoil the society

It is in this sense of justice that both Plato and Aristotle lay down the primary criterion for differentiating between good and bad governments Those which are lawful and serve the common good are just those which are lawless and serve the private interests of the rulers are unjust This meaning of *justice* applies as readily to all citizens—to all members of a society—as it does to those who have the special duties or occupy the special offices of government

Whether it is stated in terms of the *good of* other individuals or in terms of the *common* good of a community (domestic or political) this understanding of justice seems to consider the actions of a man as they affect the well being not of himself but of others. Justice alone of the virtues says Aristotle is thought to be another's good because it is related to our neighbor Concerned with what is due another justice involves the element of duty or obligation. To each one Aquinas writes is due what is his own and it evidently pertains to justice he adds that a man give another his due That is why justice alone of all the virtues implies the notion of duty Doing good to others or not injuring them when undertaken as a matter of strict justice goes no further than to discharge the debt which each man owes every other

In consequence a difference of opinion arises concerning the adequacy of justice to establish the peace and harmony of a society Some writers like Kant seem to think that if perfect justice obtained a multitude of individual wills would be perfectly harmonized in free action Others, like Aquinas think justice necessary but insufficient precisely because it is a matter of duty and debt Peace" he writes is the *work of justice* indirectly in so far as justice removes the obstacles to peace but it is the *work of charity* directly since charity according to its very nature causes peace for love is *a unitive force* The bonds of love and friendship unite men where justice merely governs their interaction. What men do for one another out of the generosity of love far exceeds the commands of justice That is why mercy and charity are called upon to qualify justice or even to set it aside Earthly power Portia declares in the *Merchant of Venice* doth then show likest God's when mercy seasons justice

THE PRECEPT to render unto others what is their due is read in a different light when the other aspect of justice is considered When the just is conceived as the fair the fairness which is due ourselves or others applies not to benefit and injury generally but to the exchange and distribution of goods or burdens What is the principle of a fair exchange or a fair distribution? Aristotle's answer to this question is in terms of equality

In the transactions of commerce fairness seems to require the exchange of things equivalent in value The rule of an eye for an eye a tooth for a tooth is another expression of the principle of equality as the criterion of a fair penalty or a just compensation If honors or rewards are to be distributed equals should in fairness be treated equally and those who are unequal in merit should receive unequal shares For all to share alike is not a just distribution of deserts if all do not deserve alike Awards should be according to merit Aristotle writes He claims that all men agree with this though they do not all specify the same sort of *merit* but democrats identify it with

their view the ultimate measure of justice in all human institutions and acts as well as in the characters of men is not itself a man made standard but rather a natural principle of justice *holding for all men at all times everywhere*

THE ISSUE JOINED BY these two theories of justice extends by implication into many related matters The opposition for example between those who affirm the reality of natural law as the source of legality in all civil regulations and those who derive the legality of positive laws from the will of the sovereign alone is considered in the chapter on LAW but its parallelism with the issue of natural and conventional justice should be noted here

Those who deny natural justice and natural law also tend to deny natural rights which unlike civil rights are not conferred on the individual by the state but are inherent in his human personality They are according to the *Declaration of Independence* unalienable in the sense that the state cannot rescind them What the state does not create it cannot destroy If a government transgresses natural rights it negates its own reason for being *since it is to secure these rights [that] governments are instituted among men*

Those who deny natural rights among which the right to liberty is usually included do not have a standard for judging when governments *violate the rights and invade the liberties of* men When men are thought to have no rights except those granted by their rulers the absolute power which the rulers exercise cannot be criticized as tyrannical or despotic

Considering the situation of men in what he calls a state of perfect freedom —apart from government and civil institutions—Locke says of this state of nature that it has a law of nature to govern it which obliges everyone and *reason which is that law* teaches all mankind who will but consult it that being all equal and independent no one ought to harm another in his life health liberty or possessions Everyone as he is bound to preserve himself and not quit his station willfully so by the like reason when his own preservation comes not in competition ought he as much as he can to preserve the rest of mankind *and not unless it* be to do justice on an offender take away or impair the life or what tends to the preservation of the life the liberty health limb or goods of another Since this law of nature and its implied principle of just dealing between men is not abolished when men associate in the common life of a civil society natural justice and natural rights *remain according to Locke* and others to limit the powers of government and to measure the justice of its laws

The principle of natural justice is sometimes not accompanied by a doctrine of natural law *and natural rights as for example in Greek* thought Their connection first seems to occur in Roman jurisprudence and mediaeval theory Not all the opponents of natural justice avoid the use of the words natural law and natural rights *Using these words in a different* sense Hobbes for example speaks of men living under natural law in a state of nature which is a condition of war of every one against every one and in such condition every man *has a right to everything even to anothers* body Only when men *abandon* this unlimited right in order to form a commonwealth do they acquire in recompense certain civil rights or as Hobbes says proprieties Then and only then can there be any *meaning to justice* conceived according to the ancient maxim which Hobbes accepts that justice is the constant will to render to each man what is his due

Both Spinoza and Hume make the same *point* Where *there is no recognized title* to property or *legally established* right there can be no justice—no respecting of what is a man s own or giving him what belongs to him The difference between Locke and these others seems *to lie in his conception of property as the natural* right which a man has to the preservation of his life liberty and estate There can be justice therefore between men in a state of nature for even then each has some property that the others are bound to respect

THE MEANING of natural justice can be examined apart from these different interpretations of the so-called state of nature Those who like Aristotle and Aquinas do not conceive the origin of political society as a transition from the state of nature do nevertheless *appeal to a principle of natural justice* For Aquinas this principle seems to be an integral

part of the natural law Sometimes the statement of the first precept of the natural law is Seek the good avoid evil" Sometimes it is Do good to others injure no one and render to every man his own." In this second formulation the natural law seems to be identical with the precept of justice The essential content of this precept seems to be present—separate from any doctrine of natural law—in Aristotle s analysis of the nature of justice both as a virtue and as a quality of human acts.

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the status of freeman supporters of oligarchy with wealth or with noble birth and supporters of aristocracy with excellence The unequal treatment of unequals however still derives its fairness from the principle of equality for there is an equivalence of ratios in the proportion of giving more to the more deserving and less to the less

Aristotle employs the distinction between these modes of equality—arithmetic and geometric or simple and proportional equality—to define the difference between fairness in exchange and fairness in distribution The one is the type of justice which is traditionally called commutative corrective or remedial the other distributive

The type of justice which plays a rectifying part in transactions between man and man Aristotle further divides into two kinds Of transactions he writes (1) some are voluntary and (2) others involuntary—voluntary such transactions as sale purchase loan for consumption pledging loan for use depositing letting while of the involuntary (a) some are clandestine such as theft adultery poisoning procuring enticement of slaves assassination false witness and (b) others are violent such as assault imprisonment murder robbery with violence mutilation abuse insult The sphere which Aristotle assigns to commutative or corrective justice thus appears to cover both criminal acts and civil injuries But as applied to civil injuries the principle of fairness in exchange usually involves a payment for damages restitution or compensation in kind whereas the principle of commutative justice as applied to criminal wrongdoing usually calls for a punishment somehow equalized in severity to the gravity of the offense This last is the principle of the *lex talionis*—an eye for an eye a life for a life The problems of justice which it raises are considered in the chapter on PUNISHMENT

JUSTICE IS SOMETIMES divided into economic and political according as on the one hand fairness or equalization concerns the kind of goods which originate with the expenditure of labor or as on the other hand it involves the status of men in the state The difference between these two modes of justice seems to be largely dependent upon the kind of transaction to which the principle of justice is applied The forms of justice—the two modes of equality or fairness—appear to remain the same The special problems of economic justice are more fully examined in the chapters on LABOR and WEALTH as the special problems of political justice are treated in greater detail in all the chapters dealing with the state government and the several forms of government Here we shall consider only the generalities and especially those which touch the main issues in the theory of justice

Though Karl Marx does not engage in the controversy over natural justice he seems to take the side which looks upon justice as a universal standard that does not derive from but rather measures human institutions Something like from each according to his ability to each according to his needs—or in another variant of the maxim to each according to his deserts—seems to be for Marx the maxim of a just economy stated without argument as if a principle self evident in the very nature of the case So too in his consideration of the exploitation of labor in its various historic forms—chattel slavery feudal serfdom or agrarian peonage and what he calls wage slavery under industrial capitalism—Marx assumes that a clear and unquestionable principle of justice is being violated when the goods produced by the labor of one man enrich another disproportionately to that other s contribution or desert Such basic words in *Capital* as expropriation exploitation and unearned increment seem never to be simply terms of description, but of evaluation Each implies a specific injustice

The labor theory of value the origin of which he attributes to Adam Smith Marx conceives as solving a problem in justice which Aristotle stated but did not solve He refers to the chapter in the book on justice in Aristotle s *Ethics* in which Aristotle discusses money as a medium to facilitate the exchange of commodities Money permits so many units of one commodity to be equated with so many units of another But the problem is how to determine equivalents in the exchange of unlike things apparently incommensurable in value How can the value of a house be commensurated with the

value of a bed, so that an equality in value can be set up between a house and a certain number of beds? Abstracting entirely from considerations of supply and demand, the determination of a just exchange or a fair price requires an equation of comparable quantities.

Aristotle tells us, Marx points out, why he found the problem insoluble. It was the absence of any concept of value. "What is that equal something, that common substance, which admits of the value of beds being expressed by a house? Such a thing, in truth, cannot exist, says Aristotle. And why not? Compared with beds, the house does represent something equal to them, in so far as it represents what is really equal, both in the beds and the house. And that is—human labor. ... The brilliancy of Aristotle's genius is shown by this alone, that he discovered, in the expression of the value of commodities, a relation of equality. The peculiar conditions of the society in which he lived alone prevented him from discovering what, in truth, was at the bottom of this equality."

We cannot help noting the character of the labor theory of value as an analysis not only of justice in exchange, but also of just compensation to labor for its productivity. The principle of justice here employed seems to be the same as that underlying the mediaeval condemnation of interest as unjust or usurious, or the later effort to discriminate between just and unjust interest rates. The principle even seems to be implicitly involved in Adam Smith's distinction between real or natural price and the market price which fluctuates with variations in supply and demand.

When the economic problem is one of distribution rather than exchange, another standard of fairness—the proportional equality of distributive justice—becomes relevant.

The assumption of a primitive possession of all things in common, especially land and its resources, is the background against which such thinkers as Aquinas and Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, Montesquieu and Hegel, Adam Smith and Karl Marx consider the origin or justification of private property. Insofar as the question is one of justification, rather than of actual historic origin, the division of *common* holdings into privately held shares is a matter of justice in distribution. In the opinion of many, a just distribution would recognize that labor alone entitles a man to claim possession of the raw materials improved by his work and of the finished products of that work.

The other face of the problem assumes an existing inequitable distribution. It is then asked how this can be rectified by some method of redistributing wealth more justly, or it is proposed that the whole system of private property be reformed in the direction of public ownership of the means of production as the basis *for* a just distribution of the fruits of human productivity.

THE CONNECTION which has become evident between justice and both liberty and equality does not imply that these three basic notions are simply coordinate with one another. On the contrary, equality seems to be the root of justice, at least insofar as it is identified with fairness in exchange or distribution, and justice in turn seems to be the foundation, not the consequence, of liberty.

The condemnation of slavery confirms this *observation*. If slavery were *not* unjust, the slave would have *no right to be free*. The injustice of treating a man as a chattel ultimately rests on the equality between him and his master as human beings. His right to the same liberty which his master enjoys stems from that equality. The justice of equal treatment for equals recognizes that right and sets him free. Aristotle's theory of natural slavery is based on a supposition of natural inequality which is thought to justify the enslavement of some men and the freedom of others. Whenever slavery is justified or a criminal is justly imprisoned, neither the slave nor the criminal is regarded as deprived of any liberty to which he has a right.

It would seem to follow that if a man is *justly* treated, he has all the liberty which he deserves. From the opposite angle, Mill argues that a man is entitled to all the liberty that he can use justly, that is, use without injuring his fellow man or the common good. More liberty than this would be license. When one man encroaches on the rights of others, or inflicts on them any loss or damage not justified by his own rights, he is overstepping the bounds of liberty and is, according to Mill, a fit object of

moral reprobation and in grave cases of moral retribution and punishment

The various relations of liberty to justice and of both to law are considered in the chapters on LIBERTY and LAW. All the writers who make the distinction between government by law and government by men fundamental in their political theory also plainly express a preference for the former on grounds both of justice and liberty.

Absolute government, which violates the equality of men, unjustly subjects them even when it does not through tyranny enslave them. The benevolence of the despot ruling for the common good has one aspect of justice, but there are other aspects of political justice which can be achieved, as Mill points out, only if "despotism consents not to be despotism" and "allows the general business of government to go on as if the people really governed themselves." The greater justice of constitutional government consists in its granting to men who deserve the equal freedom of equals the equality of citizenship—an equality under the law which levels those citizens who happen to hold public office with those in private life.

The major controversy over the several forms of constitutional government turns on a third point of justice. The defenders of democracy and oligarchy each contend that equalities or inequalities in birth or wealth justify a broader or a narrower franchise. It is Mill again who insists that nothing less than universal suffrage provides a just distribution of the political status of citizenship and that "it is a personal injustice to withhold from anyone, unless for the prevention of greater evils, the ordinary privilege of having his voice reckoned in the disposal of affairs in which he has the same interest as other people."

Of the three points of justice which seem to be involved in the comparison of forms of government, only the first (concerned with whether political power is exercised for the common good or the ruler's private interests) is not recognizable as a matter of distributive justice. Yet even here the requirement that the ruler should treat the ruled as ends rather than as means derives from a fundamental equality between ruler and ruled. The injustice of tyranny lies in a violation of this equality.

ONE MEANING of justice remains to be considered. It is related to all the foregoing considerations of economic and political justice, of just constitutions, just laws, and just acts. It is that meaning of justice in which a man is said to be just—to possess a just will, to be just in character, to have the virtue of justice. Here difference in theory reflects the difference between those moralists for whom virtue is the basic conception and those who, like Kant, emphasize duty, or who, like Mill, reduce the propensity for justice to a moral sentiment. But even among those who treat justice as a virtue, there seems to be a profound difference in analysis.

For Aristotle, the virtue of justice, like other moral virtues, is a habit of conduct. It differs from courage and temperance in that it is a habit of action, not of the passions. It is not a rationally moderated tendency of the emotions with regard to things pleasant and painful. It is that settled inclination of the will "in virtue of which the just man is said to be a doer, by choice, of that which is just, and one who will distribute either between himself and another or between two others not so as to give more of what is desirable to himself and less to his neighbor (and conversely with what is harmful), but so as to give what is equal in accordance with proportion."

Another difference between justice and the other moral virtues is that courageous and temperate acts are performed only by courageous and temperate men, whereas an act which is outwardly just can be done by an unjust man as well as by a just one.

Fair dealing in the exchange or distribution of goods, determined by objective relations of equality, is the substance of justice as a special virtue, but there is in addition what Aristotle calls "general" as opposed to "special" justice. Aristotle calls the general virtue of justice "complete virtue," because "he who possesses it can exercise his virtue not only in himself but towards his neighbor also." It embraces all the moral virtues insofar as their acts are directed to the good of others.

"Justice in this sense," he goes on to say, "is not a part of virtue but virtue entire," whereas special justice—the justice of distributions and exchanges—is merely a part of moral virtue.

merely one particular virtue Yet special justice no less than general justice is a social virtue The difference between the way each directs actions toward the good of others seems to be like the difference between the lawful and the fair or the difference between the common good of society as a whole and the good of other individuals.

The thoroughly social conception of justice in Aristotle may have some parallel in the meaning of justice in Plato's *Gorgias* (where the question is whether it is better to suffer than to do injustice) but the definition of justice as a virtue in the *Republic* does not express or develop the social reference In the state as in the soul, justice is a fitting disposition or harmonious order—of the several classes of men in the state of the several virtues in the soul The just state is not described as acting justly toward other states, nor is the just man pictured as a doer of good deeds Rather the picture of the soul in which justice resides is one of interior peace or spiritual health—the well being of happiness.

Justice, Socrates declares is concerned not with the outward man, but with the inward which is the true self and concernment of man for the just man does not permit the several elements within him to interfere with one another or any of them to do the work of others—he sets in order his own inner life and is his own master and his own law and at peace with himself" His is one entirely temperate and perfectly adjusted nature "

This conception of justice bears a certain resemblance to what the Christian theologians mean by original justice The perfect disposition of Adam's soul in a state of *supernatural* grace consisted according to Aquinas in his reason being subject to God the lower powers to reason and the body to the soul—the first subjection being the cause of both the second and the third since while reason was subject to God the lower powers remained subject to reason. The justice of man's obedience to God seems to be inseparable from the injustice internal to his own members.

The way in which justice is discussed in the *Gorgias* may similarly be inseparable from the way it is defined in the *Republic* Certainly Callicles will never *understand why it is always better to suffer* injustice than to do it unless Socrates succeeds in explaining to him that the man who is wronged suffers injury *in body or in external things*, while the man who does wrong injures his own soul by destroying what to Socrates, *is its greatest good*—that equable temper from which all fitting actions flow

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 HOMER: *Iliad*, BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

PAGE SECTIONS: When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES: *Psychology*, 116a-119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left-hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right-hand side of the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: *Symposium*, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left-hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right-hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS: One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., *Iliad*, BK II [265-283] 12d.

BIBLE REFERENCES: The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay, indicated by a (*D*), follows; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: *Nehemiah*, 7:45—(*D*) *II Esdras*, 7:46.

SYMBOLS: The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas*, consult the Preface.

1. Diverse conceptions of justice

1a. Justice as the interest of the stronger or conformity to the will of the sovereign

5 SOPHOCLES: *Antigone* [631-765] 136c-13 d / *Ajax* [1 4 - 393] 152a-155a,c

6 THUCYDIDES: *Peloponnesian War*, BK 504c-508a,c

7 PLATO: *Gorgias*, 2 1b-2 5d / *Republic*, BK I-II, 300b-315c / *Laws*, BK IV, 681d-682 x 760e

9 ARISTOTLE: *Politics*, BK I, CH 6 [1255a3-2] 448c-d; BK III, CH 13 [1283b-1 6] 481d; BK IV, CH 3 [3 5b -6] 521d-522a; BK VI, CH 2 [3-4b22-41] 528d-529a

14 PLUTARCH: *Theseus*, 2 -d / *Coriolanus*, 108b-c / *Alexander*, 566a-b

15 AUGUSTINE: *City of God*, BK XIX, CH 21 524a-52 a

23 HOBBES: *Leviathan*, PART I, 86b-91 b; PART II, 99b 101a-102c 103a 124d-12 a 130c 132a 140b 149b-c 157b

25 MONTAIGNE: *Essays*, 281 282a 519-520b

31 SPINOZA: *Ethics*, PART I, PROP 3 SCHOL 2 43 b-436a

33 PASCAL: *Pensées*, 29 338 225a 233a 8 3 345a-b

35 LOCKE: *Civil Government*, CH CT 13 28a-b; CH III 28d-29d; CH VII SECT 90-94 44d-46c; CH XVI 65d-70c passim / *Human Understanding*, BK CH II, SECT 5 105a-b

38 ROUSSEAU: *Inequality*, 333c-d 34 b-d 353c-355d passim 351c-362 / *Political Economy*, 368d-369b / *Social Contract*, BK I, 358d-359a 393b-c

46 HEGEL: *Philosophy of Right*, PART III, par 219 72d-73a; par 258 81c-82d [fn 1]; ADDITIONS, 155 142a-b / *Philosophy of History*, INTRO, 1 1c-172b; PART I, 207b-c; PART I, 2 7d-2 8a; PART III, 299a-c; PART IV, 327d-330b esp 328c-d, 330b 344a-c

47 GOETHE: *Faust*, PART II [11 1 1 185] 272a-b

48 MELVILLE: *Moby Dick*, 292a-297a

50 MARX-ENGELS: *Communist Manifesto*, 4 3b-d

51 TOLSTOY: *War and Peace*, BK X, 54 549d esp 54 c; EPILOGUE I, 647b-649d

54 FREUD: *Civilization and Its Discontents*, 780b-d

1b. Justice as harmony or right order in the soul, or moral justice

7 PLATO: *Cratylus*, 99d-100c / *Gorgias*, 282c-285a esp 282c-283a / *Republic*, BK I, 309b-310b; BK I, 346a-355a; BK IX, 425c-42 b / *Statesman*, 586d-589c / *Laws*, BK IV, 681b-d; BK IX, 748b-c

(1 *Diverse conceptions of justice* 1b *Justice as harmony or right order in the soul original justice*)

9 Aristotle *Ethics* bk v ch ii [1138^{b}5 13] 387a c
13 Virgil *Eclogues* iv 14a 15b
17 Plotinus *Third Ennead* tr vi ch 2 107a-c
18 Augustine *City of God* bk xiv ch 10–11 385b 387a ch 19 391c 392a ch 26 395d
19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i qq 95–96 506b 513c q 100 520d 522b
20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i-ii qq 81–83 162d 174b q 85 a i ans 178b 179b q 91 a 6 ans 212c 213c q 100 a 2 rep 2 252b 253a q 113 a i ans and rep i 360d 361d
32 Milton *Paradise Lost* bk iv [288–294] 158b bk xii [63 110] 320b 321b

1c Justice as a moral virtue directing activity in relation to others and to the community the distinction between the just man and the just act

7 Plato *Crito* 216d 219a c / *Republic* bk iv 342a 356a esp 348d 350a
8 Aristotle *Topics* bk i ch 15 [106 2–8] 149d bk iii ch i [116^{b}11–13] 163a bk iv ch 2 [121^{b}24–30] 169d bk vi ch 5 [143 15 19] 196c d ch 7 [145^{b}34–146 3] 199d
9 Aristotle *Ethics* bk v ch i [1129^{b}25–1130 13] 377b c ch 5 [1133^{b}16–23] 381b c [1133^{b}30–1134 15] 381c d ch 8–9 383a 385c *bk vi ch 12 [1144 11 20]* 393d *bk x ch 8* [1178 8–22] 432d / *Politics* bk iii ch 12 [1282^{b}15–22] 480c ch 13 [1283 37–40] 481c bk vii ch 2 [1324^{b}32 40] 528d 529a / *Rhetoric* bk i ch 6 [1362^{b}10–28] 603b c ch 9 [1366 33–1367 22] 608d 609d
12 Aurelius *Meditations* bk iii sect 4 260b 261a sect 6 261a c bk iv sect 10 264c bk v sect 6 269b d sect 34 273c bk vi sect 2 274a *sect 22 23 276a b sect 26* 276b c bk vii sect 44 282b c bk viii sect 32 287d 288a bk ix sect i 291a-c bk x sect 11 298b c *bk xi sect 10 303b c*
14 Plutarch *Aristides* 265c d / *Agesilaus* 491a b / *Cato the Younger* 636d 637c
18 Augustine *Confessions* bk iii par 13–15 16c 17b / *City of God* bk ii ch 21 161b 162d bk xix ch 21 524a 525a
19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 21 *a i 124b 125b*
20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i ii q 59 aa 4–5 48c 49d q 60 aa 2 3 50d 52b q 99 a 5 rep i 249a 250a q 100 a 2 rep 2 252b 253a a 3 rep 3 253a d a 12 264d 265d q 113 a i 360d 361d
23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part i 92c 93c 96a b
46 Hegel *Philosophy of History* part ii 272a b
51 Tolstoy *War and Peace* bk v 214c 216d

1d Justice as the whole of virtue and as a particular virtue the distinction between the lawful and the fair

7 Plato *Meno* 178c 179a / *Republic* bk iv 349a 350a / *Laws* bk i 642d 643b
8 Aristotle *Topics* bk vi ch 13 [150 1 15] 204c
9 Aristotle *Ethics* bk v ch i [1129 31]–ch 2 [1131 9] 376d 378c / *Politics* bk iii ch 13 [1283 37–40] 481c / *Rhetoric* bk i ch 9 [*1366 33 1367^{a}22*] 608d 609d
12 Aurelius *Meditations* bk xi sect 10 303b-c
20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i ii q 55 a 4 rep 4 28c 29d q 57 a 3 rep 2 37b 38a q 60 a 3 51c 52b q 66 a 4 78c 79b q 99 a 5 rep i 249a 250a q 100 a 2 rep 252b-253a a 12 ans 264d 265d q 113 a i ans and rep 2 360d 361d
25 Montaigne *Essays* 301d 302b
42 Kant *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 368c d 377a d
43 Mill *Utilitarianism* 468b 469b

1e Justice as an act of will or duty fulfilling obligations to the common good the harmonious action of individual wills under a universal law of freedom

42 Kant *Pure Reason* 114d 115a / *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 366d 367a 368b-369a 371b 372a / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 383a 394a c esp 383a d 386b 387a c 389a 390a c 391a c 392d 393c / *Science of Right* 397a 402a c esp 397c 399c 435a b 438d-439a
46 Hegel *Philosophy of Right* intro par 29 19a b part iii par 219 72d 73a par 61 83a d par 278 92c 93a additions 1,7 147d / *Philosophy of History* intro 199b-c part i 207b c part ii 272a d part iv 333c d 363c d 365b c
53 James *Psychology* 886b 888a

1f Justice as a custom or moral sentiment based on considerations of utility

7 Plato *Republic* bk ii 310c 315c / *Theaetetus* 528b-c 531a b
25 Montaigne *Essays* 46b 47c 281a 283c
33 Pascal *Pensées* 309 228b 312 229a
35 Locke *Human Understanding* bk i ch ii sect 2 104a b
43 Mill *Liberty* 300d 301a / *Utilitarianism* 464d-476a c esp 476a c

2 The precepts of justice doing good harming no one rendering to each his own treating equals equally

Old Testament *Exodus* 20 1 17 21 1–23 9 / *Leviticus* 19 9–18 32 37 / *Deuteronomy* 5 6–21 15 7 18 16 18 20 19 11 21 20 10–12 21 15 17 22 1 4 13 29 23 15–16 24 25 24 6 10–22 25 1 3 13–16 / *I Kings* 3 16–28 —(D) *III Kings* 3 16–28 / *Proverbs* 3 27 30

3. The duties of justice compared with the generosity of love and friendship

4 The comparison of justice and expediency the choice between doing and suffering injustice the relation of justice to happiness

OLD TESTAMENT *Leviticus* 19 17-18 / *Proverbs* 20 22 24 29 25 1
APOCRYPHA *Susanna*—(D) OT *Daniel* 13
NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 5 38-48 / *Luke* 6 27-38 / *Romans* 12 17-21 / *I Corinthians* 4 10-14 6 1-11 / *I Peter* 2 19-21 3 8-18
5 AESCHYLUS *Prometheus Bound* [944 1093] 50b 51d / *Eumenides* [490-565] 86b 87a
5 SOPHOCLES *Antigone* [631-765] 136c 137d
5 EURIPIDES *Medea* 212a 224a c / *Alcestis* 237a 247a c / *Helen* [998-1031] 307d 308a / *Hecuba* [239-331] 354d 355c / *Iphigenia at Aulis* 425a 439d
5 ARISTOPHANES *Clouds* [886-1104] 499b 502a
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 105c d BK VII 218a b 238c
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK V 504d 508a passim
7 PLATO *Apology* 206d / *Crito* 213a 219a c / *Gorgias* 263d 267c / *Republic* 295a 441a c esp BK I II 300b 315a BK X 436c-437c / *Laws* BK II 656d 658b BK IX 746a 747c
8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK VI CH 3 [141 15-18] 194b / *Sophistical Refutations* CH 25 [180^{b}21-3] 249a
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK V CH 8-9 383a 385c esp CH 9 [1136 10-^{b}14] 384a d CH 11 386b 387a c esp [1138 28 ^{b}4] 386d 387a / *Politics* BK I CH 2 [1253 14-15] 446c BK V CH 8 [1308 2-17] 510a b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 7 [1364^{b}21-24] 606c BK II CH 23 [1397^{a}19-22] 645b
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 22 127c 128c BK II CH 10 149c 150a BK III CH 18 192a-c BK IV CH 1 222c 223d CH 5 228a 230b
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK IV SECT 10 264c BK VII SECT 36 282b
14 PLUTARCH *Themistocles* 96 d / *Camillus* 106b 107a / *Aristides* 265c d 274d 275a / *Pyrrhus* 319b d / *Lysander* 357a b / *Sertorius* 468b-469a / *Agesilaus* 490d-491b / *Cato the Younger* 636d 637c / *Dion* 784d 785a / *Marcus Brutus* 816c d
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XII CH 3 343d 344b / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 36 634d 635b
22 CHAUCER *Tale of Melibeus* par 30-31 413b-414a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 86b 91b 92b 95d PART II 140b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 301d 302b 519a c
26 SHAKESPEARE *2nd Henry VI* ACT III SC I [223-237] 49c / *King John* ACT II SC I [561-598] 385c 386a
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 37a b
38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK I 387b
43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 464d-476a c esp 473c 476a c
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 261c d
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 9c 10d 40b-41a BK III 123d 124a BK V 216b d BK VIII 304d 305a BK XIV 598d 599a EPILOGUE I 656d 657a

5 Justice and equality the kinds of justice in relation to the measure and modes of equality and inequality

5 EURIPIDES *Phoenician Maidens* [528-558] 382c d
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK V 505b
7 PLATO *Republic* BK VIII 411d 413a / *Laws* BK VI 699d 700b
8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK VI CH 5 [143 15 19] 196c d CH 7 [145^{b}33 146 3] 199d
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK V CH 2 [1130^{b}30-34] 378b CH 3-5 378c 381d CH 6 [1134 25 ^{b}17] 382a c CH 9 [1136^{b}15-1137 4] 384d 385a BK VIII CH 7 [1158^{b}12 33] 410c d CH 11 413b-d / *Politics* BK I CH 12-13 453d 455a c BK II CH 2 [1261 23 ^{b}6] 456a b CH 7 461d 463c BK III CH 9 477c 478d esp [1280 8-31] 477c d CH 12-13 480c-483a CH 16 [1287 10-23] 485c BK IV CH 4 [1291^{b}30 1292^{a}7] 491a b BK V CH 1 [1301 25-^{b}4] 502b c [1301^{b}29-1302 8] 503a b CH 8 [1308^{a}2 17] 510a b CH 9 [1310 5 36] 512c BK VI CH 2 520d 521b esp [1317 40-^{b}16] 520d [1318 4 10] 521b CH 3 521c 522a BK VII CH 14 537b 538d esp [1332^{b}13-41] 537b d / *Athenian Constitution* CH 12 557b-558a
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK I SECT 14 254b-c
14 PLUTARCH *Poplicola Solon* 87a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 21 A 1 ANS and REP 3 124b 125b Q 65 A 2 REP 3 340b 341b
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 60 A 3 ANS 51c 52b Q 64 A 2 67d 68b Q 114 A 1 ANS 370c 371c
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 93b-c 94b-95c PART II 156b 157a
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK III 134b c
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH II 25d 28c CH VI SECT 54 36c CH VII SECT 90-94 44d-46c
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK VIII 52a b BK XI 71d BK XIII 96a b
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 333a d 359c d 360b d [fn 1] 361c 362a 362d 363a c / *Social Contract* BK II 397a 398a 405b c
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK IV 284d
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 617c d
42 KANT *Science of Right* 401b c 419c 420a 431a 432c 433c d 435c 437c esp 436d
43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE [7 15] 1a b
43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION IV [17 36] 5b-c
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U S ARTICLE IV SECT 2 [519-521] 16a AMENDMENTS XIII SECT 1 XIV SECT 1 18c XV 19b XIX 19d
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 80 236a b

43 Mill Representative Government 3 0a 389b passim / Utilitarianism 460a-461a 467a b 472d-473a 474d-476a
46 Hegel Philosophy of Right PART I par 49 24c 25a PART III par 00 67c 68a par 209 69d ADDITI 29 121c 1 7 147d / Philosophy of History PART IV 362d 363a
50 Marx Capital 25 d
52 Dostoevsky Brothers Karamazov BK IV 104b-107a
54 Freud Group Psychology 685d 686c / Civilization and Its Discontents 787d 788b [fn 3]

5 Justice and liberty: the theory of human rights

5 Aeschylus Suppliant Maidens 18 14 c
5 Sophocles Antigone [441-525] 134d 135c [891-943] 138d 139a / Ajax [104 1421] 152a 155a c
5 Euripides Suppliants [513-565] 262d 263b / Bacchantes [8-911] 347b-c / Phoenician Maidens [625 1682] 392b-d / Orestes [491 604] 399 -400a
7 Plato Republic BK VIII 411d-413a / Laws BK I 682 -683d
8 Aristotle Sophistical Refutations CH 12 [3 31] 238b-c
9 Aristotle Ethics K 6 [1134a24 b1] 382 -c / Politics BKV C 9 [1310a25 3] 512 BK CH 2 520d 521b esp [131 40-b 6] 520d / Rhetoric BK I CH 10 [1368b7] [611d 3] [373]] 617c d
12 Aurelius Meditations BK SEC 14 254b c K I 4 264a BK S C 55 283b-
15 Tacitus Histories BK IV 271b
18 Augustine Confessions BK III par 15 17a b / City of God BK C 4 190d K XI CH 21 524a 525
20 Aquinas Summa Theologica P R 1 II Q 94 2 NS 221d 223
23 Hobbes Leviathan PA II 112d 117b
29 Cervantes Don Quixote P RT 71b-c 108c 109b 177 b
30 Bacon Advancement of Learning 20c d
31 Spinoza Ethics P R D X V I 447d
35 Locke Civil Government 25 81d
38 Montesquieu Spirit of Laws B 1 3a K 34b-c
38 Rousseau Inequality 356b 358d 361 362a Political Economy 370b d / Social Contract BK I 387b d 394d esp 388d 390d 393b 394d BK II 398b 399
39 Smith Wealth of Nations K I 61b BK I 140b BK I 228a
41 Gibbon Decline and Fall 237c
42 Kant Pure Reason 113b-115 222b c / Science of Right 400b d-402 421c-422d / Judgement 586a 587
43 Declaration of Independence [7 8] 1a b
43 Constitution of the U S AMENDMENTS I IX 17a-d XIII S CT I XIV SECT I 18c-d
43 Federalist NUMBER 51 164a 165a NUMBER 84 251a 253d
43 Mill Liberty 267a 323a c esp 271c 273b / Utilitarianism 464d-476a c
46 Hegel Philosophy of Right PART I par 44 23c PART III par 23 75c par 61 83a d ADDITIONS 81 128d 129a / Philosophy of History INTRO 199b c PART IV 345a b 362d 363a 364a 365c
48 Melville Moby Dick 292a 297a
50 Marx Capital 83d 84a
54 Freud Civilization and Its Discontents 780c 781a

6a The relation of natural rights to natural law and natural justice

5 Sophocles Antigone [331-525] 134d 135c
9 Aristotle Rhetoric BK I CH 13 [13 3] 617c d
12 Aurelius Meditations BK IV SECT 4 264a BK II SECT 55 283b-c
18 Augustine City of God BK XIX CH 21 524a 525a
19 Aquinas Summa Theologica PART I Q / 510b 511b 4 512d 513c
20 Aquinas Summa Theologica PART I II Q 91 A 2 208d 209d Q 94 A 2 A 221d 223a Q 95 A 2 227c 228c 4 229b 230c
23 Hobbes Leviathan PART I 86c 8 d PART II 131 -c 138c
27 Shakespeare Troilus and Cressida ACT II II [163 185] 115b-c
30 Bacon Advancement of Learning 94d 95b
31 Spinoza Ethics PART IV PR 3 SC IL 2 435b-436a APPEN IX XIII 447d
32 Milton Samson Agonistes [885-902] 359a
35 Locke Civil Government II II IX 25d 54d passim CI XI SECT 135 13 55d 57b C I X ECT I,I 172 65a c
38 Montesquieu Spirit of Laws BK I 1c d
38 Rousseau Inequality 330 331b 333c d 342c 347d
39 Smith Wealth of Nations BK I 61b BK II 140b
41 Gibbon Decline and Fall 86d 87a
42 Kant Intro Metaphysic of Morals 392b / Science of Right 397 b 400b d-402a 421c 422d 429a-c 430a-432c 434a 435a-457b esp 436c 437c-d, 447b 450b 451c d
43 Declaration of Independence [1 25] 1 b
43 Mill Liberty 272d 273b
46 Hegel Philosophy of History INTRO 171c 172b

6b The relation between natural and positive rights innate and acquired rights private and public rights their correlative duties

5 Aeschylus Suppliant Maidens 1 14 c
5 Sophocles Antigone [441-525] 134d 135c [891-943] 138d 139a / Ajax [1047 1421] 152a 155 c

32 MILTON *Areopagitica* 381a 382a
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH I SECT 21 29d CH VI, SECT 57-63 36d 38c passim CH IX 53 54d CH XI SECT 135 138 55d 57c CH X SECT I 64a b
38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK I 393b-c
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 96a d
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 114b-d / *Science of Right* 398, 399c 400b d-402a c 450d-452a / *Judgement* 586a-587a
43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 1a b
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 44 144d 145a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III, par 270 84d-89c passim / *Philosophy of History* PART IV 345a b
54 FREUD *Civilization and Its Discontents* 780c 781a

7 Domestic justice: the problems of right and duty in the family

OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 20 12 21 1 11 6-7 32 / *Leviticus* 19:20-22 25 39-55 / *Deuteronomy* 5 16 15 12 18 21 15 21 / *Proverbs* 5:24 30 1 / *Zechariah* 13 3—(D) Zacharias 13 3

APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 3:2 18 4 3 7:20-1 33:30-3 —(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 3:2 18 4 35 7:22 33 31 33

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 5:4 / *Mark* 10 / *I Corinthians* / *II Corinthians* 12 14 / *Ephesians* 6 9 / *Colossians* 3 8 4 1 / *I Timothy* 5:8 / *Titus* 2:9-11 / *I Peter* 3 1-7

5 AESCHYLUS *Seven Against Thebes* [1011 1084] 38b-39a c / *Agamemnon* [1372 1673] 66d-69d
5 SOPHOCLES *Oedipus at Colonus* 114a 130a c esp [1 450] 117 118b [1151 1444] 125a 127b / *Antigone* 131a 142d esp [90] 131a L [631 705] 136c 137d / *Electra* [516-633] 150a 151
5 EURIPIDES *Medea* 212a 224a c / *Alcestis* 237a 247a c esp [614 733] 242c 243c / *Orestes* [376-724] 337b-401b
5 ARISTOPHANES *Clouds* [32 452] 504c 506b / *Birds* [337-137] 558d 559b
7 PLATO *Republic* BK 356b-368c / *Laws* BK IV 683b-d BK I, 721b-723d BK VIII 736d 737 BK X 779b 81c
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK CH 6 [1134b] 382b-c CH 1 [1135 5 3] 387 BK VIII CH 9 [1159 3 60b] 412 b CH 10 [60b 3] CH I [6] 413a d BK IX CH 2 417c-418b *Politics* BK II 1 13 453d 4 Sa BK III, CH 6 [278 3 -1279a] 4 6b BK VII, CH 4 [1332 36-4]537 -d
14 PLUTARCH *Fabius* 152b-d / *Coriolanus* 189d 191d
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 17 5b-c BK II, par 3-8 9b-10d / *City of God* BK XIX, CH 4 16 520c 522a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I, Q 92, A 1 REP 2 488d-489d A 2 489d-490c Q 96, A 4 512d-513a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 105 A 4 318b 321a
22 CHAUCER *Tale of Man of Law* [4981 4997] 239a / *Wife of Bath's Prologue* [5697-64 41] 258a 269b / *Tale of Wife of Bath* 2 0a 27 a esp [6619-6627] 2 3a b [6539-6541] 277a / *Summoner's Tale* [563 7542] 283b 290a / *Clerk's Tale* 295a 318a / *Franklin's Tale* [11 931 11] 351b-352b / *Pardoner's Tale* [12,006-036] 367b-368a / *Parson's Tale* par 79-80 541a 542
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 109c 111b 121 155b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 83a-84b 183c 192d 410a-422b
26 SHAKESPEARE *Comedy of Errors* ACT II SC I [6-43] 152a-c ACT II [112 148] 154c d / *Titus Andronicus* ACT SC III [35 64] 196d 19 a / *Taming of the Shrew* 199a 2 ACT V SC II [136-180] 227d 228a c / *Romeo and Juliet* ACT III SC V [127 195] 308c-309c / *Midsummer Night's Dream* ACT I SC I [1 121] 352a 353c / *Merchant of Venice* ACT I SC II [24 36] 408c / *Ist Henry IV* ACT II SC III 443b-444b ACT III, SC II [1 161] 452d 454c / *Julius Caesar* ACT II SC I [234 309] 577a-c
27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT I SC [12-91] 37a-d ACT II SC IV [106-135] 55d 56a / *Troilus and Cressida* ACT II SC II [163 193] 115b-c / *Othello* ACT I SC III [1 5 180] 210d 211a ACT IV SC III [63 108] 236c 23 / *King Lear* 244 283a c / *Cymbeline* ACT I SC I [125 158] 451a-c
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 251b 261c 62a
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 75c / *New Atlantis* 20 c 209d
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VIII [15 -594] 242a 245a BK X [144 156] 277b [152 195] 2 8b [867-936] 293b-294b / *Samson Agonistes* [5 1-902] 358b-359a [1010-1060] 361b-362b
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VI 36a 42a CH VII SECT 8 -83 43b-c
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 29b
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 410a-421a
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 100b 102a 108c 110c 126d 12 b 136a-c 217d 219c 235b 238d 283 d 310b-313b 35 b-352c
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XXIII 187d 188c BK XXVI 216a-c
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 357a b 365a b / *Political Economy* 367a 368
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 82b 86d passim
42 KANT *Science of Right* 404d 418c-422d
43 MILL *Liberty* 305d 306b 316d 319d
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 160a b 247c-d 301d 302a 429d-430a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 1 1 60d-61a par 1 4 180 61b-63c / *Philosophy of History* PART 1 1 28 c 259b

8b. Fair wages and prices: the just exchange of goods and services

(8 *Economic justice: justice in production, distribution, and exchange.* 8b *Fair wages and prices: the just exchange of goods and services.*)

27 SHAKESPEARE *Coriolanus*, ACT I, SC I [1–167] 351a–353a
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning*, 30c–d
36 SWIFT *Gulliver*, PART IV, 154b–155b
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws*, BK XVIII, 128b; BK XX, 146b–d
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality*, 353b; 365d
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations*, BK I, 13a–16a; 20b–23b esp 20c, 21c; 27b–37b esp 33c; 42a–62a passim, esp 52b–c, 56b–57a, 61c–d; 106c–107a; BK IV, 225d–228a
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 22c
42 KANT *Science of Right*, 424b–425a; 446a–b
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: AMENDMENTS, XII, 17d
43 MILL *Liberty*, 309a–c; 322c–d / *Representative Government*, 366d–367a / *Utilitarianism*, 467b; 470c–d; 472d–473a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right*, PART III, par 236 76a–c; ADDITIONS, 145 140b / *Philosophy of History*, PART IV, 353b–c
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick*, 292a–297a
50 MARX *Capital*, 13a–50a esp 13d–18a, 19d–20b, 24c–25d, 27a–c, 31b–33b, 37c–39c, 42b–44c; 69a–84a,c esp 74c–78a, 79c–84a; 89d–102b passim, esp 93b–96a, 100a–101a; 171a–c; 256b–260c esp 258b–c; 264a–275c; 296c–298a; 305c–307c; 324a–327b esp 327b; 366a–368a
50 MARX-ENGELS *Communist Manifesto*, 423c–d; 425d–427b
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace*, BK XIII, 572d–573b

8c *Justice in the organization of production*

50 MARX *Capital*, 33d–36c esp 34d–35a; 37d–38b [fn 5]; 85a–263d esp 111c–115c, 160d–164a, 171d–180d, 192d–209a, 215a–217b, 226d–227d, 261c–262a, 279d–286a esp 285c–286a; 311c–321b; 354a–355d; 377c–378d
50 MARX-ENGELS *Communist Manifesto*, 419d–425b esp 421a–422c, 426a–427b

8c(1) *Economic exploitation: chattel slavery and wage slavery*

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics*, BK V, CH 6 [1134b7–17] 382b–c; BK VIII, CH II [1161a30–b10] 413c–d / *Politics*, BK I, CH 3–7 446d–449c; CH II [1259a18]–CH 13 [1260b7] 453c–455a; BK III, CH 6 [1278b33–37] 476a–b / *Athenian Constitution*, CH 2 553a–c
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus*, 46c–47a / *Marcus Cato*, 278d–279c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I–II, Q 105, A 4, ANS and REP 1–4 318b–321a
32 MILTON *Samson Agonistes* [1–51] 339b–340b
36 SWIFT *Gulliver*, PART IV, 154b–155a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality*, 352a; 353c–355b; 365b–366a
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations*, BK I, 28a–d; 61c–d; 109d–110d; BK III, 165b–170c; BK IV, 253c–254a; 287c–d
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 144b
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 45b
42 KANT *Science of Right*, 421c–422d; 445c–446a
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: ARTICLE I, SECT 9 [260–266] 13d; ARTICLE IV, SECT 2 [529–533] 16b; AMENDMENTS, XIII 18c
43 MILL *Representative Government*, 339d–340c
44 BOSWELL *Johnson*, 363c–364a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History*, PART IV, 335b–336c
50 MARX *Capital*, 1a–383d esp 102b–105c, 112c–115c, 127c–131a, 150a–c, 176a–178d, 193a–209a, 264a–275c, 282d–286a, 296c–301b, 354a–355d, 366a–368b, 376c–377a, 379a–383d
50 MARX-ENGELS *Communist Manifesto*, 420c–d; 422c–423a; 424b–425a; 426b–428a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace*, BK V, 211a–213a
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov*, BK VI, 165b–c

8c(2) *Profit and unearned increment*

14 PLUTARCH *Marcus Cato*, 287c–d
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations*, BK I, 20b–23b passim, esp 21a–c; 27b–28a; 109d–110d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right*, PART III, par 243 77b–c
50 MARX *Capital*, 71d–72c; 85a–263d esp 92c–94a, 100a–101b, 104b–105c, 112c, 154d–156d, 198c–199b, 254c–255a, 263c–d; 267b–267d; 275c passim, esp 271b–c, 286a; 301b passim, esp 288b–289c, 295a–d, 301a–b; 327b

8d *Justice and the use of money: usury and interest rates*

OLD TESTAMENT: *Exodus*, 22:25 / *Leviticus*, 25:35–37 / *Deuteronomy*, 23:19–20; 24:10–13 / *Nehemiah*, 5—(D) *II Esdras*, 5 / *Psalms*, 15:5—(D) *Psalms*, 14:5 / *Proverbs*, 28:8 / *Jeremiah*, 15:10—(D) *Jeremias*, 15:10 / *Ezekiel*, 18:4–17 esp 18:8, 18:13, 18:17; 22:12—(D) *Ezechiel*, 18:4–21 esp 18:8, 18:13, 18:17; 22:12
7 PLATO *Republic*, BK VIII, 408c–d / *Laws*, BK V, 694c–d; BK XI, 775c–d
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics*, BK V, CH 5 [1130a13–b8] 377c–378a; CH 5 [1133a5–b9] 380d–381c; BK IX, CH 2 [1164b30–1165a11] 417d–418a / *Politics*, BK I, CH 9–10 450d–452d esp CH 10 [1258a38–b8] 452d / *Athenian Constitution*, CH 12, par 4 557d–558a
14 PLUTARCH *Marcus Cato*, 287c–d / *Lucullus*, 409b–d
15 TACITUS *Annals*, BK VI, 90a–c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I–II, Q 105, A 2, REP 4 309d–316a
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy*, HELL, XI [91–111] 16a–b; XVII [31–75] 24a–c
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, BK III, 133b–140b

26 SHAKESPEARE *Merchant of Venice* ACT I sc I 409c-411b
33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 55a 57a
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK V 29c BK XI 92d-93 BK X I 169a 170b BK XXII 175d 176a 184b-187a c
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 37b-41d BK II 140b 154c 155a
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 498c
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 90d 91a
42 KANT *Science of Right* 424a-425b
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 304b-c 409a b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART IV 353b-c
50 MARX *Capital* 77c 78b 252b 293a d [f s] 371 372c

9 Political justice just ce in government

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK 3 23b-d
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 396c-d
7 PLATO *Crito* 213a 219a,c / *Republic* 295a 441a c esp BK III IV 340c-343a BK IV 348d 350a / *Laws* BK III 670c-671a 672c 676c BK VI 699d 700b BK XII 795 797c
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK c I [1 29b14 19] 377 CH 2 [3 b17 29] 378a b CH 6 [1 34a24]-CH 7 [1135 14] 382a 383a / *Politics* K I CH 2 [253a8 8] 446b-c [1253 9-39] 446d K III CI 6 475d-476c esp [279a1 22] 476c CH 9 477 -478d CH 12 13 480c-483a / *Athenian Constitution* CH 12 557b-558a
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK I SECT 14 254b-c
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 46c-47a
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK I CH 21 142d 143a BK II CH 21 161b-162d BK IV C 4 190d BK XIX, CH 21 524a 525a CH 24 528b-c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 96 A 4 233a-d Q 100 A 2 252b-253a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 86b 91 b P T II 132a
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 37 S OL 2 435b-436a
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH IX 53c 54d C XI 55b-58b CH XIII XI 59b-64c C XV SECT I 65 b CH XVI X 65d 81d passim
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 28a b
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 353b-362b passim / *Political Economy* 367a 385a,c passim / *Social Contract* 387a-439d passim
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK 309 311c
42 KANT *Science of Right* 433c-434d 435c-437c 438d-439a
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 10 50d 51 NUMBER 51 164c-d
43 MILL *Representative Government* 369d 370a / *Utilitarianism* 464d-476a c passim
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 210 228 69d 75b
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [4 72 4811] 118b-119b
50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 428d 429-

9a The natural and the conventional in political justice natural law and the general will

7 PLATO *Gorgias* 271b-275d / *Republic* 295a 441a c esp BK II I 310c 356a / *Theaetetus* 528b c 531a
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK V CH 7 382c 383a / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 13 [1373b1 18] 617c d CH 15 [13 5a25 b25] 619d-620b
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK III par 13 15 16c 17b par 17 17d 18a / *City of God* BK II C I 21 161b-162d BK XIX CH 21 524a 525a CH 24 528b-c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 91 A 3 ANS 209d 210c Q 95 A 2 4 22 c 230c
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 86b 91a b PART II 131a-c
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 281a 283c
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV P P 3 S HOL 2 435b-436a
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 291 335 225a 233a
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* C I II SECT 7 13 26c 28b CH IX 53c 54d CH XI 55b 58b
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I 1c-d 3b-c
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 333a-d 362d 363a,c / *Political Economy* 368d 369b 370b-d / *Social Contract* BK I 393b c BK II 396d 398b 399b-400c
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK 397a-c
42 KANT *Science of Right* 430a-431a 435a b 448b-d 450a b
43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 465d-466b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 210-228 69d 75b esp par 217 72b-c / *Philosophy of History* PART II 271a-d

9b Justice as the moral principle of political organization the bond of men in states

5 SOPHOCLES *Antigone* [332 3-2] 134a b
5 EURIPIDES *Suppliants* [3 4 313] 261a / *Phoenician Maidens* [528-558] 382c d
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK VII 225d 226b
7 PLATO *Protagoras* 43d-4 b / *Crito* 213 219a c / *Republic* BK I 308b-309b BK I 346a 350a / *Statesman* 598b-604b / *Laws* BK XII 786b-d
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK V CH 6 [1134 4 b15] 382a-c K VI C I [1155a22 28] 406d CH 9 411d-412c CH 11 413b-d BK IX CH 6 420c 421a esp [1 6b5 15] 420d-421a / *Politics* BK I CH 2 [1253a8 18] 446b-c [1253 29-39] 446d BK III CI 9 477 -478d esp [128 8-35] 477c-d C I 12 [282b15 2] 480c [1283 8-20] 481b CH 13 [1283 37 40] 481c BK II CH 14 [1332b27 32] 537c
14 PLUTARCH *Numa Pompilius* 59d 60b / *Lycurgus Numa* 61b d 62 / *Dion* 784d 785a
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* K II C I 21 161b-162d BK IV C 4 190d BK X X CH 21 524 525a CH 23 24 528a-c

(9 *Political justice: justice in government. 9b Justice as the moral principle of political organization: the bond of men in states.*)

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 100 A 2 ANS 252b 253a Q 105 A 2 ANS 309d 316a
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE XVIII [52]-XX [148] 134a 138b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 91a 92b
27 SHAKESPEARE *Troilus and Cressida* ACT I SC III [98 124] 109a b
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV APPENDIX XV-XVI 448c d
35 LOCKE *Toleration* 3a / *Civil Government* CH II SECT 13 28a b CH VII SECT 90-94 44d 46c CH XI SECT 135 139 55d 58a CH XIX SECT 219 75b c / *Human Understanding* BK I CH II SECT 2 104a b
38 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 369a b / *Social Contract* BK II 396d 398b
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 51 164c d
43 MILL *Liberty* 302d 303a / *Representative Government* 422b / *Utilitarianism* 460a 461c 464d-476a c passim esp 470a 471b 473d 474b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* ADDITIONS 141 139c 155 142a b 160 142d 143a / *Philosophy of History* PART II 272a d PART IV 321a 334b-c
54 FREUD *Group Psychology* 685c 686c / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 780b 781a

9c The criteria of justice in various forms of government and diverse constitutions

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK II 107c 108c
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK III 396c d
7 PLATO *Republic* BK VIII 401d 416a / *Statesman* 598b 604b / *Laws* BK III 670c 671a 672c 676c BK IV 681d 682c
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK V CH 3 [1131 24-29] 378d CH 7 [1134^{b}36-1135^{b}4] 382d 383c BK VIII CH 11 413b d / *Politics* BK III CH 6 475d 476c esp [1279 17-22] 476c CH 9-13 477c 483a CH 15-17 484b-487a BK IV CH 1 [1289 13 20] 488a BK V CH 1 [1301 25 39] 502b-c CH 9 [1310 25-36] 512c BK VI CH 2 520d 521b esp [1317 40-^{b}16] 520d [1318 4 10] 521b CH 3 521c 522a BK VII CH 14 537b-538d esp [1333^{b}5-1334 10] 538b-d
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 46c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 95 A 4 ANS 229b 230c Q 100 A 2 ANS 252b 253a Q 105 A 1 307d 309d
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK III 12b 13c BK VI 33a 35a
38 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 369a d / *Social Contract* BK II 405a-406a
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 616d 617d passim
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 94c 95c 403b 575d 577b
42 KANT *Science of Right* 450a-d
43 MILL *Representative Government* 343b 344d 350b 355b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART II 271d 272d
50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 428d 429c

9d The relation of ruler and ruled: the justice of the prince or statesman and of the subject or citizen

OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 22 28 / *I Samuel*, 8 10-20—(D) *I Kings* 8 10-20 / *II Samuel*, 23 3—(D) *II Kings* 23 3 / *II Chronicles* 1 7-12—(D) *II Paralipomenon* 1 7-12 / *Proverbs* 16 12 17 7 20 28 24 21 28 15 16 29 14 / *Ecclesiastes* 10 20 / *Isaiah* 3 14—(D) *Isaias* 3 14
NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 22 16-22 / *Acts* 23 5 / *Romans* 13 1-7 / *Titus* 3 1
5 AESCHYLUS *Suppliant Maidens* [365 401] 5c 6a
5 SOPHOCLES *Antigone* [162 210] 132c d [631 765] 136c 137d
5 EURIPIDES *Suppliants* [342 358] 261b c / *Helen* [1627-1641] 313c d
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK II 84b-c BK III 107c d 120b c BK VII 223c d 245b
7 PLATO *Republic* BK I 301b 306b BK IV 346a 350a / *Laws* BK I 642d 643b BK III 670c 671a 672c 676c BK IV 681b 682c BK VIII 733d 734a / *Seventh Letter* 806d 807b 814b-c
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK V CH 1 [1130 1-5] 377b CH 6 [1134 25-^{b}17] 382a-c CH 11 [1138 4 13] 386b-c [1138^{b}5 13] 387a c BK VIII CH 11 413b d / *Politics* BK I CH 12 13 453d-455a c BK III CH 4 [1277^{b}16-20] 474d CH 6 475d 476c esp [1278^{b}30-1279 22] 476a-c CH 10 478d 479a CH 13 481b 483a BK VII CH 14 [1332^{b}13 1333 16] 537b 538a
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK III CH 7 182b-184a
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK VI SECT 30 276d 277a
13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK VI [847-853] 233b 234a
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 48a / *Numa Pompilius* 59d 60b / *Lycurgus Numa* 61b d 62c / *Aristides* 262b d 276a c esp 263d 266b 273d 275c / *Agesilaus* 490d-491b 494a c / *Agesilaus Pompey* 539a / *Alexander* 566a b / *Phocion* 604b d 605d / *Cato the Younger* 620a 648a c esp 636d 637c / *Demetrius* 742c 743b / *Dion* 784d 785a 798b d
15 TACITUS *Histories* BK IV 290a d
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIV CH 28 397a d BK XIX CH 15 16 521a 522a CH 21 524a 525a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 96 510a 513c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 105 AA 1 3 307d 318b

21 D NTE *Divine Comed* PARA SE X 1 1 [52] x [145] 134 138b passim

23 M CHIAVELLI *Prince* CI XV XIX 22b 30a

23 HOBBES *Leviath n* P RT II 101 102c 104b-d 112d 117b 147b-c 154b-158a CO CLUSION 279d 282c

25 MONT NE *Essais* 7a-d 50b 51a 381b-383d 386b-d 437b-438a

26 SH KESPE RE *Richard III* ACT V SC III [23 2-0] 146b-c / *Rich d II* ACT IV SC I [114 157] 342c 343a / *Henry V* CT IV SC I [95 297] 552c 554c

27 SHAKE E *Measure for Me sure* 174a 204d esp CT II SC II 181d 184a / *Coriola us* 351a-392a c

30 B co *Adva cement of Learning* 94b-95b

32 MILTO *Paradise Lost* BK II [445 456] 121a BK V [800-845] 192b-193b

35 LOC *Civil Government* CH VII SECT 90-94 44d-46c

38 MONT SQUIEU *Spirit of La s* BK II 6b-7c 1 10c 11 12b-13c BK IV 14d 15c 16a b 8 V 18d 19d 23a 25 BK III 51a 56a BK XI 93d 94a 94c 96a,c

38 R SS U *Inequality* 361c 362 366c-d / *Political Econ my* 370d 372b

39 SMITH *We Lh of Nat ons* BK IV 284d

40 GI ON *Decline nd Fall* 50 61d-62d 127d 284b-c 288b-289 339d 343c esp 343b-c

41 GIB ON *Decline and F ll* 39b-40 173b d 575d 577b pass m

42 KANT *Science of Right* 434

43 D CLARATIO O I ENDE CE 1a 3b passim

43 M LL *Representative Government* 334b-c 366a 370a 413d-414d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* RT III pa 215 71c-d par 93 98b par 3 2 101a-c pa 304 102 / *Philosophy f H story* RT I 242d 243b P 271d 272d T III 301c 303c

51 TOLSTO *W a and Peace* BK 9c 10d EPILOGUE 680b-684a

9 The j st di t b tion of hono s ra ks office suffrage

4 HOM R *Iliad* BK I 3a 9 BK IX [89-655] 58a-63c

5 A CHYL S *Seven Against Thebes* [1011 1084] 38b-39a c

5 SOPH CL *Ant gone* [16 1] 132c-d / *Aj x* 143a 155a esp [430-480] 146d 147b [1 47 42] 152a 155a c

5 EURIP *Hecuba* [239-331] 354d 355c

5 ARI T *Kn ght* [333 1383] 486c 487a / *Lysistr t* [572-586] 590c-d

6 HE DOTC *History* K 70c d 83d 84a K 1 275c d

6 THUC D ES *P lopo nsia W ar* BK 396c-d

7 PL *Apol gy* 209b-d / *Rep blic* K III 340c 341 K IV 349c 350 / *Law* BK III 672 -676c 8 699d 700b

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK V C 1 1 [1129b19-24] 377a 1 2 [113 b30-34] 378b CH 3 378c-379b esp [1131 24 29] 378d C 1 6 [1134a1 7] 382b CH 9 [113 15 113 4] 384d 385a BK VIII CH 14 [1163b5 13] 416a-c BK IX CH 6 [116 b5 15] 420d-421 / *Politics* BK I CH 12 [1259b5-8] 454a BK II II 2 [1261 23 b6] 456a b CH 7 [1266b36-126 2] 462c [126 3 41] 463b CI 9 [12 0b18 25] 466d-467 CH 11 [2 3 32 b] 469d-470a BK III II 5 475a d CH 6 [12 9 1] 4 6b c CH 10-13 478d 483 CH 16 [128 10-23] 485c BK V C 1 2 [13 2 16]-CH 3 [13 2b2] 503b 504a CH 8 [1308 10 1309 15] 510d 511b CH 12 [1316b21 24] 519d BK I CH 2 [1317 40] CH 4 [1319 6] 520d 522c BK II CH 13 [1332 13 41] 536d 537a / *Athenian Constitut* CH 12 par 1 557b-c

14 PLUT RC *L curgus* 45c-46a / *Numa Pom pilius* 50a / *Pompey* 505a-c / *Cato the Younger* 636d 637c

15 T CITUS *Annals* BK XI 105d 107b

23 M CHIA ELLI *Prince* CH XXI 32d 33a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 74b-c P RT II 103c d 104b 146d 147d 148b 156c 158a b

25 MONTAI NE *Essais* 181d 183c 519d 520a

32 MILTON *Pa ad se Lost* BK II [445 456] 121a / *Areop gitic* 383a

33 P SC L *Pensées* 305 228a

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* P RT I 15b-16b 28b 29 PA T III 114a

38 M NTESQUIEU *Spirit of La s* BK II 4a 6b 7c 8c passim BK III 11c 12b BK V 23a 25c 31 32 BK XI 71d 72a

38 ROUSSE U *Inequality* 358c 360a 361a esp 360b d [fn 1] / *Social Contract* BK III 408d

40 GIBBO *Decline a d Fall* 17a b 240c 244c esp 240c d, 242a-c 245d 247a passim 501c

41 GIBBON *Decli e and F ll* 39d 73b 317b-318b

42 K NT *Science of Right* 436d-437c 444c 446a

43 ARTICLES OF CO FEDERATION IV [1 36] 5b-c VI [87-93] 6b

43 CONSTITUTIO O THE U.S ARTI LE I SECT [11 49] 11b-d S CT 3 [6 2] 12 [88-95] 12b SECT 6 [143 5] 12 d SECT 9 [289]-SECT 0 [3 3] 14a ARTICL I SECT 1 [32 352] 14b-d A ICLE IV SECT 2 [519-521] 16a AME DMENTS XII 18a-c XIV SECT 2 18c XV 19b XIX 19d XXIII 20d

43 F D R LI T NUM ER 68 206b-c NUMBER 80 236a b N MB R 84 252a

43 M LL *Liberty* 302d 303a / *Representative Government* 380c 389b pass m / *Utilitarian sm* 466c-467b

44 BO WELL *Johnson* 124d 125d 127b-c 141 197 479a d 498c-499a

46 H EL *Ph l sophy f Right* PART III par 2 6 68d-69b par 291 293 97d 98b / *Ph lo ophy of H story* RT I 222a 224a P T III 295d 296c P T I 356c 357a

(9 *Political justice justice in government 9e The just distribution of honors ranks offices suffrage*)

47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [10 849-976] 264a 267a

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK III 131c 135c BK V 205a b 228c 229a 232a 234a BK VI 241c 242b

9f Justice between states the problem of right and might in the making of war and peace

OLD TESTAMENT *Deuteronomy 20 esp 20 10-14*

5 SOPHOCLES *Oedipus at Colonus* [897-959] 122d 123b

5 EURIPIDES *Suppliants* 258a 269a c

5 ARISTOPHANES *Peace* [601 692] 532d 534a

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 1a 2b BK III 93c d BK IV 144c d BK VI 202c 203c 212a c BK VII 218a b 237d 239a 241c 246c BK VIII 287a c BK IX 289a c

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK I 349a 386d esp 358b 360c 368b d 378a 380a 384b 386d BK II 402c d 404d 405b BK III 418d 420c 424d-428d 429b 434c BK IV 461b 463a 469d 470b BK V 504c 508a c BK VI 511c 516b 529b 533a esp 531b-c BK VII 542b-c 556d 557a

7 PLATO *Gorgias* 274a / *Republic* BK I 308b 309b BK V 367b 368c / *Laws* BK I 640a 643b

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK X CH 7 [1177^b8-11] 432b / *Politics* BK I CH 8 [1256^b20-26] 450c BK III CH 9 [1280 34-^{b}12] 478a b BK VII CH 2 [1324^b2 1325 13] 528c 529a CH 14 [1333 18 1334 11] 538a d

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK VI [847 853] 233b 234a BK XI [243-444] 334b 340a BK XII [175 -13] 358b 359b

14 PLUTARCH *Romulus* 26b 27a / *Numa Pompilius* 55c 56a / *Themistocles* 96c d / *Camillus* 106b 107a 108b 109a / *Marcellus* 254c 255d / *Aristides* 273b 275a / *Pyrrhus* 319b d / *Lysander* 357a b / *Cimon* 398a d / *Nicias* 426a / *Crassus Nicias* 456d-457c / *Sertorius* 468b 469a / *Agesilaus* 484a b 491a b 497c 498a / *Pompey* 503a d 518a b / *Alexander* 549d 550c 569a b / *Cato the Younger* 639d 640a / *Demetrius* 727d 728b

15 TACITUS *Annals* BK I 15b BK XI 106b d / *Histories* BK IV 272b c 290a d

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK I CH 1-7 129d 133a CH 21 142d 143a BK IV CH 14 15 196b 197a BK XIX CH 7 515a c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 105 A 3 316a 318b PART II II Q 10 A 8 432b 433b Q 29 A 1 530b 531a Q 40 577d 581d

22 CHAUCER *Tale of Melibeus* par 12 13 404a 405a par 30 38 413b-418a par 53-60 425b-427b

23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* CH XXI 32a d CH XXVI 36b 37a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 95a PART II 147c 159c CONCLUSION 279d 282c

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 36a 38a 54a 55a 58a 59d BK III 131b d 133b

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 11b 13c 95a 97b 381a b 387c 388c 440b-442d

26 SHAKESPEARE *Richard III* ACT V SC III [237 270] 146b-c / *King John* ACT II SC I [561-598] 385c 386a ACT III SC I [33 34] 388d 389d / *2nd Henry IV* ACT IV SC I 487b-489d SC II [52-123] 490b-491b / *Henry V* ACT I SC II [1-233] 534a 536b ACT IV SC III [1-68] 558d 559b

29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 290c d

30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK I APH 129 134d 135d

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK XI [638 714] 313a 314b

33 PASCAL *Pensees* 291-294 225a 226b 296 226b

35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH IX SECT 131 54d CH XI SECT 139 57c 58a CH XV SECT 172 65b-c CH XVI 65d 70c

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 23a 25b PART II 75a b 76b 78b PART IV 149b 151a

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I 3a b BK X 61b d 64a BK XV 109b-c BK XXIV 201b c BK XXVI 223c 224a BK XXIX 265d 266a

38 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 369a b / *Social Contract* BK I 389d 390d BK II 395d

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 4a b 84d 85a 402b-404b 504d 507c 509b-c 535d 536c 543b c 549d 550b

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 5d 6a 7d 8a 17d 18c 27b esp 604c [n 107] 130b-c 373d 374d 383c 384b 445a 532d 533a

42 KANT *Science of Right* 413d 452b-458a c esp 454a b 454d 455b 457a 458a c / *Judgement* 504a b 586c d

43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 1a 3b passim

43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 5a 9d passim

43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U S ARTICLE I SECT 8 [220-225] 13b SECT 10 [314 320] 14b ARTICLE III SECT 2 [469-492] 15c d AMENDMENTS XI 18a

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 3 7 33b 44c passim NUMBER 11 54c NUMBER 43 140d 143a NUMBER 80 235b 236c NUMBER 83 248b c

43 MILL *Representative Government* 434c-435c passim

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 326 107d 108a par 330-340 108d 110c esp par 333 109b c par 336 109d par 338 110a b par 351 112a b ADDITIONS 193 194 150c d / *Philosophy of History* PART III 299a c PART IV 357c 358b

48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 292a 295a

50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 428a b

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK IX 346a 355c BK X 442c-443b BK XII 547a 551c BK XIV 589a-c

54 FREUD *War and Death* 755a 757d esp 757b-c 761 -c

9g The tempering of political justice by clemency amnesty asylum and pardon

OLD TESTAMENT *Numbers* 35:6 11 15 28-33 / *Deuteronomy* 4:41 43 19:1 13 / *Joshua* 21— (D) *Josue* 21

5 ARISTOPHANES *Frogs* [686-705] 572a b

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 20b-d 36b-c BK II 71b-72a BK VI 212a-c BK VII 251 b

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK III 424d 429a 433d-434a BK IV 451d

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK IV CH 5 228a 230b

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK XI [100-111] 330b-331a

14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 37b-c / *Solon* 68a / *Aristides* 275c / *Agesilaus* 494a-c / *Pompey* 503a d / *Caesar* 599a b / *Dion* 798b-d

15 TACITUS *Annals* BK II 39b-c BK III 59d BK XII 113d 114a BK XIV 151d 152c / *Histories* BK I, 208b-c

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God*, BK I CH 1 7 129d 133a BK IX CH 5 288b-289a

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY X [70-93] 68a b X [83 114] 76b-c

22 CHAUCER *Tale of Melibeus* par 77 78 431 432a / *Parson's Tale* par 68 533b-534a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 94a

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 3a 5a 51a 53c

26 SHAKESPEARE *Merchant of Venice* ACT IV SC I [18 05] 427 -d / *Ist Henry IV* ACT sc 466a-d / *Henry V* ACT II c II [39-83] 539c 540a

27 SHAKESPEARE *Measure for Measure* ACT II c II [25 162] 182b-183d / *Cymbeline* CT V 5 V [256-422] 486c-488d

29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 71b-d 108c 109b 177a b PART II 332d 333b

30 BACON *New Atlantis* 205a

35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH XI SECT 159 62b-c

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I, 36a b 43c-d BK X 209b-d BK XX X 264b-c

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 176a 302d 449d 451a

42 KANT *Science of Right* 449c

43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U S ARTICLE II SECT 2 [4 420] 15a

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 69 208c d NUMBER 74 221d 222d

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 335c 344a b

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 5 95d 96a ADDITION 4 127d 128a 173 146d

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK V 230b-232 BK X 548d 549b

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK XII 398a d

10 Justice and law

4 HOMER *Iliad* BK XVIII [497-508] 135b

7 PLATO *Gorgias* 261b d / *Republic* BK II 311b-c / *Laws* BK IV 681b 683d BK IX 743a 75 d

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK V CH 1 [1129 12 24] 377a c 1 6 [1134 25 b8] 382a b c 1 7 382c 383a / *Politics* BK III CH 16 [1287a10-b25] 485c-486b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 1 [1354 16-1355a3] 593b-594

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK I [507-508] 117a BK VI [54 -853] 233b-234

14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus-Numa* 61b d 64a,c / *Solon* 66a b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK III par 13 17 16c 18a / *City of God* BK II CH 21 161b-162d BK XIX CH 21 524a 525a CH 24 528b-c / *Christian Doctrine* BK IV CH 15 686d 687d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 1 A 2 125c-d

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 91 A 5 A 3 211c 212c Q 94 A 4 223d 224d Q 95 A 1 3 226b-229b esp A 1 REP 2 3 226c 22 c Q 100 A 2 ANS 252b-253a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 86b PART II 131 -c 157b

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 291 338 225a 233a

35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH IX 53c 54d CH XVII 71a 73c passim

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I 1c d BK XXVI 214b,d 225a c passim

38 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 370b 371c / *Social Contract* BK I 399b-400c

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 96a-d

42 KANT *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 392a / *Science of Right* 400b-d 43 c-433a

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 10 50d 51b

43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 465c-466b 46 c-468a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 212 213 70d 71a par 215 71c d

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XII 553a

10a The measure of justice in laws made by the state natural and constitutional standards

5 EURIPIDES *Bacchantes* [8 8-911] 347b-c

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 396c-d

7 PLATO *Protagoras* 52b / *Gorgias* 271b-2 4c / *Republic* BK II 316a 319b esp 318a BK V 349a 350a / *Statesman* 598b-604b / *Laws* BK IV 680c 683b BK IX 747c BK X 760c

8 ARISTOTLE *Sophistical Refutations* CH 12 [1 3b7- 9] 238b-c

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK V CH 1 [1129 12 24] 377a CH 7 382c 383a c 1 9 [1136b32 35] 385a CH 11 [1138 4 13] 386b-c / *Politics* BK I CH 6 [1 55a3 b4] 448c-449a BK III CH 11 [1 82b 14] 480b-c CH 16 [1 87a28- 5] 485d

(10 *Justice and law* 10a *The measure of justice in laws made by the state natural and constitutional standards*)

486a BK IV CH 1 [1289 13-20] 488a / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 10 [1368b7-10] 611d CH 13 [1373b1-17] 617c d CH 15 [1375 25-b25] 619d 620b [1376 33-b31] 621a c
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK IV SECT 4 264a
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK III par 15 17a b par 17 17d 18a / *City of God* BK II CH 21 161b 162d BK XIX CH 21 524a 525a CH 24 528b c / *Christian Doctrine* BK IV CH 18 686d 687d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 91 A 3 209d 210c Q 93 A 3 217b 218a Q 94 A 4 223d 224d Q 95 A 2 227c 228c Q 96 A 4 ANS 233a d
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 91a b PART II 113d 116a b 131a c 132a b 134b-135b 156b-c 157b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 47c-48a 281a 283c 384b c 519a 520b
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 94d 95b
32 MILTON *Samson Agonistes* [888-902] 359a
33 PASCAL *Pensees* 291-338 225a 233a 878-879 345a b
35 LOCKE *Toleration* 11b 12c / *Civil Government* CH II SECT 12 27d 28a CH IX 53c 54d CH XI 55b 58b CH XVIII 71a 73c passim CH XIX SECT 221-222 75d 76c SECT 240-242 81b d
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I 1c d 3c d BK VI 39b BK VIII 54b BK XII 85c 86d BK XIX 136a 138a c BK XXVI 214b d 225a c passim esp 214b d BK XXIX 262a 265d
38 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 369c d 370b d / *Social Contract* BK II 397b-c 399b 400c 405a 406a BK IV 426b d
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 61b BK II 140b BK IV 228a 232b 284d BK V 397a c
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 525d 526c 617a d
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 76d 77b 89d 94b passim 403b
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 114b d / *Science of Right* 429a-c 434a 435a-436a 450d 452a
43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 1a 3b
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U S PREAMBLE 11a c ARTICLE I SECT 8-10 13a 14b ARTICLE VI [583-590] 16d AMENDMENTS I-X 17a-d
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 33 108b-c NUMBER 44 145c 147a NUMBER 78 230d 232d NUMBER 81 237d 238b
43 MILL *Liberty* 302d 323a c passim / *Utilitarianism* 465d-466b 467c d
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 203d 204a 205b 363c 364a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 212-213 70d 71a ADDITIONS 134 138b c / *Philosophy of History* PART IV 364b

10b *The legality of unjust laws the extent of obedience required of the just man in the unjust society*

5 SOPHOCLES *Antigone* 131a 142d esp [23-99] 131c 132a [441 496] 134d 135b [631 765] 136c 137d [891-943] 138d 139a
5 EURIPIDES *Phoenician Maidens* [16 5 1670] 392b d
7 PLATO *Apology* 200a 212a c / *Crito* 213a 219a c / *Republic* BK VI 379d-380b / *Laws* BK VI 706b-c / *Seventh Letter* 800c d
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK III CH 11 [1282b1 14] 480b c CH 13 [1284 3 37] 482a-c / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 13 [1373b1 12] 617c-d CH 15 [1375 25 b25] 619d 620b [1376b5 28] 621b-c
15 TACITUS *Annals* BK XV 172c 173c BK XVI 180d 184a c
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK III par 17 17d 18a / *City of God* BK XIX CH 17 522b 523a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 92, A 1 REP 4 213c 214c Q 93 A 3 REP 2 217b-218a Q 94 A 6 REP 3 225d 226b Q 95 A 2 227c 228c A 4 229b 230c Q 96 A 4 ANS 2 d REP 2-3 233a d Q 97 A 2 236d 237b PART II-II Q 42 A 2 REP 3 584b-d
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 102b c 104b-d 112b d 113d 114b 115a 116a 134b 135b 157b PART III 238b c
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 7a d 47a 51a 319a b 381a 388c esp 383c d 384d 385a, 388a c 463a 465c 480b 482b 504c 506a 519a 520b
32 MILTON *Samson Agonistes* [888-902] 359a
33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 114b / *Pensees* 316 231a
35 LOCKE *Toleration* 16d 17b / *Civil Government* CH XIII SECT 155 60d 61a CH XIV SECT 168 64b c CH XVI-XIX 65d 81d
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 366b-d / *Political Economy* 369c d / *Social Contract* BK I 388d 389a BK IV 426b-d
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK V 397a-c
42 KANT *Science of Right* 439a 441d 451d-452a
43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 1a 3b passim
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 16 68b c NUMBER 28 97c d NUMBER 33 108b 109a NUMBER 78 230d 232d
43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 465d-466b
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK VI 244d 245d EPILOGUE I 668a 669c 670d 671a

10c *The justice of punishment for unjust acts the distinction between retribution and vengeance*

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 9 6 / *Exodus* 21 12 29 esp 21 23 25 / *Leviticus* 24 16-21 / *Deuteronomy* 19 11 13 21
NEW TESTAMENT *Romans* 13 2 4
5 AESCHYLUS *Choephoroe* 70a 80d esp [306-314] 73a b [400-404] 74a / *Eumenides* 81a 91d esp [490-565] 86b 87a

10d The correct on of legal just ce: equity in the application of human law

11 Divine justice: the relation of God or the gods to man

11a The divine government of man: the justice and mercy of God or the gods

OLD TESTAMENT: *Genesis*, 3; 6:5-8:22 esp 8:20-22; 18:20-19:29 / *Exodus*, 20 / *Leviticus*, 26 / *Numbers*, 13-14 esp 14:11-20; 25 / *Deuteronomy*, 3- / *II Samuel*, 24—(D) *II Kings*, 24 / *II Chronicles*, 6:12—(D) *II Paralipomenon*, 6:12 / *Nehemiah*, 9:5-38—(D) *II Esdras*, 9:5-38 / *Job* / *Psalms*, 5-7; 28; 37; 59-60; 73; 76; 81; 83; 89:14; 146—(D) *Psalms*, 5-7; 27; 36; 58-59; 72; 75; 80; 82; 88:15; 145 / *Proverbs*, 14:32 / *Ecclesiastes*, 12:14 / *Isaiah*, 1:30-31; 42 esp 4:1-7; 45:21-25; 59—(D) *Isaias*, 1:30-31; 42 esp 42:1-7; 45:21-26; 59 / *Jeremiah*, 15; 24; 29-31; 34—(D) *Jeremias*, 15; 24; 29-31; 34 / *Lamentations* / *Ezekiel*, 11; 14; 18; 33:34—(D) *Ezechiel*, 11; 14; 18; 33-34 / *Daniel*, 4:4-37—(D) *Daniel*, 4 / *Joel*, 3 / *Amos* / *Obadiah*—(D) *Abdias* / *Jonah*—(D) *Jonas* / *Micah*, 1-3—(D) *Micheas*, 1-3 / *Nahum* / *Malachi*, 3:4—(D) *Malachias*, 3-4

APOCRYPHA: *Tobit*, 3—(D) OT, *Tobias*, 3 / *Wisdom of Solomon*, 1-6 passim; 12—(D) OT, *Book of Wisdom*, 1-6 passim; 12 / *Ecclesiasticus*, 16; 35—(D) OT, *Ecclesiasticus*, 16; 35 / *II Maccabees*, 6:12-17—(D) OT, *II Machabees*, 6:12-17

NEW TESTAMENT: *Matthew*, 5:22; 29-30; 11:20-24; 12:36-37; 13:24-30; 36-43; 18:7-9; 11:14; 19:16-20:16; 23 / *Mark*, 9:43-48; 10:17-31; 16:16—(D) *Mark*, 9:42-47; 10:17-31; 16:16 / *Luke*, 1:46-55; 6:36-38; 7:36-50; 10:25-28; 14:7-14; 15; 16:19-26; 18:1-8; 23:34; 39-43 / *John*, 5:30; 8:1-11 / *Romans*, 1:16-2:16; 6:28 / *Galatians*, 6:7-8 / *Ephesians*, 2 / *II Thessalonians*, 1:10-12—(D) *II Thessalonians*, 1:10-11 / *II Timothy*, 4:8-9—(D) *II Timothy*, 4:8 / *Hebrews*, 10:26-31 / *I Peter*, 3:18 / *II Peter*, 2 / *I John*, 1:9 / *Jude* / *Revelation* passim, esp 17-20—(D) *Apocalypse* passim, esp 17-20

4 HOMER: *Iliad*, BK XXIV [513-551] 176d-177a / *Odyssey*, BK I [11-95] 183a-184a

5 AESCHYLUS: *Suppliant Maidens* [1-175] 1a-3a / *Prometheus Bound* 40a-51d / *Agamemnon* [636-781] 58d-60b; [1560-1566] 68c / *Choephoroe* [772-780] 77c / *Eumenides* 81a-91d

5 SOPHOCLES: *Antigone* [279-289] 133c / *Ajax* 143a-155a,c esp [430-459] 146d-147a, [748-783] 149c-d / *Electra* [173-179] 157c / *Trachiniae* [1264-1278] 181c / *Philoctetes* [446-452] 186a

5 EURIPIDES: *Suppliants* [598-617] 263c-d / *Helen* [191-305] 300a-d; [711-721] 304d-305a / *Hecuba* [1023-1033] 361c-d / *Heracles Mad* [772-816] 371c-d

5 ARISTOPHANES: *Plutus* [86-92] 630a

6 HERODOTUS: *History*, BK I, 20b-22a; BK II, 77a-b; BK IV, 159d; BK VI, 199c-d; 201d-202c; 203a-b; 212c-213a; BK VII, 237d-239a; BK VIII, 278d-279a; 283d; BK IX, 308a-c

6 THUCYDIDES: *Peloponnesian War*, BK V, 506b-c; BK VII, 560a-b

7 PLATO: *Republic*, BK X, 437c-441a,c / *Theaetetus*, 530b-531a / *Laws*, BK IV, 682d-683b; BK IX, 757a; BK X, 757d-771b / *Seventh Letter*, 806a

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44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 482a d 539d 540a
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51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK 272a b K XIV 606a-607
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11*b* Man's debt to God or the gods: the religious acts of piety and worship

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 2 5 8- / *Exodus* 20 3- 31 / *Leviticus* 8 -5 6 / *Deuteronomy* 4 4 5-6 8 10- 23:2 3 / *Judges* 1-6—(D) *Judges* 2 -6 / *Job* 92 21 / *Psalms* passim, esp 5—8 22- 31 2 1 4 9:2, 4 3 55-8 89 -52, 95:6 9/ 8-9, 99 -9, 32 - 135 —(D) *Psalm* passim, esp 5:8-9, 23 32, 6 4 28:2 39:9 —5-8 85 -53 94:6 95:8-9, 98 -9, 13 - 37 / *Proverbs* 3 / *Ecclesiastes* 5:4-5 3—(D) *Ecclesiastes* 5 3 4 2 3 / *Micah* 6:5—(D) *Micheas* 6:8
APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 15 18 8:22 24 35—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 2 8- 3 18:2 4 3 / I *Maccabees* 20- 8 4 36-6 —(D) OT I *Machabees* 2:20- 8 4 36-6
NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 18:23 35 22:21 / *Mark* *Luke* 7 1 25 / I *John* 4 4 / *Romans* 3 9-28 4 -8 5 8 *Galatians* 1 0-13 5 -5
4 HOMER *Iliad* BK 3a 9a,c K I [394 43] 14a-b BK X [485-5] 62a b / *Odyssey* K III [1-68] 193a d

5 AESCHYLUS *Suppliant Maidens* 1 14a,c / *Persians* [800-842] 23d 24b / *Seven Against Thebes* [1011 1084] 38b-39 c / *Agamemnon* [351-402] 55d 56b
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12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK I SECT 17 253d 256d BK II SECT 13 258c BK III SECT 13 262c BK IX SECT 1 291 -c X SECT 40 295b
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I. Works by authors represented in this collection.

II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

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Chapter 43 KNOWLEDGE

INTRODUCTION

KNOWLEDGE like being is a term of comprehensive scope Its comprehensiveness is in a way correlative with that of being The only thing which cannot be an object of *knowledge or opinion which cannot be* thought about in any way except negatively is that which has no being of any sort—in short *nothing* Not all things may be knowable to us but even the skeptic who severely limits or completely doubts man s power to know is usually willing to admit that things beyond man s knowledge are in themselves knowable Everyone except Berkeley would agree *that the surfaces of bodies which we cannot* see are not for that reason in themselves in*visible*

The consideration of knowledge extends therefore to all things knowable to all kinds of knowers to all the modes of knowledge and all the methods of knowing So extensive an array of topics exceeds the possibility of treatment in a single chapter and requires this chapter to be *related to many others*

The Cross References which follow the References indicate the other chapters which deal with particulars we cannot consider here For example the nature of history science philosophy and theology and their distinction from one another are treated in the chapters devoted to those subjects *So too the chapters on* metaphysics mathematics physics mechanics and medicine deal with the characteristics and relations of these special sciences The psychological factors in knowing—the faculties of sense and mind of memory and imagination the nature of experience and reasoning—also have their own chapters Still other chapters deal with the logical elements of knowledge such as idea and judgment *definition hypothesis* principle induction and reasoning logic and dialectic

THE PROGRAM which Locke sets himself in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* is often taken to include the basic questions about knowledge His purpose he tells us is "to in*quire into the original certainty and extent of* human knowledge together with the grounds *and degrees of belief opinion* and assent Two other matters not explicitly mentioned by Locke in his opening pages assume central importance in the fourth book of his essay One is the question about the nature of knowledge itself The other concerns the kinds of knowledge

It may be thought that certain questions are prior to these and all others *Is knowledge possible?* Can we know anything? The man the *skeptic challenges is one who thinks that knowl*edge is attainable and who may even claim to possess knowledge of some sort But the issue between the skeptic and his adversaries cannot be simply formulated Its formulation depends in part upon the meaning given knowledge and the various things with which it is sometimes *contrasted such as belief and opinion or igno*rance and error It also depends in part on the *meaning of truth and probability* It would seem *therefore* that some consideration of the nature of knowledge should precede the examination of the claims concerning knowledge which provoke skeptical denials

The theory of knowledge is a field of many disputes Most of the major varieties of doc*trine or analysis are represented in the tradition* of the great books But the fact that knowledge involves a relationship between a knower and a known seems to go unquestioned William James expresses this insight *perhaps more dogmatically than some would allow in the statement* that knowledge is a thoroughgoing dualism *It supposes two elements* mind knowing and thing known Neither gets out of itself or into the other neither in any way *is* the other

neither makes the other. They just stand face to face in a common world and one simply knows or is known unto, its counterpart. This remains true even when attention is turned to the special case of knowledge about knowledge or the knower knowing himself. The mind's examination of itself simply makes the mind an object to be known as well as a knower.

This suggests a second point about the nature of knowledge which seems to be undisputed. If knowledge relates a knower to a known, then what is somehow possessed when a person claims to have knowledge is the object known. It does not seem possible for anyone to say that he knows something without meaning that he has that thing *in mind*. "Some sort of signal," James writes, "must be given by the thing to the mind's brain, or the knowing will not occur—we find as a matter of fact that the mere *existence* of a thing outside the brain is not a sufficient cause for our knowing it: it must strike the brain in some way, as well as be there, to be known." What is not in any way present to or represented in the mind is not known in any of the various senses of the word "know." What the mind cannot reach to and somehow grasp cannot be known. The words which are common synonyms for knowing—"apprehending" and "comprehending"—convey this sense that knowledge somehow takes hold of and surrounds its object.

That knowledge is a kind of possession occasions the comparisons which have been made between knowledge and love. The ancients observed that likeness and union are involved in both. Plato, for example, suggests in the *Symposium* that both the knower and the lover strive to become one with their object. "Love is also a philosopher," Diotima tells Socrates, and, as a lover of wisdom, the philosopher is also a lover.

With regard to some objects, love and knowledge are almost inseparable. To know them is to love them. But this does not hold for all objects, nor does the inseparability of knowledge and love in certain cases prevent their analytical distinction in all. Each is known by use, but unlikes attract each other. Furthermore, according to one theory of knowledge, expounded by Aquinas, the knower is satisfied to possess an image of the thing to be known. This image provides the likeness through which knowledge occurs; and thus, Aquinas writes, "the idea of the thing understood is in the one who understands." The lover, on the other hand, "is inclined to the thing itself as existing in itself." He seeks to be united with it directly. The nobility or baseness of the object known does not affect the knower as the character of the object loved affects the lover. This understanding of the difference between knowledge and love leads Aquinas to say that "to love God is better than to know God; but on the contrary, to know corporeal things is better than to love them."

The principle of likeness between knower and known does not go undisputed. On the contrary, the opposite views here form one of the basic issues about the nature of knowledge. The issue is whether the thing known is actually present to the knower, existing in the mind or consciousness exactly as it exists in itself; or whether the thing is represented in the mind by a likeness of itself through which the mind knows it. In this view, the mode of existence of the thing outside the mind is different from the way in which its representative exists in the mind.

Berkeley at one extreme identifies being and being known. "As to what is said of the absolute existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived, that seems perfectly unintelligible," he writes. "Their *esse* is *percipi*, nor is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them."

At the other extreme are those like Kant for whom the thing in itself is unknowable precisely because there can be no resemblance between the phenomenal order of objects represented under the conditions of experience and the noumenal order of the unconditioned. "All conceptions of things in themselves," he writes, "must be referred to intuitions, and with us men these can never be other than sensible, and hence can never enable us to know objects as things in themselves but only as appearances. The unconditioned," he adds, "can never be found in this chain of appearances."

In between these extremes there are those who agree that things exist apart from being known without ceasing to be knowable, but who nevertheless differ with respect to whether

the thing exists in reality in the same way that it exists in the mind The several forms of ideal ism and realism distinguished in the chapter on IDEA mark the range of traditional differences in the discussion of this difficult problem

FOR ANY THEORY of what knowledge is there is a distinction between knowledge and ignorance —between having or not having something in mind Nor does anyone confuse ignorance and error The mind in error claims to know that of which in fact it is ignorant This as Socrates points out in the *Meno* makes it easier to teach a person aware of his ignorance than a person in error for the latter supposing himself to know resists the teacher Hence getting a person to acknowledge ignorance is often the indispens able first step in teaching

But though the difference between knowl edge and ignorance and that between ignorance and error seems to be commonly understood it does not follow that everybody similarly agrees upon the difference between knowledge and er ror This much is agreed that to know is to possess the truth about something whereas to err is to be deceived by falsity mistaken for truth The disagreement of the philosophers be gins however when the meaning of truth and falsity is examined

Truth is one thing for those who insist upon some similarity between the thing known and that by which it is known or represented in the mind It is another for those who think that knowledge can be gained without the mediation of images or representations In the first case truth will consist in some kind of correspond ence between what the mind thinks or under stands and the reality it tries to know In the other truth will be equivalent to consistency among the mind s own ideas

The examination of this fundamental dis agreement is reserved for the chapter on TRUTH Here the identification of knowing with having the truth calls for the consideration of another distinction first made by Plato In his language as in that of Aristotle and others it is the differ ence between knowledge and opinion Some times as with Locke a similar distinction is made in terms of knowledge and judgment sometimes it is made in terms of knowledge and belief sometimes in terms of adequate and inadequate or certain and probable knowl edge

The difference between these opposites, un like that between knowledge and error is not a matter of truth and falsity There is such a thing as right opinion according to Socrates and it is not less useful than knowledge Con sidering the truth so far as it affects action Socrates claims that the man with right opinion will be just as good a guide if he thinks the truth as he who knows the truth The differ ence between right opinion and knowledge is here expressed by the contrast between the words thinks and knows It does not consist in the truth of the conclusion but in the way that conclusion has been reached or is held by the mind

The trouble with right opinion as compared with knowledge Socrates explains is that it lacks stability and permanence Right opinions are useful while they abide with us but they run away out of the human soul and do not remain long and therefore they are not of much value until they are fastened by the tie of the cause —or in other words un til they are fixed in the mind by the reasons on which they are grounded When they are bound Socrates declares they have the nature of knowledge and they are abid ing

At this point in his conversation with Meno Socrates makes the unusual confession that there are not many things which I profess to know but this is most certainly one of them namely that knowledge differs from true opinion It may be that Socrates claims to know so little because he regards knowledge as involving so much more than simply having the truth as the man of right opinion has it In addition to having the truth knowledge consists in seeing the reason why it is true

This criterion can be interpreted to mean that a proposition which is neither self evident nor demonstrated expresses opinion rather than knowledge Even when it happens to be true the opinion is qualified by some degree of doubt or some estimate of probability and counter probability In contrast when the mind has ade quate grounds for its judgment when it knows that it knows and why it has the certainty of knowledge

For some writers such as Plato certitude is as inseparable from knowledge as truth is To speak of a false knowledge as well as a true seems to him impossible and uncertain knowledge is as self contradictory a phrase as false knowledge

Others use the word knowledge more loosely to cover both adequate and inadequate knowledge the probable as well as the certain They make a distinction within the sphere of knowledge that is equivalent to the distinction between knowledge and opinion.

Spinoza for example distinguishes three kinds of knowledge He groups the perception of individual things through the bodily senses, which he calls knowledge from vague experience with knowledge from signs which depends on ideas formed by the memory and imagination These two ways of looking at things he writes I shall hereafter call knowledge of the first kind—opinion or imagination In contrast that which is derived from our possessing common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things he calls reason and knowledge of the second kind

The third kind which he calls intuitive science is that sort of knowing which advances from an adequate idea of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things. Knowledge of the second and third kinds he maintains is necessarily true That there can be falsity in the first kind and only there indicates that it is not genuinely knowledge at all, but what other writers would insist upon calling opinion

The several meanings of the word belief are determined by these distinctions Sometimes belief is associated with opinion sometimes with knowledge and sometimes it is regarded as an intermediate state of mind But in any of these meanings belief stands in contrast to make believe and this contrast has a bearing on knowledge and opinion as well To know or to opine puts the mind in some relation to the real or actual rather than the merely possible and subjects it to the criteria of truth and falsity The fanciful or imaginary belongs to the realm of the possible (or even the impossible) and the mind in imagining is fancy free—free from the restraints and restrictions of truth and reality

SKEPTICISM in its most extreme form takes the position that there is nothing true or false But even those who like Montaigne deny certitude with respect to everything except matters of religious faith do not go this far

In his *Apology for Raimond de Sebonde* he concedes that if opinions are weighed as more or less probable their truth or falsity is implied —at least as being the limit which an increasing probability or improbability approaches Referring to ancient skeptics of the Academic school he comments on the fact that they acknowledged some things to be more likely than others —as, for example that snow is white *rather* than black. The more extreme skeptics the Pyrrhonians he points out were bolder and also more consistent *They refused to incline* toward one proposition more than toward another for to do so, Montaigne declares is to recognize some more apparent truth in this than in that How can men suffer themselves he asks to incline to and be swayed by probability if they know not the truth itself? How should they know the similitude of that *whereof they do not* know the essence?

In this respect Montaigne's own skepticism tends to be of the more moderate variety since in the realm of action at least he would admit the need for judgments of probability But in all other respects, he takes a firm skeptical stand that nothing is self evident nothing has been proved The contradictory of everything has been asserted or argued by someone Men can have no principles, he writes if not revealed to them by the Divinity of all the rest the beginning the middle and the end are nothing but dream and vapor Every human presupposition and every declaration has as much authority one as another The persuasion of certainty is a certain testimony of folly and extreme uncertainty

The skeptical extreme is represented in the great books only through references to it for the purpose of refutation Aristotle in the *Metaphysics* for example reports the position of those who say that all propositions are true or that all propositions are false and who therefore deny the principle of contradiction and with it the distinction between true and false But if all propositions are true then the proposition Some propositions are false is also true if

all propositions are false the proposition *All propositions are false is also false* The skeptic may reply of course that he is *not checked* by arguments which try to make him contradict himself for he does not mind contradicting himself To this there is only one answer which is not to argue with the skeptic any further

From the skeptic s *point of view his position* is irrefutable so long as he does not allow himself to accept any of the standards by which refutation can be effected From his opponent s point of view complete skepticism is self refuting *because if the skeptic says anything definite* at all he appears to have some knowledge or at least to hold one opinion in preference to another His only choice is to remain silent If he insists upon making statements in defiance of *self contradiction his opponent can do nothing* but walk away

It may seem a very extravagant attempt of the skeptics to destroy *reason* by argument and ratiocination Hume writes yet this is the *grand scope of all their enquiries and disputes* He has in mind the excessive skepticism or *Pyrrhonism* from which he tries to distinguish a mitigated and beneficial form of skepticism Referring to Berkeley s arguments against the *independent reality of matter or bodies* Hume says their effect is skeptical despite Berkeley s professed intention to the contrary That his arguments are skeptical appears from this *that they admit of no answer and produce no conviction* Their only effect is to cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion which is the result of skepticism

Here and elsewhere as in his comment on *Descartes skeptical method of doubting every thing* which can be doubted Hume does not seem to think that excessive skepticism is refutable or even false But it is impractical The great subverter of *Pyrrhonism* or the excessive *principles of skepticism* he says is action and employment and the occupations of life Extreme skepticism becomes untenable in thought the moment thought must face the choices of life and take some responsibility for *action*

There is however a more *mitigated* skepticism or *academical* philosophy which may be both durable and useful This according to Hume *consists in* becoming sensible of the strange *infirmities* of human understanding and consequently in the limitation of our *enquiries to such subjects as are best adapted to* the narrow capacity of human understanding

His own view of the extent and certainty of human knowledge seems to him to exemplify such mitigated skepticism in operation The *only objects with respect to which demonstration is possible are quantity and number* Mathematics has the certitude of knowledge but it deals only with relations between ideas not with what Hume calls matters of fact and existence Such matters are evidently incapable of demonstration This is the sphere of moral certainty which is not a genuine certainty but only a degree of probability *sufficient for action* Probabilities are the best the *experimental reasoning or inquiry* about matters *of fact can achieve If probability* is characteristic of opinion rather than knowledge then we can have nothing better than opinion concerning real existences

THE DIAMETRICAL opposite to the extreme of skepticism would have to be a dogmatism which placed *no objects* beyond the reach of human knowledge which made no distinction between *degrees of knowability and admitted equal certitude* in all matters Like excessive skepticism this extreme is not a position actually held in the great books All the great thinkers who have *considered* the problem of human knowledge *have set limits to man s capacity for knowledge* They have placed certain objects beyond man s *power to apprehend at all* or have distinguished *between those which he can apprehend in some inadequate fashion but cannot comprehend* They have indicated other objects concerning *which his grasp is adequate and certain*

They all adopt a mitigated skepticism —to *use Hume s phrase—if this can be taken to mean* avoiding the extremes of saying that nothing is knowable at all and that everything is equally knowable But they differ in the criteria they employ *to set the limits of knowledge and to* distinguish between the areas of certainty and probability Consequently they differ in their determination of the knowability of certain types of objects *such as God or the infinite* substance or cause *matter or spirit* the real or the ideal *the self or the thing in itself*

For exampl Plato and Aristotle agree that knowledge must be separated from opinion and even appeal to certain common principles in making that separation but they do not define the scope of knowledge in the same way as is indicated by the r disagreement about the knowability of sens ble things. Nor do Descartes and Locke Bacon and Spinoza Hume and Kant agree bout the knowability of God or of the soul or about the conditions any object must meet in order to be knowable All alike proceed from a desire to be critical. Each criticizes what other men have proposed as knowledge and each proposes a new method by which the pursuit of knowledge will be safeguarded from illusory hopes or endless controversy

In this last respect the moderns depart most rad ca y from their mediaeval and ancient predecessors. At all times men have been interested in examining knowledge itself as well as in examining their powers to know But in the earlier phase of the tradition knowledge about knowledge does not seem to take preced nce over all other inquiries or to be prerequis te to them. On the contrary the ancients proceed as if the study of knowledge necessarily presupposed the existence of knowledge With them the examination takes place because the mind is essentially reflexive rather than for reasons of self criticism. But beginning with Descartes *Discourse on the Method* in which a method of universal doubt is proposed to clear the ground before the foundations of the sciences can be laid the consideration of knowing is put before any a tempt to know

Sometimes, as with Descartes and Bacon the emphasis is upon a new method which will at last establish knowledge on a firm footing o ad vance learnin Sometimes, as with Locke and Hume, attention is gi en first of all to th faculty of understandin, itself.

If we can find out " says Locke how far the understandin can extend its views, how far it has faculties to attain certainty and in what cases t can only judge and guess, we may learn to content oursel es with what is attainable by us in this state When we know our own strength, we hall the better know what to underta e with hopes of success and when we ha e well surveyed the powers of our own minds, and mad some estimate of what we may expect from them we shall not be inclined either to sit still and not set our thoughts to work at all in despair of knowin, anything nor on the other side question everything and disclaim all knowledge because some things are not to be understood

Hume also proposes that a study of human understanding precede everything else to show from an exact analysis of its powers and capacity" what subjects it is or is not fitted to investigate "There is a truth and falsehood in all propositions on this subject which l e not beyond the compass of human understanding" No one can doubt that a science of the mind—or knowledge about knowing—is possible unless he entertains "such a skepticism as is entirely subversive of all speculations, and even action."

Disagreeing with the principles of Locke and Hume as well as with their conclus ons Kant does approve the priority they give to the question of the possibility of knowing certain objects. To proceed otherwise as Kant charges most other philosophers with doing is dogmatism The us of the word *critique* in the title of Kant s three major works signifies his intention to construct a critical philosophy which does not presume that it is possible to achieve anything in metaphysic without a previous criticism of pure reason. He does not object to what he calls the dogmatical procedure of reason in the development of science but only after reason s self-criticism has determined just how far reason can go For Kant as for Bacon, dogmatism and skepticism are the opposite excesses which only a critical method can avoid

THESE two different approaches to the theory of knowledge seem to result in different conclusions concerning the nature and scope of human knowledge Those who begin with the established sciences and merely inquire into their foundations and methods, appear to end with unqualified confidence in man s ability to know Those who make the inquiry into the foundations and methods of science a necessary preparation for the development of the sciences, tend for the most part to set narrower boundaries to the area of valid knowledge The two approaches also affect the way in which the various kinds of knowledge are distinguished and compared

There are two sorts of comparison involved

in the classification of kinds of knowledge One is a comparison of human knowledge with divine or with angelic knowledge and the knowledge of brute animals The other is a comparison of the parts or modes of human knowledge according to such criteria as the objects to be known the faculties engaged in the process of knowing and the manner of their operation Though made separately those two comparisons are seldom independent of one another As the nature of man is conceived in relation to other beings superior or inferior to himself his faculties will be rated accordingly and his power as a knower will suggest the methods or means available to him for knowing

Aquinas for example attributes to man the kind of knowledge appropriate to his station in the hierarchy of beings Man is superior to the brutes because he has a faculty of reason in addition to the faculties of sense and imagination which he shares with them Man is inferior to purely spiritual beings—the angels and God—because since he is corporeal his intellect cannot function independently of his bodily senses and imagination Unlike the angels and God he is not a purely intellectual being

Accordingly the essential characteristics of human knowledge are first that it is always both sensitive and intellectual never merely sense perception as with the brutes or pure intellectual intuition as with the angels second that its appropriate object is the physical world of sensible material things with respect to which the senses enable man to know the existence of individuals while the intellect apprehends their universal natures and finally that the way in which the human mind knows the natures of things is abstractive and discursive for the intellect draws its concepts from sense and imagination and proceeds therefrom by means of judgment and reasoning

This analysis denies innate ideas It denies man s power to apprehend ideas intuitively or to use them intuitively in the apprehension of things It can find no place for a distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori* knowledge since sense perception and rational activity contribute elements to every act of knowing It affirms that knowledge is primarily of real existence not of the relations between ideas but it does not limit human knowledge to the changing temporal things of the material universe Though these are the objects man is able to know with greatest adequacy he can also know something of the existence and nature of immaterial and eternal beings

Yet according to Aquinas even when man s knowledge rises above the realm of experienceable things it is obtained by the same natural processes and involves the cooperation of the senses with reason The theologian does however distinguish sharply between knowledge gained through man s own efforts and knowledge received through divine revelation In addition to all knowledge acquired by the natural exercise of his faculties man may be elevated by the supernatural gift of knowledge—the wisdom of a faith surpassing reason

The foregoing summary illustrates in the case of one great doctrine the connection between an analysis of the kinds of knowledge and a theory of the nature and faculties of man in relation to all other things There is no point in this analysis which is not disputed by someone—by Plato or Augustine Descartes Spinoza or Locke by Hume Kant or William James There are many points on which others agree—not only Aristotle and Bacon but even Augustine Descartes and Locke

These agreements or disagreements about the kinds of knowledge or the scope of human knowledge its faculties and its methods seldom occur or are intelligible except in the wider context of agreements and disagreements in theology and metaphysics psychology and logic Hence most of the matters considered under the heading kinds of knowledge receive special consideration in other chapters The Cross References should enable the reader to examine the presuppositions or context of the materials assembled here

THE CULT OF IGNORANCE receives little or no attention in the tradition of the great books Even those who like Rousseau glorify the innocence of the primitives or who satirize the folly so often admixed with human wisdom and the foibles attending the advance of learning do not seriously question the ancient saying that all men by nature desire to know Nor is it generally doubted that knowledge is good that its possession contributes to the happiness of men

and the welfare of the state that its pursuit by the individual and its dissemination in a society should be facilitated by education by the support and freedom of scholars and scientists and by every device which can assist men in communicating what they know to one another

But knowledge is not valued by all for the same reason. That knowledge is useful to the productive artist to the statesman to the legislator and to the individual in the conduct of his life seems to be assumed in discussions of the applications of science in the various arts in the consideration of statecraft and in the analysis of virtue In this last connection the problem is not whether knowledge is morally useful, but whether knowledge of good and evil is identical with virtue so that sin and vice result from error or ignorance

If there is a negative opinion here it consists in saying that knowledge is not enough. To know is not to do Something more than knowledge is required for acting well.

The more radical dispute about the value of knowledge concerns the goodness of knowledge for its own sake without any regard to its technical or moral utility Is the contemplation of the truth an *ultimate end* or does the goodness of knowledge always consist in its power to effect results in the mastery of nature and the guidance of conduct? The utility of knowledge is seldom denied by those who make speculative wisdom and theoretic science good in themselves, even the highest goods quite apart from any use to which they may be put The contrary position however does not admit the special value of contemplation or the separation of truth from utility To those who say that the contemplation of truth is more dignified and exalted than any utility or extent of effects Francis Bacon replies that truth and utility are perfectly identical and the effects are more of value as pledges of truth than from the benefit they confer on men

How knowledge and action are related is one question how knowledge itself is divided into the speculative and practical is quite another Bacon for example insists upon *the necessity of distinguishing the speculative and practical* branches of natural philosophy—concerned with the search after causes and the production of effects Unlike Aristotle and Kant he does not use the word practical for the kind of knowledge which is contained in such sciences as ethics or politics but only for the applied sciences or technology Ethics and politics fall *under* what he calls civil philosophy

Despite these differences in language the way *in which Bacon divides the whole sphere of* knowledge closely resembles Aristotle's tripartite classification of the sciences as theoretic productive (or technical) and practical (or moral) and *no less a similar threefold* division by *Kant* But Kant and Aristotle (and it should be added Aquinas) give a more elaborate analy*sis of these three types of knowledge* especially with regard to the principles appropriate to each the nature of the judgments and reasoning by which they are developed and the character *and criteria* of their truth

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

in the classification of kinds of knowledge One is a comparison of human knowledge with divine or with angelic knowledge and the knowledge of brute animals The other is a comparison of the parts or modes of human knowledge according to such criteria as the objects to be known the faculties engaged in the process of knowing and the manner of their operation Though made separately those two comparisons are seldom independent of one another As the nature of man is conceived in relation to other beings superior or inferior to himself his faculties will be rated accordingly and his power as a knower will suggest the methods or means available to him for knowing

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2 Man s n tural desire and power to know

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and pa numbers of the passages referred to For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad* BK II [265 283] 12d th number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b th passage *begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119* When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the l ft hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upp r and lower halves of the right hand sid of the page For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the pa sage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164

AUTHOR S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers, in brackets are given in cer tain cases *e g Iliad* BK II [265-283] 12d

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the Kin *James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows e g* OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah 7 45—(D) II Esdras 7 46*

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface

1 The nature of knowledge the relation between knower and known the issue concerning the representative or intentional character of knowledge

7 PLATO *Cratylus* 113c 114a c / *Phaedrus* 124c 126c esp 126a c / *Meno* 179d 183a esp 180a b 182c 183a 188d 189b / *Phaedo* 228a 230d 231b 232b / *Republic* BK III 333b d BK V 371b 37 c BK VI-VII 383d 398c esp BK VII 397a 398c / *Timaeus* 476b / *Theaetetus* 515d 517b 521d 522b 538d 541a / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810d

8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 7 [6b1-6] 11a [,b 22 8 12] 12c 13a CH 8 [11 20 39] 16b c / *Interpretation* CH 1 [16 4 9] 25a / *Topics* BK IV CH 1 [121 1-6] 168d CH 4 [124b15 19] 173c [124b27-34] 173c d BK VI CH 5 [143 9 12] 196c CH 6 [145 12 18] 198d CH 8 [146 37-b9] 200b-c CH 12 [149b3 23] 203d 204a / *Physics* BK VII CH 3 [247b1 248a6] 330b d / *Metaphysics* BK V CH 15 [10 1a2- b3] 542c d BK IX CH 6 [1048b18 34] 574a c CH 9 [1051 22 34] 577b c BK X CH 1 [1053a32-b3] 580a BK XII CH 7 [107 b14 29] 602d 603a CH 9 605a d BK XIII CH 10 [1087 10 25] 619c / *Soul* BK I CH 5 [409b18 411a7] 639c 641a BK II CH 2 [414 4-14] 644a b CH 5 [416b32 417a2] 647b [417 17-21] 647d [418a2-6] 648c d BK III CH 2 [425b17 26] 657d 658a CH 3 [427a16-b6] 659c d CH 4 661b 662c CH 5 [430 14 16] 662c [430 20-22] 662d CH 7 [431a1-8] 663c CH 8 664b d / *Memory and Reminiscence* CH 1 [450 25-451 19] 691a 692b

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VI CH 1 [1139 6-11] 387c

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [26-109] 44b-45c [722-817] 53d 54d

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR I CH 7 3d-4a / *Third Ennead* TR VIII CH 6 132a CH 8 132d 133b CH 9 134a b / *Fifth Ennead* TR I CH 4 210b c TR III CH 4-5 217b 218c CH 10-13 221b 224b TR V CH 1 2 228b 229d TR IX CH 7 249b c / *Sixth Ennead* TR VII CH 36-41 339c 342c

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X par 11 38 74a 81a esp par 17 75c d par 19 76a b par 22 24 76d 77c par 27 28 78b d / *City of God* BK VIII CH 6 269b / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 38 654c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 3 REP 1 16a d Q 5 A 4 REP 1 25d 26c Q 8 A 3 REP 3 36b 37c Q 12 A 1 REP 4 50c 51c A 2 51c 52c A 4 ANS and REP 1 53b 54c AA 9-10 58b 59d Q 13 A 7 A 5 and REP 6 68d 70d Q 14 A 1 ANS and REP 3 75d 76c A 76d 77d

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 5 110b-c
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X, par 10 73d 74a par 19 76a b BK XII par 5 100a b / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 36 634d-635b BK II CH 38 654c
19 AQ S *Summa Theologica* PART I Q I A I RE I 2 3b-4a Q 2 A I ANS and REP I 3 10d 11d Q 13 A 12 REP 3 74c 75b Q 14 A 8 RE 3 82c 83b A 9 REP I 83b-d A 12 ANS and R P 3 85d 86d A 15 REP 3 89b-90b QQ 16-17 94b-104b Q 54 A 2 A S and REP 2 285d 286c A 5 288a d Q 57 A I REP 2 295 d Q 58 5 303c 304c Q 59 A 2 EP 3 307 308b Q 60 A I REP 3 310b 311a Q 79, A 9 REP 3 4 422b-423d Q 84 6 REP I 447c-449a A 7 R P 3 449b-450b Q 85 A I REP I 451c 453c A 2 ANS 453d-455b A 6 458d-459c A 7 ANS 459c-460b Q 88 A 3 R I 472 -473a Q 89 A 5 ANS 477a-478b Q 94 A 4 505a 506a Q 101 A I REP 2 522c 523a Q 117 A I ANS 595d 597c PART I II Q 2 2 A S 721c 722c
20 AQUI AS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 93 A 2 ANS 216c 217b PA T III SUPPL, Q 92 3 8 1034b-1037c
21 DA T *Dvine Comedy* PA DISE I [115]-[2] 111d 112b
23 HO ES *Le ath* RT I 56b-d 58d 60a 8a d
25 MONT IG E *Essays* 150d 151a 238c d
30 B C N *Novum Org m* BK I A 39 45 109c 110b
31 D CA TES *Rule* I II 1a 3b XII 24a-c / *Discourse* P T I 52a / *Meditat ns* I 75 77c I 89a 93a / *Objectio s and Replies* 126a b 168b-d
31 S OZA *Ethics* P RT II P OP 43 SCHOL 388d 389b
33 P CAL *Pensées* 263 221a b 327 231a b / *V cuum* 358b
35 LOC E *Huma Understa d g* BK IV CH 329 331b esp SECT 8-9 330d 331a CH VI ECT 16 336d XX CT I 388d
42 KANT *Pure Re so* 224 -c
46 H G *Ph l s phy f Right* P 7a INTRO par I 9 T I par 4 52c 54a
53 J MES *Psychol gy* 141 142a
54 F EU *Gener l In roduct o* 560c 561 / *New In r duct ry Le t res* 879 d

4b Kn wl dg hel ef d op nion, the re-lat n di t ct on

6 THU ID S *P l p nesian War* BK I 353d 354b
7 PLATO *Cratyl* 113c 114a c / *Phaedrus* 125a 125c / *Symp si m* 163b / *Meno* 188b 189 / *Gorgia* 256b 257a / *Rep blic* BK V 354d 355 K 370c 373c K VI VII 383d 398c S 430d-431d / *Tim eus* 447b-d 450b-c 457 -d / *Th tet* 531 532a 534a 536b 549d / *S ph st* 559c 561d / *Ph lebus* 632d 635
8 A ISTOTLE *Categories* CH 7 [8 35 b14] 13b-c / *Prior A alytics* BK I CH 13 [32b4 23] 48b d / *Po terior Analytics* BK I CH 2 [1b8 16] 97d 98a CH 33 121b 122 c / *Topics* BK IV CH I [121 20-26] 169a b / *Metaphysics* BK IV C I 4 [1008b27 32] 528b BK VII CH 15 [1039b31 1040a8] 563d 564a BK IX CH 10 577c 578a c / *Soul* BK III C I 3 [427a16-428b9] 659c 660d
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10 HIPPOCRATE *The Law* par 4 144d
11 NICOM CHUS *Arithmetic* BK I 811 d
17 PLOTI US *F fth Ennead* TR IX CH 7 219b-c
18 AUGUSTINE *Co fessio s* BK I par I 1a b BK VI par 5-8 36b-37c / *City f God* BK XXII CH 4-5 588b 590a CH 7 591c-d / *Christ an Doctrine* BK I CH 40 636a c BK II CH 7 638d 639c
19 AQUIN S *Summa Theol gica* PART I Q I A 8 RE 2 7c 8d Q 12 A ANS and REP 2 3 56a 57b A 13 REP 3 61c 62b Q 14 A 15 REP 3 89b 90b Q 16 A 8 99d 100d Q 57 A 3 ANS 297b-298a Q 79 A 9 REP 3 4 422b-423d Q 108 A 7 REP 2 560b-561a P RT I II Q 17 A 6 NS 690b-d
20 AQUINA *Summa Theologica* P RT I II Q 5 3 14b 15 Q 53 A I ANS 19d 21a Q 57 A 2 RE 3 36a 37b Q 67 A 3 83b 84d Q 77 A 2 RE 3 145d 147c P RT II II Q I AA 4-5 382c 384b Q 2 390d-400b Q 4 A I 402a-403d P T III Q 9 A 3 REP 2 765b-766b
21 D NTE *Dvine Comedy* P RADISE XX [67 148] 137b-138b esp [88-93] 137c
22 C UCER *Tro lus and Cresnda* K IV ST ZA 29 92b
23 HOBBES *Le atha* P RT I 58d 59a 65b-66c P T III 241c 242a
25 MO T IGN *Essays* 80b 82b 98b 99 150c 151a 238c 239c 240c 246a 258c 261c 267c 268a 271b-273b
28 H R E O *A imal Generat on* 333c d 335 b
30 B CON *Advancement of Learn g* 16a b 95d 96
31 DE C RT S *Rules* II III 2 5 / *Disco se* P T I 64a d / *Med tations* 72b d I 75a 77 V 95b 96a / *Object ns and Repl s* 123 d 167 d 218c d 226d
31 S I OZA *Eth cs* P T I APPENDIX 369b 372d RT PRO 40 SC OL 2 388a b 49 S HOL 391d 394d
32 MILTON *A p git ca* 406 b
33 P C *Pensees* 99 191a
35 LOCKE *H man U derst d g* INTRO SECT 2-5 93b 94d K CH III S CT 23 25 119b-120d K IV II SECT 307 III CT 14 312b CH I S CT 13 335c d CH XIV XV

(2 *Man's natural desire and power to know.*)

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK V 335b c
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 130b 151d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 157b-158a
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [354-517] 11a 14b [522-601] 15a 16b [1765 1784] 42b
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 4b 5a
53 JAMES *Psychology* 522b 525a esp 524b 525a 711b 712b 729a 730a 851b 852a
54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psycho Analysis* 16b

3 Principles of knowledge

7 PLATO *Phaedo* 228a 230c / *Republic* BK III 333b d BK IV 350d 351b BK VI-VII 383d 398c / *Theaetetus* 544d 547c / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810d
8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK II CH 19 136a 137a c / *Physics* BK I CH 1 259a b CH 5 [188ᵇ26-189 9] 264b-c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 1 499a 500b BK V CH 1 [1013 14 23] 533b CH 6 [1016ᵇ18-25] 537b / *Soul* BK II CH 2 [413 11-13] 643a
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VI CH 3 [1139ᵇ25 34] 388c CH 6 389d
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [690-700] 9c BK IV [469-521] 50b 51a
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 1 1a b BK IV par 25 25c BK V par 4 27d 28a BK X par 65 87d 88a BK XIII par 46 123a-c / *City of God* BK VIII CH 4 7 266d 269d CH 9-10 270d 271d BK X CH 2 299d 300a BK XI CH 7 326a c CH 24 25 335c 336d CH 27 29 337b 339b BK XIX CH 18 523a b / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 37-40 635b 636a c BK II CH 7 638d 639c BK III CH 37 674a d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 2 A 1 ANS and REP 1 3 10d 11d Q 15 91b 94a passim esp A 3 ANS 93b 94a Q 18 A 2 ANS 105c 106b Q 84 AA 4-6 444d-449a Q 85 A 3 455b 457a Q 88 A 3 REP 1 472c-473a Q 105 A 3 540c 541b PART I II Q 1 A 4 REP 2 612a 613a A 5 ANS 613a 614a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 50 A 3 REP 3 8b 9a Q 51 A 1 ANS 12b 13c PART III Q 11 A 6 REP 3 775d 776b
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVIII [49 60] 80b c PARADISE IV [28 48] 111a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 285c 286a
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 332a 335c esp 333d 334d
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 39d-40a 58b / *Novum Organum* BK I APH 14 107d 108a APH 39-40 109c
31 DESCARTES *Rules* I 1a 2a IX 5c d 6d VI 8d 9a VIII 13c d / *Discourse* PART IV 51b 54b / *Meditations* II 77d 81d / *Objections and Replies* 224b d
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 37-40 386b-388b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH III SECT 23 120a BK II CH I 121a 127d passim esp SECT 1-8 121a 123a SECT 2- 25 127a d CH VII SECT 10 133a b CH IX SECT 15-CH X SECT - 141a-c CH X SECT 8 142d 143a CH XII 147b 148d CH XIV SECT 2 155b-c CH XVII SECT 2-CH XVIII SECT 1 173d 174a CH XVIII SECT 6 174c-d CH XXII SECT 9 202c 203a CH XXV SECT 9 216d SECT 11 217a BK III CH I SECT 5 252b-c CH XI SECT 23 305a b BK IV CH I SECT 9-CH II SECT 1 308c 309d CH II SECT 7-8 310d-311a CH III SECT 1 2 313a CH VII 337a 344d esp SECT 1 337a SECT 10-11 339b 340a CH XII SECT 1-6 358c 360a SECT 15 363a b
35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO SECT 4 405c d SECT 25 412a c SECT 1 2 413a b SECT 25-33 417d 419a SECT 89 430b-c
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT II 455b-457b esp DIV 13-14 455d-456b SECT VII DIV 49 471c d DIV 61 477c
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 338c 339b
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 34a 35b 66d 72c esp 67d 68a / *Practical Reason* 343a / *Judgement* 492c d 517d [fn 2] 550a 551a c 562a d 570b 572b 577b 578a d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO par 2 9b-10a
53 JAMES *Psychology* 213b 214a 299a 300a 315a 319a esp 317b 318a 360a 453a-459b esp 453b-454a 455a-457a 859a 860b
54 FREUD *Ego and Id* 700a 701d

4 Knowledge in relation to other states of mind

4a Knowledge and truth the differentiation of knowledge error and ignorance

7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b / *Meno* 179b 183a esp 180d 181d 182c d 188c 189b / *Apology* 201d 202d / *Gorgias* 256b / *Republic* BK V 368c 373c BK VI-VII 383d 398c / *Timaeus* 447b d 450b c 457c d / *Parmenides* 490b-d / *Theaetetus* 535c 536a 542a 544a / *Sophist* 557c 558b / *Laws* BK IX 748a
8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK II CH 21 87d 89b / *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 6 [75 1 18] 103a CH 16-18 109b 111c / *Topics* BK VI CH 9 [147 16-21] 201a b [147ᵇ26-148ᵃ9] 201d 202a CH 14 [151 3- ᵇ3] 206b-c / *Metaphysics* BK II CH 1 511b d 512b BK IV CH 7 [1011ᵇ 25 29] 531c [1012 1 17] 531d 532a BK V CH 29 [1024ᵇ27 38] 546d 547a BK VI CH 4 550a c BK IX CH 10 577c 578a c BK XII CH 10 [1075ᵇ20-24] 606c / *Soul* BK III CH 3 [427 16-ᵇ6] 659c d
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VI CH 9 [1142ᵇ7 12] 391d / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 1 [1355ᵃ21 39] 594c d
11 ARCHIMEDES *Sphere and Cylinder* BK I 403b
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [469-521] 50b 51a

Q 6, 1 REP 2 184a-d P T II-II Q 23 A 6 E 1 487 -d Q 2 4 523, 524
21 DANTE Divine Comedy PL G TORY X II [-5] 8c-9b P R DIS IV [115]- [12] 111d 112b X VI [25 36] 146a XXVIII [SS-114] 149c 150a
26 SHAKESPEARE Love's Labour's Lost ACT IV SC III [59-363] 271c 272a
31 DESCARTES Objections and Replies 227b-c
31 SPINOZA Ethics PART II AXIOM 3 3 3d PROP 48-49 391a 394d PART PROP 24 33 438d-460c PROP 34, CO 460d PROP 35 37 450d-461 PROP 4 463b-d
33 PASCAL Geometrical Demonstration 440a

The extent or limits of human knowledge

5a. The knowable the unknowable and the unknown, the knowability of certain objects

7 PLATO Meno 179d 183a esp 180a / Parmenides 489d-491a 492a 504c esp 495b-c, 504c 50 c-d 509d 510b esp 510b 511c-d / Theaetetus 54-c 547c / Sophist 560a b
8 ARISTOTLE Interpretation CH 3 [6b19-26] 2d 5a / Physics K CH 4 [9a5] 2 3a / Metaphysics K I CH 2 [98 30-b3] 500c-d BK T CH 2 548c 549c BK II CH 10 [1 36 9-12] 5 9c CH 15 563c 564c
9 ARISTOTLE Parts of Animals BK I CH 5 [644b-645a5] 168c-d
L EPICTETUS Discourses K II CH 20 164c 166c
17 PLOTINUS Fifth Ennead, TR III 215d 226c esp CH 13 223d 224b
18 AUGUSTINE Confessions K I par 1-6 1a 2c / City of God BK XI CH 2 323a-c K XII CH 7 3-6c-d BK XXI CH 5 563d 564d
19 AQUINAS Summa Theologica P T I, Q 3 4 EP 16d 17c Q 5 A 2, A. S 24b-25a Q 12, A 1 50c 51 Q 14, A 3 AN 77d 78b A 10 A 1 A.d EP 4 83d-84c Q 6, A 3 96b-d Q 5 2, A. 270a 272 Q 55 A 1 REP 2 289a-d Q 5- A 3 A. S 297b-298a Q 79, A 3 416a 417 Q 84 A 2, A. 442b-443c Q 8 464d 468d passim
20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica ART III, Q 10 A 3 769d 771b ART II SUPPL, Q 9., A 1 102c 1032b
21 DANTE Divine Comedy H LL, II [61-96] 10b-c URG. TO Y 1 [6-45] 56a b P R. E, XIX [2.-99] 13 b-136a XXI [,3 1] 139a b
25 MONTAIGNE Essays 80b-82b 98b-99a 238c 239c 246a 261 passim 271b-273a 291b-294b 439c-440a
27 SHAKESPEARE Hamlet ACT III C 1 [56-88] 47 -d
28 HARVEY On Animal Generation 363d 364 393b 492
30 BACON Advancement of Learning 2c-4c 95d-97b / Novum Organum K I APH 107a
31 DESCARTES Rules II 2a 3b VIII 12 14a XII 22b-c / Meditations 0 I 90a b / Objections and Replies 112a-d 215a b
31 SPINOZA Ethics P RT I P OP 30 366c d APPENDIX 369b-372d P RT II XIOM 5 373d
32 MILTON Paradise Lost BK V [544-576] 18 a b BK VII [109-13] 219b-220a BK III [114 130] 234b-235a [1-9-214] 236a b / Samson Agonistes [60-6] 340b-341a
33 PASCAL Pensées 72 181 184b 263 221a b
35 LOCKE Human Understanding INTRO, SECT 3-7 93d-95c BK II C I I SECT 1-8 121 123a SECT 4 127b-c CH II SECT 3 128b-c CH VII SECT 10 133a b CH XI SECT 26 160c d CH X SECT II 165a b CH XXII, SECT 9 202c 203a CH XXIII 204a 214b passim CH XXXI SECT 6-13 240d 243b CH XXXII SECT 24 247c-d BK III CH III S CT 15 18 258b-259c CH VI 268b-283 passim BK I CH III 313a 323d CH VI SECT 4 16 331d 336d passim CH VIII SECT 9 347d 348a CH X CT 19 354a-c CH XII SECT 7 13 360b-362d CH X I SECT 12 3 0b-371 CH X II SECT 9-10 377d 3 8a S CT 23 380b-c H X III SECT 383b
35 BERKELEY Human Knowledge INTRO, SECT 2 3 405b-c SECT 81 428c-d SECT 89 430b-c
35 HUME Human Understanding SECT I DIV 1 453c-455b SECT I DIV 6 460b-c CT VI I DIV 62 4 8c SECT IX DIV 84 488b [fn 1] CT X 1 503c 509d
40 GIBBON Decline and Fall 159a-c 308 d
42 KANT Pure Reason 1a-4a c 19d 20c 117b-118a 120c 121a 1 5b [fn 1] 215d 216c 224 -c / Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals 281 282d 285a 287d / Practical Reason 292 -c 296a-d 309b 337a-c 354d 355d / Judgement 465a-c 564a-c 599d-600d 604a b
47 GOETHE Faust PART I [6-2-6 5] 18a PART II [1,431 432] 2 8b
48 MELVILLE Moby Dick 366a b
53 JAMES Psychology 116a 119b esp 117b 119b 122b 223b-224a 6 6b-657a 822b
54 FREUD Interpretation of Dreams 383b-c

5a(1) God as an object of knowledge

OLD TESTAMENT Exodus 33 12 23 / Deuteronomy 34 1 / I Chronicles 28:9—(D) I Paralipomenon 28:9 / Job 11:7-9 6 14 36:26 38 42:6 / Psalms 19 1 4 46 10 83 18 100 3 —(D) Psalms 18 1-5 45 11 82 9 99 3 / Proverbs 25 / Ecclesiastes 3 11 8 16-1 11 5 / Isaiah, 9 49:22 6 60 6—(D) Isaias 9 49:2 6 60 16 / Jeremiah 24- 3 34 —(D) Jeremias 24:7 31 34 / Ezekiel 6:9-1 13 4 28:22 26—(D) Ezechiel, 6:9-10,13 4 28:22 6 / Hosea 2:2 6:2 3 6—(D) Osee 2:2 6 3 6
APOCRYPHA Wisdom of Solomon, 8 1 4 9 3 16 13 1-9—(D) OT Book of Wisdom 8:1 4 9 13 6 13 1-9 / II Maccabees 7:28—(D) OT II Machabees 7:28

(4 *Knowledge in relation to other states of mind* 4b *Knowledge belief and opinion their relation or distinction*)

364b 366c esp CH XV SECT 1-3 365a d CH XVI SECT 14 371b c CH XVII SECT 2 371d 372b SECT 14-24 378c 380d passim CH XVIII XIX 380d 388d

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT IV 458a 463d passim esp DIV 20-21 458a c DIV 30 461d-462b SECT VI 469d [fn 1]

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART IV 165a b

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK V 335d 336a

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 2a 4a c 228c d 240b 243c / *Judgement* 601d 607c esp 601d 602a 603a b 603d 604b 604d 606d

43 MILL *Liberty* 274b 293b passim

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PREF 1a 7d passim INTRO par 1 9a PART II par 132 46b c PART III par 147 55d 56a par 316 104c ADDITIONS 1 115a d

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK I 11a b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 636a 638b passim

54 FREUD *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 661c 662a / *New Introductory Lectures* 881d 882b

4c The distinction between knowledge and fancy or imagination

7 PLATO *Ion* 142a 148a c / *Republic* BK VI-VII 383d 389c BK X 427c 431d esp 430b 431b / *Sophist* 577a b / *Laws* BK IV 684b c / *Seventh Letter* 809b 810b

8 ARISTOTLE *Soul* BK III CH 3 659c 661b

14 PLUTARCH *Coriolanus* 191d 192b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK III par 10-11 15b 16a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 12 A 3 ANS and REP 3 52c 53b A 11 REP 1 59d 60d A 13 ANS and REP 2 61c 62b Q 17 A 2 REP 2 102a d Q 54 A 5 288a d Q 57 A 1 REP 2 295a d Q 78 A 4 ANS 411d 413d Q 84 A 2 REP 1 442b-443c A 6 REP 1-2 447c-449a A 7 REP 2 449b 450b A 8 REP 2 450b 451b Q 93 A 6 REP 4 496b 498a PART I II Q 17 A 7 REP 3 690d 692a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL Q 70 A 2 REP 3 896a 897d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVII [13-45] 78c 79a

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 335a c

29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 189d 193c PART II 205a 209d 273c 278a 326c 331a

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 32d 33c d 38d 39b 55a d / *Novum Organum* BK I APH 15 108a APH 60 112c 113a / *New Atlantis* 203a

31 DESCARTES *Rules* III 4a b VIII 13a 14b XIV 29b 31c / *Discourse* PART IV 53b 54a b / *Meditations* I 75d 76c II 79a 81d III 82d 86a VI 96b 103d passim esp 96b d / *Objections and Replies* 122c d 136d 137a 212a 218c d 219b-c

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 17 COROL 381a PROP 17 SCHOL-PROP 18 381b 382b PROP 26 384a b PROP 40 SCHOL 1 387b 388a PROP 44 389b 390a PROP 49 SCHOL 391d 394d passim PART V PROP 34 460c d

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK V [95-128] 177b-178a BK VIII [179-197] 236a b

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 82-86 186b 189a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXX 238a 239b BK IV CH IV SECT 1-12 323d 326d passim esp SECT 1-3 323d 324c SECT 18 328d 329a CH V SECT 7-8 330b d

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 29-30 418c SECT 33 419a SECT 36 419c d SECT 82 428d 429a SECT 84 429b c SECT 86 429c d

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT V DIV 39-40 466c 467c

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 345c

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 173b 174a / *Judgement* 528c 529c 532b d 575b c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 220c 221a

53 JAMES *Psychology* 639a 641a 646b 655a 659a 660b

4d Knowledge and love

7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 126a 129d / *Symposium* 164d 165b 167a d

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III CH 10d / *Third Ennead* TR V CH 3 102a b CH 7 104a-c / *Sixth Ennead* TR VII CH 34 35 338b 339c

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 1-6 1a 2c BK X par 33 35 79d 80c par 38 81a BK XI par 3 89d 90a / *City of God* BK VIII CH 4 5 267c 268b CH 8 10 270a 271d BK X CH 3 300b 301a BK XI CH 7 326a c CH 25 29 336b 339b BK XIV CH 28 397a d / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 36-40 634d 636a c BK II CH 7 638d 639c CH 38 654c CH 41 42 656a d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 1 A 6 REP 3 6b 7a A 8 REP 2 7c 8d Q 8 A 3 REP 3 36b 37c Q 12 A 6 ANS 55b 56a A 7 REP 1 56a 57b Q 14 A 15 REP 1 89b 90b Q 16 A 1 ANS 94b 95c A 4 esp ANS and REP 1 97a-c Q 23 A 4 135a d Q 27 AA 3 5 155c 157c Q 28 A 4 ANS 160c 161d Q 30 A 2 REP 2 168a 169b Q 35 A 2 ANS 189d 190d Q 36 A 2 ANS and REP 4-5 192a 194c Q 37 197c 200c Q 59 A 2 307c 308b Q 60 A 1 REP 3 310b 311a A 2 311a d A 3 ANS and REP 3 311d 312b A 5 REP 5 313b 314c Q 64 A 1 ANS 334a 335c Q 78 A 1 ANS and REP 3 407b-409a Q 82 A 3 ANS and REP 3 433c 434c Q 87 A 1 REP 1 465a-466c Q 93 AA 7-8 498a 500c PART I II Q 1 A 8 615a c Q 3 A 4 625a 626b Q 22 A 2 ANS 721c 722c Q 27 A 2 737d 738c Q 28 A 1 esp REP 3 740b 741a A 2 ANS and REP 2 741a 742a A 3 ANS and REP 1 742a d A 4 REP 2 742d 743c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 50 A 5 REP 1 10b d Q 66 A 6 REP 1 80c 81b

31 DESCARTES *Meditations* 74a c 1-11 75a 81d esp 11 81b-c / *Objections and Replies* 120b c 12 c POSTULAT 11 131 152b d 155d

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 72 184a b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH X SECT 11 16 b CH XXIII 204a 214b passim, esp SECT 5 205a b SECT 15 208c d, SECT 9 211d 212a BK III CH 1 SECT 11 1 271b-272b CH XI SECT 23 30 a b K I CH III SECT 6 313c 315b SECT 9-1 315c 317c passim, esp SECT 1, 317c SECT 23 2 320a 322a CH I SECT 14 335d 336b CH X SECT 19 354 CH XI SECT 1 357c d CH X 1 SECT 1 3 0b 371a

3 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 16-20 415 41 a SECT 25 27 417d-418b SECT 86-89 429c-430c esp SECT 89 430b-c SECT 135 48 440a-442d

3 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT XI IV 1 06a

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK 336b-c

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 136b-d / *Practical Reason* 319c 321b / *Judgement* 603 -d

5a(3) Cause and substance as objects of knowledge

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK II CH 4 [196b5 /] 273a / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 2 [983a5 10] 501b III CH [996a 3-b 6] 514d 515b CH 4 [999a-4 9] 518a CH 6 [1003a5] 521d 522a,c BK CH 15 563c 564c K X C 2 [1060b 0-23] 588d BK X C 1 to 618c 619a,c

9 ARISTOTLE *Generation of Animals* BK I II 6 [742 35] 283d 284

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK V [5-6 533] 67d-68a K 1 [3 1] 89c-d

16 COPERNICUS *Revolutions of the Heavenly Spheres* 505a 506a

17 PLOTINUS *Sixth Ennead* TR II CH 1 348b-c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PAR 1 Q 1 8 57b-58b Q 19 A 5 P 2 112d 113c Q 9, A P 3 162a 163b Q 56 1 A P 2 291a-d Q 5 3 A 5 297b 98a Q 7 A 2 7 399c-401b Q 84 A 7 NS 449b-450b Q 86 A A 461c-462a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* A T 1 Q 49 A 3 2b-4

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY 1 [24 4] 56a b 1 [49-60] 80b-c

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART 78a 80c P T 271c 272

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 271b-272c 497d-498a

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 45a-46a / *Novum Organum* K A II 2 137b-c / *New Atlantis* 210d

31 DESCARTES *Meditations* 90a b / *Objections and Replies* 108a 112 209c 210b 211b-c 215a b

1 SPINOZA *Ethics* P 1 3 4 35 b AXIOM 4 355d O 8 S II L 356d 357d P OP O 358a b PPE IX 369b 372d PART 1 PR 422b d 423b

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 184 241 205a 217b passim, esp 33 241 213b-21 b

34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III GENERAL SCHOL, 371b-372a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH III SECT 19 117c d BK II CH XIII SECT 17 20 152a d CH XXI SECT 1-6 178b 180a CH XXIII 204a 214b passim esp SECT 2 204b-c SECT 5 205a b SECT 15 208c d SECT 5-29 211b-212 CH XXV SECT 11-CH XXVI SECT 2 217a d CH XXXI SECT 6-13 240d 243b CH XXXII SECT 24 247c-d BK III C 1 III SECT 15 18 258b 259c II 1 268b-283a passim esp SECT 7 10 2 0b-271b C 1 IX SECT 11 17 287d 290a CH XI SECT 19 25 304b-306c esp SECT 22 305a BK 1 CI III SECT 9-1 315c 317c SECT 24 29 320c 323a esp SECT 29 322c 323a CH IV SECT 12 326c d C 1 1 SECT 4 16 331d 336d CI III SECT 9 347d 348a CH XII SECT 9- 2 360 1 362c C 1 XVI SECT 12 370b-c

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 101 102 432c-433

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT III DIV 18 SECT VIII DIV 4 457c-484c passim 1 CT XI D 1 5 498d-499a DIV 115 503b-c 1 CT XII DIV 1 7 507b-c

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 15a b 17 d 46d-4 c 57c d 58d 59b 63d 64a 76c-83b esp 81b 83b 86c d 95a-d 99a 100d esp 100c d 110b 133a 140b d 145c 171a 172c 214b d [fn 1] / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 267d 268a 285c 286a / *Practical Reason* 294c 295d 30 a d 313b 314d / *Judgement* 550a 551a c 556b-c 557c 558b 564a-c 574a b 584c-d 611d-613 c

45 FOURIER *Theory of Heat* 169a

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XIII 563a b EPILOGUE I 646c-647b passim 650b-c 1 LOGUE II 693c 694d-695c

53 JAMES *Psychology* 89b-90a 885b-886a

5a(4) The infinite and the individual as objects of knowledge

7 PLATO *Philebus* 610d-617d

8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 5 [2 6-3] 6c 7a / *Posterior Analytics* X 1 C 1 31 120a-c / *Physics* K II 4 [18-b- 14] 262d CH 5 [189 3] 264b-c C 6 [189 11 19] 254c BK III CH 6 [07a21 3] 285c d BK 1 1 CH 3 [24-b3] 330b / *Metaphysics* BK II CH 2 [994b1 3] 513a b BK III CH 4 [999a 4 29] 518a II 6 [1003 1] 521d 522 C BK VII C 1 0 [036a2] 559b-c CH 15 563c 564c K X CH 2 [1060 20-23] 588d BK XIII CH 10 618c-619a

9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK C 1 2 [1356b28 35] 596b-c

11 NICOMACHUS *Arithmetic* BK I 812a

17 PLOTINUS *Sixth Ennead* TR VI CH 3 311c 312b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* K VII PAR 0- 1 49d 50 K X 1 PAR 3-6 99d 100c

(5a *The knowable the unknowable and the unknown the knowability of certain objects* 5a(1) *God as an object of knowledge*)

NEW TESTAMENT *John* 1 1-5 18 14 7-11 17 25-26 / *Acts* 17 22-31 / *Romans* 1 18-21 11 33-36 / *I Corinthians* 2 16 8 1-7 15 34 / *II Corinthians* 4 6 / *Ephesians* 1 17 3 2-5 / *Colossians* 1 9-15 / *I Timothy* 6 14 16 / *Hebrews* 8 11 11 3 / *I John* 4 7-21
5 AESCHYLUS *Suppliant Maidens* [86 103] 2a b
5 EURIPIDES *Helen* [1137-1150] 309a
7 PLATO *Timaeus* 447c
8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK I CH 2 [982b28-983 11] 501a b BK XII CH 8 [1074b1-14] 604d 605a
14 PLUTARCH *Numa Pompilius* 53b c / *Coriolanus* 191d 192b
17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR VIII CH 9 133d 134b / *Fifth Ennead* TR I CH I 208a-c TR III CH 13-14 224a c TR V CH 6 231b d
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X par 7-38 73a 81a par 65 87d 88a BK XIII par 17 19 115a d / *City of God* BK VIII CH 10 271a d BK XI CH 2 323a c BK XXII CH 29 614b 616d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q I A I 3b-4a A 7 REP I 7a c Q 2 AA I-2 10d 12c Q 3 A 3 REP I 16a d A 4 REP 2 16d 17c A 5 17c 18b QQ 12-13 50b 75b Q 32 175d 180d Q 42 A 2 REP I 4 225d 227a Q 50 A 2 ANS 270a 272a Q 56 A 3 294a d Q 57 A 5 299b 300b Q 84 A 5 446c 447c A 7 REP 3 449b 450b Q 86 A 2 REP I 462a-463a Q 88 A 2 REP 4 471c 472c A 3 472c-473a Q 89 A 2 REP 3 475a d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 93 A 2 216c 217b PART III Q 9 A 3 REP 3 765b 766b PART III SUPPL Q 92 A I 1025c 1032b
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY III [16-45] 56a b PARADISE II [37-45] 108a IV [28-48] 111a XIX [22-99] 135b 136a XX [130-148] 138a b XXI [73 102] 139a b XXXIII [46-145] 156c 157d
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 54b c 78d 79a 79d 80b PART II 162a 163b PART IV 271b c
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 98b 99a 208c 209c 212a d 238c 239c 246a 257d passim
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 2c-4c 17b 20a 38a 45a 46a 95d 101d esp 96d 97b 99c 100a
31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 51b 54b passim / *Meditations* 69b d 74a c III 81d 89a IV 89b V 93a 96a / *Objections and Replies* 108a 114c 120c d 121a 123a 127b c POSTULATE V 131b-c PROP I III 132b 133a 211c 212a 213a 213d 214a 215b-c 227b c
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP II SCHOL 358d 359b PART II PROP I 2 373d 374a PROP 47 390c 391a PART V PROP 24 32 458d 460b
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VII [109-130] 219b 220a BK VIII [114 130] 234b 235a / *Samson Agonistes* [60-62] 340b 341a [293 325] 346a b
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 184-241 205a 217b passim esp 233 241 213b 217b
34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III GENERAL SCHOL, 370b 371a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH II SECT 12 107c d CH III SECT 7 18 113d 117c BK II CH XVII SECT I 167d 168a SECT 1, 172b-c CH XXIII SECT 33 37 212d 214b passim BK III CH VI SECT II 271b d BK IV CH X 349c 354c passim
35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* PREF 404a SECT 146-156 442a-444d
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT II DIV 14 456b SECT XI 497b 503c
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 308b 309a
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 33a d 143a 145c 152a 153c 177b-179c 186d 187a 190a 192d 218d 223d 239a-c 241d 242c / *Practical Reason* 291a 292c 348b 352c / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 384a c / *Judgement* 575b 577a 588d 589c 603b 607c esp 606d 607c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 158c 160b PART IV 349b 350a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK V 196b 197b BK XV 630d 631c

5a(2) Matter and the immaterial as objects of knowledge

7 PLATO *Timaeus* 456a-458a
8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK I CH 7 [191 8 12] 266d / *Meteorology* BK IV CH 12 493d-494d / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 9 [991 8 11] 509b BK VII CH 10 [1036 2-12] 559b c BK IX CH 2 [1046b7-15] 571c d / *Soul* BK I CH I [403 25-b19] 632b d
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [265 3 9] 4b 5a [418-448] 6b c
17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR VIII CH 9 31c 32a / *Second Ennead* TR IV CH 10 53b d CH I 54c 55b TR V CH 4-5 59c 60c
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XI XII 89b 110d / *City of God* BK XI CH 3 323d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q I A 9 8d 9c Q 12 A I REP 2 50c 51c A 2 ANS 51c 52c Q 13 A 12 REP 3 74c 75b Q 14 A 11 84c 85c Q 15 A 3 REP 3 4 93b 94a Q 16 A 5 REP 3 97c 98b Q 29 A 2 REP 3 163b 164b Q 54 A 4 ANS and REP 2 287b 288a Q 56 291d 294d Q 57 AA I 2 295a 297a Q 76 A REP 3 388c 391a Q 84 A 7 ANS and REP 3 449b-450b Q 85 A I 451c-453c Q 86 A I ANS and REP 3 4 461c-462a A 2 REP I 462a 463a A 3 463b d Q 87 A I ANS 465a-466c Q 88 468d-473a Q 89 A 2 475a d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q 11 A I REP 2 772b 773a Q 12 A I REP 3 776c 777b PART III SUPPL, Q 92 A I ANS and REP 12 1025c 1032b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART III 172a d PART IV 269c 270c
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 41d 42a 43d-44c

Acts Med ations BK XI SECT I 30 a
Plotinus Third Ennead TR IX CH 3 13 c-d / Fourth Ennead TR I CH 2 159d 160b / F h Ennead, TR III CH 1-8 215d 220d
8 Augustine Confessions BK X par 7 73a par 21 5 6c 77d par 41 81c-d / City of God XI, CH 26 336d 337b
19 Aquinas Summa Theologica P RT I Q 14, 2, REP I 3 6d 77d Q 56, A I 292a-d Q 8 4 EP 2 411d-413d Q 8 464d-468d Q 88, I REP I 469a-471c A REP 3 4 1c-472c Q 84, A 5 473a-d
23 Hobbes Leviathan INTRO, 47b-d
29 Cervantes Don Quixote P RT II 332b
30 Bacon Advancement of Learning 88c 89b
31 Descartes Meditations II 77d-81d esp 81b-c / Objections and Replies POSTULAT II 131 209d 210a 215b-c
31 Spinoza Ethics P RT I PROP 19-30 382b-383c
35 Locke Human Understanding BK IV CH IX, ECT 3 349a-c
38 Rousseau Inequality 36 c
4. Kant Pure Reason, 1a-4a esp 1b-d 7d-8b 9a-10b 12-d [fn 1] 32a-c 49c 50c 51b-c 53a 56c 120c 129c 200c 204c / Fund Prin. Metaphysic of Morals 281c 282d 283a 287d esp 283c 286a / Practical Reason 292a 293b 307d 310c 311d 314d 327d 329a 331c 33 a, 33 -c / Judgement 465a-c 497a 498b 5 4b-577 594d [f] 599d-600d
46 Hegel Philosophy of Right P T I, par 35 21a-b par 44 23c DDITION 22 120c d / Philosophy of History RT 257d 258a
48 Melville M by Dick 370b-371b
51 Tolstoy War and Peace E LOG I 688b-c
53 James Psychology 121 125b 177b-178a 191 19 a esp 196a 197 213a 238b esp 213b-217a, 223b-224 227b-228b 232b-233b 471b-472b
54 Freud Unconscious 428a-430c esp 429c-430c / Civilization and Its Discontents 767d 768d

5b. The distinction between what is more knowable in itself and what is more knowable to us

8 Aristotle Prior Analytics BK II CH 3 [68 35-36] 90c / Posterior Analytics BK I CH 2 [71b5-72a6] 98b-c / Topics BK VI, CH 4 [141b6-142a] 194c 195c K I CH I [35-136a] 211d 212a / Physics BK I CH I 259a b CH 5 [188b26-189a9] 64b-c CH 7 [189b30-33] 265b-c / Generation and Corruption BK CH 3 [3 5 3 3 9a2] 415b-d / Metaphysics K CH [993a 0-] 511b d VII, CH 3 [1 9a35 b 2] 552 / Soul BK I CH [4 3 1 9] 643a b
9 Aristotle Ethics K H 4 [095 1 4] 340c
19 Aquinas Summa Theologica ART I Q I 5, 5c-6a 9 8d 9c Q 2 A AN 10d 11d A A and 3 11d 12 Q 3 A 3 EP 16a-d Q A and P 40d-41d Q I A I ANS and REP 2 50c 51c A4 8 56a 58b Q 11 62b-75b passim Q 50 A 2 A 5 2 0a 272a Q 85 A 3 455b-45 a A 8 460b-461b Q 88 A I RE 3 4 469a-4 1c
28 Harvey On Animal Generation 332 c
31 Descartes Discourse P RT IV 51b-54b / Meditations I 69b-d II 77d-81d passim IV 89b V 93a 96a / Objections and Replies POSTULATE II 131a
31 Spinoza Ethics P RT II PROP 4 390c d
4 Kant Judgement 601d

5c Dogmatism skepticism and the critical attitude with respect to the extent certainty and finality of human knowledge

7 Plato Euthydemus 65a 84a c / Cratylus 86b-d / Meno 179b-180b / Apology 203a / Phaedo 236c 238a / Timaeus 447b-d / Theaetetus 521d 526b
8 Aristotle Prior Analytics BK I CH 13 [3 4 23] 48b-d / Posterior Analytics BK I CH I [71a26]-CH 2 [2b4] 9 c 99a CH 6 102b-103c CH 33 121b-122a,c / Heavens BK II CH 5 [18 b 9 88 3] 379b-c / Generation and Corruption BK CH 2 [316a5 14] 411c-d / Metaphysics BK I C 5-6 525c 531c BK X CH I [1 53 31 b3] 580a CH 6 [1057 11] 584b BK XI H 6 [106 12 1063 14] 590d 592a
9 Aristotle Ethics BK I CH 3 [094b11 27] 339d 340a CH 7 [1098a20-b2] 343 d BK II CH 2 [1103 6-1104a9] 349b-c BK I CH 3 388b-c
12 Lucretius Nature of Things BK IV [469-521] 50b-51a
12 Epictetus Discourses K II CH I 158d 161a CH 0 164c 166c BK III CH 17 c I 8b CH 21 193d 195a
18 Augustine Confessions BK V par 19 32b-c / City of God K XIX CH 18 523 b
19 Aquinas Summa Theologica PART I Q I A I 3b-4a A 5, NS and REP I 5c-6a Q 84, A I ANS 440d-442a Q 85 2 ANS 453d-455b Q 86, A I 3 461 -463d Q 87 A I 465a-466c Q 88 A I 469a-471c
20 Aquinas Summa Theologica P RT I II Q 64 A 3 4 68b-70a T II Q 4 A 8 409a-d
23 Hobbes Leviathan P T I 65c P R 267 b
24 Rabelais Gargantua and Pantagruel BK III 197b-200a
25 Montaigne Essays 80b-82b 208a 294b esp 240c 246a 253c 254a, 257d 264a 269d 279c 282c 294b 308c d 318a 319b 439c-440a 49 b-502c 516b-524a
28 Gilbert Loadstone 1c 2a
28 Harvey Motion of the Heart 26 b,d 268d / On Animal Generation, 411c-d
30 Bacon Advancement of Learning 13a-c 15a-17b esp 15d 16b 47d-48d 57d 58b / Novum Organum P E 105a 106d BK I APH 37 109b-c H 67 115d 116a APH 75 118b-d APH 95 126b-c H 6 134b

(5a *The knowable the unknowable and the unknown the knowability of certain objects* 5a(4) *The infinite and the individual as objects of knowledge*)

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 3 ANS 16a d Q 12 A 1 REP 2 50c 51c A 7 ANS 56a 57b A 8 REP 4 57b 58b Q 14 AA 11-12 84c 86d Q 15 A 3 REP 4 93b 94a Q 22 A 2 ANS and REP 1 128d 130d Q 29 A 1 REP 1 162a 163b A 2 REP 3 163b-164b Q 30 A 4 170c 171b Q 32 175d 180d Q 56 A 1 REP 2 292a d Q 57 A 2 295d 297a Q 84 A 7 ANS and REP 1 449b 450b Q 86 AA 1-3 461c 463d Q 89 A 4 ANS 476c-477a PART I II Q 14 A 6 REP 3 680c 681a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q 10 A 3 769d 771b Q 11 A 1 REP 3 772b 773a Q 12 A 1 REP 3 776c 777b PART III SUPPL Q 92 A 1 REP 12 1025c 1032b

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 54b c PART IV 262b

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 332a 333b

31 DESCARTES *Meditations* III 86a d 88c 89a / *Objections and Replies* 112a d 121d 122b 169a 211c d 212c 213a 213d 214a

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 10 SCHOL 376d 377a PROP 30-31 385a c

33 PASCAL *Pensees* 72 181a 184b 233 213b 216a / *Geometrical Demonstration* 435a b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XIII SECT 4 149b CH XIV SECT 26-31 160c 162a passim CH XV SECT 2-3 162c d SECT 12 165b c CH XVI SECT 8 167c CH XVII 167d 174a esp SECT 15 171b 172a CH XXIII SECT 31 212b c SECT 33 34 212d 213b CH XXIX SECT 15 16 237a 238a

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO SECT 2 405b

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART II 278a b

47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [1810-1815] 43a

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XV 631a c EPILOGUE II 693c 694d

53 JAMES *Psychology* 312a 631a

5a(5) The past and the future as objects of knowledge

OLD TESTAMENT *Proverbs* 27 1 / *Ecclesiastes* 6 12 8 6-7 9 11-12 11 2 6—(D) *Ecclesiastes* 7 1 8 6-7 9 11 12 11 2 6

APOCRYPHA *Wisdom of Solomon* 8 8—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 8 8

NEW TESTAMENT *James* 4 13 14—(D) *James* 4 13 15

5 AESCHYLUS *Suppliant Maidens* [86 103] 2a b

5 SOPHOCLES *Oedipus the King* [463 512] 103c d [1524 1530] 113c / *Ajax* [1419 1421] 155c

5 EURIPIDES *Medea* [1415-1419] 224c / *Alcestis* [1159-1163] 247c / *Helen* [1688 1692] 314c / *Andromache* [1284-1288] 326c / *Bacchantes* [1388-139] 352a c

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK I 349b 354a c

7 PLATO *Critias* 479d / *Theaetetus* 531a 532a

8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation* CH 9 28a 29d / *Memory and Reminiscence* CH 1 [449^{b}3 9] 690a-c

9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK II CH 19 [1392^{b}14 1393 8] 640b c

10 HIPPOCRATES *Prognostics* par 1 19a b / *Epidemics* BK III SECT III par 16 59b-c

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK VI [713-755] 230a 231a

14 PLUTARCH *Theseus* 1a b / *Pericles* 129a

15 TACITUS *Annals* BK IV 79b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X par 3 24 77a c BK XI par 17-41 93b 99b / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 30 651c d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 14 A 13 86d 88c A 15 REP 3 89b 90b Q 57 A 3 297b 298a Q 78 A 4 ANS and REP 5 411d 413d Q 79 A 6 ANS and REP 2 419b-420d Q 86 A 4 463d 464d Q 89 A 3 REP 3 475d-476c A 7 REP 3 478d-479c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q 12 A 1 REP 3 776c 777b

22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida* BK IV STANZA 56 95b-96a STANZA 136 154 106a 108b

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 53c 54a 65b c

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 41c d 439c 440a

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 13d 14a 54c 55a

31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 259a b

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 62 SCHOL 443c d PROP 66 DEMONST 444c

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XV SECT 12 165b c BK IV CH XI SECT 11 357b-c

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 44 420d 421a SECT 107 433b c

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VI 469d 470d

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 348a c / *Social Contract* BK IV 428a

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 88a c 96b d 413b d

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 234d / *Judgement* 579d 580a 583d 584c

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 277c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 155b c 181b d 190a b

47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [570-583] 16a PART II [8591 8603] 209b

48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 366b

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 42a 59d 60a 166a c 231d 233b esp 233a b 242b 243c / *Descent of Man* 287d

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XIII 584d 585b EPILOGUE II 685a

53 JAMES *Psychology* 852b

54 FREUD *Interpretation of Dreams* 387a c

5a(6) The self and the thing in itself as objects of knowledge

8 ARISTOTLE *Soul* BK III CH 6 [430^{b}21 26] 663b

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 27 133a b

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK XI SECT 1 302a
17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR IX CH 3 137c-d / *Fourth Ennead*, TR I CH 2 159d 160b / *Fifth Ennead*, TR II CH 1-8 215d 220d
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X par 7 73a par 25 76c 77d par 4 81c-d / *City of God*, XI, CH 26 336d 337b
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 14, A 2, REP 3 6d 77d Q 56 A 1 292a-d Q 8 4 REP 2 411d-413d Q 8 464d-468d Q 85 1 469a-471c REP 3 471c-472c Q 8, A AN 475a-d
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* INTRO, 47b-d
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 332b
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 88c-89b
31 DESCARTES *Meditations* II 72d-81d esp 81b-c / *Objections and Replies* POSTULATE II 131 209d 210a 215b-c
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II, PROP 19-30 382b-3 3c
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK IV C I IX, SECT 2 3 349a-c
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 362
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 1a-4a,c esp 1b-d 7d-8b 9a 10b 12c-d [fn 1] 32a-c 49c 50c 51b-c 53a 56c 120c 129c 200c 204c / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 281c 282d 2 3a 287d esp 285c 286a / *Practical Reason* 292a 293b 307d 310c 311d 314d 327d 329a 331c 33 a-c 33 a-c / *Judgement* 465a-c 497a 498b 5 4b-5 7 594d [fn 1] 599d-600d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I, par 35 21a-b par 44 23c ADDITION 22 120c-d / *Philosophy of History* PART I 257d 258a
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick*, 370b-371b
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE II 688b-c
53 JAMES *Psychology* 121a 125b 177b-178a 19 a 19 a esp 196a 197 213a 238b esp 213b-217a, 223b-224a 227b-228b 232b-233b 4 1b-4 2b
54 FREUD *Unconscious* 428a-430c esp 429c-430c / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 767d 768d

5b The distinction between what is more knowable in itself and what is more knowable to us

8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK II, CH 23 [68 35-36] 90c *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH [1a25-2b6] 98b-c / *Topics* BK VI, CH 4 [41a26-142a22] 194c 195c BK VII CH I [15-a35 36] 211d 212a / *Physics* BK I CH 2 3a b CH 5 [55b26- 9a9] 264b-c H 7 [5a32-33] 2 3b-c / *Generation and Corruption* BK I, CH 3 [3 5a13 3 9a] 415b-d / *Metaphysics* K I, CH 1 [993a30-b11] 511b d BK VII CH 3 [1 a35 [5 2a / *Soul* BK II CH [413a11 19] 643a b
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK CH 4 [095b1 4] 340c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 5, 2 5c-6a 9 8d 9c Q 2 A AN 10d 11d 2 3 and R 2 3 12d 12c Q 3 3 16a-d Q 1 A and P 1 40d-41d Q 12 A 1 ANS and REP 2 50c 51c AA 8 56a 58b Q 13 62b-75b passim Q 5 A 2 ANS 2 0a 272a Q 8, A 3 455b-457a A 8 460b-461b Q 88 A 1 E 3 4 469a-471c
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 332a-c
31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 51b-54b / *Meditations* 69b-d II 77d-81d passim IV 89b V 93a 96a / *Objections and Replies* POSTULATE II 131a
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 4 390c d
42 KANT *Judgement* 601d

5c Dogmatism skepticism and the critical attitude with respect to the extent certainty and finality of human knowledge

7 PLATO *Euthydemus* 65a 84 c / *Cratylus* 86b-d / *Meno* 179b-180b / *Apology* 203a / *Phaedo* 236c 238a / *Timaeus* 447b-d / *Theaetetus* 521d 526b
8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics* BK I CH 13 [32 4 23] 48b-d / *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 1 [71a26]-CH 2 [2b4] 97c-99a CH 6 102b-103c CH 33 121b-122a c / *Heavens* BK II CH 5 [28 b 9- 88 3] 3 9b-c / *Generation and Corruption* BK I CH 2 [316a5 14] 411c-d / *Metaphysics* II 5-6 528c 531c BK X CH 1 [1053 31 b3] 580a CH 6 [105 7 11] 581b BK XI CH 6 [106 13 106 b14] 590d 592a
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 3 [094b11 27] 339d 340a CH 7 [098a20-b2] 343c d BK II CH 2 [1103b 6-11 4a9] 349b-c BK VI H 3 388b-c
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [469-521] 50b-51a
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK II CH 1 158d 161a CH 0 164c 166c BK III CH 2, 177c 178b CH 21 193d 195a
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK V par 19 32b-c / *City of God*, BK XIX CH 18 523 b
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 1 A 1 3b-4a A 5 ANS and R P 1 5c-6a Q 84, A 1 A 440d-442a Q 85 A 2, ANS 453d-455b Q 86, AA 1 3 461c-463d Q 87 A 1 465a-466c Q 88 A 1 469a-471c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 64 AA 3 4 68b-70a P RT II II Q 4 A 8 409a-d
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 65c PART IV 2 7a b
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK III 197b-200a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 80b-82b 208a 294b esp 240-246a, 2 3c 2 4a, 257d 264a, 269d 279c 28 c 294b 308c-d 318a 319b 439c-440a 497b-502 516b-524a
28 GILBERT *Loadstone* PREF 1c 2
28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 267b,d 268d / *On Animal Generation* 411c d
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 13a-c 15a 17b esp 15d 16b 47d-48d 57d 58b / *Novum Organum* PR 105a 106d K I APH 37 109b-c H 6 11 d 116a APH 75 118b-d APH 95 126b-c PH 6 134b

(5 *The extent or limits of human knowledge 5c Dogmatism skepticism and the critical attitude with respect to the extent certainty and finality of human knowledge*)

31 DESCARTES *Rules* IV 5a d / *Discourse* PART II 44c-48b / *Meditations* 72b d I 75a 77c III 83b 84a / *Objections and Replies* 168b d 272a c
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II DEF 4 373b PROP 37-47 386b 391a
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 381-385 238b 239a 432 248a 434 435 248a 251a / *Vacuum* 355a 358b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* INTRO 93a 95d esp SECT 4-7 94a 95c BK I CH III SECT 24 120a c BK II CH II SECT 3 128b c CH XV SECT 11 165a b CH XXIII SECT 12 13 207a 208b SECT 36 213c d BK III CH VI SECT 1-9 268b 271a esp SECT 9 270d 271a BK IV CH III SECT 22-30 319c 323c esp SECT 22 319c 320a CH VI SECT 4-16 331d 336d passim CH X SECT 19 354a c CH XII SECT 9-13 360d 362d CH XIV SECT 1 2 364b-c CH XVII SECT 9-10 377d 378a
35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO SECT 3-4 405b d SECT 17 409d 410a SECT 86-88 429c 430b SECT 101-102 432c 433a SECT 133 439c-440a
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT I DIV 7 10 453c-455b SECT IV DIV 20-21 458a-c DIV 26 460b c SECT IV DIV 28 SECT V DIV 38 460d 466c passim SECT VII DIV 60 477a SECT XII 503c 509d esp DIV 129-130 508a d
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 1a 4a c 15c 16c 19a 22a c 101d 102a 129c 130a 133c 134d 146a 149d 157d 187c 188b 193a b 196b 197c 218d 227a esp 221c 222b 248d 250a c / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 253c d 277d 279d / *Practical Reason* 292d 293b 295b d 311d 313d 320c 321b 331a 332d 335b c 336d 337a c / *Judgement* 492c d 567c 568a
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 31 103d 104a NUMBER 37 119b 120b
43 MILL *Liberty* 274b 293b
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 121c d 126a b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PREF 7a INTRO par 31 19c 20a
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [656-675] 17b 18a [1064-1067] 26b [1810 1815] 43a [1868 2050] 44b-48b esp [1948 1963] 46a b [1968 1979] 46b-47a [2011 2022] 47b 48a [4343 4362] 107a b
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 78a b 250b 257a 276a b
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 253d
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK V 195a
53 JAMES *Psychology* 881b
54 FREUD *New Introductory Lectures* 828b c 873d 884d passim esp 874d 875a 878d 880b 883d 884a

5d The method of universal doubt as prerequisite to knowledge God s goodness as the assurance of the veracity of our faculties

31 DESCARTES *Rules* II 2a 3b / *Discourse* 41a 67a c esp PART II 44c-48b PART IV 51b 54b / *Meditations* 72b d I 75a 77c III 82b d IV 89b c V 95b 96a / *Objections and Replies* 119c 123a d 124b 125b POSTULATE VII 131c 134b c 142c 143c 162a 167a-c 206a-c 207b 215c d 226d 227a 229c d 237b 238b 239a 240a 242c 244c 245c
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXVII SECT 13 223b d BK IV CH IX SECT 3 349b c
35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO SECT 3 405b c
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT XII DIV 116 503d 504a DIV 120 505b DIV 129 130 508a d
53 JAMES *Psychology* 881b

5e Knowledge about knowledge as the source of criteria for evaluating claims to knowledge

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* 87d INTRO 93a 95d esp SECT 4 7 94a 95c BK IV CH III SECT 22 319c 320a
35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO SECT 4 405c d SECT 17 409d-410a
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT I DIV 7 10 453c-455b SECT II DIV 17 457a b SECT VII DIV 49-53 471c-474b esp DIV 49 471c d
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 1a 12d esp 1b d 8c 9a 55a 56c 99a 101b 121a 123b / *Practical Reason* 292d 293b 294a b 307d 310c 331a 332d

6 The kinds of knowledge

6a The classification of knowledge according to diversity of objects

6a(1) Being and becoming the intelligible and the sensible the necessary and the contingent the eternal and the temporal the immaterial and the material as objects of knowledge

7 PLATO *Cratylus* 86b d 113c 114a c / *Phaedrus* 125a 126c / *Symposium* 167a d / *Phaedo* 223d 232d esp 223d 225a 228b 232d / *Republic* BK III 333b 334b BK V 368c 373c esp 372a 373b BK VI VII 383d 398c / *Timaeus* 447b d 457b-458a / *Theaetetus* 521d 522b 534d 536b / *Sophist* 565a 569a esp 568a 569a / *Statesman* 595a-c / *Philebus* 610d 613a 633a 635a esp 634b 635a / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810d
8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 5 [4a10-b19] 8b 9a / *Prior Analytics* BK I CH 13 [32b4 23] 48b-d / *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 2 [71b9 16] 97d 98a CH 4 [73a21 b30] 100a 101a CH 6-8

6c( ) Knowledge of natures or kinds distinguished from knowledge of individuals

6a The classification of knowledge according to diversity of objects 6a(2) Knowledge of natures or kinds distinguished from knowledge of individuals)

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 211c 218d / *Judgement* 572a b 572d 574b
53 JAMES *Psychology* 305a 312a esp 309a 312a

6a(3) Knowledge of matters of fact or real existence distinguished from knowledge of our ideas or of the relations between them

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 84 A 1 REP 1 440d-442a Q 85 A 2 453d-455b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 60a b 65c 71c d
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH I SECT 15 16 98d 99c SECT 23 101b 102a BK III CH V SECT 12 266d 267a SECT 14 267b c CH VI SECT 43-51 280c 283a esp SECT 43 280c d BK IV CH I SECT 1-7 307a 308a CH II 309b 313a passim esp SECT 14 312b d CH III 313a 323d esp SECT 29 322c 323a CH IV SECT 1-12 323d 326d passim SECT 18 328d 329a CH V SECT 6-8 330a d CH VI SECT 13 335c d SECT 16 336d CH IX 349a-c CH XI 354c 358c esp SECT 13-14 357d 358c CH XII SECT 6-13 360a 362d CH XVII SECT 8 377b d
35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 18-20 416b 417a SECT 23 417b c
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT IV 458a 463d esp DIV 20-21 458a c DIV 30 461d-462b SECT V DIV 34-38 464b-466c SECT IX 487b-488c esp DIV 82 487b c SECT XII DIV 131-132 508d 509d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PREF 5c 6a / *Philosophy of History* PART IV 354b
53 JAMES *Psychology* 157b 161a esp 158b 159b 301b 304b passim 453a b 867a 890a esp 868b 869a 879b 882a 886a 889a b

6a(4) Knowledge in relation to the distinction between the phenomenal and the noumenal the sensible and supra sensible

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 25c 26a 27b 33d 37b d 53b 59b 93c 99a esp 94b 95a 96a 97b 97d 98c 101b 108a c esp 106b 107b 117b 118a 120c 121d 153a 157d 164a 165c 172c 173a 193a b 224a 230c / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 253a d 264d 281c 282d 285a 287d / *Practical Reason* 291a 296d esp 292a 293b 307d 314d esp 307d 308b 310d 311d 319c 321b 328a 329a 331a 332d 337a c 340a 342d esp 340c 341c 349b 355d / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 383c d 390b / *Judgement* 465a-c 474b 475d esp 474d [fn 1] 497a-498b 500c d 501d 502a 506d 507a 510b-c 530a 541a 542a 543a 543c 544c 564a c 570b 572b 574b 577a 578d 579a 581a b 584c d 587d 588a 596c 598b 599d 600d 603a b 603d 606d esp 603d 604b 606a d
53 JAMES *Psychology* 233a 234b

6b The classification of knowledge according to the faculties involved in knowing

7 PLATO *Phaedo* 224a 232d esp 224a 225a 228b 232d / *Republic* BK VI VII 383d 398c BK X 431c d
8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK II CH 19 [99b34 100b3] 136b d / *Topics* BK IV CH 4 [125a25-33] 174b / *Physics* BK I CH 5 [188b26 189a9] 264b c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH I [980a28-982a1] 499a 500b BK III CH 4 [999a24-b5] 518a b / *Soul* BK II CH 5 [417b1, 8] 648b-c
17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR I CH 7 3d-4a / *Fourth Ennead* TR IV CH 13 164d 165b TR VI CH 2 189d 190b / *Fifth Ennead* TR III CH 2 3 216b 217b TR V CH I 228c 229c CH 7 231d 232b TR IX CH 7 249b-c / *Sixth Ennead* TR III CH 18 291a b
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK III par 10-11 15b 16a BK X par 8 38 73b 81a / *City of God* BK VIII CH 6 7 268d 269d BK XI CH 2 3 323a d BK XIX CH 18 523a b / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 12 627c d BK II CH 2, 39 650a 655b esp CH 27 650a BK IV CH 5 677b-c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 12 A 3 52c 53b A 4 ANS and REP 3 53b 54c Q 14 A 1 ANS 75d 76c A REP 1 76d 77d Q 18 A 2 ANS and REP 1 105c 106b A 3 ANS 106b 107c Q 85 A 1 ANS 451c 453c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 50 A 3 REP 3 8b 9a PART II II Q 8 A 1 ANS 417a d
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 60a b 71c d
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 32d 55b d
31 DESCARTES *Rules* XIV 29b 31c / *Meditations* VI 96b 103d passim / *Objections and Replies* 119d 120c 124d 125a POSTULATE I II 130d 131a AXIOM V 131d 132a 136d 137a 157c d 162d 165d 211d 212a 217c d 218c d 219b-c 228c 229c 229d 230c
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 10 376c 377a PROP 40 SCHOL PROP 44 388a 390a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK IV CH II 309b 313a passim esp SECT 14 312b d CH III SECT 5 313a c CH IX SECT 2 349a CH XI SECT 13 14 357d 358c
35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO SECT 1 405a b SECT 18 416b c SECT 27 418a b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 2 7 74b d
53 JAMES *Psychology* 144b 145a 157b 167b esp 157b 161a 167b 450a 451b 453a 457a esp 453b 455a

6b(1) Sensitive knowledge sense perception as knowledge judgments of perception and judgments of experience

7 PLATO *Phaedo* 224a 225a 231c 232a / *Republic* BK VI VII 383d 398c esp BK VI 386d 387a 387d 388a BK VII 389b 392c 393a / *Timaeus* 447b / *Theaetetus* 517b 536a esp 521d 526d 533a 536a

8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK II CH 19 [99b20-100b5] 136a-d / *Topics* BK II CH 8 [114a18-26] 159d 160a / *Physics* BK I CH 5 [188b-6-189a9] 264b-c / *Heavens* BK III CH 7 [306a1 18] 397b-c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH I [980a-0-b24] 499 [981b10-13] 499d 500a BK IV CH 5 [1009b1 17] 528d 529 [1011a1 1011a2] 530a-c BK XI CH 6 [1062b34 1063a9] 591a b CH 7 [1064a 4-9] 592b / *Soul*, BK II CH 5 647b-648d BK III CH 2 657d 659c

9 ARISTOTLE *Generation of Animals* BK I CH 23 [731a30-b5] 271c-d / *Ethics* BK I CH 7 [1098a33-b8] 343d 344a BK II CH 9 [1109b20-23] 355c BK VI CH 8 [1142a12 31] 391b-c BK VII CH 3 [1147a25 b 9] 397c 398a

10 HIPPOCRATES *Surgery* par 1 70b

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [379-521] 49a 51a

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I, CH 6 110c 111c

14 PLUTARCH *Marcellus* 252b-c

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR I CH 6-7 3c-4a / *Fourth Ennead*, TR III CH 23 153d 154b CH 26, 155c TR IV CH 23 25 169c 171b TR VI CH 1 2 189b-190b / *Fifth Ennead* TR V CH 228c 229c TR IX CH 7 249b-c / *Sixth Ennead* TR II CH 18 291a b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK III par 10-11 15b-16a BK IV par 15 7 23a-c BK X par 8-11 73b-74b / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 2 30 650a 651d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 5 A 4, REP 1 25d 26c Q 12 4 ANS and REP 3 53b-54c Q 14 1 75d 76c A 2 ANS and REP 1 76d 77d A 6 REP 1 80a 81c A 11 ANS and REP 2 84c 85c 1 ANS 85d 86d Q 16, A 2 95c-96b Q 17 A 2 102 d A 3 A 5 102d 103c Q 18 2 A and REP 1 105c 106b A A 5 106b-107c Q 54 A 5 288a d Q 57 REP 2 295 d A A 5 295d 297a Q 59 1 R 1 306c 307b Q 75 A 3 ANS and REP 2 380c 381b 5 A 382a 383b Q 6 A 2 RE 4 388c 391a Q 77 5 REP 3 403d-404c Q 9 1 AN 407b-409a AA 3 4 410 -413d Q 9, A 3 A 5 and R 2 416a-417 A 6 A od REP 1 419b-420d Q 84 A 1 NS and REP 2 440d-44 ANS 442b-443c A 4, AN and RE 2 444d-446b A 6 447c 449a Q 85 1 s a d R 3 451c-453c 2 453d-455b 3 A 455b-457a 6 A 5 458d-459c Q 86 A a d REP 2 4 461 462a A 3 463b-d Q 87 A 3 EP 3 467b-468a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* K III SUPPL, Q 82, AA 3 4 971a 9 4c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE IV [28-45] 111

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART 49a d

25 MONTAIGNE *Essay* 285c 286a

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 332a 335c

30 BACON *Novum Organum* K I A H 4 109c d APH 50 111b BK I PH 40 170c 173d

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART IV 53b / *Meditations* I 75a 77c passim II 80c 81d III 83d 84a 1 96b-103d passim / *Objections and Replies* 119d 120c 124d 125a POSTULATE I III 130d 131a AXIOM V 131d 132a 162d 165d 211a b 211d 212a 228c 230c 231a b

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II AXIOM 4-5 373d PROP II 13 377b-3 8c POSTULATE 5 380b PROP 14 17 380c 381d PROP 19 382b-c PROP 22 29 383b-385a

34 NEWTON *Principles* BK III RULE III 270b-271a

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH IX SECT 8 10 139b-140b BK III CH VI SECT 9 270d 271a BK IV CH II SECT 14 312b-d CH III SECT 14 316b-d SECT 21 319c CH XI 354c 358c

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO SECT I 405a b SECT 18 416b-c SECT 25 33 417d 419a passim SECT 135 142 440a-441c

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 108a d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III PAR 227 74b-d

53 JAMES *Psychology* 450a-471a esp 453a-459b 469 b 470b-471 502 525a passim esp 503a 505b 508a 564a b

6b(2) Memory as knowledge

8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK II CH 4 [111b24 31] 156d 157a BK IV CH 4 [125b4 14] 174c / *Metaphysics* BK I CH I [980a28-981 1] 499a b / *Memory and Reminiscence* CH I [449b1]-CH 2 [452 13] 690a 693d

17 PLOTINUS *Fourth Ennead* TR III CH 25 TR IV CH 1 9 154d 163a passim TR VI CH 3 190b-192c

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X par 12 38 74b-81a / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 9 640c d BK IV CH 5 677b-c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 54 A 5 288a d Q 78 A 4 ANS and REP 5 411d 413d Q 79 AA 6-7 419b-421c Q 89, A 6, REP 1 478b-d

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 51 3 14b-15a PART III SUPPL, Q A REP 4 896a 897d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE V [34 42] 112c

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 50b-c 53a 54a

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 32d

31 DESCARTES *Rules* III 4c d VII 10b-c XI 17b-18b XII 18b-25a passim / *Meditations* V 95d 96a / *Objections and Replies* 125 b

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 18 SCHOL 382a b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK CH III SECT 21 118b-119a BK II CH X SECT 2 141b-c BK IV CH I SECT 8-9 308b-309b CH XI SECT 11 357b-c CH XVI SECT 1 2 366d 367a

53 JAMES *Psychology* 145a 421 -422 passim 424b-427 450a-451b

[6]b The classification of knowledge according to the faculties involved in knowing 6b(2) Memory as knowledge)

54 FREUD *Unconscious* 428d / *General Introduction* 484c 486a

[6b](3) Rational or intellectual knowledge

7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 125a b / *Phaedo* 224a 232d esp 224a 225a 228b 232d / *Republic* BK VI VII 383d 398c esp BK VI 387a 388a BK VII 389b 393a c / *Theaetetus* 534d 536a / *Laws* BK X 765b

8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK VII CH 3 [247b1-248 9] 330b d / *Metaphysics* BK I CH I [980b25 98[...]1] 499b 500b

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VI CH I [1139a6-11] 387c CH 3-7 388b 390d

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [469 521] 50b 51a

14 PLUTARCH *Numa Pompilius* 53b c / *Marcellus* 252b c

17 PLOTINUS *Fourth Ennead* TR IV CH I 159a d TR VI CH 2 189d 190b / *Fifth Ennead* TR V CH I 228c 229c TR IX CH 7 249b c / *Sixth Ennead* TR III CH 18 291a b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X par 10 73d 74a par 16-19 75b 76b par 30 79b-c par 36 80c d / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 31-38 651d 654c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 14 A I ANS 75d 76c A 2 ANS and REP I 76d 77d A II ANS and REP I 2 84c 85c A 12 ANS 85d 86d Q 16 A 2 95c 96b Q 17 A 3 102d 103c Q 18 A 2 ANS and REP I 105c 106b A 3 ANS 106b-107c Q 54 284d 288d passim Q 57 A I REP 2 295a d A 2 ANS 295d 297a Q 59 A I REP I 306c 307b Q 78 A I ANS 407b 409a A 4 ANS and REP 4-6 411d 413d Q 79 413d 427a QQ 84-89 440b 480c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II QQ 57–[5]8 35a 45c

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 58a 61a 65c d 71c PART II 163a PART IV 267a-c

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 32d

31 DESCARTES *Meditations* II 77d 81d passim VI 96b 103d passim / *Objections and Replies* 119d 120c 124d 125a DEF I-II 130a b AXIOM V 131d 132a 162d 165d 228c 230c

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 37 40 386b-388b PROP 44 COROL 2 PROP 46 390a-c PART V PROP 29 459b d

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK IV CH II SECT 1-8 309b 311a CH III SECT 2-4 313a-c CH IX SECT 2 349a CH XI SECT 13 14 357d 358c

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO SECT I 405a b SECT 89 430b c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 227 74b d

53 JAMES *Psychology* 299a 314b esp 302b 304b 313b-314a

6b(4) Knowledge in relation to the faculties of understanding judgment and reason and to the work of intuition imagination and understanding

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 23a 110d esp 25b c 27c 28d 29d 32a c 34a c 37b 39c 41c-45b 48c d 52c 55a 57d 59b 65d 66d 94b 95a 99a 101b 109d 110d 130b c 166c 171a 193a 195a / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 282b c / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 385a-c / *Judgement* 461a-476c 493c 495a c 518a d 542b-543c 570b 572b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 232b 235a

6c The classification of knowledge according to the methods or means of knowing

6c(1) Vision contemplation or intuitive knowledge distinguished from discursive knowledge

7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 125a 126c / *Symposium* 150c 151a 167a d / *Phaedo* 224a 225a / *Republic* BK VI-VII 386d 389[...] / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810d

8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK VII CH 10 [1036 1-8] 559b-c BK XII CH 7 [1072b13 29] 602d 603a CH 9 [1075 5-11] 605c d

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK X CH 8 [1178b20-3] 433b c

16 KEPLER *Harmonies of the World* 1083b-1084b

17 PLOTINUS *Fourth Ennead* TR III CH 18 151b c TR IV CH I 159a d / *Fifth Ennead* TR III CH 3 216c 217b TR V CH 1-2 228b-229d passim CH 7 231d 232b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK IX par 23 [...] 68a c BK XII par 16 102d 103a / *City of God* BK IX CH 16 294a b CH 2 296d 297a BK XI CH 2 323a c CH 7 326a-c CH 21 333a d CH 29 339a b BK XVI CH 6 426c 427a BK XXII CH 29 614b d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 12 50b 62b esp A 10 59a d Q 14 A I REP 2 75d 76c A 7 81d 82b A 9 ANS 83b d A 12 REP 1-2 85d 86d A 13 ANS and REP 3 86d 88c A 14 88d 89b A 15 REP 2-3 89b 90b Q 16 A 5 REP I 97c 98b Q 19 A 5 ANS 112d 113c Q 34 A I REP 2 185b 187b Q 46 A 2 REP 3 253a 255a Q 57 A I REP 2 295a d A 3 A [...] and REP 2 297b 298a Q 58 300b 306b esp A 4 302d 303c Q 59 A I, REP I 306c 307b Q 60 A 2 ANS 311a d Q 78 A 4 REP 6 411d 413d Q 79 A 4 ANS 417a 418c A 8 421c 422b Q 85 A 5 457d 458d Q 86 A [illegible] 462a 463a A 4 ANS 463d-464d PART I II Q 14 A I REP 2 677b 678a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II II Q 8 416d-423b Q 9 A I REP I 423c-424b Q 180 AA 3-6 609c 614d PART III Q II AA 3 4 773d 775a PART III SUPPL Q 92 A 3 1034b-1037c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE, II [3–45]; XXX [1–3] 151d 153a; XXXIII [46–145] 156c 157d
30 BACON *Novum Organum*, BK II APH 15 149a
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK V [469–505] 185b–186a
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 1–5 171a 173a; 282 222b–22 b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH IX SECT 3 349a-c
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 33a-d 52c 53b / *Practical Reason* 329c 331b 33 -c 350c-351b / *Judgement* 572d 574b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART IV 349b-350a
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 276a b
54 FREUD *New Introductory Lectures* 874a-875a

6c( ) The distinction between immediate and mediated judgments: induction and reasoning, principles and conclusions

8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 1 3 97a 100a; CH 15 109a b; CH 22 [83b3–84b2] 114c 115b; CH 23 [84b 9–85a1] 115c 116a; CH 31 [88a5 1] 120b-c; CH 33 [88b30–89a1] 121b-c [89a1] 121d; BK II CH 9 128a b; CH 13 [97b31 39] 133c; CH 19 136a 137a,c / *Topics* BK I, CH 12 148d / *Physics* BK VIII, CH 1 [252a 19–b5] 335d 336b / *Metaphysics* BK II CH 2 [994b16–27] 513a b; BK III, CH 2 [997a 5 3] 515d 516a; BK IV CH 3 [1005b5]–CH 4 [1006a 12] 524c 525b; CH 6 [1011a 3 4] 530d; BK VII, CH 17 [1041b9–11] 565d; BK IX, CH 10 [1051b18–1052a4] 577d 578a,c; BK XI CH 2 [1059b 9–34] 587b; CH 6 [1063b 12] 591d; CH 7 [1064a 4–9] 592b
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH [1095a35 b4] 340d; BK VI, CH 3 [1139b25 35] 388c; CH 6–7 389d 390d; CH 8 [1142a23 31] 391b-c; CH 1 [1143a35–b5] 392d 393a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I, Q 1 A 7–8 -8d; Q 2, AA 1 2 10d 12c; Q 12 A 8, ANS 57b-58b; Q 14, A 1 REP 75d 76c; ANS and REP 2 3 81d 82b; Q 1 A 3 REP 2 102 103c; Q 9, A 5, A 112d 113c; Q 58 A 3, ANS and REP 2 301d 302d; A 4 ANS 302d 303c; Q 60 2, A 311 -d; Q 73 A 8 ANS 421c-422b; 12, A 3 425c-426b; Q 85 A 6, A 1 458d-459c; Q 87 A 1 REP 465a-466c; ART I-II, Q A 4 REP 612a-613a; A 5 ANS 613a-614
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 57 35a 37b; Q 93 A A 221d 223a; PART II-II, Q 8 A 1 2 417 -d
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART 58d 59a 65c-d 71
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 59c 61d 96d-97 / *Novum Organum*, PREF 105a 106d; BK I 107 136a,c esp APH 11 26 107d 108d, APH 69 116a b, APH 1 3 06 127d 128c; BK II APH 5, 139a APH 140c-d

31 DESCARTES *Rules* II, 2d 3a; III, 4a-d; XI 10c 12a; IX 14d; XI 17b 18b; XII XIV 20d 28b / *Discourse* PART VI 62a b / *Objections and Replies* 123a b 125a b 2 b d
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 40 SCHOL 2; PROP 4 388a-c; PROP 4 SCHOL 370c 391a; PART V PROP 28 459b
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 1–5 171a 173a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK I CH II, SECT 1 103d 104a; SECT 4 104d 105a; CH III SECT 23 119b-120a; K CH 1 SECT 9–CH III, SECT 4 309b-313c; CH VII SECT 1 11 337a 342d passim; CH IX SECT 2 3 349a-c; C IX SECT 1 355a-c; S CT 3 365d; CH XVII SECT 3 371d 3 2b; SECT 14 17 378c 3 9c
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 39a-c 66d 72c esp 67d 68a 99a b 109d 111c 211c 218d / *Judgement* 542d 543a
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 31 103c 104a; NUMBER 83 244b-c
43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 461c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PREF 1a-c
53 JAMES *Psychology* 144 b 167b 453a-457a esp 453b-454a, 456a

6c(3) The doctrine of knowledge as reminiscence: the distinction between innate and acquired knowledge

7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 124 126c / *Meno* 179d 183a 188d 189a / *Phaedo* 228a 230d / *Theaetetus* 515d 517b
8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH 1 [71a–6–b9] 9 c-d; BK II, CH 19 [99b–0–33] 135a b / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 9 [99 b24 993a11] 511a-c
10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK I CH 12, 173a b
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK II CH 11 150a 151b
17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR II, CH 4 8b-c / *Fourth Ennead*, TR III CH 25 154d 155c; TR IV CH 5 160d 161b
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X, par 10 73d 74a; par 16–19 75b- 6b; par 26–38 78a 81a / *City of God* BK VIII CH 6, 269b-c / *Christian Doctrine* BK I, CH 9 627a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 54 A 4 AN and REP 1 287b-288a; Q 55, A 2 289d 290d; Q 57 A 1 REP 3 295a d; Q 58 A 1 300c 301a; Q 60 A 1 REP 3 310b-311; A 2 AN 311 -d; Q 84 A 3 443d-444d; 4 ANS 44 d 4-6b; A 6, ANS 44 c-449a; Q 89 1 REP 3 473b-475a; Q 1 1 ANS 59 d 597c
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 264d 265b
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 333d 334d
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 1b-c
31 DESCARTES *Rules* IV 5c-d 6d 8d 9a; VIII 13c-d / *Discourse* PART V 54c; PART VI 62a / *Meditations* II 77d-81d esp 81a d; III, 83b 88c-d; VI 96d 97a / *Objections and Replies* 120c-d 140b-c 215b-c 224b d 225a
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART V PROP 23, SCHOL 458-d

(*6c The classification of knowledge according to the methods or means of knowing 6c(3) The doctrine of knowledge as reminiscence the distinction between innate and acquired knowledge*)

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* 90d 91b BK I 95b d 121a c passim BK II CH I SECT 6 122 b c CH IX SECT 6 139a

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT II DIV 17 457b d [fn 1]

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 113b 115a / *Practical Reason* 352c 353a / *Judgement* 551a 552c

53 JAMES *Psychology* 633a 635a 851a 862a esp 851a 852b 856a 858a 859a 860a 867a 868a 877b 878a 879b 880a 889a b 897a b

54 FREUD *General Introduction* 512b 513b 526c d 532b 599a b

6c(4) The distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori* knowledge the transcendental or speculative and the empirical

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK IV CH IV SECT 6-8 325a c CH IX SECT I 349a CH XII SECT 6-13 360a 362d CH XVII SECT 371d

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT IV 458a 463d passim esp DIV 20 21 458a c DIV 30 462a SECT V DIV 34 38 464b 466c SECT X DIV 89 490b c SECT XII DIV 131 132 508d 509d

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 5a d 14a 108a c esp 14a 20c 23a 24a 25b 26b 27b 28b 29d-33d 35b 36a 41c 42b 46a 48d 57d 59b 64b 66d 115d 120c 121a d 170d 171a 172c 173a 177d 199a / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 253c 254d / *Practical Reason* 307d 308b 309b d / *Science of Right* 405b d / *Judgement* 600d 603d esp 603a b

43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 445a 447b passim

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 156d 158a

53 JAMES *Psychology* 232b 238b passim esp 235a 851a 897b esp 851a 853a 859a 862a 865b 866a 868b-869a 879b 880a 889a b 897a b

6c(5) The distinction between natural and supernatural knowledge knowledge based on sense or reason distinguished from knowledge by faith or through grace and inspiration

OLD TESTAMENT *Deuteronomy* 4 5-6 / *I Kings* 3 3 15 4 29-34—(*D*) *III Kings* 3 3 15 4 29-34 / *II Chronicles* 1 7 12—(*D*) *II Paralipomenon* 1 7 12 / *Job* 28 28 / *Psalms* 111 10 119 97 104—(*D*) *Psalms* 110 10 118 97 104 / *Proverbs* 1 7 2 5-6 9 10 / *Isaiah* 11 1 4—(*D*) *Isaias* 11 1-4 / *Jeremiah* 8 8-9—(*D*) *Jeremias* 8 8-9 / *Daniel* 1 2 esp 2 17-23

APOCRYPHA *Wisdom of Solomon* 6-9 passim esp 7 7 7 15 21 8 21 9 13 18—(*D*) OT *Book of Wisdom* 6-9 passim esp 7 7 7 15-21 8 21 9 13 18 / *Ecclesiasticus* 1 6 32 3 17 6 7 11 24 23 27—(*D*) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 1 6 33-37 17 5-6 9 24 32 37

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 11 25 27 / *Luke* 8 4 18 esp 8 10 10 21 22 21 12 15 / *John* 1 1 18 8 31-32 10 37-38 12 28-30 14 10-12 16 12 14 20 24 29 / *Romans* 10 17 / *I Corinthians* 1 4-5 1 17-2 16 3 18-21 8 1 2 12 8-11 / *II Corinthians* 1 12 4 3-6 12 1-6 / *Ephesians* 1 15 18 3 1 1 / *Colossians* 2 8 / *I Thessalonians* 2 13 / *II Thessalonians* 2 10-14 / *Hebrews* 4 2 11 1-3 / *James* 1 5 3 13 18 / *II Peter* 1 19-21

14 PLUTARCH *Coriolanus* 191d 192b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 1 1a b BK IV par 25 25c BK VI par 6-8 36c 37c BK VII par 16 48c-49a BK VIII par 28 29 60d 61a BK IX par 23-25 68a-c BK XIII par 46 123a c / *City of God* BK X CH 2 299d 300a BK XI CH 2-4 323a 324a BK XIX CH 18 523a b BK XXI CH 5 563d 564d BK XXII CH 4-5 588b 590a CH 7 591c d / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 40 655b 656a CH 42 656c d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 1 3a 10c Q 2 A 2 REP 1 11d 12c Q 8 A 3 ANS and REP 4 36b 37c Q 12 50b 62b esp AA 11 13 59d 62b Q 32 A 1 175d 178a Q 46 A 2 253a 255a Q 56 A 3 294a d Q 57 A 5 299b-300b Q 58 A 1 ANS and REP 2 300c 301a AA 5-7 303c 306b Q 62 A 7 322d 323b Q 64 A 1 ANS 334a 335c Q 84 A 5 446c-447c Q 86 A 2 REP 1 462a-463a Q 88 A 1 ANS 469a 471c A 3 REP 1 472c-473a Q 89 A 1 REP 3 473b 475a A 2 ANS and REP 3 475a d A 3 REP 3 475d-476c A 4 ANS 476c 477a A 8 479c 480c Q 94 501c 506a Q 113 A 1 REP 1 576a d PART I II Q 3 AA 3-8 624b 629c Q 4 AA 2-3 630b 631d

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 6 A 3 61c 62b Q 67 A 3 83b 84d Q 100 A 4 REP 1 253d 255a Q 108 A 2 REP 1 332b-333d Q 109 A 1 338b 339c Q 110 A 3 REP 1 350a d A 4 ANS 350d 351d Q 112 A 5 359c 360c PART II II Q 1 AA 4-5 382c 384b Q 2 AA 3 4 392d 394b A 10 399b 400b Q 4 402a 409d QQ 8-9 416d 426c Q 19 A 7 469d 470c Q 45 598c 603c Q 188 A 5 REP 2 3 679d 681a PART III QQ 9 12 763b 779d PART III SUPPL, Q 92 1025b 1037c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY III [16-45] 56a b XVII [13 45] 78c 79a PARADISE II [37 45] 108a IV [124 132] 112a V [1 12] 112a b XIX [2 -66] 135b d XXIV [52 14,] 143b 144a XXV [1-123] 151d 153a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 52a b 66a-c 69b 83b PART II 137b-c 149c d 160b-c 163a b PART III 165a 166a 172d 173a 241c 242a PART IV 267a c

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 98b 99a 208d 209c 212a 215b 238c 239c 250a b 267c 268a 273a b

6*f* The classification of knowledge according to the degrees of assent

6*f*(1) The distinction between certain and probable knowledge

(6c *The classification of knowledge according to the methods or means of knowing 6c(3) The doctrine of knowledge as reminiscence the distinction between innate and acquired knowledge*)

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* 90d 91b BK I 95b d 121a c passim BK II CH I SECT 6 122 b c CH IX SECT 6 139a
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT II DIV 17 457b d [fn 1]
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 113b 115a / *Practical Reason* 352c 353a / *Judgement* 551a 552c
53 JAMES *Psychology* 633a 635a 851a 862a esp 851a 852b 856a 858a 859a 860a 867a 868a 877b 878a 879b 880a 889a b 897a b
54 FREUD *General Introduction* 512b 513b 526c d 532b 599a b

6c(4) The distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori* knowledge the transcendental or speculative and the empirical

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK IV CH IV SECT 6-8 325a c CH IX SECT I 349a CH XII SECT 6-13 360a 362d CH XVII SECT 2 371d
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT IV 458a 463d passim esp DIV 20 21 458a-c DIV 30 462a SECT V DIV 34-38 464b 466c SECT X DIV 89 490b-c SECT XII DIV 131-132 508d 509d
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 5a d 14a 108a c esp 14a 20c 23a 24a 25b 26b 27b 28b 29d 33d 35b 36a 41c 42b 46a-48d 57d 59b 64b-66d 115d 120c 121a d 170d 171a 172c 173a 177d 199a / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 253c 254d / *Practical Reason* 307d 308b 309b d / *Science of Right* 405b d / *Judgement* 600d 603d esp 603a b
43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 445a 447b passim
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 156d 158a
53 JAMES *Psychology* 232b 238b passim esp 235a 851a 897b esp 851a 853a 859a 862a 865b 866a 868b 869a 879b 880a 889a b 897a b

6c(5) The distinction between natural and supernatural knowledge knowledge based on sense or reason distinguished from knowledge by faith or through grace and inspiration

OLD TESTAMENT *Deuteronomy* 4 5-6 / *I Kings* 3 3 15 4.29-34—(D) *III Kings* 3 3-15 4.29-34 / *II Chronicles* 1 7 12—(D) *II Paralipomenon* 1 7 12 / *Job* 28 28 / *Psalms* 111 10 119 97-104—(D) *Psalms* 110 10 118 97 104 / *Proverbs* 1 7 2 5-6 9 10 / *Isaiah* 11 1-4—(D) *Isaias* 11 1-4 / *Jeremiah* 8 8-9—(D) *Jeremias* 8 8-9 / *Daniel* 1 2 esp 2 17-23
APOCRYPHA *Wisdom of Solomon* 6-9 passim esp 7 7 7 15 21 8 21 9 13-18—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 6-9 passim esp 7 7 7 15-21 8 21 9 13-18 / *Ecclesiasticus* 1 6 32 3, 17 6-7 11 24 23-27—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 1 6 33-37 17 5-6 9 24 32-37
NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 11.25 27 / *Luke* 8.4 18 esp 8 10 10.21 22 21 12 15 / *John* 1 1 18 8 31-32 10 37-38 12.28-30 14 10-12 16 1 14 20 24-29 / *Romans* 10 17 / *I Corinthians* 1 4-5 1 17-2 16 3 18 21 8 1 2 12.8-11 / *II Corinthians* 1 1- 4 3-6 12 1-6 / *Ephesians* 1 15-18 3 1-12 / *Colossians* 2.8 / *I Thessalonians* 2 13 / *II Thessalonians* 2 10-14 / *Hebrews* 4.2 11 1-3 / *James* 1 5 3 13 18 / *I Peter* 1 19-21
14 PLUTARCH *Coriolanus* 191d 192b
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 1 1a b BK IV par 25 25c BK VI par 6-8 6c 37c BK VII par 16 48c-49a BK VIII par 8 24 60d 61a BK IX par 23 25 68a-c BK XIII par 46 123a-c / *City of God* BK X CH 2 299d 300a BK XI CH 2 4 323a 324a BK XIX CH 18 523a b BK XXI CH 5 563d 564d BK XXII CH 4-5 588b 590a CH 7 591c d / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 40 655b 656a CH 42 656c d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 1 3a 10c Q 2 A 2 REP 1 11d 12c Q 8 A 3 ANS and REP 4 36b 37c Q 12 50b 62b esp AA 11 13 59d 62b Q 32 A 1 175d 178a Q 46 A 2 253a 255a Q 56 A 3 294a d Q 57 A 5 299b-300b Q 58 A 1 ANS and REP 2 300c 301a AA 5 7 303c 306b Q 62 A 7 322d 323b Q 64 A 1 ANS 334a 335c Q 84 A 5 446c-447c Q 86 A 2 REP 1 462a-463a Q 88 A 1 ANS 469a 471c A 3 REP 1 472c-473a Q 89 A 1 REP 3 473b 475a A 2 ANS and REP 3 475a d A 3 REP 3 475d-476c A 4 ANS 476c 477a A 8 479c 480c Q 94 501c 506a Q 113 A 1 REP 1 576a d PART I II Q 3 AA 3-8 624b 629c Q 4 AA 2-3 630b-631d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 62 A 3 61c 62b Q 67 A 3 83b 84d Q 100 A 4 REP 1 253d 255a Q 108 A 2 REP 1 332b-333d Q 109 A 1 338b 339c Q 110 A 3 REP 1 350a d A 4 ANS 350d 351d Q 112 A 5 359c 360c PART II II Q 1 AA 4-5 382c 384b Q 2 AA 3-4 392d 394b A 10 399b-400b Q 4 402a 409d QQ 8-9 416d-426c Q 19 A 7 469d-470c Q 45 598c-603c Q 188 A 5 REP 2-3 679d 681a PART III QQ 9-12 763b 779d PART III SUPPL, Q 92 1025b 1037c
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY III [16-45] 56a b XVII [13 45] 78c 79a PARADISE II [37 45] 108a IV [124-132] 112a V [1 12] 112a b XIX [22-66] 135b-d XXIV [52 147] 143b-144a XXX [1-123] 151d 153a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 52a b 66a-c 69b 83b PART II 137b-c 149c d 160b-c 163a b PART III 165a 166a 172d 173a 241c 242a PART IV 267a-c
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 98b 99a 208d 209c 212a 215b 238c 239c 250a b 267c 268a 273a b

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK IX par 23-25 88a-c BK X, par 7 73a BK XIII par 18 115c / *City of God* BK XXII CH 29 614b-616d / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 37 38 635b-d BK II, CH 638d-639c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 1 A 9, REP 3 8d 9c, Q 12 50b-62b esp AA 11 13 59d 62b Q 62, A 1 ANS 317d 318c Q 84 5 446c-447 Q 88 A 1 ANS 469a-471c Q 89 473a-480c Q 94 501c 506a Q 101 572c 534
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 6 A 2-3 82c-84d Q 69, A 2 REP 3 97b-98c PART II II, Q 180 A 5 611d-613a PART III Q 11 A 1 REP 2 772b-773a A 2 ANS and REP 1 2 773a-d, PART III SUP Q 92 A 1 REP 1 917 919a Q 8.. A 3 REP 4 9 1a 9 2d Q 9.. A 1, REP 3-5 13,15 1025c 1032b A 2 ANS 1032b-1034b
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL, X [94 105] 14c-d PURGATORY I [16-45] 56a b PARADISE [37-69] 128d 129a XIX [22-66] 135 b-d XX [130-148] 138a b XXI [73 102] 139a b XXVI [9 105] 146d 147a XXX [1 123] 1 1d 153a
31 DESCARTES *Meditations* III 85d 89
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 242 218a 425-427 243b-244b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* ADDITIONS 99 130b-d
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI 158a-c

7d. The knowledge of man and brutes

5 EURIPIDES *Trojan Women* [669-672] 275d
7 PLATO *Laches*, 35b-36a / *Republic* BK I 370b-c
8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK I, CH 1 [980b 25 27] 499b / *Soul*, BK III CH 3 [427b 14] 659d-660a [428a20- 4] 660c CH 10 [433a8-13] 66 d
9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals*, BK I, CH 1 [488b24 27] 9d BK II CH 1 [588a18-b4] 114b-d / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH 3 [731a 30-b5] 271 -d / *Ethics* BK VII, CH 3 [14-b 2-5] 39 d
10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK I CH 2, 173a-c
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I, CH 6 110c 111c CH 9, 114c-d CH 28 134b BK II CH 8 146a-c BK IV CH 233a
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK I S CT 6 262d 263a,c BK VI SECT 23 276b BK IX SECT 9 29 b-d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I Q 18 A 2, ANS and 1 105c 106b Q S A 4 ANS and RE 4-6 411d-413d Q 79, A 6, REP 419b-420d 8 REP 3 421c-422b Q 84 A 2 REP 1 442b-443c
23 HOBBES *Leviathan*, PART I 52b 53a b 53d 54a 63a 79b-c PART II 100a-c PART IV 267b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 215a 223b
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK I APH 73 117d 118a BK II APH 40 173c-d
31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART 5 59c-60b / *Objections and Replies* 156a-d
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VII [506-516] 228a BK VIII [369-451] 240a 242a BK IX [549-566] 259b
33 PASCAL *Vacuum* 357a-358a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH IX SECT 12 15 140c 141a CH XI SECT 4 11 144d 146a CH XXVII, SECT 8 221a 222a BK III CH VI SECT 12 272b
35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO, SECT 11 407b-408a
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT IX 487b 488c SECT XII DIV 118 504c
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I 1d 2a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 338a
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 164a 165c / *Practical Reason* 316c 317a / *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 372a-b / *Judgement* 479a-c 584d 585c 602b d [fn 1]
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 244a 245b
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 288d 289a 290c 298c passim, esp 292a-293a 294d 295a
53 JAMES *Psychology* 6 8b-686b 04a b

8\. The use and value of knowledge

8a. The technical use of knowledge in the sphere of production: the applications of science in art

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 5:22 / *Exodus* 31 1 35 30-36.8
5 AESCHYLUS *Prometheus Bound* [442-506] 44c 45a
7 PLATO *Lysis* 16c 18b / *Protagoras* 43b-45a / *Euthydemus* 70a-c / *I* 142a 148a,c / *Gorgias* 261a 262a / *Republic* BK VII 392 b 394b-d / *Statesman* 580d 581a / *Philebus* 633a 634b / *Laws*, BK IV 684c-685a
8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK II CH 19 [00b6-9] 136c / *Physics* BK II CH 2 [194a 1 b13] 270c 271a / *Metaphysics* BK I CH 1 499a 500b BK II CH 7 [103 25 1033a4] 555b-556a CH 9 [1034a 1 3] 557c BK IX CH 2 571 572a CH 5 [1 4-b31 1048 10] 573a b CH 7 [1049a5 12] 574c-d BK XI CH 7 [1064 10-14] 592b-c / *Sense and the Sensible*, CH 1 [436a16-b2] 673b / *Youth, Life and Breathing* CH 27 [480b21 31] 726d
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 1 339a b CH 7 [098a28-32] 343d BK II CH 4 [1105a1 b4] 350d 351a BK VI CH 4 388d 389a
10 HIPPOCRATES *Ancient Medicine* 1a 9a,c esp par 4 1a 2c, par 4 5a-c par 20-22 7b-8d / *Prognostics* par 1 19a b par 25 26a,c / *Epidemics* BK III SECT III par 16 59b-c / *Surgery* par 1 70b / *Articulations* par 58 112d / *The Law* par 4 144d
10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK II CH 9 195c 196a

(7 *Comparison of human with other kinds of knowledge 7a Human and divine knowledge*)

/ *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 8-10 626c 627b CH 12-14 627c 628b

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q I A 2 4a c A 4 5a b A 5 ANS 5c 6a A 6 6b 7a A 8 REP 2 7c 8d Q 3 A I REP I 14b 15b A 6 REP I 18c 19a Q 8 A 3 ANS and REP 2-4 36b 37c Q 12 A I REP I 50c 51c A 4 53b 54c AA 7-8 56a 58b Q 14 75c 91b Q 16 94b 100d passim Q 18 AA 3-4 106b 108c QQ 22 24 127c 143c passim Q 27 AA I 2 153b 155b Q 28 A 4 REP I 2 160c 161d Q 34 185a 189a passim Q 44 A 3 240b 241a Q 46 A 2 REP 3 253a 255a Q 55 A I ANS and REP 3 289a d A 3 ANS 291a d Q 57 A I ANS 295a d A 2 ANS 295d 297a A 3 ANS and REP I 297b 298a A 4 ANS 298a 299a Q 62 A 9 ANS 324a 325b Q 79 A I ANS 414a d A 2 ANS 414d 416a A 4 ANS and REP I 5 417a 418c A 10 REP 2 423d 424d Q 84 A 2 ANS and REP 3 442b 443c Q 85 A 4 ANS 457a d A 5 ANS 457d 458d Q 86 A 2 REP I 462a 463a A 4 ANS 463d 464d Q 87 A I ANS 465a-466c A 3 ANS 467b 468a Q 89 A I ANS 473b 475a A 4 ANS 476c 477a Q 93 A 4 ANS 494c 495b PART I II Q 2 A 3 ANS 617b 618a Q 3 A 8 REP 2 628d 629c Q 14 A I REP 2 677b 678a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 91 A 3 REP I 209d 210c Q 110 A 2 REP 2 349a d A 4 ANS 350d 351d PART II-II Q 45 A 6 REP I-2 602b 603c Q 180 A 8 REP 3 616a d PART III Q 9 A I 763b 764c A 4 ANS 766b 767b Q 10 767b 772a Q 13 A I REP 2 3 780a 781b Q 15 A 3 789d 790c A 10 ANS 795b 796a PART III SUPPL, Q 92 A 3 1034b 1037c

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE IV [124 132] 112a XIX [22-66] 135b d XXI [73 102] 139a b XXVI [103-108] 146d 147a

22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida* BK IV STANZA 136 154 106a 108b

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 162c

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 213a b 238c 239c

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 17b c 98d 99b / *Novum Organum* BK I APH 23 108c BK II APH 15 149a

31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 152d 153c

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I PROP 17 SCHOL 362c 363c

3 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [654 735] 149b 151b BK VII [109-130] 219b 220a BK VIII [66-197] 233b 236b [412-418] 241a / *Samson Agonistes* [60-62] 340b 341a

33 PASCAL *Pensees* 793 326b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH I SECT 10 123b CH X SECT 9 143a c CH XV SECT 12 165b-c CH XXIII SECT 34 213a b BK III CH VI SECT 3 268d SECT 11-12 271b 272b BK IV CH X SECT 5-6 350a-c

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 33a d 52c 53b / *Practical Reason* 344a c 350c 351b / *Judgement* 5/2d 574b 579a

47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [1765 1784] 42b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 669a b

7b Human and angelic knowledge

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XII par 12 102a par 16 102d 103a par 20 103c d par 23 104b-c / *City of God* BK VIII CH 25 283b-c BK II CH 21-22 296b 297a BK XI CH 29 339a b BK XVI CH 6 426c 427a BK XXII CH I 586b d 587b CH 29 614b-d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 12 A 4 53b 54c A 10 ANS and REP 2 59a d QQ 54 58 284d 306b passim Q 59 A I REP I 306c 307b Q 60 A 2 ANS 311a d Q 64 A I REP 2 334a 335c Q 79 A 8 ANS and REP 3 421c 422b A 10 ANS 423d 424d Q 84 A 2 ANS and REP 3 442b-443c A 3 REP I 443d-444d A 7 ANS 449b-450b Q 85 A I ANS 451c 453c A 5 ANS 457d-458d Q 87 A I ANS and REP 2-3 465a 466c A 3 ANS 467b-468a Q 89 A 3 ANS and REP I 3 475d-476c A 4 ANS 476c 477a QQ 106-107 545c 552b passim Q 108 A I ANS 552c 553c Q 117 A 2 597c 598c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 51 A I ANS 12b 13c PART III Q 9 A 3 ANS 765b-766b A 4 ANS 766b 767b Q 11 A 3 REP 3 773d 774c A 4 774c 775a A 6 ANS and REP I 775d 776b Q 12 A 4 779a d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE XIX [2 66] 135b d XXIX [70 81] 151a

30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 15 149a

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [654 735] 149b 151b BK V [388-505] 183b-186a esp [404 413] 184a [469 490] 185b 186a [544 576] 187a b BK VI [316 353] 203a 204a BK VIII [66-75] 233b

33 PASCAL *Pensees* 285 224a 793 326b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH X SECT 9 143a c CH XXIII SECT 36 213c d BK III CH VI SECT 3 268d CH XI SECT 23 305a b BK IV CH III SECT 6 315a b SECT 23 320a-c CH XVII SECT 14 378c d

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* SECT 81 428c d

36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 318b 394a

42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 285a 287d / *Practical Reason* 354d 355d / *Judgement* 572d 574b

7c Knowledge in this life compared with knowledge in the state of innocence and knowledge hereafter

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 2 19-20 3 1 22 esp 3 5 3 22

NEW TESTAMENT *I Corinthians* 13 12

7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 124b 126d / *Meno* 179d 180b / *Phaedo* 228a 230c

17 PLOTINUS *Fourth Ennead* TR IV CH 1-5 159a 161b

8b(2) Knowledge as a condition of voluntariness in conduct

(8 *The use and value of knowledge* 8a *The technical use of knowledge in the sphere of production the applications of science in art*)

11 Nicomachus *Arithmetic* bk i 812d 813a
12 Lucretius *Nature of Things* bk v [1241-1457] 77b 80a c passim
12 Epictetus *Discourses* bk ii ch 17 158d 159b
13 Virgil *Georgics* 37a 99a passim esp ii [475-515] 65a 66a
14 Plutarch *Marcellus* 252a 255a
19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 14 a 8 82c 83b q 16 a 1 ans 94b 95c q 17 a 1 ans 100d 101d q 19 a 4 rep 4 111c 112c
20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i-ii q 57 a 3 ans and rep 1 3 37b-38a a 4 esp ans and rep 2 38a 39a a 5 rep 3 39a-40a q 95 a 2 ans 227c 228c
22 Chaucer *Troilus and Cressida* bk i stanza 153 21a
23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part i 60a b 73b part iv 267a b
25 Montaigne *Essays* 450d-451a 523c 524b
28 Gilbert *Loadstone* bk v 100c 101c
28 Galileo *Two New Sciences* first day 154c 155b 160d 161a second day 191b 193b
28 Harvey *Motion of the Heart* 289d 291d 292a / *Circulation of the Blood* 305a d
29 Cervantes *Don Quixote* part i 145c d
30 Bacon *Advancement of Learning* 5b c 48d 49b 50c 51d 74b-c / *Novum Organum* bk i aph 3 107b aph 11 107d aph 81 120b c aph 85 121d 122d aph 129 134d 135d bk ii aph 4 137d 138b aph 44-52 175d 195d passim / *New Atlantis* 199a 214d esp 210d 214d
31 Descartes *Discourse* part vi 61b d 66d 67a
33 Pascal *Equilibrium of Liquids* 392b 393a
34 Newton *Principles* 1a b corol ii 15a 16b
35 Locke *Human Understanding* bk iv ch xii sect 11 12 361c 362c
35 Hume *Human Understanding* sect i div 5 452d-453b
36 Swift *Gulliver* part iii 97b 106a 112a
39 Smith *Wealth of Nations* bk i 5b 6a
40 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 633c 661c 663c
42 Kant *Pure Reason* 60a c / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 266d 267a / *Practical Reason* 300d [fn 1] / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 388d / *Judgement* 463a 464c 523d 524a 526a 527b
43 Mill *Representative Government* 369a
45 Lavoisier *Elements of Chemistry* part i 45c d
45 Fourier *Theory of Heat* 170a 184a 213b
45 Faraday *Researches in Electricity* 433a 440a c
46 Hegel *Philosophy of History* part i 218d 219a
49 Darwin *Origin of Species* 19c d
50 Marx *Capital* 167a 171c passim esp 170a 171a 176d 178d 180d 189b esp 188b-189b 239b-241a 299b d
51 Tolstoy *War and Peace* bk ix 361d 365c bk x 424a c 425b-426a 441b-c 456a-45 c epilogue ii 685a
54 Freud *Psycho Analytic Therapy* 123a 11a esp 123b 125a / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 777a-c 778b d

8b The moral use of knowledge and the moral value of knowledge

8b(1) The knowledge of good and evil the relation of knowledge to virtue and sin

Old Testament *Genesis* 2 9 16 17 3 1 7,22 / *Job* 28 28 / *Psalms* 37 30 82 4-5—(D) *Psalms* 36 30 81 4-5 / *Proverbs* 1 1 23 21 20 7-8 esp 8 8 8 20 10 8 31 11 12 14 9 16-18 22 29 15 21 19 8 24 1-14 28 7 29 8 / *Ecclesiastes* 2 26
Apocrypha *Wisdom of Solomon* 1 1-7 6 12 20 8 5-7 9 9-10 14 14 22-27—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 1 1 7 6 13 20 8 5-7 9 9 10 14 14 22-27 / *Ecclesiasticus* 17 7 19 22 24 50 28-29—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 17 6 19 19-21 50 30 31
New Testament *Luke* 23 34 / *John* 3 17 21 / *Romans* 2 17-23 7 esp 7 15 25 16 19 / *Philippians* 1 9-11 / *Colossians* 1 9-11 / *Titus* 1 16 / *Hebrews* 5 14 / *James* 4 17 / *II Peter* 1 1 11
5 Euripides *Hippolytus* [373 387] 228b-c
6 Thucydides *Peloponnesian War* bk ii 397b-c 402d 403b
7 Plato *Charmides* 7b-c 12a 13c / *Laches* 31a b 33a 37a / *Protagoras* 40b-41a 56b 57d 64d / *Euthydemus* 69a 71a 74b 76b / *Meno* 174a 190a c esp 177d 178b 183b 190a c / *Phaedo* 225d 226c 230d 234c / *Gorgias* 256d 259c 280c 281b / *Republic* bk i 301d 302c 306c 308a bk ii 314d 315a bk iii 333b d 337b d bk iv 354d 355a bk vi vii 383d-401d bk x 439b-441a c / *Theaetetus* 530b 531a / *Laws* bk i 643c d 645b 652d bk iii 670b bk v 689d 690c 696c-697a bk vii 724c 728a bk ix 748a b 754a b bk xii 788d 789a 792c d 795c d / *Seventh Letter* 801b 806b c 809c 810d esp 810c d
8 Aristotle *Prior Analytics* bk ii ch 25 [69^{a}20-28] 91a / *Topics* bk ii ch 9 [114^{b}9-13] 160b bk iii ch 6 [120^{a}26-31] 168a bk iv ch 2 [121^{b}24 122^{a}2] 169d 170a ch 3 [124 10-14] 172d bk v ch 7 [137^{a}13 17] 189b / *Metaphysics* bk iii ch 2 [996^{a}21-^{b}13] 514d 515a
9 Aristotle *Ethics* bk i ch 1 3 339a 340b ch 4 [1095 30-^{b}1] 340c d ch 6 [1096^{b}32 1097^{a}14] 342b-c bk ii ch 2 [1103^{b}26-1104^{a}9] 349b-c ch 4 350d 351b esp [1105^{b}1-4] 351a [1105^{b}13 18] 351a b ch 6 [1106^{b}36-1107^{a}3] 352c bk iii ch 1 [1110^{b}17 35] 356b-c bk v ch 8 [1135^{b}9 1136^{a}9] 383c 384a bk vi ch 5

8c The political use of knowledge the knowl edge requisite for the statesm n legisla tor or cit zen

(8 The use and value of knowledge 8c The political use of knowledge the knowledge requisite for the statesman legislator or citizen)

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 450d-451a 451d 452d
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 40d PART II 331a 333b
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 1d 2b 4c 7c 20d 26a esp 23a 26a 94b 95a
32 MILTON *Sr Henry Vane* 69b / *Areopagitica* 383a 385a b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH X SECT 8-9 293c 294a
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 28b 29b PART II 77a 78b PART III 112a 115b PART IV 157a 158a
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XII 85b
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 329a 331d / *Political Economy* 371b c / *Social Contract* BK II 400c 402a
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK V 337d 338c 343c d 347c d
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 284a c 343a c
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 40b 75d 81c passim
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U S ARTICLE II SECT 2 [413-417] 15a SECT 3 [440-444] 15b
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 35-36 113a 116a NUMBER 53 168b 169b NUMBER 56 174d 176d NUMBER 62 190b d NUMBER 84 253d 254b
43 MILL *Liberty* 317d 319b / *Representative Government* 330d 331a 337a 357b d 359a 361b 363b-366a 374c 377a 380c 389b 401a-406a 410d 412a 415a-417c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 211 70a c par 215 71c d par 300 100b / *Philosophy of History* PART II 272c 273a
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 107a b
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK VI 242b 243a BK IX 385c 387a passim BK XII 537c 538a

9 The communication of knowledge

9a The means and methods of communicating knowledge

5 ARISTOPHANES *Clouds* 488a 506d
7 PLATO *Protagoras* 47d-48a 50c 52d / *Cratylus* 85d 88a esp 87c d / *Phaedrus* 138c 140b / *Meno* 179b 183a / *Apology* 206b d / *Gorgias* 259d 260a 261d 262a / *Republic* BK VII 388a 398c esp 389d 390a 397b 398c 399c / *Theaetetus* 515d 517b 549c 550a c / *Sophist* 551d 556c 558d / *Statesman* 590d 591c / *Laws* BK II 656b c BK IV 684c 685a / *Seventh Letter* 809a 811a
8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH I 97a d / *Topics* BK I CH 18 [108a17-37] 152b-d / *Sophistical Refutations* CH 2 [165a38-b3] 227d 228a CH 10 [171a27-b2] 235d 236a CH II [172a15-21] 237a / *Metaphysics* BK II CH 3 513c d / *Sense and the Sensible* CH I [436b18-437a17] 673d 674a
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VI CH 3 [1139b25-34] 388c / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 2 [1358a3-26] 597d 598b CH 4 [1359b1-18] 599d BK III CH I [1404a1-12] 654a
11 ARCHIMEDES *Sphere and Cylinder* BK I 403b
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [921-950] 12b-c BK IV [1-25] 44a b
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK II CH 21 167a d CH 24 172d 173c BK III CH 21-23 193d 203b passim BK IV CH 4 225a 226a CH II 241d 242d
17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III CH 2-3 10d 11a
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 13 4b-c par 19-20 5d-6a par 23 6d 7a BK IX par 13 22c d / *City of God* BK XI CH 25 336b-d / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 6 638a-d CH 36-37 653d 654b BK IV 675a 698a c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PROLOGUE 1a b PART I Q I A 2 REP 2 4a c A 5 REP 2 5c 6a AA 8-10 7c 10c Q 27 A I ANS 153b 154b Q 34 A I ANS and REP I 3 185b 187b Q 57 A 4 REP I 298a 299a Q 76 A 2 REP 5 388c 391a Q 79 A 10 REP 3 423d-424d Q 84 A 3 REP 3 443d-444d A 7 ANS 449b 450b Q 89 A I ANS 473b-475a QQ 106-107 545c 552b Q 108 A 2 REP 2 553c 554c Q III A I ANS 568c 569b A 3 REP 3 570b-571b Q 117 A I 595d 597c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II II Q I A 7 REP 2 385c 387a Q 181 A 3 618c-619b PART III Q 9 A 4 REP I 766b 767b Q 12 A 3 778b 779a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 55a b
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK II 101b 106a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 63d 80b passim esp 65a 66b 73b 74a 446d-450a
26 SHAKESPEARE *Richard II* ACT II SC I [5-16] 327d
28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 268c / *On Animal Generation* 336d 337a c
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 14c 15a 16c 29c 32c 62c 68b
31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART I 42b 42d PART V 59c 60b
32 MILTON *Areopagitica* 384a b
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 9-10 173b 6 6 286b / *Geometrical Demonstration* 439b-446b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH X SECT 34 299d 300a BK IV CH VII SECT II 340d-341a
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III 109b-112a
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 99d 100a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 339d 340a
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK V 337c d 339d 340a
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 88c d 597a 601b c 669a 670b
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 80c d 231a 527c 528a c
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 2d-4a c / *Practical Reason* 335b-c

(8 *The use and value of knowledge* 8c *The political use of knowledge the knowledge requisite for the statesman legislator or citizen*)

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 450d-451a 451d-452d
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 40d PART II 331a 333b
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 1d 2b 4c 7c 20d 26a esp 23a 26a 94b 95a
32 MILTON *Sr Henry Vane* 69b / *Areopagitica* 383a 385a b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH X SECT 8-9 293c 294a
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 28b 29b PART II 77a 78b PART III 112a 115b PART IV 157a 158a
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XII 85b
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 329a 331d / *Political Economy* 371b c / *Social Contract* BK II 400c 402a
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK V 337d 338c 343c d 347c d
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 284a c 343a c
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 40b 75d 81c passim
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U S ARTICLE II SECT 2 [413-417] 15a SECT 3 [440-444] 15b
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 35-36 113a 116a NUMBER 53 168b 169b NUMBER 56 174d 176d NUMBER 62 190b d NUMBER 84 253d 254b
43 MILL *Liberty* 317d 319b / *Representative Government* 330d 331a 337a 357b d 359a 361b 363b 366a 374c 377a 380c 389b 401a-406a 410d-412a 415a-417c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 211 70a-c par 215 71c d par 300 100b / *Philosophy of History* PART II 272c 273a
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 107a b
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK VI 242b 243a BK IX 385c 387a passim BK XII 537c 538a

9 The communication of knowledge

9a The means and methods of communicating knowledge

5 ARISTOPHANES *Clouds* 488a 506d
7 PLATO *Protagoras* 47d-48a 50c 52d / *Cratylus* 85d 88a esp 87c d / *Phaedrus* 138c 140b / *Meno* 179b 183a / *Apology* 206b d / *Gorgias* 259d 260a 261d 262a / *Republic* BK VII 388a 398c esp 389d 390a 397b 398c 399c / *Theaetetus* 515d 517b 549c 550a c / *Sophist* 551d 556c 558d / *Statesman* 590d 591c / *Laws* BK II 656b-c BK IV 684c 685a / *Seventh Letter* 809a 811a
8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK I CH I 97a d / *Topics* BK I CH 18 [108a1, 37] 152b-d / *Sophistical Refutations* CH 2 [165a38-b3] 227d 228a CH 10 [171a27-b2] 235d 236a CH 11 [172a15-21] 237a / *Metaphysics* BK II CH 3 513c d / *Sense and the Sensible* CH 1 [436b18-437a17] 673d 674a
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VI CH 3 [1139b25-34] 388c / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 2 [1358a3-26] 597d 598b CH 4 [1359b1-18] 599d BK III CH 1 [1404a1-12] 654a
11 ARCHIMEDES *Sphere and Cylinder* BK I 403b
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [921-950] 12b c BK IV [1-25] 44a b
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK II CH 21 167a-d CH 24 172d 173c BK III CH 21 23 193d 203b passim BK IV CH 4 225a 226a CH 11 241d 242d
17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III CH 2 3 10d 11a
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 13 4b-c par 19 20 5d 6a par 23 6d 7a BK IV par 13 22c d / *City of God* BK XI CH 2 336b-d / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 6 638a-d CH 36-37 653d 654b BK IV 675a 698a c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PROLOGUE 1a b PART I Q I A 2 REP 2 4a c A 5 REP 2 5c 6a AA 8-10 7c 10c Q 27 A 1 ANS 153b 154b Q 34 A 1 ANS and REP 1 3 185b 187b Q 57 A 4 REP 1 298a 299a Q 76 A 2 REP 5 388c 391a Q 79 A 10 REP 3 423d-424d Q 84 A 3 REP 3 443d 444d A 7 ANS 449b-450b Q 89 A 1 ANS 473b 475a QQ 106-107 545c 552b Q 108 A 2 REP 2 553c 554c Q 111 A 1 ANS 568c 569b A 3 REP 3 570b-571b Q 117 A 1 595d 597c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II II Q 1 A 7 REP 2 385c 387a Q 181 A 3 618c-619b PART III Q 9 A 4 REP 1 766b 767b Q 12 A 3 778b-779a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 55a b
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK II 101b 106a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 63d 80b passim esp 65a 66b 73b 74a 446d 450a
26 SHAKESPEARE *Richard II* ACT II SC I [5-16] 327d
28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 268c / *On Animal Generation* 336d 337a c
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 14c 15a 16c 29c 32c 62c 68b
31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART I 42b 42d PART V 59c-60b
32 MILTON *Areopagitica* 384a b
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 9-10 173b 326 286b / *Geometrical Demonstration* 439b-446b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH X SECT 34 299d 300a BK IV CH VII SECT 11 340d-341a
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III 109b 112a
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 99d 100a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 339d 340a
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK V 337c d 339d 340a
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 88c d 597a 601b-c 669a 670b
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 80c d 231a 527c-528a c
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 2d-4a c / *Practical Reason* 335b-c

For Matters relevant to the classification of the kinds of knowledge by reference to the degrees of assent, see JUDGMENT 9 OPINION 3–3b TRUTH 2c

Other discussions of the distinction between theoretic and practical knowledge see JUDGMENT 2 PHILOSOPHY 2a PRUDENCE 2a REASONING 5e–5 (1) THEOLOGY 4d TRUTH 2c WISDOM 1b

The basic divisions of theoretic knowledge see ASTRONOMY 4 DIALECTIC 4 HISTORY 1 MATHEMATICS 1a METAPHYSICS 3b–3c NATURE 4b PHILOSOPHY 2b PHYSICS 1a SCIENCE 1a( ) 1c, 2a THEOLOGY 3a 4a TRUTH 4c and for the problem of the hierarchy of the sciences and the definition of the highest form of human knowledge see DIALECTIC 4 METAPHYSICS 1 THEOLOGY 4a WISDOM 1a

The basic divisions of practical knowledge see ART 6c PHILOSOPHY 2c PRUDENCE 6a–6b SCIENCE 3a–3b WEALTH 9.

The moral or political value of knowledge see CITIZEN 6 GOOD AND EVIL 6a–6c HAPPINESS 2b(,) PHILOSOPHY 4a–4c PLEASURE AND PAIN 4c 4c(2) PRUDENCE c SCIENCE 1b( ) STATE 8c–8d VIRTUE AND VICE 1a WILL 3a(1) WISDOM 2b

The technical use of knowledge and the applications of science to production see ART 6c MEDICINE 2 PHYSICS 5 SCIENCE 1b(1) 3b WEALTH 3a.

The general problem of the dissemination and communication of knowledge see EDUCATION 5b LANGUAGE 1b LIBERTY 2a OPINION 5b.

The development of human knowledge the advancement of learning or progress in science and philosophy see ART 12 PHILOSOPHY 7 PROGRESS 6a–6e SCIENCE 6a–6b TRUTH 6

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups

I. Works by authors represented in this collection
II. Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date, place and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited, consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

I

AUGUSTINE. *Answer to Skeptics*
— *On the Profit of Believing*
— *On Faith in Things Unseen*
AQUINAS. *On the Trinity of Boethius* QQ 5–6
— *Summa Contra Gentiles* BK CH 43–
— *Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate*
SPINOZA. *Of the Improvement of the Understanding*
BERKELEY. *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous*
HUME. *A Treatise of Human Nature* BK I, PART IV SECT 1–IV
KANT. *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic*
— *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*
— *Introduction to Logic* V VI IX X
HEGEL. *The Phenomenology of Mind*, III
— *Logic* CH 3–5
FARADAY. *Observations on the Education of the Judgment*
J. S. MILL. *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy* CH 2–3
W. JAMES. *The Will to Believe*
— *The Meaning of Truth*, CH 1–2, 4

II

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, BK I–II
SAADIA GAON. *The Book of Beliefs and Opinions* INTRODUCTORY TREATISE
ANSELM OF CANTERBURY. *Dialogue on Truth*
MAIMONIDES. *The Guide for the Perplexed*, PART III CH 20–21
ALBERTUS MAGNUS. *On the Intellect and the Intelligible*
MATTHEW OF AQUASPARTA. *Ten Disputed Questions on Knowledge* QQ 1–II
DUNS SCOTUS. *Oxford Commentary* BK I DIST 3 Q 4
PETRARCH. *On His Own Ignorance*
ALBO. *The Book of Principles (Sefer ha Ikkarim)* BK IV CH I
SUAREZ. *Disputationes Metaphysicae* I (6) VIII–IX, XII (6) XX (1) XXI (1) XXII (7–8) XXX (11–12) XXXV (4)

(10 *The growth of human knowledge the history of man's progress and failures in the pursuit of knowledge*)

70 115 116b 130d passim / *New Atlantis* 203d 207b

31 DESCARTES *Rules* IV 5a 7d / *Discourse*, PART I 42b 44c PART VI 60d 67a c

32 MILTON *Areopagitica* 404a b

33 PASCAL *Vacuum* 355a 358b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* 88d 89b

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO SECT 17 409d 410a

35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT I DIV 5 450a b DIV 8-9 454b 455a SECT VII DIV 48 471b c

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III 118a 119a

36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 224b 225a

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 329b 330d 338c 342c

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK V 331b d 343d passim

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 23d 24a c 148a b 159a c 597a 601b c 633c 634a c 669a 671b

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 75b 80d passim 225a b 274a d 298a 300b 325d 328a c 347a c 439d-440a c 451c-452b 509d 510a c 522b 528a c esp 527d 528a c

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 1d 2b [fn 2] 5a 8b 17: [fn 1] 248d 250a c / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 273d 274a / *Practical Reason* 299d 307a d 317b 318b 327c d 339b d *Judgement* 513d 514a 551b-552a

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 9 47c d NUMBER 3 119b 120b

43 MILL *Liberty* 274b 293b passim / *Utilitarianism* 445a 447b

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 129a

45 FOURIER *Theory of Heat* 175b

45 FARADAY *Researches in Electricity* 391b-c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* ADDITIONS 13 138c d / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 185 186a PART I 217c 219c 229b d 253b 257d 258a PART II 279d 280b PART II 323c d 347b d 361a-c

48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 95b 105b

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK V 196b BK X 469a d EPILOGUE II 694d 696d

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK XI 341d

53 JAMES *Psychology* 37b 125b 127b

54 FREUD *Psycho Analytic Therapy* 125d 126a *Interpretation of Dreams* 137b 139a esp 138d 139a / *General Introduction* 550d / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 777a / *New Introductory Lectures* 880d 881c

CROSS REFERENCES

For The differences between human and other kinds of knowledge *see* ANGEL 3d ANIMAL 1a(1) 1a(2) GOD 5f INFINITY 7d MIND 4e-4f WISDOM 1d

Other discussions bearing on the nature of human knowledge its relation to truth error and ignorance and its distinction from opinion belief and fancy *see* MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 6a ONE AND MANY 4f OPINION 1 3-4b PRINCIPLE 3c(2) SAME AND OTHER 4a TRUTH 2e 3d WILL 3b(1) and for the elements causes or principles of knowledge *see* DEFINITION 5 EXPERIENCE 3 FORM 3 4 IDEA 1a-1c INDUCTION 3 JUDGMENT 8-8d PRINCIPLE 2-2b(3) REASONING 5a-5b(5) WILL 3b(1)

Other considerations of the limits of human knowledge and of the knowability of certain objects *see* ANGEL 2b BEING 8a-8c 8e CAUSE 5d EXPERIENCE 4a FORM 3b GOD 6-6b INFINITY 6b MAN 2a MATTER 4a ONE AND MANY 4c OPINION 3c PRINCIPLE 5 SCIENCE 4e SOUL 1d THEOLOGY 3c TIME 6e-6f TRUTH 7a UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 4c

Matters relevant to the classification of the kinds of knowledge by reference to its objects *see* BEING 8a-8b FORM 3-3a IDEA 1a MIND 1a(1) NATURE 4a-4c NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 4a RELATION 4d RELIGION 1a SENSE 4a-4b UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR 4a

Matters relevant to the classification of the kinds of knowledge by reference to the faculties involved *see* MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 3 6a MIND 1a(1) SENSE 4a-4b

Matters relevant to the classification of the kinds of knowledge by reference to the methods or means of knowing *see* EXPERIENCE 2d GOD 6c-6c(4) INDUCTION 1a JUDGMENT 8a MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 3a OPINION 4a REASONING 1b RELIGION 6g THEOLOGY 2 WISDOM 1c and for methodology in general and the methods of the particular sciences *see* ASTRONOMY 2a-2c HISTORY 3a LOGIC 4-4f MATHEMATICS 3-3d MECHANICS 2-2c METAPHYSICS 2c PHILOSOPHY 3-3c PHYSICS 4-4d SCIENCE 5-5e THEOLOGY 4c

Chapter 44 LABOR

INTRODUCTION

MEN have dreamed of a golden age in the past when the world was young and everything needed for the support of life existed in profusion. Earth, Lucretius writes, "first spontaneously of herself produced for mortals goodly corn-crops and joyous vineyards; of herself gave sweet fruits and glad pastures which now-a-days scarce attain any size even when furthered by our labor; we exhaust the oxen and the strength of the husbandmen; we wear out our iron, scarcely fed after all by the tilled fields; so niggardly are they of their produce and after so much labor do they let it grow. When the aged plowman compares present times with times past," Lucretius adds, "he praises the fortunes of his sire living in the time of earth's plenty."

This ancient myth of a golden age has sometimes taken the form, as with Rousseau, of an idealization of primitive society uncorrupted by civilization, in which an easy, almost effortless, existence corresponded to the simplicity of man's needs. Rousseau pictures a situation in which "the produce of the earth furnished [man] with all he needed, and instinct told him how to use it," so that "singing and dancing, the true offspring of love and leisure, became the amusement, or rather the occupation, of men and women assembled together with nothing else to do."

In our own day, industrial utopias have been projected into a future made free from toil by the adequacy of machines or the efficiency of atomic energy. Long before the industrial era Aristotle envisioned, as a supposition contrary to fact, a society built upon labor-saving machines. "If every instrument could accomplish its own work," he writes, "if it could obey or anticipate commands, if ... the shuttle would weave without a hand to guide it, the chief workmen would not want servants, nor masters slaves."

In all these conceptions of a better life, labor is eliminated or reduced. The implication seems to be that the labor required for the maintenance of all historic societies is an affliction, a drudgery, a crushing burden which deforms the lives of many, if not all. The pains of toil do not belong to human life by any necessity of human nature, but rather through the accident of external circumstances which might be other than they are. "Work became indispensable," according to Rousseau, only when "property was introduced" and then "vast forests became smiling fields, which man had to water with the sweat of his brow." It was the result of "some fatal accident, which, for the public good, should never have happened." Man might have realized his nature more surely and richly if, like the lilies of the field, he neither toiled nor spun.

The contrary view would maintain that work is not a curse but a blessing, filling man's hours usefully, turning to service energies which would otherwise be wasted or misspent in idleness or mischief. The sinfulness of sloth implies the virtue of work. "The principle of activity," according to Hegel, "whereby ... the workman has to perform for his subsistence ... gives man a dignity which ... consists in his depending entirely on his diligence, conduct, and intelligence for the supply of his wants. In direct contravention of this principle are pauperism, laziness, inactivity."

It is even suggested that useful occupations save men from a boredom they fear more than the pain of labor, as evidenced by the variety of amusements and diversions they invent or frantically pursue to occupy themselves when work is finished. The satisfactions of labor are as peculiarly human as its burdens. Not merely to keep alive, but to keep his self-respect, man is obliged to work.

Marlowe *The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus*
John of Saint Thomas *Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus Ars Logica* part ii q 26
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Chapter 44 LABOR

INTRODUCTION

MEN ha e dreamed of a golden age in the past when the world was young and everything needed for the support of life existed in profusion. Earth Lucretius writes, first spontaneously of herself produced for mortals goodly corn-crops and joyous vineyards of herself gave sweet fruits and glad pastures which now-a-days scarce attain any size even when furthered by our labor we exhaust the oxen and the strength of the husbandmen we wear out our iron scarcely fed after all by the tilled fields so niggardly are they of their produce and after so much labor do they let it grow When the aged plowman compares present times with times past Lucretius adds, he praises the fortunes of his sire living in the time of earth s plenty

This ancient myth of a golden age has sometimes taken the form as with Rousseau of an idealization of primitive society uncorrupted by civilization, in which an easy almost effortless existence corresponded to the simplicity of man s needs. Rousseau pictures a *situation in* which the produce of the earth furnished [man] with all he needed and instinct told him how to use it " so that singing and dancing the tru offspring of love and leisure became the amusement or rather the occupation of men and women assembled together with nothing else to do

In our own day industrial utopias ha e been projected into a future made free from toil by the adequacy of machines or the efficiency of atomic energy Long before the indu trial *era* Aristotle envisioned as a supposition contrary to fact a society built upon labor-saving machines. If every instrument could accomplish its own work, he writes, if it could obey or anticipate commands, if the shuttle would weave without a hand to guide it the chief workmen would not want servants, nor mast rs slaves

In all these conceptions of a better life labor is eliminated or reduced The implication seems to be that the labor required for the maintenance of all historic societies is an affliction a drudgery a crushing burden which deforms the lives of many if not all. The pains of toil do not belong to human life by any necessity of human nature but rather through the accident of external circumstances which might be other than they are Work became *indispensable* according to Rousseau only when *property* was introduced and then vast forests became smiling fields, which man had to water with the sweat of his brow It was the *result of some fatal accident which* for the public good should never have happened Man might have realized his nature more surely and richly if like the l lies of the field he neither toiled nor spun.

The contrary view would maintain that work is not a curse but a blessing filling man s hours usefully turning to service energies which would otherwise be wasted or misspent in idleness or mischief The sinfulness of sloth implies the virtue of work The principle of activity according to Hegel, whereby the workman has to perform for his subsistence gives man a dignity which consists in his depending entirely on his diligence conduct, and intelligence for the supply of his wants. In direct contravention of this principle are pauperism laziness inactivity "

It is even suggested that useful occupations save men from a boredom they fear more than the pain of labor as evidenced by the variety of amusements and diversions they invent or frantically pursue to occupy themselves when work is finished. The satisfactions of labor are as peculiarly human as its burdens Not merely to keep alive but to keep his self respect man is obl ged to work.

In the morning when thou risest unwilling the emperor Marcus Aurelius tells himself let this thought be present—I am rising to the work of a human being Why then am I dissatisfied if I am going to do the things for which I exist and for which I was brought into the world? Or have I been made for this to lie in the bed clothes and keep myself warm? But this is more pleasant Dost thou exist then to take thy pleasure and not at all for action and exertion?

The perspectives of theology give still another view of labor It is not an accidental misfortune which men may some day be able to correct But neither is it a blessing nor the thing for which man was created When the golden age of Saturn came to an end and Jupiter replaced him on the throne of heaven then as Virgil tells the story labor was first introduced into the world Before Jove

Fields knew no taming hand of husbandmen
To mark the plain or mete with boundary line—
Even this was impious for the common stock
They gathered and the earth of her own will
All things more freely no man bidding bore
He to black serpents gave their venom bane
And bade the wolf go prowl and ocean toss
Shook from the leaves their honey put fire away
And curved the random rivers running wine
That use by gradual dint of thought on thought
Might forge the various arts with furrow s help
The corn blade win and strike out hidden fire
From the flint s h art

Here while labor may in some sense be a punishment or at least a fall from the golden age it still does result in benefits The divers arts arose from Jove s whetting the minds of men with care on care nor suffering realm of his in drowsy sloth to stagnate But although toil conquered all it is still remorseless toil

According to Christian doctrine labor is an inevitable consequence of man s fall from grace a punishment for Adam s disobedience like disease and death In the earthly paradise of Eden the children of Adam would have lived without labor or servitude of any sort But when Adam sinned the Lord God said unto him Cursed is the ground for thy sake in toil shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread till thou return into the ground

That work should be painful belongs to its very essence Otherwise it would not serve as a penalty or a penance But in the Christian as in the Virgilian view labor also contributes to such happiness as man can enjoy on earth The distinction between temporal and eternal happiness is a distinction between a life of work on earth and the activity of contemplation in Heaven This does not mean the elimination of leisure and enjoyment from earthly life but it does make labor their antecedent and indispensable condition It also means that even in his highest activities—in the development of his arts and sciences—man must be perpetually at work His achievement of truth or beauty is never so perfect and lasting that he can rest in it

In these diverse conceptions of the relation of labor to human life work seems to have several different meanings It always involves activity or exertion Its clearest opposite is sleep But other things are also opposed to work—play or amusement leisure idleness When leisure is not identified with idleness it involves activity no less than work So too many of the forms of play require intense exertion of body or mind The difference therefore must lie in the nature or purpose of the activity

Aristotle suggests what the difference is when he puts play work and leisure in an ordered relationship to one another Nature he writes, requires that we should be able not only to work well but to use leisure well Leisure is the first principle of all action and so leisure is better than work and is its end As play and with it rest (i.e sleep) are for the sake of work so work in turn is for the sake of leisure

The characteristics of work as the middle term here seem to be first that work is activity directed to an end beyond itself and second that it is productive of the necessities which sustain life rather than of the goods by which life is perfected The political or speculative activity which Aristotle considers the proper occupation of leisure is intrinsically good or enjoyable For participation in such activities leisure—in the sense of time free from labor—is required but since the good life cannot be lived unless life itself is sustained labor also is a prerequisite

Work is thus defined by wealth as its immediate end—the production of the external eco-

nomic or consumable goods which support life Though play has the immediately enjoyable character of an activity performed for its own sake Aristotle subordinates it to work assigning to it the same utility which rest has Both refresh men from the fatigues of labor and recreate the energies needed for work Amusement he writes, is needed more amid serious occupations than at other times, for he who is hard at work has need for relaxation and amusement gives relaxation

The economic sense which connects work and labor with wealth seems to be the primary but not the only sense in which these terms are used in the great books. There is the more general sense of human work as any productive activity in which men exercise some art or skill The familiar distinction between skilled and unskilled labor may be only a distinction in degree if there is truth in the theory that some degree of skill—some rudimentary art at least —is required for the performance of the simplest tasks of hand and eye

Kinds of work according to this theory can be differentiated by reference to the type of art involved The ancient distinction between the servile and the liberal arts also divides workers into those who manipulate and transform physical materials and those who employ the symbols of poetry music, or science to produce things for the mind This distinction between manual and mental work based on the character of the work itself is not to be identified with the distinction between slave and free labor The latter is based on the status of the worker Even in the slave economies of the ancient world some freemen were artisans, farmers or sailors, and some slaves were philosophers Nor is mental as opposed to manual work necessarily directed to the production of the goods of the mind The white-collar workers of an industrial economy employed with the symbols of finance counting or management do mental work which has its ultimate end in the production or exchange of material goods

THERE ARE STILL other traditional distinctions among kinds of work and types of workers all of which cannot be put together into a single scheme of classification without much overlapping Some distinctions like that between hand work and machine labor or between healthful and unhealthful occupations turn on the characteristics of the work itself. Some depend on the social conditions under which the work is done or on the relationship between the individual worker and other men. The work to be done may be accomplished by an individual working alone or by the cooperative labor of many and in the latter case the social organization of the laboring group may involve the ranking of men according to the functions they perform

Here we get the division into the master craftsmen who plan and superintend and all grades of helpers who execute their directions One meaning of the word menial as applied to work signifies the inferior tasks in the hierarchy of functions but it is also used to express society s opinion of those who perform certain tasks, such as that of the domestic servant The distinction between what is menial and what is dignified work varies, of course from society to society

The characterization of labor as productive or non productive and of work as useful or wasteful, is based on strictly economic criteria and on considerations of social welfare The sense in which work cannot be divorced from the production of some extrinsic effect is not violated by the conception of non productive labor as work which in no way increases the wealth of nations.

There is one sort of labor which adds to the subject upon which it is bestowed there is another which has no such effect The former writes Adam Smith may be called productive the latter unproductive labor The labor of some of the most respectable orders in society is unproductive of any value The sovereign for example with all the officers both of justice and war who serve under him the whole army and navy are unproductive laborers Like the declamation of the actor the harangue of the orator or the tune of the musician the work of all of them perishes in the very instant of its production.

The standard by which Marx judges the usefulness of labor also implies the economic notion of a commodity Nothing can have value he says without being an object of utility If the thing is useless so is the labor contained in

it' But Marx also adds a criterion of social utility Whoever *directly satisfies his own* wants with the produce of his labor, creates in deed use values but not commodities In order to produce the latter he must not only produce use values but use values for others social use values *It is by this last criterion that Marx criticizes the capitalist economy for its most outrageous squandering of labor power in* superfluous or socially useless production

The principle of the division of labor does not depend upon any particular classification of work or workers according to type *Nor does* it belong to one system of economy rather than another But the ancients, concerned as they were with its bearing on the origin and development of the state saw the division of labor as primarily of political significance whereas the moderns are more concerned with its economic *causes and consequences*

Thucydides compares the poverty and crude life of the early Hellenic tribes with the wealth the power and the civilization of Athens Sparta Corinth and other city-states at the opening of the *Peloponnesian War* The difference is not to be accounted for in terms of the *invention of new tools but rather in terms of* the greater efficiency in production which is obtained by a division of labor This is both an effect and a cause of the enlargement of the community, and its increasing population The greater the number of men associated in a common life the greater the number of specialized tasks which can be assigned to different members of the community

This observation is formulated by Plato and Aristotle in their accounts of the origin of the state The advantages which the state confers *upon its members are in part won by the division* of labor in which they participate

The isolated family Aristotle remarks is barely able to supply the everyday wants of its members The tribe or village which is an association of *families can achieve a little more* than bare subsistence but not until several tribes unite to form a city does a truly self sufficing community come into existence and one with an adequate division of labor Some men if not all can then acquire the leisure to engage in the arts and sciences and politics—the pursuits of civilization which have their material basis in sufficient wealth

The effect of the division of labor on the social structure of the state seems to be generally agreed upon by all observers ancient and modern Men are divided into social classes according to the kind of work they do—not only by reference to the type of economically productive labor but also in terms of the distinction between labor and leisure or between economic and other functions in society

All do not agree however that such class distinctions are as beneficial to society as the increase of wealth or opulence which the division of labor affords They not only threaten the *unity and peace of the society but tend to de*grade the condition of labor by reducing the individual worker to a cog in the machine The division of labor frequently restricts him to a slight and insignificant task repetitively per*formed and so makes it impossible for him to* develop his skill or to enjoy any pride of workmanship From a purely economic point of view Adam Smith advocates the greatest intensification of the division of labor Each more minute sub-division of tasks augments efficiency in production But from the human point of view he *sees that this method of maximizing wealth by* dividing men into functional groups—one man one task—leads to the mental impoverishment of the men who require a multiplicity of functions for their development

In the progress of the division of labor Smith writes the employment of the far greater part of those who live by labor comes to be confined to a few very simple operations frequently one or two The man whose whole life is spent in performing a few simple operations has no occasion to exert his understanding or to exercise his invention

He naturally loses therefore the habit of such exertion and generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become The situation seems even worse to Marx The industrial system revolutionizing the mode of work converts the laborer into a crippled monstrosity by forcing his detailed dexterity at the expense of a world of productive capabilities and instincts It makes the individual worker the automatic motor of a fractional operation

THE GREAT ISSUES concerning labor seem to be moral and political rather than economic. The consideration of the division of labor from the point of view of efficiency in production remains purely economic only when it is abstracted from any concern about the effect upon the laborer. The analysis of factors affecting the productivity of labor ceases to be merely economic when the hours, conditions, and organization of work are viewed in terms of the working men.

The determination of wages by the buying and selling of labor (or, as Marx insists, of labor power) as a commodity subject to market conditions of supply and demand; the difference between real and nominal wages as determined by the level of wages in relation to the price of other commodities; the so-called "iron law of wages" according to which wages cannot be reduced below the minimum of bare subsistence for the laborer and his family—these are matters which the economist may deal with in a descriptive or historical manner, calculating rates and ratios without regard to questions of justice. But in terms of such formulations questions of justice are raised and become the great issues concerning the rights of workmen to the fruits of their labor, to the security of full employment and other forms of protection, to collective bargaining, to a voice in the management of industry or business.

Stated in this way, the issues seem to be peculiarly modern. These are the problems of a capitalist economy, to which the partisans of capital and of labor propose different solutions. Yet the principles of justice to which the parties in conflict appeal seem to be no less applicable to earlier conflicts in other economic systems—between master and slave or between feudal lord and serf. All the institutional differences among these three economies should not, according to Karl Marx, conceal from us the profound analogy which obtains in the relation between owners and workers, whether the workers are chattel slaves, peons bound to the land, or industrial proletarians selling their labor power.

"Wherever a part of society possesses a monopoly of the means of production," he writes, "the laborer, free or not free, must add to the working time necessary for his own maintenance an extra working time in order to produce the means of subsistence for the owners of the means of production, whether this proprietor be the Athenian gentleman, Etruscan theocrat, civis Romanus, Norman baron, American slave-owner, Wallachian Boyard, modern landlord or capitalist."

Marx undertakes to explain how the surface difference between slave labor and wage labor conceals the analogy. "In slave labor, even that part of the working-day in which the slave is only replacing the value of his own means of existence, in which, therefore, he works for himself alone, appears as labor for his master. All the slave's labor appears as unpaid labor. In wage-labor, on the contrary, even surplus labor, or unpaid labor, appears as paid. There the property relation conceals the labor of the slave for himself; here the money relation conceals the unrequited labor of the wage laborer."

Two phrases here—"unpaid labor" and "unrequited labor"—indicate that Marx is thinking in terms of justice. Elsewhere he calls the industrial proletariat "wage-slaves" to emphasize the presence in an apparently free economy of the same unjust exploitation which the word "slave" connotes when it refers to the use of men as chattel. The essential similarity in all forms of economic exploitation—which makes all forms of economic slavery essentially similar—is seen by Marx in terms of the production of a surplus value by the laborer; that is, he produces a greater value in commodities than he needs to support his own subsistence. This surplus value, when appropriated by the owner of the materials and the tools on and with which the propertyless laborer works, becomes an unearned increment, or in other words, an unjust profit from the work of another man.

The controversy over the theory of surplus value in Marx's *Capital* can be separated from the controversy over the revolutionary program of the *Communist Manifesto*. But neither can be separated from issues of justice. It is questionable whether those economists join issue with Marx who criticize his analysis in terms of the facts or conclusions of economics as a purely descriptive science, and who put aside all considerations of the fair and the equitable. Yet those facts or conclusions, especially with regard to the operation of the capitalist economy

become relevant in the dispute as to whether capitalist profits are intrinsically unjust because they are incapable of accruing except from the exploitation of labor

Those who dispute this matter seldom deny that chattel slavery is unjust On that there may be conflicting opinions as indicated in the chapter on SLAVERY but they are not germane to the present issue Nor do the opponents seem to argue their case in terms of a different theory of what is just and unjust They themselves appeal to the common principle of fairness in exchange and distribution to defend the rights of the owners of capital to a profit in return for their own prior labor in accumulating capital stock as well as for the risks they take when they invest their reserves in productive enterprises The problem therefore seems to narrow down to such questions as whether laborers are exploited when they receive in wages less than the full value their work creates whether capitalist profits are entirely reaped from the surplus value which is the differential between what labor creates and what labor receives or whether if profit is not identical with surplus value it always contains a marginal element of unearned increment derived from the exploitation of labor

THE NOTION OF VALUE—the value of commodities and the value of labor itself—is obviously of central importance As indicated in the chapter on JUSTICE the formulae of equality which determine fair exchanges or distributions require some measure of equivalents in value What determines the intrinsic value of a commodity according to which it can be compared with another commodity without reference to the price of each in the market place? Adam Smith s answer to this question is *labor* It is the answer given before him by Locke and after him by Marx.

Equal quantities of labor at all times and places Smith declares may be said to be of equal value to the laborer In his ordinary state of health strength and spirits in the ordinary degree of his skill and dexterity he must always lay down the same portion of his ease his liberty and his happiness The price which he pays must always be the same whatever may be the quantity of goods which he receives in return for it Of these indeed it may sometimes purchase a greater and sometimes a smaller quantity but it is their value which varies not that of the labor which purchases them From this Adam Smith concludes that labor alone therefore never varying in its own value is alone the ultimate and real standard by which the value of all commodities can at all times and places be estimated and compared It is their real price money is their nominal price only

This labor theory of value raises the further question of the value of labor itself What determines its natural or real price as opposed to its market or nominal price? On this Marx and Smith appear to part company which may account for their further divergence when Marx declares that the real value of labor is the cost of its production not the average price it can command in the market and then goes on to explain how a surplus value is derived by the capitalist who pays for labor power on a basis of the cost of producing and sustaining the laborer but uses his labor power to produce a real value in commodities which exceeds the real price of labor itself

Smith on the other hand holds that the whole produce of labor belongs to the laborer only in that original state of things which precedes both the appropriation of land and the accumulation of stock When land becomes private property the landlord makes the first deduction in the form of *rent* and the capitalist or the person who invests some part of his stock accumulation makes a second deduction in the form of *profit* After rent and profit are taken the laborer s *wage* represents what is left of the whole produce of labor

Yet Smith also says of the landlords that as soon as the land of any country has all become private property they like all other men love to reap where they never sowed The implication of unearned increment in this remark suggests that Smith is neither disinclined to mix moral judgment with economic description nor at variance with Marx on the principle of economic justice That Smith regards profit as the price properly paid for the use of capital and that he does not see reaping without sowing as an essential element in profit making may perhaps be read as a challenge to Marx s develop-

ment of the labor theory of value into a theory of surplus value and unearned increment

IT IS POSSIBLE, of course that the difference in the conclusions of Smith and Marx from a common premise can be explained by the different directions their analyses take It may not represent a direct opposition on a point of fact. The proposition that value derives from labor seems to yield a number of theoretical consequences.

Locke for example, holding that it is labor which puts the difference of value on every thing makes this the basis for the right to private property certainly in its original appropriation from the common domain which is God s gift to mankind. Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person. The labor of his body and the work of his hands we may say are properly his Whatsoever then, he removes out of the state that nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labor with and joined to it something that is his own and thereby makes it his property

This view seems to be shared by Rousseau. It is impossible to conceive he says how property can come from anything but manual labor for what else can a man add to things which he does not originally create so as to make them his own property? In the same vein Smith declares that the property which every man has in his own labor as it is the original foundation of all other property so it is the most sacred and inviolable

What further conclusions follow from this justification of private property as a right founded upon labor? How is the original right to property extended into a right of inheritance? How does this conception of the origin of property bear on the Marxist conception of the origin of the proletariat—the propertyless workers who have nothing but their labor power to sell? Denying the charge that communists desire to abolish the right of personally acquiring property as the fruit of a man s own labor Marx and Engels make the countercharge that the development of industrial capitalism has to a great extent already destroyed it and is still destroying it daily They propose public ownership of the means of production to protect the property rights of labor they seek to abolish only the bourgeois form of private property which in their view is a use of property to exploit labor

The rights of labor seem to be central in any formulation of the problem of a just distribution of wealth. But when other rights are taken into consideration the problem of economic justice becomes more complex and different solutions result from differences in emphasis. Even with regard to one group of solutions, J S Mill observes that some communists consider it unjust that the produce of the labor of the community should be shared on any other principle than that of exact equality others think it just that those should receive most whose wants are greatest." To weigh the merits of competing solutions, as well as to reach an adequate statement of the problem, the discussion of labor must be connected with the discussion of related considerations in the chapters on JUSTICE, REVOLUTION and WEALTH

THERE ARE ISSUES of justice concerning labor other than the strictly economic problem of distribution. In the ancient world for example, not only chattel slaves but also free artisans were frequently regarded as incapable of participation in political life Only men of independent wealth had enough leisure for the activities of citizenship which in the Greek city states, was almost a full time occupation. This, according to Aristotle is one reason for the disfranchisement of the laboring classes who must devote a great part of their energy to earning a living and who have neither the time nor training for liberal pursuits Since leisure is necessary both for the development of virtue and the performance of political duties, citizens, he maintains cannot lead the life of mechanics or tradesmen.

Against this oligarchical view (which also involves the notion that wealth deserves special political privileges) the Greek democrats take the position that all free men should be citizens on an equal footing regardless of the amount of their property or their conditions of labor and leisure But the oligarchical principle still tends to prevail among republicans in the 18th century Kant for example holds that citizenship presupposes the independence or self-sufficiency of the individual citizen among the peo-

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ple On this basis he excludes from the suffrage as only passive citizens the apprentice of a merchant or tradesman a servant who is not in the employ of the state a minor (*naturaliter vel civiliter*) all women and generally everyone who is compelled to maintain himself not according to his own industry but as it is arranged by others (the state excepted) They are without civil personality and their existence is only as it were incidentally included in the state

The preference shown by the writers of *The Federalist* for a republican as opposed to a democratic form of government—or representative government as opposed to direct democracy—rests partly on their fear of the political incompetence as well as the factional interests of wage earners and day laborers While expressing disapprobation of poll taxes they still defend the right of the government to exact them in the belief that there may exist certain critical and tempestuous conjunctures of the State in which a poll tax may become an inestimable resource Yet such a tax would seem to be primarily a device for disfranchising working men of no property and small income and in the opinion of a later day it is so regarded

The democratic revolution does not begin until the middle of the 19th century But even then Mill who advocates universal suffrage argues for the disqualification of paupers or those on the dole without raising the question whether the right to work—to avoid poverty and involuntary indigence—is not a democratic right inseparable from the right to citizenship It is required by first principles Mill writes 'that the receipt of parish relief should be a peremptory disqualification for the franchise He who cannot by his labor suffice for his own support has no claim to the privilege of helping himself to the money of others By becoming dependent on the remaining members of the community for actual subsistence he abdicates his claim to equal rights with them in other respects

The historic connection of democracy with a movement toward political justice for the laboring classes seems to suggest that political democracy must be accompanied by economic democracy in order to attain its full realization

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

1e The pain of labor and the exemption of some: the disciplinary and penal use of labor

1d The social necessity of labor and the moral obligation to work

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad* BK II [265 283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119 When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164

AUTHOR S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases *e g* *Iliad* BK II [265-283] 12d.

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a *(D)* follows *e g* OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—*(D) II Esdras* 7 46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface

1 Labor in human life

1*a* The curse of labor: myths of a golden age and the decay of the world

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 3 17-19 23 / *Psalms* 90 10—*(D) Psalms* 89 10 / *Ecclesiastes* 1 3-2 11 2 17-24 3 9-13 4 4-8 5 15-16 6 7—*(D) Ecclesiastes* 1 3-2 11 2 17 24 3 9-13 4 4 8 5 14-16 6 7 / *Jeremiah* 20 18—*(D) Jeremias* 20 18

APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 7 15 31 3-4 40 1—*(D)* OT *Ecclesiasticus* 7 16 31 3-4 40 1

NEW TESTAMENT *II Thessalonians* 3 7-12

7 PLATO *Statesman* 588a 589c / *Laws* BK III 664a 665c BK IV 681b-c

9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK I CH 4 [1253b33-40] 447b c

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK II [1105-1174] 29a 30a c BK V [195-217] 63c d

13 VIRGIL *Eclogues* IV [16-47] 14b 15a / *Georgics* I [118-159] 40a-41b / *Aeneid* BK VIII [306-336] 267a 268a

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIV CH 10 385b d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XXII [130-154] 87d 88a XXVIII [91-96] 97a

27 SHAKESPEARE *Tempest* ACT II SC I [143 168] 532d 533a

29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 27b 28a

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK X [1046-1104] 297a 298b BK XI [84-98] 301a [162 180] 302b 303a [251-262] 304b-305a

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 348b d 353b 362b-c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* ADDITIONS 125 137a

48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 316a b 355b 356a

50 MARX *Capital* 199c 200a esp 199d [fn 4]

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK VII 275a

1*b* Labor leisure and happiness the servile political and contemplative life

OLD TESTAMENT *Proverbs* 6 6-11 13 4 15 19 18 9 19 15 24 20 4 21.25 26 24 30-34 26 13-16 28 19

APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 11 11 14 38 24 34—*(D)* OT *Ecclesiasticus* 11 11-14 38 25 39

NEW TESTAMENT *Luke* 10 38-42

5 ARISTOPHANES *Plutus* [415-618] 633d 636d

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK II 86b BK V 161a

7 PLATO *Protagoras* 43b d / *Republic* BK VII 390b 391b / *Critias* 479d / *Statesman* 581b-c / *Laws* BK VII 710c 722d 723c BK VIII 740d 741a

8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK I CH I [981b13 24] 500a CH 2 [982b11 28] 500d 501a

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK X CH 6-7 430d-432c / *Politics* BK I CH 4 [1253b33 40] 447b-c CH 5

2b to 3c

50 MARX *Capital* 16a 18d 113c 114a 251c-d 253a 254c 255a 292d 307c
50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 426b

2b The process of work: the relations of art, hand, machine, and matter

7 PLATO *Republic* BK II 319a-c / *Statesman* 591d 593d 596a b 596d / *Phaedrus* 633a c
8 ARISTOTLE *Soul* BK III CH 8 [432 1] 664c
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK II CH 1 348b d 349b / *Politics* BK I CH 4 447b-c
18 AUGUSTINE *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 30 651c-d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 91 A 3 REP 2 486b-487d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 87 A 6, A 5 182d 184a PART II-II Q 187 A 3 ANS and REP 1 666a-669b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 73b
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 407c
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH V SECT 42 43 34 c
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 352a-d
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 4d 5a 54d 55a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 68 29d 30a PART III par 196 67a ADDITIONS 126 137a b
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 278c-d
50 MARX *Capital* 16d 17a 31a b 85a-88d 180d 188c esp 184b 188b-c 197a 198a 251a-c
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XIII 576b-577a
54 FREUD *Civilization and Its Discontents* 778b-c

3 The kinds of work and the relationship of different types of workers

3a The differentiation of work according to the human talent or ability required: skilled and unskilled labor; manual and mental work

7 PLATO *Republic* BK II 316c 320c / *Timaeus* 442b / *Statesman* 581c 582a
8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK I CH I [981 3 b7] 499d
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK I CH 7 [1255b20-37] 449b-c CH 11 [1258b35 39] 453b BK VIII CH 4 [1339a6-10] 544c
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK V [1350-1360] 78c-d
14 PLUTARCH *Marcellus* 252a 255a esp 253d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 91 A 3 REP 2 486b-487d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II II Q 187 A 3 666a-669b
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE VIII [115 148] 118b-c
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 60a-c 110c 112a 156d 158a c 460a-461a
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 6c-d

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 29b 31a PART IV 158b 164b
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 42d 43c 54c 55a 56b-57b
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 597a 598a
42 KANT *Judgement* 524a b 586a 587a
43 MILL *Representative Government* 366d 367a 385b-d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 68 29d-30a PART III par 200 67c-68a par 04 68c-d ADDITIONS 44 123c 126 137a b
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 324b
50 MARX *Capital* 17b-18a 95c-96a esp 9 d-96b [fn 2] 165d 166b 170c 171b 176d 178a 186b-d 212a-c 251b-d

3b The differentiation of work according to the social status of the worker: servile and free, menial and honorable work

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK II 84d-85b
7 PLATO *Laws* BK VII 722d 723c BK III 740d 741a BK XI 774a 775a
8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK I CH I [981 31 b7] 499d
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK I, CH 7 [1255b20 27] 449b-c CH 11 [1258b35 39] 453b CH 13 [1260a33-b2] 455a BK III CH 4 [1277a30-b6] 474b-c BK IV CH 4 [1290b37 1291a19] 490a b BK VI CH 4 [1319a20-] 522d BK VII CH 8-9 537c 533d BK VIII CH 2 [1337b3 23] 542c-d / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 9 [1367a28-3] 610a
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 44d-45b / *Solon* 64d-65b / *Pericles* 121a 122b / *Demetrius* 733b-c
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 110c 112a 459c-462a
26 SHAKESPEARE *2nd Henry VI* ACT IV SC II 57d 59d
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH IV SECT 23 30a b CH VII SECT 85 43c-d
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 134a b 256b-c
38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK IV 428c-d
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 41b-d 44c 45c 56b-58b BK III 164c-d 169c 171c
42 KANT *Judgement* 524a b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* ADDITION 44 123c
50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 420d
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI 165b-167b

3c The classification of occupations by reference to bodily and mental concomitants of the work: healthy and unhealthy occupations; pleasant and unpleasant tasks

9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK I CH 11 [1258b35 39] 453b BK VIII CH 2 542b-d CH 4 [1339a6-10] 544c
14 PLUTARCH *Pompey* 512c-d
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 110c 112a 459c-462a passim
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 365b-c

(1 *Labor in human life* 1d *The social necessity of labor and the moral obligation to work*)

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 597a b
43 MILL *Representative Government* 339d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 189 65d 66a par 194 66c d par 196 67a / *Philosophy of History* PART IV 333c 353b c
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 316a b
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 324b
50 MARX *Capital* 17a 88c d 253a 255a passim
50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 426d 427a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK V 197b c BK VII 275a BK XIII 572d 573b
54 FREUD *General Introduction* 573c / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 772d 781d 782c

1e The honor of work and the virtue of productivity progress through the invention of arts for the conquest of nature

OLD TESTAMENT *Proverbs* 6 6-11 14 23 31 10-31
APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 10 -7 38 25-34—(*D*) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 10 30 38 -6-39
4 HOMER *Iliad* BK XVIII [541-589] 135d 136c
5 AESCHYLUS *Prometheus Bound* [442-506] 44c 45a
7 PLATO *Charmides* 6c / *Laws* BK III 664a 665c BK VII 722d 723c
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK V SECT 1 268b d BK VI SECT 33 27 b
13 VIRGIL *Georgics* I [118 159] 40a-41b
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 44d 45b / *Solon* 64d 65b 72d / *Marcellus* 252a 255a esp 253d
18 AUGUSTINE *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 30 651c d
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL XI [91-111] 16a b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 73b
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 6c d / *Novum Organum* 105a 195d esp PREF 105a 106d BK I APH 11 107d APH 81 120b c APH 124 133c-d APH 129 134d 135d BK II APH 49-51 188b 194c / *New Atlantis* 210d 214d
31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART VI 61b d
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK IV [610-633] 165b 166a
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART II 78a b PART III 106a 115b
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XVIII 126c d
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 339b c 352a d 363b / *Social Contract* BK IV 428d
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* INTRO 1a d BK I 6a d 8b 10b passim
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 21c 23c passim 633d 634a c 655d 656a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 243d 244c 245a PART II 267a b 268a b PART IV 333c 353b-c
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [11 559-586] 281b-282a
50 MARX *Capital* 87a b 292d
50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 420d 421a 421d
54 FREUD *Civilization and Its Discontents* 772d 777a 779a passim

1f The degradation of labor the alienation of the laborer's work in chattel slavery serfdom and industrial wage slavery

OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 1 8 14
14 PLUTARCH *Marcus Cato* 278d 279a / *Crassus* 439a-c
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART II 53a 56a PART IV 154b 155b
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 355a b 365d 366a
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 20b 21c 27b-28d 43a b 52b 53b BK III 165b 171c BK IV 239c 240a 253c 254a
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 144b
42 KANT *Science of Right* 421c-422d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 67 29c
50 MARX *Capital* 82d 83a 88d 89b 104b-105c 150a-c 161b 163c 174b-c 176a 178d 194b 195c 199b 200a 206c 208a 2 6a 236c passim 238c 240b 251c 253b 261d 262a 263b d 266b 267c 280c 286a 288b 290c 319c 321b 354a 355d 369c 371c 383d
50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 420c 421a 422c-423a 424c-425a
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI 165b 167b

2 The nature of work

2a The ends of work the good of the product and the good of the workman

7 PLATO *Charmides* 6c / *Republic* BK I 303a 306b / *Laws* BK VIII 733b d BK XI 774a 775a
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK VII CH 8 [1328a22 35] 532c
13 VIRGIL *Georgics* I [118 159] 40a-41b
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 36c d / *Pericles* 121a 122b / *Marcellus* 252a 255a / *Pompey* 512c d / *Alexander* 560b d
18 AUGUSTINE *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 30 651c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II II Q 187 A 3 666a 669b
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE VIII [115 148] 118b c
22 CHAUCER *Second Nun's Prologue* [15 469 489] 461a
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 6c d
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART IV 154b 155b
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 54d 55a BK V 332a c
42 KANT *Judgement* 524a b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 196 67a / *Philosophy of History* PART II 259a b

(3 *The kinds of work and the relationship of different types of workers 3c The classification of occupations by reference to bodily and mental concomitants of the work healthy and unhealthy occupations pleasant and unpleasant tasks*)

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 42b d 54d 55a BK III 164a BK V 340c 343d
42 KANT *Judgement* 524a b
50 MARX *Capital* 85c d 117c 130c passim 166b c 176d 178a 194b 195c 200a 204c passim esp 204a-c 206b 209a 227d 231b
53 JAMES *Psychology* 79b

3*d* Types of work distinguished by reference to the manner in which the work is done solitary and group work the relation of master craftsmen and helpers

7 PLATO *Statesman* 581c 582a
8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK I CH I [981 31–^{b}7] 499d
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK III CH 4 [1277^{a}30–^{b}6] 474b c
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 3d 5b 35c 36a 50a-c 51b 53b 109a
43 MILL *Representative Government* 385b d
50 MARX *Capital* 157a 164a esp 158d 159d 160d 162a 165d 166b 170c 171b 186b 188c 251b c

3*e* Types of work distinguished by reference to their effect on the increase of wealth productive and non productive labor

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 365b 366b
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK II 142d 151c esp 142d 143c BK IV 288c 292a 294b-296a
50 MARX *Capital* 16b 17a 17c 86d 87d esp 87b [fn 2] 96a 97a 219a d 251a 252a 290d 292a

3*f* The differentiation of work in terms of its relation to the common welfare socially useful and wasteful or superfluous work

7 PLATO *Republic* BK II 318b d
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK IV CH 4 [1290^{b}37–1291 33] 490a c BK VII CH 8–9 532c 533d
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK VII SECT 5 280a b
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 36c d / *Marcellus* 255d 256b / *Demetrius* 733b c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II II Q 187 A 3 REP 3 666a 669b
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL XI [91–111] 16a b
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 365b 366b / *Social Contract* BK IV 428c d
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK II 142d 151c esp 142d 143c
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 324b
50 MARX *Capital* 16a 18d esp 16a 18d 31a 32c esp 32a-c 34d 35c 48b d 174a b 261d 262a

4 The division of labor

7 PLATO *Charmides* 5d 12a b / *Republic* BK II 316a 319c BK IV 349a 350a / *Timaeus* 442b c 445c d / *Critias* 480a-481b / *Laws* BK VIII 740d 741a
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK IV CH 4 [1290^{b}20–1291^{b}29] 489d 491a BK VII CH 8–9 532c 33d
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK VII CH 4 246d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II II Q 187 A 3 REP I 666a-669b
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE VIII [115 148] 118b-c
30 BACON *New Atlantis* 210d 214d
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH V SECT 42 43 34a c
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 352a 353c
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 3a 10b BK II 117a d
42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 253c d
43 MILL *Representative Government* 420a b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 198–208 67b-69c par 243 77b-c
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 278d
50 MARX *Capital* 164a 160d esp 164a 165c 171d 176a 178d 179c

4*a* The economic causes and effects of the division of labor its relation to the exchange production and distribution of goods and services its bearing on opulence

7 PLATO *Republic* BK II 316c 319a
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH V SECT 42 43 34a-c
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART IV 154b 155b
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XXIII 191a c
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 352a 353c 365b 366b
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 3a 10c BK II 117a d BK III 163a c BK IV 191a
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 21c 23b 655d 656a
42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 253c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 198 199 67b c / *Philosophy of History* PART I 250a c
50 MARX *Capital* 16c d 17b-c 31a 37c esp 32a c 34c 35a 48b 50b 80b-81a 164a 165b 167a 170b 171c 175c 176a d 178a 180d esp 178c 179c 218c 219b 251a 255a passim 377c 378a

4*b* The social consequences of the division of labor the development of classes

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK II 84d 85b BK VI 196c
7 PLATO *Republic* BK II-IV 316c 356a / *Laws* BK VIII 740d 741a
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK I CH 4 447b c BK II CH 5 [1264 1 ^{b}25] 459a-460a CH 8 [1268 16–^{b}4] 464a b BK III CH 5 [1277^{b}33 1278 25]

(5 *The organization of production the position of labor in different economies 5b Serfdom or agrarian peonage in a feudal economy*)

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK V 211a 213a BK VI 235a BK X 410c 411a EPILOGUE I 654a 655c
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI 165b 166a

5c The wage earner or industrial proletariat in a capitalist economy

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 365d 366a
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 20b 21c 27b 3 b passim 42a 62a passim
42 KANT *Science of Right* 436d 437c
43 MILL *Liberty* 309b c / *Representative Government* 345c 346a 366d 367b 369b 370a / *Utilitarianism* 473b c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 251-256 78d 80a
50 MARX *Capital* 79a 256a esp 82d 84a c 88d 89b 104b 105c 112c 115c 131a 150a c 161b 162d 176a 178d 192d 250c 254c 255a 261d 262a 279a 383d esp 280c 286a 287b 290c 303b 305a 311c 353a c 354c 355d 364a 368b 377a 378b
50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 422c 423a 424b c 426b 428a
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI 165b c

5d The condition of the worker in a socialist economy

43 MILL *Liberty* 309b c
50 MARX *Capital* 34d 35c
50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 425b 4 9c esp 426b 429b c

6 The wages of labor kinds of wage payments

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 27b 37b 42a 62a
43 MILL *Liberty* 309b c / *Representative Government* 366d 367a / *Utilitarianism* 472d 473a
50 MARX *Capital* 82d 83c 264a 2/8a c

6a Labor as a commodity the labor market

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 124c
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART IV 154b 155b
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 365d 366a
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 13a 16d 20b 21c 27b 37b esp 28a d 29b 33c 42a 62a 107b BK IV 243b d 244a BK V 380b d
42 KANT *Science of Right* 424b-425a
43 MILL *Liberty* 319b d
50 MARX *Capital* 79a 84a c 91a 95a passim esp 93b 94a 112c 113c 211a 219d esp 211a-c 216a d 302d 317c esp 303b 305a 315c 317c 379a 383d esp 381b 382c 383d
50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 422c 423a

6b The iron law of wages the subsistence level and the minimum wage

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 28d 29a 41b BK V 383b 384c
50 MARX *Capital* 81a 82c 256b
50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 422c d 424d-425a 426b

6c The distinction between real and nominal wages variable factors affecting wage levels

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 13a 20b esp 14b d 23c 27b passim 27b 37b esp 28a 32b 39d-40b 42a 62a 82d 83a 87b c BK II 123b 124a BK IV 265a d BK V 380b d 382a c 383b 387b 391b 392a
50 MARX *Capital* 171a c 223a esp 223b [fn 1] 256b 260c esp 258b-c 267d 268c 302d 307c 315c 316c
50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 422c d 423c 425a b

6d The natural wages of labor and the labor theory of value

35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH V 30b 36a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 353a b
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 13a 14d 16a 20b 21c 27b 28a
42 KANT *Science of Right* 424b-425a
50 MARX *Capital* 13a 25d esp 14c 16a 24c 25d 32c 33b 35d 36a [fn 1] 36a b [fn 1] 78c d 93b 96a 100a 101c 112c 113b 264a 267d esp 265a 266a

7 Economic and political justice to the laborer

7a Fair wages hours and working conditions labor legislation

OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 1 16 20 9-10 21 1 12 16 20 26-27 32 31 14-17 / *Leviticus* 16 29 19 13 23 3-8 2 25 27-36 25 1-2 39-55 / *Numbers* 28 16-18 25 26 29 1 7 12 35 / *Deuteronomy* 5 12-15 15 12-18 16 8 23 15 16 24 14 15 / *Jeremiah* 17 22 24 2 13—(D) *Jeremias* 17 22 24 22 13
APOCRYPHA *Tobit* 4 14—(D) OT *Tobias* 4 15 / *Ecclesiasticus* 7 20-21 33 24 31 34 20-22 —(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 7 22 23 33 25 33 34 24 27
NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 10 10 20 8 / *Luke* 3 14 10 7 / *Ephesians* 6 5-9 / *I Timothy* 5 18 / *II Timothy* 2 6
7 PLATO *Laws* BK VIII 741b d
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK IX CH 1 416b d 417c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 105 A 2 REP 6 309d 316a
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 30c d
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART IV 154b 155b
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XV 111b-c
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 353b 365b d
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 13a 14d 20b

8. Historical observations on the condition of labor

6 HERODOTUS: *History*, BK II, 84d-85b; BK VI, 196c

9 ARISTOTLE: *Politics*, BK II, CH 9 [1269a33-b12] 465c

13 VIRGIL: *Georgics*, I [118-159] 40a-41b

14 PLUTARCH: *Lycurgus*, 36a-37c / *Solon*, 72d / *Pericles*, 128a-129b / *Marcus Cato*, 278d-279a; 287b-d / *Crassus*, 439a-c

15 TACITUS: *Annals*, BK XIV, 151d-152c

20 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART I-II, Q 105, A 4, ANS and REP 1 318b-321a

25 MONTAIGNE: *Essays*, 411a-d

30 BACON: *Advancement of Learning*, 30c-d

38 ROUSSEAU: *Inequality*, 348b,d-353b / *Social Contract*, BK IV, 428d-429d

39 SMITH: *Wealth of Nations*, BK I, 27b-37b esp 27b-28a, 29d-33c; 42a-62a passim, esp 50a-53a, 56b-58b, 59a-62a; 88c-d; BK III, 165b-173b; 175d-179a; BK IV, 200c-201a; 239c-240a; 287b-c

40 GIBBON: *Decline and Fall*, 16c-17d; 113c; 144b-c; 498b-501c passim

41 GIBBON: *Decline and Fall*, 404c-d; 452d-453a,c

46 HEGEL: *Philosophy of Right*, ADDITIONS, 149 140d-141a

48 MELVILLE: *Moby Dick*, 295a-297a

50 MARX: *Capital*, 63b-c; 113c-115c; 127c-146c; 162d-163c; 333c-377a esp 355d-368b

50 MARX-ENGELS: *Communist Manifesto*, 415a-423b passim, esp 415b-416c, 419b-d; 424d-425a; 429c-433d

52 DOSTOEVSKY: *Brothers Karamazov*, BK VI, 165b-c

CROSS-REFERENCES

For: Other discussions of the golden age, *see* MAN 9a; PROGRESS 1c; TIME 8b.

Other considerations of penal labor, *see* PUNISHMENT 4b(3).

Matters relevant to the nature of productive work and the factors influencing productivity, *see* ART 4, 9a-9b; EDUCATION 6; SCIENCE 1b(1)-1b(2); WEALTH 3a.

Other discussions of the division of labor and its consequences, *see* FAMILY 3a-3b; PROGRESS 3a; STATE 5c; WEALTH 3d.

Other discussions of the position of labor in different economic systems, *see* SLAVERY 4a-4c; WEALTH 6a, 7b(1).

The general theory of wages and the relation of wages to profits, *see* WEALTH 4c-4d, 6d(1)-6d(2).

The problem of economic justice to the laborer, *see* DEMOCRACY 4a(2); JUSTICE 8b-8c(2); PROGRESS 3b; WEALTH 6d( ); and for the relation of economic to political liberty, *see* LIBERTY 2d, 6b; REVOLUTION 4a.

The discussion of property rights and the problem of the ownership of the means of production, *see* WEALTH 7a-7c, 8a-8c.

The problem of the political status of the laboring classes and the issue concerning the extension of the suffrage to workmen, *see* CITIZEN 3; CONSTITUTION 5a; DEMOCRACY 4a(1); LIBERTY 1f; OLIGARCHY 4, 5a; SLAVERY 5a-5b.

Another discussion of the problems of poverty and unemployment, *see* WEALTH 8c-8d.

The general theory of the class war as it occurs in different economic systems, *see* OPPOSITION 5b; REVOLUTION 5a-5c; STATE 5d(2)-5e; WAR AND PEACE 2c; WEALTH 9h.

(7c *The consequences of economic inequality or oppression the class war*)

7c(2) The organization of workmen and the formation of trade unions to protect labor s rights and interests

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 28a d 51a 56b 61c d
43 MILL *Liberty* 309b c / *Representative Government* 345d 346a 366d 367b
50 MARX *Capital* 121c 122b 137b 138c 146a c 317b c 367c 368b
50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 415a 416c 423b d 425b c

7c(3) The proletariat as a revolutionary class its revolutionary aims

50 MARX *Capital* 9c 294b 295a esp 295a 377c 378d esp 378d 379b [fn 2]
50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 415b 417a c esp 416b d 422c 424a d 425b 434d esp 425b-c 428d 430a 434c d

7d The underprivileged condition of workers the exclusion of slaves from citizenship the disfranchisement of the laboring classes

5 ARISTOPHANES *Frogs* [686-705] 572a b
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK III 107d 108a
7 PLATO *Republic* BK VIII 405c 407a / *Laws* BK VIII 740d 741a
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK II CH 7 [1267b14 19] 463b c CH 8 [1268 16-33] 464a b BK III CH I [1275a5 10] 471d CH 4 [1277a30-b6] 474b c CH 5 [1277b33-1278 34] 475a c BK IV CH 6 [1292b22-1293 10] 492b c BK VI CH 4 522a 523b CH 7 [1321a27-32] 525a BK VII CH 8 [1328 -35 38] 532c CH 9 533a d CH 10 [1330a25-34] 534d / *Athenian Constitution* CH -5 553a 555a
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XV 114c 115b
38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK III 412b c BK IV 429c d
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 27b 37b
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 17a b 144b
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 73b 81d 82b 404c d 452d
42 KANT *Science of Right* 436d 437c
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U S AMENDMENTS XIII SECT I-XIV SECT I 18c XV 19b
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 54 170b 171b passim
43 MILL *Representative Government* 339d 340c 345c 346a 351d 352b 383d 387d passim 394a 395c passim / *Utilitarianism* 473b c
50 MARX *Capital* 137b-141b passim esp 138b 140a b 283d 286a 316d 317c 364a 368b esp 367c 368b
50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 424c 425a 428a

7e The problem of poverty and pauperism unemployment and the right to work

7 PLATO *Laws* BK V 695a c BK XI 783b
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK VI CH 5 [1320 17 b13] 523d 524b
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 36a 37b / *Lycurgus Numa* 62b c / *Pericles* 127a 128a / *Lucullus* 409b d
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 157a
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART IV 154b 155b
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XX 147a BK XXIII 190a b, 191b c 199b 200a c
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 365c 366a / *Political Economy* 375b d / *Social Contract* BK III 415b d
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 27b 37b esp 28a d 30b 31b 58c 62a BK IV 239c 240a
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 501c d 658c
43 MILL *Liberty* 322c d / *Representative Government* 383d 384a
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 428b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 230 75c par 241-245 76d 77d par 254 79c ADDITIONS 148-149 140c 141a
50 MARX *Capital* 209c 225d passim esp 211a-c 215d 217c 302d 366a esp 303d 305a 311c 325c 354b 355b 358a d 364a c
50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 424d 425a

7f The relation of economic to political freedom economic democracy

9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK III CH 9 477c-478d BK IV CH 4 [1291b30-38] 491a b CH 6 492b-493a CH 11 [1295b2 1296b2] 495c-496c BK V CH 5 [1305 29-34] 507a BK VI CH 4 [1318b6-1319b2] 522a 523a BK VII CH 9 533a d
14 PLUTARCH *Solon* 68d 70d / *Poplicola Solon* 87a / *Tiberius Gracchus* 671b d 681a c esp 675b d / *Caius Gracchus* 681b d 689a c
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK V 19d 21d BK VII 44d 45b BK XIII 99b 100c BK XV 114c 115b
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 353c 355b passim 355d 356a / *Social Contract* BK II 405b c esp 405b [fn 1] BK III 422c d
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 51a 62a passim esp 52b c 61b 109d 110d BK IV 287c 288c
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 144b
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 13b 452d 453a c
42 KANT *Science of Right* 436d 437c
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 10 50b 51d NUMBER 35 113b 114a
43 MILL *Liberty* 309a-c / *Representative Government* 369b 370a 382c d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 243 77b-c ADDITIONS 44 123c 145 140b *Philosophy of History* PART III 287d 288b PART IV 352a 364d
50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 426b-c 428d-429c esp 429b c

Chapter 45 LANGUAGE

INTRODUCTION

THE liberal arts of grammar, rhetoric, and logic are all concerned with language. Each of these disciplines establishes its own rules for the use of language, each by reference to a special standard of excellence or correctness which measures language as an instrument of thought or communication. Together these three arts regulate discourse as a whole. Their relation to one another represents the relation of the various aspects of discourse—the emotional, the social, and the intellectual.

The tradition of the great books is the tradition of the liberal arts. Their greatness consists not only in the magnitude of the ideas or problems with which they deal, but also in their formal excellence as products of liberal art. Some of the great books are expositions of logic or rhetoric. None is a treatise on grammar. But they all plainly exemplify, even where they do not expound, the special refinements of the arts of language; and many of them, especially the works of science, philosophy, and theology, and even some of the poetical works, deal explicitly with the difficulties of discourse and the devices that have been used to overcome them. Language is their instrument and they are consciously critical in its use.

One of the great books—Augustine's treatise *On Christian Doctrine*—is directly and explicitly concerned with grammar in the broad sense of the art of reading. Addressed to "earnest students of the word," it attempts to "lay down rules for interpretation," and in so doing it is compared by Augustine to "one who teaches reading, that is, shows others how to read for themselves." It is not reading in general, however, but the reading of one book—the Bible—with which Augustine is concerned. We shall return later to this special problem of interpreting the word of God, or language which is thought to be inspired.

In our day there is a lively interest in the problems of language. This is partly because of the development of historical and comparative studies of the various human languages, and the scientific formulation of what is common to all languages in origin, structure, and change. But it also results in part from the claims of a discipline popularly called "semantics" to have discovered the properties of language as a medium of expression and especially *to have discovered* its limitations. The claims of semantics often go so far as to find in the misuse of language the origin of many human ills. The novelty of semantics is supposed to lie both in the diagnosis and in the remedies proposed.

Of these two sources of current interest in language, the second calls attention to the vitality of the liberal arts, of which semantics is a contemporary formulation. It might almost be said that there is nothing new about semantics except the name. *Hobbes, Bacon, and Locke*, for example, deal explicitly with the abuses of language and the treachery of words. Each makes recommendations for the correction of these faults. *Plato and Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas, Berkeley and Hume*, are similarly concerned with ambiguity in speech, with the multiple senses in which discourse of every sort can be interpreted, and with the methods by which men can approximate precision in the use of language.

The other interest in language is also represented in the great books. Though the science of linguistics and the history of languages are researches of recent origin, speculation about the origin of language and, in that context, consideration of the natural and conventional aspects of language extend throughout the tradition. At all times the discussion of the nature of man and society considers language as one of the principal characteristics of the specifically

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection

II Works by authors not represented in this collection

For the date place and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

I

AUGUSTINE *Of the Work of Monks*
HEGEL. *The Phenomenology of Mind* IV (A)
MARX *The Poverty of Philosophy* CH 2 (2 5)
J S MILL *Principles of Political Economy* BK I CH 1-3 7-8 10 BK II CH 11-14 BK III CH 6 BK IV CH 7
—— The Claims of Labor in VOL II *Dissertations and Discussions*
ENGELS *The Condition of the Working Classes in England*
—— *Herr Eugen Duhring s Revolution in Science* PART II
TOLSTOY On Labor and Luxury in *What Then Must We Do?*

II

HESIOD *Works and Days*
LANGLAND *Piers Plowman*
T MORE *Utopia*
PARACELSUS *The Miners Sickness and Other Miners Diseases*
DEKKER *The Shoemaker s Holiday*
RAMAZZINI *De Morbis Artificum (The Diseases of Workers)*
FRANKLIN *Poor Richard's Almanack*
FOURIER *Social Destinies*
SOUTHEY *Essays Moral and Political* IX
RICARDO *The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation* esp CH 1 5 16
MALTHUS *An Essay on Population*
—— *Principles of Political Economy* esp BK I CH 1-2 4 BK II CH I SECT 10
SKIDMORE *The Rights of Man to Property!*
T CARLYLE *Sartor Resartus*
HESS *Sozialistische Aufsätze*
PROUDHON *The Philosophy of Misery*
KIERKEGAARD *Christian Discourses* PART IV (2)
THOREAU *Walden* CH I
RUSKIN *Time and Tide*
—— *Munera Pulveris*
—— *Fors Clavigera*
GEORGE *Progress and Poverty*
STEVENSON An Apology for Idlers in *Virginibus Puerisque*
JEVONS *The State in Relation to Labour*
ZOLA *Germinal*
SMILES *Life and Labor*
NIETZSCHE *The Dawn of Day* APH 173
—— *The Joyful Wisdom* APH 42 329 348
NIETZSCHE *Beyond Good and Evil* CH VII (58)
—— *The Genealogy of Morals* III (18)
A MARSHALL *Principles of Economics* esp BK IV CH 6 9 BK VI CH 3-5
LEO XIII *Rerum Novarum* (Encyclical on the Condition of Labor)
DURKHEIM *The Division of Labor in Society*
BUCHER *Arbeit und Rhythmus*
S and B WEBB *Industrial Democracy* esp PART II III
GROOS *The Play of Men*
—— *The Play of Animals*
KROPOTKIN *The Conquest of Bread*
—— *Fields Factories and Workshops*
SINCLAIR *The Jungle*
PÉGUY *Basic Verities* (The Honor of Work)
NEXO *Pelle the Conqueror*
SOREL. *Reflexions on Violence* CH 7
TROELTSCH *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*
BRADLEY *Essays on Truth and Reality* CH 3
J A HOBSON *The Evolution of Modern Capitalism*
—— *Work and Wealth*
T VEBLEN *The Theory of the Leisure Class*
—— *The Instinct of Workmanship and the State of the Industrial Arts*
HAMSUN *Growth of the Soil*
MICHELS *Economia e felicità*
TAWNEY *The Acquisitive Society*
BRIEFS *The Proletariat a Challenge to Western Civilization*
DE MAN *Joy in Work*
BEVERIDGE *Unemployment*
PIUS XI *Quadragesimo Anno* (Encyclical on the Reconstruction of the Social Order)
BERLE and MEANS *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*
E CHAMBERLIN *The Theory of Monopolistic Competition*
DUNKMANN *Soziologie der Arbeit*
B RUSSELL. *Proposed Roads to Freedom* CH 4
—— *Freedom Versus Organization*
A R BURNS *The Decline of Competition*
BORNE and HENRY *A Philosophy of Work*
GILL. *Work and Leisure*
—— *Work and Property*
SIMON *Trois leçons sur le travail*
STEINBECK *The Grapes of Wrath*
MARITAIN *Freedom in the Modern World* APPENDIX I
—— *Scholasticism and Politics* CH VII
J M CLARK *Alternative to Serfdom*

ference between the sophist and the philosopher is not one of skill but of purpose. When he censures the trickery of sophistical argument he also acknowledges the cleverness with which the sophists juggle words and propound absurdities under the cover of superficially significant speech. The sophistical fallacies which Aristotle enumerates are seldom accidental errors. Far from being the result of the impediments which language places in the way of thought, they are in large measure artfully contrived equivocations. They are ways of using language against logic. According to Aristotle, they represent "foul fighting in disputation" and are resorted to only by "those who are resolved to win at all costs."

IN THE MODERN treatment of language there is more of an imputation that words cause men unwittingly to deceive themselves as often as they enable one man intentionally to deceive another. Men are duped or tricked by the tendency of words to counterfeit a reality which does not exist. This, in the view of Hobbes or Locke, Berkeley or Hume, is particularly true of general or universal names—or words that signify nothing which can be perceived or imagined.

We cannot imagine anything infinite, says Hobbes. Hence a word like "infinite" is a form of absurd speech "taken upon credit (without any signification at all) from deceived philosophers and deceived or deceiving Schoolmen." In addition to the deceptions of ordinary ambiguity and of metaphorical speech, Hobbes pays particular attention to the absurd insignificant or nonsensical use of words "whereby we conceive nothing but the sound." He gives as examples, not merely "round quadrangle," but "infused virtue," "free will," and "immaterial substance."

In the light of these examples, this theory of insignificant or meaningless speech explains what Hobbes means when he says that "words are wise men's counters, they do but reckon by them: but they are the money of fools." It also indicates how Hobbes uses the susceptibility of men to self-deception through language as a way of explaining the errors—he calls them "absurdities"—into which his predecessors have fallen. What is novel here is not that he disagrees with earlier thinkers on points of psychology and metaphysics or theology, but that he reduces what might be supposed to be an issue between true and false opinions to a difference between significant and absurd speech. His opponents might reply that unless his own views about matter and mind are true, his semantic criticism of them does not hold. They have been seduced by language into talking nonsense only if Hobbes is right in his metaphysics and psychology.

The criticism of arguments which seem to rely on metaphors is not peculiarly modern. In his attack on the Platonic theory of ideas, Aristotle dismisses the statement that the Forms "are patterns and other things share in them" as a use of "empty words and poetical metaphors." But Hobbes carries this method of criticism much further. He frequently rests his case against other philosophers entirely on the ground that they are talking nonsense. Though he himself catches the imagination almost as often as Plato does, by his skillfully wrought metaphors, he would insist that what he says can always be rendered literally, whereas the metaphors of others conceal the insignificance of their speech.

Bacon provides another illustration of the modern attitude which ascribes a diabolical character to language. "There arises from a bad and unapt formation of words," he writes, "a wonderful obstruction to the mind. Nor can the definitions and explanations with which learned men are wont to guard and protect themselves in some instances afford a complete remedy—words still manifestly force the understanding, throw everything into confusion, and lead mankind into vain and innumerable controversies and fallacies." He goes on to say that "the idols imposed upon the understanding by words are of two kinds. They are either names of things which have no existence ... or they are names of actual objects, but confused, badly defined, and hastily or irregularly abstracted from things."

Here, as in the case of Hobbes, a theory of reality and of the way in which the mind draws its ideas from experience seems to underlie the charge that language tangles the mind in a web of words, so that it deals with words rather than with things. In the same spirit, though not from the same premises, Locke tells his reader why

human world or compares the language of men with the speech of brutes

In addition there is the broad philosophical inquiry into the nature of signs and symbols in general This is not limited to the problem of how written or spoken words get their meaning The general question calls for an examination of every type of signifying and every sort of symbol verbal and non verbal natural and artificial human and divine Though these matters are closely related to the problems of language and may therefore be touched upon here their main treatment is reserved for the chapter on SIGN AND SYMBOL.

THE TREATMENT of language seems to have a different tenor in ancient and modern times The philosophers of antiquity appreciate the need to safeguard discourse from the aberrations of speech Plato and Aristotle usually preface their discussion of a subject with an examination of the relevant words in current use Discovering the variety of meanings attached to common words they take pains to enumerate the various senses of a word and to put these meanings in some order They pursue definitions or construct them to control the ambiguity that is latent in the language anyone must use to express or communicate ideas But they do not expect to remove ambiguity entirely They tend to accept the fact that the same word will have to be used in a number of senses and they discriminate between the occasions when it is desirable to be precise about a word s meaning and those times when the purpose of discourse is better served by permitting a word to carry a whole range of meanings They see no special difficulty in abstract as opposed to concrete words or in general names as distinguished from the proper names which designate individuals or in words which refer to purely intelligible objects like ideas rather than to the objects of sense experience

The mood of the ancients which also prevails for the most part among the philosophers and theologians of the Middle Ages seems to express a certain tolerance of the imperfections of language If men do not think clearly if they do not reason cogently or argue honestly the fault is primarily the result of the misuse of their faculties not of the betrayal of their intentions by the intractable character of language as an instrument Even when men misunderstand one another the inadequacy of language as a medium of communication is not solely responsible for the failure of minds to meet through the interchange of words With greater effort with a more assiduous application of the liberal arts men can succeed even if language works against them

Some things are inexpressible in human speech even as they are incapable of being fully grasped by human thought My vision Dante says when he reaches the mystic rose of Paradise was greater than our speech Such knowledge as we can have of the highest matters and the first principles of things Plato thinks does not admit of exposition like other branches of knowledge In his *Seventh Letter* he even goes so far as to say that no man of intelligence will venture to express his philosophical views in language

With these exceptions the ancients seem to adopt a mood of tolerance towards language This does not imply an underestimation of the difficulties of using language well It simply does not make of language an insidious enemy of clarity and truth The deficiencies of language are like the weaknesses of the flesh As man can in large part overcome them through the discipline of the moral virtues so through the discipline of the liberal arts—by skill in grammar rhetoric and logic—he can make language express almost as much truth as he can acquire and communicate it almost as clearly as he can think it Men need not succumb to the tyranny of words if they will make the requisite effort to master language to serve their purpose

But the liberal arts do not guarantee purity of purpose Obscurantism obfuscation deception and falsification are sometimes the aim Men try to persuade others at all costs or to win the argument regardless of where the truth lies They try to confuse their opponents or mislead their audience The use of language for such ends requires as much skill as its employment in the service of truth If such use is a misuse then language is equally available for use or misuse

It is an ancient saying that only the competent in grammar can make grammatical errors intentionally So as Plato recognizes the dif

modern development of symbolic or mathematical logic from Boole and Venn to Peano Couturat Russell and Whitehead The hopes to be realized by an algebra of logic find expression in Jevons plan for a logical abacus which like an adding machine or comptometer would be a thinking machine able to solve all problems that can be put in suitable terms.

IS THE IDEAL of a perfect and universal language a genuine hope or a utopian dream? Not all modern scientists seem to agree with Lavoisier s point that th improvement of a science and the improvement of its language are inseparable Faraday for example apologizing for the invention of n w words to name electrical phenomena says that he is fully aware that names are one thing and science another The utopian character of the ideal seems to be implied in Swift s satirization of a universal language On his voyage to the cloud land of the scienti ts in Laputa Gulliver learns of a project which is being cons dered by the professors of language S nce words are only names for things it would be more convenient for all *men* to carry about them such things as were necessary to express the particular business th y are to d scourse on The substitution of things for words would thus provide a universal language to be understood in all civilized nations

In the ancient world the imperfection of ordinary speech gives rise not to the conception of a perfect language which man should try to construct but to the cons deration of the distinction between a hypothetical natural language and the existing conventional languages *actually in use* If there were a natural language it would not only be the same for all men everywhere but its words would also be perfect images or imitations of things That human language is conventional rather than natural may be seen not only in the plurality of tongues but also in the fact that existing *languages embody* contradictory principles of symbol zation

Th s fact Plato suggests in the *Cratylus* ind cates that human language does not *originate as a gift* from the gods for if the gods had given men the names they use signs would be perfectly and consistently adapted to things signified The hypothes s of a natural or god g ven la guage is not proposed as an ideal to inspire men to try to invent a perfect language for themselves It functions rather as a norm for the criticism of man made language and for discovering the natural elements common to all conventional languages

Like human society human language seems to be partly natural partly conventional As there are certain political principles, such as that of natural justice common to all societies despite the diversity of their customs and institutions so all conventional languages have certain common characteristics of structure which indicate their natural basis in the physical and mental constitution of man In the tradition of the liberal arts the search for a universal grammar applicable to all conventional languages, represents not the hope to create a universal or perfect language but the conviction that all languages have a common natural basis.

THE HYPOTHESIS of a natural language takes another form and has another implication in the Judaeo-Christian tradition where it is discussed in the light of certain portions of revelation Yet it retains the same fundamental relevance to the problem of the origin and characteristics of the many conventional languages which now exist

Genesis relates how after God formed every beast of the field and every fowl of the air He brought them to Adam to see what he would call them and whatsoever Adam called every living creature that was the name thereof The names which Adam devised constituted a natural language at least *insofar* as according to Augustine s *interpretation* it is the one common language of the race both before the flood and for some time after But there is the further question whether the *names* which Adam gave to *things* were their *rightful or proper* names—whether they were natural signs *in the sense of true* representations of the natures of the *things signified*.

Hobbes suggests one answer when he says that he first author of speech was God himself who instructed Adam how to name such *creatures as he presented to his sight* Augustine suggests another answer by identifying the original language of *man* with Hebrew and by affirming the continuity of th Hebrew spoken after Babel with the language all men spoke before the confusion of tongues

he found it necessary to include in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* the long third book on language which examines in detail the imperfections as well as the abuses of words and the remedies therefor

Vague and insignificant forms of speech and abuse of language he says have so long passed for mysteries of science and hard or misapplied words with little or no meaning have by prescription such a right to be mistaken for deep learning and height of speculation that it will *not be easy to persuade either those who speak* or those who hear them that they are but the covers of ignorance and hinderance of true knowledge *So few are apt to think they deceive* or are deceived in the use of words or that the language of the sect they are of has any faults in it

Without judging the fundamental issues involved concerning the nature of things and of man and his mind one point seems to be clear According as men hold different conceptions of the relation of language to thought (and in consequence assume different attitudes toward the imperfections or misuse of language) they inevitably take opposite sides on these issues Whether the discipline of language is called semantics or the liberal arts the standards by which one man criticizes the language of another seem to depend upon what he holds to be true

The present work on the great ideas aims in part to record the agreements and disagreements among the great minds of the western tradition It also records how those minds have used the same word in different senses or have used quite distinct words for the same thing It could not do either unless it did both This indicates the basic relationship between language and thought which the great books exemplify even when they do not explicitly make it the basis of their discussion of the relation between language and thought

THE IDEAL OF a perfect and universal language seems to arise in modern times from dissatisfaction with the inadequacy of ordinary language for the analytical refinement and precision of mathematics or science As Descartes holds up the method of mathematics as the procedure to be followed in all other inquiries and subject matters so his conception of a universal mathesis calls for a language which shall be the perfect instrument of analysis and demonstration

It is sometimes supposed that the symbolism of mathematics is itself that perfect language Lavoisier quotes Condillac to the effect that algebra in the most simple most exact and best manner is at the same time a language and an analytical method Of the analytical equations which Descartes was the first to introduce into the study of curves and surfaces Fourier remarks that they extend to all general phenomena There cannot be a language more universal and more simple more free from errors and obscurities that is to say more worthy to express *the invariable relations of natural things* Its chief attribute is clearness it has no marks to express confused notions It follows the same course in the study of all phenomena it interprets them by the same language

This praise of mathematical symbolism indicates that one feature of the ideal is an exact correspondence between words and ideas Like three impressions of the same seal Lavoisier says the word ought to produce the idea and the idea to be a picture of the fact If there were a perfect one to one correspondence between physical symbols and mental concepts *there would never be any failures of communication* Men would be able to understand each other as well as if they could see directly into each others minds Though they still used external signs as a medium of communication they would approximate the immediate communication which the theologians attribute to angels In addition the process of thinking itself quite apart from communication could be perfectly regulated by the rules of grammar—the rules for manipulating symbols

In the sense in which Lavoisier says that the art of reasoning is nothing more than a language well arranged the rules of thought might be reduced to the rules of syntax if there were a perfect language If the symbols of mathematics lack the universality to express every sort of concept then it may be necessary as Leibnitz proposes to construct a universal characteristic which would make possible a symbolic calculus for the performance of all the operations of thought This conception seems to contain the principle and the motivation for the various logistical schemes which accompany the

associa ion from the companionship of gregar ious animals.

Human speech is for Descartes, one of the two criteria by which we can recognize the difference that exists between men and brutes For it is a very remarkable fact that there are none so depraved and stupid, without even ex cepting idiots that they cannot arrange differ ent word together forming of them a state ment by which they can make known their thoughts wh le on the other hand there is no other animal which can do the same It is not the want of organs that brings this to pass for it is evident that magpies and parrots can utter words just like ourselves and yet they cannot speak as we do that is, so as to give evi dence that they think of what they say This does not merely show that the brutes have less reason than men, but that they have none at all.

The difference between men and other ani mals is more fully discussed in the chapter on MAN Here we are concerned with opposite opin ions on that subject only in relation to opposite views of human language and its origin. When, as in Descartes vi w human language is dis tinguished by syntax and grammar or as in Locke s, by man s speci l power to use sounds as signs of *internal conceptions*, and to make them stand as marks for ideas within h s own mind the origin of human speech does not seem explicable in evolutionary terms.

THE RELATION OF grammar to the other liberal arts and to the various uses of language is con sidered in the chapters on LOGIC, POETRY and RHETORIC. Isolated from these others, gram mar is primarily concerned with the distinction of the parts of speech such as noun and verb or particle and adjective

By a noun says Aristotle we mean a sound significant by convention wh ch has no reference to t me and of which no part is sig nificant apart from the rest In contrast to the noun the verb is defined by Aristotle as the sort of word which in addition to its proper mea ing carries with it the notion of time Moreover he continues, a verb is always a sign of someth ng said of something else The grammat cal function of nouns and verbs is in Locke s opin on more generally recognized and better defined than that of particles, prepositions, and conjunctions. Such words, Locke writes, show what connexion restriction distinction opposition emphasis, etc [a man] gives to each respective *part* of his discourse. He who would show the right use of particles and what significancy and force they have must take a little more pains, enter into his own thoughts and observe nice ly the several postures of his mind in dis coursing

Grammar is also concerned with the dif ference between words (or phrases) and sen tences, or in Aristotl s terms, between simple and composite expressions and with the rules of syntax which govern the order and agree ment of words according to their function as parts of speech By reference to these rules the grammarian criticizes the misuse of language and classifies a great variety of common errors

One test of whether grammar is a universal art applicable to all languages—not just a set of rules for using a particular conventional language *correctly*—is the naturalness of its theoretical distinctions. Does Aristotle s dis tinction between noun and verb for example, respond to something natural in all discourse or is it peculiar to the Greek or to the Indo-European languages?

THERE IS A MEANING of language which includes more than the speech of men and brutes. From Hippocrates on the physician regards the symp toms of disease as if they were a connected sys tem of signs, a language for which his diagnostic art provides a grammar of interpretation This is particularly true in the psychological realm where in the psychoanalysis of the neuroses and especially in Freud s interpretation of *dreams*, both symptom and dream-symbol are treated as an elaborate language That language serves to express the unconscious thoughts and desires which cannot be expressed in the ordinary lan guage of social intercourse over which conscious ness exercises some control.

These medical examples represent a concep tion of language according to which the whole of nature is a book to be read by the scientist He penetrates the mysteries of nature by learn ing th grammar of natural signs. To know the relation of natural things as cause and effect or

At the time when men began to build a tower whose top may reach unto heaven Genesis tells us that the whole earth was of one language and one speech And the Lord said Behold the people is one and they have all one language and this they begin to do and now nothing will be restrained from them which they have imagined to do Go to let us go down and there confound their language that they may not understand one another s speech

This according to Hobbes means that the language gotten and augmented by Adam and his posterity was again lost at the tower of Babel when by the hand of God every man was stricken for his rebellion with an oblivion of his former language If the further implication is that the lost language was unlike any of the conventional languages in the historical record then it may be supposed to have been that natural form of speech in which each thing is named according to its nature The modern ideal of a perfect and universal language may even be looked upon as an impious wish to achieve what God took away from men at Babel

THE PROBLEM of the origin of human language is not an easy one for the theologian It is more difficult still for those who speculate about it in purely naturalistic terms Rousseau tries to expose some of the perplexities in such speculations

If speech did not become a social necessity until men passed from isolation in a state of nature to living together in society how he asks could societies have been formed before languages had been invented? If men need speech to learn to think he remarks they must have stood in much greater need of the art of thinking to be able to invent that of speaking The development of languages already in existence or the way in which the child learns to speak through living in an environment where speech exists by no means explains how languages were originally formed'

Rousseau imagines a primitive condition in which men uttered instinctive cries to implore assistance in case of danger or relief in case of suffering he supposes that to such cries men may have added gestures to signify visible and movable objects and imitative sounds to signify audible ones Such methods of expression being insufficient to convey ideas about absent or future things men had at last to invent the articulate sounds of the voice and to institute these as conventional signs But as he observes, such an institution could only be made by common consent itself still more difficult to conceive since such a common agreement must have had motives and speech therefore seems to have been highly necessary in order to establish the use of it

The problem of the origin of human language is not only connected with the problem of the origin of human society but also with the problem of the origin of man himself The faculty of articulate speech does not according to Darwin offer any insuperable objection to the belief that man has been developed from some lower form Though the habitual use of articulate language is peculiar to man he uses in common with the lower animals inarticulate cries to express his meaning aided by gestures and the movements of the muscles of the face The songs of birds and the speech of parrots show that animals can learn to make and repeat certain definite sounds and even to connect words with things It seems to Darwin quite credible that man s articulate language owes its origin to the imitation and modification of various natural sounds the voices of other animals and man s own instinctive cries aided by signs and gestures

SUCH AN ACCOUNT of the origin of human speech is not credible however to those who disagree with Darwin s statement that the lower animals differ from man solely in his almost infinitely larger power of associating together the most diversified sounds and ideas Those who hold that human rationality differs in kind rather than degree from animal intelligence tend to find a corresponding difference in kind between human language and the sounds of brutes Aristotle for example says that man is the only animal whom nature has endowed with the gift of speech Mere vocalization is only an indication of pleasure and pain and is therefore found in other animals but men alone have the power to discuss the expedient and the just and this fact distinguishes human

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad* BK II [265–283] 12d the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119 When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164

AUTHOR S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets, are given in certain cases *e g* *Iliad* BK II [65 283] 12d

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a *(D)* follows *e g.,* OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—*(D) II Esdras* 7.46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style *for general guidance in the use of The Great Ideas consult the* Preface.

1 The nature and functions of language the speech of men and brutes

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 11 1–9

APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 4 24—*(D)* OT *Ecclesiasticus* 4.–9

NEW TESTAMENT *I Corinthians* 14 / *Ephesians* 4:29

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK II 61a b

7 PLATO *Cratylus* 85a 114a c / *Theaetetus* 547c d / *Sophist* 575d 577b / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810d

8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 6 [4ᵇ3–36] 9b / *Interpretation* CH 1 [16 4–8] 25a / *Soul* BK II CH 8 [420ᵇ5–421ᵃ6] 651d 652c

9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK I CH I [488 33–ᵇ3] 9b c BK IV CH 9 62a 63c / *Parts of Animals* BK II CH 16 [659ᵇ28]–CH 17 [660ᵇ3] 186d 187c / *Politics* BK I CH 2 [1253ᵃ7–18] 446b-c / *Rhetoric* BK III CH 2 [1404ᵇ1 3] 654c CH 10 [1410ᵇ9–29] 662c d / *Poetics* CH 6 [1450ᵇ10 15] 685a CH 19 [1456 33 ᵇ8] 691d 692a

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK V [1028–1090] 74c 75b

14 PLUTARCH *Demosthenes* 692a

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR II CH 3 8a / *Fourth Ennead* TR III CH 18 151b-c

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK X par 19 76a b / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 13 627d BK II CH 3 637c d

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 13 A I ANS 62c 63c Q 34 A I ANS 185b 187b Q 107 A I REP 1–3 549b 550b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q 60 A 6 ANS 851b 852b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE XXVI [124–138] 147a b

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 54c 55b PART II 100b PART IV 270a

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 215b 216b 218a-c 300c 323c 324b

26 SHAKESPEARE *Richard II* ACT I SC III [154 173] 325b

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 62c 63a / *Novum Organum* BK I APH 14 107d 108a

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART V 59c 60b

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VIII [369–451] 240a 242a BK IX [549–612] 259b 260b

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 45 178b 912 349b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XI SECT 8 II 145b 146a CH XVIII SECT 7 174d 175a CH XXII SECT 5 201d CH XXVII SECT 8 221a 222a CH XXVIII SECT 2 228c 229a CH XXXII SECT 7–8 244c d BK III CH I 251b d 252d CH II 252d 254c passim CH III

(1 *The nature and functions of language the speech of men and brutes* 1b *The service of language to society*)

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO SECT 19-21 410c-411b
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 25b 26a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 340a 342c 349d 350a 350d
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 15d 16c passim
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 300a b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART IV 347b d
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 278a 294d 295a
54 FREUD *General Introduction* 450a c / *Group Psychology* 668c 685a

2 Theories of the origin of language

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 2 19-20 11 1-9
5 AESCHYLUS *Prometheus Bound* [442-461] 44c d
5 SOPHOCLES *Antigone* [332-375] 134a b
5 EURIPIDES *Suppliants* [201-210] 260a b
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK II 49a d
7 PLATO *Protagoras* 44c / *Cratylus* 85a 114a c esp 106b-c / *Phaedrus* 138c 139b / *Gorgias* 271b 272b
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK V [1028 1090] 74c 75b
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XVI CH 4 425b 426a / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 4-5 637d 638a
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL XXXI [34 81] 46b d PARADISE XXVI [70-142] 146c 147b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 54d 55a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 218a-c
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 2d 3a 17d 18b
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VIII [267-277] 238a [338-356] 239b 240a BK XII [1-62] 319a 320b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH I SECT 5 252b c CH II SECT I 252d 253a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 340a 342c 350d
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 509b
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 211b-c / *Descent of Man* 298a 301c 349d
53 JAMES *Psychology* 685b [fn 1]
54 FREUD *General Introduction* 512d 513b

2a The hypothesis of one natural language for all men

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 2 19-20 11 1-9
7 PLATO *Cratylus* 85a 114a c esp 110c 111c
8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation* CH I [16a4-9] 25a
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XVI CH 11 429d 431a / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 4-5 637d 638a
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL XXXI [34 81] 46b d PARADISE XXVI [70-142] 146c 147b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 54d 55a
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK III 164a b
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 2d 3a 18b
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VIII [267 277] 238a [338-356] 239b 240a BK XII [1-62] 319a 320b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH II SECT I 252d 253a
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT III DIV 18 457c d

2b The genesis of conventional languages the origin of alphabets

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 10 5 11 1-9
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 12a b BK II 60a d 80a-c BK V 171a b
7 PLATO *Cratylus* 107c 114a c / *Phaedrus* 138c 139b / *Philebus* 612d 613a
15 TACITUS *Annals* BK XI 103c d
18 AUGUSTINE *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 4 637d 638a CH 24 648d 649a
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL XXXI [34-81] 46b d PARADISE XXVI [70-142] 146c 147b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 54c 55a
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 62d 63a
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK XII [38-62] 320a b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXII SECT 2 201a b SECT 5 7 201d 202b CH XXVIII SECT 2 228c 229a BK III CH II SECT I 252d 253a SECT 8 254b-c CH V SECT 8 265c 266a CH VI SECT 43-51 280c 283a passim esp SECT 51 282d 283a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 340a 342c 349d 350a 350d
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 10d esp 675d [n 83] 756a [n 43]
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 225a b 338b 342b c 706c [n 22]
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 509b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 221a
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 211b c / *Descent of Man* 300c 301c 329a b
53 JAMES *Psychology* 685b [fn 1]

3 The growth of language

3a The invention of words and the proliferation of meanings

5 ARISTOPHANES *Ecclesiazusae* [116, 1182] 628c d
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK IV 128d
7 PLATO *Cratylus* 89a 107b
8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK I CH 15 [104^b34 105^a1] 148c / *Metaphysics* BK IV CH 4 [1006^a29-^b4] 525c d
9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK III CH 2 [1405^a3-^b21] 655b-656a CH 3 [1406^b5 19] 657c d CH 10 [1410^b5-15] 662c CH 11 [1412 18 21] 664c / *Poetics* CH 21 [1457^b1-1458^a7] 693a d
18 AUGUSTINE *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 10 640d 641a CH 16 641b d BK III CH 5 659d 660a CH 24 25 666d 667c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 13 A 2 REP 2 63c 64d A 8 70d 71b Q 37 A 2 ANS 199a 200c Q 67 A 1 349d 350b
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I

3d. The spoken and written word in the development of language

3e. Tradition and the life of languages

4. The art of grammar

4a. Syntax: the parts and units of speech

4b. Standards of correctness in the use of language grammatical errors

(4 *The art of grammar* 4b *Standards of correctness in the use of language grammatical errors*)

9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK III CH 2 654c 656b CH 5 657d 658c / *Poetics* CH 22 694a 695a
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK I SECT 10 254a
18 AUGUSTINE *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 13 642b 643a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 70d 71a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXX SECT 4 238d 239a CH XXXI SECT 4-5 240b d BK III CH VI SECT 51 282d 283a CH IX SECT 8 286c d CH XI SECT 11 302b c
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 287b 288a
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 361d 362a
53 JAMES *Psychology* 164a b

5 The imperfections of language

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK IV 131d 132a
7 PLATO *Euthydemus* 65a 84a c / *Cratylus* 108c 110b / *Phaedrus* 138c 140a / *Republic* BK V 369b / *Critias* 478b d / *Theaetetus* 526b 534a / *Sophist* 561d 563b / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810d
8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics*, BK IV CH 4 525a 528b
9 ARISTOTLE *Poetics* CH 25 [1461 9-b18] 697c 698b
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [136 139] 2d
17 PLOTINUS *Fifth Ennead* TR VIII CH 6 242c / *Sixth Ennead* TR VIII CH 13 349b d
18 AUGUSTINE *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 6 626a b
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 13 AA 1-2 62c 64d A 3 ANS 64d 65c
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL XXVIII [1-6] 41b XXXIV [1-27] 51b c PURGATORY XXXI [133-145] 102b PARADISE I [38-81] 106c 107a X [28 48] 120c d XXIII [40-69] 141d 142a XXX [19-36] 152a XXXIII 156b 157d
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 57d 58a
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK II 101d 102a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 253c 254a 422c-423c 476b
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 336d 337a c
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 60b c 65b c / *Novum Organum* BK I APH 43 109d 110a APH 59-60 112b 113a
31 DESCARTES *Meditations* II 80d 81a
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 47 SCHOL 390c 391a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XIII SECT 18 152a-c BK III CH V SECT 16 267d 268a CH VI SECT 43 280c d CH IX SECT 1-CH XI SECT 7 285a 301c
35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO SECT 21 25 411b-412a c SECT 52 422d 423a SECT 74 427c SECT 143 144 441c d
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 307b-308b
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 340d 341a 342a-c / *Social Contract* BK II 401c
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 40c d
42 KANT *Science of Right* 400d
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 70d 71b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 182b-c
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [3432-3468] 84a b esp [3451-3458] 84b PART II [8691-869] 211b
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK VII 302c d
53 JAMES *Psychology* 127b 128b 153b-154a 159a b
54 FREUD *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 662a b

5a The abuse of words ambiguity imprecision obscurity

5 ARISTOPHANES *Clouds* [1178 1 00] 503a b / *Frogs* [9-3-991] 575a 576a [1119 1197] 577d 578d
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK VI 192b-c
7 PLATO *Euthydemus* 65a 84a c esp 68c d / *Phaedrus* 138c 140a / *Theaetetus* 520b 526b 534d / *Sophist* 552b-c / *Seventh Letter* 809c 810d
8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 7 [6b36-7b14] 11c 12b / *Topics* BK I CH 15 149d 152a CH 18 [108 18-36] 152b d BK II CH 3 154d 155d BK V CH 4 [133b15-134 4] 184d 185b BK VI CH I [139b12]-CH 2 [140a22] 192b 193b CH 14 [151b3 11] 206c BK VIII CH 3 [158b8 159a2] 215b c CH 7 217c d / *Sophistical Refutations* CH I [165 5-19] 227b-c CH 4 [165b24 166b19] 228b 229c CH 19-23 243d 247a CH 24 [179b38-180 22] 247d 248b CH 33 [182b13 32] 251d / *Metaphysics* BK IV CH 4 525a 528b BK VII CH II [1037 5-9] 560c
9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK II CH 2 [648 37]-CH 3 [649b22] 172d 174b / *Ethics* BK V CH I [1129a26-31] 376d / *Politics* BK II CH 3 [1261b16-31] 456c / *Rhetoric* BK III CH 2-5 654c 658c passim / *Poetics* CH 25 [1461 9 b19] 697c 698b passim
17 PLOTINUS *Fifth Ennead* TR VIII CH 6 242c
18 AUGUSTINE *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 10 640d 641a CH 12 641c 642b BK III CH 1 4 657b d 659d
22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida* BK II STANZA 37 26b STANZA 147-149 40b-41a BK V STANZA 257 153b 154a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 55b 57d 58a 78a b PART II 135c 157c
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 66b 67d BK II 77b 78b 101b 106a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 75a 77d 148a 149a 253c 254a 284d 285c 422c-423c 448d 449a 517b 519a
26 SHAKESPEARE *Taming of the Shrew* ACT I SC II [1-44] 205b c / *Romeo and Juliet* ACT II SC IV [38-140] 297d 298d / *Merchant of Venice* ACT II SC II [34 120] 412b-413a / *Julius Caesar* ACT I SC I [5 36] 568b d

27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT V SC I [9-68] 64d-65b [123 154] 65d-66a
28 GILBERT *Loadstone* BK III 73d
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 11b-13c 60b-c 61b-c / *Novum Organum* BK I APH 43 109d 110a APH 59-60 112b-113a
31 DESCARTES *Rules* XIII 26b-c / *Meditations* II, 80d 81 / *Objections and Replies* 208c-d
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 40 SCHOL 1 387b-388a PROP 4 SCHOL 390c 391a
33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 1a 14a / *Vacuum*, 370b 374b 376b-377a / *Geometrical Demonstration*, 432a-434a
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH II SECT 12 27d 28a / *Human Understanding* 89a-c BK II CH XIII, SECT 18 152a-c SECT 8 155a b CH XXIX, SECT 6-1 234d 236c CH XXX SECT 4 238d 239a BK III CH V SECT 16 26 d 268a CH 1, ECT 30 276d 277b SECT 48-1 282b-283a CH IX SECT 1-CH X SECT 7 285a 301c esp H X CT 5 13 292d 294d BK IV CH III CT 19, 318c-d SECT 3 323a-c CH IV SECT 13 r 326d 328d esp SECT 17 328d CH VIII CT 11 348b-c
35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO SECT 21 5 411b-412a,c SECT 52 422d-423a
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VII DIV 48 470d-471 SECT VIII, DIV 6 -63 478b-d DIV 74 484a-c
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 234b-236b
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 38 39a 264b-c
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XII 89c-d
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 342a-c / *Social Contract* BK 1 419b-c
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK II 123b-d
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 113b-c / *Practical Reason* 315d 316a
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 3 120a b NUMBER 41 135c 136a passim
45 LAVOISIER *Elements of Chemistry* 6d 7a,c
45 FARADAY *Researches in Electricity* 801a-b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 218a-c
47 GOETHE *Faust* 1 [995 2000] 47 b PART II [8691-8692] 211b
50 MARX *Capital*, 104d [fn 4]
54 FREUD *General Introduction*, 517 518b 540b-541b

5b Insignificant speech. meaninglessness absurdity

7 PLATO *Cratylus* 107c 108c
8 ARISTOTLE *Sophistical Refutations* CH 13 238d 239a CH 3 250c-d / *Metaphysics* BK IV CH 4 [1006a1 11] 525b-d
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART 49d 54b-c 56b-d 57 59a-60a 71a b 78a PART IV 269b-272c 274a-b
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, BK II, 77b-78b
33 PASCAL *Vacuum*, 370b 374b / *Geometrical Demonstration* 432b

35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* 89a-c BK III, CH II SECT , 254a b CH IV SECT 8-10 260d 261d passim CH V SECT 16 267d 268a CH X SECT 4 291d 292c SECT 6 298c SECT 31 299a CH XI SECT 8 301c d
35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO, SECT 23 24 411c-412a SECT 54 423b SECT 79-81 428b-d SECT 85 430a b
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [1948-1963] 46a b
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XII, 534 c BK XIV 612d-613a BK XV 620b-c
53 JAMES *Psychology* 168b-171a

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8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 7 [6b36-7b14] 11b-12b / *Topics* BK I CH 18 [108b18-36] 152b-d / *Sophistical Refutations* CH 19-23 243d 247a
9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK III CH 1 12 653b d 667b
10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK I CH I 167a b
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIX CH 7 515a-c / *Christian Doctrine* BK III CH 1 4 657b,d 659d
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 59b-d 60c
28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences* FIRST DAY 142d 143a
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31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 290c-d
33 PASCAL *Geometrical Demonstration*, 430b-431b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH I SECT 6 252c-d CH XI 300a 306d esp SECT 8-27 301 306d
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III 109b-111b
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 340d 341a
42 KANT *Practical Reason* 294b-c 339b-d
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44 BOSWELL *Johnson*, 70d 71b 81b-82
45 LAVOISIER *Elements of Chemistry* PREF 1a-c 4 5d 6d 7a,c
45 FOURIER *Theory of Heat* 173a b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I, 218a-c
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 301a b

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7 PLATO *Euthydemus* 65a-84a,c / *Cratylus* 85a 114a c / *Phaedrus* 138c 139d / *Symposium* 172b-c / *Theaetetus*, 534d 541d 542a / *Sophist*, 561d 563b 569d 577b / *Seventh Letter* 809a 811a esp 809a-c
8 ARISTOTLE *Categories* CH 1 4 5a-6a / *Interpretation*, CH 4 [-1-] 26b / *Prior Analytics* BK I CH 34-41 66b-68c / *Posterior Analytics* BK II, CH 3 [97b38-39] 133c / *Topics* BK I CH 15 149d 152 CH 18 [08a 3] 1 2b-d BK I CH 3 154d 155d CH 9 [114a6- 14] 160a b BK IV CH 3 [12 0-14] 172d CH 4 [124 35-125a4] 173d BK V CH 2 [130b11 15]

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18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK XII par 32-36 107a 108c par 41-43 110a d BK XIII par 36 120c d / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 13 627d

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 55a 57c 58a 60b 65c d PART III 172a PART IV 269b c 270a b

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 18d

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 253c 254a

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 56b 66a esp 58c 59a

31 DESCARTES *Rules* XIII 26b c / *Discourse* PART I 43b PART VI 66d / *Objections and Replies* 137a 290c d

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33 PASCAL *Pensées* 22-23 175b 392 239b 240a / *Geometrical Demonstration* 430b-434a

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35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO SECT 19 410c SECT 52 422d 423a

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 339d 342c

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 1a 4a c

45 LAVOISIER *Elements of Chemistry* PREF 1a c 4a 5d 6d 7a c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 182b c

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 40c d

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE I 672a b

53 JAMES *Psychology* 144a b

54 FREUD *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 662a b

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5 ARISTOPHANES *Knights* [1373 1383] 486d 487a / *Clouds* 488a 506d esp [882 1105] 499b 502a

7 PLATO *Euthydemus* 65a 84a c / *Phaedrus* 131b 141a c / *Symposium* 172b-c

8 ARISTOTLE *Interpretation* CH 1 [16 4-8] 25a CH 4 [17 1-7] 26b

9 ARISTOTLE *Rhetoric* BK III CH 1 12 653b d 667b / *Poetics* CH 21 [1457^{b}1 1458^{a}7] 693a d CH 22 694a 695a

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK I [142 156] 107a

14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 42c-43b / *Alcibiades* 159a b / *Marcus Cato* 279d 281b / *Phocion* 606c d / *Demosthenes* 692d 695d passim / *Marcus Brutus* 803b-c

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK III par 7-8 14c 15a BK V par 10 11 29b 30a par 23 24 33c 34b / *Christian Doctrine* BK II CH 6 638a d BK IV 675a 698a c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PROLOGUE 1a b

22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida* BK II STANZA 2-4 21b-22a STANZA 147 149 40b 41a / *Prologue* [725-746] 171b 172a / *Franklin's Prologue* 351a / *Prologue to Melibeus* 400b 401a / *Manciple's Tale* [17 154-186] 491a b / *Parson's Prologue* [17 341 375] 494a b

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 127d 128d PART IV 270a CONCLUSION 282c d

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK II 77b 78b 101b 106a

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 75a 77d 309c 310c 422c 424c 448d-449c 482b-483b

28 GILBERT *Loadstone* PREF 2b c

29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 1b c

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 1b 2b 12b c 16c 31a d 39b d 58c 59a 64b c 65a c 66b 68b 83d 84a

31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART I 43b PART VI 66d

32 MILTON *Vacation Exercise* [1-58] 59a 60b

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35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK III CH X SECT 34 299d 300a

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40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 343a b 529d

41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 327a c 526a-c

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 3c d

43 MILL *Liberty* 292b 293b passim

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 59c 61d 284b 353c 354a 381d 382a 454a

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 40c d

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK IX 347b 348a

54 FREUD *General Introduction* 450b / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 662a b

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5 ARISTOPHANES *Clouds* [331 340] 492a [1351 1378] 504d 505b / *Peace* [734-764] 534c 535a / *Birds* [1373-1409] 559b c / *Frogs* [55 1533] 573a 582a c / *Thesmophoriazusae* [99 172] 601c 602b

7 PLATO: *Protagoras*, 52d-57a / *Ion*, 143a-c; 144b-d / *Republic*, BK III, 328b-333a; BK X, 430b-c

8 ARISTOTLE: *Interpretation*, CH 4 [17a1-7] 26b

9 ARISTOTLE: *Ethics*, BK IV, CH 8 [1128a18-25] 375b-c / *Politics*, BK VIII, CH 7 [1342a32-b8] 548a / *Rhetoric*, BK III, CH 1-12 653b-d; 667b / *Poetics*, CH 1 [1447a29-b23] 681b-c; CH 6 [1450b13-15] 685a; CH 19-22 691d-695a esp CH 22 694c-695a; CH 24 [1460b2-5]; CH 25 [1460b13] 696d; [1461a9-b8] 697-698b

18 AUGUSTINE: *City of God*, BK XI, CH 18 331d-332a / *Christian Doctrine*, BK II, CH 6 638a-d

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART I, Q 1, A 9, REP 1 8d-9c

21 DANTE: *Divine Comedy*, HELL, XXXII [1-12] 47c; PURGATORY, XXIV [49-63] 90a-b; PARADISE, X [43-48] 120c-d; XXVI [40-69] 141d; 144a; XXX [19-36] 152a; XXXIII 156b-157d

22 CHAUCER: *Troilus and Cressida*, BK I, STANZA 1-4 21b-22a; ST 147-149 40b-41a; BK II, STANZA 56-57 153b-154a / *Prologue* [725-742] 171b-172a / *Clerk's Prologue* [7,888-7,932] 295a-296a / *Franklin's Prologue* 351a / *Prologue to Melibeus* 400b-401a / *Manciple's Tale* [17,154-17,186] 491a-b / *Parson's Prologue* [17,341-17,355] 494a-b / *L'Envoi* 550a-b

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31 DESCARTES: *Discourse*, PART I, 43b

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33 PASCAL: *Pensées*, 23-35 175b-177

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44 BOSWELL: *Johnson*, 167d-168b; 180c; 307; 381d-382a; 455b

46 HEGEL: *Philosophy of History*, INTRO, 153b

52 DOSTOEVSKY: *Brothers Karamazov*, BK V, 115a-c

53 JAMES: *Psychology*, 687a-688a

10. The language of things and events: the book of nature; the symbolism of dreams; prophetic signs

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16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK IV 853b 854a / *Harmonies of the World* 1080b 1085b passim

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 13 4b-c BK III par 19-20 18b 19a BK XIII par 6-48 112a 124a passim / *City of God* BK I PREF 129a d CH 36 149c d BK II CH 2-3 150c 151c BK IV CH 33-34 206c 207a c BK V CH I 207d 208c CH 11-26 216c 230a c BK X CH 5 301b-302a CH 8 303a d CH 1 -20 306d 311c BK XI CH 18 331d 332a CH 24 28 335c 338d BK XV CH 1 397b d 398c CH 1-22 415b 416c BK XVI CH 25 438a b BK XVII CH 1-3 449a-451c BK XVIII CH 1-2 472b d-473d BK XXII CH 30 618c d / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 2 624d 625a BK II CH 1-3 636b d 637d esp CH I 637a BK IV CH 21 690d 691b

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23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 53c d 80b c 81d 82b

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52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK II 36b c BK VI 147c 148a BK VII 189a 191a c

54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psycho Analysis* 11b 12d passim / *Hysteria* 57a 59d / *Interpretation of Dreams* 137d 138d 173a 174d 178a 205c esp 178b 179c 194b d 197b 198d 230b 231c 252c 340a esp 252c 253a 264c 272c 282a 285b 332a 333b / *Unconscious* 440c 442b / *General Introduction* 467a b 489c-494d esp 492d-493c 504d

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23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part i 70c 71a 81d 82a part ii 160b c part iii 165a 167b 171a 172a 176d 177b 181a 186c 215b 216b 241a 242a 246c part iv 247a 258b
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30 Bacon *Advancement of Learning* 2c 4c 97c 100b / *New Atlantis* 202d 203c
31 Descartes *Objections and Replies* 123d 124a 227a 228a
32 Milton *Paradise Lost* bk v [544–576] 187a b
33 Pascal *Provincial Letters* 78b 80b 163a 164b / *Pensées* 570–588 273b 277b passim 642–736 290b 317b 775 323b 324a 803–856 328b 341b
35 Locke *Toleration* 5a b 21c 22d / *Human Understanding* bk iii ch ix sect 9 286d 287b sect 23 291b c ch x sect 12 294b c
35 Berkeley *Human Knowledge* sect 44 420d 421a sect 65–66 425d–426a
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46 Hegel *Philosophy of History* part iii 308c 309d
47 Goethe *Faust* part i [1 20 1237] 30a b
48 Melville *Moby Dick* 30a 36b
52 Dostoevsky *Brothers Karamazov* bk v 127b 137c

CROSS REFERENCES

For The other major discussion of language in terms of the variety of signs and the modes of signification *see* Sign and Symbol

Other considerations of language as an instrument of thought *see* Idea 4a Judgment 5a Logic 3a Mathematics 3d Rhetoric 1b 2c–2d Sign and Symbol 1d 4b 4e

The distinction of the natural and the conventional as applied to language *see* Custom and Convention 1 Sign and Symbol 1b 1d 1f

The general discussion of the liberal arts of grammar rhetoric and logic *see* Art 6b and for the relation of grammar to these other arts *see* Logic 3a Rhetoric 1b 3c

Another analysis of the imperfections of language and for the remedies proposed by semantics *see* Sign and Symbol 3a 4c

The language of poetry *see* Poetry 8b

The language of symptoms in medicine of dreams in psychoanalysis and of omens and portents in prophecy and divination *see* Medicine 3c Memory and Imagination 8d–8e Prophecy 3b–3c Sign and Symbol 4e 5b 6a–6c

The language of God or the gods in Sacred Scripture or oracular utterances and for the problem of interpreting the divine word *see* God 6c(1) Prophecy 3a–3d Religion 1b(1) Sign and Symbol 5e Theology 4b

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection
II Works by authors not represented in this collection

For the date place and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

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Chapter 46 LAW

INTRODUCTION

THE notion of law is associated with a diversity of subject matters and its meaning undergoes many variations as the discussion shifts from one context to another The most radical difference separates the way in which natural scientists use the term *law* from the way in which it is used in the arts and in morals or politics

We ordinarily think of law as a rule—a command or a prohibition—which should be obeyed and can be disobeyed Both alternatives are usually present Though the duty or obligation which a law creates is one of obedience there would be no moral significance to discharging this duty if the law could not be violated But the laws of nature which the scientist tries to discover do not have this characteristic They are inviolable The so-called law of gravitation for example or Newton s three laws of motion cannot be disobeyed Scientists may disagree about the truth of any formulation of a natural law but if the formulation is valid then the general rule of behavior is supposed to obtain without exception and if exceptions are found they are not interpreted as instances of disobedience but rather as cases to which the law does not apply

The rules of an art may be violated either unwittingly or intentionally For example grammatical errors can be made by those ignorant of the rules or by those who wish to disregard them The so called law of contradiction in the art of logic seems to be like the rules of grammar or of any other art Men certainly contradict themselves in spite of the rule which places the penalty of error on those who make contradictory statements

But according to another conception of the law of contradiction which belongs to the science of metaphysics rather than to the art of logic nothing can both be and not be at the same time in the same respect This law of being like the laws of motion is regarded as inviolable by those who think it true In this it has the aspect of a scientific or natural law The law of contradiction conceived as a rule of logic may also be natural in the sense of *not being man made* In the opinion of certain philosophers man does not invent either the metaphysical rule which all existences *must* observe or the logical rule which the human mind *should* always obey He discovers both

There still remains that other class of rules to which the word law is most commonly applied These are rules of moral action or social conduct which like rules of art are essentially violable Laws in their most general signification Montesquieu writes are the necessary relations arising from the nature of things In this sense all beings have their laws But he points out that law operates differently in the realm of physical nature and in the realm of intelligent beings like man The latter he says does not conform to [its laws] so exactly as the physical world This is because on the one hand particular intelligent beings are of a finite nature and consequently liable to error and on the other their nature requires them to be free agents Hence even the laws of their own instituting they frequently infringe

The profound division between laws of nature and laws of human conduct thus seems to involve two points (1) the former may apply to all things the latter are addressed to man alone (2) the former being inviolable state the necessities of behavior the latter precisely because they are violable imply freedom in those to whom they are addressed

These two kinds of law have this much in common Both the laws of nature discovered by the scientist and the rules of conduct instituted by the legislator are general rather than particu

lar Their generality has been made in the tra dition of jurisprudence the ba is for differen tiating rules of law from particular decisions or decrees. On theological grounds however the two kinds of law *can* be said to have a more sig nificant characteristic in common.

Aquinas concei es the laws of nature which the scientist discovers as laws implanted in the very nature of things at their creation by God. The laws which God implants in human nature do not differ in their eternal origin in the divine intellect and will or n their manifestation of the d ine government of the world They dif f r only in that it is part of man s nature to be free and therefore able to disobey even the rules of his own nature Thus both sorts of law are d rections of behavior Only if the laws which science d scovers are not attributed to God will they seem to be merely descriptive rather than prescripti e

In this chapter we shall be primarily con cerned with law as a direction of human con duct or as Kant would say law in the sphere of freedom. But within the one meaning of law which concerns us here there are still many im portant distinctions of type The di i ion of law in o divine and human, natural and positive pri ate and public moral and political—to name only some of the traditional distinctions —determines the outlines of the diverse philoso phies of law which the great books contain and underlies the great issues concernin the origin the properties, and the authority of law

DIFFERENT WRITERS use different criteria to set up their classification of the kinds of law It is nevertheless possibl to perceive certain paral lels in analysis and classification. The opposite of natural law is sometimes called human law " positive law " or "written law sometimes ci il law" or "municipal law Sometimes, as with Kant for whom the analysis of law deri es from an analysis of *rights*, the differentiation be tween natural and pos tive right is also expressed in terms of innate and acquired right public and pri ate right

Thus for Kant "natural right rests upon pure rational principles *a priori* positi e or stat u ory right is what proceeds from the will of a legislator Innat right is that right which belongs to every one by nature independent of all juridical acts of experience Acquired right is that right which is founded upon such juridi cal acts. From natural or innate right develops the system of *those* laws which require no ex ternal promulgation and which therefore be long to the sphere of private right Positive or civil rights are the acquired rights of men living in a state of civil society under the system of those laws which require public promulgation" and which therefore belong to the sphere of public right The source of differentiation here seems threefold whether the right is inherent in human nature or acquired from the state whether men are viewed as living in a state of nature or as living in a civil society whether the laws do or do not need to be publicly pro mulgated

The distinction between the state of nature and the state of civil society is used by many other writers in differentiating between natural and positi e (or civil) law *e g* by Hobbes Spi noza Locke Montesquieu Rousseau They also recognize that the law which governs men living in a state of nature is natural in the sense of being instinctive or a rule of conduct which man s reason is innately competent to prescribe whereas the civil law originates with specific acts of legislation by a political power vested in a so ereign person in a representative assembly or in the whole body of the peopl

Dividing all laws into two kinds— laws of nature and laws of the land —Hegel holds that "the laws of nature are simply what they are and are valid as they are" In contrast positive law is "valid in a particular state and this *legal authority is the guiding principle* for the knowledge of right in this positi e form, *i.e.* for the science of positive law Our man ner of knowing their content further distin guishes between these two kinds of law "To know the law of nature Hegel explains, "we must learn to know nature since its laws are rigid and it is only our ideas about them that can be false Knowledge of the laws of the land is in one way similar but in another way not These laws too we learn to know j ist as they exist But the difference in the case of laws of the land is that they arouse the spirit of reflection and their diversity at once draws attention to the fact that they are not abso lute

This leads us to the heart of the distinction The law of the land or civil law is something posited something originated by men It is positive law in the sense that it must be *posited* (i e officially instituted) in order to exist The *civil law is not something discovered* by examining man s nature It is *made* and must be externally promulgated so that those who are subject to it can learn its provisions Anyone who will inquire can learn the natural law for himself, or he can be helped to discover it by a teacher who instructs him in this matter as he would instruct him in geometry not as a lawyer informs clients concerning the prevailing laws of the state

AQUINAS BOTH subtracts from and adds to this analysis of the difference between natural and positive law On the one hand he does not appeal to the condition of man in a state of nature as contrasted with civil society On the other hand he finds the chief difference between the natural and the positive law in their originating sources The one is made by God the other by man The natural law Aquinas writes is nothing else than the rational creature s participation in the eternal law It is God s eternal law with respect to man as that is received and exists in human nature It exists in man as the first principle of his practical reason and includes all the precepts which can be discovered by reasoning therefrom

Hence for Aquinas as for Locke the law of nature is not only the law of reason but the law of nature s God But Aquinas distinguishes between the law of nature generally or the eternal law and *the natural law in man* The latter is a *moral* law both in the sense that it is a law governing free acts and also in the sense that it directs man with *regard to good and evil in the* sphere of his private life not merely with regard to the political common good

Natural and *positive law are alike in the very* respects in which they differ Both share in the nature of law which according to Aquinas is nothing else than an ordinance of reason for the common good made by him who has care of the community and promulgated Each has a maker God or man each proceeds in a *certain* way from the reason and will of its maker each must be promulgated though not in the same manner and each is concerned with a common good—human happiness or the welfare of the state

The further additions which Aquinas makes consist of distinctions with respect to divine and human law With respect to the divine law he distinguishes between God s eternal ordinances and His positive commandments The eternal part of the divine law as we have seen is that which at the moment of creation God imprints on the whole of nature to instill in each created species the principles of its proper actions If man were ordained to no other end than that which is proportionate to his natural faculties Aquinas writes there would be no need for man to have any further direction besides the natural law and the human law which is derived from it But man is ordained to the end of eternal happiness and since salvation is a supernatural end which exceeds man s power to achieve without God s help it was necessary that man should be directed to this end by a law given by God

God gave such a body of law to man not at creation but at a certain moment in history He did not implant it in his nature but promulgated it in the manner appropriate to positive law through verbal declaration—through His revealed word in the Old and the New Testaments *e g* the Ten Commandments and the two precepts of charity

The human law Aquinas divides into the *law of nations* [or the *ius gentium*] and *civil law* The civil law is that which is instituted by a community for its own members With regard to the *ius gentium* Aquinas follows the *tradition of the Roman jurists* What he has in mind in using this term should therefore not be confused with what later writers such as *Grotius treat as the ius inter gentes* or international law Yet applicable to both the law of nations and international law is the *question whether such law belongs more properly to the sphere of natural or to the sphere of positive law*

International law concerns the relations between *autonomous states which as Hegel points* out are in a state of nature in relation to one another since *the sovereignty of a state is the principle of its relations to others* Laws cannot be applied to sovereign states with the coercive force of positive law It follows says

Hegel that if states disagree and their particular wills cannot be harmonized the matter can only be settled by war His statement that international law does not go beyond an ought to-be separates it from positive law On similar grounds Aquinas separates the *ius gentium* from positive law He recognizes as will presently appear that it does not result from legislative enactment. Furthermore he points out that it is discovered by reason and derives its rules by way of deduction from natural law The law of nations is, therefore not positively instituted

That the law of nations lacks some of the properties of civil law does not make it for Aquinas, less essentially a body of law but for Hegel it falls short of the essence of law which consists in a determinate and universal rule of right posited by a sovereign will The great legal positivists of the 19th century such as Austin, go further and deny that anything is truly law except the positive enactments of a government which has the power to enforce its ordinances. The laws of nature are laws only in a metaphorical sense

The Greeks also appear to regard law as primarily a creation of the state Aristotle conceives political justice as part natural part legal—natural that which everywhere has the same force and does not exist by people s thinking this or that legal that which is originally indifferent but when it has been laid down is not indifferent This tends to identify the legal aspect of justice with the conventional The threefold division of law into civil law law of nations, and natural law is not Greek but Roman in origin

Yet the Greeks do not hold that all law is of human institution or merely a matter of local convention The fundamental opposition between the divine law and the man-made law of the state occurs frequently in the Greek tragedies and with particular force in the *Antigone* of Sophocles. In burying her brother Antigone violates the king s edict but in her view not to have done so would have been to violate the unwritten statutes of heaven which she declares, are not of today or yesterday but from all time and no man knows when they were first put forth. Not through dread of any human pride " she says, could I answer to the gods for breaking *these*

Aristotle cites this passage from Sophocles when in his *Rhetoric* he advises the forensic orator (or trial lawyer) to appeal to the universal law and insist on its greater equity and justice *if* the written law tells against our case Under such circumstances, he thinks it is wise to urge that the principles of equity are permanent and changeless and that the universal law does not change either for it is the law of nature whereas written laws often do change Under the opposite circumstances that is, when the written law supports our case he prescribes an opposite course—to cite the laws of the state and to urge that they be upheld

Though Aristotle here speaks of the law of nature he seems to have in mind the notion of a universal law or a body of law that is *common* to all peoples For the most part he speaks of natural justice rather than natural law Whether or not the two notions are equivalent his principle of natural justice stands in the same relation to political enactments as, for later writers the natural law stands to the positive law Plato s conception of law as a disposition of reason which orders things according to their natures even more explicitly recognizes that law *neither* depends upon nor derives its authority from the power of the state The phrase natural law may be infrequent in the Greek books but its meaning is not unrepresented in Greek thought

OTHER DISTINCTIONS in kinds of law—written and unwritten statutory and customary constitutional law and the various particular bodies of law such as the law of contracts, of crimes or of torts—are for the most part subdivisions of positive law The one exception perhaps is the unwritten law which when not identified with customary law stands for the natural law or the law of reason With respect to these parts of law the chief problems concern constitutions and customs. The difference between a constitution as law and all other laws obtaining in a state is considered in the chapter on CONSTITUTION and the legal force of custom both in itself and also in relation to legislative enactments, is discussed in the chapter on CUSTOM

Here our major concern is with positive law as a whole with its properties and defects but above all with its relation to natural law Some

of the properties of positive law are agreed upon even by those who sharply disagree concerning its relation to natural law

It is generally agreed for example that a rule of positive law cannot be made by *any* man but only by him who exercises the legislative authority and has the power to enforce the rule Agreement also prevails concerning the mutability of positive law though not all would go as far as Montaigne in holding that there is nothing more subject to perpetual agitation than the laws Yet it is generally recognized that the content of positive law continually undergoes change with the nullification or amendment of old rules and the addition of new ones and that positive regulations on any particular matter may vary from state to state

No less common is the understanding of the indispensability of courts and judges Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and define their true meaning and operation Hamilton writes Though rules of law in distinction from decrees are formulated to cover an indefinite number of like cases the cases to which they must be applied by the judicial process are far from uniform Courts and judges have the task of deciding whether the facts of the particular case bring that case under the specific provisions of the law This is the field of judicial discretion and the battleground of litigants and lawyers

The propensities of men of law on the bench and at the bar to protract and complicate the procedures of a trial to multiply and divide the issues to separate themselves from laymen by a heavy curtain of language have been satirically noted in the great diatribes against the legal profession from Aristophanes to Chaucer Rabelais Montaigne and Swift

Rabelais for example has Pantagruel undertake to arbitrate in the litigation between Lord Kissbreech plaintiff of one side and Lord Suckfist defendant of the other whose controversy was so high and difficult in law that the court of parliament could make nothing of it Pantagruel conducts the proceedings in an unusual style When the counsellors and attorneys delivered into his hands the bags wherein were the writs and pancarts concerning that suit which for bulk and weight were almost enough to load four great couillard or stoned asses Pantagruel said unto them Are the two lords between whom this debate and process is yet living? Upon being told they are alive to what a devil then said he serve so many paltry heaps and bundles of papers and copies which you give me? Is it not better to hear their controversy from their own mouths whilst they are face to face before us than to read these vile fopperies which are nothing but trumperies deceits diabolical cozenages of Cepola pernicious slights and subversions of equity

Furthermore Pantagruel continues seeing the laws are excerpted out of the middle of moral and natural philosophy how should these fools have understood it that have by G— studied less in philosophy than my mule? In respect of human learning and the knowledge of antiquities and history they are truly laden with these faculties as a toad is with feathers And yet of all this the laws are so full that without it they cannot be understood Therefore if you will that I make any meddling in this process first cause all these papers to be burned secondly make the two gentlemen come personally before me and afterwards when I shall have heard them I will tell you my opinion freely without any feignedness or dissimulation whatsoever The trial which Pantagruel then conducts in which the two lords are forced to plead without benefit of counsel is a choice and proper piece of litigation

The problems of casuistry with which Pascal deals at length in his *Provincial Letters* are sometimes thought of as peculiar to the canon law but casuistry in the sense of distinguishing cases and examining them in relation to general rules necessarily occurs in the judicial application of any body of law The most difficult cases are those which may fall under the letter of a law but seem to be inconsistent with its spirit The reverse also happens cases fall outside the letter of the law but the purpose of the law seems to cover them All such cases indicate an unavoidable defect in rules of law

The defect is unavoidable Aristotle says Law aims at universality but about some things it is not possible to make a universal statement which shall be correct To remedy this defect

the i tention of the lawmaker should be consulted. The particular case should be treated as h. would have treated it if he had had it in mind when he framed the general rule Such handl.. of the difficult case is what Aristotle means by the equitable— a correction of the law where it is defective owing to its universality"

The law which equity is called upon to correct ma be a just rule, but that does not prevent its being unjustly applied. Equity prevents the injustice of misapplication by dispensing justice in the particular case according to the spirit, not the letter of the law It is a kind of justice Aristotle says not legal justice but a correction of legal justice not better than absolute justice but better than the error which arises from the absoluteness of the rule.

Those who share Aristotle s theory of equity acknowledge a standard of justice by which not only the law s application, but also the law itself, is to be measured. In his terms, natural justice provides this standard. The justice of laws made by the state is not only relative to the constitution of the state, but since the constitution itself can be more or less just there is a standard of justice prior to and independent of the state—in this sense *natural*.

Essentiall the same point is made by those who, like Montesquieu and Locke appeal to the natural law both as a measure of constitutions and as a criterion for distinguishing good from bad law Before laws were made, Montesquieu writes, "there were relations of possible justice To say that there is nothing just or unjust but what is commanded or forbidden by positive laws, is the same as saying that before the describin of a circle all the radii were not equal.

Th. law of nature according to Locke does not apply only to the conduct of men living in a stat of nature The law of nature which Locke describes as a rul of common reason and equity such is that measure God has set to the actions of men for their mutual security is not abolished when men enter into civil society 'The obligations of the law of nature cease not in society but only in many cases are drawn closer and have by human laws known penalties annexed to them, to enforce their observation. Thus the law of nature stands as an eternal rule to all men legislators as well as others." The rules of positive law writes Locke must be conformable to the law of nature, i.e to the will of God of which that is the declaration. The municipal laws of any particular state are only so far right as they are founded on the law of nature by which they are to be regulated and interpreted.

THE POSITION of Locke and Aquinas makes natural law the source as well as the standard of positive law As a source natural law gives rise to positive law in a way which, for Aquinas at least, differentiates it from the law of nations or the *ius gentium*

Something may be derived *from the natural* law in two ways," he writes. First as a conclusion from premises secondly by way of determination of certain generalities. The first way he explains, is like to that by which in sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the principles while the second mode is likened to that whereby in the arts, general forms are particularized as to details thus the craftsman needs to determine th general form of a house to some particular shape. Now "to the law of nations belong those things which are derived from the law of nature, as conclusions from premises, e g., just buyings and sellings, and the like without which men cannot live together which is a point of the law of nature, since man is by nature a social animal. But those things which are derived from the law of nature by way of particular determination, belong to the civil law according as each state decides on what is best for itself."

Aquinas exemplifies the determinations of positive law by pointing out that the law of nature has it that the evildoer should be punished but that he be punished in this way or that is a determination of the law of nature" which the positive law must institute. He might also have used as an example the fact that the universal prohibition of killing is a conclusion from the principle of natural law that "*one should do harm to no man*," whereas the various kinds and degrees of murder are differently defined in diff rent countries according to the determination of the natural law made by the positive law of homicide in each country

The rules of positive law cannot be arrived at deductively They do not follow necessarily from principles They are only determinations which particularize the precepts of natural law in a manner which fits the contingent circumstances of a particular society Whatever is made determinate by positive law is something which the natural law leaves indeterminate because no point of justice or right is involved Other determinations could have been made An element of choice is involved in the making of positive laws In addition to being formulated by the reason they must be posited by the will of whoever has the authority to make laws

Rules of positive law are the work of reason to the extent that reason is called upon to propose various *possible* determinations of the natural law *e g* one or another definition of murder in the first degree one or another definition of the penalty for it Since a definite rule of positive law cannot be instituted until a choice is made among the alternative possibilities the positive law cannot be solely the work of reason Choice according to Aquinas is always an act of the will

Though he recognizes the role of choice and hence of the will in the enactment of positive law Aquinas does not go to the other extreme of making the will the sole arbiter of what is law The legality of the state s ordinances does not depend entirely on their being posited by the will of a sovereign authority If a positive regulation is not derived from the natural law it cannot be a just rule Quoting Augustine s remark that a law which is not just is a law in name only Aquinas goes on to say Every human law has just so much of the nature of law as it is derived from the law of nature But if in any point it departs from the law of nature it is no longer a law but a perversion of law

An ordinance which had no other foundation than the will of a sovereign prince or government might have the coercive force of law but it would lack the moral authority of law It would bind men not through conscience but only through their fear of punishment for disobedience That force and tyranny may be an element in law writes Hegel is accidental to law, and has nothing to do with its nature

A COMPLETELY opposite view is taken by those who deny natural law or principles of innate right and natural justice There is in addition a theory of natural law which leads to an opposite view of the legal and the just though the opposition in this case is qualified to some extent

According to Hobbes civil and natural law are not different kinds but different parts of law ' The law of nature and the civil law he says contain each other and are of equal extent But he also says that the laws of nature are not properly laws but qualities that dispose men to peace and to obedience

Before the formation of a commonwealth by the contract or covenant whereby men transfer the rights and liberties which they possess in a state of nature the natural law directs men first to preserve their lives in the war of every man against every man and second to seek the security of peace by leaving the natural state of war to join with their fellow men in the order of a civil society The nineteen precepts of natural law which Hobbes enumerates seem to set forth reason s recognition of the advantages of civil society over the state of nature and also reason s understanding of the conditions indispensable to a firm foundation of the commonwealth

These rules of reason are the laws of nature dictating peace for a means of the conservation of men in multitudes and which only concern the doctrine of civil society But until the commonwealth exists the laws of nature bind in conscience only and they are therefore not effective in achieving their end which is security When a commonwealth is settled then they are actually laws and not before as being then the commands of the commonwealth and therefore also civil laws For it is the sovereign power which obliges men to obey them

The distinction between natural and civil law then becomes a distinction between unwritten and written rules but the test of whether any rule is actually a law is the same namely whether it is adopted and enforced by the sovereign All laws written and unwritten have their authority and force from the will of the commonwealth Hobbes writes

The difference between the Hobbesian theory and that of Locke or Aquinas reveals itself in its

consequences Under what circumstances can a subject or citizen refuse obedience to the laws of the state? On the ground that they are un just or tyrannical? By the criterion that they violate precepts of natural law or the positive commandments of God? Is the individual bound in conscience to obey every command of the civil law because the civil law includes the natural law interprets it and gives it the authority and force of law and because the natural law itself commands obedience to the civil law once a commonwealth has been instituted? Or on the contrary is an individual in conscience free to disobey those positive enactments which lack the authority of law because they are not in conformity to the natural law or the divine law?

TO QUESTIONS OF THIS sort and to the whole problem of the right of rebellion different answers seem to be given in terms of different views of the nature of law the sources of its authority and its sanctions.

At one extreme there is the doctrine that rebellion is never justified that the security of peace which the maintenance of law and order provides, is always better than the anarchy and war which result from rebellion. Hobbes for example holds that nothing the sovereign representative can do to a subject on what pretence soever can properly be called injustice or injury The rebel would therefore always be a criminal a man who takes the law into his own hands and uses force to gain his ends. A man may be justified in using force according to Hobbes only to repel force used against him and then only in defense of his life So much the law of nature permits or requires But it does not permit or require him to decide which laws enacted by his sovereign he shall obey or disobey

At the other extreme there is the doctrine of civil disobedience as expounded by Thoreau and of course Gandhi. Unjust laws or laws which violate a man s conscience may have the force of the state behind them. But they exert no authority over him The just man is called upon to break them and to submit gladly to the consequences of breaking them by suffering whatever penalties may be attached to their breach. It is not enough for the individual citizen to satisfy his conscience by criticizing the government and joining with like-minded fellow citizens in an effort to get unjust laws abolished or reformed. He is obliged in conscience not to await help from others or to be patient in the use of gradual means He is obliged to act alone and at once—by disobeying the unjust law

Kant seems to go this far when he interprets the precept Do wrong to no one as meaning "Do no wrong to anyone even if thou shouldst be under the necessity in observing this duty to cease from all connection with others and to avoid all society But he qualifies this somewhat by the precept Enter if wrong cannot be avoided into a society with others in which everyone may have *secured* to him what is his own.

Another sort of qualification limits disobedience rebellion or secession from society—even when the individual conscience recoils from the injustice or illegality of a civil ordinance The principle as stated by Aquinas seems to be that the common good may under certain circumstances, be better served by acquiescence than by disobedience Unless what the law commands involves a transgression of God s commandments an unjust law may be obeyed in order to avoid scandal or disturbance"

Even with regard to reforming law by legal means Aquinas recommends that the disadvantages resulting from the change of law be weighed against the advantages The effectiveness of law depends upon the habits of obedience it forms and upon the customary behavior it establishes Consequently Aquinas says when a law is changed the binding power of law is diminished in so far as custom is abolished This harm to the common welfare may of course be compensated rather by the benefit conferred by the new enactment or by the fact that the existing law is clearly unjust or its observance extremely harmful

Locke states the principle somewhat differently So long as due process of law is available to remedy unjust ordinances or illegal acts the individual is not justified in disobedience for such action would unhinge and overturn all polities, and instead of government and order leave nothing but anarchy and confusion Nor

is it effective for the individual to act alone in *using force to resist tyranny or injustice* But if these illegal acts have extended to the majority of the people and they are persuaded in their consciences that their laws and with them *their estates liberties* and lives are in danger and perhaps their religion too how they will be hindered from resisting illegal force used against them I cannot tell This is an inconvenience I *confess* that attends all *governments There is* no alternative then but rebellion— properly a state of war wherein the appeal lies *only to* heaven

As the foregoing discussion indicates the basic issues in the *philosophy* of law are inseparable from questions about justice and liberty the rights of the individual and the authority of the state the powers of government, *and the fundamental alternatives* of crime and punishment war and peace These matters are considered in the chapters appropriate to the terms mentioned above More *particular consequences of the theory of law* especially natural law are found in such *chapters as* REVOLUTION SLAVERY *and* TYRANNY CITIZEN CONSTITUTION and WEALTH

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

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AUTHOR S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases *e g* *Iliad* BK II [265 283] 12d

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a *(D)* follows *e g* OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—*(D) II Esdras* 7 46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited

For additional information concerning the style of the references see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface

1 The definition of law

7 PLATO *Statesman* 599c 601b / *Laws* BK I 650a b BK IV 681b c BK IX 743a b 754a b 757a

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK V CH I [1129^b14 19] 377a BK X CH 9 [1180 14–24] 434d-435a / *Politics* BK III CH 16 [1287^a28 32] 485d [1287^b3-5] 486a BK VII CH 4 [1326^a29-32] 530b-c

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK XI SECT I 302a b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 90 205a 208b esp A 4 ANS 207d 208b

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 130b c 131a c 149c 157b

35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VI SECT 57 36d 37b CH IX SECT 124 53d 54a CH XI 55b 58b

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I 1a 2b 3c

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 330b d / *Political Economy* 370b d / *Social Contract* BK II 399b-400c esp 399c d

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 110c / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 266c d / *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 367b c / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 383a 394a c esp 392b / *Science of Right* 397a 399c

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 33 108d 109a NUMBER 62 191b

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 203d 204a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PREF 4a l INTRO par 3 10a 12c ADDITIONS I 115a d

1a The end of law peace order and the common good

7 PLATO *Republic* BK I 301b 304a BK I 311b c BK V 363b 365d BK IX 425c-427 esp 426c d / *Theaetetus* 531a b / *Statesman* 599c 601b / *Laws* BK I III 640a 677a esp BK I 643a 644a 650a b BK III 669b d 676b-c BK IV 677d 681b 682c BK VI 706b c BK IX 747d 754a b 757a BK XII 795c 796b / *Seventh Letter* 804b c

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK V CH I [1129^b14 19] 377a CH 6 [1134^a29 32] 382a / *Politics* BK III CH 16 [1287^a18 $^b35$] 485c-486c BK VII CH 4 [1326 29 32] 530b c

14 PLUTARCH *Solon* 72b

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIX CH 17 522b-523a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 90 A 2 206b 207a A 3 ANS and REI 3 207a c Q 91 A I REP 3 208b d A 5 ANS 211c 212c A 6 REP 3 212c 213c Q 92 A I ANS and REP I 3 4 213c 214c Q 93 A I REP I 15b d 216c A 4 CONTRARY 218b d Q 94 A 2 ANS 221d 223a A 3 REP I 223a c Q 95 A I 226c 227c

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21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURG TORY XVI [85-102] 77d

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30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 20c d

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35 LOCKE *Toleration* 8c 11b 15c 16a 17b passim / *Civil Government* CH I SECT 3 25d CH VII SECT 57 36d 37b CH IX 53c 54d CH XI 55b-58b CH XV SECT 171 65a b CH XIX SECT 219 75b-c

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38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I 2c 3d passim

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 353d 355b esp 354d 355a 359c-d / *Political Economy* 370b-d 375b-c / *Social Contract* BK II 399b-c

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 617a

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 114b-115a / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 259c 261d esp 259c-d 272a b 274a 277b / *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 373d / *Science of Right* 398c 399c 405c-409c 412c-414a

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1b Law in relation to reason or will

7 PLATO *Gorgias* 271 272b / *Republic* BK I 301c 302c / *Laws* BK 650a b BK III 669b-670c BK 679c-680d 681b-682 685d BK IX 754a b BK XII 792c-d

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK CH 9 [1180a14-24] 434d-435a / *Politics* BK I CH 2 [1253a31-3] 446d BK 6 485b-486c esp [1287a28-19-3] 485c-d BK CH 3 521 522a

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20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 90, 205b 206b 3 207a-c Q 97 1 226c 227c

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 86b-87a 96b PART 127b 131d 132b 133a 160b-c PART IV 72

35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH II SECT 6-8 26b-27 CH VI SECT 57-63 36d 38c CH XI 55b-58b passim CH XI SECT 51 59d-60a CH XIX, SECT 2 74a b

36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 266a b

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I 1a 3c

38 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 368d 371a / *Social Contract* BK II 395b-d 399b-400c BK III 419c-420a

42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 264b-d 273d 274a / *Practical Reason* 309d / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 390b 393a / *Science of Right* 435a 448b-d 450a b / *Judgement* 596c 598b

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46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO par 4 12d 13a / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 170c 171c PART IV 328a 364d-365a

50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 427a b

1c The authority and power needed for making law

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK X CH 9 [1180a14-24] 434d-435a / *Politics* BK III CH 16 48. b-486c BK VI CH 3 521c 522a

14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 32a-48d esp 34b-d 47 -c / *Numa Pompilius* 52b-c / *Solon* 64b d 77 c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 90 A 3 207a-c Q 92 A 2 REP 3 214d 215a,c Q 95 A 1 226c 227c

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38 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 369a / *Social Contract* BK II 399d-400a 400c-402a BK I 420a-421

42 KANT *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 393c / *Science of Right* 398b-c 399c 405d-406c 412c-414c 435c-436c 438b-c

43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE [43-47] 2a

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46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 94 36b PART II par 2 70d 71a / *Philosophy of History* PART I 207b-c

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE II 680d 684a

1d The promulgation of law the need and the manner of its declaration

OLD TESTAMENT *Deuteronomy* 27 -8 / *Joshua* 8 30-35—(D) *Josue* 8 30-35

NEW TESTAMENT *Romans* 14 15

(1 *The definition of law 1d The promulgation of law the need and the manner of its declaration.*)

5 Sophocles *Antigone* [450-460] 135a
5 Euripides *Iphigenia Among the Tauri* [1435-1499] 424a d
7 Plato *Laws* bk iv 684c 686b bk ix 745c 746a bk x 760c 761b
9 Aristotle *Ethics* bk iii ch 3 [1113 3-13] 359a / *Athenian Constitution* ch 7 par 1 555c
14 Plutarch *Lycurgus* 38c / *Numa Pompilius* 60d 61c / *Solon* 73d 74a
20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i ii q 90 a 4 207d 208b q 91 a 1 rep 2 208b d q 93 a 2 216c 217b a 5 rep 1 219a d q 106 a 1 321a 322a
23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part ii 132b 133d 137b 138b 143b c 157c d 160b
25 Montaigne *Essays* 47c d
30 Bacon *Advancement of Learning* 94d 95a
35 Locke *Toleration* 14b / *Civil Government* ch ii sect 9 27a b ch vi sect 57-60 36d 38a ch ix sect 124 53d 54a ch xi sect 136-137 56c 57b
38 Montesquieu *Spirit of Laws* bk xxix 266b 268c
38 Rousseau *Political Economy* 371a / *Social Contract* bk ii 401c 402a
40 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 616d 617a
41 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 73a 73d 74b passim
42 Kant *Science of Right* 435a b
44 Boswell *Johnson* 203d 204c
46 Hegel *Philosophy of Right* part iii par 210-211 69d 70c par 215 71c d par 217 72b c par 224 73d additions 1 115a d 141 139c

2 The major kinds of law comparison of human natural and divine law comparison of natural and positive innate and acquired private and public abstract and civil rights

5 Sophocles *Antigone* [441-525] 134d 135c [891-943] 138d 139a / *Ajax* [1047-1421] 152a 155a c
5 Euripides *Suppliants* [513-565] 262d 263b / *Bacchantes* [878-911] 347b c
7 Plato *Laws* bk iv 681b 683a
8 Aristotle *Sophistical Refutations* ch 12 [173ᵃ7-31] 238b c
9 Aristotle *Ethics* bk v ch 7 382c 383a / *Politics* bk i ch 6 448c-449b / *Rhetoric* bk i ch 10 [1368ᵇ7-10] 611d ch 13 [1373ᵇ1 17] 617c d
18 Augustine *Confessions* bk iii par 15 17a b par 17 17d 18a / *City of God* bk xix ch 17 522b 523a
20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i ii q 63 a 2 ans 64b 65a q 91 208b 213c q 97 a 3 rep 1 237b 238b q 100 a 1 251b 252a a 2 ans 252b-253a q 107 a 1 ans 325c 327b
21 Dante *Divine Comedy* paradise xxx [91-123] 152d 153a
23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part i 86c d part ii 131a-c 136d 137b 138c 151a-c part ii 245c 246a part iv 249a
25 Montaigne *Essays* 281a 283c 516c 517a 519a b
30 Bacon *Advancement of Learning* 100d
35 Locke *Civil Government* ch ii 25d 28c passim ch iv sect 21 29d ch vi sect 56-57 36d 37d ch ix 53c 54d passim / *Human Understanding* bk i ch ii sect 13 10 d 108c bk ii ch xxviii sect 6-13 229d 231
38 Montesquieu *Spirit of Laws* bk i 1a 3a bk xxiv 202b c bk xxvi 214b d 215a 218a 221c d
38 Rousseau *Social Contract* bk ii 399b-c
41 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 72a
42 Kant *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 392b / *Science of Right* 400b d-403b 429a-c 434b 436b
43 Mill *Utilitarianism* 467c d
46 Hegel *Philosophy of Right* intro par 3 10a 11b additions 1 115a d

3 The divine law

3*a* The eternal law in the divine government of the universe the law in the nature of all creatures

Old Testament *Psalms* 119 esp 119 91—(*D*) *Psalms* 118 esp 118 91 / *Proverbs* 8 15 30
18 Augustine *City of God* bk v ch 11 216c d bk xi ch 22 333d 334c bk xix ch 11 1 516d 520d
19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 21 a 1 rep 2 124b 125b a 2 125c d part i ii q 19 a 4 705b c a 6 ans and rep 2 707a 708a
20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i ii q 91 a 1 208b d a 2 ans and rep 3 208d 209d q 93 215b d 220d
21 Dante *Divine Comedy* paradise i [94 142] 107b d xxx [97 123] 152d 153a
23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part ii 159d 160b
30 Bacon *Advancement of Learning* 71a b
31 Descartes *Discourse* part v 55a b
35 Berkeley *Human Knowledge* sect 30-32 418c 419a passim
38 Montesquieu *Spirit of Laws* bk i 1a 2b
49 Darwin *Origin of Species* 243b d

3*a*(1) The natural moral law as the eternal law in human nature

Old Testament *Psalms* 37 30-31—(*D*) *Psalms* 36 30-31
New Testament *Romans* 2 11 16
5 Sophocles *Antigone* [450-460] 135a
18 Augustine *Confessions* bk ii par 9 10d bk iii par 13 15 16c 17b
19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i-ii q 19 a 4 705b c

20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I-II Q 91 A 2 208d 209d Q 93, A 2 216c 217b A 6 219d 220d
23 HOBBES Leviathan, PART I 96b PART II 134c 136d 137a 160b-c PART III 171a-c 216c 21 a
30 BACON Advancement of Learning 100d
35 LOCKE Human Understanding BK I CH II, SECT 5-6 10oa-c passim BK II, CH XX III SECT ,-8 229d 230a
38 MONTESQUIEU Spirit of Laws BK I 2b-d
38 ROUSSEAU Inequality 330d 331d / Social Contract BK IV 437
38 ROUSSEAU Social Contract BK II 402a BK 1 435c
40 GIBBON Decline and Fall 181b-c
41 GIBBON Decline and Fall 252c

3a(2) The distinction between the eternal law and the positive commandments of God

NEW TESTAMENT Romans 2 1 6
20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I-II Q 91 4 A and REP 210c 211c
23 HOBBES Leviathan PART II 136d 138b 160b-c PART III 171 -c 199b 216c 217a
30 BACON Advancement of Learning 71a b 100d

3b The divine positive law: the difference between the law revealed in the Old and the New Testament

OLD TESTAMENT Genesis 9 8-17 7-4 14 62 5 / Exodus 19 3-6 20 / Deuteronomy 5 1 28-19 27 1-8 31:26 / Joshua 8:30-35—(D) Josue 8 30-35 / Psalms 1 40 8 119 passim, esp 1 9 1 16 1 9 33 4 119:129-136—(D) Psalms 1 39 9 77 1 8 passim, esp 118 16 118:33 4 1 8 29- 36 / Proverbs 3 1 2 6:20-23 / Jeremiah, 31 33—(D) Jeremias 3 33
APOCRYPHA Ecclesiasticus 2 16 1 11 19:17-2 32 5 33:2 3 39 1 11—(D) OT Ecclesiasticus 9 17 9 19 7 18 32 19 33:2 3 38:39-39 15
NEW TESTAMENT Matthew 5 17 44 esp 5 17-20 22 36-40 / Luke 6 6-17 / John 1 7 19-23 / Acts 1 48 13:38-39 2 29 21 9 8 esp 21:20-25 / Romans passim / I Corinthians 9 19-21 1 23 33 / Galatians passim, esp 1-5 2 / Ephesians 2 14 15 / Colossians 2 3 23 / I Timothy 1 5 11 / Hebrews esp 0 / James 1:25 2 8-2
18 AUGUSTINE City of God, BK X CH 17 309c 3 0b CH 25 313c 314c BK XVII CH 11 47c-d BK XX CH 4 537b-c
20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I-II Q 91 AA 4-5 210c 212c QQ 98-108 239b-337d PART II II, Q 16 454c-456d Q 22 480d-482c Q 44 591d 595
23 HOBBES Leviathan PART II 137b-138b 160b-c PART III 171a 172a 177 180a 199b-207b 215b-219d 240c 241a PART IV 257c 258a
32 MILTON Paradise Lost BK XII [101 314] 321b-329a [47 4 9] 328a
33 PASCAL Provincial Letters 79b / Pensées 520 253b-264a 522 264 6 0 285a-286a 6 2 296a
35 LOCKE Toleration, 14b-c

3b(1) Law in the Old Testament: the moral, the judicial, and the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law

OLD TESTAMENT Genesis 9:3 7 17:9-14 62-5 / Exodus 12 13 0-31 34-35 40 / Leviticus / Numbers passim, esp 15 1-19, 27 30 35 36 / Deuteronomy esp 4 27 / Joshua 1 7-8 8 30-35 2 1-6—(D) Josue 1-8 8:30-35 2 1-6 / I Samuel 13:9-14—(D) I Kings 13:9-14 / II Kings 1 8—(D) IV Kings 21 8 / I Chronicles 22 1 13—(D) I Paralipomenon, 22 12 13 / II Chronicles 34 35 esp 35:1 19—(D) II Paralipomenon 34-35 esp 35:1 19 / Ezra 9-10—(D) I Esdras 9-10 / Nehemiah 1 5-9 9 16-38—(D) II Esdras 1 5-9 9 16-38 / Psalms 8 89 30-3 94 / 105 43-45 119 passim—(D) Psalms 88:31 33 93:12 104:43 45 118 passim / Proverbs 3 1 2 4 1 2 6:20-23 / Isaiah 1:10-17 5:24 5 42:21 5 51-8—(D) Isaias 1 10-17 5 24 25 42:21-25 51-8 / Jeremiah 6 19 9 13 6 16 10-13 26 4-6 31:33 44 10-14,23—(D) Jeremias 6:19 9:13-16 16 10-13 6 4-6 31 33 44:10-14,23 / Ezekiel 5:6-9 11 18- 0 18 22:26 36:25 43 48—(D) Ezechiel, 5:6-9 11 18- 0 18 22:26 36:25 2 43 48 / Daniel, 9:1 15 / Hosea 4:6 8—(D) Osee 4:6 8 / Micah 6:6-8—(D) Micheas 6:6-8 / Zechariah, 3 1-7—(D) Sophonias 3 1 7 / Zechariah, 7 12 14—(D) Zacharias 12 14 / Malachi, 2 1 10 3—(D) Malachias 2 1 10 3
APOCRYPHA Ecclesiasticus 2 16 10 19 11 15 17:11 19 20 24 1 23 esp 24:23 3 15 33:2 3 39 1 11 45:5—(D) OT Ecclesiasticus 2 9 10:23 11 15 17:9 19 17 18 24 1-33 esp 24:32 33 3 19 33:2 3 38:39-39 15 45:5 6 / I Maccabees 1:38-63 2:19-68—(D) OT I Machabees 1:40-66 2 19-68 / II Maccabees 6- 5 1-9—(D) OT II Machabees 6- 5 7
18 AUGUSTINE City of God BK X CH 17 309c 310b CH 5 313c-314c BK XX, CH 4 531b-c
20 AQUINAS Summa Theologica PART I-II, Q 91 A 5 211c 212c A 6, A 5 and REP 1 212c 213c QQ 98-1 5 239b-321 Q 106 A 3 ANS 323a 324a A 4 ANS and REP 1 3 324a 325c Q 107 325c 330d passim Q 108 A 1 ANS and REP 3 331a 332b A 2 332b-333d A 3 REP 1 3 334 336b PART II-II Q 16 454c-456d Q 22 480d 482
23 HOBBES Leviathan PART II 137b-c 154b-155c 160b-c PART III 177 188a 199b-204a 212d 213a 216c 218a 223a-c 226b-d 231b PART IV 268b-c 269a
30 BACON Advancement of Learning 18b-c
32 MILTON Paradise Lost BK XII [-23 3-1] 324a 327a esp [223 23] 324a, [8 309] 32 b-326a

(3b *The divine positive law: the difference between the law revealed in the Old and the New Testament.* 3b(1) *Law in the Old Testament: the moral, the judicial, and the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law.*)

33 PASCAL *Pensées*, 619-620 284b-286a
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 180b-182c passim, 208a-c
43 MILL *Utilitarianism*, 467c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History*, PART I, 246c-247a

3b(2) Law in the New Testament: the law of love and grace; ceremonial precepts of the New Law

NEW TESTAMENT: *Matthew*, 5-7 esp 5:17-20; 16:18-19; 18:18; 22:34-40; 28:19 / *Mark*, 12:28-34 / *Luke*, 6:20-49; 10:25-37; 16:16-17; 22:15-20 / *John*, 3:1-8; 6 esp 6:47-58; 13:31-17:26; 20:21-23—(D) *John*, 3:1-8; 6 esp 6:47-59; 13:31-17:26; 20:21-23 / *Acts*, 2:37-42; 8:14-17; 26:40; 10:34-48; 13:2-4; 38-39; 15:2-29; 19:1-7; 21:20-25 / *Romans* esp 3-13 / *I Corinthians*, 11:23-34; 13 / *Galatians* esp 3-6 / *Colossians* / *I Timothy*, 4:14 / *Hebrews*, 7-10 / *James*, 5:14-15 / *I Peter*, 4:8-11 / *I John* / *II John*
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God*, BK X, CH 5 313c-314c; BK XX, CH 4 532b-c / *Christian Doctrine*, BK I, CH 22-30 629b-633b; CH 35 634c-d; BK III, CH 10 661c-662a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I-II, Q 91, A 5 211c-212c; Q 98, A 4, ANS 242b-243c; Q 101, A 2, ANS 267a-268a; A 4, REP 2 269a-270b; Q 102, A 1, REP 1 270c-271b; A 4, REP 2-4 276d-283c; A 5, REP 3 283c-292c; Q 103, A 3, ANS 300d-302a; QQ 106-108 321a-337d; PART II-II, Q 16, A 1, REP 2 454c-455c
22 CHAUCER *Parson's Tale*, par 31 517b-518b; par 68 533b-534a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan*, PART III, 180c-d; 206c-207a; 218a-219d; 240d; PART IV, 257c-258a
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning*, 81a; 100d
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost*, BK XII [285-314] 325b-326a; [576-605] 331b-332a
33 PASCAL *Pensées*, 672 296a
42 KANT *Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals*, 259a / *Practical Reason*, 327c-d
43 MILL *Liberty*, 286b-287a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace*, BK XI, 525c-526b
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov*, BK V, 121d-137c esp 121d-122b, 126c-127b; BK VI, 150a-c; 166c-170a

4. The natural law

4a. The law of reason or the moral law: the order and habit of its principles

12 AURELIUS *Meditations*, BK III, SECT 11 262a-b; BK IV, SECT 4 264a; BK VII, SECT 55 283b-c; BK XI, SECT 1 302a-b
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions*, BK II, par 9 10d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I, Q 79, A 12 425c-426b
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I-II, Q 58, AA 4-5 44a-45c; Q 63, A 1 63a-64a; Q 90, A 1 205b-206b; Q 91, A 2 208d-209d; A 5, REP 3 211c-212c; A 6 212c-213c; Q 94 220d-226b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan*, PART I, 86b-87a; 91a-96b esp 96b; PART II, 132c-d; 133b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays*, 23b-c; 184a-b; 520c-d
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning*, 96a-c
31 SPINOZA *Ethics*, PART IV, PROP 18, SCHOL 429a-d; PROP 31-35 432a-434a; PROP 37, SCHOL 2 435b-436a
35 LOCKE *Civil Government*, CH II 25d-28c esp SECT 6-11 26b-27d; CH VI, SECT 56-63 36d-38c; CH IX, SECT 124 53d-54a / *Human Understanding* 90d; BK I, CH II, SECT 5-6 105a-c passim; SECT 13 108b-c
38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract*, BK II, 399b
42 KANT *Pure Reason*, 235a-b; 236d-237a / *Fund. Prin. Metaphysic of Morals*, 253d-254d; 259c-261d; 264b-265a; 268d [fn 2]; 271c-d; 282b-287b / *Practical Reason*, 306d-310b; 314d-321b; 360d-361d / *Intro. Metaphysic of Morals*, 386b-387a,c; 388b-c; 390b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right*, PART II, par 140 52a-53a; PART III, par 213 71a; ADDITIONS, 1 115a-d / *Philosophy of History*, INTRO, 170d-171a

4b. The law of men living in a state of nature

7 PLATO *Republic*, BK II, 311b-312d
23 HOBBES *Leviathan*, PART I, 84c-87b; PART II, 99a-b
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning*, 20c-d
35 LOCKE *Civil Government*, CH II-III 25d-29d; CH IX 53c-54d
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws*, BK I, 2b-d
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality*, 330a-331b; 333b-d; 342c-348a esp 343b-345c / *Social Contract*, BK I, 389d-390a
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 237c
42 KANT *Pure Reason*, 222b-c / *Science of Right*, 402c; 433c-436c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right*, PART I, par 93 36a-b / *Philosophy of History*, INTRO, 171c-172b

4c. The *a priori* principles of innate or abstract right: universal law in the order of freedom; the objectification of the will

42 KANT *Pure Reason*, 110c; 114b-115a / *Intro. Metaphysic of Morals*, 390b-392b / *Science of Right*, 400b-d; 404a; 412c-414c; 416b-417b; 429a-c; 435a-436b
43 MILL *Utilitarianism*, 446a-d; 458d-459d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right*, INTRO, par 4-30 12d-19c esp par 4 12d-13a; par 15 16a-b; par 22 17c-d; par 27-30 18d-19c; par 33 20b-d; PART I 21a-39d esp par 36 21b-c; par 94 36b; PART II, par 106-114 40a-42b; par 133 47a; par 135

41b-d ART I I par 142 134 55a 57d esp par 149 56b par 2 9 69d ADDITIO S 1 115a-d 46 123d 124a 84 129b 86 129c 94 132b 131 137d / Ph oso hy of History INTRO 170c 171c P RT IV 362b-d 364c-d

4d The natural law as underlying the precepts of virtue its relat on to the moral pre cepts of d v e law

OLD TESTAME T E odus 20 1 17 / Deuteron omy 5 6-21 / Jeremiah 31 33—(D) Jeremias 3 33

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18 AU STI Confessions BK II par 9 10d BK I par 13 15 16c 17b par 17 17d 18a

19 AQ I Summa Theologica P RT I II Q 19 A 4 705b-c A 6 ANS and REP 2 707 708a

20 AQUIN S Summa Theologica PA T Q 51 A I A S 12b-13c Q 91 A 4 ANS and REP 1 210c 211 Q 94 A 3 223a-c A 5 224d 225d Q 98 AA 5-6 243c 245b Q 99 2 246b-247a A 4 R P 2 248a-d A 5 ANS 249 250 Q 100 251a 265d A T I I Q 61 A 3 REP 856c 857

23 H BB S Leviath n PART I 91a 96b esp 95d 96b P T 1 131a b 136d 137a PART III 216c 217a 240d 241a

30 B ON Adva cement of Learni g 96a-c 100d

31 S OZA Eth s P RT I PRO 18 CHOL 429 -d

35 LOCKE Civil Go ernment CH II ECT 4-6 25d 26c / Hum Understa ding BK I H II ECT 5-6 105a-c passim

38 MONTESQUIEU Spirit f Laws BK I 1 d

38 ROUS U I equality 343b-345c 366c d

42 KA T F nd Prin Metaphysic of Morals 275b / P actic l Rea n 317b-318c 327c-d

46 HE E Philosophy of History P T I 361 -d

52 DO KY Brothers Ka amazov K II 33c 34b

4e Th relation of natural law to natural rights and n tural just ce

5 SOPHOC E A t gone [441-5 5] 134d 135c

9 A I TOTL Politics BK I CH 2 447d-448c / Rhet ric K I, CH 3 [373b1 1] 617c d

12 AU LI M ditat S BK IV SECT 4 264 BK VI T 55 283b-c

18 AU U TI E City f God BK XIX CH 21 524a 525a

19 AQ I Summa Theologica T I Q 96 A 510b-511b 4 512d 513c

20 AQU S mma Theologica P RT Q 9 A 2 208d 209d Q 94 2 221d 223a Q 9 2 227c 228c 4 229b 230c

23 H Levia han P 86c d RT II 131a-c 138c

27 S E Troil a d Cr da CT I C II [63 88] 115b-c

30 B CON Advancement f Learning 94d 95b

31 SPI OZA Ethic OP 37 SCHO 2 435b-436a P O X 1 447d

32 MILTON Samson Agon stes [8 8-902] 359a

35 LOCKE Civil Government CH II IX 25d 54d passim CH XI SECT 135 137 55d 57b CH XV S CT 1,1 –2 65 -c

37 FIELDING Tom Jones 53b d

38 ROUSSE U Inequal y 330a 331b

39 SMITH Wealth f Nations K I 61b BK II 140b

41 GIB ON Decline and Fall, 86d 87a

42 KAN Int o Metaphysic of Morals 392b / Science of Right 397a b 421c-422d 429a-c 430a-432c 434a 435a-457b esp 436c 437c d 447b-450b 451c d

43 DECLARATION OF INDEP DENC [1 8] 1a b

43 MILL Liberty 272d 273b

46 H G L Philosophy of History INTRO 171c 172b

4f The relation of natural law to civil or munic ipal law the state of nature and the reg ulations of the ci il state

5 SOPHOCLES Antigone [450-460] 135a

9 ARI TOTLE Ethics BK V CH 7 [1134b18 1 35 4] 382c-d / Rhetoric BK I CH 13 [1373b1 18] 617c-d CH 15 [1375a26-b8] 619d-620a [376a33 b31] 621a-c

18 AUGUSTINE Co fess ons BK III par 15 17 b par 17 17d 18a / City of God K I, CH 21 142d 143 K X X CH 12 517b-519a CH 21 524 525 H 24 528b-c

20 AQ INAS S mma Theologic PART I II Q 91 A 3 209d 210c Q 94 AA 4-6 223d 226b pass m Q 95 A 2 227c 228c A 4 ANS 229b-230c Q 99 A 3 R P 2 247a 248a

23 HOB ES Leviathan PART I 84c 87b 91 96b passim P RT II 99 b 103a 115b-c 124d 125a 131a-c 132c d 134b-135b 138c 142a-c 156b-c RT IV 273c d

24 R BELA S Gargantua and P ntagruel BK I 87a

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31 S INOZ Ethics P RT IV PROP 37 SCHOL 2 435b-436a

32 M LTO S mson Ago iste [888–902] 359a

35 LOCK Ci il Government CH II ECT 7 13 26c 28b CH VII SECT 89 44d CH IX 53c 54d CH XI 55b-58b CI X I SECT 149 59b-d CH X SECT 159 62b-c SECT 168 64b-c CH X SECT 171 65 b

38 MONTESQUIEU Spirit of Laws BK I 1c-d BK VIII 52a BK XVI 119d BK XXVI 215b-218a 219d 221c

38 ROUSSEAU Ineq lity 333b-c 353d 355b 361 362a / P litical Economy 369a b 3 0d / S cial Contract BK I 393b-394d K I 397 399b-c 40 d-406a

39 SMITH We lth f N tions BK I 52b-c 61b K I 228a K 39 -c

41 GI BO D l ne and F ll 82b 86d 89b esp 86d 81d

(3b *The divine positive law the difference between the law revealed in the Old and the New Testament* 3b(1) *Law in the Old Testament the moral the judicial and the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law*)

33 PASCAL *Pensees* 619-620 284b 286a
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 180b 182c passim 208a-c
43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 467c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 246c 247a

3b(2) Law in the New Testament the law of love and grace ceremonial precepts of the New Law

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 5-7 esp 5 17-20 16 18 19 18 18 22 34-40 28 19 / *Mark* 12 28 34 / *Luke* 6 20-49 10 25-37 16 16-17 22 15 20 / *John* 3 1-8 6 esp 6 47-58 13 31-17 26 20 21 23—(D) *John* 3 1-8 6 esp 6 47-59 13 31 17 26 20 1-23 / *Acts* 2 37-42 8 14 17 26-40 10 34-48 13 . 4 38-39 15 22-29 19 1 7 21 20-25 / *Romans* esp 3-13 / *I Corinthians* 11 23-34 13 / *Galatians* esp 3-6 / *Colossians* / *I Timothy* 4 14 / *Hebrews* 7 10 / *James* 5 14-15 / *I Peter* 4 8-11 / *I John* / *II John*
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK X CH 25 313c 314c BK XX CH 4 532b c / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 22-30 629b 633b CH 35 634c d BK III CH 10 661c 662a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 91 A 5 211c 212c Q 98 A 4 ANS 242b 243c Q 101 A 2 ANS 267a 268a A 4 REP 2 269a 270b Q 102 A I REP I 270c 271b A 4 REP 2-4 276d 283c A 5 REP 3 283c 292c Q 103 A 3 ANS 300d 302a QQ 106-108 321a 337d PART II-II Q 16 A I REP 2 454c-455c
22 CHAUCER *Parson's Tale* par 31 517b 518b par 68 533b 534a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART III 180c d 206c 207a 218a 219d 240d PART IV 257c 258a
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 81a 100d
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK XII [285-314] 325b 326a [576-605] 331b 332a
33 PASCAL *Pensees* 672 296a
42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 259a / *Practical Reason* 327c d
43 MILL *Liberty* 286b 287a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XI 525c 526b
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK V 121d 137c esp 121d 122b 126c 127b BK VI 150a c 166c 170a

4 The natural law

4a The law of reason or the moral law the order and habit of its principles

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK III SECT II 262a b BK IV SECT 4 264a BK VII SECT 55 283b-c BK XI SECT I 302a b
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par 9 10d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 79 A 12 425c 426b
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 58 AA 4-5 44a-45c Q 63 A I 63a 64a Q 90 A I 205b 206b Q 91 A 2 208d 209d A 5 REP 3 211c 212c A 6 212c 213c Q 94 220d 226b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 86b 87a 91a 96b esp 96b PART II 132c d 133b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 23b-c 184a b 520c d
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 96a c
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 18 SCHOL 429a d PROP 31-35 432a-434a PROP 37 SCHOL 2 435b 436a
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH II 25d 28c esp SECT 6 II 26b 27d CH VI SECT 56-63 36d 38c CH IX SECT I 4 53d 54a / *Human Understanding* 90d BK I CH II SECT 5-6 105a-c passim SECT 13 108b c
38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK II 399b
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 235a b 236d 237a / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 253d 254d 259c 261d 264b 265a 268d [fn 2] 271c d 282b 287b / *Practical Reason* 306d 310b 314d 321b 360d 361d / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 386b 387a c 388b c 390b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART II par 140 52a 53a PART III par 213 71a ADDITIONS I 115a d / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 170d 171a

4b The law of men living in a state of nature

7 PLATO *Republic* BK II 311b 312d
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 84c 87b PART II 99a b
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 20c d
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH II III 25d 29d CH IX 53c 54d
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I 2b d
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 330a 331b 333b d 342c 348a esp 343b 345c / *Social Contract* BK I 389d 390a
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 237c
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 222b c / *Science of Right* 402c 433c-436c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 93 36a b / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 171c 172b

4c The *a priori* principles of innate or abstract right universal law in the order of freedom the objectification of the will

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 110c 114b 115a / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 390b 392b / *Science of Right* 400b d 402a 412c-414c 416b 417b 429a c 435a-436b
43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 446a d 458d 459d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO par 4 30 12d 19c esp par 4 I d 13a par 15 16a b par 22 17c d par 27-30 18d 19c par 33 20b d PART I 21a 39d esp par 36 21b-c par 94 36b PART II par 106-114 40a 42b par 133 47a par 135

(4 *The natural law* 4f *The relation of natural law to civil or municipal law: the state of nature and the regulations of the civil state*)

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 222b-c / *Science of Right* 397a-b 402c 405d-406c 426b-429a 430a 432c 433c-434d 435c-436b
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 43 143b-c
43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 470d-471b
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 120b-c 275d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 214 71a-c par 217 72b-c ADDITIONS 1 115a-d / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 186a-c PART I 207b-c 208b-d PART IV 361c-d

4g The relation of natural law to the law of nations and to international law: sovereign states and the state of nature

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK IV SECT 4 264a
14 PLUTARCH *Camillus* 108b-109a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 94 A 4 223d-224d Q 95 A 2 ANS 227c-228c A 4 229b-230c
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 86a PART II 114b-c 159c
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 13a-b
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH II SECT 9 27a-b SECT 14 28b-c CH III SECT 19 29b-c CH XII SECT 145-146 58d-59a
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I 2d-3b BK X 61b-d-63d BK XXIV 201b-c BK XXVI 223c-224a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 355b-c / *Political Economy* 369a-b / *Social Contract* BK I 389d-390d
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 604c [n 107]
42 KANT *Science of Right* 435a-b 452a-455c esp 452a-d 456b-457a
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 64 197d-198a NUMBER 75 223b-c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 338 110a-b / *Philosophy of History* PART IV 361c-d

4h The precepts of the natural law and the condition of the state of nature with respect to slavery and property

9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK I CH 5-6 447d-449b
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 13 120b-c
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIX CH 15 521a-c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 92 A 1 REP 2 488d-489d Q 96 A 4 512d-513c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 94 A 5 REP 3 224d-225d
22 CHAUCER *Parson's Tale* par 65-67 531a-532a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 85d-86b 91a-b 94b-c PART II 103a 124d-125c
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH IV-V 29d-36a CH VII SECT 85 43c-d SECT 87 44a-b CH IX 53c-54d passim CH XI SECT 138-140 57b-58a CH XV SECT 171-173 65a-c CH XVI SECT 183 67d-68b
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XV 109b-110a 110d-111b BK XXVI 216a-217b
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 333b-d 348b-d 353a-353d 355b 356c-357a 357c-358b / *Political Economy* 368a / *Social Contract* BK I 388a-c 389a-390d 393c-394d
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 52b-c BK IV 228a BK V 309a-311c
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 86d-87b
42 KANT *Science of Right* 401b-402a 413d-414a 421c-422d 445c-446a 454a-455a
43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE [7-10] 1a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 49 24c-25a
50 MARX-ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 427b

5 The human or positive law: the sanction of coercive force

7 PLATO *Crito* 213a-219a-c esp 216d-219a-c / *Republic* BK IV 344a-345d / *Statesman* 599c-604b / *Laws* BK IV 684b-686c
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK X CH 9 [1179^b35-1180^b28] 434a-435c / *Politics* BK III CH 15 [1286^b28-41] 485b / *Athenian Constitution* CH 12 par 4 557d-558a
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIX CH 17 522d-523a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 90 A 1 205b-206b A 3 REP 2 207a-c QQ 95-97 226b-239b
23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* CH XII 18a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 103a 113c 130b-138d
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 362b
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 94d-95b
35 LOCKE *Toleration* 3a 3c-4a / *Civil Government* CH IX 53c-54d passim CH XIX SECT 219 75b-c / *Human Understanding* BK I CH II SECT 5 105a-b BK II CH XXVIII SECT 6 229d SECT 9-13 230b-231c esp SECT 9 230b
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I 3c
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 345d / *Political Economy* 371a-c / *Social Contract* BK II 399b-400c BK IV 426b-d
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 71b-d 96d
42 KANT *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 392b / *Science of Right* 439a-b
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 15 65a-d NUMBER 16 66c-68d passim esp 67d-68a NUMBER 21 78b-d NUMBER 28 96c NUMBER 33 108d
43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 467d-468c passim
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 211 228 70a 75b ADDITIONS 131 137d / *Philosophy of History* PART III 290a-b PART IV 364d-365a

5a The difference between laws and decrees

7 PLATO *Laws* BK IX 745c-746a
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK IV CH 4 [1292^a4-37] 491b-d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 96 A 1 REP 1 230c-231c

15 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK X CH 16 411a-d BK XIX CH 17 522d 523a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theol* gica ART I II Q 95 A 2, REP 3 227c 228c Q 96 A 2 ANS 231c-232b Q 97 AA 2 3 236d 238b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 78b-c PART II 108c 130d 131 131 136d
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 46b-48b 131b-132a 281 283c 462d-463b
27 SHAKESPEARE *Measure for Measure* ACT II SC I [4] 178d 179a / *King Lear* ACT I SC II [2] 247d 248a
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 294 225b-226b 312 229 325 326 230b-231a
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH XIII SECT 157-158 61-62b
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK I 3c-d BK X 65b BK XIV 106b BK XIX 135a 146a c BK XXI 168d 169a BK XXIII 197c 198a BK XXVIII 237a-d 240b 261a 262a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 324d / *Social Contract* BK II 406c-d BK III 419d-420a
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 616d-617
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 71d 73a passim b-d 77c-d 79d-80d passim 96b-c
43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE [2] 1b
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 27 95c-d NUMBER 49 159d 160a
43 MILL *Liberty* 269c 271b 307b-d / *Representative Government* 329d 330a 330d 331a
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 204c 205b 276a b 277b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART II par par 4 92a par 339 110b par 35 112d 113a ADDITION 137d 138b / *Philosophy of History* PART I 271d 272d PART III, 294c-d
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 292a 297
50 MARX *Capital* 235a 236c

5f The application of positive law to cases: the casuistry of the judicial process the conduct of a trial the administration of justice

OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 18:20-22 23 1 3 6-9 *Numbers* 5 3 / *Deuteronomy* 1:16-1 16 8-9 13 19 15 20 / *I Kings* 3:16-3—(D) *III Kings* 3 6- 8 / *Daniel* 13
NEW TESTAMENT *Acts* 6
5 AESCHYLUS *Eumenides* 81a 91d esp [39 -8] 85c-89c
5 EURIPIDES *Hecuba* [9- 5] 362 363c
5 ARISTOPHANES *Birds* 50 a 525d
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK 32b-c BK II 95d 96b 135c-d BK V 164c BK 211d 212a
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK I 381d 382d BK III, 429c-434c BK VI 523b-c 524d 25d
7 PLATO *Apology* 200a 212a,c / *Republic* BK I 337b 3-8a *Theaetetus* 544a-c / *Statesman* 599c-603a / *Laws* BK VI 704c 705c BK VIII, 40c-d BK 744b-c 754a d BK XI 782a b 783c 784b BK XII 792a 793a

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK CH 4 3 9b-380b esp [1132a 9-b15] 379d 380b BK VI CH 8 [1141b23-33] 390d-391a / *Politics* BK II CH 8 [1 68b5-3] 464c BK III CH 11 [1282b1-6] 480b-c CH 15 [1 86a10-3] 484b-c CH 16 [1287a24 28] 485d [1287b15 5] 486a b BK IV CH 16 501c 502a,c / *Athenian Constitution*, CH 45 573d 574a / *Rhetoric* BK I CH I [1354 13 1355a3] 593b-594a CH 15 619d-622d
14 PLUTARCH *Solon*, 70d 71b / *Alcibiades* 162d 165b / *Coriolanus* 179c 18 c / *Aristides* 264b-c / *Agesilaus*, 494a-c / *Pompey* 526a-d / *Agesilaus Pompey* 539a
15 TACITUS *Annals*, BK III 46d-49b 61c-6 a BK XIV 151c / *Histories*, BK II, 216d 217a
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIX CH 6 514b-515a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theol* gica PART I-II Q 95 1 REP 2 3 226c 227c Q 105 A 2 A S and REP 7-8 309d 316a ART II SUPPL, Q 8 A 1 ANS 997b-998c
22 CHAUCER *Tale of Melibeus* PAR 403b-404
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 78b-c PART II 123b-d 134b-136b PART III 234d PART IV 275a
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, BK II 83c 97 BK III 204c 215c
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 47c-48a 283a 516c 520b passim
26 SHAKESPEARE *Merchant of Venice* ACT I SC I 425c-430b
27 SHAKESPEARE *Measure for Measure* 174 204d esp ACT II SC I-II 1 8d 184a / *King Lear* ACT III C VI 266c 267d / *Coriolanus* ACT II SC III 375b-377a / *Henry VIII* ACT II SC I [51 136] 558c 559c
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 332d 333b 340d 343a 353b-356d 361a-d
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 94d 9 b
33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 27a-62a 90a 99a 102b-11 b
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VII SECT 90-94 44d-46c CH IX SECT 5 54a
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART II 73b-7a ART I 152b-154a
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 260a b 266a b
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 8c 10c 28c
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK VI 33a 37d 42c-d BK XXIX 62a b
38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK IV 433a b
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK V 311 315a c
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 244d 245b 251b-d 343b-c 618a-d
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 77b 78b 93b-c 94c 95c 403c-404b 4o8c-d 459b
4 KANT *Pure Reason* 60a-c / *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 372b-d
43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE [52-5] 2 [70-] 2b
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S ARTICLE III 15c 16a AMENDMENTS V VIII 17b-d XI 18a XIV SECT 1 18d

(5 *The human or positive law: the sanction of coercive force. 5d The origins of positive law in the legislative process: the function of the legislator.*)

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I-II, Q 90, A 4 207d-208b; Q 95, A 1 226c-227c; A 4, ANS 229b-230c
23 HOBBES *Leviathan*, PART II, 103a; 123b-d; 130d-131a; 131d-132a; 133d-134a; 151c-152a; PART IV, 273d
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote*, PART II, 363d-364a
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning*, 94d-95a
31 DESCARTES *Discourse*, PART II, 44d-45a
35 LOCKE *Toleration*, 11b; 16a-c / *Civil Government*, CH VII, SECT 88-89 44c-d; CH IX, SECT 127-CH X, SECT 132 54a-55b; CH XI, SECT 134 55b-d; CH XI, SECT 141-CH XII, SECT 143 58a-d; CH XIII, SECT 150 59d; CH XIX, SECT 212-217 74a-75a
36 SWIFT *Gulliver*, PART II, 73a-74b
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws*, BK II, 6b; BK VI, 33a-35c; BK XI, 69d-71a; 72b passim; BK XXIX, 262a-269a,c
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality*, 324c-d / *Political Economy*, 368c-369a / *Social Contract*, BK II, 399b-402a; BK III, 419c-423a
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 27d-28a; 154a-b; 616d-617a; 624b-c
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 71d-75b esp 72a-73b,c; 79d-80b; 93b-c; 108a-c
42 KANT *Intro. Metaphysic of Morals*, 393c / *Science of Right*, 397a-b; 436b-c; 438b-c; 451d-452a
43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: [29-47] 1b-2a; [62-64] [78-79] 2b
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: ARTICLE I, SECT 1-9 11a-14a
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 33, 107b-108c; NUMBER 38, 121b-124a; NUMBER 40, 130c-132a; NUMBER 44, 145c-146d; NUMBER 53, 168b-169b
43 MILL *Representative Government*, 356b-362c
44 BOSWELL *Johnson*, 255d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right*, PART III, par 298 99c / *Philosophy of History*, PART II, 271d-273a; PART III, 290a-b; PART IV, 364d-365d

5e. The mutability or variability of positive law: the maintenance or change of laws

OLD TESTAMENT: *Esther*, 1:19 / *Daniel*, 6 esp 6:8, 6:15
6 HERODOTUS *History*, BK I, 6c; BK III, 108c
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War*, BK III, 425a-c; 438a-b
7 PLATO *Republic*, BK IV, 344b-345d; BK VIII, 403a-404a / *Statesman*, 598b-604b / *Laws*, BK IV, 679c-680d; BK VI, 705d-706c; 707a-b; BK VII, 717d-718c; BK VIII, 740c-d
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics*, BK V, CH 7 [1134^{b}18-1135^{a}4] 382c-d / *Politics*, BK II, CH 8 [1268^{b}23-1269^{a}28] 464d-465b; BK V, CH 9 [1310^{a}12-19] 512b-c / *Rhetoric*, BK I, CH 15 [1375^{a}25-^{b}25] 619d-620b
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus*, 38c; 47a-48a / *Lycurgus-Numa*, 63d-64a,c / *Solon*, 69c-d / *Agesilaus-Pompey*, 539a
15 TACITUS *Annals*, BK I, 21b-c; BK III, 51a-52a; 57d-58b; BK XI, 106d; BK XIV, 151d-152c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I-II, Q 97 235d-239b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan*, PART I, 78b-c; PART II, 116a-b; 157c-d
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays*, 47a-51a; 131b-132a; 281a-c; 318c-319b; 462c-465c; 504c-506a; 516c-517a
35 LOCKE *Civil Government*, CH XIII, SECT 157-158 61c-62b; CH XIX, SECT 223 76c-d
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws*, BK XI, 77d; BK XIV, 102b-104c; BK XVIII, 126d; BK XIX, 135d-136a; BK XXIX, 268d
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality*, 324d / *Social Contract*, BK II, 405d-406b; BK III, 419c-420a
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations*, BK III, 166a
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 78b-81c passim, esp 80d-81b; 96b-c
42 KANT *Science of Right*, 441b-c; 450d-452a
43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: [76-77] 2b
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.: ARTICLE V 16c
43 FEDERALIST: NUMBER 37, 118d-119b; NUMBER 39, 127d-128b; NUMBER 40, 128b-132a; NUMBER 43, 143a-b; NUMBER 49-50, 159b-162c; NUMBER 53, 167d-168b; NUMBER 62, 190d-191c; NUMBER 64, 197a-c; NUMBER 73, 220a-b; NUMBER 81, 239a-b; NUMBER 85, 257a-259a
43 MILL *Representative Government*, 359a-d; 360c
44 BOSWELL *Johnson*, 203d-205a; 205d; 276a-277b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right*, INTRO, par 3 11c-d; PART III, par 216 71d-72a; ADDITIONS, 176 147c-d
47 GOETHE *Faust*, PART I [1972-1979] 46b-47a
50 MARX-ENGELS *Communist Manifesto*, 427a-b
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace*, BK VI, 238c-243d; BK VIII, 308d

5f. The relation of positive law to custom

5 EURIPIDES *Bacchantes* [877-911] 347b-c / *Hecuba* [798-805] 359d
6 HERODOTUS *History*, BK III, 97d-98a
7 PLATO *Symposium*, 154a-c / *Republic*, BK IV, 344b-d; BK VII, 401c-d / *Statesman*, 600a-b / *Laws*, BK III, 666b-c; BK IV, 678d-679a; BK VII, 713c-716b; 718b-c; 730d-731b; BK VIII, 736c-737a
8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics*, BK II, CH 3 [995^{a}4-6] 513c
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics*, BK V, CH 7 382c-383a / *Politics*, BK II, CH 8 [1268^{b}23-1269^{a}28] 464d-465b; BK III, CH 16 [1287^{b}5-7] 486a; BK V, CH 8 [1307^{b}30-38] 509d-510a; CH 9 [1310^{a}12-19] 512b-c
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus*, 32a-48d esp 38b-d / *Lycurgus-Numa*, 63d-64a / *Themistocles*, 99b-c
15 TACITUS *Annals*, BK XII, 111b-c; BK XIV, 151d-152c

(5 *The human or positive law the sanction of coercive force 5g The application of positive law to cases the casuistry of the judicial process the conduct of a trial the administration of justice*)

43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 15 65a b NUMBER 17 69d 70a NUMBER 22 83d 84a NUMBER 65 198a 200c passim NUMBER 73 221b c NUMBER 78–83 229d 251a passim
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 133b c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 85 35a b PART III par 214 71a c par 219 72d 73a par 222–229 73b 75b ADDITIONS 141 139c / *Philosophy of History* PART I 250d 251a
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 292a 295a
50 MARX *Capital* 139b 140b
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XII 547a d
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI 168c d BK IX 235b d 271d BK XII 348b d 401d

5*b* The defect of positive law its need for correction or dispensation by equity

7 PLATO *Laws* BK VI 699d 700b BK IX 754b d BK XI 777d 778b BK XII 785c 786a
8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK VI CH 3 [141 15–18] 194b
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK V CH 10 385c 386b esp [1137b10–28] 385d 386a / *Politics* BK III CH 15 [1286 10–37] 484b d CH 16 [1287a24 28] 485d [1287b15–25] 486a b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 13 [1374 17–b24] 618c 619a
14 PLUTARCH *Fabius* 150d 151a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I–II Q 96 A 6 235a d Q 97 A 4 238b 239b Q 100 A 8 ANS and REP I 259d 261a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 94d PART II 132d 133d 135d 136b 156b c
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 50b 51a
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH XIV SECT 159–160 62b d
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART IV 152b 154a
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 343c
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 73d 74b 77d 78a 91b c
42 KANT *Science of Right* 399c-400d
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 78 232c d NUMBER 80 237a b NUMBER 83 248d 249a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 214 71a c par 223 73c d

6 Law and the individual

6*a* Obedience to the authority and force of law the sanctions of conscience and fear the objective and subjective sanctions of law law duty and right

OLD TESTAMENT *Deuteronomy* 5:28 29 13 11 17 12 13 19 18 20 21 20–21 28 58–59 / *Ecclesiastes* 12 13
NEW TESTAMENT *Romans* 13 1–5 / *I Peter* 2 13–16
5 AESCHYLUS *Eumenides* [490–565] 86b 87a [681–710] 88b-c
5 SOPHOCLES *Antigone* 131a 142d esp [362 372] 134b [640–680] 136d 137a / *Ajax* [666–676] 148d [1047–1421] 152a 155a c
5 EURIPIDES *Orestes* [491–525] 399a b
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK I 370b-c BK II 396c d 400d 401a BK III 425a-c
7 PLATO *Apology* 206b d / *Crito* 213a 219a c / *Republic* BK II 311b 312b / *Statesman* 599c 604b / *Laws* BK III 675c 676b / *Seventh Letter* 807a
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VI CH 12 [1144 12 21] 393d BK X CH 9 [1179 35–1180b28] 434a 435c / *Politics* BK II CH 8 [1269 12 23] 465a b BK III CH 15 [1286b28 41] 485b BK IV CH 8 [1294 1–8] 493d CH 11 [1295b2 0] 495c d BK V CH 8 [1307b30–38] 509d 510a
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK V [1143 1160] 76a b
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK IV CH 7 234d 235a
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 38c 48a / *Lycurgus Numa* 63d 64a c / *Solon* 66a / *Agesilaus* 480b d-481a / *Cleomenes* 659d 660a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 92 A I ANS and REP 2 213c 214c A 2 ANS and REP 4 214d 215a c Q 95 A I ANS and REP I 226c 227c Q 96 AA 4–6 233a 235d
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 90b d PART II 99a b 112b d 115a b 130b 131c 132d 133d 149b c 153b c PART III 224d 240a 241a 244d 246a c CONCLUSION 279a-c 283c
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 48b 50a 319b 383c d 480b c 520b
27 SHAKESPEARE *Coriolanus* ACT III SC I [263 336] 372c 373b
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 68b 3a 177a b PART II 362b
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 37 SCHOL 2 435b 436a
32 MILTON *Samson Agonistes* [1334–1379] 368b-369b
33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 114b / *Pensees* 297 303 227a b
35 LOCKE *Toleration* 3a 16c 17c / *Civil Government* CH VII SECT 94 46a c CH VIII SECT 97 47a b SECT 120–122 52d 53c CH IX 53c 54d passim CH XI SECT 134 55b d / *Human Understanding* BK I CH II SECT 5–6 105a c passim SECT 13 107d 108c BK II CH XXVIII SECT 6 229d
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VIII DIV 76 485a
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XI 69a-c
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 366d / *Political Economy* 371a 372b / *Social Contract* BK II 398d 401c 402a 406c d BK IV 426b d
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK V 308a 309a 311c passim 397a-c
42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 253d 254b 259a c 273d 287d esp 273d 274a 275b d 277d 279d 281c 282d 283b d /

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 446a b
26 SHAKESPEARE *Romeo and Juliet* ACT I SC I [1 110] 286b-d
27 SHAKESPEARE *Measure for Measure* ACT I SC III 177b-d ACT V SC I [318-324] 202b
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 37 SCHOL 2 435b-436a PROP 51 SCHOL 439d PROP 63 SCHOL 444
35 LOCKE *Toleration* 3a / *Civil Government* CH II SECT 7 12 26c 28a / *Human Understanding* BK I CH II SECT 13 107d 108c
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VIII DIV 76 485a
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 150b 267b-268b
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK VI 37d 38a 38d-40b BK XIX 139c
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 351b-d / *Political Economy* 371a-c 372 / *Social Contract* BK II 399a
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK V 309 -c
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 175c d 216a
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 83 85 -c 92b
42 KANT *Science of Right* 446a-449c esp 446b 447 448b-d
43 MILL *Liberty* 271c 272d 313a 316b / *Representative Government* 334d 335a / *Utilitarianism* 471b-472d
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 7d-8a 204b-c 301c d 335c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 99 3 b d PART I par 232 75c d par 319 106a ADDITIONS 62 126a / *Philosophy of History* PART 214d 216
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 314b
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK II 30d 32 33c 34b BK XI 365c
54 FREUD *Civilization and Its Discontents* 787c

6e(3) The punishment of crime

5 AESCHYLUS *Eumenides* [490-562] 86b-87a [681 7] 88b-c
5 SOPHOCLES *Antigone* [640-680] 136d 137a / *Electra* [501 507] 169a,
5 EURIPIDES *Orestes* [49 -604] 399a-400a
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK 32b-c BK III 116b-117a BK 135c 136a BK V 164c BK VII 251a b
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK III 427d-428a
7 PLATO *Protagoras* 45 -46d / *Gorgias* 267c 270c / *Statesman* 601 602d / *Laws* BK V 690d 691b BK IX 743a 757d esp 747d 757 769d 770c BK XI 771b-784b passim BK XI 784b-786b 792 793a
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK 1 4 379b-380b 5 [32ᵇ21 3] 380b-c CH II [138ᵃ4 23] 386b-c BK X 9 [179ᵃ33 180ᵃ32] 434 435a / *Politics* BK VI CH 8 [132 ᵇ40-1322ᵃ28] 525d 526a BK CH 13 [1332 10-16] 536d / *Athenian Constitution* CH 52 576b-d CH 57-59 579b-580c *Rhetoric* BK I CH 12 [1372ᵃ3 16] 615c 616b CH 619a d

14 PLUTARCH *Solon* 70d 73a / *Themistocles* 97b d / *Cicero* 711c 712d / *Artaxerxes* 851a b
15 TACITUS *Annals* BK III 57a
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIX CH 6 514b 515a BK XXI CH 11 570b 571a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 92 A 2 ANS and REP 3 4 214d 215a c Q 96 A 5 233d 234d Q 105 A 2 ANS and REP 9 12 309d 316a
22 CHAUCER *Tale of Melibeus* par 40 418b 419a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 145a 148b 157d 158a CONCLUSION 281a d
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 519a c
26 SHAKESPEARE *2nd Henry VI* ACT II SC III [1 15] 44c d / *Romeo and Juliet* ACT I SC I [71 110] 286b d ACT III SC I [146-202] 302c 303a / *Richard II* ACT I SC III [118 153] 324d 325b / *2nd Henry IV* ACT V SC II [65 145] 498d-499b / *Henry V* ACT II SC II 539a 541a
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART I 68b 73a
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 51 SCHOL 439d
33 PASCAL *Provincial Letters* 108b 109a
35 LOCKE *Toleration* 3a / *Civil Government* CH I SECT 3 25d CH II SECT 6-13 26b 28b CH VII SECT 87-88 44a-c CH IX SECT 128 54b c SECT 130 54c CH XV SECT 171 65a b / *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXVIII SECT 6 229d SECT 9 230b
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VIII DIV 76 485a
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART I 28a b 29b
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK VI 37d 43d BK XII 85c 92b
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 351b-d / *Political Economy* 3 1a-c / *Social Contract* BK II 398b 399 406c
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 175d 176a 388c d 617b-d
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 83b-c 91a 94c
42 KANT *Practical Reason* 306b-c / *Science of Right* 446a-449c esp 446b-447c 448a d 450a
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U S ARTICLE I SECT 9 [2,1 72] 13d SECT 10 [300-301] 14a ARTICLE II SECT 4 15c ARTICLE III SECT 3 [507-511] 16a AMENDMENTS V 17b-c VIII 17d XII 18c
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 15 65a b NUMBER 21 78b-d NUMBER 65 198a 200c passim
43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 471d-472d 474d
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 204b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 90-103 35d 39b esp par 96-100 36c 38a PART II par 132 46b-47a PART III par 2 8 72c d par 220 73a b par 233 75d par 319 106a ADDITIONS 60 125d 138 139 b / *Philosophy of History* PART I 320b-c
50 MARX *Capital* 364 367a passim
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK XI 505a 511b
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK II 30b-32a BK V 168c-d BK XII 398b-d

(6 *Law and the individual* 6d *The educative function of law in relation to virtue and vice the efficacy of law as limited by virtue in the individual citizen.*)

15 TACITUS *Annals* BK III 57b 58d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 92 213c 215a c Q 95 A 1 226c 227c Q 96 AA 2-3 231c 233a Q 98 A 6 ANS 244c 245b Q 100 251a 265d
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVI [85-105] 77d
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 131a b 140b 141b 149b-c 153a 155c
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 131b 132a
27 SHAKESPEARE *Measure for Measure* ACT I SC III [19-39] 177c ACT II SC I [225-270] 181a c ACT V SC I [318-324] 202b
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 78d 81c
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK XII [285-306] 325b 326a / *Areopagitica* 383a 395b
35 LOCKE *Toleration* 8c 14a / *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXVIII SECT 9 13 230b 231c
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 267b 268b
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK IV 13b d 17b BK V 18b d 23a BK VII 44d-45c 47c 50c BK XII 86b 87c 88a BK XIV 104a 108d passim BK XVI 119d BK XIX 138c 142a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 345d 359d / *Political Economy* 372a 377b esp 372a 373a 375d 377a / *Social Contract* BK I 393b-c BK II 400d 401a BK IV 434b 435a
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 100c 101b 291d
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 93d 94a
42 KANT *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 367b c 373b c / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 383a b / *Science of Right* 448d 449c
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U S AMENDMENTS XVIII 19c d XXI 20b c
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 12 58b c
43 MILL *Liberty* 272d 273d 302d 312a passim esp 306b 307a 315d 316b / *Representative Government* 336c 337b / *Utilitarianism* 467b 468a
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 222d 223b 301c d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 150 56c 57a par 153 57c / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 166b PART IV 333c d
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 328c d
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK II 30d 32a
54 FREUD *War and Death* 758c d

6e The breach of law crime and punishment

6e(1) The nature and causes of crime

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 400d 401a BK III 436d 438b
7 PLATO *Laws* BK II 654c d BK V 690d 691b BK IX 743c 746a 750a BK X 758b 760c BK XI 771b 784b passim BK XII 784b 786b 791c d
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK V CH 2 [1130^b30-1131 9] 378b c CH 11 [1138 4-13] 386b c / *Politics* BK II CH 7 461d-463c esp [1267^a2 16] 462c d BK IV CH 11 [1295^{b}3 12] 495c / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 10-14 611c 619d
18 AUGUSTINE *Christian Doctrine* BK III CH 10 662a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 139c 144d
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 23b-c 334b 335a
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 37 SCHOL 2 435b-436a
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH II SECT 6-13 26b 28b
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 271c 273a c
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XII 85c 86d
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 364d
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK V 309a c 397a-c
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 35a 175c
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 92c 93c
42 KANT *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 391d 392a / *Science of Right* 446a b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 95 102 36b 39b PART III par 218 72 d par 319 106a
50 MARX *Capital* 364a-c
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK II 33c 34b
54 FREUD *Ego and Id* 714a b

6e(2) The prevention of crime

5 AESCHYLUS *Eumenides* [490-565] 86b 87a
5 SOPHOCLES *Electra* [1501 1507] 169a c
5 EURIPIDES *Orestes* [491-525] 399a b
5 ARISTOPHANES *Clouds* [1303 1464] 504b 506c
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK II 87a b BK V 164c
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 400d 401a BK III 424d-429a
7 PLATO *Protagoras* 45b d / *Gorgias* 267c 270c / *Republic* BK II 321d 322d / *Laws* BK V 688d 689a 690d 691b BK IX 743a c 757a BK X 769d 770c BK XI 782a b BK XII 786a
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK III CH 5 [1113^b21 1114 2] 359d 360a BK X CH 9 [1179 33 1180^a32] 434a 435a / *Politics* BK II CH 7 461d-463c esp [1267 2 16] 462c d / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 12 [1372 23 27] 615d 616a CH 14 [1375 1-7] 619b c
15 TACITUS *Annals* BK III 61c d BK XIV 151d 152c BK XV 162c d
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIX CH 16 521d 522a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 87 A 3 REP 2 187b 188b Q 105 A 2 REP 9 309d 316a
22 CHAUCER *Tale of Melibeus* par 40 418b-419a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 94a PART II 140a 141b 143d 145a 145d 147a b 157d 158a

38 M TESQUIEU *Sprit of Laws* BK I 1c d 2b-d BK X 109b-110a 111a b BK XX I 215b-217

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequa y* 357c 358b / *Social Con tract* BK 393d 394d BK I 397a b 399b-c

39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 52b-c 61b BK I 140b BK I 223a

42 KANT *Science f Right* 408d-409c 426b-429b esp 426b-c 434 436a b 456b-457a

43 D CLARATION OF I DEPENDENCE 1a 3b esp [25] 1 b

43 CO STITUTION OF THE U.S AME M NTS IX 17d 18a

43 F D RALIST NUMBER 28 97c N M ER 43 143b-c

43 MILL *Utilitarianism* 465d-466b

44 B SWELL *Joh so* 363 364a

46 HE L *Philosophy of Right* P RT I par 66 29a-c T II par 27 45b-c PART III par 323 3 4 107a d DITIO S 43 123c / *Phi losophy f History* T IV 362d 363a 364d 365a

7*d* Tyran y and treason or sed tion as llegal acts th us of force without autho ity

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23 H B *Levi th* PART I 96c 98a c PART II 100c 102c 104a b 117b-119a 119d 120c 122b-124b esp 122b-c 130b-d 132a b 151c 152a

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I W ks by authors represented in th s collect on.
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Chapter 47 LIBERTY

INTRODUCTION

LIBERTY and law liberty and justice liberty and equality—the familiar connection of these terms breeds neglect of the meaning they confer upon one another through association A few simple questions may help to restore the significance of these relationships Are men free when their actions are regulated by law or coercion? Does liberty consist in doing whatever one pleases or whatever one has the power to do or is one required by justice to abstain from injury to others? Do considerations of justice draw the line between liberty and license? Can there be liberty apart from equality and perhaps also fraternity?

Other questions immediately suggest themselves. Does not the rule of law secure liberty to the governed? Is not slavery the condition of those who are ruled tyrannically or lawlessly? Does it make a difference to freedom whether the law or the constitution is just? Or is that indifferent because government itself is the impediment to liberty? Does liberty increase as the scope of government dwindles and reach fullness only with anarchy or when men live in a state of nature?

Yet are not some forms of government said to be fitting and some uncongenial to free men? Do all men have a right to freedom or only some? Are some men by nature free and some slave? Does such a differentiation imply both equality and inequality in human nature with as a consequence equality and inequality in status or treatment? What implications for law justice and equality has the distinction between free societies and dependent or subject communities?

As Tolstoy points out the variety of questions which can be asked about liberty indicates the variety of subject matters or sciences in which the problems of freedom are differently raised What is sin the conception of which arises from the consciousness of man's freedom? That is a question for theology What is man's responsibility to society the conception of which results from the conception of freedom? That is a question for jurisprudence What is conscience and the perception of right and wrong in actions that follow from the consciousness of freedom? That is a question for ethics How should the past life of nations and of humanity be regarded—as the result of the free or as the result of the constrained activity of man? That is a question for history

The great traditional issues of liberty seem to be stated by these questions From the fact that most perhaps all of these questions elicit opposite answers from the great books it might be supposed that there are as many basic issues as there are questions of this sort But the answers to certain questions presuppose answers to others Furthermore the meaning of liberty or freedom or independence is not the same throughout the questions we have considered Answers which appear to be inconsistent may not be so when the meanings involved in their formulation are distinguished We must therefore find the roots of the several distinct doctrines of liberty in order to separate real issues from verbal conflicts

THE HISTORIANS report the age-old struggle on the part of men and of states for liberty or independence History as a development of the spirit does not begin according to Hegel until this struggle first appears The History of the world he writes is none other than the progress of the consciousness of Freedom which does not reach its climax until freedom is universally achieved But though freedom is its product history in Hegel's view is not a work of freedom but involves an absolute ne-

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absolute economic independence is possible for men or e en for nations.

The real question here seems to be a meta physical one Can any finite thing be absolutely independent? The traditional answer is No. As appears in the chapter on Infinity only a being infinite in perfection and power—only the Supreme One of Plotinus, the uncreated God of Aquinas, or the self caused God of Spinoza—has complete independence God has the freedom of autonomy which cannot belong to finite things. There is however another sense of di ine freedom which Aquinas affirms and both Plotinus and Spinoza deny That is freedom of choi e

God does not act from freedom of will Spinoza writes yet God alone acts as a free cause for God alone exists from the necessity of his own nature and is determined to action by himself alone The divine freedom consists in God s self-determination which for Spinoza does not exclude necessity The opposite view is most clearly expressed in the Christian doctrine of *creation*. The created world does not follow necessarily from the di ine nature Since the goodness of God is perfect Aquinas writes, and can exist without other things, inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him *from them* it follows that for *Him to* will things other than Himself is not absolutely necessary This issue of freedom or necessity with regard to God s will and action is more fully discussed in the chapters on Will and World

The metaphysical identification of independence with infinity does *not carry o er* into the sphere of political freedom. Yet *in one* respect there is an analogy The autonomous is that which is a law unto itself. It admits *no superior* authority When in the tradition of polit cal thought states are called "free and *independent*" their autonomy or so ereignty means that by virtue of wh ch in the words of the Declaration of Independence they have full power to levy war conclude peace contract alliances, establi h commerce and to do all other acts and things which independent states may of rig t do.

Free and independent states do not have infinite power There is always the possibility of their being subjugated by another state and reduced to the condition of a dependency But though their power is not infinite they ac knowledge no superior To be a sovereign is to accept commands from no one

Since autonomy or sovereignty is incompati ble with living under human law or govern ment the independence of sovereign princes or states must be an anarchic freedom—a freedom from law and government This seems to be the view of Hobbes, Locke Kant and Hegel all of whom refer to the anarchy of in dependent states or sovereign princes to explain what they mean by the state of nature Sov ereigns are in the words of Kant "like lawless savages.

Applying this conception to indiv idual men Hobbes and Locke define natural as opposed to civil liberty in terms of man s independence in a state of nature In a state of nature man had a limited independence *since each man might be* coerced by a superior force but it was an absolute independence *in the sense that he was* subject to no human government or man made law

The natural freedom of *man* according to Hobbes is not free will Since every act of man s will and every desire and inclination proceed from some cause and that from another cause in a continual chain (whose first link is in the hand of God the first of all causes) they proceed from *necessity*" Liberty is not of the will but of the man consisting in this that *he finds no stop in doing what he has the will* desire or inclination to do The proper application of the word free is to bodies in motion and the liberty it signifies when so applied is merely the absence of external im pediments.

The natural right of every man is the l ber *ty each man has to use his own power* for the preservation of his own nature that is to say of his own life and consequently of doing any thing which in his own jud ment and reason he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto This l berty or natural right belongs *to man* only in a state of nature When men lea e the state of nature and enter the commonwealth, they surrender this natural l berty in exchange for a civil liberty which *according to Hobbes*, consists in nothing more than their *freedom* to do what the law of the

cessity Each stage of its development occurs inevitably

Other historians see man as free to work out his destiny and look upon the great crises of civilization as turning points at which free men that is men having free will exercise a free choice for better or for worse Whether we speak of the migration of the peoples and the incursions of the barbarians or of the decrees of Napoleon III or of someone s action an hour ago in choosing one direction out of several for his walk we are unconscious of any contradiction Tolstoy declares between freedom and necessity Our conception of the degree of freedom he goes on to say often varies according to differences in the point of view from which we regard the event but every human action appears to us as a certain combination of freedom and inevitability In every action we examine we see a certain measure of freedom and a certain measure of inevitability And always the more freedom we see in any action the less inevitability do we perceive and the more inevitability the less freedom

Accordingly neither necessity which flows from the laws of matter or of spirit nor overhanging and indomitable fate determines the direction of events If the theologians say that nothing happens which God does not foresee they also say that divine providence leaves the world full of contingencies and man a free agent to operate among them Though there is for God a certain order of all causes it does not follow Augustine says that nothing depends on the free exercise of our own wills for our wills themselves are included in that order of causes which is certain to God and is embraced by His foreknowledge for human wills are also causes of human actions

These matters are further discussed in the chapters on Fate History and Necessity and Contingency The mention of them here suggests another meaning of liberty—that of free choice or free will—and with it issues other than those involved in the relation of the individual to the state or to his fellow men Yet the metaphysical questions about liberty and necessity or freedom and causality and the theological questions about man s freedom under God are not without bearing on the political problems of man s freedom in society or his rights and powers The fundamental doctrines of civil liberty certainly seem to differ according to the conception of natural freedom on which they are based Freedom may be natural in the sense that free will is a part of human nature or in the sense that freedom is a birth right an innate and inalienable right It may be natural in the sense in which freedom in a state of nature is distinguished from political liberty or liberty under civil law and government

The effort to clarify meanings requires us to look at the three words which we have used as if they were interchangeable— liberty freedom and independence For the most part liberty and freedom are synonyms Both words are used in English versions of the great books Though authors or translators sometimes prefer one sometimes the other their preference does not seem to reflect a variation in meaning

In English the word freedom has a little greater range in that it permits the formation of the adjective free It is also adapted to speaking of freedom *from* certain restraints or undesirable conditions as well as of freedom *to* act in accordance with desire or to exercise certain privileges In consequence the word freedom is more frequently employed in the discussion of free will Though the traditional enumeration of civil liberties may use the phrasing liberty of conscience or worship as frequently as freedom of conscience or worship freedom of speech is more usual and freedom from fear or want or economic dependence does not seem to have an alternative phrasing

The word independence has special connotations which make it equivalent to only part of the meaning of freedom or liberty Negatively independence is a freedom from limitation or from being subject to determination by another Positively independence implies self sufficiency and adequate power When we speak of a man of independent means we refer not only to his freedom from want or economic dependence on others but also to his having sufficient wealth to suit his tastes or purposes A moment s reflection will show that this is a relative matter It is doubtful whether

there is not to be free The sphere of liberty increases as the *scope or stringency* of law diminishes.

The opposite view does not regard freedom as freedom *from* law "Freedom Hegel maintains, is nothing but the recognition and adoption of such universal substantial objects as Right and Law" All that matters in the relation between liberty and law is whether the law is just and whether a man is virtuous. If the law is just then it does not *compel* a just man to do what he would not *freely* elect to do even if the law did not exist Only the criminal is coerced or restrained by good laws. To say that such impediment to action destroys freedom would be to deny the distinction between liberty and license

Nevertheless, liberty can be abridged by law That is precisely the problem of the good man living under unjust laws. If, as Montesquieu says, "liberty can consist only in the power of doing what we ought to will and in not being constrained to do what we ought not to will, then governments and laws interfere with liberty when they command or prohibit acts contrary to the free choice of a good man.

The conception of freedom as the condition of those who are rightly governed—who are commanded to do only what they would do anyway—seems to be analogically present in Spinoza's theory of human bondage and human freedom. It is there accompanied by a denial of the will's freedom of choice.

According to Spinoza human action is causally determined by one of two factors in man's nature—the passions or reason. When man is governed by his passions, he is in bondage for a man under their control is not his own master but is mastered by fortune in whose *power* he is, so that he is often forced to follow the worse although he sees the better before him." When man *is governed* by reason he is free for he does the will of no one but himself and does those things only which he knows are of great importance in life and which he therefore desires above all things." The man who acts under the influence of the passions acts in terms of inadequate ideas and in the shadow of error or ignorance When reason rules, man acts with adequate knowledge and in the light of truth.

So, too, in the theory of Augustine and Aquinas, the virtuous man is morally or spiritually free because human reason has triumphed in its conflict with the passions to influence the free judgment of his will. The rule of reason does not annul the will's freedom Nor is the will *less free when it is moved by* the promptings of the passions. A passion writes Aquinas, "cannot draw or move the will directly It does so indirectly as, for example when those who are in some kind of passion do not easily turn their imagination away from the object of their affections. But though the will is not altered in its freedom by whether reason or emotion *dominates, the situation is* not the same with the human person as a whole. The theologians see him as a *moral agent* and a spiritual being who gains or loses freedom according as the will submits to the guidance of reason or follows the passions.

On the supernatural level the theologians teach that God's grace assists reason to conform human acts to the divine law but also that grace does not abolish free choice *on the* part of the will. "The first freedom of the will Augustine says, *which man received when he was* created upright consisted in an ability not to sin, but also in an ability to sin So long as man lives on earth he remains free to sin But supernatural grace added to nature raises man to a higher level of spiritual freedom than he can ever achieve by the discipline of the acquired virtues.

Still higher is the ultimate freedom of beatitude itself Augustine calls this "the last freedom of will which by the gift of God leaves man "*not able to sin." It is worth* noting that this ultimate liberty consists in freedom from choice or the need to choose not in freedom *from love or law* Man *cannot be* more free than when he succeeds, with God's help in submitting himself through love to the rule of God

THE POLITICAL significance of these moral and theological doctrines of freedom would seem to be that man *can be* as free in civil society as in a state of nature Whether in fact he *is* depends upon the justice of the laws which govern him, not upon their number or the matters with which they deal. He is, of course not free to do whatever he pleases regardless of the well being of other men or the welfare of the community

state does not prohibit or to omit doing what the law does not command

Locke agrees that *man s natural liberty is not* the freedom of his will in choosing but the freedom to do what he wills without constraint or impediment He differs from Hobbes however in his conception of natural liberty because *he differs in his conception of the state of nature*

For Hobbes the state of nature is a state of war the notions of right and wrong justice and injustice can have no place in it Where there is no common power there is no law where no law no injustice The liberty which sovereign states now have is the same as that which every man should have if there were no civil laws nor commonwealth at all And the effects of it also are the same For as amongst masterless men there is perpetual war of every man against his neighbor *so in states and commonwealths* not dependent on one another every commonwealth has an absolute liberty to do what it shall judge most conducing to its benefit

For Locke *the state of nature is not a state of* war but a natural as opposed to a civil society that is a society in which men live together under natural rather than under civil law Men who live in this condition are in a state of *perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose* of their possessions as they think fit within the bounds of the law of nature This is a limited not an absolute freedom or as Locke says *though this be a state of liberty yet it is not a state of license The line between liberty* and license is drawn by the precepts of the natural law The difference then between natural and civil liberty lies in this Natural liberty consists in being free from any superior power on *earth or not being under the* will or legislative authority of man Only the rules of natural law limit freedom of action Civil liberty or liberty under civil law consists in being under no other legislative power but that *established by consent* It is a freedom for the individual to follow his own will in all matters not prescribed by the law of the state

IN THE ARGUMENTS *for* and against free will one view regards *free* will as incompatible with the principle of causality natural necessity or God s omnipotence the other conceives free choice as falling within the order of nature or causality and under God s providence We shall not consider these alternatives in this chapter since this issue is reserved for the chapter on WILL

Yet one thing is clear for the present consideration of political liberty If the statement that men are born free means that it is a property of their rational natures to possess a free will then they do not lose their innate freedom when they live in civil society Government may interfere with a man s actions but it can not coerce his will Government can go no further than to regulate the expression of *man s* freedom in external actions

Nor is the range of free will limited by law As indicated in the chapter on LAW any law—moral or civil natural or positive—which di*rects human conduct can be violated It leaves* man free to disobey it and take the consequences But if the rule is good or just then the act which transgresses it must have the opposite quality The freedom of a free will is therefore *morally indifferent It can be exercised to do* either good or evil We use our freedom properly says Augustine when we act virtuously we misuse it when we choose to act viciously The will he writes is then truly free when *it is not the slave of vices and sins*

Those who conceive the natural moral law as stating the precepts of virtue or the commands of duty and who in addition regard every concrete act which proceeds from a free choice *of the will as either good or bad—never indifferent*—find that the distinction between liberty and license applies to every free act The meaning of this distinction is the same as that between freedom properly used and freedom misused Furthermore since there is no good act which is not prescribed by the moral law the whole of liberty as opposed to license consists in doing what that moral law commands

These considerations affect the problem of political liberty especially on the question whether the spheres of law and liberty are separate or even opposed One view as we have seen is that the area of civil liberty lies outside the realm of acts regulated by law To break the law may be criminal license but to

obey it is not to be free The sphere of liberty increases as the scope or stringency of law diminishes

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but that in the moral conception of liberty is not a loss of freedom He loses freedom in society only when he is mistreated or mis governed—when being the equal of other men he is not treated as their equal or when being capable of ruling himself he is denied a voice in his own government

The meaning of tyranny and slavery seems to confirm this conception of political liberty To be a slave is not merely to be ruled by another it consists in being subject to the mastery of another *i e* to be ruled as a means to that other s good and without any voice in one s own government This implies in contrast that to be ruled as a free man is to be ruled for one s own good and with some degree of par *ticipation in the government* under which one lives

According to Aristotle s doctrine of the natural slave—examined in the chapter on SLAVERY—some men do not have the nature of free men and so should not be governed as free men Men who are by nature slaves are not un justly treated when they are enslaved It is better for them as for all inferiors Aristotle maintains that they should be under the rule of a master Though they do not in fact have the liberty of free men they are not deprived thereby of any freedom which properly be longs to them *any more than a man who is just* ly imprisoned is deprived of a freedom which is no longer his by right

The root of this distinction between free men and slaves by nature lies in the supposition of a natural inequality The principle of equality is also relevant to the injustice of tyranny and the *difference* between absolute and constitutional government In the *Republic* Plato compares the tyrant to an owner of slaves The only difference he writes is that the tyrant has more slaves and enforces the harshest and bitterest form of slavery The tyrannical ruler enslaves those who are his equals by nature and who should be ruled as free men Throughout the whole tradition of political thought the name of tyranny signifies the abolition of lib- erty But absolute or despotic government is not uniformly *regarded* as the enemy of liberty

The issue concerning the legitimacy or jus tice of absolute government is examined in the chapters on MONARCHY and TYRANNY But we can take it as generally agreed that the subjects of a despot unlike the citizens of a republic do not enjoy any measure of self government To *the extent that political liberty consists in some* degree of self government the subjects of absolute rule lack the sort of freedom possessed by citizens under constitutional government For this reason the supremacy of law is fre- quently said to be the basic principle of political liberty

Wherever law ends tyranny begins Locke writes In going beyond the law a ruler goes beyond the grant of authority vested in him by the consent of the people which alone makes man subject to the laws of any government Furthermore law for Locke is itself a principle *of freedom In its true notion* he *writes it* is not so much the limitation as the direction of a free and intelligent agent to his proper interest and prescribes no farther than is for the general good of those under that law Could they be happier without it the law as a useless thing would of itself vanish and that ill de serves the name of confinement which hedges us in only from bogs and precipices So that however it may be mistaken the end of law is not to abolish or restrain but to preserve and enlarge freedom

A constitution gives the ruled the status of *citizenship and a share in their own govern ment* It may also give them legal means with which to defend their liberties when officers of government invade their rights in violation of the constitution According to Montesquieu for whom political liberty exists only under government by law never under despotism or the rule of men the *freedom of government* it self demands from the very nature of things *that power should be a check to power This* is accomplished by a separation of powers A system of checks and balances limits the power of each branch of the government and permits the law of the constitution to be applied by one department against another when its officials usurp powers not granted by the constitution or otherwise act unconstitutionally

Yet unlike tyranny absolute government *has been defended* The ancients raise the ques tion whether if a truly superior or almost god like man existed it would not be proper for him to govern his inferiors in an absolute man

ner Mankind will not say that such a one is to be expelled and exiled Aristotle writes on the other hand he ought not to be a subject—that would be as if mankind should claim to rule over Zeus, dividing his offices among them The only alternative he concludes is that all should joyfully obey such a ruler according to what seems to be the order of nature and that men like him should be kings in their state for life Those subject to his government would be free only in the sense that they would be ruled for their own good perhaps better than they could rule themselves But they would lose that portion of political freedom which consists in self government Faced with this alternative to constitutional government —which Aristotle describes as the government of free men and equals—what should be the choice of men who are by nature free?

THE ANCIENT ANSWER is not decisively in one direction. There are many passages in both Plato and Aristotle in which the absolute rule of a wise kin (superior to his subjects as a father is to children, or a god to men) seems to be pictured as the political ideal The fact that free men would be no freer than children in a well administered household does not seem to Plato and Aristotle to be a flaw in the picture They do not seem to hold that the fullness of liberty is the primary measure of the goodness of government

On the contrary justice is more important. As Aristotle suggests it would be unjust for the superior man to be treated as an equal and given the status of one self governing citizen among others. But he also points out that democratic states have instituted ostracism as a means of deali g with such superior m..n. Equality is above all things their aim, and therefore they ostracized and banished from the city for a time those who seemed to predominate too much. Because i saves the superior man from injustice and lea es the rest free to practice self government the argument for ostracism, Ari otle claims, "is based upon a kind of political justice in that it preserves the balance within the state and perhaps also because it lea es men free to practice self government among themsel es.

Since the eigl teenth century a strong tendency in the opposite direction appears in the political thought of Locke Montesquieu Rousseau Kant the American constitutionalists, and J S Mill Self government is regarded as the essence of good government It is certainly the mark of what the eighteenth century writers call free government Men who are born to be free it is thought cannot be satisfied with less civil liberty than this

Freedom, says Kant is independence of the compulsory will of another and in so far as it can co-exist with the freedom of all according to a universal law it is the one sole original inborn right belonging to every man in virtue of his humanity There is indeed an innate equality belonging to every man which consists in his right to be independent of being bound by oth rs to anything more than that to which he may also reciprocally bind them The fundamental equality of men thus appears to be founded in their equal right to freedom and that for Kant at least rests on the freedom of will with which all men are born. The criterion of the good society is the realization of freedom.

Kant s conception of human society as a realm of ends in which no free person should be degraded to the ignominy of being a means expresses one aspect of political freedom The other is found in l is principle of the harmonization of individual wills which results in the freedom of each being consistent with the freedom of all. In institutional terms republican government founded on popular sovereignty and with a system of representation is the political ideal precisely because it gives its citizens the dignity of free men and enables them to realize their freedom in self-government

Citizenship according to Kant has three inseparable attributes "1 constitutional freedom, as the right of every citizen to have to obey no other law than that to which he has given his consent or approval 2 civil equality as the right of the citizen to recognize no one as a superior among the people in relation to himself except in so far as such a one is as subject to his moral power to impose obligations as that other has power to impose obligations upon him and 3 political independence as the right to owe his existence and continuance in soci ty not to the arbitrary will of another

but to his own rights and powers as a member of the commonwealth and consequently the possession of a civil personality which cannot be represented by any other than himself.

Kant leans heavily on Rousseau s conclusions with regard to political liberty Rousseau however approaches the problem of freedom somewhat differently Man is born free he begins and everywhere he is in chains He next considers two questions What makes government legitimate, since no man has a natural authority over his fellow and force creates no right ? Answering this first question in terms of a convention freely entered into Rousseau then poses the second problem—how to form an association in which each while uniting himself with all may still obey himself alone and remain as free as before This he says is the fundamental problem of which the *Social Contract* provides the solution

The solution involves more than republican government popular sovereignty and a participation of the individual through voting and representation It introduces the conception of the general will through which alone the freedom of each individual is to be ultimately preserved Like Kant s universal law of freedom the general will ordains what each man would freely will for himself if he adequately conceived the conditions of his freedom In fact says Rousseau each individual as a man may have a particular will *contrary or dissimilar to* the general will which he has as a citizen His particular interest may speak to him quite differently from the common interest Nevertheless under conditions of majority rule the members of the minority remain free even though they appear to be ruled against their particular wills

When a measure is submitted to the people the question is whether it is in conformity with the general will which is their will Each man in giving his vote states his opinion on that point and the general will is found by counting votes When *therefore* the opinion that is contrary to my own prevails this proves neither more nor less than that I was mistaken and that what I thought to be the general will was not so If my particular opinion had carried the day I should have achieved the opposite of what was my will and it is in that case that I should not have been free This presupposes indeed that all the qualities of the general will still reside in the majority when they cease to do so whatever side a man may take liberty is no longer possible

J S MILL SEES THE same problem from the opposite side Constitutional government and representative institutions are indispensable conditions of political liberty Where Aristotle regards democracy as the type of constitution most favorable to freedom because it gives the equality of citizenship to all *free-born* men Mill argues for universal suffrage to give equal freedom to *all* men for all are born equal But neither representative government nor democratic suffrage is sufficient to guarantee the liberty of the individual and his freedom of thought or action

Such phrases as self government and the power of the people over themselves are deceptive The people who excercise the power Mill writes are not always the same people with those over whom it is exercised and the self government spoken of is not the government of each by himself but of each by all the rest The will of the people moreover practically means the will of the most numerous or the most active part of the people the majority or those who succeed in making themselves accepted as the majority

To safeguard individual liberty from the tyranny of the majority Mill proposes a single criterion for social control over the individual whether by the physical force of law or the moral force of public opinion The sole end for which mankind are warranted individually or collectively in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number is self protection

The only part of the conduct of anyone for which he is amenable to society is that which concerns others In the part which merely concerns himself his independence is of right absolute Over himself over his own body and mind the individual is sovereign

Mill s conception of individual liberty at first appears to be negative—to be freedom *from* externally imposed regulations or coercions Liberty increases as the sphere of government diminishes and for the sake of liberty that government governs best which governs

least or governs no more than is necessary for the public safety "There is a sphere of action Mill writes, in which society as distinguished from the individual, has, if any only an indirect interest comprehending all that portion of a person's life and conduct which affects only himself or if it also affects others, only with their free voluntary and undeceived consent and participation When I say only himself Mill continues I mean directly and in the first instance for whatever affects himself may affect others through himself. This, then is the appropriate region of human liberty

But it is the positive aspect of freedom from governmental interference or social pressures on which Mill wishes to place emphasis. Freedom *from* government or social coercion is freedom *for* the maximum development of individuality—freedom to be as different from all others as one's personal inclinations talents, and tastes dispose one and enable one to be

It is desirable Mill writes, that in things which do not *primarily concern others*, individuality should assert itself. Liberty is undervalued as long as the free development of individuality is not regarded as one of the principal ingredients of human happiness and indispensable to the welfare of society "The only freedom which deserves the name Mill thinks, "is that of pursuing our own good in our own way so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it for in proportion to the development of his individuality each person becomes more valuable to himself and is therefore capable of being more valuable to others There is a greater fullness of life about his own existence and when there is more life in the units there is more in the mass which is composed of them.

Mill's praise of liberty as an ultimate good both for the individual and for the state finds a clearly antiphonal voice in the tradition of the great books Plato, in the *Republic* advocates political regulation of the arts, where Mill even more than Milton before him argues against censorship or any control of the avenues of human expression But the most striking opposition to Mill occurs in those passages in which Socrates deprecates the spirit of democracy because of its insatiable desire for freedom. That spirit Socrates says, creates a city full of freedom and frankness *in which a man may do and* say what he likes Where such freedom exists the individual is clearly able to order for himself his own life as he pleases.

The democratic state is described by Socrates as approaching anarchy through relaxation of the laws or through utter lawlessness Under such circumstances there will be the greatest variety of individual differences. It will seem the fairest of states being like an embroidered robe which is spangled with every sort of flower But it is a state in which liberty has been allowed to grow without limit at the expense of justice and order It is full of variety and disorder and dispensing a sort of equality to equals and unequals alike

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited, use the numbers in heavy type, which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to. For example, in 4 Homer: *Iliad*, BK II [265-283] 12d, the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set; the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12.

P GE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page. For example, in 53 JAMES: *Psychology*, 116a-119b, the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119. When the text is printed in two columns, the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page, the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page. For example, in 7 PLATO: *Symposium*, 163b-164c, the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164.

AUTHOR'S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART, BK, CH, SECT) are sometimes included in the reference; line numbers, in brackets, are given in certain cases; e.g., *Iliad*, BK II [265-283] 12d.

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book, chapter, and verse. When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (D) follows; e.g., OLD TESTAMENT: *Nehemiah*, 7:45—(D) *II Esdras*, 7:46.

SYMBOLS The abbreviation "esp" calls the reader's attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference; "passim" signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited.

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style; for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas*, consult the Preface.

1. Natural freedom and political liberty

1a. The birthright of freedom

18 AUGUSTINE: *City of God*, BK XIX, CH 15 521a-c

19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART I, Q 96, A 4 512d-513c

20 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART I-II, Q 94, A 5, REP 3 224d-225d

26 SHAKESPEARE: *Julius Caesar*, ACT I, SC II [90-96] 570b

32 MILTON: *Paradise Lost*, BK XII [63-110] 320b-321b

35 LOCKE: *Civil Government*, CH VII 36a-42a

37 FIELDING: *Tom Jones*, 53b-d

38 MONTESQUIEU: *Spirit of Laws*, BK XV 1?b-d

38 ROUSSEAU: *Inequality*, 35?c-d / *Social Contract*, BK I, 38?c-390d passim

42 KANT: *Science of Right*, 401b-402a; 420d-421c-d

43 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE: [1-15] 1a-b

44 BOSWELL: *Johnson*, 363c-364a

46 HEGEL: *Philosophy of Right*, PART I, par 5?b-?; par 66 29a-c; ADDITIONS, 36 122b-c / *Philosophy of History*, INTRO, 171c-1?b

1b. The independence of men and the autonomy of sovereigns in a state of nature or anarchy

15 TACITUS: *Histories*, BK IV, 271a-b

23 HOBBES: *Leviathan*, PART I, 84c-87b; PART II, 99b-c; 113d-115a; 159c

30 BACON: *Advancement of Learning*, 20c-d

31 SPINOZA: *Ethics*, PART IV, PROP 37, SCHOL 2 435b-436a

35 LOCKE: *Civil Government*, CH II-VI 25d-42a passim, esp CH I, SECT 14 28b-c; CH VII, SECT 87 44a-b; CH IX, SECT 123 53c-d; SECT 128 54b-c; CH XI, SECT 135-137 56c-57b; CH XII, SECT 145 58d-59a; CH XIX, SECT 211 73d-74a

38 MONTESQUIEU: *Spirit of Laws*, BK I, 2b-d; BK VIII, 52a; BK XXVI, 221c-d

38 ROUSSEAU: *Inequality*, 342c; 345c; 352?-353c; 355b passim; 356c-357a / *Political Economy*, 369a-b; 374?-b / *Social Contract*, BK I, 393b-c; BK II, 398a-b; BK III, 419a-b

41 GIBBON: *Decline and Fall*, 237c-d

42 KANT: *Pure Reason*, 222b-c / *Science of Right*, 402c; 408c-d; 433c-434d; 435c-436a; 452a-d

46 HEGEL: *Philosophy of Right*, PART III, par 194 66c-d; par 333-334 109b-c / *Philosophy of History*, INTRO, 171c-172b; PART IV, 317d-318a

54 FREUD: *Civilization and Its Discontents*, 780d

2b Liberty of conscience and religious freedom

10 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 12a 14a 206b d 232b passim, esp 211a b 290d 291c 324b 349a-c 464b-d 601d-603b
11 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 227b-d 285d 333b-335a,c esp 335a, 480d-481a
42 KANT *Science of Right* 433b-c 444a-c
43 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION III 5b
43 CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S. ARTICLE VI [591-593] 16d AMENDMENTS, I 17
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 30a NUMBER 51 154b-c
43 MILL *Liberty* 270c 271a 272d 274a 276d 287b 290a 292a 307d 309a 311a-312a / *Representative Government* 341 -c 437d-438b
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 221d 224 421d 436d 438b 512 -d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 66 29a-c PART III, par 270 84d-89c ADDITIONS 6-116d / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 193a b PART IV 350d 351a 353c-d
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 60b-65a
50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 428b-c
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK V 127b-137c passim

2c Freedom in the sphere of economic enterprise: free trade freedom from governmental restrictions

35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH 30b-36a passim
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XX 148d 149a 149c d
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 42a 51 -62a passim BK II 142d BK IV 182a 300d passim, esp 194 -c, 287c 288c 291d 294a, 300a-c BK 397a-c
42 KANT *Science of Right* 441d-443b
43 MILL *Liberty* 312c 315c / *Representative Government* 48c 349a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART I par 1 9 62b-c par 235 36 6a-c ADDITIONS 145 140b / *Philosophy of History* 1 277b-c PART IV 345a b 364d
50 MARX *Capital* 79c-81 83d-84a,c 127c 146c passim, esp 130c 131a 135d 138c 141 -c 144a 146c 194 b 235c 248d passim esp 241 242a, 243d 244 277d 278a 316d 317c 3 c 368b
50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 420d 421d-422 4 6c
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* 573a b

2d Economic dependence as a limitation of civil liberty economic slavery or subjection

9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK I CH 5 [1254^b34-1255^a39] 475a-c VII CH 9 [1328^b33-1329^a] 533b
14 PLUTARCH *Poplicola-Solon* 87
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH II SECT 85 43c d
38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK V 20d 21d BK XIII, 99b 100c

38 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 381a b / *Social Contract*, BK II 405a-c
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 144b
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 73b
42 KANT *Science of Right* 436d-437c
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 10 50b-51d NUMBER 9 233c
43 MILL *Representative Government* 339d-340c 332 -d
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART III par 243 77b-c ADDITIONS 145 140b / *Philosophy of History* PART I 352a
50 MARX *Capital* 138b 366c-368b esp 367c 368b
50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 420b-d 424c 426b-d 428c-429c 434c-d

3 Moral or spiritual freedom

3a Human bondage or the dominance of the passions

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 4:1 16 6:5 1 8:20-22 / *Numbers* 11:4 35—(D) *Numbers* 11:4 34 / *II Samuel* 11 13—(D) *II Kings* 11 13 / *Proverbs* 5:22 23
APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 18:30-31 23:5-6 31:1 7,29-30—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 18:30-31 36 31:1 , 39-40
NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 6:24 / *Mark* 14:38 / *John* 8:31 36 / *Acts* 8:18-23 / *Romans* 1:8-3:4 5:12-6:23 7:8-8:21 / *Galatians* 4:1 1 5:1 3:26 / *Philippians* 3:18-19 / *I Timothy* 6:9-10 / *Titus* 3 / *James* 1:1 16 4:1 7 / *I Peter* 2 1 / *II Peter* 2 esp 2:19-20 / *I John* 2
7 PLATO *Phaedrus* 120b-c 128a 129c / *Phaedo* 224d 232 234c / *Gorgias* 275d 280d / *Republic* BK I 296b-c BK I 347d 348d BK VIII-IX 411d-427b / *Laws* BK III 669b-d / *Seventh Letter* 801b-c 814b
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK III CH 1 [1119^a35-^b18] 366a c / *Politics* BK III CH 16 [1287^a28-32] 48 d
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [59-93] 30d 31b BK [1113 1135] 75c-d
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 10a 106c CH 4 109c-d BK II CH 18 161a 162b BK I CH 15 190d CH 22 193a 201a BK CH 1 213a 223d
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK II SECT 2 7d 258a
17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead*, TR I CH 10 82b / *Sixth Ennead*, TR I CH 15 304c-d
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK PAR 18-26 40d-43a BK PAR 7 51d 52 BK II PAR 10-11 55c 56b / *City of God* BK I CH 3 190a-c BK X CH II 385d 386b CH 15 388d 390a BK XIX CH 15 521 -c *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 4 630c 631a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 89 A 2, PART I 475a-d PART I-II Q 9 2 658d 659c Q 10 A 3 664d-665c

(3 *Moral or spiritual freedom* 3a *Human bondage or the dominance of the passions*)

20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i ii q 72 a 2 rep 4 112b 113a q 73 a 5 123a d q 77 144d 152a esp a 2 145d 147c
21 Dante *Divine Comedy* hell v [25-45] 7b-c
22 Chaucer *Manciple's Tale* [17 130-144] 490b
25 Montaigne *Essays* 165c 166a 232b c 488b 489b
27 Shakespeare *Hamlet* act iii sc ii [61-79] 49c d / *Othello* act iv sc i 229d 233a / *Antony and Cleopatra* act iii sc xiii [111-116] 335d 336a [195-201] 336d 337a / *Winter's Tale* act ii sc iii [1-192] 498c 500d
30 Bacon *Advancement of Learning* 66c d 78a d
31 Spinoza *Ethics* part iii prop 2 schol 397c d part iv pref-prop 18 422b d 429d
32 Milton *Paradise Lost* bk viii [561-594] 244b 245a bk xii [79-110] 321a b
35 Locke *Human Understanding* bk ii ch xxi sect 12 180d 181a sect 54 192b c sect 69 196d 197a
36 Sterne *Tristram Shandy* 239b
38 Rousseau *Social Contract* bk i 393c
46 Hegel *Philosophy of History* part i 233b c part iv 348d 349b
52 Dostoevsky *Brothers Karamazov* bk vi 164b d
54 Freud *War and Death* 760d 761a

3b Human freedom or the rule of reason: freedom through knowledge of the truth

New Testament *John* 8 31-59 / *II Corinthians* 3 17 / *James* 1 esp 1 25
7 Plato *Lysis* 16c 18b / *Phaedrus* 120b c 128a 129c / *Phaedo* 230d 234c / *Republic* bk iv 347d 348d bk ix 425c-427b / *Theaetetus* 528c 531a / *Laws* bk i 650a b bk iii 669b d bk ix 754a b
8 Aristotle *Topics* bk v ch i [129 10-16] 179a
9 Aristotle *Ethics* bk i ch 13 [1102b13-1103a3] 348a c bk iii ch 12 [1119 35-b18] 366a c / *Politics* bk i ch 5 [1254 33-b26] 448a b ch 13 [1260 4-15] 454c bk iii ch 16 [1287a 28-32] 485d
12 Lucretius *Nature of Things* bk ii [1-61] 15a d bk v [1117-1120] 75d
12 Epictetus *Discourses* bk i ch 12 118d 120b bk ii ch 1-2 139 141c ch 18 161a 162b bk iii ch 7 182b 184a ch 15 190d ch 22 195a 201a bk iv ch i 213a 223d ch 7 232 235a
12 Aurelius *Meditations* bk ii sect 5 257b c sect 16-17 259a d bk iii sect 6 261a c bk iv sect 24 265c d bk v sect 9 270b c sect 26 272c bk vii sect 55 283b c sect 68-69 284c d bk xi sect 18 305b
14 Plutarch *Cato the Younger* 646b 648a
17 Plotinus *Third Ennead* tr i ch 10 82b / *Sixth Ennead* tr viii ch 3 344a b
18 Augustine *Christian Doctrine* bk i ch 24 630c 631a ch 34 634b-c bk iii ch 5-9 659d 661c
19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 81 a 3 430c-431d q 83 a 1 rep 1 436d-438a q 95 a 2 507c 508a part i ii q 24 a 1 727b d
20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i ii q 50 a 3 8b 9a q 56 a 4 32b 33c q 57 a 3 rep 3 37b 38a q 59 aa 2-3 46c-48c part ii ii q 183 a 4 ans and rep 1 627d 628d
21 Dante *Divine Comedy* purgatory xviii [19-75] 80a c
23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part i 58c d
24 Rabelais *Gargantua and Pantagruel* bk i 65c 66b
25 Montaigne *Essays* 70a c 184b d 204d 205b
27 Shakespeare *Hamlet* act iii sc ii [61-79] 49c d / *Othello* act i sc iii [322-337] 212b-c
30 Bacon *Advancement of Learning* 71d 72b 78a d
31 Spinoza *Ethics* part iv prop 67-73 444d 447a part v 451a-463d esp prop 3-4 453a d prop 20 schol 457b-458a prop 42 463b d
32 Milton *Sonnets* xii 65a b / *Paradise Lost* bk xii [79-110] 321a b / *Areopagitica* 404a b 409b 410a
35 Locke *Civil Government* ch vi sect 56-63 36d 38c passim / *Human Understanding* bk ii ch xxi sect 46-54 189d 192c sect 69 196d 197a
38 Rousseau *Social Contract* bk i 393c
41 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 300b
42 Kant *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 282b-283d / *Practical Reason* 296a d / *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 378c
44 Boswell *Johnson* 97b-c
46 Hegel *Philosophy of History* intro 160c 161c part ii 279d 280b part iv 315a 348d 349b 350a b 361b c
54 Freud *Psycho Analytic Therapy* 126a 127a c / *General Introduction* 625a d / *Ego and Id* 702c d 715c 716a / *New Introductory Lectures* 838c 839b

3c Virtue as the discipline of free choice: freedom as the determination of the will by the moral law of practical reason

9 Aristotle *Ethics* bk ii ch 6 [1106b36-1107a6] 352c bk iii ch 1-2 355b d 358a
18 Augustine *City of God* bk iv ch 3 190c bk xiv ch 11 386b bk xix ch 20 523d 524a bk xxii ch 30 617c-618a
19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 83 a 2 ans and rep 3 438a d
20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part ii ii q 183 a 4 ans 627d 628d
21 Dante *Divine Comedy* purgatory xviii [19-75] 80a c xxvii 94c 96a esp [139-142] 96a paradise xxxi [73-90] 154a
32 Milton *Areopagitica* 391a 392a 394b 395b

4. KANT *Fund. Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 2 5b / *Practical Reason*, 302a-d 307d 314d 331a-b 332a-334b 342a-c / *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 35 d 3,8a 378a-b / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 386b-387a,c 390b,d 3?1a / *Science of Right* 420d-421a / *Judgement* 571c 572a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO, par 29 19a b PART II, par 10? 14 40a-42b PART III, par 14? 56b ADDITIONS, 9? 132b / *Philosophy of History* INTRO, 171a-c PART IV 328a 352d 353a
– DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI, 154 155

3d Freedom from conflict and freedom for individuality as conditions of happiness

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 398a-c
7 PLATO *Lysis* 15c 18a / *Gorgias*, 275d 2 6b / *Laws* BK I, 29?d 296c
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics*, BK III, CH 9 [12?0?32 34] 4??d 478a
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things*, BK V [1-?4] 61a-d
1. EPICTETUS *Discourses*, BK I, CH 1 105a 106c CH 4 108d 110a, CH 12 118d 120b CH 18 12 a 125a BK II CH 1 2 138b,d 141c BK III, CH 22 195a 201a CH 24 203c 210a BK IV CH 1 2 213a-224b CH 4 225a 228a CH 6 230b-235a
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK X, 5 CT 12 298c-d
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK VIII, par 10-30 55c-61 / *City of God*, BK XII, CH 9 523d 52 BK XXII, CH 30 61 618a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II-II, Q 1 1 REP 3 670b-631d
22 CHAUCER *Merchant's Tale* [.109-1 3] 490a-b
4 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, BK I, 65c-66b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays*, 1?9a 318a 319b 459a-470a 4?5b-48?b
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II, 3?9d 380a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II, CH XXI, ?? 52-?3 191d 19?b
4. KANT *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics*, 3?8c 3?9a
43 MILL *Liberty* 269b-c 2?2d 2 4 293b-302. *Utilitarianism*, 451d-452a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* ADDITIONS 1 5 136a b 5 142d / *Philosophy of History* PART II, 2 6a-d PART IV 320c 321 364d
1 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* ? 221b-d ? ?, 5??a 5?8b BK XIV 60 b-d BK X 63?c 63,a
?? JAMES *Psychology* 199?-202a
54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psycho-Analysis*, 9a b 20a-d *General Introduction*, 573c 623d-625d 633d-634d 635c

4. The metaphysics of freedom

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I, Q 19, 3 110b-111 8 116a-d A 10 117d 118b Q 22, ? 4 128d 130d 4 131c 132b Q 59, A 3 308b-309a Q 83 436c-440b PART I-II, Q 6, A 1 REP 3 644d-646a Q 10 662d-666a,c Q 13, A 6 676c-677b Q 17 685b d-693d esp A 6 690b-d Q 21 A 4, REP 2 719d 720a,c
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I, DEF 7 355b PROP 17 362b-363c PROP 32 33 367a-369a APPENDIX 369b-372d, PART II, PROP 48-49 391a-394d PART III, 395a-d DEF 1 3 395d 396a PROP 1 3 396a-398c PART IV PREF 421b d-424a DEF 8 424b-c PROP ?3 430c-d PROP 66-?3 44?c 44? a PART V 451a-463d esp PREF 451a-452c, PROP 40-4? 462c-?63d
4. KANT *Pure Reason*, 133a 140b,d 143a 164a-172c esp 169c 1 0a, 1 0c-171a 190c-d 234c ?35a / *Fund. Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 264d 265a 279b,d 287d / *Practical Reason*, 291a-293c esp 292a 293b 296a-d 307d 314d esp 309d, 310b-311d 331c 337a,c 340a 342d 3 1b-352c / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 390b,d 391a / *Judgement*, ?63a-467a 571c 572a 587d 588a 606d 607c 609b-610a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART II, par 139 48d-49b / *Philosophy of History* 153a-359a,c esp INTRO, 156d 190b, 203a 206a,c, PART IV 368d 369a,c
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE II, 688a 696d

4a The relation of human liberty to chance and contingency

7 PLATO *Republic* BK X, 439b-441a,c / *Laws* BK IV 679a b
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK III, CH 3 [1112a18-b11] 358a-c
1. LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK II [? 293] 18b-d
15 TACITUS *Annals* BK III, 49c BK IV 69a-b BK VI, 91b-d
17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead*, TR I, CH 8-10 81d 82b
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God*, BK V CH 9 213b-215c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 82, A 432d-433c Q 83, A 1 436d-?38a Q 116, A 1 597d 593d
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PARADISE, XVII [13-4?] 132b-c
23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* CH XXV 35a b
42 KANT *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 39?d 393c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* INTRO, par 5 16a b PART III par ?06 68d-69b ADDITIONS, 1 118a-c / *Philosophy of History* PART IV 368d ?69a,c
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 158b-159a

4b The opposites of freedom: causality or necessity nature, and law

8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK IX, CH 5 [1048a35-1048b24] 573b-c
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK III, CH 3 [1112a18-b22] 358a-c
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things*, BK II [251-260] 18b

(3 *Moral or spiritual freedom* 3a *Human bondage or the dominance of the passions*)

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 72 A 2 REP 4 112b 113a Q 73 A 5 123a d Q 77 144d 152a esp A 2 145d 147c
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL V [25-45] 7b-c
22 CHAUCER *Manciple's Tale* [17 130-144] 490b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 165c 166a 232b c 488b 489b
27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT III SC II [61-79] 49c d / *Othello* ACT IV SC I 229d 233a / *Antony and Cleopatra* ACT III SC XIII [111-116] 335d 336a [195 201] 336d 337a / *Winter's Tale* ACT II SC III [1-192] 498c 500d
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 66c d 78a d
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III PROP 2 SCHOL 397c d PART IV PREF PROP 18 422b d 429d
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK VIII [561-594] 244b 245a BK XII [79 110] 321a b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 12 180d 181a SECT 54 192b c SECT 69 196d 197a
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 239b
38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK I 393c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 233b c PART IV 348d 349b
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI 164b d
54 FREUD *War and Death* 760d 761a

3b Human freedom or the rule of reason freedom through knowledge of the truth

NEW TESTAMENT *John* 8 31 59 / *II Corinthians* 3 17 / *James* 1 esp 1 25
7 PLATO *Lysis* 16c 18b / *Phaedrus* 120b c 128a 129c / *Phaedo* 230d 234c / *Republic* BK IV 347d 348d BK IX 425c 427b / *Theaetetus* 528c 531a / *Laws* BK I 650a b BK III 669b d BK IX 754a b
8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK V CH I [129 10-16] 179a
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 13 [1102b13-1103a3] 348a c BK III CH 12 [1119 35-b18] 366a c / *Politics* BK I CH 5 [1254 33 b26] 448a b CH 13 [1260 4 15] 454c BK III CH 16 [1287a 28-3] 485d
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK II [1-61] 15a d BK V [1117-1120] 75d
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 12 118d 120b BK II CH 1 2 139c 141c CH 18 161a 162b BK III CH 7 182b 184a CH 15 190d CH 22 195a 201a BK IV CH 1 213a 223d CH 7 232c 235a
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK II SECT 5 257b c SECT 16-17 259a d BK III SECT 6 261a-c BK IV SECT 24 265c d BK V SECT 9 270b-c SECT 26 272c BK VII SECT 55 283b c SECT 68-69 284c d BK XI SECT 18 305b
14 PLUTARCH *Cato the Younger* 646b 648a
17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR I CH 10 82b / *Sixth Ennead* TR VIII CH 3 344a b
18 AUGUSTINE *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 24 630c 631a CH 34 634b-c BK III CH 5-9 659d 661c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 81 A 3 430c-431d Q 83 A 1 REP 1 436d-438a Q 95 A 2 507c 508a PART I II Q 24 A 1 727b d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 50 A 3 8b 9a Q 56 A 4 32b 33c Q 57 A 3 REP 3 37b 38a Q 59 AA 2-3 46c-48c PART II II Q 183 A 4 ANS and REP 1 627d 628d
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVIII [19-75] 80a c
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 58c d
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK I 65c 66b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 70a c 184b d 204d 205b
27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT III SC II [61 79] 49c d / *Othello* ACT I SC III [322 337] 212b c
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 71d 72b 78a d
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 67-73 444d 447a PART V 451a 463d esp PROP 3 4 453a d PROP 20 SCHOL 457b 458a PROP 42 463b d
32 MILTON *Sonnets* XII 65a b / *Paradise Lost* BK XII [79-110] 321a b / *Areopagitica* 404a b 409b 410a
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH VI SECT 56-63 36d 38c passim / *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 46-54 189d 192c SECT 69 196d 197a
38 ROUSSEAU *Social Contract* BK I 393c
41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 300b
42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 282b-283d / *Practical Reason* 296a d / *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 378c
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 92b c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 160c 161c PART II 279d 280b PART IV 315a 348d 349b 350a b 361b c
54 FREUD *Psycho Analytic Therapy* 126a 127a c / *General Introduction* 625a d / *Ego and Id* 702c d 715c 716a / *New Introductory Lectures* 838c 839b

3c Virtue as the discipline of free choice freedom as the determination of the will by the moral law of practical reason

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK II CH 6 [1106b36-1107a6] 352c BK III CH 1-2 355b d 358a
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK IV CH 3 190c BK XIV CH 11 386b BK XIX CH 20 523d 524a BK XXII CH 30 617c-618a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 83 A 2 ANS and REP 3 438a d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II II Q 183 A 4 ANS 627d 628d
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVIII [19-75] 80a c XXVII 94c 96a esp [139 142] 96a PARADISE XXXI [73-90] 154a
32 MILTON *Areopagitica* 391a 392a 394b 395b

9 AQUI AS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 19 A 8 116a-d Q 22 A 2 REP 4-5 128d 130d QQ 23 24 132b-143c Q 83 A I R P 4 436d 438a Q 103 A 5 esp REP 3 531b-532b AA 7-8 533b-534b Q I 5 AA 3-5 540c 543b Q 116 592d 59? PA T I II Q 6 A I R P 3 644d 646a 4 REP I 647b-648a Q 9 A 6 662a d Q 10 A 4 665d 666a c Q 21 A 4 RE 2 719d 720

21 D TE *Di ne Comedy* I ELL VII [61-96] 10b-c PU GATO Y X I [5 114] 77b 78a X I [I 75] 79d 80c P RA ISE I [94 142] 107b-d II [64-90] 110a b X II [3 45] 132b-c

22 CH UCE *Troilus and Cress da* BK IV STANZA 135-154 106b-108b

23 M C AVELLI *Prince* CH XXV 35a b

23 HO ES *Leviathan* PAR II 113b-c P RT IV 272b-c

25 MONT I E *Essays* 515a 520b d

27 SH ESPE RE *Hamlet* ACT III SC II [220-223] 51b / *King Lear* CT I SC II [128 164] 249a b

29 CER NTES *Don Q ixote* PA T I 408c

31 D C RTE *Object ns a d Repl s* 141b

31 S OZA *Ethics* RT I P E 369b 372d

32 MILTON *Pa ad se Lost* BK II [80-134] 137a 138a BK V [224 245] 180a b [506-543] 186a 187 BK VI [169-188] 200 BK VII [139-173] 220 221 BK IX [342 375] 254b-255b K X [615-640] 287b 288b / *Samson Agon st s* [660-709] 354a 355a / *A eop g t ca* 394b 395b

35 LOCKE *Ci l Government* CH I S CT 6 26b-c

41 C O *Decline d F ll* 230b

42 KANT *Practical Reaso* 334 335c

44 B SWELL *J hnson* 549c

46 HEGEL *Ph losophy f History* I TRO 161d 167a

48 MEL ILLE *M by Dick* 159 396b 409b-410b

51 TOLSTOY *W d P ace* K X 481d K XII 553b EPILOGU I 650b-c EPILOGUE II 675a 677b 680b-c 684b-d

54 F *In erpreta o of Dr ams* 246c 247d / *General Introduction* 582a b

5b Man s freedom d God s knowledge

OLD TEST MENT *Psalms* 139 15 16—(D) *Psalms* 138 15 16

APOCRY *Ecclesiasticus* 42 19—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 42 9 / *S s nn* 13 42 43—(D) OT *D niel* 13 42 43

N W T T MENT *Act* 2 23 / *Romans* 8 28 30 *Ephe* 1 4 12 / *I Peter* 1 2 19-20

12 AU ELIUS *Meditat s* BK VI SECT 44 278b-c

18 AU USTI E *City of God* BK C 9-10 213b-216c BK XXII H I 587 b

19 AQUI A *Summa Theologica* P RT I Q 14 13 86d 88c Q 22 A 2 EP 4 128d 130d QQ 23 24 132b-143c Q 86 A 4 NS 463d-464d PA I II Q 4 A 3 R I 794c 795a

21 D NTE *Divine Comedy* P RADIS XVII [13 42] 132b-c

22 CH UC *Troilu and Cre ida* BK V ST NZA

138-154 106b 108b / *Nu s Pries s Tale* [15 236-256] 456b-457a

23 HO BES *Le athan* PART IV 271b

25 MO TAIGNE *Ess ys* 342a

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [80-134] 137a 138a BK V [224 245] 180a b BK X [1-62] 274b 275b

41 GI ON *Decline and Fall* 230b

44 BOSWELL *Joh s n* 173c 392d 393a

5c Man s freedom and God s grace the free dom of the children of God

OLD TESTAMENT *Proverbs* 1:20-33

NEW TESTAMENT *John* 1 1 18 esp 1 12 13 6 44 65-66 8 31 36 / *Acts* 13 14-52 15 1 11 / *Romans* passim esp 3 1-8:2 11 1 10 / *I Corinthi ns* 6 11 12 7:21 23 8 9-13 9 1 5 19-21 10:23 29 / *II Corinth ans* 3 17 6 1 2 / *Galatians* 2 4 4 1-5 4 5 13 18 22 24 / *Ephesians* 1 3 12 2 4 22 / *Philippia s* 2 12 13 / *Colossians* 1 12 13 / *Tit s* 2 11 14 3 3 7 / *James* 1:25 2 10-12 / *I Peter* 15 16 / *Rev lat on* 3:2 —(D) *Apocalypse* 3:20

18 AUGU TINE *Co fessions* BK IX par 1 61c d / *City of God* BK X CH 32 319d 322a c BK XXII CH I 587a b CH 30 617c-618a

19 AQUI S *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 23 A 3 RE 3 134b 135a AA 5-6 135d 138c A 8 140a 141a Q 62 A 3 REP 2 319c 320b A 4 A 320b-321b Q 83 A 2 CONTRARY 438a d Q 95 A I R 3 5 506b-507c PART I II Q 5 A 5 RE I 6 0b-641 Q 9 A 6 REP 3 662a d

20 AQUIN S *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 108 A I and REP 2 331a 332b Q 109 A 2 339 340b Q 11 2 352d 353d Q 113 A 3 362c 363c A 5 364b-365a PART II II Q 183 A 4 REP 1 627d-628d

21 D NT *Di* *C medy* PURGATO Y I [1-84] 53a 54a XXVII 94c 96a esp [39-142] 96a P R ISE III [64-90] 110a b VII [64-84] 115d 116a XXI [52-75] 138d 139a

31 DES RT *Med tat ons* IV 91 b

31 SPINOZA *Eth cs* BK IV PROP 68 SCHOL 445a b

32 MILTON *Pa ad se Lost* BK II [1024 1033] 133b BK III [56-415] 136b-144b esp [130-134] 138a [7 238] 140b BK XI [1 21] 299a b [251 262] 304b-305

33 PASCAL *Provinc l Letter* 154b-159a

42 KANT *Pure Reason* 238b

46 HEGEL *Ph losophy f Ri ht* PART II par 140 50a / *Philosophy of History* P RT III 310d 311a

5d The divine freedom the ndependenc or utonomy of infinite being d e cho ce

OLD TE TAMENT *Exod s* 33 19 / *Ps lms* 135 6 —(D) *Psalms* 134 6 / *Isa h* 14:24 25 46 9-13—(D) *Isa as* 14:24 25 46 9-12 / *Jeremiah* 4:28—(D) *Jeremias* 4:28 / *D l* 4 4 37—(D) *Da iel* 4

NEW TESTAMENT *M thew* 2 1 16 / *J hn* 5:21 / *Roma* 8:28-9:26 esp 9 15 18 / *I Corinthi a s* 12- 18 / *Ephesa* 1 9-11 / *Ph l pp ans* 2 12 13 / *II Timo hy* 1 8-10 / *J m s* 1 18

(4 *The metaphysics of freedom* 4b *The opposites of freedom causality or necessity nature and law*)

15 TACITUS *Annals* BK IV 69a b BK VI 91b d
17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR I CH 4 79d 80a CH 8-10 81d 82b
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK V CH 9 10 213b 216c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 19 AA 3-9 110b 117d passim Q 41 A 2 218c 219d Q 47 A 1 REP 1 256a 257b Q 59 A 3 308b 309a Q 62 A 8 REP 2 323c 324a Q 83 A 1 436d-438a Q 103 A 1 REP 1 3 528b 529a Q 115 A 6 ANS 591d 592d PART I II Q 10 662d 666a c Q 13 A 6 676c 677b
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 50 A 3 8b 9a Q 71 A 4 ANS and REP 3 108b 109a
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL, VII [61-96] 10b c PURGATORY XVI [52-114] 77b 78a
22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida* BK IV STANZA 138 154 106b 108b / *Nun s Priest s Tale* [15 236-256] 456b 457a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 113b c PART III 165c
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 216c 219a
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I DEF 7 355b PROP 17 SCHOL 362c 363c APPENDIX 369b 372d
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK III [80 134] 137a 138a
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XXI SECT 7 27 180a 184c
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT VIII 478b 487a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 337d 338a
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 133a 140b d 143a 164a 171a 234c 235a / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 264d 265a 279b d 287d esp 283d 285a / *Practical Reason* 292a 293b 296a d 301d 302d 307d 314d esp 310b 311d 331c 337a c / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 386b 387a c 390b / *Judgement* 463a-467a 571c 572a 587a 588a 607c 609b 610a
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 392d 393a 549c
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PART II par 139 48d 49b PART III par 186-187 64d 65c ADDITIONS 90 130b d / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 160c 161c 171b 186b c PART I 236a c
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 158b 159a 209b 237a
50 MARX *Capital* 7b c 42a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK VIII 303d 304b BK IX 342a 344b BK X 389a 391c BK XI 469a 472b BK XIII 563a 564 BK XIV 588a 590c EPILOGUE I 645a 650c EPILOGUE II 688a 696d
53 JAMES *Psychology* 84a 94b passim esp 87b 90b 291a 295b esp 291a b 823a 826a esp 825b 826b [fn 2]
54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psycho Analysis* 13c / *General Introduction* 454b c 462d 486d

5 The theology of freedom

5a Man s freedom in relation to fate or to the will of God

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 3 4 5-7 / *Exodus* 4 21 7-14 esp 7 3 10 1 14 17 / *Deuteronomy* 11 26-28 30 esp 30 15 30 19-20 / *Joshua* 11 19-20 24 14 24—(D) *Josue* 11 19 20 24 14 24 / *I Kings* 8 57-58—(D) *III Kings* 8 57 58 / *Job* 3 23 12 14-25 34 29 / *Psalms* 119 36 139 15-16 141 4—(D) *Psalms* 118 36 138 15-16 140 4 / *Proverbs* 21 1 / *Ecclesiastes* 3 14-15 / *Isaiah* 14 24 27 63 17 64 8—(D) *Isaias* 14 24 27 63 17 64 8 / *Malachi* 4 6—(D) *Malachias* 4 6
APOCRYPHA *Rest of Esther* 13 8 18—(D) OT *Esther* 13 8 18 / *Wisdom of Solomon* 7 16—(D) OT *Book of Wisdom* 7 16 / *Ecclesiasticus* 15 11 20—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 15 11 21
NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 20 1 16 23 37 26 39 / *John* 6 44 64-65 70-71 10 26-29 12 37-40 13 18 17—(D) *John* 6 44 65-66 71 72 10 26-29 12 37-40 13 18 27 / *Acts* 4 27 28 7 51-53 13 48 17 24-27 esp 17 26 / *Romans* 8 28-9 24 11 1 10 / *I Corinthians* 7 21-23 9 16-23 12 / *Ephesians* 1 3 12 2 8 10 4 7 14 / *Philippians* 2 13 / *II Thessalonians* 2 11-14—(D) *II Thessalonians* 2 10 13 / *II Timothy* 1 9 / *James* 4 13 15
4 HOMER *Iliad* BK VI [342-358] 43c d BK XIX [74-94] 137d 138a BK XXIV [507-551] 176c 177a / *Odyssey* BK VIII [117 150] 285b-c
5 SOPHOCLES *Oedipus the King* 99a 113a c esp [1297 1415] 111b 112b / *Oedipus at Colonus* 114a 130a c esp [258 291] 116c d [960-999] 123b c / *Philoctetes* [169-200] 183d 184a [1316-1347] 193d 194a
5 EURIPIDES *Helen* [711-721] 304d 305a / *Electra* [1168 1359] 337d 339a c / *Heracles Mad* [1255 1357] 376a d
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 7b 8c 20a 22a BK II 77a b BK III 98b 99a BK VII 218b 220b BK IX 291b-c
7 PLATO *Republic* BK X 439b-441a c / *Laws* BK I 650a b BK IV 679a b BK X 765d 769c esp 767c 768b
8 ARISTOTLE *Metaphysics* BK XII CH 10 [1075a 12 24] 605d 606a
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 12 118d 120b BK II CH 8 147b BK III CH 22 197c 198b CH 24 209c 210a BK IV CH 1 218d 219c CH 3 224d CH 7 233d
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK III SECT 11 262a b BK VI SECT 42 46 278a d BK X SECT 5 296d
13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK III [492-505] 160b 161a BK IV [333-361] 176a 177a
14 PLUTARCH *Coriolanus* 188d 189c / *Sulla* 370c 371b
15 TACITUS *Annals* BK IV 69a BK VI 91b d
17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead* TR II III 82c 97b passim
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par 14 12a b / *City of God* BK V CH 9-10 213b 216c

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For The problem of the freedom of the will *see* WILL 5-6c 8a and for the relation of political liberty to free will *see* WILL 5a(2) 7a

The freedom of men in a state of nature or anarchy and for the independence of sovereign states, *see* GOVERNMENT 1a NATURE 2b STATE 3c 9d WAR AND PEACE 1

Matters relevant to political liberty or the freedom of the individual as a member of society *see* CITIZEN 2b CONSTITUTION 1 2b 7b DEMOCRACY 4a 4b 5c GOVERNMENT 1h JUSTICE 6, 6c-6e LAW 7b-7c MONARCHY 1a(1) 4d-5b SLAVERY 6-6d TYRANNY 5-5c and for the relation of economic to political liberty *see* DEMOCRACY 4a(2) LABOR 7f SLAVERY 5-5b WEALTH 9d

Other discussions of freedom of thought or expression *see* ART 10b EDUCATION 8c KNOWLEDGE 9b OPINION 5a-5b POETRY 9b PROGRESS 6e TRUTH 8d and for other discussions of liberty of conscience and freedom of worship *see* RELIGION 6c(1)-6e THEOLOGY 4e

The moral or psychological freedom in the relation of reason and emotion *see* DESIRE 5-6c EMOTION 4-4b(2) MIND 9d SLAVERY 7 TYRANNY 5d

The metaphysical consideration of liberty and matters related thereto *see* CAUSE 3 FATE 3 NATURE 2f NECESSITY AND CONTINGENCY 5a 5a(3) 5f WILL 5a(3) 5c 8a

The theological consideration of liberty *see* FATE 4 GOD 4e 5f-5g 7b 7d 7f SIN 6a 7 WILL 4b, 7e(2)

(5 *The theology of freedom 5d The divine freedom the independence or autonomy of infinite being divine choice*)

4 Homer *Odyssey* bk xiv [441-445] 264c
5 Aeschylus *Agamemnon* [1017-1034] 63a
8 Aristotle *Metaphysics* bk v ch 5 [1015b9-16] 536a bk xii ch 6-7 601b 603b ch 10 [1075 12-16] 605d
12 Epictetus *Discourses* bk iii ch 13 188c d bk iv ch 6 230c d
17 Plotinus *Sixth Ennead* tr viii 342d 353d
18 Augustine *Confessions* bk vii par 6-7 44d-45d bk xii par 18 103a b bk xiii par 5 111d par 12 113b d par 19 115c d / *City of God* bk v ch 10 215c 216c bk xii ch 17 353a 354a bk xxi ch 7-8 565d 568d bk xxii ch 2 587b 588a ch 30 617d 618a
19 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i q 7 aa 1-2 31a 32c q 9 a 1 38c 39c q 19 aa 3-5 110b 113c a 10 117d 118b q 22 a 3 rep 3 130d 131c q 23 a 5 rep 3 135d 137d a 6 rep 3 137d 138c q 25 a 2 144c 145b aa 5-6 147d 150a q 46 a 1 rep 9 10 250a 252d q 47 a 1 rep 1 256a 257b q 61 a 2 rep 1 315c 316a q 104 a 3 537b d q 105 a 1 rep 2 538d 539c
20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i-ii q 93 a 4 rep 1 218b d part iii q 21 a 1 ans 823d 824d part iii suppl q 91 a 1 rep 2 1016b 1017c
23 Hobbes *Leviathan* part ii 113b c
30 Bacon *Advancement of Learning* 38a
31 Descartes *Objections and Replies* 228a-c
31 Spinoza *Ethics* part i def 6-7 355b prop 17 362b 363c prop 32 35 367a 369a appendix 369b 372d
32 Milton *Paradise Lost* bk vii [139-173] 220a 221a / *Samson Agonistes* [300-329] 346a b
33 Pascal *Pensees* 654 292b
35 Locke *Human Understanding* bk ii ch xxi sect 50-51 191b c
35 Berkeley *Human Knowledge* sect 57 423d 424a sect 106 433c d
42 Kant *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 265b c esp 265b d [fn 1] / *Practical Reason* 321b c 324d 325a 325d 328b 342c / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* 393c
46 Hegel *Philosophy of History* intro 160c 161a
51 Tolstoy *War and Peace* epilogue ii 684c d

6 Liberty in history

6a The historical significance of freedom stages in the realization of freedom the beginning and end of the historical process

6 Herodotus *History* bk i 23a b 38b c bk v 175b bk vi 207b 208c bk vii 233a b 238b c
6 Thucydides *Peloponnesian War* bk i 353c d
7 Plato *Laws* bk iii 663d 677a
15 Tacitus *Annals* bk iii 51b-c
20 Aquinas *Summa Theologica* part i-ii q 108 a 1 331a 332b
40 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 24c 32c 34a c esp 33c d 51c 90d 91a 475a 521c 523a c esp 522d 523a 523d 524a
41 Gibbon *Decline and Fall* 161c 162a 202a d 300a b 452d-453a c
43 Mill *Liberty* 267d 268b 271d 272a / *Representative Government* 339a 341d 346a c / *Utilitarianism* 475d
46 Hegel *Philosophy of Right* intro par 4 12d part i par 57 26b 27a part iii par 340-360 110b 114a c additions 36 122b c / *Philosophy of History* 153a 369a c esp intro 156d 190b 203a 206a c part i 207a 209a 219d 221a 230a c 235d 236c, 245d 246c 251c 257a 258a part ii 259a 260c 263d 267a 268b 274a part iii 286c 287a 303c 307b 310d 311d part iv 315a 319b 321c 331d 333d 348a c 350a c 360c 365c 368d 369a c
50 Marx *Capital* 35b c

6b The struggle for civil liberty and economic freedom the overthrow of tyrants despots and oppressors

Old Testament *I Kings* 12 1-25—(D) *III Kings* 12 1-25 / *II Kings* 9 1 10 11 11 21 18 26—(D) *IV Kings* 9 1-10 11 11 21 18 26 / *II Chronicles* 10—(D) *II Paralipomenon* 10
6 Herodotus *History* bk iii 120b c bk iv 124a d bk v 167a b 171c 175b 177d 180a bk vi 193b-c 201a b 208d 209b bk vii 243b-c
6 Thucydides *Peloponnesian War* bk i 353c bk vi 523c 524d bk viii 564a 593a c esp 582a 583c 585d 586b 587a 589a 590a c
7 Plato *Seventh Letter* 813d 814d
9 Aristotle *Politics* bk v ch 10 512d 515d / *Athenian Constitution* ch 5 554d 555a ch 13 20 558b 562b ch 33-41 568b 572a passim
14 Plutarch *Solon* 64b d 77a c / *Poplicola* 77a 86a c / *Poplicola Solon* 86a 87d / *Coriolanus* 174b d 193a c / *Timoleon* 195a 213d esp 206d / *Pelopidas* 232a 246a c / *Caesar* 600a 604d / *Cato the Younger* 620a 648a c esp 643a 644b / *Agis* 648b d 656d / *Tiberius Gracchus* 671b d 681a c esp 678b d / *Caius Gracch* 681b d 689a c / *Demetrius* 728b 729d *Antony* 752a 755c / *Marcus Brutus* 802b 824a c / *Aratus* 826a 846a c
15 Tacitus *Annals* bk xi 104a-c bk xii 112 113b 115d 116b 117a bk xv 169a 176b *Histories* bk i 195a 201c esp 197a-c
26 Shakespeare *2nd Henry VI* act iv sc ii 57d 64d / *Richard III* act v sc iii [237 27 146b c / *Julius Caesar* 568a 596a c esp act i sc iii [72 130] 573b d act iii sc i 580b 583c
27 Shakespeare *Coriolanus* 351a 392a c
32 Milton *Lord Gen Fairfax* 68b-69a / *Lord Gen Cromwell* 69a b

Chapter 48 LIFE AND DEATH

INTRODUCTION

MEN have divided the totality of things in various ways. The three most fundamental divisions rest on the distinction between the natural and the supernatural, between the material and the spiritual, and between the lifeless and the living.

The same kind of basic question is raised by each of these divisions, and given opposite answers in the tradition of the great books. The question is not always formulated in the same way. It may be a question about the existence of the supernatural order or of incorporeal beings. It may be a problem of whether the terms of the division represent a real duality or merely different aspects of one and the same whole. Are God and nature one or are they radically distinct? Is spirituality merely one expression of bodily existence or are there two worlds, a world of bodies and a world of spirits?

These issues are considered in the chapters on GOD, NATURE, ANGEL, and MATTER, as well as in the chapter on BEING. The issue raised by the third great division is one of the central topics in this chapter. That issue concerns the difference between the living and the nonliving. There is no question here about whether in the order of nature living things exist. The fact of life is not denied, at least not as a matter of observation. On the surface there certainly appears to be a striking difference between the living tree and the stone, or between the animal which a moment ago was alive and is now dead.

But how this difference is to be understood is the question. Does it signify an absolute break, a discontinuity between the world of living bodies and the domain of inanimate things? Or is the continuity of nature preserved across the line which divides inorganic and organic matter? Is the difference between the nonliving and the living (or the living and the dead) one of kind or of degree?

Those who answer that it is a difference in kind usually formulate a definition of life which draws a sharp line on one side of which are the things that have the indispensable properties of life, while on the other side are things totally lacking in these properties. The critical point here turns on whether vitality is present in some degree or totally absent. The definition of life may not always be the same. It may not always, for example, postulate the soul as the principle in all living things, or involve the same conception of soul in relation to living organisms. But when life is defined as an essential characteristic of some natures, the definition implies the existence of natures which are totally lacking in the properties essential to life. It also implies the impossibility of intermediate links between the lowest form of life and the most complex of the inorganic substances.

The opposite answer that there is only a difference in degree between the inanimate and the animate *affirms* the continuity of nature across the gap between things which appear lifeless and those which seem to be alive. All bodies have the same fundamental properties, though not in the same magnitude. But here there is a further question. It can be asked whether those properties are the powers or functions commonly associated with the appearance of being alive, such as growth, reproduction, sensitivity, desire, locomotion, or whether they are the mechanical properties of matter in motion—properties which vary only with the degrees of complexity in the organization of matter.

According to the doctrine which is sometimes called "animism" and sometimes "panpsychism," everything is alive; every body is besouled, though at the lower end of the scale the

For The issue of freedom and necessity in the philosophy of history *see* FATE 6 HISTORY 4a(1) 4a(3) WILL 7b and for the history of man's struggle for civil liberty and economic freedom *see* CITIZEN 9 LABOR 7c–7c(3) REVOLUTION 5a–5c 6a 7 TYRANNY 8

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection
II Works by authors not represented in this collection

For the date place and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

I

DANTE *On World Government or De Monarchia* BK I CH 12
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HEGEL *The Phenomenology of Mind* IV (B)
DOSTOEVSKY *The House of the Dead*

II

LUTHER *A Treatise on Christian Liberty*
CALVIN *Institutes of the Christian Religion* BK IV
SUAREZ *Disputationes Metaphysicae* XI (3) XIX XXX (16) XXXV (5)
DEFOE *The Shortest Way with the Dissenters*
LEIBNITZ *New Essays Concerning Human Understanding* BK II CH 21
FRANKLIN *Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity Pleasure and Pain*
VOLTAIRE *Essay on Toleration*
—— Liberty Liberty of Opinion Liberty of the Press Toleration in *A Philosophical Dictionary*
T REID *Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind* IV
PAINE *Rights of Man*
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GODWIN *An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice* BK II CH 4–6
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SCHELLING *Of Human Freedom*
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BYRON *Sonnet on Chillon*
—— *The Isles of Greece*
BENTHAM *On the Liberty of the Press*
EMERSON Self Reliance in *Essays* I
J H NEWMAN Private Judgment in VOL II *Essays and Sketches*
THOREAU *Civil Disobedience*
WHITMAN *Leaves of Grass*
LOTZE *Microcosmos* BK I CH I (4)
BURCKHARDT *Force and Freedom*
J F STEPHEN *Liberty Equality Fraternity*
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PÉGUY *Basic Verities* (Freedom)
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—— *The Study of Ethics* CH 8
—— *Characters and Events* VOL II BK III (14)
—— *Experience and Education* CH 5–6
—— *Freedom and Culture*
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—— The Roots of Liberty in *Freedom Its Meaning*
KOESTLER *Darkness at Noon*
MARITAIN A Philosophy of Freedom in *Freedom in the Modern World*
—— *Scholasticism and Politics* CH 5
BECKER *New Liberties for Old*
A J CARLYLE *Political Liberty*
BARKER *Reflections on Government* CH 1–2
MALINOWSKI *Freedom and Civilization*
BERDYAYEV *Freedom and the Spirit*
—— *Slavery and Freedom*
HOCKING *Freedom of the Press*
SIMON *Community of the Free* CH I

IN THE GREAT BOOKS the opposite position with respect to the living and non-living seems to appear for the first time with Descartes. It might be supposed that Lucretius, since he denies the soul as an immaterial principle would also tend to reject anything except a difference in degree between animate and inanimate bodies. But this is not the case. According to Lucretius living things are not merely more complex combinations of atoms and void. Their constitution includes a special type of soul-atom, whose round, smooth shape and speed of movement through all parts of the living body accounts for the powers and activities which are peculiar to that body. Lucretius is recognized as a materialist and a mechanist yet he sharply separates living from non-living bodies and appeals to a special principle—the soul atom—to explain this difference in kind.

As appears in the chapters on MIND and SOUL, Descartes is at variance not only with Lucretius but also with Aristotle, Galen, and Plotinus in his conception of the soul and of life. The soul is not a body or composed of bodies. Neither in his opinion, is it an immaterial principle conjoined with organic matter to constitute the living body. It is itself an immaterial substance quite separate from the human body to which it is allied.

Descartes tells us how he passed from a description of inanimate bodies and plants to that of animals, and particularly to that of man. He asks us to consider the supposition that "God formed the body of man altogether like one of ours without making use of any matter other than that which I have described and without at first placing in it a rational soul or any other thing which might serve as a vegetative or sensitive soul. He then goes on to say that examining the functions which might in accordance with this supposition exist in this body I found precisely all those which might exist in us without our having the power of thought and consequently without our soul—that is to say this part of us, distinct from the body of which it has been said that its nature is to think.

The mechanistic implications of his supposition are explicitly developed by Descartes in his consideration of Harvey's discovery of the motions of the heart and blood. These movements, he says, follow as necessarily from the very disposition of the organs as does that of a clock from the power the situation, and the form of its counterpoise and of its wheels. In these motions, as well as in the actions of the nerves, brain, and muscles, it is not necessary to suppose any other cause than those operating according to the laws of Mechanics which are identical with those of nature."

This will not seem strange Descartes adds, to those who know "how many different automata or moving machines can be made by the industry of man, without employing in so doing more than a very few parts in comparison with the great multitude of bones, muscles, nerves, arteries, veins or other parts that are found in the body of each animal. From this aspect the body is regarded as a machine which having been made by the hands of God is incomparably better arranged and possesses in itself movements which are much more admirable than any of those which can be invented by man. Only the functions of reason only the acts of thinking—not those of living—operate under other than the mechanical laws of corporeal nature. Whether living or not all bodies without reason or a rational soul are automata or machines. Whatever they do can be explained as a kind of clockwork—by the disposition and interaction of their parts.

ANOTHER SOURCE and another version of the view that the continuity of nature is uninterrupted comes from the theory of evolution. Darwin himself in his brief consideration of the origin of life deals mainly with the alternative hypotheses of the divine creation of a *single* original form or of *several* primitive forms from which the whole of the plant and animal kingdoms has developed by the natural steps of evolution. He rejects the division of the animate world into more than the two great kingdoms of plant and animal life and holds that man differs from other animals only in degree, not in kind.

As indicated in the chapters on ANIMAL and EVOLUTION Darwin questions the discontinuity between plants and animals. He refers to the intermediate forms which seem to belong to both kingdoms. He suggests the possibility that the lowest forms of animal life may have

signs of vitality remain hidden from ordinary observation Although this theory is usually attributed to a primitive view of nature it appears in a subtle form in certain philosophical developments which make soul or mind a principle as universal as matter There is one common substance says Marcus Aurelius though it is distributed among countless bodies which have their several qualities There is one soul though it is distributed among infinite natures and individual circumscriptions

The doctrine which in modern times is called mechanism conceives the continuity of nature in terms of the universality of purely mechanical principles It reduces all phenomena to the interaction of moving parts or particles No new principle is needed to explain the phenomena of life The laws of physics and chemistry suffice Biophysics and biochemistry simply deal with the mechanics of more complex material systems The apparent differences in function between living and non living things represent the same functions They are altered only in *appearance* by the more complex organization of the matter which is called living

THE CONTROVERSY over mechanistic principles in the analysis of life arose with great explicitness in the latter part of the nineteenth century and continues to our own day The chief opponents of the mechanists are those who at one time called themselves vitalists to signify their insistence upon an essential difference between vital and mechanical phenomena The work of Jacques Loeb can be taken to represent the mechanistic side of this controversy the writings of Bergson Haldane Whitehead the vitalist position

Those who regard the realm of living things as a distinct domain in nature also think that the study of living things has special concepts principles and methods as different from those of physics and chemistry as the objects studied are distinct

Biology is a science of ancient origin The Hippocratic collection of writings on health and disease the extensive biological researches of Aristotle the work of Galen represent more than a bare beginning of the science The ancient classification of vital functions establishes the terms of biological analysis Ideas which have come to seem obvious because of traditional acceptance were once great discoveries for example that all living bodies nourish themselves grow and reproduce that these are the minimal not the maximal functions of organic matter that there is a regular cycle of growth and decay in the normal life span which is itself different for different types of organisms that in the dynamic equilibrium between the living organism and its physical environment the organism actively maintains itself through a certain balance of exchanges in the biological economy of which breathing is a prime example

The great books of biological science from Aristotle to Harvey seem to be of one mind on the point that living matter possesses distinctive powers and performs functions which are not present *in any degree* in the realm of the inert or inorganic For the most part they reflect the theory that the living body possesses a soul which is the principle of its vitality and the source of the vital powers embodied in its various organs

In ancient and mediaeval theory the soul is not conceived as belonging peculiarly to man it is not identified with mind or with the intellectual faculties The word animal derives from the Latin name for soul—the principle of animation It is true that Galen distinguishes between what he calls the natural and the psychic faculties The latter for him are the powers of sensitivity desire and locomotion Yet his analysis of the vegetative powers of nutrition growth and reproduction which are common to plants and animals squares with Aristotle s conception of the vegetative soul

What has soul in it Aristotle writes differs from what has not in that the former displays life Now this word has more than one sense Living that is may mean thinking or perception or local movement and rest or movement in the sense of nutrition decay and growth Hence we think of plants also as living for they are observed to possess in themselves an originative power through which they increase and decrease in all spatial directions This power of self nutrition is the originative power the possession of which leads us to speak of things as *living*

IN THE GREAT BOOKS the opposite position with respect to the living and non living seems to appear for the first time with Descartes It might be supposed that Lucretius since he denies the soul as an immaterial principle would also tend to reject anything except a difference in degree between animate and inanimate bodies But this is not the case According to Lucretius living things are not merely more complex combinations of atoms and void Their constitution includes a special type of soul atom whose round smooth shape and speed of movement through all parts of the living body accounts for the powers and activities which are peculiar to that body Lucretius is recognized as a materialist and a mechanist yet he sharply separates living from non living bodies and appeals *to a special principle*—the soul atom—to explain this difference in kind

As appears in the chapters on MIND and SOUL, Descartes is at variance not only with Lucretius but also with Aristotle Galen and Plotinus in his conception of the soul and of life The soul *is not a* body or composed of bodies Neither in his opinion is it an immaterial principle conjoined with organic matter to constitute the living body *It is itself* an immaterial substance quite separate from the human body to which it is allied

Descartes tells us how he passed from a description of inanimate bodies and plants to that of animals and particularly to that of men He asks us to consider the supposition that God formed the body of man altogether like one of ours without making *use of any* matter other than that which I have described and without at first placing in it a rational soul or any other thing which might *serve as a* vegetative or sensitive soul. He then goes on to say that examining the functions which might in accordance with this supposition exist in *this body* I found precisely all those which might exist in us without our having the power of thought and consequently without our soul—that is to say this part of us distinct from the body of which it has been said that its nature is to think.

The mechanistic implications of his supposition are explicitly developed by Descartes in his consideration of Harvey s discovery of the motions of the heart and blood. These movements he says follow as necessarily from the very disposition of the organs as does that of a clock from the power the situation and the form of its counterpoise and of its wheels In these motions as well as in the actions of the nerves brain and muscles it is not necessary to suppose any other cause than those operating according to the laws of Mechanics which are identical with those of nature

This will not seem strange Descartes adds to those who know how many different automata or moving machines can be made by the industry of man without employing in so doing more than a very few parts in comparison with the great multitude of bones muscles *nerves arteries* veins or other parts that are found in the body of each animal From this aspect the body is regarded as a machine which having been made by the hands of God *is incomparably* better arranged and possesses in itself movements which are much more admirable than any of those which can be invented by man Only the functions of reason only the acts of thinking—not those of living—operate under *other than the mechanical* laws of corporeal nature Whether living or not all bodies without reason or a rational soul are automata or machines Whatever they do can be explained as a kind of clockwork—by the disposition and interaction of their parts

ANOTHER SOURCE and another version of the view that the continuity of nature is uninterrupted comes from the theory of evolution Darwin himself in his brief consideration of the origin of life deals mainly with the alternative hypotheses of the divine creation of a *single* original form or of *several* primitive forms from which the whole of the plant and animal kingdoms has developed by the natural steps of *evolution*. He rejects the division of the animate world into more than the two great kingdoms of plant and animal life and holds that *man* differs from other animals only in degree not in kind

As indicated in the chapters on ANIMAL and EVOLUTION Darwin questions the discontinuity between plants and animals *He refers* to the intermediate forms which seem to belong to both *kingdoms. He* suggests the possibility that the lowest forms of animal life may have

developed by natural evolutionary descent from plant organisms But he does not *seriously* consider the hypothesis of an evolutionary transition from inorganic matter to living organisms *Here on the contrary he seems to recognize* a difference in kind The most humble organism he writes is something much higher than the inorganic dust under our feet, and no one with an unbiased mind can study any living creature however humble without being struck with enthusiasm at its marvellous structure and properties He questions the notion that living organisms might have originated from inorganic matter by spontaneous generation Science has not as yet proved the truth of this belief he says whatever the future may reveal

Nevertheless with the extension of Darwin s theory of the origin of species into a doctrine of cosmic evolution what James calls the evolutionary afflatus leads writers like Tyndall and Spencer to talk as if mind grew out of body in a continuous way So strong a postulate is continuity James writes that the evolutionists try to leap over the breach between inorganic matter and consciousness

In a general theory of evolution he explains the inorganic comes first then the lowest forms of animal and vegetable life then forms of life that possess mentality and finally those like ourselves that possess it in a high degree

We are dealing all the time with matter and its aggregations and separations and although our treatment must perforce be hypothetical this does not prevent it from being *continuous* The point which as evolutionists we are bound to hold fast is that all the new forms of being that make their appearance are nothing more than results of the redistribution of the original and unchanging materials The self same atoms which chaotically dispersed made the nebula now jammed and temporarily caught in peculiar position form our brains and the evolution of the brains if understood would be simply the account of how the atoms came to be so caught and jammed In this story no new *natures* no factors not present at the beginning are introduced at any later stage

James is here presenting a theory which he himself rejects He recognizes the strength of the postulate of continuity in the theories of Spencer Tyndall and other evolutionists but he thinks the evident contrasts between living and inanimate performances favor the division of nature into two realms Yet he also seems to regard some degree of intelligence or mentality as an accompaniment of life Hence his criterion of the difference in kind between an intelligent and a mechanical performance —namely purposiveness or the pursuance of future ends and the choice of means —also serves as the mark of distinction between the animate and the inanimate

It is worth remarking that this criterion is one of the tests Descartes proposes for differentiating man from all the rest of nature man *alone having reason or thought It is also worth* noting that in associating different degrees of mentality or consciousness with life at all levels of development James himself affirms a continuity in the realm of all living things He *therefore does not go as far in the direction of* discontinuity as do those in the tradition of the great books who find an essential difference between the inanimate and the living between plant and animal and between brute and human life

The issues raised by these last two distinctions are further considered in the chapters on ANIMAL MAN and MIND Here we are concerned only with the fact that those who find genuine differences in kind in the world of animate things also tend to distinguish between the living and the non living by reference to the most generic properties of corporeal life that is the powers or functions shared by plants, animals and men The question of origins does not seem to be relevant to the problem of differences Aquinas for example does not seem to regard the hypothesis of the spontaneous generation of living organisms from putrefying *organic matter as inconsistent with his assertion* that the vegetative functions of plants and animals are not performed—*in any degree*—by inanimate bodies

When Aristotle says of natural bodies that *some have life in them others not* and by life we mean self nutrition and growth he is aware that the word growth occurs in the description of a certain type of change in inanimate bodies Other than living things increase in

size. To avoid an equi vocal use of the word growth " he assums three distinguishing char acteristics to th quantitati e chan e or increase in livin things (1) Any and every part of the growing magnitude is made b gger (2) by the accession of somethin, and (3) in such a way that the growing thing is preserved and persists.

To exem lify this difference Galen compares the growth of an organism with the expansion of a dried bladder wl en children blow air into it. The expanding bladder seems to grow but not as it did when it was a part of a living ani mal and when the growth of the whole in olved the growth of each part "In these doings of the children," Galen writes, the more the interior cavity of the bladder increases in size, the thin ner necessarily does its substance become But if th children were abl to bring nourishment to this thin part then they would make the bladd r b in the same way that Nature does.

To be distended in all directions belongs only to bodies whose grow th is directed by N ure for those which are distended by us undergo this distension in one direction but grow less in the others it is impossible to find a body which will remain entire and not be torn through whilst we stretch it in the three dimen sions. Thus Nature alone has the power to ex pand a body in all directions so that it remains unruptured and preserves completely its pre vious form."

Modern biologists sometimes compare the growth of crystals in solution with living gro th and reproduct on. Or making the point that other systems in dynamic equilibrium show in essence all the properties of l ing things they say that it is almost impossible to distinguish a candle flame from a liv ng organism. Aristotle considers the latter comparison and rejects it He observes that the growth of fire goes on wi hout limit so lon, as there is a supply of fuel" but no amount of nutriment can increase the size of liv ng things without limit "There is a limit or ratio which determines their size and increase and the limit and ratio are marks of the soul, but not of fire

The flame is a li ely thing but to say that it is al e that it grows or dies is in Aristotle s view a poetic metaphor not a scientific state ment. When I have plucked the rose " Othello says, "I cannot give it vital growth again it needs must wither But to the candle burning beside Desdemona s bed he says If I quench thee thou flaming minister I can again thy former light restore The flame is lit or ex tinguished by motions from without but the birth and death the nourishing and growth of the living thing is self movement

According to Aristotle and Aquinas self movement is the essential mark of being alive All things are said to be alive Aquinas writes which determine themselves to movement or operation of any kind whereas those things which cannot by their own nature do so cannot be called living except by a similitude He fur ther defines the meaning of self movement by distinguishing between the *transitive* action of one inert body upon another and the *immanent* activity of a living thing whereby the agent itself is perfected Growing sensing and under standing are immanent actions because they are activities which affect the growing sensing or understanding thing The result of such actions *remains in the agent* In contrast heating is a transitive action. In heating one thing *acts upon* another and the hot thing loses *its own* heat in the process.

As ital operations differ thus from the ac tions of inanimate bodies so do vital powers differ from the capacities of inert matter through which bodies can act upon or react to other bodies. The power of self movement (or immanent act vity) enables living things alone to change from a less perfect to a more perfect state of bein as measured by the thing s na ture rather than simply to change from con trary to contrary as a body changes when it mo es locally from this place to that or alters from hot to cold or cold to hot

FOR THE THEOLOGIAN there is an additional as pect to the problem of defining life If the realm of corporeal substances is di ided into inert and living bodies, what is to be said about incor poreal substances (e the angels) and about God? It is easier to think of the angels as *not being* than to conceive them as *not being alive* More than infinite or omnipotent or eter nal the ever living God is the phrase which, in the language of religious worship expresses positively the divine nature But the funda mental activities which distinguish li ing from

non living bodies (such as nutrition growth reproduction) are essentially corporeal in nature So too are sensing and locomotion What common meaning of life then can apply to material and spiritual beings?

Aquinas answers by saying that since a thing *is said to live in so far as it operates of itself* and not as moved by another the more perfectly this power is found in anything the more perfect is the life of that thing By this criterion plants are less perfectly alive than animals in whom self movement is found to a higher degree because of their sensitive faculties and among animals there are grades of life according to degrees of sensitivity, and according to the possession of mobility a power which certain animals seem to lack In both the higher *animals and in man there is purposive behavior* but man alone through his intellect and will can freely determine his own ends and choose the means to them hence these faculties give human life an even greater degree of self movement

But the action of the human intellect is not perfectly self determined for it depends in part upon external causes Wherefore Aquinas concludes that life in the highest degree belongs properly to God— that being whose act of understanding is its very nature and which in *what it naturally possesses is not determined* by another He quotes Aristotle s remark that the perfection of God s life is proportionate to the perfection of the divine intellect which is purely actual and eternally in act And he goes on to remark that in the sense in which understanding is movement and that which understands itself moves itself *Plato also taught that* God moves Himself

Nourishment growth and reproduction are indispensable features of corporeal life precisely because corporeal things are perishable They need reproduction, to preserve the species Aquinas writes and nourishment to preserve the individual Hence the higher powers of life such as sensing and understanding are never found in *corporeal things apart from* the vegetative powers This does not hold however for *spiritual* beings which are by nature imperishable Spiritual life is essentially immortal life

Subject to the ravages of time corporeal life at every moment betrays its mortality—in its need for sleep in the enfeeblement of its powers in disease decay or degeneration Death is the correlative of life for those who sharply divide the living from the non living Rocks may crumble into dust bodies may disintegrate and atoms explode—but they do not die Death is a change which only living matter undergoes

The transition from life to death accentuates the mystery of life The notion of spontaneous *generation aside life always seems to come from* life Whether by cell division or by germination the living thing that is generated comes from the living substance of another thing But when a living thing dies it crosses the gap between the living and the non living As the organic matter of the corpse decomposes nothing is left but the familiar inorganic elements and compounds This seems to be a change more radical *than generation or birth All the metaphysical* problems of form and substance of matter and the soul *of continuity and discontinuity* in nature which appear in the analysis of life become more intense in the understanding *of death*

As APPEARS in the chapter on IMMORTALITY the living are preoccupied with death not predominantly with analyzing it but with facing and fearing it *struggling against or embracing* it Death as the great poems reveal is the object *of soliloquy in moments of greatest* introspection or self appraisal To die well Montaigne points out requires greater moral stamina than to live well *For him* the essence of the philosophical temper as for others the meaning of heroism or martyrdom consists in facing death with an equanimity which reflects *the highest qualities of a well resolved life*

Montaigne devotes a long essay to the subject that to philosophise is to learn to die and begins it by quoting Cicero s statement that to study philosophy is nothing but to prepare one s self to die Socrates then is the prototype of the philosopher for in conversation with his *friends in prison while awaiting death he tells* them that the true votary of philosophy is always pursuing death and dying He tries to prove to them by his actions as well as by his words that the real philosopher has reason to be of good cheer *when he is about to die*

Not only death but the dead exercise a profound *effect upon the living The historians* describe the various forms which the ceremonials

of death take in every society. Whether the rituals are secular or sacred, they are among the most significant customs of any culture, for they reveal the value placed upon life and the conception of life's meaning and man's destiny. No deeper differences exist among the great religions than those which appear in the practices or sacraments in preparation for death and in the services for the dead.

The moral, social, and religious aspects of death appear to be peculiarly human. Yet on the biological level, the same fundamental instincts and emotions seem to prevail in animals and men. The struggle to remain alive may be presumed to occur in plants. But it is not there as plainly discernible as in the specific patterns of behavior manifested by the animal instinct of self-preservation. Almost in proportion to the degree of vitality, the instinct of self-preservation operates with a strength and pertinacity as vigorous as the love for life, and arouses as an emotional corollary an equally devouring fear of death.

The instinct of self-preservation is the life instinct. Directed toward the related ends of maintaining and increasing life are the reproductive impulses and the erotic instincts. But according to Freud there is in all living matter a more primitive instinct than these, and one which aims in the opposite direction. That is the death instinct—the impulse of the living to return to lifelessness.

"It would be contrary to the conservative nature of instinct," Freud writes, "if the goal of life were a state never hitherto reached. It must rather be an ancient starting point, which the living being left long ago, and to which it harks back again. ... If we may assume as an experience admitting of no exception that everything dies from causes within itself, and returns to the inorganic, we can only say 'The goal of all life is death.'"

The death instinct, according to Freud, originates with life itself. "At one time or another, by some operation of force which completely baffles conjecture, the properties of life were awakened in lifeless matter. ... The tension then aroused in the previously inanimate matter strove to attain an equilibrium; the first instinct was present, that to return to lifelessness." The death instinct acts against the tendency of the erotic instincts, which are always trying to collect living substances together into ever larger unities. The cooperation and opposition of these two forces produce the phenomena of life to which death puts an end.

Freud's hypothesis of the death instinct has a bearing on the impulse to commit suicide and on the question whether it is natural or perverse for men to choose this escape from the tensions and difficulties of life. The psychological problem here, especially with regard to the unconscious forms of the suicidal impulse, is not the same as *the moral problem. The question* whether animals other than men ever commit suicide, like the question whether the killing of one animal by another can be called "murder," indicates the difference between psychological description and moral judgment.

FOR THE MORALIST the condemnation of suicide seems to rest on the same grounds as the condemnation of murder. With Kant, for example, it represents the same type of violation of the universal moral law. The categorical imperative requires us to act always as if the *maxim of our* individual action could be universalized as a rule for all men to follow. But, in the case of suicide, as in the case of murder, the maxim of the action cannot be universalized without accomplishing a result which no one intends. Furthermore, suicide is not consistent with the idea of the human person as an end in itself. "The *man*," says Kant, "who destroys himself *in order to* escape from painful circumstances uses a person merely as a means to maintain a tolerable condition up to the end of life."

Suicide is also condemned by the theologians as a contravention of the divine as well as of the natural law. Men are God's handiwork and therefore, as Locke puts it, "they are His property ... made to last during His, not one another's pleasure." Under the natural law, a man is not at liberty to destroy himself, nor consequently is he at liberty to sell himself into slavery. Everyone "is bound to preserve himself and not quit his station wilfully." If, furthermore, there is an after life of rewards and punishments, suicide is no escape. "Death so snatched," Adam tells Eve in *Paradise Lost*, "will not exempt us from the pain we are by doom to pay."

There is similar reasoning in pagan antiquity Suicide is an act of violence and says Plotinus if there be a period allotted to all by fate to anticipate the hour could not be a happy act

If everyone is to hold in the other world a standing determined by the state in which he quitted this there must be no withdrawal as long as there is any hope of progress A Christian would add that to relinquish hope as long as life persists is the sin of despair

But the pagan tradition also speaks with an opposite voice For the Stoics suicide does not seem to be as reprehensible as murder To those who complain of life s pains and the fetters of the body Epictetus says The door is open In a doctrine in which all things that affect only the body are indifferent to the soul s well being death too is indifferent Death is the harbor for all this is the place of refuge as soon as you choose you may be out of the house "

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use th numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages eferred to For example, in **4** Ho IE *Iliad* BK II [65 283] **12d** the number **4** is the number of the volume in the set the number **12d** indicates that the passage is in section d of page 1

PAG S CTIO S When the text is pr ted in o e column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower hal es of th pa e For example in **53** JAMES *Psychology* **116a 119b** the passage beg ns in the upper half of pag 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119 When the text is p nted i tw columns, th lette s a and b refer to th upper and lo ver halves of the left hand side of the p ge the letters c and d to the upper a d lower hal es of the right hand side of the pag For example in **7** PLATO *Symposium* **163b-164c** the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand s de of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164

A TH S DI SI NS One or more of the main div sions of a work (such as PART BK, CH S CT) are sometim es in luded in the reference l e numbers, in brackets are gi en in certain cases *e g* *Iliad* K II [265 283] **12d**.

BIB REF EN S The refe ences are to book chapter and verse When the King James and Douay ersions differ i title of book or in the numberi g of chapters or verses, the King James version is cited first and the Do ay i d cated by a (*D*) follows *e g* OLD TESTMENT *N hem h* 7 45—(*D*) *II Esdr s* 46

SYMBOLS Th bbr iati n esp calls the reader s attention to one or mo e especially rele ant parts f a whole refe en e pass m s nifies that tl e top c is d scussed intermittently ather than continuously n the wo k or passage cited

For add tional information concerning the style of the refe ences see the Explanation of Reference Style f r general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface

1 The tur nd cause of life the oul as the principle of life in organ c bodies

OLD TES AM NT *Gene i* 1:20-27 2 7 / *J b* 12:9-1

7 PLATO *Cratyl s* **93c** / *Pha d us* **124b-d** / *Phaed* **223c-d 225b 244b 246c** / *Gorgias* **275d 277b** passim / *Laws* BK X **763a 764a**

8 A ISTOTLE *Topics* BK VI CH 0 [148ª23 37] **202b-c** / *Metaphysics* K V CH 4 [1 14ᵇ22 26] **535a** 8 [0 7ᵇ 0-17] **538b** K VII CH 10 [035ᵇ14 28] **559a b** K X C 6 [1 48ᵇ18 34] **574a c** BK XII CH 7 [072ᵇ14 29] **602d 603a b** X II CH 2 [077ª20-23] **608c** / *So l* BK I **631a 641d** p ss m K II CH 1 4 **642 647b** BK I CH 12 3 **667a-668d** / *Youth Life a d Breathing* CH 1 4 **714a 716b** CH 14 **720d 721**

9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of A imals* BK I CH 1 [64 ᵇ 3?-64 33] **163 164b** / *Gener t f A mal* CH 19 [726ᵇ15 29] **266d 267** BK II CH 1 [3 29-33] **272a b** [734ᵇ20-735ª9] **275b-d** CH 3 [737ª18 34] **278a b** CH 5 [741ª6-31] **282a b** K III CH [6 8-ᵇ22] **303b-d**

10 G L N *Natur l Fa ult* BK I CH 1 **167a b** BK II CH 3 **185 b**

12 LU ETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [865 1022] **26a 28a** K III [94 416] **31b-35c** BK V [783-8 5] **71b d**

17 PLOTI US *First E n ad* TR 1 **1a 6b** pas m / *Seco d Ennead* TR II CH 12 13 **46c-47b** / *Th d Ennead* TR VI CH 3 **108b** TR VIII C 8 **133a b** / *Fourth Ennead* TR III CH 8 **146c d** CH 9 **147b c** CH 19 **151d 152b** CH 23 **153d** TR IV CH 29 **173b 174b** TR V CH 7 **188b-c** TR II CH 2-5 **192a 194a** CH 14 **200b-c** / *Fifth Enn ad* TR I CH 2 **208c 209** / *S th En ad* TR IV CH 1 **297b d** CH 4-6 **299a 300b** CH 16 **305a** TR V CH 12 **310b d**

18 AUGU TIN *City of G d* BK XI CH 25 **358b 359** BK XIII CH **360b-361a** BK XXII CH 24 **609c 610a** / *Christian Doctrine* K I H 8 **626c-627a**

19 AQ N S *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 1 NS **14b 15b** Q 4 A 2 REP 3 **21b 22b** Q 10 A E 2 **40d-41d** Q 18 **104b 108c** Q 27 A 2 AN **154c 155b** Q 51 A EP 3 **275b-276b** A 3 **27 a 2 8c** Q 69 A 2 **361 362** Q 7 A 3 A S and REP 2-5 **365b-367a** QQ 1-72 **367a 369d** QQ 75 76 **378a 399b** pass m Q 97 A 3 ANS **515a d** QQ 1 8 19 **600a-608d** passim

20 AQU N S *Summa Theol gica* P RT I-II Q 56 A R 1 **30a-c** ARt 1 II Q 23 A 2 REP 2 **483d-484d** PART III Q A 5 **715a 716b** Q 5 A 3 **737d 739a**

[641b5-10] 164b-c BK II CH 10 [655b3-656a14] 181d 182b BK I CH 5 [685a12-13] 211d CH 10 [686b3-689a] 218b-c / *Mo. on of A i mals* CH 6-11 235d 239d esp CH 10 238c 239a / *Gait of Animals* CH 4 244a 245a / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH 23 [731a24-b8] 271d BK II CH 3 [736a25-b29] 276d 277 CH 4 [740b25]-CH 5 [741a3] 281d 281b BK III CH 7 [757b14-3] 298c-d CH 11 [761a2-b23] 301b-d / *Ethics* BK I CH 7 [1097b33-1098a7] 343b CH 13 [1102a33-1103a3] 347d 348c / *Politics* BK VII CH 13 [1332a39-b8] 537a b
10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* 167a 215d esp BK I, CH 1 167 b, CH 5-8 169b-171a
11 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [258-322] 33b-34b
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 6 111a-c BK II, CH 8 146a b
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK III SECT 16 262d 263a,c BK V SECT 16 271c-d BK VIII SECT 7 286a BK IX SECT 9 292b-d
16 KEPLER *Epitome* BK I 854b-856a
17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR I CH 1 7 1a-4a passim CH 11 5b-c TR IV CH 3 13d / *Fourth Ennead*, TR III CH 19 151d 152b CH 23 153d 154b TR IV CH 28 172a 173b TR VII CH 14 200b-c TR X, CH 3 206a b / *Fifth Ennead*, TR II, CH 2 215a-c
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK VII CH 23 257b-c CH 29 261 b BK XIX H 13 519a / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 8 626c-627a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 3 A 1 REP 1 14b-15b Q 8 A 1 3 104c 107c Q 27 A 2, ANS 154c 155b Q 42 A 1 REP 1 245c 24 Q 51 A 3 277 2 8c Q 69 2 361c 362 Q 70 A 3 365b-36 QQ 1 6 36 a 369d Q 75, A 5 378b-379c A 6 RE 1 383c 384c Q 76 A 5 RE 3 4 394c 396a QQ 7-83 399b-440b Q 98 516d 519a QQ 1 8-1 9 600a-608d PART I-II Q A 8-9 692a-693d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I D, 4 1 3 350d 351d II Q A 9, ANS 751d 752c
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XXV [3-84] 91d 92b PARADISE II [1 148] 11 b-c
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel* BK III 137b-c 138a 139b 192d
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 369d 3 0b 334d 390b passim 397b-398c 441 443b 444c-445c 44 a b 456b-458a esp 4 7a-d
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK APH 30 159c-d APH 45 185d
31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART V 56a b 59a 60c *Objections and Replies* 156a-d 207 244b-c
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II PROP 5 SCHOL 413b
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK [469-490] 185b-185a 5 T [307-335] 223b-224b [35-350] 224b-229a
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 5 185b-186a 339-344 233a b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH IX SECT 11 15 140b-141a CH XX 11 SECT 4-6 220a d BK III C 1 SECT 1 271d 272b BK I CH X 1 ECT 12 370c 371
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 337d 338a
42 KANT *Pure Reason* 199c 200c / *Judgement* 578d 580a 583b-c 602b d [fn 1]
45 FARADAY *Researches in Electricity* 836d
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 3a b 47c-49c 60b-61d 64a d 71a-d 241b-c / *Descent of Man* 331b-c
53 JAMES *Psychology* 4a a 68b-73b esp 68b, 71a 9 b 699a
54 FREUD *Narcissism* 401a-d / *Instincts* 415b / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 647 648a 648b-c 651d-654b 654d-657d esp 656a 657b-c 659d-661c / *Ego and Id* 708d 09b 711c 712a / *New Introductory Lectures* 851a-c

3a Continuity or discontinuity between plants and animals comparison of plant and animal nutrition respiration growth and reproduction

7 PLATO *Republic* BK VIII 403b-d / *Timaeus* 469d-4 0a
8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK CH 10 [145a-3 38] 202b-c / *Physics* BK II CH 8 [199a-b13] 2 6c-d / *Heavens* K II CH 12 [9 b 11] 384a / *Soul* BK I CH 5 [410b16-411a2] 640d-641a K II CH 2 [413a20-b4] 643b-c CH 4 [415b28-416a5] 646a-b / *Sleep* CH 1 696a-697c
9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK IV CH 6 [531b8-9] 58b BK V CH 1 [539a15 26] 65b-d CH 11 [543b23 31] 0c BK III CH 1 [588b4 589a2] 114d 115b / *Parts of Animals* BK II CH 3 [650a5 3] 174c 175a CH 10 [655b 7-656a9] 181d 182a BK I CH 4 [6 36-67 15] 207d 208a CH 5 [681 10-b9] 211c 212b CH 6 [682b26- 8] 213d CH 10 [686b3-68 1] 218b-c / *Gait of Animals* CH 4 [705a26-b9] 244 b / *Generation of Animals* BK I CH 1 [715b17-716a2] 255d 256a CH 23 271b-d BK II CH 1 [32a12 24] 272c [735a13 26] 275d 276a CH 3 [36a24 b14] 276d 277b CH 4 [740a-4]-CH 5 [41a32] 281b-282b BK III CH 2 [752 10-23] 293a b CH 5 [55b6- 3] 296c-d CH 7 [75 b14 3] 298c d CH 11 302b-304d K V CH [8b30 9a] 321a b / *Ethics* K I H 3[34 b4] 347d / *Politics* K I CH 2 [25 6-31] 445c
10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK I CH 1 167 b
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK II [700-710] 23d 24 BK V [83-8 0] 71b-d
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK II CH 8 146a b
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 18 A ANS and RE 2 104c 105c A 2 R P 1 105c 106b A 3 ANS and RE 3 106b-107 Q 69, A 2, REP 361c 362c Q 72 A R 1 5 368b-369d Q 1 8 A 1 esp R P 2 600a-601c Q 119 604c-608d
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, K III 143a 144c

(3 *The modes or grades of corporeal life the classification and order of the various vital powers or functions 3a Continuity or discontinuity between plants and animals comparison of plant and animal nutrition respiration growth and reproduction*)

28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 278b 299b c / *Circulation of the Blood* 327d 328a / *On Animal Generation* 368a b 369d 370b 372b 384c d 397c 398c 428c 429a 442b c 449a b 457c d 461b d 468b 469b 471b c
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 27 158a b
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH IX SECT II 15 140b 141a passim BK III CH VI SECT 12 271d 272b
42 KANT *Judgement* 579d 580a 582b c
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 37 119c
45 LAVOISIER *Elements of Chemistry* PART II 57b c
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 47c 49c passim esp 49a c 115b 241b c / *Descent of Man* 372b-c
53 JAMES *Psychology* 8a

3*b* The grades of animal life types and degrees of mobility and sensitivity analogies of structure and function

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* I 20-25
8 ARISTOTLE *Posterior Analytics* BK II CH 14 [98 20- 3] 134a / *Soul* BK II CH 2 [413^{b}4-10] 643c [414 1-3] 644a BK III CH II [433^{b}31-434 9] 666d CH 12 13 667a 668d / *Sense and the Sensible* CH I [436^{b}12-437 17] 673c 674a CH 5 [443^{b}17-445 4] 681c 682d / *Youth Life and Breathing* 714a 726d passim
9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* 7a 158d esp BK I CH 1-6 7a 13a BK II CH I 19b d 23d BK IV CH 8 59d 62a BK V CH I 65a 66a BK VIII CH I 114b d 115b / *Parts of Animals* 161a 229d passim esp BK I CH 4 167d 168c CH 5 [645^{b}1-646 5] 169b d / *Gait of Animals* 243a 252a c / *Generation of Animals* 255a 331a c esp BK I CH I 19 255a 268a BK II CH I 272a 276a BK III 290a 304d BK IV CH 4-6 311c 317d BK V 320a 331a c
10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK III CH 199d 200a
12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK III SECT 16 262d 263a c
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 18 A 2 REP I 105c 106b A 3 ANS 106b 107c Q 50 A 4 REP I 273b 274b QQ 71-72 367a 369d Q 76 A 5 REP 3 394c 396a Q 78 A I ANS and REP 4 407b 409a
28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 274b d 277b 278d 280c 283a 299b 302c / *On Animal Generation* 336b d 338a-496d esp 449a-454c 463d 464a 470c-472c
30 BACON *Novum Organum* BK II APH 27 158a APH 30 159c d
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH IX SECT II 15 140b 141a BK III CH VI SECT 12 271d 272b
35 HUME *Human Understanding* SECT IX DIV 8 487b c
42 KANT *Judgement* 578d 580a esp 579b-c 602b d [fn I]
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 273a 274a 279a b
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 75b 78c 82d 94c 112b 113c 207a 229a c esp 228c 229a c 238b-239a / *Descent of Man* 255a 265d 271a 275c 278c 284b 300a b 331a 341d esp 332a-c, 337a 341d 348b-c 402b-c
53 JAMES *Psychology* 13a 14b 19b-42b passim esp 40a 41b 51a 52a 705b 706b
54 FREUD *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 651d 654b esp 653b 654a / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 768d 769a

4 The biological economy the environment of the organism the interdependence of plants and animals

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* I II 13 20-31
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK II 63b-c 64b c BK III 112d 113b
7 PLATO *Republic* BK VI 377c d / *Timaeus* 469d 470a
8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK II CH [194^{b}13] 271a / *Meteorology* BK IV CH I 482b d-483c / *Longevity* 710a 713a c
9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK I CH I [487 14 ^{b}5] 8a b BK V CH II [543^{b}19-31] 70b c CH 22 [553^{b}20 23] 80c CH 31 [557 4 32] 83d 84a BK VI CH 17 [570^{b}29 571 2] 96d BK VIII CH 2 29 115c 132d esp CH 2 13 115c 125b CH 16 20 127b 129b CH 28 29 131c 132d BK IX CH I [608^{b}19]-CH [610^{b}19] 134a 136b CH 31 [618^{b}9 13] 144a b CH 32 [619 27 31] 144d 145a CH 37 [622 8 15] 147c / *Parts of Animals* BK IV CH 8 [684 1 14] 215b CH 12 [693 10 24] 225a / *Gait of Animals* CH 15 [713 3] CH 18 [714^{b}8] 250d 252a / *Generation of Animals* BK III CH 10 [760 2, ^{b}28] 301b d
10 HIPPOCRATES *Airs Waters Places* 9a 19a c esp PAR I 2 9a-c
10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK II CH 8-9 191b 199a c
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [784 787] 40b BK V [837-877] 72a c [925 1010] 73b 74b
17 PLOTINUS *Fourth Ennead* TR IV CH 32 175d 176a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 69 A 2 361c 362c QQ 71-72 367a 369d Q 118 A I REP 3 600a 601c
28 GALILEO *Two New Sciences* FIRST DAY 160c d SECOND DAY 187d 188c
28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation* 453c
33 PASCAL *Equilibrium of Liquids* 401a-403a / *Weight of Air* 415a b
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 224a b 295b 296b

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of La s* BK XIV 102b d 104a
38 RO SSEAU *Inequality* 334b d 337d passim
39 S ITH *We lth of Nat o s* K I 33c 34a 63a b
40 GI O *Decline a d Fa l* 428c-d
42 KANT *Judgement* 53c 554b 583b-c 584d 585c
45 LA OI IER *Elements of Chemistry* PART II 57b-c
45 FOURIER *Theory f H at* 209b
48 ME VILLE *M by D k* 227b 228a
49 D WIN *Origin of Species* 9b 10d 32a-41c esp 38b-39a 49d 55b esp 52d 53a 53d 55b 65a d 68b-69c 81a-c 181a 206a c p ssim esp 184d 188c 204d 206a 242d 243d / *Descent of Man* 268b-269a 341b d [fn 32] 350b 356a 424 -425d 430d-432c 442a-443b 525b 527c 554d 555b
53 JAM S *Psychology* 701a

5 Normal v tality and its impairment by d s e se degeneration and enfeeblement with age

7 PLATO *Timaeus* 471d-474d
8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK V I C 3 [246a 0-b19] 329c 330a / *Heaven* BK II CH 6 [288b 5 19] 380 b / *So l* BK I CH 4 [408b18 29] 638c
9 A ISTOTLE *Hist ry f Animals* K VI CH 25 103c BK VII CH I [58 b -58 4] 107b-c / *Parts f A im l* K II C 5 [651 37 b 8] 176c H 7 177 179 esp [653b1 7] 178d 179a / *Generation of An mals* BK I CH 18 [725b 18-25] 265d 266a BK I CH 2 [766b27 34] 308b BK V H I [780a 4 b 2] 322b-d C I 4 [784 31 b37] 326b-d
10 H PPOCR T *Ancient M d cine* par 3 4 1d 2c par 9-22 3b 8d
10 G LEN *Natur l Faculties* BK II CH 8-9 191b 199 c esp CH 8 194c d, CH 9 195c 196a
12 LUCRETIUS *Nat of Things* K II [1105 1174] 29a 30a c BK III [445 458] 35d 36a
12 AU ELIUS *Meditat s* BK III SECT I 259b d
20 AQUI AS *Summ Theologic* I P L, Q 7 A I REP 7 893d 895d
22 CHAUCER *Reeve's Prologue* [3862 3896] 224a b / *W fe f Bath Prologue* [6051-6062] 263b-264a
24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and P t gruel* BK III 181d 182b
25 MO TAIGNE *Essays* 33b-c 156d 158a 394a 395b 406c-408b
26 S KES EAR *Ist Henry VI* ACT II S V [1 16] 12d 13a / *As You Like It* CT I S VII [37- 66] 608d-609a
28 H EY *M tio f the Heart* 296a-d / *O Animal Gener tion* 433 -c 493a b
32 M LTON *Paradise Lost* K XI [527-543] 310b 311
34 EWTON *Optic* I 384b-385b
36 SWIFT *G ver* PA T I I 127 128a
36 S ERNE *Tristram Shandy* 352b-353a
38 ROUSSEAU *Pol tical Economy* 368d 369a / *Social Contract* BK III 419c d
49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 143d 145c esp 145a / *D scent of Man* 256c 323c 327b passim 354a 355c
51 TOLSTOY *Wa and Peace* BK X 449b-c BK XI 499c 500c BK XV 617a b EPILOGUE I 665 d
53 J ES *Psychology* 19b-41a passim esp 21a 26b 44a-47a 431b-433a 815
54 FREUD *Beyond the Pleasu e Pr nciple* 655b-657d / *I h bitions Symptoms an Anxiety* 718a 719d

5a The nature and causes of health

6 HE ODOTUS *History* BK IV 157a
7 PLATO *Charm des* 2d 3b / *Symposium* 155d 157a / *Gorgia* 282c 283a / *Republic* BK I I 334b 337 BK IV 355b d / *Timaeus* 474d 475d / *Ph lebus* 616d 617a
8 A ISTOTLE *Categories* CH 8 [8b25-9a28] 13d 14b pass m / *Topics* BK III CH I [116b17 21] 163a b / *Physics* BK VII CH 3 [246a10-b19] 329c 330a / *Heavens* BK II CH 12 [292 14 b18] 383d 384b / *Metaphy ics* BK V CH 20 [1 22b 10-13] 544a / *So l* BK I CH 4 [4 8 I 2] 637c BK I CH 2 [414 4 14] 644a b / *Sense and the Sensible* CH 5 [445 17 31] 683a b
9 ARISTOTLE *History of A imals* BK III CH 19 [520b19-521 15] 45c-46a BK VII CH I [581b25 58 4] 107b-c / *Parts of A mals* BK II CH 5 [651 37 b 7] 176c CH 7 177c 179a BK IV CH 2 [677a5 b1] 206d 207b / *Ethics* BK II CH 2 [1104 10-19] 349c BK V CH I [1129 12 25] 376b-c H II [1138a29-32] 386d BK VI CH 12 [1143b21 1144 5] 393b-c passim BK VII CH 14 [1154b17 20] 406a c / *Politics* BK II CH 17 [133 4 39] 541a c / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 5 [1361b3 7] 602a CH 7 [1363b34 1364a5] 605b
10 HIPPOCRATES *Ancient M d cine* p r 13 19 4c 7b / *Regimen in Acut Dise ses* par 9 29d / *Surgery* par 20 73d / *Articulat s* par 58 113a / *Sacr d Di a e* 156b c
10 GA EN *N tur l Facult es* BK II CH 8 194c d CH 9 195c 196a
12 LU RETIUS *N ture f Th gs* BK III [558-565] 37b
12 AURELIUS *Med tations* BK V SECT 8 269d 270b
18 AU USTIN *C ty of God* BK XIX CH 13 519 BK XXI CH 24 610c 611a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologi a* PART I II Q 49 A 2 2b-4a 3 REP 3 4b 5 A 4 ANS 5 6a Q 50 A I ANS and R P 2 3 6a 7b A 3 REP 2 8b 9 Q 51 A I 12b 13c Q 52 A I ANS 15d 18a A 2 ANS 18a 19a Q 54 A I NS 22d 23d
24 RABELAIS *G rgantua d P ntagru l* BK III 134d 135a BK IV 234a 235a 239d 240a
25 MONT I N *Es s* 233c 236a passim 368d 369d 370a 528c 529b
28 H RVEY *Mot n f the Heart* 296d 297a / *On A imal Generat o* 433a-c 493 b

(5 Normal vitality and its impairment by disease degeneration and enfeeblement with age 5a The nature and causes of health)

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 72b
32 MILTON *Areopagitica* 407b
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 412a-417a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 335a b 336b 337a
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK IV 293d 294b
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 87d 88a
42 KANT *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 368d 369a / *Judgement* 509c d
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 171d 172a
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 324d 356d 357c
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 52d
54 FREUD *General Introduction* 635b c

5b The restorative function of rest or sleep

5 SOPHOCLES *Philoctetes* [821-832] 189c
8 ARISTOTLE *Sleep* 696a 701d esp CH 2 [455^b13-$^b18$] 698b-c
9 ARISTOTLE *Parts of Animals* BK II CH 7 [653 11-20] 178b c / *Ethics* BK I CH 13 [1102 34-$^b13$] 347d 348a
10 HIPPOCRATES *Prognostics* par 10 21c
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [907-961] 56a d
26 SHAKESPEARE *Midsummer Night's Dream* ACT III SC II [431-436] 367c / *2nd Henry IV* ACT III SC I [1 31] 482d 483a / *Henry V* ACT IV SC I [270-301] 554b c
27 SHAKESPEARE *King Lear* ACT IV SC IV [1 20] 272b c / *Macbeth* ACT II SC II [35 43] 291c d / *Henry VIII* ACT V SC I [1 5] 578a / *Sonnets* XXVII 590c
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 413b
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 348b 349b
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 337c
39 SMITH *Wealth of Nations* BK I 35a b
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 352b c
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [4613-4727] 115a 117b
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 91b
50 MARX *Capital* 112b 128a b
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK III 144d 146d BK XII 554b d BK XIII 584c
54 FREUD *General Introduction* 478c d 617b c

5c The nature and causes of disease

OLD TESTAMENT *Leviticus* 26 16 / *Numbers* 12 10-15 16 46-50 / *Deuteronomy* 28 21-22 27-28 35 58-62 / *II Kings* 5 7—(D) *IV Kings* 5 27 / *I Chronicles* 21 14 15—(D) *I Paralipomenon* 21 14 15 / *II Chronicles* 26 18 21—(D) *II Paralipomenon* 26 18-21 / *Job* 2 7 / *Psalms* 107 17 20—(D) *Psalms* 106 17-20
APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 37 9-31—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 37 32 34 / *II Maccabees* 3 27-29—(D) OT *II Machabees* 3 27 29
NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 9 32-33 17 14 18 / *I Corinthians* 11 25 30
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 32c d 38a b BK II 64c d BK III 96c BK IV 135c d 157a
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 399b-401b
7 PLATO *Symposium* 155d 157a esp 156d / *Republic* BK III 334b 337a BK IV 345b-c 355b-c BK X 435a c / *Timaeus* 472a 474b
8 ARISTOTLE *Physics* BK VII CH 3 [246^a10-$^b19$] 329c 330a / *Meteorology* BK IV CH 7 [384^a25-34] 488c
9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK III CH 11 [518^b2-4] 43a CH 15 [519^b15-20] 44c CH 19 [521 10-32] 46a b BK VII CH 1 [581^b-584] 107b c CH 12 114c BK VIII CH 18 27 127b-131b passim CH 29 132c d / *Parts of Animals* BK II CH 5 [651 37-$^b18$] 176c CH 7 [653^b1-] 178d 179a BK III CH 7 [670^b5-11] 199a BK IV CH 2 [677 5-$^b1$] 206d 207b / *Generation of Animals* BK IV CH 7 317d 318b BK V CH 4 [784 31-$^b35$] 326b d / *Ethics* BK II CH 2 [1104 10-19] 349c BK V CH 1 [1129 12 25] 376b-c CH 11 [1138 29-32] 386d BK VII CH 8 [1150^b 29-35] 401c d
10 HIPPOCRATES *Ancient Medicine* par 1 1a b par 3 1d 2b par 6 2d 3a par 9-11 3b-4b par 13-22 4c 8d / *Airs Waters Places* par 1 10 9a 14a par 22 17b 18a / *Regimen in Acute Diseases* par 9 10 29d 30d APPENDIX par 1 35c d par 3 35d 36a par 5-6 36b 37a par 17 40d-41a / *Epidemics* BK I SECT I par 1 44a b SECT II par 7-8 47a c BK III SECT III par 1 2 56d 57a par 15 59b / *Surgery* par 20 73d / *Fractures* par 31 87a / *Articulations* par 11 96a b par 58 113a / *Aphorisms* SECT II par 51 133d SECT III par 1 19 134a d SECT V par 16-24 138b-c / *Fistulae* par 1 150a / *Hemorrhoids* par 1 152b / *Sacred Disease* 154a 160d esp 155d 156a 160b d
10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK II CH 8 9 191b-199a c passim BK III CH 12 208b 209b esp 208d
12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [459-614] 36a 38a BK VI [769-829] 90c 91b [1090-1286] 94d 97a c
17 PLOTINUS *Second Ennead* TR IX CH 14 74b d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 71 A 1 REP 3 105d 106c Q 72 A 5 ANS 115a 116b Q 77 A 3 ANS 147c 148b Q 88 A 1 ANS 193a 194b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II 151b c
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 330b c 367b 368a 369d 370a 371c d 528c 529b
28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 296a d / *Circulation of the Blood* 305a d 316c d 321d 322a / *On Animal Generation* 386d 387a 407a 423b 433a c 455d-456a 493a b
30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 52b d
31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART VI 61c
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK XI [477-548] 309b 311a
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART IV 155b 157a 161b 162a

8. The concern of the living with life and death

8a The love of life: the instinct of self preservation; the life instinct

8b The desire for death: the death instinct; the problem of suicide

(6 *The life span and the life cycle* 6c *The biological characteristics of the stages of life*)

317d CH 8 [776^{b}15 23] 318d BK V CH I [778^{b}20–779^{b}13] 321a d [780 14–^{b}9] 3 2b d CH 3 [781^{b}30–782 19] 324a b CH 3 [783^{b}2] CH 8 [789^{b}21] 325c 331a c passim / *Politics* BK VII CH 16 [1335^{b}7 34] 540a b / *Rhetoric* BK II CH 12 [1389 2–6] 636b CH 13 [1390 11–16] 637c CH 14 [1390^{b}9 11] 638a

10 HIPPOCRATES *Injuries of the Head* par 18 69a b / *Articulations* par 12 96a b par 29 99c par 41 103c 104b par 52–53 109b 111a par 55 111a c par 60 113b d / *Aphorisms* SECT I par 13 14 131d SECT II par 39 133c par 53 133d SECT III par 3 134a par 18 134d par 24–31 135a b SECT VI par 6 140c par 30 141a par 57 141d SECT VII par 82 144a / *Sacred Disease* 157b 158b

10 GALEN *Natural Faculties* BK II CH 8 193a d

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [445–458] 35d 36a BK IV [1037 1057] 57d

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK III SECT I 259b d

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III SUPPL, Q 70 A I REP 7 893d 895d

22 CHAUCER *Reeve's Prologue* [3862–3896] 224a b / *Wife of Bath's Prologue* [6051–6062] 263b 264a

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 33b c 156d 158a c 339a d 394a 395b 406c–408b 429d–430a

26 SHAKESPEARE *1st Henry VI* ACT II SC V [1–16] 12d 13a / *2nd Henry IV* ACT I SC II [201–208] 472a b / *Henry V* ACT V SC II [167 174] 565a / *As You Like It* ACT II SC VII [137 166] 608d 609a

27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT II SC II [197 206] 42c d / *King Lear* ACT I SC I [91 312] 247c d ACT II SC IV [148 158] 260a

28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 281a 282c 300b c / *On Animal Generation* 352c 363d 383c 391a c 449a 454c

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK XI [527–543] 310b 311a

34 NEWTON *Optics* BK I 384b 385b

36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART III 127a 128a

36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 352b 353b

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 336a b

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 306d 307a 360b

47 GOETHE *Faust* PART II [11 531 538] 280b

49 DARWIN *Origin of Species* 11d 12a 219d 225b passim esp 219d 220a 221b 222a 257c 258a 377c 381d passim esp 377d 378c 381c d 511a 525a 562c 563a

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK V 209a c BK VIII 305b 310d passim BK X 391d 394d BK XIII 584c 586c EPILOGUE I 659d 660b 665a d

53 JAMES *Psychology* 431b 433a 714a 715b

54 FREUD *Origin and Development of Psycho Analysis* 15a 16c / *Sexual Enlightenment of Children* 119d 120b / *General Introduction* 572d 576a passim esp 573a b 574a c 579b 580d / *Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety* 746c d / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 770b

7 The causes and occurrence of death the transition from life to death

4 HOMER *Odyssey* BK XI [215 224] 245b BK XVII [290–327] 280a c

7 PLATO *Phaedo* 223c d 225b 246c / *Gorgias* 292d / *Republic* BK X 434c–436a / *Timaeus* 471d 472a

8 ARISTOTLE *Soul* BK III CH 13 [435^{b}4 19] 668 / *Youth Life and Breathing* CH 4 27 715d 726d

9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK I CH 4 [489 20 22] 10b c BK V CH 20 [553^{a}12 16] 79d 80a BK VII CH 12 [588^{a}7–9] 114c / *Parts of Animals* BK II CH 7 [653^{b}1 7] 178d 179a BK III CH 4 [667 32 ^{b}14] 195c-d / *Generation of Animals* BK II CH 5 [741^{b}15 24] 282d

10 HIPPOCRATES *Prognostics* par 2 3 19b 20b par 9 21b c / *Regimen in Acute Diseases* APPENDIX par 9 38b c / *Aphorisms* SECT II par 44 133c SECT VI par 18 140d

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK III [417, 829] 35c 40c

12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK IV SECT 5 264b BK VI SECT 28 276c

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR VI CH 6 24a TR IX 34b d

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIII CH 9–11 363c 365c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 119 A I REP 4 604c 607b

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 72 A 5 ANS 115a 116b Q 85 A 6 182d 184a Q 88 A I ANS 193a 194b

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 156d 157b 176c 180b 530a c

26 SHAKESPEARE *Henry V* ACT II SC III [1 8] 541a b

28 HARVEY *Motion of the Heart* 276d 278a 296a d / *On Animal Generation* 407a b 433a c 493a b

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 52d 53a

31 DESCARTES *Objections and Replies* 127c d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 4 425b d PROP 39 436b 437a

38 ROUSSEAU *Political Economy* 368d 369a / *Social Contract* BK III 419c d

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 306d 307a

48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 351a b

49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 326b 327a 383d 384c

50 MARX *Capital* 122c 124a 194b 195b 228d 229b 318a b

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 44b 45b BK IV 180d 183c BK X 406c–410c BK XI 499c 500c BK XII 558a 562d BK XV 624d 625b EPILOGUE I 650d 651a

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI 149c 150d BK VII 170c 177b

54 FREUD *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 652b 653a 654c 657d / *Ego and Id* 708d 709a 711d 712a

II Timothy 1 10 4 6-8 / *Hebre s* 2 9 18 9 27 28 / *Jam s* 4 13 16 / *I John* 3 14 / *Rev l t o* 2 10-11 6 8 9 6 14 13 20 6 21 4—(D) *Ap calypse* 2 10-11 6 8 9 6 14 13 20 6 21 4

4 H ME *Il ad* BK VI [144 151] 41c [482 493] 45 BK XII [290-3 8] 85b c BK X II [65 126] 130d 131 BK XIX [98 237] 139a b BK XXI [462 467] 153a BK XXII 155a 160d esp [289-305] 158b [355 366] 159 / *Odyssey* BK XI 243a 249d esp [477 489] 247d

5 A SCHYLU *Prom theus Bou d* [249-253] 42d

5 SOPHOCLE *Oed p s at Colon s* [1579-1779] 128c 130a c / *Ant go e* [332 375] 134a b

5 EU IPIDES *Rhesus* [756-761] 209d / *Alcestis* 237 247 c / *Hera leidae* [593-596] 253b / *S ppliants* [1108 1113] 268a / *Hecuba* [342 582] 355d 357d / *Heracle Mad* [275 326] 367c d / *Iph gen a at Aulis* 425a-439d esp [211 1252] 436 c

6 HER DOTUS *H story* K I 6c 10a 20b 21a B II 64d 65 BK V 183b-c BK VII 224c 225a BK I 281d 282a K IX 303c 304a

6 THUCYDID S *Pel ponne a W a* BK II 395c 399a esp 397d 398d 400d 401a

7 PLATO *Laches* 34d / *Sympos m* 166b-c / *Ap logy* 205d 206d 207c d 211b 212a c / *Crito* 215d 216a 218b d / *Phaedo* 220a 251d esp 230d 235a / *Gorgias* 286b 287c 292a b / *Rep bl c* K 297a b K III 324c 325b BK T 374a d / *Seventh Letter* 805d 806a

9 AR TOT E *Ethics* K III c 6-9 361a 364b esp CH 6 [115a24 b6] 361b-c H 9 [1117b7 15] 364a / *Rhetoric* BK II C 5 [1382 19-27] 628b

12 LUCR TI S *Natur f Things* BK I [102 158] 2b 3a BK I [569-580] 22b K III [31-93] 30b-31b [830-1094] 40c 44

12 EPICTETUS *D scourses* BK I CH 4 108d 110 H 9 114c 116b CH 24 129 d CH 27 132b-133b CH 29 134d 138a K II CH I 138b d 140c CH 16 156b-158d BK I II 5 180d 181d H 195a 201 K V CH 1 213a 223d CH 4 225a 228a H 10 238d 240d

12 AU ELI S *M ditat* BK I CT II 2 258a-c SE T 14 258d S T 7 259b d BK II ECT I 259b d CT 3 260b BK IV CT 5 264b SE T 48 267d 268a S CT 50 268c B VI SECT 24 276b CT 47 278d SECT 49 279a BK VII CT 23 281b SEC 32 35 282a K VIII ECT 25 287b-c SECT 31 287d ECT 58 290d K IX SE 3 291d 292 ECT 21 293b-c K XII CT 35 36 310c d

13 V G L *Georgics* II [490-493] 65b / *Aeneid* BK VI 211a 235a

14 PLUT RC I *Pericle* 139c / *Pel pid s* 232 d

15 T T *A als* BK XI 101 b BK X 172 173d BK XVI 180c d 181d 182a 183d 184a, / *Histories* K I 226d 228a K III 256a-c

17 PLOTI U *First Enn ad* TR I CH 16 18d 19b TR VI CH 6 24 b TR VII CH 3 26d 27a

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK IV par 7 14 20d 23a K VI par 18 19 40d-41b BK VIII par 18 57d 58a par 25 60a K IX par 23 37 68a 71b / *City of God* BK I CH II 136d 137a BK IX CH II 291b BK XII CH 4 361d 362a CH 7-8 362d 363c BK XIX CH 8 515c 516a

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25 MONTA NE *Essays* 6d 10a 26d 36b 99b-100a 115b-121c 124c 125a 167a 173d 176c 180b 211b 212a 294b-297b 327d 329d 339a d 365b 366b 402c-403c 404d-405a 470b-c 473d-477b 503b 504c 508a 512a 529c 530c 535c 536a

26 SHAKESPEARE *Ist Henry VI* ACT II SC V [1 32] 12d 13a / *3rd Henry VI* ACT V SC II [5 28] 100a b / *Richa d III* ACT I SC IV 114d 117c / *Romeo and Jul et* ACT IV SC V [1-95] 312d 314 ACT V SC III [74 222] 316c 318b / *Rich d II* ACT III SC II [144 177] 337a b / *Ist Henry IV* ACT V SC IV [111 132] 465c / *Jul s Caesar* ACT II SC II [32 37] 578c ACT III SC I [98 110] 581c

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29 CERV NT S *Don Q i ote* P RT II 237b-c 267 b 280b-c 366d-367a 427a-429d

30 B ON *Adv cement f Le g* 26a-c 73d 74a

31 S NOZ *Ethics* P RT IV P OP 67 444d 445a PART PROP 38-39 461d-462c

32 MILTO *P dise Lost* BK X [782-844] 291b-292b

33 PASC L *Pensées* 63 180a 166 168-169 203a 199 210b 210 211b 215 216 212a 481 257b

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42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphy c of Morals* 258b 269a

8c The contemplation and fear of death the attitude of the hero the philosopher the martyr

II Timothy 1 10 4 6-8 / *Hebrews* 2 9-18 9:27 28 / *James* 4 13 16 / *I John* 3 14 / *Revelation* 2 10-11 6 8 9 6 14 13 20 6 21 4—(D) *Apocalypse* 2 10-11 6 8 9 6 14 13 20 6 1 4

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6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 6c 10 20b-21 BK II 64d 65 BK V 183b-c BK VI 224c 225a BK VIII 281d 282a BK IX 303c 304a

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK I 395c 399a esp 397d 398d 400d-401a

7 PLATO *Laches* 34d / *Symposium* 166b-c / *Apology* 205d 206d 207c-d 211b-212a / *Crito* 215d 216a 218b-d / *Phaedo* 220a 251d esp 230d 235a / *Gorgias* 286b-287c 292 b / *Republic* BK 297a b BK I 324c 325b BK 1, 374a d / *Seventh Letter* 805d-806a

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12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK I [102 58] 2b-3a BK I [569-580] 22b BK III [31-93] 30b-31b [830-1094] 40c-44

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12 AURELIUS *Meditations* BK I SECT 1 12 258a-c SECT 14 258d SECT 7 259b-d BK II SECT 1 259b d SECT 3 260b BK V SECT 5 264b SECT 48 267d 268a SECT 50 268c BK VI SECT 24 276b SECT 47 278d SECT 49 2 9a BK VII SECT 23 281b SECT 32 35 282a BK VI SECT 5 287b-c SECT 31 287d SECT 58 290d BK IX SECT 3 291d 292 SECT 21 293b-c BK XI SECT 35 36 310c d

13 VIRGIL *Georgics* II [490-493] 65b / *Aeneid* BK VI 211 235a

14 PLUTARCH *Pericles* 139c / *Pelopidas* 232 d

15 TACITUS *Annals* BK XI 101 b BK XV 172c 173d BK XVI 180c d 181d 182 183d 184a,c / *Histories* BK 226d 228a BK III 256a-c

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26 SHAKESPEARE *1st Henry VI* ACT II SC V [1 32] 12d 13a / *3rd Henry VI* ACT V SC II [5 28] 100a b / *Richard III* ACT I SC IV 114d 117c / *Romeo and Juliet* ACT IV SC V [1-95] 312d 314a ACT V SC I [74 222] 316c 318b / *Richard II* ACT III SC II [144 177] 337a b / *1st Henry IV* ACT V SC IV [1 13] 465c / *Julius Caesar* ACT I SC II [32 37] 578c ACT III SC I [98 110] 581c

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29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 237b-c 267a b 280b-c 366d 367a 427a-429d

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37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 86c 88b

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41 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 238c

42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals*, 258b 269a

(8 *The concern of the living with life and death*
8c The contemplation and fear of death: the attitude of the hero, the philosopher, the martyr)

8d The ceremonials of death: the rites of burial in war and peace

CROSS REFERENCES

For The doctrine of soul as the principle of life *see* ANIMAL 1a 1e SOUL 1b

The general issue concerning continuity or hierarchy in nature *see* ANIMAL 1b–1c 2c EVOLUTION 4a 4c 7b MAN 1–1c 8b–8c NATURE 3b WORLD 6b

The contrast between the powers and activities of living and non-living bodies *see* ANIMAL 4a CHANGE 6c 8a–8b 9a–9b 10a–10b and for other discussions of the distinctive powers of plant animal and human life *see* ANIMAL 1a(1)–1a(4) 1c–1c(2) 8d MAN 1–1c 4a–4c SOUL 2c–c(3)

The anatomical and physiological considerations relevant to the analysis of vital powers and operations *see* ANIMAL 3–3d 4b–4c 5a–5g 6a– 8b–8c(4)

Discussions of animal sensitivity and intelligence *see* ANIMAL 1a(1) 1c(2) MAN 1c MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 1 MIND 3a–3b SENSE 2b– c

Other considerations of health and disease *see* MEDICINE 4 5a–5d

A discussion of the human life cycle *see* MAN 6c

Other discussions of man s attitude toward death *see* HAPPINESS 4b IMMORTALITY 1 and for matters relevant to the special problem of the life and death instincts *see* ANIMAL 1d DESIRE 3a HABIT 3a

Another discussion of sleeping and waking *see* ANIMAL 1a(5)

Another discussion of the relation between the living organism and its environment *see* ANIMAL 11b

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection

II Works by authors not represented in this collection.

For the date place and other facts concerning the publication of the works cited consult the Bibliography of Additional Readings which follows the last chapter of *The Great Ideas*

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F BACON Of Death Of Youth and Age " in Essays

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— *Science of Logic* ... CH

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TOLSTOY *Three Deaths*

— *Memoirs of a Madman*

— *The Death of Ivan Ilyitch*

II

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— *De Senectute (Of Old Age)*

S... *Disputationes Metaphysicae* XXX (4)

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HAZLITT *Table Talk* XXXIII

LAMB New Year s Eve " in *Essays of Elia*

COMTE *The Positive Philosophy* BK V

SCHWANN *Microscopical Researches into the Accordance in the Structure and Growth of Animals and Plants*

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R BROWNING *The Bishop Orders His Tomb at Saint Praxed's*

EMERSON *Threnody*

SCHOPENHAUER *The World as Will and Idea* VOL 1 ... CH 42

— On the Doctrine of the Indestructibility of Our True Nature by Death

— On S... in *Studies in Pessimism*

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(8 *The concern of the living with life and death* 8c *The contemplation and fear of death the attitude of the hero, the philosopher, the martyr*)

44 Boswell *Johnson* 93d 94b 102b 167a 169d 174b c 238b 347a c 394a c 399d 400a 573b 574a
46 Hegel *Philosophy of History* intro 197c d part i 245b d 255a 257a part iv 339b d
47 Goethe *Faust* part i [1544-1626] 37b 39a part ii [8909-9126] 216b 221b [11 384 401] 277a b
48 Melville *Moby Dick* 27a 28a 168a 169b 209b 238a 316a b 318b 331a 332a 351a b
49 Darwin *Descent of Man* 311a b
51 Tolstoy *War and Peace* bk i 34b c 37d 47b bk ii 77c 81b 97a 106d bk iii 146d 147c bk iv 179b 180d bk v 194c d 200 d 216d 218b 226d 227a bk vii 288b c bk viii 311a 313a bk ix 369a 372a bk x 416c-417b 433d 434a 439b 440a 457a c 461d 464a bk xi 481a 482a bk xii 549c 551c 558a 562d bk xiii 569d 570a bk xiv 607c 608d bk xv 614a 618b 636c 637c
52 Dostoevsky *Brothers Karamazov* bk ii 26a bk v 118b 119a bk vi 148d 150d esp 149c 150d
54 Freud *Interpretation of Dreams* 243a-c / *Ego and Id* 716c 717a c / *Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety* 735d 736b / *War and Death* 761c 766d

8d The ceremonials of death the rites of burial in war and peace

Old Testament *Genesis* 23 49 1-50 13 / *Leviticus* 19 28 21 1-5 / *Deuteronomy* 14 1 2 33 / *II Samuel* 1 17-27 3 31-36—(D) *II Kings* 1 17 27 3 31-36 / *II Chronicles* 16 13 14—(D) *II Paralipomenon* 16 13 14 / *Isaiah* 3 16-26 15 1 4—(D) *Isaias* 3 16 26 15 1-4 / *Jeremiah* 16 6—(D) *Jeremias* 16 6 / *Ezekiel* 7 18 24 16-23—(D) *Ezechiel* 7 18 24 16-23 / *Amos* 8 10
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5 Euripides *Suppliants* 258a 269a c / *Trojan Women* [1123-1255] 279c 280c / *Phoenician Maidens* [1625-1670] 392b d
6 Herodotus *History* bk i 38a b bk ii 65c 66c bk iii 94b c bk iv 128c d 136a d 157c bk v 160d 161a bk vi 196b c bk vii 235b-c bk ix 293a 305a c 306b c
6 Thucydides *Peloponnesian War* bk ii 395c 399a 400c d
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14 Plutarch *Lycurgus* 46a b / *Numa Pompilius* 55b c / *Poplicola* 80d 86a c / *Coriolanus* 192c d / *Pelopidas* 245a d / *Pompey* 537d 538a c / *Alexander* 574c 575a / *Cato the Younger* 623c 624a / *Demetrius* 747c d / *Marcus Brutus* 810b d
15 Tacitus *Annals* bk i 3c-4a bk iii 45d 46a bk xvi 177b c
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27 Shakespeare *Hamlet* act v sc i [1 35] 64c d [241-266] 66d 67a / *Cymbeline* act iv sc ii [186 290] 475a 476b
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32 Milton *Epitaph on the Marchioness of Winchester* 14a 15b / *On Shakespear 1630* 16a / *On the University Carrier* 16b / *Another on the Same* 17a b / *Lycidas* 27b 32a / *Death of a Fair Infant* 57a 59a esp [1 21] 57a b / *Sonnets* xiv xv 66a b xix 67b 68a
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48 Melville *Moby Dick* 25b 28a 350b 354b
51 Tolstoy *War and Peace* bk i 38b 43b 44b bk xi 512a b bk xii 549d 551c bk xv 624d 625b
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For The doctrine of soul as the principle of life *see* ANIMAL 1a, 1e; SOUL 1b.

The general issue concerning continuity or hierarchy in nature *see* ANIMAL 1b–1e; [illegible]; EVOLUTION 4a, 4c, 7b; MAN 1–1c; 8b–8c; NATURE 3b; WORLD 6b.

The contrast between the powers and activities of living and non-living bodies *see* ANIMAL 4a; CHANGE 6c; 8a–8b; 9a–9b; 10a–10b; and for other discussions of the distinctive powers of plant, animal, and human life *see* ANIMAL 1a(1)–1a(4), 1c–1c(2); 8d; MAN 1–1c; 4a–4c; SOUL 2c–2c(3).

The anatomical and physiological considerations relevant to the analysis of vital powers and operations, *see* ANIMAL 3–3d, 4b–4c, 5a–5g, 6a–[illegible]; 8b–8c(4).

Discussions of animal sensitivity and intelligence, *see* ANIMAL 1a(1), 1c(2); MAN 1c; MEMORY AND IMAGINATION 1; MIND 3a–3b; SENSE 2b–2c.

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A discussion of the human life cycle, *see* MAN 6c.

Other discussions of man's attitude toward death, *see* HAPPINESS 4b; IMMORTALITY 1; and for matters relevant to the special problem of the life and death instincts, *see* ANIMAL 1d; DESIRE 3a; HABIT 1a.

Another discussion of sleeping and waking, *see* ANIMAL 1a(5).

Another discussion of the relation between the living organism and its environment, *see* ANIMAL 11b.

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World*, but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals. These works are divided into two groups:

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LAMB. "New Year's Eve," in *Essays of Elia*

COMTE. *The Positive Philosophy*, [illegible]

SCHWANN. *Microscopical Researches into the Accordance in the Structure and Growth of Animals and Plants*

WHEWELL. *The Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*, [illegible]

[illegible] *The Eclogues Orders His Tomb at* [illegible]

[illegible]

SCHOPENHAUER. *The World as Will and Idea*, [illegible]

—— *On the Doctrine of the Indestructibility of Our True Nature by Death*

—— "On Suicide," in *Studies in Pessimism*

[illegible] *Memoriam*, [illegible]

(8 *The concern of the living with life and death* 8c *The contemplation and fear of death the attitude of the hero the philosopher the martyr*)

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 93d 94b 102b 167a 169d 174b c 238b 347a c 394a c 399d 400a 573b 574a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 197c d PART I 245b d 255a 257a PART IV 339b d
47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [1544-1626] 37b 39a PART II [8909-9126] 216b 221b [11 384 401] 277a b
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 27a 28a 168a 169b 209b 238a 316a b 318b 331a 332a 351a b
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 311a b
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 34b c 37d 47b BK II 77c 81b 97a 106d BK III 146d 147c BK IV 179b 180d BK V 194c d 200c d 216d 218b 226d 227a BK VII 288b c BK VIII 311a 313a BK IX 369a 372a BK X 416c-417b 433d 434a 439b 440a 457a c 461d 464a BK XI 481a 482a BK XII 549c 551c 558a 562d BK XIII 569d 570a BK XIV 607c 608d BK XV 614a 618b 636c 637c
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK II 26a BK V 118b 119a BK VI 148d 150d esp 149c 150d
54 FREUD *Interpretation of Dreams* 243a-c / *Ego and Id* 716c 717a c / *Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety* 735d 736b / *War and Death* 761c 766d

8*d* The ceremonials of death the rites of burial in war and peace

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 23 49 1-50 13 / *Leviticus* 19 28 21 1-5 / *Deuteronomy* 14 1 2 33 / *II Samuel* 1 17 27 3 31-36—(D) *II Kings* 1 17-27 3 31 36 / *II Chronicles* 16 13-14—(D) *II Paralipomenon* 16 13 14 / *Isaiah* 3 16-26 15 1 4—(D) *Isaias* 3 16 26 15 1-4 / *Jeremiah* 16 6—(D) *Jeremias* 16 6 / *Ezekiel* 7 18 24 16- 3—(D) *Ezechiel* 7 18 24 16-23 / *Amos* 8 10
APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 22 11-12 38 16 23 —(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 22 10 13 38 16- 2
NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 8 21 22 27 57-60 / *Mark* 15 43 16 1 / *Luke* 23 50 24 1 / *John* 19 38 42 / *James* 5 14-15
4 HOMER *Iliad* BK XI [446-455] 76d 77a BK XIX [198-237] 139a b BK XXII [247 ,2] 157d 158a BK XXIII XXIV 161a 179d / *Odyssey* BK XI [51-80] 243c d BK XXIV [1-190] 317a 319a
5 AESCHYLUS *Seven Against Thebes* [1011 1084] 38b 39a c
5 SOPHOCLES *Oedipus at Colonus* [1579 1779] 128c 130a c / *Antigone* 131a 142d / *Ajax* [1040 1421] 152a 155a c / *Electra* [404 471] 159b d / *Trachiniae* [1191 12,8] 180b-181a c
5 EURIPIDES *Suppliants* 258a 269a c / *Trojan Women* [1123-1255] 279c 280c / *Phoenician Maidens* [1625 1670] 392b d
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 38a b BK II 65c 66c BK III 94b c BK IV 128c d 136a d 157c BK V 160d 161a BK VI 196b-c BK VII 235b c BK IX 293a 305a c 306b c
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 395c 399a 400c d
7 PLATO *Republic* BK X 367b / *Laws* BK XII 793a 794a
13 VIRGIL *Georgics* IV [451-558] 95b 99a / *Aeneid* BK III [60 68] 148b 149a BK IV [474 705] 180a 186b BK VI [212 235] 216b 217b [295-383] 219a 221a BK IX [07 23] 284b 285a BK X [898-908] 327a BK XI [182 212] 333a b
14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 46a b / *Numa Pompilius* 55b c / *Poplicola* 80d 86a c / *Coriolanus* 192c d / *Pelopidas* 245a d / *Pompey* 537d 538a c / *Alexander* 574c 575a / *Cato the Younger* 623c 624a / *Demetrius* 747c d / *Marcus Brutus* 810b d
15 TACITUS *Annals* BK I 3c 4a BK III 45d 46a BK XVI 177b c
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK I CH 12 13 137a 138b BK VIII CH 26-27 283c 285d
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART III Q 65 A 1 ANS 879c 881d A 2 ANS and REP 5 881d 882c A 3 ANS 882d 883d PART III SUPPL, Q 71 900d 917b
22 CHAUCER *Knight's Tale* [859 1004] 174a 176b
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 5a 10a 32b c 36a b 405a c 473d-477b 483b-484a
26 SHAKESPEARE *1st Henry IV* ACT V SC IV [77 101] 465a b / *Julius Caesar* ACT V SC V [76-81] 596c
27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT V SC I [1 35] 64c d [241-266] 66d 67a / *Cymbeline* ACT IV SC II [186 290] 475a-476b
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote* PART II 427d 429d
32 MILTON *Epitaph on the Marchioness of Winchester* 14a 15b / *On Shakespear 1630* 16a / *On the University Carrier* 16b / *Another on the Same* 17a b / *Lycidas* 27b 32a / *Death of a Fair Infant* 57a 59a esp [1 21] 57a b / *Sonnets* XIV-XV 66a b XIX 67b 68a
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 34d
40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall* 263a 381a d 513b 568d 569a
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 193a b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* INTRO 197c d PART I 211d 212c 252a c 255a 257a
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 25b 28a 350b 354b
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 38b 43b 44b BK XI 512a b BK XII 549d 551c BK XV 624d 625b
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VII 171a-c
54 FREUD *General Introduction* 510b-c / *War and Death* 762a b

Chapter 49 LOGIC

INTRODUCTION

In this set of great books, the *Organon* of Aristotle, the *Novum Organum* of Bacon, Descartes' *Discourse on Method* and his *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, and Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* indicate or discuss the nature, scope, and divisions of the discipline which has come to be called "logic." Though of all the works mentioned the *Organon* is perhaps the most extensive treatment of the subject, Aristotle does not use the word "logic" to name the science or art of which he seems to be the inventor—certainly the first systematic expounder—in the tradition of western thought.

Here as elsewhere Aristotle is indebted to his predecessors for providing him with materials to develop or criticize: to the sophists for the construction of arguments, for the formulation of methods of disputation, and for the discovery of fallacies; to Plato for the theory of classification and definition, for the root notion of the syllogism and a conception of proof or demonstration, for the general outlines of an intellectual method to which Plato gives the name "dialectic."

As indicated in the chapter on DIALECTIC, Aristotle uses Plato's name for the whole method of the mind in the pursuit of truth in order to designate just one part of his method, the part concerned with probability rather than truth. Yet in the Roman and mediaeval tradition, the words "logic" and "dialectic" come to be used interchangeably. This is exemplified by the Stoic division of the sciences into physics, ethics, and logic or dialectic, and by the mediaeval enumeration of the liberal arts of the trivium as grammar, rhetoric, and logic or dialectic. So used, these names designate the whole range of discussion to be found in Aristotle's *Organon*.

In their opposition to Aristotelian or what they sometimes call "scholastic" logic, modern inventors of new methods, like Bacon or Descartes, tend to restrict the meaning of logic. For them logic is little more than the doctrine of the syllogism. And this they judge to be no part of genuinely fruitful method, or they hold it to be of use mainly as a critical instrument in disputation rather than discovery. Their identification of logic with dialectic (like their association of both with rhetoric) seems to have an intentionally invidious significance.

But with Kant, who was influenced by the scholasticism of Christian Wolff, "logic" is generally restored as the name for the whole range of materials in Aristotle's *Organon*, of which dialectic again becomes a part. In his own *Introduction to Logic* Kant speaks of Aristotle as "the father of Logic." Though "logic has not gained much in extent since Aristotle's time," he says, "there are two amongst more recent philosophers who have again brought general logic into vogue, Leibnitz and Wolff." Since their day, and certainly since Kant's, as may be seen from the titles listed under Additional Readings, "logic" prevails as the name for treatises which discuss, in whole or part, the matters treated in Aristotle's *Organon*.

"Logic" is also used in modern times as the name for an inquiry or study which bears little resemblance to the discipline expounded in Aristotle's *Organon*. What is called "modern logic," to distinguish it from the traditional Aristotelian or scholastic logic, is purely a science and in no sense an organon, methodology, instrument, or art. It does not restrict itself to stating the laws of thought or formulating the rules of inference. In the words of Josiah Royce, it is "the science of order," and it is applicable "to the order of things as well as the order of thought." So conceived, the science of logic is sometimes regarded as having the kind of generality which is traditionally assigned to

Virchow *Cellular Pathology*
Bernard *Introduction to Experimental Medicine*
Stevenson Æs Triplex, in *Virginibus Puerisque*
T. H. Huxley *Methods and Results*, III
Weismann Life and Death, in VOL I, *Essays upon Heredity and Kindred Biological Problems*
Tennyson *Crossing the Bar*
Frazer *The Golden Bough*, PART III; PART V, CH 13; PART VI, CH 7
Hertwig *The Cell*
Pearson *The Chances of Death*
Andreyev *Lazarus*
Driesch *The Science and Philosophy of the Organism*
Loeb *The Mechanistic Conception of Life*
Joyce *Dubliners*, esp. The Dead
Osler *A Way of Life*
Unamuno *Mist*
D. W. Thompson *On Growth and Form*
Bergson *Creative Evolution*
Bergson *Mind Energy*, CH I
Uexküll *Theoretical Biology*
J. S. Haldane and J. G. Priestley *Respiration*
Pearl *The Biology of Death*
Lillie *Protoplasmic Action and Nervous Action*
Santayana *Scepticism and Animal Faith*, CH 23
Dewey *Experience and Nature*, CH 7
Jung *Spirit and Life*
G. N. Lewis *The Anatomy of Science*, ESSAY VIII
Henderson *Blood*
J. S. Haldane *Mechanism, Life and Personality*
—— *The Sciences and Philosophy*, LECT I-VI
Woodger *Biological Principles*
Cannon *The Wisdom of the Body*
Goldstein *The Organism*
Whitehead *Modes of Thought*, LECT VIII
Sherrington *The Integrative Action of the Nervous System*
—— *Man on His Nature*
Schrödinger *What Is Life?*

know these things already when they come to a special study and not be inquiring into them while they are listening to lectures on it."

Logic, in Aristotle's view, trains the mind in the ways of science. Its product or goal as an art is the making of science itself. For this reason, in the mediaeval period logic comes to be called a "speculative art" or, with grammar and rhetoric, a liberal art.

Even in speculative matters," Aquinas says, "there is something by way of work, e.g., the making of a syllogism, or of a fitting speech, or the work of counting or measuring. Hence whatever habits are ordained to such works of the speculative reason are, by a kind of comparison, called arts indeed, but *liberal* arts, in order to distinguish them from those arts that are ordained to works done by the body. . . . On the other hand, those sciences which are not ordained to any such work are called sciences absolutely, and not arts."

But though it may not be a science *absolutely speaking* because it is an instrument of intellectual work, logic, in addition to being an art, may also have some of the characteristics of a science. If it is a science, what is the object of its knowledge?

Aristotle's division of the speculative sciences, which he seems to *present* as exhaustive, leaves no place for logic. "There are three kinds of theoretical sciences," he writes, "physics, mathematics, theology"—or metaphysics, as the last came to be called. Each of these sciences, furthermore, seems to have a distinctive subject matter which is some aspect of reality, such as change, or quantity, or being. But insofar as logic is concerned with the study of terms, propositions, and syllogisms, it deals with elements common to all sciences.

This suggests that whereas reality is the object of the other sciences, the object of logic as a science is science itself, or more generally the whole of discourse. It considers the elements or patterns of discourse in a formal manner; that is, it considers them apart from their reference to reality or their real significance as the terms, propositions, and syllogisms of particular subject matters or sciences. Because it separates the forms which discursive thought takes from the matter or content it may have, logic is traditionally called a "formal science."

Whereas Aristotle makes his object the elements of discourse (or thought expressed in language), later logicians treat the formal aspect of thought itself. They deal with concepts, judgments, and reasoning instead of with terms, propositions, and syllogisms. This difference results in a definition of logic as the science of thought; the basic formulations of logic are the laws of thought. Thus, for example, Kant says that logic "treats of nothing but the mere forms of thought." Its limits "are definitely fixed by the fact that it is a science which has nothing to do but fully to exhibit and strictly to prove all formal rules of thought."

The logical principles of identity, excluded middle, and contradiction, as well as the principles of inference, are said to be "laws of thought." James proposes as the most fundamental principle of inference" what he calls the "axiom of skipped intermediaries," which states that "*skipping intermediary terms leaves relations the same.*" That "equals of equals are equal" is a special application of this principle in the sphere of quantities. Because it applies to all subject matters equally, James regards this principle as "on the whole the broadest and deepest law of man's thought."

In either conception of logic as a formal science, questions arise concerning the relation of logic to other sciences. For Aristotle the question is about logic and metaphysics, because both seem to have an unrestricted scope. Metaphysics considers the being of *everything*, which is logic, the formal components of discourse about *anything*. Aristotle says of philosophy in relation to dialectic that both "embrace all things," but that "dialectic is merely critical where philosophy claims to know." The same comparison could apply to metaphysics and logic. Both "embrace all things," *but not* from the same point of view.

Aristotle also asks whether it belongs to metaphysics as well as to logic to inquire into the truths which are called axioms—especially those which are the first principles of all knowledge or demonstration, not merely the foundations of knowledge about some limited subject matter. "Since these truths clearly hold good for all things *qua* being," the science which studies being *qua* being (i.e., metaphysics) must be concerned with them. It also belongs to

metaphysics as for example by Bertrand Russell in his essay Logic as the Essence of Philosophy

But it is mathematics rather than metaphysics with which logic is identified by its modern exponents Logistic or mathematical logic writes Russell is mathematical in two different senses it is itself a branch of mathematics and it is the logic which is specially applicable to other more traditional branches of mathematics Since Boole s *Laws of Thought* which according to Russell initiates the modern development of mathematical logic logic has become more mathematical and mathematics has become more logical The consequence he says is that it has now become wholly impossible to draw a line between the two in fact the two are one

ARISTOTLE s *Organon* stands to the tradition of logic as Euclid s *Elements* stands to the tradition of geometry In both cases the work of later minds may alter considerably the structure and content of the discipline In both cases there are modern departures from the earlier tradition As in the one case we have Descartes analytical geometry and the various non Euclidean geometries so in the other we have Kant s transcendental logic and the various non Aristotelian logics

But all these innovations even when they might be described as anti Aristotelian rather than simply as non *Aristotelian bear the marks* of their traditional origin Kant for example takes pains everywhere to indicate the parallelism between the formulations of his transcendental logic and those of Aristotle s logic Even the various systems of relational and mathematical logic usually attempt to show that the Aristotelian logic of subject and predicate of particular and universal propositions and of syllogisms can be treated as a special case under their own formulations The proposals of Bacon or Mill with *respect* to induction and the method of Descartes though accompanied in each case by a critique of the syllogism are less radical departures for they do not apparently reject Aristotle s basic doctrines of predication and proof

Many of these issues in logical theory are dealt with in other chapters *e g* in DIALECTIC INDUCTION and HYPOTHESIS in IDEA JUDGMENT and REASONING Here we are principally concerned with the conception of logic itself not with the detailed content of the science as much as with its character as an art or science its relation to other arts and sciences its major divisions and its leading principles Though such considerations are more explicitly treated by Kant than by Aristotle the formative influence of the *Organon* warrants examining it first

THE PARTS OF LOGIC as Aristotle conceives them seem to be indicated by the subject matter of the various books which comprise the collection of writings assembled under the title of *Organon* That title has a bearing on the question whether logic is a science or an art and on its difference from other sciences and arts The word organon has the meaning of instrument or method That in turn suggests something to be used as rules of art are used—as directions to be followed to produce a certain result

Aristotle s own differentiation of the speculative sciences the practical sciences and the arts throws light on this view of logic as an art The end of theoretical knowledge he writes is truth while that of practical knowledge is action In other words the theoretical or speculative sciences differ from the practical sciences in that they are knowledge for its own sake as opposed to knowledge for an ulterior end According as the ulterior end is the production or making *of something as distinct* from human action or conduct art is distinct from the other practical sciences Making and acting are different Aristotle says the reasoned state of capacity to act is different from the reasoned state of capacity to make *Hence* too they are not included one in the other for neither is acting making nor is making acting Logic then if it is an art will be concerned with the making of something with producing a work or an effect

The way in which Aristotle himself refers to the *Organon* seems to confirm this view He regards it as a preparation for work in the theoretic sciences Due to a want of training in logic he writes some men attempt to discuss the criteria of truth in mathematics or physics at the same time that they are considering the subject matter of these sciences They should

pears only in its result, *i.e.*, whether it is knowledge or opinion. The *Posterior Analytics* and the *Topics* consider the employment of both syllogism and induction. The *Posterior Analytics* treats them in relation to the development and structure of scientific knowledge. The *Topics* discusses them in relation to the dialectical procedures of argument and discovery.

The last book of the *Organon*, which is concerned with exposing the fallacies in sophistical proofs or refutations, serves to protect both scientific and dialectical reasoning from such sophistry. Unlike the philosopher or the dialectician, the sophist does not aim at the truth. Sophistry misuses the weapons of logic—the same weapons used by the scientist or dialectician—to produce a counterfeit of wisdom or, as Aristotle says, "a wisdom which exists only in semblance." Though the dialectician cannot claim to know, he does, nevertheless, deal with opinions critically and respects the canons of logic as much as the philosopher.

The art of logic seems to have three main employments. To its use by the scientist and the dialectician, Aristotle adds its utilization by the orator *for* the purposes of persuasion. The rhetorician and the dialectician are most closely allied because both deal with probabilities and disputable matters concerning which opposite conclusions can be drawn. "As in dialectic, there is induction on the one hand and syllogism ... on the other, so it is in rhetoric." Aristotle says that "the enthymeme is a rhetorical syllogism, and the example a rhetorical induction."

The foregoing suggests that a certain order obtains between *two of the three* arts traditionally called the trivium. The elements and principles of logic are in a sense *prior to the rules* of rhetoric. The art of rhetoric depends on and uses logic. The third art, that of grammar, seems to serve both logic and rhetoric. It serves the logician in his task of forming terms and propositions out of words, phrases, and sentences. It serves the rhetorician in his effort to make a forceful use of language. This conception of the use of grammar appears in Aristotle's *Poetics*, in his consideration of style, and in the opening books of the *Organon*, in his discussion of univocal and equivocal names, the parts of speech, simple and complex expressions, and the different types of sentences.

KANT SEEMS TO diverge from Aristotle both with regard to the unity of logic and with regard to the nature and relation of its parts. Formal or elementary logic, Kant thinks, is not the same as an organon of the sciences. He explains in his *Introduction to Logic* that an organon gives instruction as to "how some particular branch of knowledge is to be attained. An organon of the sciences is therefore not a mere logic, since it presupposes the accurate knowledge of the objects and sources of the sciences.... Logic, on the contrary, being the general propaedeutic of every use of the understanding and of the reason, cannot meddle with the sciences and anticipate their matter." Conceding that it may be called an organon so far as it serves, "not for the *enlargement*, but only for the *criticism* and *correction* of our knowledge," Kant insists that "logic is not a general art of discovery, nor an organon of truth; it is not an algebra by the help of which hidden truths may be discovered."

Aristotle, according to Kant, *treats the whole* of his logic as an organon, dividing it into an analytical and a dialectical part. As Kant sees it, the dialectical part arises from a misuse of the analytical part. This occurs, he says in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, when general or elementary logic (*i.e.*, the analytic part) "which is meant to be a mere canon of criticism, is employed as if it were an organon, for the real production of at least *the* semblance of objective assertions. This general logic," says Kant, "which assumes the semblance of an organon, is called dialectic."

Kant here seems to identify dialectic with what Aristotle calls sophistry. He says of dialectic that "different as are the significations in which the ancients use this name of a science or art, it is easy to gather from its actual employment that with them it was nothing but a logic of semblance. It was a sophistic art of giving to one's ignorance, nay, to one's intentional casuistry, the outward appearance of truth, by imitating the accurate method which logic always requires." When logic is treated as an *organon*, it "is always an illusive logic, that is, dialectical. For as logic teaches nothing with regard to the contents of knowledge, ... any attempt at using it as an organon in order to extend and enlarge our knowledge, at least in appearance, can end

metaphysics as well as to logic to inquire into the principles of the syllogism

The principles of identity excluded middle and contradiction belong to both sciences—to the one as the most universal truths about existence to the other as the basic rules of discourse or the laws of thought This sharing of a common ground does not seem to Aristotle to violate their separateness but Bacon charges him with having corrupted natural philosophy by logic Of Aristotle s physics he says that it is built of mere logical terms and Bacon adds Aristotle remodelled the same subject in his metaphysics under a more imposing title

Whereas Aristotle considers the relation of logic to metaphysics Kant considers its relation to psychology Both logic and psychology are concerned with thinking and knowing Distinguishing between pure and applied logic Kant says that pure logic has nothing to do with empirical principles and borrows nothing from psychology Applied logic depends on psychology In fact says Kant in his *Introduction to Logic* it is a psychology in which we consider what is the usual process in our thought not what is the right one Applied logic ought not to be called logic at all for logic is the science of the right use of the understanding and the reason generally not subjectively that is not according to empirical (psychological) principles as to how the understanding actually thinks but objectively that is according to *a priori* principles as to how it ought to think

James also insists upon the distinction between psychology and logic He even uses Kant s terms in calling logic an *a priori* and psychology an *empirical science* What the psychologist calls laws of thought such as the laws of the association of ideas describe the actual flow of thought and connections which depend upon similarity and succession The laws of logic in contrast state reason s perception of the rational structure of thought itself and the relations which must obtain if thought is to be rational

Returning now to the indication of the parts of logic which may be found in the structure of the *Organon* we can see two orders in the books The first three books—the *Categories On Interpretation* and the *Prior Analytics*—deal with terms propositions and syllogisms with the classification of terms and their relation to one another with the classification of propositions and their opposition to one another with the analysis of the various types of syllogisms and the formulation of the rules of valid inference Terms are the elements of propositions terms and propositions are the elements of the syllogism This seems to determine the order of the first three books

The first three books as a whole stand in a certain order to the remaining books Taking the latter as a group their differentiation from what precedes them seems to lie in the fact that they deal with terms propositions and syllogisms not abstracted from all considerations of knowledge and truth about reality but rather with primary emphasis upon the logic of actual knowledge or on the processes of knowing and arguing about what is true or probable In the traditional development of Aristotelian logic this division between the first three and the remaining books of the *Organon* is sometimes characterized as a distinction between *formal* and *material* logic

In the *Posterior Analytics* and the *Topics* Aristotle considers the discovery and establishment of either the true or the probable He distinguishes between induction and syllogism (or reasoning) as modes of learning and arguing The later division of logic into deductive and inductive—sometimes confused with the distinction between formal and material logic—does not seem to correspond to the difference between the *Prior* and the *Posterior Analytics* In the *Advancement of Learning* for example Bacon divides the art of judgment which treats of the nature of proof or demonstration into that which concludes by induction and that which concludes by syllogism whereas Aristotle appears to treat induction as that upon which syllogistic demonstration depends for its primary and indemonstrable premises

The distinction between truth and probability or between knowledge and opinion does not affect the formal character of either induction or syllogism A syllogism may be scientific (*i e* demonstratively certain) or dialectical (*i e* merely probable) according to the character of its premises In either case its formal structure remains the same Similarly the difference between scientific and dialectical induction ap-

pears only in its result, i.e. whether it is knowledge or opinion. The *Posterior Analytics* and the *Topics* consider the employment of both syllogism and induction. The *Posterior Analytics* treats them in relation to the development and structure of scientific knowledge. The *Topics* discusses them in relation to the dialectical procedures of argument and discovery.

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KANT SEEMS TO diverge from Aristotle both with regard to the unity of logic and with regard to the nature and relation of its parts. Formal or elementary logic, Kant thinks, is not the same as an organon of the sciences. He explains in his *Introduction to Logic* that an organon gives instruction as to "how some particular branch of knowledge is to be attained. An organon of the sciences is therefore not a mere logic, since it presupposes the accurate knowledge of the objects and *sources of the sciences*. ... Logic, on the contrary, being the general propaedeutic of every use of the understanding and of the reason, cannot meddle with the sciences and anticipate their matter." Conceding that it *may be called an organon* so far as it serves "not for the *enlargement*, but only for the *criticism* and *correction* of our knowledge," Kant insists that "logic is not a general art of discovery, nor an organon of truth; it is not an algebra by the help of which hidden truths may be discovered."

Aristotle, according to Kant, treats the whole of his logic as an organon, dividing it into an analytical and a dialectical part. As Kant sees it, *the dialectical part* arises from a *misuse of* the analytical part. This occurs, he says in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, when general or elementary logic (*i.e.* the analytic part), "which is meant to be a mere canon of criticism, is employed as if it were an organon for the real production of at least the semblance of objective assertions." This general logic, says Kant, "which assumes the semblance of an organon, is called dialectic."

Kant here seems to identify dialectic with what Aristotle calls sophistry. He says of dialectic that "different as are the significations in which the ancients use this name of a science or art, it is easy to gather from its actual employment that with them it was nothing but a logic of semblance. It was a sophistic art of giv*ing to* one's ignorance, nay, to one's intentional casuistry, the outward appearance of truth, by imitating the accurate method which logic always requires." When logic is treated as an organon "it is always an illusive logic, that is, dialectical. For as logic teaches nothing with regard to the contents of knowledge ... any attempt at using it as an organon in order to extend and enlarge our knowledge, at least in appearance, can end

in nothing but mere tall by asserting with a certain plausibility anything one likes or if one likes denying it

Yet Kant himself retains Analytic and Dialectic as the major divisions of his own transcendental logic explaining that he employs the title of dialectic not for the misuse of logic but rather to signify that portion of logic which is the critique of dialectical semblance or sophistry General or ordinary logic takes no account of the content of knowledge and applies to all objects *universally* because it treats of the form of thought in general Transcendental logic does not entirely ignore the content of knowledge but only the content of that knowledge which is empirical in origin If there are transcendental or *a priori* concepts which do not originate from experience then there can be a science which treats of that knowledge which belongs to the pure understanding and by which we may think objects entirely *a priori*

That is the science Kant calls *transcendental Logic* It deals he writes with the laws of the understanding and reason in so far only as they refer *a priori* to objects That part of it which teaches the elements of the pure knowledge of the understanding and the principles without which no object can be thought is the transcendental Analytic The second part of it is the transcendental Dialectic— a critique of the understanding and reason with regard to their *hyperphysical employment in order thus to lay* bare the false semblance of its groundless pretensions serving as a protection of the pure understanding against all sophistical illusions

The issue between Kant and Aristotle cannot be understood if it is read simply as a dispute about the nature and divisions of logic Their diverse views of logic must be seen against the larger background of their philosophical differences with regard to the nature of the mind the nature of reality the origin of knowledge and the character of its objects Controversies about logic (and even within logic about this or that theory of judgment or reasoning) usually reflect fundamental issues in psychology and metaphysics The attack made by some modern logicians for example against the subject predicate logic of Aristotle cannot be separated from their rejection of his doctrine of substance and accident in physics and metaphysics even as their own relational logic represents a different view of the structure of reality or the constituents of experience

On the other hand the criticism of Aristotelian logic by Bacon and Descartes seems to be motivated primarily by considerations of method They do not have a different logic to propose as do Kant and later symbolic or mathematical logicians Rather for them logic itself—by which they mean Aristotle s logic and particularly his doctrine of the syllogism—appears useless for the purposes of enlarging knowledge *discovering new truths and developing the* sciences Where Kant criticizes Aristotle for regarding logic as an organon or method for acquiring knowledge Bacon and Descartes complain that logic does not serve that purpose at all and therefore a *novum organum*—not a new logic but a new method—is needed

The present system of logic is useless for the discovery of the sciences Bacon writes It *rather assists in confirming and rendering inveterate* the errors founded on vulgar notions than in searching after truth and is therefore more hurtful than useful The syllogism for example is unequal to the subtlety of nature

Our only hope is in genuine induction Induction is the key to an art of discovery and the rules of induction the heart of a fruitful method of inquiry

The relation of induction to demonstration in Aristotle s logic and the difference between Aristotle s and Bacon s theories of induction are discussed in the chapter on that subject In Bacon s view the *Novum Organum* departs radically from the old *Organon* The new can be substituted for the old in its entirety It may be asked he says whether we talk of perfecting natural philosophy alone according to our method or the other sciences also such as logic ethics politics His answer is that as common logic which regulates matters by syllogisms is applied not only to natural but also to every other science so our inductive method likewise comprehends them all

Demonstration is opposed not only to induction but to discovery Accordingly logic conceived as concerned only with the rules of demonstration is opposed to other methods which aim at directing scientific inquiry and research.

The basic contrast is between criticism and construction, or between examining what is offered as knowledge for its validity and developing techniques for adding new knowledge to old In his *Two New Sciences* Galileo says that logic teaches us how to test the conclusiveness of any argument or demonstration already discovered and completed but not to discover correct arguments and demonstrations. It does not, as regards stimulation to discovery compare with the power of sharp distinction which belongs to geometry

In the same vein Descartes says of logic that "the syllogisms and the great part of the other teaching serve better in explaining to others those things that one knows than in learning what is new This made me feel that some other method must be found The four rules of the method he then states which codify the steps he himself has taken to make discoveries in geometry and physics, seem to him a general procedure for insuring the advancement of all fields of learning

As his *Rules for the Direction of the Mind* indicates Descartes method does not omit the intuition of principles and the deduction of conclusions therefrom—the apparent equivalents of induction and demonstration in Aristotle s *Organon*. But he explains why he has omitted all the precepts of the dialecticians even though he is himself concerned with *improving* our power of deducing one truth *from* another Their style of argument he says, "*contributes* nothing at all to the discovery of the truth. Its only possible use is to serve to explain at times more easily to others the truths we have already ascertained hence it should be transferred from Philosophy to Rhetoric."

Furthermore the forms of the traditional syllogism do not seem able to accommodate the connections in mathematical reasoning or the structure of mathematical proof. "Everyone will perceive in mathematical demonstrations," Locke writes, that the knowledge gained thereby comes shortest and clearest without syllogisms. Locke identifies logic with the doctrine of the syllogism and, even more explicitly than Descartes, rejects it as an aid to reasoning

THE QUESTION whether logic is itself a methodology or includes rules for the discovery as well as the demonstration of truth is answered in terms of broader and narrower conceptions of the science or art. Those who regard the rules of logic as primarily a canon of criticism, which test the validity of intellectual work look elsewhere for a method whose rules are productive rather than critical The question then usually arises whether there is one methodology applicable to *all* fields of inquiry or as many distinct methods as there are different disciplines or subject matters

The difference between the traditional Aristotelian and the modern mathematical logic suggests that there may be a plurality of logics. The attempts made by the exponents of each to subsume the other as a special case do not seem to be entirely successful Though Aristotelian logic appears to give a satisfactory account of the forms of judgment and reasoning in certain types of discourse it cannot in the opinion of symbolic logicians, be applied to mathematics. Mathematics consists of deductions, and yet according to Bertrand Russell "the orthodox accounts of deduction are largely or wholly inapplicable to existing mathematics." Symbolic logic on the other hand *may* succeed in formulating the relational structure of modern mathematics, but it does not in the opinion of its critics, hold for metaphysics—at least not the sort of metaphysics which treats relation as a category subordinate to substance

The difference between the kind of thinking that men do in science and in law suggests another type of diversity among logics. The practical or moral judgment seems to involve a special type of predicate. What Aristotle calls the practical syllogism and what Aquinas describes as the process of "determination — quite distinct from deduction—by which positive laws are derived from natural law seem to call *for a logic of practical thinking* quite distinct from the logic of all the theoretic sciences.

Using the word logic in its broadest sense we must ask whether there is one logic common to all the sciences or a logic which fits mathematics but not physics or metaphysics, a logic appropriate to speculative philosophy but not to experimental or empirical research a logic peculiar to the nature of the practical or moral sciences such as ethics and politics, or to the work of jurisprudence

There is evidence in the great books that sciences as different as mathematics and physics or as metaphysics and politics differ in their methods of discovery and demonstration This may mean that they differ in their logics as well Yet it also appears to be the case that the principle of contradiction applies in all that fallacious inference is detected by the same criteria in all and to this extent all share a common logic Where alternative methods have been proposed within a single major field—notably in the case of philosophy—this may reflect different conceptions of philosophy itself rather than alternative routes to the same end

Because of their relevance to the basic issues about logic (and especially those concerning its scope and unity) the rules of methodology in general and the various methods proposed for particular disciplines are included in this chapter They are also considered of course in chapters devoted to the special disciplines or subject matters e g ASTRONOMY HISTORY MATHEMATICS METAPHYSICS PHYSICS THEOLOGY and in the chapters on SCIENCE and PHILOSOPHY What is distinctive about each of these methods is discussed in those chapters in relation to the type of knowledge or inquiry which seems to require a method of its own

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in hea y type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to For ex mple, in 4 HOMER *Iliad* BK II [65 283] 12d, the number 4 is the number f the olume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passa e is in section d of pag 12

PAGE S CTIO S When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page For example in 53 JA IES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage be ins in the pper half of page 116 and nds in the lower half of page 119 When the text is printed in two columns, the lett rs a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the pa e th letters and d to the upper and lo er halves of the right hand s de of th pa e For example, in 7 PL T *Sympos um* 163b-164c the passage begins in the lower half of the l ft hand side of p e 163 and en ls in the upper half of the right hand s de of page 164

AUTHOR S DI IONS On or more of th main di isions of a w o k (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers, in brackets, are g ven in cer tain cases *e g* *Iliad*, K II [265 83] 12d

BIBLE REFERENC S The references are t book, chapter and erse Wh n the King James and Douay versions differ n title of books or n the numberin of chapters o verses the King James ersion is ted first and the Doua ind cated by a (*D*) follows *e g* OLD TESTA MENT *N hemiah* 7 45—(*D*) *II Esd as* 7 46

SYM LS The abbre iation esp calls the reader s attentio to one or mo e especially rel vant parts of a whol refe ence passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermit tently rather than continuously in the wo k or passage cited.

For additional inf rmat on concernin the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidan e in the use of *The G eat Ideas* consult the Preface

1 Logic a science ts scope and subject matter compared with psychology and metaphy cs

7 PL TO *Rep blic* BK VII 397a 398c / *Sophist* 571a-c / *P ebus* 634b-635a

8 ARI TOTL *Pro A a ytics* K I CH I [24a10-1] 39a / *Meta hysics* BK III, CH 1 [995b6-1] 514 CH 2 [99 6-997a1] 515b-d K IV CH [004 1 6] 523d H 3-8 5 4b-532d BK CH [1071b22 29] 53 d 538a BK XI CH I [1059a23 6] 58 CH 4-6 589d 592b

9 ARI TOTLE *Rhetoric* BK I CH I [354a1 1] 593a CH 2 [35 5 3] 597d 598b

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK CH 112b-113d I 122d 124a

17 PLOTI S *First Ennead* TR I CH 4 11 c

18 A STINE *City f God*, BK III, CH 4 266d 2 c CH 269c-d / *Christian Doctrine* BK I, CH 3 651d-652b

20 A *Summa Theologica* P RT I Q 5 3 I 3 37b-38a 6 RT 3 40a-41 Q 94 2, A 5 221d 223a

23 H *Le iathan* RT I, 58a b 7 -d

28 G LILE *T o New Sciences* ECOND Y 197b-c

30 B *Advancement f Learning* 55b-61d esp 56c 58c, 59c-60c

31 D SCART S *Rules* II 2c 3b / *Discourse* PART 46c d

33 P SCAL *Geometrical Demo stra io* 430a 446b esp 445a-446b

35 LOCKE *Human Understand g* K IV CH XXI 394d 395a c

35 BERKELEY *Human Knowledge* INTRO SECT 6 40 d-406a

39 SMITH *W alth of Nat ons* BK V 335d 336a

42 K T *Pur Reason* 5 6d 34 37d 59c 210b-c / *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 253a-c 254c-d / *Judgement* 463a 492 d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy f H story* INTRO 182d

53 JAMES *Psych logy* 524a 867a 872b-874a 878a 880b 889a b

1*a* The axioms of logic: the laws of thought; the principles of reasoning

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8 ARIS OTLE *Categorie* CH 3 [b10-16] 5c-d CH 10 [3b 35] 19a-c / *Prior A lytics* BK I CH I 3 39a-40c / *Posterio A alytic* BK I, CH I 97 99a c II 105d 106b / *Metaphys* K II CH I [995b6-] 514 CH [997b26-997a] 515b-d BK IV CH 3-8 524b-532d BK XI, CH I [059a23 6] 58 a CH 4-6 589d 592b

(4 *Methodology: rules for the conduct of the mind in the processes of thinking, learning, inquiring, knowing. 4a Mathematical analysis and reasoning: the search for a universal method.*)

9 ARISTOTLE: *Ethics*, BK III, CH 3 [1112b20-24] 358d; BK VII, CH 8 [1151a15-19] 402a
11 ARCHIMEDES: *Method* 569a-592a esp 569b-570a
11 NICOMACHUS: *Arithmetic*, BK II, 831d-841c
16 KEPLER: *Harmonies of the World*, 1012b-1014b
19 AQUINAS: *Summa Theologica*, PART I, Q 85, A 8, REP 2 460b-461b
23 HOBBES: *Leviathan*, PART I, 56b; 58a-c; 59b-c
28 GALILEO: *Two New Sciences*, SECOND DAY, 190b-c
30 BACON: *Advancement of Learning*, 65b / *Novum Organum*, BK I, APH 59 112b-c
31 DESCARTES: *Rules*, I 1a; 40a-c esp II 2a-3b, IV 5c-7d, VI 8a-10a, XII 24d-25a, XIV-XVI 28a-35c, XVIII-XXI 36b-40a,c / *Discourse*, PART I, 43b-c; PART II, 46c-48b; PART III, 50d / *Objections and Replies*, 128a-129a; 130a-133a,c / *Geometry* 295a-353b esp BK I, 295a-298b, BK II, 304a-306a, 316a-317a, BK III, 331b-353a
33 PASCAL: *Pensées*, 1-5 171a-173a / *Geometrical Demonstration*, 430a-434a; 442a-446b / *Arithmetical Triangle*, 451b-452a; 458b-459b; 464a-466a
34 NEWTON: *Principles*, 1a-b; BK I, LEMMA 1-11 and SCHOL 25a-32a esp LEMMA 11, SCHOL 31a-32a; PROP 31, SCHOL 79a-81a; BK II, LEMMA 2 168a-169b; BK III, LEMMA 5 338b-339a
35 LOCKE: *Human Understanding*, BK II, CH XVI, SECT 4 166a-b; BK IV, CH I, SECT 9 308c-309b; CH II, SECT 9-10 311b-c; CH III, SECT 18-20 317d-319c; SECT 30 323a-c; CH IV, SECT 6-9 325a-326b; CH VII, SECT 11 340c-341a; CH XII, SECT 1-8 358c-360c passim; SECT 14-15 362d-363b; CH XVII, SECT 11 378b
35 BERKELEY: *Human Knowledge*, INTRO, SECT 12 408a-b; SECT 19 410c; SECT 15-16 415d-416a; SECT 118-132 436b-439c passim
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51 TOLSTOY: *War and Peace*, BK XI, 469a-d; EPILOGUE II, 694d-695c
53 JAMES: *Psychology*, 175a-176a; 870a-874a; 878a

4b. *The heuristic principles of research in experimental and empirical science*

8 ARISTOTLE: *Heavens*, BK III, CH 7 [306a1-18] 397b-c / *Generation and Corruption*, BK I, CH 2 [316a5-14] 411c-d / *Meteorology*, BK I, CH 7 [344a5-9] 450b
9 ARISTOTLE: *History of Animals*, BK I, CH 6 [491a5-16] 12c-13a / *Parts of Animals*, BK I, CH 1 161a-165d esp [645a4-b4] 165b-d / *Generation of Animals*, BK III, CH 10 [760b28-33] 301d-302a
10 HIPPOCRATES: *Ancient Medicine*, par 1-8 1a-3b; par 20 7b-d
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28 HARVEY: *Motion of the Heart*, 285c-d / *Circulation of the Blood*, 322d-323d; 324c-d / *On Animal Generation*, 331a-337a esp 331b-333d, 335c-336c
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31 DESCARTES: *Discourse*, PART VI 60d-67a,c esp 61d-62c, 66a-b / *Meditations*, IV 90a-b / *Objections and Replies*, 215a-b
33 PASCAL: *Vacuum*, 355a-358b; 365b-371a passim / *Great Experiment*, 382a-389b
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54 FREUD *Narcissism* 400d-401 / *Instincts* 412a b / *General Introduction* 463d 483d 485a esp 484d-485 / *Beyond the Pleasure Princi le* 661c 662b / *New Introductory Lectures* 815a b 818c-819b 874a-c 879c 881b-c

4c Th criteria of e idence and inference in historical inquiry

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I 17b-c BK II 49a 56b passim 59a 69b-d 71a 73b 76d K III, 89c-d 99b-c K V 168b-c BK VII 254c d BK VIII 281d 282b

6 THUCYDIDES *Pel ponnesia War* K I 353d 354b K II 391c d BK VI 523c 524d passim VIII 586b-d

14 PLUTARCH *Romulus* 15a 30a,c passim esp 15a 18d / *Numa Pompilius* 49a b / *Themistocles* 102 c / *Aristides* 262b d 263c / *Nici s* 423a-c

15 TACITUS *Annals* BK III 49c d K IV 66b-d

40 GI *Decline and Fall* 96b d 232c 296a

46 HEG L *Philosophy of History* INTRO 153a 158a 180c 183d P RT III 285d 286a

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4d The d rse methods of speculati e philosophy th r le of intuition an lys s dial ctic genet c o transcende tal criti ci m

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17 PLOTINUS *First En d* TR III CH 4-6 11 12b / *S xth Ennead* TR II CH 4 270c 271a

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK VIII CH 2-8 265b-270d passim

19 AQU S *S mm Theologica* P RT I Q I A 2 ANS and REP I 4a-c Q 2 A 2 11d 12c Q 32 A RE 2 175d 178a PART I II Q 18 693b d 703 passim

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31 S I OZ *Ethics* ART II PROP 10 SC OL 376d 377a

33 PA CAL *Geometrical Demo str ti* 430a 434 442a-443b

35 LOCK *Human U de st d g* 87d INTRO 93 95d BK I CH II S CT 24 25 120a d

35 B RK EY *Hum n Knowled e* INTRO SE T 2 25 411b-412a,c

35 HUME *Hum Understand g* SECT I DIV 2 451b-c DIV 7-9 453 -455a S CT I DIV 7 457a b SECT XI DIV 116 503d 504a DIV 130 508c d

38 PO AU *I qu I y* 339d 341b 342b 362 d pass m

42 K NT *Pur Reason* 1a 13d 16a-c 109d 112d 115d 116a 119a b 133c 134d 184b-c 185b-c 193 200c esp 193d 194b, 199a c 215d 216d 218d 227a 248d 250a c / *Fu d Prin Metaphysic of Mor l* 253 -c 254b-c 263b-d 264b-d esp 264d 271 -c 283d 284d / *Practical Re son* 293c 294b esp 293d [fn 3] 297 -c 329d 330c 335b-c 336d 337a c 359a / *Pref Meta hysical Elements f Ethics* 365 366a 376c-d / I tro *Metaphysic f M al* 38 a 388d / *Judgement* 570b-572d

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(4 *Methodology: rules for the conduct of the mind in the processes of thinking, learning, inquiring, knowing. 4d The diverse methods of speculative philosophy: the role of intuition, analysis, dialectic, genetic or transcendental criticism*.)

43 MILL *Liberty* 287b 288c / *Utilitarianism* 445a 447b
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* PREF 1a-c INTRO par 2 9d-10a ADDITIONS 3 116a / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 156c-158a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* EPILOGUE II 690a-b
53 JAMES *Psychology* 674a-675b esp 675b; 687a
54 FREUD *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 661c-662b / *New Introductory Lectures* 874c-875b esp 875a

4e. The logic of practical thinking: the methods of ethics, politics, and jurisprudence

5 ARISTOPHANES *Wasps* [799-1002] 517c-519d
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31 DESCARTES *Discourse* PART III 48b-50b / *Objections and Replies* 126a-b
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4f. Theological argument: the roles of faith, reason, and authority

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42 KANT Pure Reason 240b-243c / Pr ctical Reason 348b-349b 351b-352c / Judgement 583a-613 ,c esp 588a 592d, 593d 596c, 603d 607c
46 HEG L Phl sophy of History INTRO 158c 160b PART III 308c 309d PART IV 360c 361a

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5 A ISTOPHAN S Clouds 488a 506d
7 PL TO Euthydem s 65a 84 c / Repu bl c BK VII 400d-401a / Theatet s 525d 526b
12 E ICTETUS D scourses BK II H 21 166c 167d BK I I H 2 177c 178d CH I 193d 195a
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42 KANT Pure Reason 36d 37d 109b-c 120c 121c 133d 157d 221c 222b / Judgement 607d-608c
47 GOETHE Faust PART I [1908-194] 45b-46a
51 TOLSTOY War and Peace BK VI 238a-c 242c 243b BK IX 361d 365 EPILOGUE I 672a b E LOGUE II 683d-684a
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The concept on of the liberal arts and their place in education see ART 4 6b EDUCATION 5b MATHEMATICS 1b

The conception of logic or dialectic as an art, in itself and in relation to other arts see DIALECTIC 1 2a(2)-2b LANGUAGE ~ MATHEMATICS 1a RHETORIC 1b

Other discussions of the laws of thought and the rules of inference see JUDGMENT 7a-7b OPPOSITION 1d(1)-1d( ) PRINCIPLE 1c, 3a(3) REASONING 2-2c, 4a and for the examination of logical fallacies, see REASONING 3a-3c TRUTH 3d(2)-3d(3)

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Other statements of the attack on sophistry or logic-chopping see DIALECTIC 6 METAPHYSICS 4a SCIENCE 7b THEOLOGY 5.

(4 *Methodology: rules for the conduct of the mind in the processes of thinking, learning, inquiring, knowing.* 4d *The diverse methods of speculative philosophy: the role of intuition, analysis, dialectic, genetic or transcendental criticism.*)

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Chapter 50 LOVE

INTRODUCTION

HERE as in the chapters on GOD and MAN almost all the great books are represented except those in mathematics and the physical sciences. Even those exceptions do not limit the sphere of love As the theologian understands it love is not limited to things divine and human nor to those creatures less than man which have conscious desires Natural love Aquinas writes is not only in all the soul s powers but also in all the parts of the body and universally in all things because as Dionysius says Beauty and goodness are beloved by all things

Love is everywhere in the universe—in all things which have their being from the bounty and generosity of God s creative love and which in return obey the law of love in seeking God or in whatever they do to magnify God s glory Love sometimes even takes the place of other gods in the government of nature Though he thinks the motions of the world are without direction from the gods Lucretius opens his poem *On the Nature of Things* with an invocation to Venus the *life giver* —without whom nothing comes forth into the bright coasts of life nor waxes glad nor lovely

Nor is it only the poet who speaks metaphorically of love as the creative force which engenders things and renews them or as the power which draws all things together into a unity of peace preserving nature itself against the disruptive forces of war and hate The imagery of love appears even in the language of *science* The description of magnetic attraction and repulsion borrows some of its fundamental terms from the vocabulary of *the passions* Gilbert for example refers to the love of *the iron for* the load tone

On the other hand the impulsions of love are often compared with the pull of magnetism But such metaphors or comparisons are seldom intended to conceal the ambiguity of the word love when it is used as a term of universal application. Romeo wants Juliet as the filings want the magnet writes William James and if no obstacles intervene he moves toward her by as straight a line as they But Romeo and Juliet if a wall be built between them do not remain idiotically pressing their faces against its opposite sides —like iron filings separated from the magnet by a card

THE LOVE BETWEEN man and woman makes all the great poems contemporaneous with each other and with ourselves. There is a sense *in* which each great love affair is unique—a world in itself incomparable unconditioned by space and time That at least is the way it feels to the romantic lovers but even to the dispassionate observer there seems to be a world of difference between the relationship of Paris and Helen in the *Iliad* and that of Prince Andrew and Natasha in *War and Peace* or Troilus and Cressida Tom Jones and Sophia Don Quixote and Dulcinea Jason and Medea Aeneas and Dido Othello and Desdemona Dante and Beatrice Hippolytus and Phaedra Faust and Margaret Henry V and Catherine Paola and Francesca Samson and Delilah Antony and Cleopatra Admetus and Alcestis Orlando and Rosalind Haemon and Antigone Odysseus and Penelope and Adam and Eve

The analyst can make distinctions here He can classify these loves as the conjugal and the illicit the normal and the perverse the sexual and the idyllic the infantile and the adult the romantic and the Christian He can in addition group all these loves together despite their apparent variety and set them apart from still other categories of love the friendships between human beings without regard to gender the familial ties—parental filial fraternal the love of a man for himself for his fellow men for his

ADDITIONAL READINGS

Listed below are works not included in *Great Books of the Western World* but relevant to the idea and topics with which this chapter deals These works are divided into two groups

I Works by authors represented in this collection
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In the *Confessions* of Augustine a man who finally resolved the conflict of his loves lets his memory dwell on the torment of their disorder in order to repent each particular sin against the love of God "What was it that I delighted in, he writes, but to love and be beloved? but I kept not the measure of love of mind to mind, friendship s bright boundary but out of the muddy concupiscence of the flesh and the bubblings of youth mists fumed up which beclouded and overcast my heart that I could not discern the clear brightness of love from the fog of lustfulness

Augustine shows us the myriad forms of concupiscence and avarice in the lusting of the flesh and of the eyes, and in the self love which is pride of person In no other book except perhaps the Bible are so many loves arrayed against one another Here in the life of on man as tempestuous in passion as he was strong of will their war and peace produce his bondage and his freedom, his anguish and his serenity

In the Bible the history of mankind itself is told in terms of love or rather the multiplicity of loves. Every love is here—of God and Mammon perverse and pure the idolatry and vanity of love misplaced every unnatural lust every ecstasy of the spirit every tie of friendship and fraternity and all the hates which love engenders.

THESE BOOKS of poetry and history of meditation, confession and revelation teach us the facts of love even when they do not go beyond that to definition and doctrine Before we turn to the theory of love as it is expounded by the philosophers and theologians or to the psychological analysis of love we may find it useful to summarize the facts of which any theory must take account And on the level of the facts we also meet the inescapable problems which underlie the theoretical issues formed by conflicting analyses

First and foremost seems to be the fact of the plurality of loves. There are many different kinds of love—different in object different in tendency and expression—and as they occur in the individual life they raise the problem of unity and order Does one love swallow up or subordinate all the others? Can more than one love rule the heart? Is there a hierarchy of loves which can harmonize all their diversity? These are the questions with which the most comprehensive theories of love find it necessary to begin

Plato s ladder of love in the *Symposium* has different loves for its rungs. Diotima whom Socrates describes as his instructress in the art of love tells him that if a youth begins by loving a visibly beautiful form he will soon of himself perceive that the beauty of one form is akin to the beauty of another and therefore how foolish would he be not to recognize that the beauty in every form is one and the same He will then abate his violent love of the one and will pass from being a lover of beautiful forms to the realization that the beauty of the mind is more honorable than the beauty of the outward form Thence he will be led to love the beauty of laws and institutions and after laws and institutions, he will go on to the sciences that he may see their beauty As Diotima summarizes it the true order of love begins with the beauties of earth and mounts upwards from fair forms to fair practices and from fair practices to fair notions until from fair notions [we] arrive at the notion of absolute beauty

Aristotle classifies different kinds of love in his analysis of the types of friendship Since the lovable consists of the good pleasant or useful he writes there are three kinds of friendship equal in number to the things that are lovable for with respect to each there is a mutual and recognized love and those who love each other wish well to each other in that respect in which they love one another Later in the *Ethics* he also considers the relation of self love to all love of others and asks whether a man should love himself most or someone else

Aquinas distinguishes between love in the sphere of the passions and love as an act of will The *former* he assigns to what he calls the concupiscible faculty of the sensitive appetite the latter to the rational or intellectual appetite The other basic distinction which Aquinas makes is that between love as a natural tendency and as a supernatural habit Natural love *is that* whereby things seek what is suitable to them according to their nature When love exceeds the inclinations of nature it

country for God All these other loves are no less than the love between man and woman the materials of great poetry even as they are omnipresent in every human life

The friendship of Achilles and Patroclus dominates the action of the *Iliad* even more perhaps than the passion of Paris for Helen The love of Hamlet for his father and in another mood for his mother overshadows his evanescent tenderness for Ophelia Prince Hal and Falstaff Don Quixote and Sancho Panza Pantagruel and Panurge seem to be bound more closely by companionship than any of them is ever tied by Cupid s knot The love of Cordelia for Lear surpasses though it does not defeat the lusts of Goneril and Regan The vision of Rome effaces the image of Dido from the heart of Aeneas Brutus lays down his life for Rome as readily as Antony gives up his life for Cleopatra

Richard III aware that he wants love s majesty implies that he cannot love anyone because he is unable to love himself Why should I love myself he asks for any good that I myself have done unto myself ? This element of self love which in varying degrees prompts the actions of Achilles Odysseus Oedipus Macbeth Faust and Captain Ahab finds its prototype in the almost infinite *amour propre* of Lucifer in *Paradise Lost* This self love which in its extreme form the psychoanalyst calls narcissism competes with every other love in human life Sometimes it qualifies these other loves when for example it enters into Pierre Bezukhov s meditations about freeing his serfs and turns his sentiment of brotherly love into a piece of sentimentality which is never confirmed by action

Yet self love like sexual love can be overcome by the love which is charity toward or compassion for others True self love according to Locke necessarily leads to love of neighbor and in Dante s view of the hierarchy of love men ascend from loving their neighbors as themselves to loving God Through the love he bears Virgil and Beatrice for the goodness they represent Dante mounts to the highest heaven where he is given the Good itself to love

The panorama of human love is not confined to the great works of poetry or fiction The same drama with the same types of plot and character the same lines of action the same complications and catastrophes appears in the great works of history and biography The stories of love told by Herodotus Thucydides Plutarch Tacitus and Gibbon run the same gamut of the passions the affections the tender feeling and the sacrificial devotion in the attachments of the great figures of history

Here the loves of a few men move the lives of many History itself seems to turn in one direction rather than another with the turning of an emperor s heart Historic institutions seem to draw their strength from the ardor of a single patriot s zeal and the invincible sacrifices of the martyrs whether to the cause of church or state seem to perpetuate with love what neither might of arms nor skill of mind could long sustain History s blackest as well as brightest pages tell of the lengths to which men have gone for their love s sake and as often as not the story of the inner turbulence lies half untold between the lines which relate the consequences in acts of violence or heroism

STILL OTHER OF THE great books deal with love s exhibition of its power A few of the early dialogues of Plato discuss love and friendship but more of them dramatically set forth the love his disciples bear Socrates and Socrates love of wisdom and the truth Montaigne can be skeptical and detached in all matters He can suspend judgment about everything and moderate every feeling by the balance of its opposite except in the one case of his friendship with Etienne de la Boetie where love asserts its claims above dispute and doubt The princely examples with which Machiavelli documents his manual of worldly success are lovers of riches fame and power—that triad of seducers which alienates the affections of men for truth beauty and goodness

The whole of Pascal s meditations insofar as they are addressed to himself seems to express one thought itself a feeling The heart has its reasons which the reason does not know We feel it in a thousand things I say that the heart naturally loves the Universal Being and also itself according as it gives itself to them and it hardens itself against one or the other at its will You have rejected the one and kept the other Is it by reason that you love yourself?

of love and hate toward the same object as a mere vacillation of the mind he does not like Freud develop an elaborate theory of emotional ambivalence which tries to explain why the deepest affections of men are usually mixtures of love and hate

A THIRD FACT which appears in almost every one of the great love stories points to another aspect of love s contrariness There seems to be no happiness more perfect than that which love confirms But there is also no misery more profound no depth of despair greater than that into which lovers are plunged when they are bereft disappointed unrequited Can the pleasures of love be had without its pains? Is it better to have loved and suffered than never *to have loved at all?* Is it wiser not to love than to love not wisely but too well? Is the world well lost for love?

These questions paraphrase the soliloquies of lovers in the great tragedies and comedies of love For every praise of love there is in Shakespearian speech or sonnet an answering complaint All creatures in the world through love exist and lacking love lack all that may persist But thou blind fool love what does thou to mine eyes that they behold and see not what they see? The greater castle of the world is lost says *Antony* to Cleopatra we have kissed away kingdoms and *provinces* But in Juliet's words to Romeo "My bounty is as boundless as the sea my love as deep the more I give to thee, the more I have *for* both are infinite

Love is all opposites—the only reality the great illus on the giver of life and its consumer the benign goddess whose benefactions men beseech and—to such as Hippolytus or Dido—the dread Cyprian who wreaks havoc and devastation She is a divinity to be feared when not propitiated her potions are poison her darts are shafts of destruction Love is itself an object of love and hate Men fall in love with love and fight against it *Omnia vincit amor* Virgil writes—love conquers all

In the dispassionate language of the moralist the question is simply whether love is good or bad a component of happiness or an obstacle thereto. How the question is answered depends upon the kind of love in question The love which consists in the best type of friendship seems indispensable to the happy life and more than that to the fabric of any society domestic or political

Such love Aristotle writes is a virtue or implies virtue and is besides most necessary with a view to living For without friends no one would choose to live though he had all other goods. Friendship seems too to hold states together and lawgivers care more for it than for justice When it is founded on virtue it goes further than justice *for it binds men* together through benevolence and generosity When men are friends Aristotle says they have *no need of justice*

But Aristotle does not forget that there are other types of friendship based on utility or pleasure-seeking rather than upon the mutual admiration of virtuous men Here as in the case of other passions the love may be good or bad It is virtuous only when it is moderated by reason and restrained from violating the true order of goods in conformity to which man s various loves should themselves be ordered

When the love in question is the passion of the sexual instinct some moralists think that temperance is an inadequate *restraint* Neither reason nor law is adequate to the task of subduing—or as Freud would say of domesticating—the beast To the question Socrates asks whether life is harder towards the end the old man Cephalus replies in the words of Sophocles when he was asked how love suits with age I feel as if I had escaped from a mad and furious master

In the most passionate diatribe against love s passion Lucretius condemns the sensual pleasures which are so embittered with *pain* Venus should be entirely shunned for once her darts have wounded men the sore gains strength and festers by feeding and day by day the madness *grows* and the misery becomes heavier This is the one thing whereof the more and more we have the more does our heart burn with the cursed desire When the gathering desire is sated the old frenzy is back *upon them* nor can they *discover* what device may conquer their disease in such deep doubt they waste beneath their secret wound These ills are found in love that is true and fully prosperous but when love is crossed and hopeless

does so by some habitual form superadded to the natural power and this habit of love is the virtue of charity

Freud s theory places the origin of love in the sexual instincts and so for him the many varieties of love are simply the forms which love takes as the libido fixes upon various objects The nucleus of what we mean by love he writes naturally consists in sexual love with sexual union as its aim We do not separate from this he goes on to say on the one hand self love and on the other love for parents and children friendship and love for humanity in general and also devotion to concrete objects and to abstract ideas All these tendencies are an expression of the same instinctive activities They differ from sexual love only because they are diverted from its aim or are prevented from reaching it though they always preserve enough of their original nature to keep their identity recognizable Sexual love undergoes these transformations according as it is repressed or sublimated infantile or adult in its pattern degraded to the level of brutal sexuality or humanized by inhibitions and mixed with tenderness

All of these classifications and distinctions belong to the theory of human love But the fact of love s diversity extends the theory of love to other creatures and to God In the tradition of biology from Aristotle to Darwin the mating of animals and the care of their young is thought to exhibit an emotion of love which is either sharply contrasted with or regarded as the root of human love Darwin for example maintains it is certain that associated animals have a feeling of love for each other which is not felt by non social adult animals

At the opposite pole the theologians identify God with love and see in God s love for Himself and for His creatures the principle not only of creation and of providence and salvation but also the measure of all other loves by which created things and men especially turn toward or away from God Beloved let us love one another St John writes for love is of God and everyone that loveth is born of God and knoweth God He that loveth not knoweth not God for God is love In this was manifested the love of God toward us because that God sent his only begotten Son into the world that we might live through him Herein is love not that we loved God but that he loved us And we have known and believed the love that God hath to us God is love and he that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God and God in him

In the moral universe of the *Divine Comedy* heaven is the realm of love pure light Beatrice says light intellectual full of love love of true good full of joy joy which transcends every sweetness There courtesy prevails among the blessed and charity alone of the theological virtues remains The beatitude of those who see God dispenses with faith and hope but the vision of God is inseparable from the fruition of love The Good which is the object of the will Dante writes is all collected in it and outside of it that is defective which is perfect there Desire and will are revolved like a wheel which is moved evenly by the Love which moves the sun and the other stars Hell is made by the absence of God s love—the punishment of those who on earth loved other things more than God

There is a second fact about love to which poetry and history bear testimony Love frequently turns into its opposite hate Sometimes there is love and hate of the same object sometimes love inspires hate as it occasions jealousy of the things which threaten it Anger and fear too follow in the wake of love Love seems to be the primal passion generating all the others according to the oppositions of pleasure and pain and by relations of cause and effect Yet not all the analysts of love as a passion seem to agree upon this point or at least they do not give the fact the same weight in their theories

Hobbes for example gives primacy to fear and Spinoza to desire joy and sorrow Spinoza defines love as joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause and he defines hatred similarly in terms of sorrow Nevertheless Spinoza like Aquinas and Freud deals more extensively with love and hate than with any of the other passions He like them observes how their fundamental opposition runs through the whole emotional life of man But he does not like Aquinas regard love as the root of all the other passions Treating the combination

living well may grow and the other which leads us to evil may decrease until our whole life be perfectly healed and transmuted into good. Only a better love a love that is wholly virtuous and right has the power requisite to overcome love s errors. With this perfect love goes only one rule Augustine says *Dil ge et quod vis f c*— love and do what you will

This perfect love which alone deserves to be a law unto itself is more than fallen human nature can come by without God s grace It is according to Christian theology the super natural virtue of ch rity whereby men par ticipate in God s love of Himself and His crea tures—loving God with their whole heart and soul and mind and their neighbors as them sel es. On these two precepts of charity ac cording to the teaching of Christ depends the whole law and the prophets

The questions which Aquinas considers in his treatise on charity indicate that the theo logical resolution of the conflict between love and morality is in essence the resolution of a conf ct between diverse loves a resolution accomplished by the perfection of love itself. Concernin the objects and order of charity he asks, for example whether we should love charity out of charity whether irrat onal creatures also ought *to* be loved out of charity whether *a man* ought to love his body out of charity whether we ou ht *to* love sinners out of charity whether charity *requires* that we should love our enemies" whether God ought to be loved more than *our neighbors* whether out of charity *man is* bound *to* love God more than *himself* whether out of charity man ought to love himself *more than* his neighbor whether a *man ought to* love his neighbor more than his own body hether we ought to *love one* neighbor more than another whether we ought to love those who are better more than those ho are more closely united to us whether a man ought out of charity to love his children *more* than his father whether a man *ought to* love h wife more than his father and mother whether a man ought to love his ben factor more than one he has benefited

THE DIVERSITY of love seems to be both the basic fact and the basic problem for the psychologist the moralist the theologian The ancient languages have three distinct words for the main types of love *eros philia agape* in Greek *amor amicitia* (or *dilectio*) and *caritas* in Latin. Because English has no such distinct words it seems necessary to use such phrases as sexual love love of friendship and love of charity in order to ind cate plainly that love is common to all three and to distinguish the three meanings. Yet we must observe what Augustine points out namely that the Scrip tures make no distinction between *amor dilec tio* and *caritas* and that in the Bible *amor* is used in a good *connection*

The problem of the kinds of love seems fur ther to be complicated by the need to differ entiate and relate love and desire Some writers use the words love and desire interchange ably as does Lucretius who in speaking of the pleasures of Venus says that Cupid [i e de sire] is the Latin name of love Some like Spinoza use the word desire as the more general word and love to name a special mode of desire Still others use love *as the* more general word and desire to signify an aspect of love Love Aquinas writes is naturally the first act of the will and appetite for which reason all the other appetitive move ments presuppose love as their root and origin For nobody desires anything *nor rejoices* in anything except as a good that is loved

One thing seems to be clear namely that both love and desire belong to the appetitive faculty—to the sphere of the emotions and the will rather than to the sphere of *perception* and knowledge When a distinction is made between desire and love as two states of appe tite it seems to be based on their difference in tendency As indicated in the chapter of DE SIRE the tendency of desire is acquisiti e The object of desire is a good to be possessed and the drive of desire continues until *with posses* sion it is satisfied Love equated with desire does not differ from any other hunger

But there seems to be another tendency which impels one not to possess the object loved but to benefit it The lover wishes tl e well being of the beloved and reflexively wishes himself well through be ng united with the ob*ject of his love* Where desire devoid of love is selfish in the sense of one s seeking goods or

there are ills which you might detect with closed eyes ills without number so that it is better to be on the watch beforehand even as I have taught you and to beware that you are not entrapped For to avoid being drawn into the meshes of love is not so hard a task as when caught amid the toils to issue out and break through the strong bonds of Venus

In the doctrines of most moralists however the sexual passion calls for no special treatment different from other appetites and passions Because it is more complex in its manifestations perhaps and more imperious in its urges more effort on the part of reason may be required to regulate it to direct or restrain it Yet no special principles of virtue or duty apply to sexual love Even the religious vow of chastity is matched by the vow of poverty The love of money is as serious a deflection from loving God as the lust of the flesh

WHAT IS COMMON to all these matters is discussed in the chapters on DUTY, EMOTION VIRTUE and SIN But here one more fact remains to be considered—the last fact about love which the poets and the historians seem to lay before the moralists and theologians

When greed violates the precepts of justice or gluttony those of temperance the vice or sin appears to have no redeeming features These are weaknesses of character incompatible with heroic stature But many of the great heroes of literature are otherwise noble men or women who have for love s sake deserted their duty or transgressed the rules of God and man acknowledging their claims and yet choosing to risk the condemnation of society even to the point of banishment or to put their immortal souls in peril The fact seems to be that only love retains some honor when it defies morality not that moralists excuse the illicit act but that in the opinion of mankind as evidenced by its poetry at least love has some privileged status Its waywardness and even its madness are extenuated

The poets suggest the reason for this Unlike the other passions which man shares with the animals characteristically human love is a thing of the spirit as well as the body A man is piggish when he is a glutton a jackal when he is craven but when his emotional excess in the sphere of love lifts him to acts of devotion and sacrifice he is incomparably human That is why the great lovers as the poets depict them seem admirable in spite of their transgressions They almost seem to be justified—poetically at least if not morally—in acting as if love exempted them from ordinary laws as if their love could be a law unto itself Who shall give a lover any law? Arcite asks in Chaucer s Knight s Tale Love is a greater law he says than man has ever given to earthly man

To a psychologist like Freud the conflict between the erotic impulses and morality is the central conflict in the psychic life of the individual and between the individual and society There seems to be no happy resolution unless each is somehow accommodated to the other At one extreme of repression the claims of our civilization according to Freud make life too hard for the greater part of humanity and so further the aversion to reality and the origin of neuroses the individual suffers neurotic disorders which result from the failure of the repressed energies to find outlets acceptable to the moral censor At the other extreme of expression the erotic instinct would break all bounds and the laboriously erected structure of civilization would be swept away Integration would seem to be achieved in the individual personality and society would seem to prosper only when sexuality is transformed into those types of love which reinforce laws and duties with emotional loyalty to moral ideals and invest ideal objects with their energies, creating the highest goods of civilization

To the theologian the conflict between love and morality remains insoluble—not in principle but in practice—until love itself supplants all other rules of conduct The good man according to Augustine is not he who knows what is good but who loves it Is it not then obvious he goes on to say that we love in ourselves the very love wherewith we love whatever we love? For there is also a love wherewith we love that which we ought not to love and this love is hated by him who loves that wherewith he loves what ought to be loved For it is quite possible for both to exist in one man And this co-existence is good for a man to the end that this love which conduces to our

pleasures for oneself without any regard for the good of the other be it thing or person love seeks to give rather than to get or to get only as the result of giving Whereas nothing short of physical possession satisfies desire love can be satisfied in the contemplation of its object s beauty or goodness It has more affinity with knowledge than with action though it goes beyond knowledge in its wish to act for the good of the beloved as well as in its wish to be loved in return

Those who distinguish love and desire in such terms usually repeat the distinction in differentiating kinds of love The difference between sexual love and the love which is pure friendship for example is said to rest on the predominance of selfish desires in the one and the predominance of altruistic motives in the other Sexual love is sometimes called the love of desire to signify that it is a love born of desire whereas in friendship love is thought to precede desire and to determine its wishes

In contrast to the love of desire the love of friendship makes few demands In true friendship wherein I am perfect Montaigne declares *I more give myself to my friend than* I endeavor to attract him to me I am not only better pleased in doing him service than if he conferred a benefit upon me but moreover *had rather he should do himself good than me* and he most obliges me when he does so and if absence be either more pleasant or convenient *for him tis also more acceptable to me than his* presence

These two loves appear in most of the great analyses of love though under different names concupiscent love and fraternal love the friendship base on pleasure or utility and the friendship based on virtue animal and human love sexuality and tenderness Sometimes they are assigned to different faculties the love of desire to the sensitive appetite or the sphere of instinct and emotion the love of friendship to the will or faculty of intellectual desire capable of what Spinoza calls the *amor intellectualis Dei*— the intellectual love of God Sometimes the two kinds of love are thought able to exist in complete separation from one another as well as in varying degrees of mixture as in romantic and conjugal love and sometimes the erotic or sexual component is thought to be present to some degree in all love Though he asserts this Freud does not hold the converse that sexuality is always accompanied by the tenderness which characterizes human love The opposite positions here seem to be correlated with opposed views of the relation of man to other animals or with opposed theories of human nature especially in regard to the relation of instinct and reason the senses and the intellect the emotions and the will

As suggested above romantic love is usually conceived as involving both possessive and altruistic motives the latter magnified by what its critics regard as an exaggerated idealization *of the beloved The theological virtue of charity* on the other hand is purely a love of friendship its purity made perfect by its supernatural foundation One of the great issues here *is whether the romantic is compatible with the* Christian conception of love whether the adoration accorded a beloved human being does *not amount to deification*—as much a violation *of the precepts of charity* as the pride of unbounded self love Which view is taken affects the conception of conjugal love and the relation of love in courtship to love in marriage These matters and in general the forms of love in the domestic community are discussed in the chapter on FAMILY

OUTLINE OF TOPICS

REFERENCES

To find the passages cited use the numbers in heavy type which are the volume and page numbers of the passages referred to For example in 4 HOMER *Iliad* BK II [265 283] 12d the number 4 is the number of the volume in the set the number 12d indicates that the passage is in section d of page 12

PAGE SECTIONS When the text is printed in one column the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the page For example in 53 JAMES *Psychology* 116a 119b the passage begins in the upper half of page 116 and ends in the lower half of page 119 When the text is printed in two columns the letters a and b refer to the upper and lower halves of the left hand side of the page the letters c and d to the upper and lower halves of the right hand side of the page For example in 7 PLATO *Symposium* 163b 164c the passage begins in the lower half of the left hand side of page 163 and ends in the upper half of the right hand side of page 164

AUTHOR S DIVISIONS One or more of the main divisions of a work (such as PART BK CH SECT) are sometimes included in the reference line numbers in brackets are given in certain cases *e g* *Iliad* BK II [265–283] 12d

BIBLE REFERENCES The references are to book chapter and verse When the King James and Douay versions differ in title of books or in the numbering of chapters or verses the King James version is cited first and the Douay indicated by a (*D*) follows *e g* OLD TESTAMENT *Nehemiah* 7 45—(*D*) *II Esdras* 7 46

SYMBOLS The abbreviation esp calls the reader s attention to one or more especially relevant parts of a whole reference passim signifies that the topic is discussed intermittently rather than continuously in the work or passage cited

For additional information concerning the style of the references, see the Explanation of Reference Style for general guidance in the use of *The Great Ideas* consult the Preface

1 The nature of love

1*a* Conceptions of love and hate as passions and as acts of will

APOCRYPHA *Wisdom of Solomon* 6 17–18—(*D*) OT *Book of Wisdom* 6 18–19
NEW TESTAMENT *I John* 4 7–8 16 18
7 PLATO *Lysis* **14a 25a c** / *Cratylus* **103b d** / *Phaedrus* **115a 129d** / *Symposium* **149a 173a c** / *Laws* BK VIII **736b c**
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK II CH 5 [1105^{b}20–23] **351b** BK IV CH 6 [1126^{b}20–25] **373d** BK VIII CH 1 **406b d-407a** esp [1155 32–^{b}15] **406d 407a** CH 3 [1156 31–^{b}5] **408a** CH 5 [1157^{b}28–33] **409c** CH 6 [1158 10–17] **409d-410a** BK IX CH 5 [1166^{b}33–1167^{a}3] **420b** CH 7 [1168 19–21] **421d** CH 10 [1171 11 12] **424d** / *Politics* BK VII CH 7 [1327^{b}40–1328 17] **532a b** / *Rhetoric* BK II CH 4 **626c 628b**
17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III CH 1–3 **10a 11a** TR VI CH 5 **23b-24a** / *Third Ennead* TR V **100c 106b** / *Sixth Ennead* TR V CH 10 **309a b** TR VII CH 33 **337d 338b** TR IX CH 9 **359b-c**
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIV CH 7 **380c 381c** / *Christian Doctrine* BK III CH 10 **662a**
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 20 A 1 ANS and REP 1 **120a 121b** Q 27 A 3 ANS and REP 3 **155c 156a** A 4 ANS and REP 2 **156b d** Q 37 A 1 ANS and REP 2 **197c 199a** Q 60 AA 1 2 **310b 311d** Q 82 A 5 REP 1 **435c 436c** PART I II Q 23 A 4 **726a 727a** Q 25 A 2 **731b 732a** Q 26 **733d 737a** Q 28 A 1 ANS and REP 1–2 **740b 741a** Q 29 **744d 749a**
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 62 A 3 ANS and REP 3 **61c 62b** PART II–II Q 23 A 2 ANS **483d 484d**
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVII [82]–XVIII [75] **79b 80c** PARADISE XXVI [1–81] **145d 146c**
22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida* BK III STANZA 1–7 **54b 55b** STANZA 250–253 **87a b**
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I **61c 63a**
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* **424d**
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART II AXIOM 3 **373d** PART III PROP 13 SCHOL **400d** PROP 38 49 **408a 411b** THE AFFECTS DEF 6–7 **417b d** PART IV APPENDIX XIX–XX **449a**
35 LOCKE *Human Understanding* BK II CH XX SECT 4–5 **176d 177a**
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* **453a-456a 502a b 523b 526b**
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* **9b-c**
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* **343d 345d**
42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* **259a** / *Intro Metaphysic of Morals* **385c 386d**

9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK VI, CH 18 [572ᵃ5] 97b-c

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [1003-1120] 57d-58d; [1192-1208] 59d-60a; BK V [1058-1065] 73c

13 VIRGIL *Aeneid* BK I [657-756] 121a-123b

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25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 6a-b; 36c-40a; 83d-82 79d; 299c; 395c-399c; 406a-434d

26 SHAKESPEARE *Titus Andronicus* 170a-198d; ACT II 176a-181d

27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet*, ACT I, SC V [40-91] 37b-d; ACT II, SC IV [40-96] 55a-c / *Troilus and Cressida* 103-141a, esp ACT I, SC I [51-79] 104b-c, SC V [13-63] 130a-c; ACT V, SC II 134c-135a / *Measure for Measure* 174-204d esp ACT II, SC [234-] 181b, c; II [16-18] 183d-184a / *Othello*, ACT I, SC III [306-355] 212b-213a / *King Lear*, ACT IV, SC I [109-135] 244c-d; SC I 277d-2 8d / *Pericles*, ACT I, PROLOGUE; SC I 421b-423c; ACT I G 441-443b / *Sonnets* CXXIX 606a

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART III, PROP 35 406d-407b; THE AFFECTS, DEF 48 421b-d; PART V APPEND X, XIX 449a

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK V [443-45] 185a; BK VII [500-643] 243a-246a; BK IX [990-1133] 269a-2 2a esp [1004-1095] 269a-271a / *Samson Agonistes* [373-419] 347b-348b; [1-66-843] 358b-3,6a

33 PASCAL *Pensées* 402 493 241a; 45 461 253b-255a

36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 513a; 516a; 521a-b; 525a; 526a; 554b-556a

37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 9b-c; 58b-59b; 130b-c; 138b-d; 289b-290b; 321b-322a; 352d; 353a

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XI 103c; 104a; BK XVI 118a-b; 119a-b; 119d

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 345d; 346b; 348d

40 GIBBON *Decline and Fall*, 92c-d; 649d-650c

44 BOSWELL *Johnson*, 301c-d

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right*, PART III par 16-58b-d

47 GOETHE *Faust* PART I [2605-6--] 63b-65a

49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 371c; 372c

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 15b-16a; BK II, 76a-b; 86b-87b; BK III 111a; 118d esp 113d; 115a; 122b-c; BK V 201a-c; 204a; 206c passim; BK VII 318a; 341a,c; BK XI 476c-480a

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK II, 20a-b; 39a-40a; BK III 46a; 82a,c esp 53c; 54b

54 FREUD *Wild Psycho-Analysis* 128d-129a / *Narcissism* 399a-411a,c esp 404d-406c, 409b-410d / *Instincts* 418c-421a,c esp 420b-c / *General Introduction*, 569c; 585a esp 569d-570a, 574c-d; 580a; 581b; 615b-618a esp 616d-618a / *Group Psychology* 673b-674a; 681c-683d; 693a-69 b / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 782a-b,d [fn 1]; 783c; 784a; 785a esp 785a-b [fn 1] / *New Introductory Lectures* 854a-863d esp 862b-863c

2a(1) The sexual instinct: its relation to other instincts

7 PLATO *Symposium* 15 b-159b; 165b-c / *Timaeus*, 476c-d / *Laws*, BK IV 685a-c; BK 7 712b

9 ARISTOTLE *History of Animals* BK V, CH 8 [54- 1- 4] 68d-69a; BK VI, CH 18-BK VII, CH 97b-108c, passim, esp BK VI, CH 18 97b-99c, BK VII, CH 1 106b,d-108a / *Generation of Animals* BK IV, CH 1 [764ᵃ4] 320c / *Rhetoric* BK I, CH 7 [1365ᵃ21-25] 631d

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK IV [1037-1057] 57d

22 CHAUCER *Wife of Bath's Prologue* [5697-5744] 258a-b

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 414d-416c; 424d-425b

28 HARVEY *On Animal Generation*, 346a-347d; 349a; 350a; 402a-d; 405c-406a; 476c-477a

36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 555a-556a

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 345d-346d

49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 287d

53 JAMES *Psychology* 734b-735b

54 FREUD *Narcissism*, 401-402c / *Instincts* 414d-418c esp 414d-415d / *General Introduction* 574a-5 6a esp 574a; 580a-d; 587d; 588b; 590a; 593b; 615b-616b; 618d-619a / *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* 651d-662b esp 653b-d, 654c-d, 65 c-659a, 662b,d [fn 1] / *Ego and Id*, 708d-709c; 710c-712a / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 789c; 790c / *New Introductory Lectures* 846a-851d esp 847b-d, 849c-850c, 851b-c

(1 *The nature of love*)

1f The power of hate

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 4:1-9; 37 / *II Samuel* 13:15-39—(D) *II Kings* 13:15-39 / *Esther* 3:2-5; 5:9-14 / *Proverbs* 10:1
NEW TESTAMENT *I John* 2:9-11; 3:12-15; 4:20
5 EURIPIDES *Medea* 212a; 224a-c esp [465-662] 216a-217c
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK I, 34a-b; BK III, 100b-101b; BK VII, 258d-259a
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II, 403c-404a
7 PLATO *Apology* 205c-d / *Phaedo* 237b
9 ARISTOTLE *Politics* BK VII, CH 7 [1328a1-16] 532b / *Rhetoric* BK II, CH 4 [1382a1-16] 628a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II, Q 29, A 3 746b-747a
23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* CH V, 8c; CH XIX, 26a-30a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART II, 141a-b
26 SHAKESPEARE *3rd Henry VI*, ACT I, SC III 73d-74b; ACT III, SC II [146-195] 87d-88a; ACT V, SC VI [61-93] 103d-104a / *Richard III* 105a-148a,c esp ACT I, SC I 105b-d 107b; ACT V, SC III [119-206] 144d-145d / *Merchant of Venice*, ACT I, SC I [35-62] 425d-426a
27 SHAKESPEARE *Othello* 205a-243a,c esp ACT II, SC I [1-81] 213b-214b [295-321] 216c / *Coriolanus*, ACT IV, SC V [70-152] 380b-381a / *Timon of Athens* 393a-420d esp ACT IV, SC I 409c-d; SC III 410c-416d / *Cymbeline*, ACT III, SC V [70-150] 469d-470c
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK I [81-105] 95a-b / *Samson Agonistes* [819-842] 357b-358a
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 30a; 39a; 124d; 237b-c
48 MELVILLE *Moby Dick* 119a-121a; 134b-136a
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 312b-d [fn 27]
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK IV, 183d-186c; 188a-190c
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK V, 137c-142c; BK XII, 393a-394a
53 JAMES *Psychology* 717a-720b
54 FREUD *Interpretation of Dreams* 328a-b / *Group Psychology* 677c-678a / *War and Death* 764d-765d / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 787a-788d; 790a-791d esp 791b-c

2\. The kinds of love

7 PLATO *Symposium* 153b-155c; 165b-167d / *Laws* BK VIII, 735c-736c
17 PLOTINUS *Third Ennead*, TR V, 100c-106b / *Sixth Ennead*, TR IX, CH 9 359b-c
18 AUGUSTINE *City of God*, BK XIV, CH 7 380c-381c / *Christian Doctrine*, BK III, CH 10 661c-662a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I, Q 20, A 2, REP 3 121b-122a; Q 60, AA 1-3 310b-312b; Q 82, A 5, REP 1 435c-436c; PART I-II, Q 26 733d-737a esp AA 3-4 735c-737a; Q 27, A 3, ANS 738c-739c; Q 28, AA 1-2 740b-742a
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica*, PART I-II, Q 66, A 6, REP 2 80c-81b; PART II-II, Q 23, A 1, ANS 482d-483d; A 4, ANS 485d-486b
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy*, PURGATORY, XVII [8-139] 79b-d
22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida*, BK II, STANZA 128 38a
23 HOBBES *Leviathan*, PART I, 63a
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 83a-85a; 399a-b; 424d-425c
29 CERVANTES *Don Quixote*, PART II, 381c-382a
31 SPINOZA *Ethics*, PART IV, APPENDIX, XIX-XX 449a
32 MILTON *Paradise Lost*, BK VIII [500-617] 243a-245b; BK IX [990-1189] 269a-273a
36 STERNE *Tristram Shandy* 522a-525a
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 14c-d; 167c-169c; 198d-199a
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 345d-346b; 348d
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 289c-290b; 303c-305c; 309a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace*, BK I, 50a; BK VI, 269c-d; BK VII, 276c-277a; BK XI, 520a-521b
52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov*, BK II, 27c-d
54 FREUD *Group Psychology* 673b-d; 681c-682a / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 783b-c

2a Lustful, sexual, or selfish love: concupiscent love

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 39:6-20 / *Exodus* 20:14,17 / *Leviticus* 18 / *Numbers* 25:1-9 / *II Samuel* 11; 13:1-14—(D) *II Kings* 11; 13:1-14 / *Proverbs* 5:1-20; 6:20-35; 7; 23:26-35 / *Ecclesiastes* 7:26—(D) *Ecclesiastes* 7:27 / *Ezekiel* 23—(D) *Ezechiel* 23
APOCRYPHA *Judith* 11:21-23; 12:11-20; 16:7-9—(D) OT, *Judith* 11:19-21; 12:10-20; 16:8-11 / *Ecclesiasticus* 9:3-9; 25:21; 47:19-20—(D) OT, *Ecclesiasticus* 9:3-13; 25:28; 47:21-22 / *Susanna*—(D) OT, *Daniel* 13
NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 5:27-32 / *Romans* 6:12-13; 7:14-25; 13:13-14 / *I Corinthians* 6:9-7:11 / *Colossians* 3:5 / *I Thessalonians* 4:4-5 / *Hebrews* 13:4 / *James* 1:13-16 / *I Peter* 2:11 / *I John* 2:15-17
4 HOMER *Odyssey*, BK VIII [266-366] 224d-225d
5 AESCHYLUS *Suppliant Maidens* 1a-14a,c esp [776-835] 11a-d, [980-1073] 13b-14a,c / *Agamemnon* [681-781] 59b-60b / *Choephoroe* [585-651] 75d-76b; [892-930] 78d-79b
5 EURIPIDES *Electra* [988-1122] 336a-337b
6 HERODOTUS *History*, BK IX, 311b-312d
7 PLATO *Charmides* 2b-c / *Phaedrus* 117a-122a / *Symposium* 153b-155c / *Republic*, BK III, 326c-327b; 333b-334b; BK IX, 417b-418a / *Timaeus* 474b-d; 476b-d / *Laws*, BK VIII, 735b-738c
8 ARISTOTLE *Prior Analytics*, BK II, CH 22 [68a25-b7] 89d-90a / *Topics*, BK VI, CH 7 [146a3-13] 199d; BK VII, CH 1 [152b6-9] 207c

2a(1) The sexual instinct its relation to other instincts

(2a Lustful sexual or selfish love concupiscent love)

2a(2) Infantile sexuality polymorphous perversity

54 Freud Origin and Development of Psycho Analysis 15a 18a esp 15d 16c / Hysteria 113d 114b / Sexual Enlightenment of Children 119d 120b / General Introduction 530d 531d 572d 576d 578b 585a esp 578c 580d / Group Psychology 693a b / New Introductory Lectures 847c 848d 855d 861c

2a(3) Object fixations identifications and transferences sublimation

12 Lucretius Nature of Things bk iv [1058-107] 57d 58a
14 Plutarch Solon 66b d
25 Montaigne Essays 10b 11b 191c 192d 398c 399d
26 Shakespeare 3rd Henry VI act iii sc ii [123-195] 87c-88a
31 Spinoza Ethics part iii prop 13-17 400c 402a part iv prop 6 426a prop 44 schol 437d-438a
38 Rousseau Inequality 345d 346a
53 James Psychology 734b 735b
54 Freud Origin and Development of Psycho Analysis 16b 20d esp 17b c 19a c 20a d / Narcissism 399a-411a c esp 399d-400b 404d 406c 409d-410d / Instincts 414b / General Introduction 551a 589c passim esp 574c d 581b c 583c d 587d 588a 589a b 594d 597b 599d 600d 616d 622c 627b-630d 634b d / Beyond the Pleasure Principle 644d 645d / Group Psychology 678d 681a 681b d [fn 4] 685c 686a 691c 692a 693a 694b / Ego and Id 703c 706c esp 704d 705c 711b c 712b c / New Introductory Lectures 832b 834b esp 832d 833b 847a 849b 856a 863d esp 856b d 862d 863c

2a(4) The perversion degradation or pathology of love infantile and adult love

Old Testament Genesis 19 4 13 38 6-10 / Exodus 22 19 / Leviticus 18 20 13 16 / Deuteronomy 27 21 / Judges 19.22-30
New Testament Romans 1 24-27
7 Plato Symposium 170b 171c / Laws bk i 645d 646a bk viii 735d 736a
9 Aristotle Ethics bk vii ch 5 399a d passim
13 Virgil Eclogues vi [45-60] 20a b / Aeneid bk vi [23-30] 211b
18 Augustine Confessions bk iii par 1 13b c
21 Dante Divine Comedy hell xv-xvi 21a 23d purgatory xxvi [25-87] 93b d
25 Montaigne Essays 36c-40a 84b-85a 225a 427b-d
27 Shakespeare Pericles 421a-448a c esp act i prologue sc i 421b-423c
28 Harvey On Animal Generation 349b-c
31 Spinoza Ethics part iv prop 44 schol 437d-438a
32 Milton Paradise Lost bk ii [629-870] 125a 130a
36 Swift Gulliver part iv 163b
38 Montesquieu Spirit of Laws bk xii 87c-88a bk xvi 117d bk xxvi 219d 221c
41 Gibbon Decline and Fall 93d 94c 169a
42 Kant Science of Right 419b [fn 1]
47 Goethe Faust part ii [11 676-843] 284a 288a
51 Tolstoy War and Peace bk i 24a 25a bk iv 177c d bk vi 271c d bk vii 292b-296a bk viii 305b-307d 322c bk ix 355c-d 357a b 357d 358b bk xi 520a d
52 Dostoevsky Brothers Karamazov bk i 4a d bk ii 39a-40a bk iii 46a 82a c esp 53c 54b 58d 59b 69d 70c bk iv 95b-100c bk viii 200c 201c bk x 282b 283c bk xi 324a b bk xii 366a 368c
53 James Psychology 735a b 802b 804a 805b
54 Freud Origin and Development of Psycho Analysis 14b 15a 16d 17a 18a b / Hysteria 84a 86c 90d 96a 97d 106c esp 97d 99d 111a 118a c esp 111b 115a / Narcissism 409c 410d / Instincts 415d-418c / General Introduction 547b 549d esp 548d 549a 569c 573a 577a 578c 583d 591d 593d 599b 604c 606a 611a d 619b 622b esp 620d 622a / Beyond the Pleasure Principle 659b d / Group Psychology 680c-d / Inhibitions Symptoms and Anxiety 718b d 724a 728b esp 725d 726c 728a b 733c 735a / Civilization and Its Discontents 789d 790c / New Introductory Lectures 847c 850c 859c d 861c-862a

2b Friendly tender or altruistic love fraternal love

Old Testament Leviticus 19 17 18 33 34 / Deuteronomy 10 18-19 / I Samuel 18 1 4 19 1-7 20 23 15-18—(D) I Kings 18 1 4 19 1-7 20 23 15 18 / II Samuel 1—(D) II Kings 1 / Psalms 133—(D) Psalms 132 / Proverbs 17 17 18 18 19 24 27 6
Apocrypha Ecclesiasticus 6 1 13 17 7 18 19 9 10 25 1 27 16 21 29 10 15 37 1-6 40 23 24—(D) OT Ecclesiasticus 6 1 13 1 7 20-21 9 14 15 25 1-2 27 17 24 29 13 19 37 1 2 6 40 23 24
New Testament Matthew 5 21-26 19 19 22 39 / Mark 12 31 / Luke 10 27 / John 15 13 / Romans 13 9 / Galatians 5 14 / Colossians 4 7 18 / I Thessalonians 4 9-10 / II Timothy 4 9-22 / James 2 8 / I Peter 3 8 / II Peter 1 5 7 / I John 3 11 17
4 Homer Iliad bk iv [153 183] 25c d bk vi [212 236] 42b c bk xvi 112a 121d bk xviii 130a 136d bk xix [276-368] 139d 140c bk xxiii [1 261] 161a 163d / Odyssey bk viii [581-586] 228c
5 Sophocles Ajax [666-683] 148d 149a

2b(1) The relation between love and friendship

2b(2) Self-love in relation to the love of others

(2b *Friendly tender or altruistic love fraternal love* 2b(2) *Self love in relation to the love of others*)

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 19 125b 126c BK II CH 17 158d 161a
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK IV par 7-14 20d 23a BK X par 58-64 86a 87d / *City of God* BK XIV CH 28 397a d / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 22 27 629b-631d CH 35 634c d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 20 A I REP 3 120a 121b A 2 REP I 121b 122a Q 60 AA 3-5 311d 314c Q 63 A 2 326c 327b PART I-II Q 27 A 3 738c 739c Q 28 A I 740b 741a A 2 ANS 741a 742a A 3 ANS and REP 3 742a d A 4 ANS and REP 1-2 742d 743c Q 29 A 3 REP 2 746b 747a A 4 747a c Q 3 AA 5-6 762a 763c Q 40 A 7 797a-c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 62 A 4 ANS and REP 3 62b 63a Q 66 A 6 REP 2-3 80c 81b Q 73 A I REP 3 119c 120c Q 77 A 4 148b 149a Q 84 A 2 175b 176a PART II-II Q 23 A I 482d 483d Q 25 AA 4-5 503c 504c A 7 506a d A 12 509c 510b Q 26 AA 3 13 511d 520d
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVII [82-139] 79b d
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 83c PART II 104d
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 486b 489b
26 SHAKESPEARE *3rd Henry VI* ACT V SC VI [80-84] 104a / *Richard III* ACT V SC III [177-206] 145c d
27 SHAKESPEARE *Twelfth Night* ACT I SC V [97-104] 5b
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 46 438c d PROP 48-49 439a b
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 100 191a 192b 455-457 253b 254a 471-477 256a 257a 492 259b
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH II SECT 5 26a b
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART II 70b
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 58d 59a 167c 170a esp 169d 170a 291d 292a 305d 330b-c 354c d
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 330d 331b 343d 345c
42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 262a d 268d 270a / *Practical Reason* 297a 314d esp 298a 300a 304d 307d 321b 327d esp 325a 327d / *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 376b c
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 70 212a
43 MILL *Representative Government* 367d 368a / *Utilitarianism* 451b-c 453a-c
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 169d 170b 310d 311a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* ADDITIONS 101 133b / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 172b d
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 308d 309a 310a d 316d 317a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 31a-32a BK III 146d 147c 159d 160a BK VI 254b-c 267d 268c BK VIII 323b 324b BK IX 354a 355c BK XII 545b-547a BK XV 617b d EPILOGUE I 651d 652a 656d 657a
53 JAMES *Psychology* 204b-211a
54 FREUD *Narcissism* 399a-411a c esp 404d 406c 409b-411a c / *General Introduction* 528d 616c 618a esp 617c-618a / *Group Psychology* 677d 678c / *War and Death* 758c d

2b(3) The types of friendship friendships based on utility pleasure or virtue

OLD TESTAMENT *Proverbs* 14 20 17 17 18
APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 6 1-17 9 10 12 8-9 37 1-9 40 24—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 6 1 17 9 14-15 12 8-9 37 1-11 40 24
5 EURIPIDES *Rhesus* [319-478] 206a 207b / *Heracles Mad* [55-59] 365c d [1214 1228] 375c / *Orestes* [356-806] 397b-402c / *Iphigenia at Aulis* [334-401] 427d-428b
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 397b-c
7 PLATO *Lysis* 14a 25a c / *Symposium* 153b-155c / *Gorgias* 285d 286b / *Republic* BK I 299b c / *Seventh Letter* 805b-c
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VIII CH 2-8 407a-411d CH 13-14 414d-416d BK IX CH I 416b d-417c passim CH 5 [1167ᵃ10-20] 420b c CH 9 [1169ᵇ22-1170ᵃ12] 423b d CH 10 424c-425a passim esp [1170ᵇ23-31] 424c CH 11 425a d esp [1171ᵃ20-33] 425a b CH 12 [1172ᵃ2-8] 425d-426a BK X CH 3 [1173ᵇ32 1174ᵃ1] 428a b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 5 [1361ᵇ35 40] 602c BK II CH 4 [1380ᵇ34-1381ᵇ38] 626d 627d CH 12 [1389ᵃ35-ᵇ3] 636d
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK II CH 22 167d 170a BK III CH 16 191a d BK IV CH 2 223d 224b
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par 16-17 12c 13a BK IV par 12-14 22a 3a par 21 23 24c 25a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 4 A 8 ANS 636a-c Q 26 A 4 REP 3 736b-737a Q 27 A 3 738c 739c Q 31 A 6 REP 3 756d 757c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II II Q 23 A I REP 3 482d-483d A 3 REP I 485a d A 5 ANS and REP 3 486b-487a
22 CHAUCER *Tale of Melibeus* par 20-21 409a b
23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* CH XVII 24a b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 77b-c
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 82b 88d
26 SHAKESPEARE *Two Gentlemen of Verona* ACT II SC VI 239a c ACT IV SC I 245b-246b / *Richard II* ACT V SC I [55-70] 345d / *Midsummer Night s Dream* ACT III SC II [192 219] 364d 365a / *2nd Henry IV* ACT V SC V 501b-502c / *Julius Caesar* ACT IV SC II [10-27] 587d / *As You Like It* ACT II SC VII [174-190] 609a b
27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT III SC II [57-99] 49c 50a [206-225] 51b [360-389] 52d 53a / *Troilus and Cressida* ACT II SC III [110-111] 116d / *Timon of Athens* 393a-420d esp ACT I SC II 397a-400a ACT IV SC I 409c-d SC III [464-543] 415d-416d

30 B co *Advancement of Learning* 84a b 89a
31 SPI OZ *Ethics* PART IV PROP 0–71 445c 446b AP E D X IX 448a XX 1 449c
36 S IFT G lliver PA T IV 165b-166a
37 FIELD G *Tom Jo e* 167c 170a esp 169d 170 364d 365
40 GIBBON *Decl ne and Fall* 92a-c
42 KA T *Fund Prin Meta hysic of Morals* 262c 263a
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 193a 423c d 533b
51 TOLSTOY *War nd Peace* BK I 28c 29d K 1 1 137 140c pas im BK VIII 322c 329c 332a passim BK X 617b-d 639 b

2b(4) P ue ns of lo e and friendship in the family

OLD TE TAMENT *Gen sis* 4 1 16 9 18–29 16 21 9-21 22 1 19 24 25:21 34 esp 25:28 27 29:21 3 3 34 3 42 48 50 15 23 / *Exo d* 2 1-8 / *Judges* 11 30–40 / *Ruth* 1 3 18 / *I Sam el* 1 1-8 18 31–(D) *I Ki g* 1 1-8 18-3 / *II Samuel* 13 1 20 14 18 33–(D) *II Kings* 13 1 20 14 18 33 / *Proverbs* 10 1 15:20 / *Mic h* 7 5-6 –(D) *Miche s* 7 5-6
APOCRYPH *T bit* pass m esp 4 4–(D) OT *T bias* passim esp 4 1-5 / *Eccles a ticu* 25 1 4 23–(D) OT *Ecclesi sticu* 25 1 2 4 23
N w TESTAMENT *Matthew* 10:21 35 37 12 46–5 19:29 / *Ma k* 3 31 35 13 2 / *Luke* 8 19–2 12 51-53 14:26 15 11 3 18.29-30
4 H MER *Iliad* B K 11 [1–98] 155a 156 [405 515] 159c 160d B XXIV [159–804] 172d 179d / *Odyssey* BK 1 188a 192d BK XI [458–540] 247c 248b BK XIV XV 260a 271d BK XVI [67 225] 273d 274b BK XVII [31–60] 277b-c BK XXIII [1 245] 312a 314d BK XIV [290-361] 320a d
5 AESCHYLUS *Seven Against Th bes* [956-1078] 37d 39a,c / *Ch epho oe* 70a 80d esp [212 305] 72b-73a, [89–930] 78d 79b / *E men de* [6–3-666] 88a
5 SOPHOC E *Oed pus t Col s* 114a 130a c esp [324 460] 117a 118b [1150–1446] 124d 127b / *Ant gon* 131 142d / *Ajax* [1 90-1315] 154 b / *Elect a* 156a 169a c / *Trachin ae* 170 181a,c
5 EU IPIDES *Medea* 212 224 c esp [9 6–1270] 220b-222d / *Alce tis* 237a 247a c esp [614 740] 242 243c / *S ppli* 258a 269 c esp [990–1113] 267a 268a / *Trojan Women* [740-98] 276c-d [1156–1255] 279d 280c / *Androm ache* [309–42] 318a-d / *Electr* [998–112] 336a 337b / *Hecub* [383 443] 356a d / *Heracles Mad* [562–584] 369d 370a [632 636] 370c / *Phoenician Maiden* 378a 393d / *Orest s* 394a-410d esp [11 315] 396a 397a, [1012 1055] 404a c / *Iph genia Am ng the T uri* 411a-424d esp [769–908] 417d-419a / *I higenia at Aulis* 425 -439d
6 HERODOTUS *History* BK 1 7a b 8a 10 32a-c B 11 73b 74d 76b-d BK III 89d 9 d 96c 100b-101b 114d 115 116a BK IV 143b-144b BK VI 194d 195b 212c 213a BK IX 311b-312d
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesia War* BK II 398c d
7 PLATO *Republic* BK I 296d 297a BK V 360d 365d
9 ARI TOTLE *Generation of Animals* BK III C 1 2 [753a7 15] 294 b / *Et ics* BK VII CH 4 [1148a26–b4] 398d BK VIII CH 1 [1155 16–21] 406b d CH 7 [1158b12 24] 410c d CH 8 [1159a26–32] 411b-c CH 9–12 411d-414d passim CH 14 [1163b12 27] 416c d BK IX CH 2 417 -418b CH 4 [1166 1–9] 419a b CH 7 [168a1 27] 421d / *Politics* BK 1 CH 12 13 453d-455 c BK II CH 3 4 456c-458a
12 LU R TIUS *Nat re of Things* BK V [1011 1018] 74b
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* K I CI 23 128c-d
13 VIRGIL *Eclog es* IV [60–63] 15b / *Aeneid* BK III [69 715] 166a b BK V [42 103] 188a 190a BK VI [679–702] 229a b BK VIII [554–584] 273b 274b K IX [280–30] 286b-287a BK X [822–828] 324b-325a BK XI [29–71] 328b 330a [139–181] 331b-333a BK XII [409–440] 365a b
14 PLU RC I *Lycurgu Numa* 62d 63c / *Solon* 66b-d 71d 72a / *Pericles* 139 140a / *Cori olanus* 174b d 176b 189d 191d / *Timoleon* 196b-198b / *Marcus Cato* 286b-287b / *Alex der* 542a 545b / *Cat the You ger* 623c 624 / *Agis* 654c-655 / *Demetrius* 727a b 740d 741c / *Marcu Brutus* 807b-d 811c d
15 TACITUS *An ls* BK I 10c d BK XI 107b-108c BK XII 115a c 118d 119b 128a 131b K XIV 141b-143d BK X I 183a-c / *Histo ies* BK I 92b d
18 A USTI E *Confe si s* BK III par 19–21 18b 19b K par 15 31 c BK IX par 17 37 66a 71b / *City f God* BK XIX CH 14 520a d
19 AQUIN s *Summa Theol gica* PART Q 60 A 4 ANS 312c 313b Q 96 A 3 REP 2 512a c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 26 AA 8 11 516a 519a
21 DANTE *Div ne Com dy* H LL, XXX I [1]-XXXIII [9] 47c 50c PAR DISE XV XVII 128b-133c pass m
22 CH UC R *W fe of B th s Prologue* [5893 5914] 261a b / *Clerk s T le* 296a 318a
23 M C IA VELLI *Prince* CH XXI 24b-c
23 HOB ES *Le iathan* PART I 155b
24 RABEL I *Garga tua a d Pantagru l* BK 8c d BK I 81a 83b BK I I 144b-c 196b-d BK IV 243b-244d 248d 250
25 M NTAIGNE *Ess ys* 66c 67a 83a 84b 183 192d esp 184a d 358b 362a 409d 434d esp 410a-422b 472a-473a
26 S I KE R *1st Henry VI* ACT IV SC V VII 23d 6a / *3 d Henry VI* ACT I SC V [5 113] 62b-d / *Richa d II* ACT I SC II [1 41] 322d 323a / *2nd Henry IV* CT II SC III 477d-478c ACT IV SC IV 492d-496d / *Jul us Caesar* T II SC I [34 309] 577a-c

(2b *Friendly tender or altruistic love fraternal love* 2b(2) *Self love in relation to the love of others*)

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 19 125b 126c BK II CH 17 158d 161a
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK IV par 7 14 20d 23a BK X par 58-64 86a 87d / *City of God* BK XIV CH 28 397a d / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 22-27 629b 631d CH 35 634c d
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 20 A I REP 3 120a 121b A 2 REP I 121b 122a Q 60 AA 3-5 311d 314c Q 63 A 2 326c 327b PART I II Q 27 A 3 738c 739c Q 28 A I 740b 741a A 2 ANS 741a 742a A 3 ANS and REP 3 742a d A 4 ANS and REP 1-2 742d 743c Q 29 A 3 REP 2 746b 747a A 4 747a c Q 32 AA 5-6 762a 763c Q 40 A 7 797a-c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 62 A 4 ANS and REP 3 62b 63a Q 66 A 6 REP 2 3 80c 81b Q 73 A I REP 3 119c 120c Q 77 A 4 148b 149a Q 84 A 2 175b 176a PART II-II Q 23 A I 482d-483d Q 25 AA 4-5 503c 504c A 7 506a d A 12 509c 510b Q 26 AA 3-13 511d 520d
21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XVII [82-139] 79b d
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 83c PART II 104d
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 486b 489b
26 SHAKESPEARE *3rd Henry VI* ACT V SC VI [80-84] 104a / *Richard III* ACT V SC III [177-206] 145c d
27 SHAKESPEARE *Twelfth Night* ACT I SC V [97-104] 5b
31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV PROP 46 438c d PROP 48-49 439a b
33 PASCAL *Pensées* 100 191a 192b 455-457 253b 254a 471-477 256a 257a 492 259b
35 LOCKE *Civil Government* CH II SECT 5 26a b
36 SWIFT *Gulliver* PART II 70b
37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 58d 59a 167c 170a esp 169d 170a 291d 292a 305d 330b c 354c d
38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 330d 331b 343d 345c
42 KANT *Fund Prin Metaphysic of Morals* 262a d 268d 270a / *Practical Reason* 297a 314d esp 298a 300a 304d 307d 321b 327d esp 325a 327d / *Pref Metaphysical Elements of Ethics* 376b-c
43 FEDERALIST NUMBER 70 212a
43 MILL *Representative Government* 367d 368a / *Utilitarianism* 451b c 453a c
44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 169d 170b 310d 311a
46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* ADDITIONS 101 133b / *Philosophy of History* INTRO 172b d
49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 308d 309a 310a d 316d 317a
51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK I 31a 32a BK III 146d 147c 159d 160a BK VI 254b c 267d 268c BK VIII 323b 324b BK IX 354a 355c BK XII 545b-547a BK XV 617b d EPILOGUE I 651d 652a 656d 657a
53 JAMES *Psychology* 204b 211a
54 FREUD *Narcissism* 399a-411a c esp 404d 406c 409b-411a c / *General Introduction* 528d 616c 618a esp 617c 618a / *Group Psychology* 677d 678c / *War and Death* 758c d

2b(3) The types of friendship friendships based on utility, pleasure or virtue

OLD TESTAMENT *Proverbs* 14.20 17 17 18
APOCRYPHA *Ecclesiasticus* 6 1 17 9 10 12.8-9 37 1-9 40.24—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 6 1 17 9 14-15 12 8-9 37 1-11 40.24
5 EURIPIDES *Rhesus* [319-478] 206a 207b / *Heracles Mad* [55-59] 365c d [1214 1228] 375c / *Orestes* [356-806] 397b-402c / *Iphigenia at Aulis* [334-401] 427d-428b
6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 397b-c
7 PLATO *Lysis* 14a 25a c / *Symposium* 153b-155c / *Gorgias* 285d 286b / *Republic* BK I 299b c / *Seventh Letter* 805b c
9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VIII CH 2-8 407a-411d CH 13-14 414d-416d BK IX CH I 416b d 417c passim CH 5 [1167 10-20] 420b c CH 9 [1169b22-1170a12] 423b d CH 10 424c-425a passim esp [1170b23-31] 424c CH 11 425a d esp [1171a20-33] 425a b CH 12 [1172a2-8] 425d-426a BK X CH 3 [1173b32 1174 1] 428a b / *Rhetoric* BK I CH 5 [1361b35 40] 602c BK II CH 4 [1380b34-1381b38] 626d 627d CH 12 [1389 35-b3] 636d
12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK II CH 22 167d 170a BK III CH 16 191a d BK IV CH 2 223d 224b
18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK II par 16-17 12c 13a BK IV par 12-14 22a 23a par 21 23 24c 25a
19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 4 A 8 ANS 636a c Q 26 A 4 REP 3 736b-737a Q 27 A 3 738c 739c Q 31 A 6 REP 3 756d 757c
20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART II II Q 23 A I REP 3 482d-483d A 3 REP I 485a d A 5 ANS and REP 3 486b-487a
22 CHAUCER *Tale of Melibeus* par 20 21 409a b
23 MACHIAVELLI *Prince* CH XVII 24a b
23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 77b-c
25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 82b 88d
26 SHAKESPEARE *Two Gentlemen of Verona* ACT II SC VI 239a c ACT IV SC I 245b-246b / *Richard II* ACT V SC I [55-70] 345d / *Midsummer Night's Dream* ACT III SC II [192 219] 364d 365a / *2nd Henry IV* ACT V SC V 501b-502c / *Julius Caesar* ACT IV SC II [10- ,] 587d / *As You Like It* ACT II SC VII [174 190] 609a b
27 SHAKESPEARE *Hamlet* ACT III SC II [57-99] 49c 50a [206-225] 51b [360-389] 52d 53a / *Troilus and Cressida* ACT II SC III [110-111] 116d / *Timon of Athens* 393a-420d esp ACT I SC II 397a 400a ACT IV SC I 409c-d SC III [464-543] 415d-416d

2c Romantic chivalric, and courtly love the idealization and supremacy of the beloved

BK IX, 377b-c BK X 465a-c BK XI 476c 480a 525c 526b BK XV 641c-643b

5 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK II 27c d BK III 58d 59b BK VI 158b 159a 165b-170b passim

54 FREUD *War and Death* 758c-d / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 774d 775a 782d 783b 792 796c

3b The demands of love and the restraints of virtue moderation in love the order of loves

5 AESCHYLUS *Suppliant Maidens* 1a 14a c / *Agamemnon* [681 781] 59b-60b / *Choephoroe* [585-651] 75d 76b [892-930] 78d 79b

5 EURIPIDES *Hippolytus* 225a 236d / *Electra* [998-1122] 336a 337b / *Iphigenia at Aulis* [543-589] 429d-430a

7 PLATO *Symposium* 165b-167d 170b-171c / *Republic* BK II 333d 334b / *Timaeus* 474b-c / *Laws* BK V 687b BK VIII 735b-738c

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK I CH 6 [1096a11 16] 341b / *Politics* BK VI CH 7 [1327b40-1328a17] 532 b

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 11 116d 118d BK I CH 10 148c 150 CH 18 161a 162b BK IV CH 2 223d 224b

14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 39d-40 / *Solon* 66b-d / *Alexander* 550b-551a / *Demetrius* 740d 741c / *Antony Demetrius* 780c d

17 PLOTINUS *First Ennead* TR III CH I 3 10a 11a TR VI CH 5 23b-24 / *Third Ennead* TR V 100c 106b / *Sixth Ennead* TR IX CH 9 359b-c

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK par 1-8 9a 10d par 16-17 12 13a BK III par 1 13b-c BK V par 18- 640d-43a BK II par 11 47 -c par 10-3 55c 61c passim BK XIII par 8 112b-c / *City of God* BK XII CH 8 346d 347b BK XI C 7 380c-381c BK XV CH 22 416a-c / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 27 631d BK III CH 66a

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 98 2 s and EP 3 517d 519a ART II Q 26 A 3 3 735c 736b Q 28 A 1 REP 2 740b-741a 5 743c 744b Q 29 4 747a-c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I II Q 55 4 26b-27 Q 62 A REP 3 60d 61b Q 66 6 180c 81b Q 73 A 1 P 3 119c 120c Q 77 A 4 148b-149 Q 84 A 2 C REP 3 175b-176a Q 86 184 185c PART II Q 15 3 453c-454c Q 3 A 5 1 2 486b-487 A 6 487a d Q 25 A 4 RE 3 503c 504a A 5 504a-c QQ 26-27 510b-527b Q 45 6 602b-603c Q 46 A 3 604d 605a c Q 184 A 1 629 -d

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* HELL V 7a-8b XI [13-90] 15b-16a PURGATORY X T [85 102] 77d X II [8]-XVIII [75] 79b 80c XIX [1-69] 81 82a XX [109]-XXVI [148] 92 94c XXX XX 199b-102b PARADISE I [97 142] 107b-d VI [2 1 6] 114d 115a

22 CHAUCER *Troilus and Cressida* BK IV STANZA 240 119b 120a

23 HOBBES *Leviathan* PART I 63a

24 RABELAIS *Gargantua and Pantagruel*, BK III 188d 191c

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 89d 90c 184a d 350d 351b 353c 354b 398c 399d 406a-434d esp 431c-432d

26 SHAKESPEARE *Romeo and Juliet* ACT II SC VI 300 -d

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART I APPENDIX XIX XX 449a

32 MILTON *Paradise Lost* BK V [443 450] 185a BK VIII [500-617] 243a 245b / *Areopagitica* 390b-391a

37 FIELDING *Tom Jones* 8c 10c 78c d 198d 199a

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 345c 346d

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 67c 68a

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of Right* ADDITIONS 106 134a

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK III 122b-c 127d 128d BK V 201a-c BK VI 249d 250a BK VIII 318a 340c BK XI 476c-480 EPILOGUE I 660d-661b

5 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK II 20a b

54 FREUD *General Introduction* 624a-625b / *Group Psychology* 682d

3c The conflict of love and duty the difference between the loyalties of love and the obligations of justice

OLD TESTAMENT *Genesis* 22 1 19 / *Exodus* 23.4-5 / *Leviticus* 19 17 18 / *Deuteronomy* 13 6-11 21 18 21 / *Judges* 11.28 40 / *II Samuel* 13-(D) *II Kings* 11 13 / *Proverbs* 2 22 24 29 25 21

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 5 38-48 / *Romans* 12 17 21 / *I Peter* 3 8 18

4 HOMER *Iliad* BK VI [369-502] 43d 45a

5 AESCHYLUS *Agamemnon* [184 247] 54a-c

5 SOPHOCLES *Antigone* 131a 142d esp [1-99] 131a 132a [162 210] 132c d [441 470] 134d 135a / *Philoctetes* 182a 195a c esp [895 1292] 190a 193c

5 EURIPIDES *Hippolytus* 225a 236d / *Orestes* [356-806] 397b-402c / *Iphigenia at Aulis* 425a-439d

5 ARISTOPHANES *Lysistrata* 583 599 c esp [706-780] 592b-593b

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK IV 139a b BK VI 197 b BK II 223c d

7 PLATO *Euthyphro* 191a 199a c / *Seventh Letter* 813d 814a

8 ARISTOTLE *Topics* BK III CH I [116 31 39] 162d CH 2 [118 1-7] 164d

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK IV CH 6 373d-374b passim BK VIII CH 1 [1155a22 28] 406d CH 7 [1158b29-1159a13] 410d-411a CH 9 [1159b25-1160a8] 411d-412b CH 413b d BK VIII C 1 [16 9] BK IX CH 3 [1165 37] 414d 419

4c. Love between equals and unequals, like and unlike: the fraternity of citizenship

27 SHAKESPEARE *Timon of Athens* ACT IV SC I 409c d

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 31d 32a

31 SPINOZA *Ethics* PART IV APPENDIX IX XVIII 448a-d

38 MONTESQUIEU *Spirit of Laws* BK XXIV 206c

38 ROUSSEAU *Inequality* 355b-c / *Political Economy* 369a b 373c / *Social Contract* BK IV 437c-d

42 KANT *Science of Right* 449c-458a c esp 455c 456a 457a-458a,c / *Judgement* 586a 587

43 MILL *Representative Government* 424c 428a passim, esp 426a b / *Utilitarianism* 451b-c

44 BOSWELL *Johnson* 392b-c

46 HEGEL *Philosophy of History* PART I 224a

49 DARWIN *Descent of Man* 317c d 318d

50 MARX ENGELS *Communist Manifesto* 428a b

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK II 69a-c BK V 198b-203 passim, esp 199b-200d 202d 217a BK VI 244d 245d BK IX 375d BK X 466b-c BK XI, 548d 549c esp 549b 555b-c BK XIII 575d 577 BK X 625c-626d 632b-c

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK I 13c d BK V 121d 122d BK VI 164b-170b esp 166c 167b

54 FREUD *Group Psychology* 674c d 691d 692a / *War and Death* 755a 761 esp 755b 757c, 761a-c / *Civilization and Its Discontents* 783a b 785d 788d esp 786a-c 788b-c

5 Divine love

5a. God as the primary object of love

OLD TESTAMENT *Deuteronomy* 6:4-9

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 6:33 / *Luke* 12:31

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK II CH 16 158b-d BK III CH 24 203c 210a BK IV CH 12 243c

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 1 1 b BK IV par 7-20 20d 24c BK VI par 22 50a BK X par 10-3 55c-61c passim BK IX par 3 25 68a-c BK X par 8-11 73b 74b par 38 81a BK XI par 10 103c par 23 104b-c / *City of God* BK X CH 18 310b-d BK XII CH 8-9 346d 348b BK XI CH 7 380c d BK XV CH 22, 416c / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 3 4 625b-c CH 9- 627a b CH 22 23 629b-630c BK I CH I 661

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 12 A 1 A. 50c 51c A 8 R 4 57b-58b Q 60 5 313b-314c PART I-II Q 1 A 8 615a-c Q 2 REP 3 615d-616c 8 621 -622b Q 4 8 A and 3 636a-c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 109 3 340c-341b PART II II Q 24 A 2 REP 2 490b-d Q 5 A 1 509c 510b Q 26 A 2 3 511a 512c Q 27 A 3 522c 523b A 8 526c 527b

21 DANTE *Divine Comedy* PURGATORY XV [40-81] 75d 76a XVI [82]-XVIII [75] 79b 80c XX XXXI 99b-102b PARADISE I [97 142] 107b-d IV [1 5]-V [12] 111d 112b XXVI [1-81] 145d 146c

30 BACON *Advancement of Learning* 80b-81a

31 DESCARTES *Meditations* III 88c 89a

31 SPINOZA *Ethics*, PART IV APPENDIX IV 447b-c PART V PROP 15 16 456c PROP 18 456d PROP 32 33 460b-c

42 KANT *Practical Reason* 325a-327d / *Judgement* 504b 505a 611a-c

51 TOLSTOY *War and Peace* BK IX 373b 377b passim BK XI 525c 526b BK XII 560a 561c

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK V 127b 137c passim

5a(1) Man's love of God in this life respect for the moral law

OLD TESTAMENT *Exodus* 20 5-6 / *Deuteronomy* 5:9 10 6 7:9-11 1 12 11:1 13-22 13 3 19 9 30:6 15 20 / *Joshua* 22 1-6 23 11—(D) *Josue* 22 1-6 23 11 / *Psalms* passim esp 18 1 3 23 37 10 116 1 119 132 12 6 145:20—(D) *Psalms passim*, esp 1 22 3 24 96 10 114 1 118 132 121:6 144 20 / *Ecclesiastes* 12 13 / *Isaiah* 29 8-9—(D) *Isaias* 29 8-9 / *Jeremiah* 2:2—(D) *Jeremias* 2:2

APOCRYPHA *Tobit* 13 12 14—(D) OT *Tobias* 13 16-18 / *Ecclesiasticus* 2 7 30 10 19 13 14 25 11 12 34 16 47:8—(D) OT *Ecclesiasticus* 2 7 32 10:23 13 18 25 14 16 34 19 47 9-10

NEW TESTAMENT *Matthew* 22 36-38 / *Mark* 12:30-32 / *Luke* 10:25 28 / *John* 14 15,21,23-24 / *Acts* 20:22 24 21:13 15 / *Romans* 5:5 8:28 / *I Corinthians* 8 1 3 / *Ephesians* 3 14 21 / *II Thessalonians* 3 5 / *James* 1 12 2:5 / *I Peter* 1:7-8 / *I John* 2 5 12 1 4 19-5 3 / *II John* 6

12 EPICTETUS *Discourses* BK I CH 16 121d 122d BK II CH 16 158b-d BK III CH 24 203c 210a BK IV CH 12 243c

18 AUGUSTINE *Confessions* BK I par 15 16 17a d BK IV par 14 19 22d 24b BK VII par 23 24 50b-51a BK VIII par 10-30 55c 61c passim BK IX par 1 61c d BK X par 8 73b-c par 38-70 81a 89b / *City of God* BK X CH 1 298b d 299d CH 3 300b-301a BK XII CH 20 355b-357 BK XI CH 28 397a d BK XV CH 22 416a-c BK XIX CH 20 523d 524a BK XXI CH 15 6 572 574a / *Christian Doctrine* BK I CH 15 16 628b-d CH 22 23 629b-630c CH 26-27 631b-d CH 29-30 632a-633b CH 33 633d-634b CH 35 37 634c-635c BK II CH 38 654c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 6 A 9 REP 1 324a 325b Q 82 A 3 ANS and REP 3 433 -434c PART I-II Q 27 A 2 REP 2 737d 738c Q 28 A 5 743c 744b Q 35 A 5 REP 1 775d 777a

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 65 5 ANS and REP 1 3 74c 75 Q 67 A 5 85d 86d Q 73 A 1 REP 3 119c 120c Q 110 A 1 34 d-349a Q 114 A 8 376a d PART II I Q 23 A 1 REP 1 482d 483d Q 24 A 2 REP 2 490b-d AA 4 12 491d 500d Q 27 520d 527b esp A 4 523c 524a Q 34 558d 562d Q 184 AA 3 629a 632c

(4 *The social or political force of love sympathy or friendship 4a Love between equals and unequals like and unlike the fraternity of citizenship*)

52 DOSTOEVSKY *Brothers Karamazov* BK VI 165b 170b

54 FREUD *Group Psychology* 674b 675a 676c d 687d 691d 692a

4b The dependence of the state on friendship and patriotism comparison of love and justice in relation to the common good

4 HOMER *Iliad* BK XII [230-250] 84c d

5 SOPHOCLES *Antigone* [16 210] 132c d / *Philoctetes* 182a 195a c

5 EURIPIDES *Phoenician Maidens* [929 1018] 386b 387b

6 HERODOTUS *History* BK IV 142c BK VII 225d 226b 239a c 258b-d BK VIII 273d

6 THUCYDIDES *Peloponnesian War* BK II 397d 398c 402b-404a BK III 419a

7 PLATO *Republic* BK I 308b 309b / *Laws* BK V 692b c 694d / *Seventh Letter* 804b c

9 ARISTOTLE *Ethics* BK VIII CH I [1155 22 28] 406d CH 9-1 411d-414d BK IX CH 6 420c 421a CH 8 421d-423a esp [1169a6-32] 422c 423a / *Politics* BK II CH 3-4 456c-458a esp CH 4 [1262 40-b23] 457c d BK III CH 9 [1280b33 1281 4] 478c BK IV CH 11 495b 496d

12 LUCRETIUS *Nature of Things* BK V [1011-1027] 74b c

14 PLUTARCH *Lycurgus* 32a-48d / *Pelopidas* 233b d / *Sertorius* 467d 469a / *Dion* 784d 785a 798b d

18 AUGUSTINE *City of God* BK XIX CH 21-24 524a 528c

19 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I Q 60 A 5 ANS 313b 314c

20 AQUINAS *Summa Theologica* PART I-II Q 99 A 1 REP 2 245c 246b A 2 ANS 246b 247a PART II-II Q 26 A 3 ANS 511d 512c A 8 ANS and REP 3 516a 517a QQ 37 4 570c 584d Q 45 A 6 602b 603c

25 MONTAIGNE *Essays* 84b 85a 382b 383d 4,1a c

26 SHAKESPEARE *Richard II* ACT I SC III [275-309] 326c d ACT II SC I [40-68] 328a b

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I Works by authors represented in this collection.
II Works by authors not represented in this collection.

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For The basic psychological terms in the analysis of love *see* DESIRE 3c EMOTION 1 2-c PLEASURE AND PAIN 7a and for the comparison of love and knowledge *see* KNOWLEDGE 4d

Other discussions of the objects of love *see* BEAUTY 3 DESIRE 1 2b GOOD AND EVIL 12, 3c TRUTH 8c WILL 7d

Other considerations of the sexual instincts sexual love and their normal or abnormal development *see* DESIRE 4b-4d EMOTION 1c 3c-3c(3) HABIT 3-3a PLEASURE AND PAIN 4b 7b 8b-8c TEMPERANCE 2 6a-6b

Other considerations of conjugal love and its components *see* FAMILY 7a

For the moral problems raised by love *see* DUTY 8 JUSTICE 3 OPPOSITION 4d PLEASURE AND PAIN 8b SIN 2b TEMPERANCE 6a-6b VIRTUE AND VICE 6e

The role of friendship in the life of the individual the family and the state *see* FAMILY 7c HAPPINESS 2b(5) STATE 3e VIRTUE AND VICE 6e and for other discussions of the brotherhood of man and the world community *see* CITIZEN 8 MAN 11b STATE 10f WAR AND PEACE 11d

Man's love of God or charity as a theological virtue *see* DESIRE 7b VIRTUE AND VICE 8d(3) 8f WILL 7d and for the fruition of this love in eternal beatitude *see* HAPPINESS 7c-7c(2) IMMORTALITY 5f

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